On 15 September, US Secret Service agents opened fire at an individual at the golf club owned by former President Donald Trump in West Palm Beach, Florida. The individual – later identified as a 58-year old US citizen – reportedly was spotted by agents as he aimed a scoped rifle through the perimeter fence of the golf club. After being fired at, the individual escaped on foot and was subsequently arrested uninjured.

According to available reports, the individual, who intended to assassinate Trump, never had the former President in his sights and did not fire any shots. Trump claimed that the rhetoric used by his Democrat Party opponents is a major factor in driving targeted violence against him.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The suspect has a large online and legacy media footprint, as well as a criminal record, including a charge for possessing a “weapon of mass destruction” in 2002. On his various social media profiles, he shared pro-Palestine, pro-Taiwan content, and had reportedly carried out efforts to encourage US citizens to move to Ukraine to join foreign units fighting for Kyiv.

It is almost certain that the most recent assassination attempt was inspired by the first one that occurred in Butler, Pennsylvania, in July. The dynamic of the latest attempt – with the shooter waiting in an easily-accessible area of the golf course’s perimeter – suggests a low degree of organisation and sophistication. Nevertheless, some elements – including the Go-Pro wearable camera retrieved on the scene – suggest that the suspect sought to either livestream his action or boost its visibility via online broadcasting.

It is highly likely that this incident will further contribute to the polarisation of the ongoing electoral campaign, and there is a realistic possibility of further copycat actions targeting US politicians or government officials. Moreover, the scope of possible security threats is likely to extend beyond the US – due to the extremely high visibility of former President Trump, attempts on his life may drive copycat actions in third countries. Finally, as in the previous case, the assassination attempt resulted in the widespread online sharing of conspiracy theories, some likely meant to instigate lone wolf terrorist attacks on specific private companies or individuals. It is highly likely that this rhetoric will continue to be spread on social media in the weeks prior and immediately after the election.

Overnight on 16 September, major urban violence occurred in the Saint-Therese neighbourhood of Fort-de-France. A group of individuals set up barricades on the road and targeted police officers and vehicles with gunfire and Molotov cocktails. The unrest lasted for much of the night and at least seven police officers and one rioter were injured.

Authorities responded aggressively, with allegedly more than 300 tear gas canisters being used on the night in attempts to quell the unrest. As a result of the unrest, looting and vandalism occurred at the port of Fort-de-France. Only two arrests were reported.

On 18 September, an overnight curfew was announced in the Dillon and Jambette areas of Fort-de-France between the hours of 21:00 and 05:00.

Solace Global Assessment: 

This violence follows a recent trend in Martinique of police officers being targeted by gunfire. On 2 September six police officers were shot and injured during unrest in Fort-de-France and, on 6 September, the Fort-de-France police station was targeted with gunfire by two suspects, causing no casualties.

The recent unrest is occurring in parallel with protesters demanding that retailers align their prices with those charged in mainland stores. There have been multiple calls for nationwide protests until demands are met. It is highly likely a higher number of police officers will be deployed to deter future unrest, particularly in the Saint-Therese neighbourhood.

Further outbreaks of violence remain likely until the government responds to the protests. A general strike is also a realistic possibility. In 2009 a strike occurred in the Fort-de-France with an estimated 11,000 people involved, paralysing the capital. The strike action in 2009 was successful in its aims to get the minimum salary increased, and so it is possible the government agree to the protesters’ demands as an attempt to stop the protests and violence.

The National Liberation Army (ELN) attacked the installation in the northeastern Arauca province on 17 September. Colombian President Gustavo Petro stated that the attack “practically closes” peace talks. The ceasefire in place between the ELN and the Colombian government expired in August. The government has simultaneously pursued separate peace talks with ELN splinter groups.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Both sides accused the other for the failure of the ceasefire agreement. In August, government officials stated that the military would resume operations against the ELN, likely reflecting Colombia’s government assessment of a better strategic position to combat the group. The ELN, which is assessed as having 6,000 active members, has strongholds in the departments of Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Arauca, with a smaller presence in more than a dozen other Colombian departments.

Moreover, the ELN operates transnationally and has a sanctuary in Venezuelan territory, where it maintains friendly relations with pro-regime forces. The recent ELN attack is likely a reflection of ELN’s leaders’ confidence in the group’s ability to conduct protracted armed struggle against the government while retaining its main drug-related sources of income. Moreover, it is likely an attempt at destabilising the government’s parallel efforts to strike a ceasefire with rival splinter groups in disputed regions, such as the Comuneros del Sur, in Nariño.

Contrary to the assessment that the ELN has improved its position, President Gustavo Petro claimed that the ELN is “stagnant”. This assessment, however, appears untenable, as it both contradicts official government assessments of ELN growth and does not provide a clear explanation for the group’s decision to directly attack the military.

Haiti’s transitional administration sets up electoral council

As of the time of writing, there is no clear exact date for the elections, which are scheduled to be held by 2026. The gangs, which still control much of the country despite the arrival of a Kenya-led, UN-backed police contingent, are likely to continue attacks against officials, as part of their likely strategy to delay the creation of alternative administrative bodies that could challenge their authority.

Venezuelan authorities claim arrested Americans were planning coup

On 15 September, Venezuelan channels released more information about six American citizens, including a former Navy SEAL, arrested in the country in August. According to pro-regime sources, the six were planning a coup to oust Maduro.

It is highly likely that the Venezuelan regime is increasing efforts to provoke a domestic “rally round the flag” effect to minimise the risk of further post-election protests. Detaining foreigners – especially US citizens – allows the Maduro regime to bolster its claims of being under attack from abroad, while also granting greater leverage for future negotiations in the form of political prisoners.

It is highly likely that the regime will take advantage of further opportunities to arbitrarily detain foreign travellers to the country.

Evo Morales supporters clash with counterprotesters in Bolivia

The former president called for his supporters to join a “March to Save Bolivia” from Caracollo to La Paz. The march was initially peaceful but was reportedly attacked by supporters of current President Luis Arce. The two sides then clashed using improvised bombs, among other weapons. Tensions have remained high in Bolivia since the attempted coup in late June. Morales has announced plans to run in the 2025 presidential election, and will likely continue stoking unrest to retain a central position in the country’s politics.

At least 30 killed so far in Sinaloa, Mexico in cartel clashes

Heavy fighting in Sinaloa state between two rival factions of the powerful Sinaloa cartel, formerly led by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, started on 9 September. Clashes have been particularly severe in the state capital, Culiacan. In July, Sinaloa leader Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada was arrested by US authorities after being reportedly lured onto a private plane by one of El Chapo’s sons, Joaquín Guzmán López, which then landed in El Paso, Texas.

Since then, it is almost certain that a power struggle has broken out between those loyal to El Chapo’s other sons, the “Chapitos”, and those loyal to Zambada. This is highly likely the primary cause for the clashes, effectively a cartel civil war.

While 2,200 personnel from the military and National Guard have been sent to Sinaloa, it is unlikely security forces will be able to quell the violence without substantial reinforcements. The outgoing Mexican President, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), has adopted a policy of “hugs not bullets” against the cartel, seeking to resolve Mexico’s endemic crime problem with job opportunities and training programs, a policy that will highly likely be continued by his successor Claudia Sheinbaum.

Brazilian wildfires continue

Severe droughts are exacerbating the strength and spread of wildfires in Brazil, as authorities continue to struggle to combat a particularly intense wildfire season in the Amazon this year. On 15 September, the Supreme Court authorised the lifting of spending restrictions for wildfire and drought response in the Amazon and Pantanal regions.

It is highly likely that, while the drought conditions continue, authorities will struggle to contain the fires. In addition to the widespread agricultural impact and threat to residents in the Amazon and Pantanal regions, air quality has been considerably lowered in the major cities of Sao Paulo and Brasilia, which has led to flight disruptions and school closures.

At least 24 people have been killed by large-scale flooding in multiple European countries, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Romania, Hungary, Germany, and Italy. The flooding was caused by a low-pressure storm which stemmed from a Genoa low, a relatively rare weather system which develops south of the Alps, and which was favoured by extremely high surface water temperatures in the Mediterranean Sea. After affecting Central Europe, where it caused more than EUR 1 billion in damages according to early reports, the storm moved southwards to Italy, where it caused widespread flooding in the region of Emilia Romagna.   

Solace Global Assessment: 

Researchers have predicted that the damages from storm Boris will reach the EUR 2 billion threshold by 20 September. Indirect damages from the floods will highly likely be much higher – the 2023 floods in Emilia Romagna alone caused damages of EUR 8.5 billion – and especially notable in regions that have lower flood-resilient infrastructure. The European Union has already pledged EUR 10 billion from the emergency “cohesion funds”. Infrastructural damage will almost certainly have short-term consequences for travellers and residents in the affected areas.

It is highly likely that the storm’s severity was affected by climate change. In 2024, extremely high Mediterranean Sea surface water temperatures were recorded, with season highs of above 31 degrees Celsius. Protracted high temperatures allow a greater level of atmospheric humidity, and therefore likelier severe precipitation events. Researchers have also argued that climate change also favours a phenomenon known as “atmospheric blocking”, whereby lack of movement between high- and low-pressure zones favours persistent weather conditions in the summer, with high-pressure areas experiencing protracted clear weather, possibly leading to drought, and low-pressure areas being at risk of considerable heavy rainfall.

On 17 September thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah members simultaneously detonated across Lebanon. At least 12 deaths were reported, including the son of a Hezbollah MP, and approximately 3,000 injuries, including Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon. Then, on 18 September, thousands of walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah members detonated, with unconfirmed reports that other devices such as home solar energy systems and biometric fingerprint scanners also exploded. 20 deaths were reported, with 450 injuries. Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed retribution for the attacks in a 19 September speech. During the speech, Israeli warplanes flew low over Beirut, and the Israeli military conducted over 52 strikes across southern Lebanon soon after the speech.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the 17 September pager detonations were more widespread, the 18 September walkie-talkie blasts were more powerful and deadly. The attacks were highly likely conducted by Mossad, but an official claim of responsibility is highly unlikely. Speculation that the attack involved hacking into the devices to make the batteries explode is almost certainly untrue, the detonations were almost certainly caused by remotely detonated small quantities of military-grade high explosives. The pagers that detonated were Taiwanese company Gold Apollo models, mostly AR924s. Hezbollah reportedly ordered over 5,000 pagers before distributing them to members throughout Lebanon, as well as to members and allies in Iraq, Syria and Iran – at least 14 people were injured in Syria.

Gold Apollo have since stated that the pagers were manufactured on license by the Budapest-registered company BAC Consulting, that they encountered issues with remittances from BAC and that payments had come through the Middle East. It is highly likely that BAC Consulting was an Israeli front posing as an international pager producer. It is highly likely that Israeli intelligence similarly infiltrated the supply chain of the walkie-talkies that detonated, primarily IC-V82 models from the Japanese company ICOM, with ICOM stating that they ended production of the model 10 years ago.

The most likely reason for the specific timing of the attack is that the capability was about to be exposed – a case of “use it or lose it”. It is likely that the operation was originally intended to be conducted as an immediate prelude to a wider operation into southern Lebanon by Israeli forces, but the potential imminent discovery of the device tampering expedited the operation.

On 16 September, the Israeli security cabinet made the safe return of residents to northern Israel an official war objective, and the defence minister Yoav Gallant stated after the device detonations that Israel is “opening a new phase in the war”, as Israeli forces reorient to the northern front against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

It is highly likely that Hezbollah will attempt to retaliate, due to the extent of the operation and the humiliation caused, however their operational effectiveness has almost certainly been degraded and Hezbollah will not wish to give the Netanyahu administration an excuse to launch a major IDF offensive into southern Lebanon.

Additionally, the at least 52 IDF strikes across southern Lebanon were almost certainly pre-emptive, as they largely targeted rocket launchers, further degrading Hezbollah’s capability to retaliate. Nonetheless, it is likely that Hezbollah will launch further retaliation strikes to the limited attacks already made, which will most likely consist of rocket and missile attacks against targets in northern Israel within range of the majority of their weapon systems, or about 40 kilometres.

King Abullah II of Jordan appointed the Harvard-educated palace aide Jafar Hassan as prime minister on 15 September, replacing former diplomat and palace advisor Bisher Khasawneh who had served as prime minister since 2020. The appointment followed the resignation of Jordan’s government, which conventionally occurs after legislative elections, with a parliamentary election having earlier taken place on 10 September.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

While Jordanians elect representatives to Jordan’s lower house of parliament, the House of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwwāb), as they did on 10 September, Jordan’s king holds all substantial powers within Jordan’s political system, with ultimate authority over the executive, legislative and judiciary. In this regard. the appointment of the technocrat and loyalist Jafar Hassan is almost certainly a continuation of the status quo. In addition to pervasive economic issues, namely unemployment and declining tourism because of regional conflict, Hassan will need to wrestle with increasingly Islamist (political Islam) sentiment in Jordan.

The political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist Action Front (IAF) made significant gains in the parliamentary election, winning 31 seats out of 138, their best result in 35 years. This makes the IAF the largest political grouping in parliament, although pro-government independents and tribal factions are still overall dominant. The result came about firstly due to electoral reform in Jordan which allocated an increased number of seats to party lists. Political parties have previously only had a limited presence in Jordan’s legislature. Secondly, the aforementioned economic issues and a general “climate of disillusionment” have driven discontentment with the political system, benefiting the Islamists. Thirdly, and most notably, the ongoing Israel-Hamas war in Gaza has led to widespread protests in Jordan and increasing popular support for Islamism.

Compared to 2020 where polls indicated that 44 per cent of Jordan’s population expressed a positive view of Hamas, in November and December 2023 polling showed a rise to 85 per cent. The IAF has regularly organised protests, particularly in Amman, with common protest slogans including “we are all Hamas” and “Yahya Sinwar is our leader”. Between 50-70 per cent of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin, and the Israel-Hamas War has highly likely generated the greatest political shift in Jordan, a key military ally for the US, in decades.

On 17 September, the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), attacked the military airport in Bamako, Mali. JNIM claimed that the attack was in retaliation for recent joint operations involving Malian forces and Russian Wagner group operatives. The group also claimed that the attack killed up to 100 junta troops and destroyed dozens of military vehicles including six aircraft. There are reports that, following the attacks, lynch mobs formed in Bamako and killed uninvolved residents of the Fulani – also known as Peul – ethnic group, which have often been singled out as “allies” of the Islamists in local discourse.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is highly significant for multiple reasons. First, it likely represents the greatest direct security failure experienced by the Mali junta, and the first attack of this kind in Bamako since 2016. The attack likewise further demonstrates the junta’s growing inability to cope with a growing Islamist insurgency and follows other significant losses and setbacks – most notably, the loss of at least 100 Mali and Wagner troops in a joint Tuareg-JNIM attack in the country’s north in July.

Second, JNIM operatives likely aimed to obtain maximum political leverage out of the attack. The attack solely targeted a military installation – unlike many  other JNIM attacks which target civilians indiscriminately. The Mali junta, as well as its allies in Niger and Burkina Faso, are likely increasingly unable to respond to a growing insurgency, which is also emboldened by the evident security vacuum in the Sahel following the withdrawal of Western counterterrorist assets and their replacement with more brutal but likely less effective Wagner forces operating under the Russian Defence Ministry-run Africa Corps.

Botched counterinsurgency operations by the juntas have resulted in civilian casualties, with cases of arbitrary and brutal treatment of civilians – including reported summary executions of even children – being leveraged by Islamist groups to bolster recruitment operations. As a return to cooperating with the West is highly unlikely due to the extremely high political costs, it is likely that the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) will further rely on extremely violent – and likely less strategically effective – counterinsurgency operations.

Currently, Islamist groups almost certainly have the capacity to strike Ouagadougou and Bamako at will, and will likely soon have the capacity to directly strike Niamey. Further attacks in major urban centres are likely to increasingly put pressure on the top junta leaders, making palace coups and replacement of current junta heads likely in the coming months. There is a realistic possibility of the complete collapse of one or more juntas in the medium term.

Eight migrants die in attempted English Channel crossing

On 14 September, 801 people arrived on small boats to the UK from France, the second highest daily number this year. The increased volume of crossings is almost certainly dependent on multiple days of relatively mild weather at the beginning of September. The deaths reportedly occurred near the French coast, as the vessel carrying migrants struck rocks near Ambleteuse.

Georgia parliament passes “family values” law

The law is largely seen as an anti-LGBTQ bill mirroring similar legislation in Russia. The law is highly likely to be understood as part of the broader process of alignment with Moscow that the current Georgian government has undertaken, most notably via the controversial “foreign agents” bill. The law is likely to drive further protests, and, as in Russia, it is highly likely that the law will allow Georgian authorities to further attack civil society and NGOs under the pretext of “defending family values”.

Armenian officials say they thwarted a Russian coup attempt

On 18 September, the Investigative Committee of Armenia stated that, earlier in 2024, Moscow attempted to carry out a coup via a trained network of at least six insurgents. The extent and scope of the alleged plan are still unclear.

Protests in Tunisia before Presidential elections

The vote will take place on 6 October and will highly likely be won by current President Kais Saied, who has concentrated significant power and reduced the freedom of independent election commission officials. In the last weeks, Saied’s government accelerated its campaign of arrests of political opponents, including detaining 97 members of the opposition party Ennahda on 12 September. It is highly likely that protests will continue in the coming weeks before the vote, and that Tunisian authorities will respond to them violently.

Elections in South Sudan postponed by two years

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir unilaterally announced the extension of the transitional period by two years, postponing elections for the second time – the first postponement having occurred in 2022. South Sudan’s government transition period started with the 2018 peace deal which ended five years of civil war. The decision to postpone the elections was largely expected, but it is unlikely that government forces will manage to solve all the issues that Kiir highlighted – including the lack of a constitution and widespread insecurity – before the end of the new two-year extension period.

Islamist knife attack in the Netherlands

On the evening of 19 September, a man carried out a stabbing attack on Erasmus Bridge in Rotterdam, killing one and wounding at least another. Information available so far indicates that the perpetrator, which was overpowered by a witness and then arrested, likely was a self-radicalised lone wolf Islamist terrorist.

Two explosions in Cologne, Germany, in less than a week

On 17 September, a second explosion in three days occurred in Cologne, Germany. Both blasts occurred in the city centre, outside residential buildings. The blasts are still unexplained, but observers have indicated that detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is a common intimidation tactic used by gangs in the Netherlands, which borders Cologne’s state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The blasts are therefore likely linked to drug trafficking routes from the Netherlands towards central and eastern Europe.

Eight Azeri troops killed in clashes with Islamist group

Local media reported that the troops were involved in counterterrorism operations in the Qusar district of north Azerbaijan. In August, an Azeri public official was reportedly killed by unidentified “Salafi” militants in the area. Residents in Qusar have reported ongoing counterterrorism operations for the past two weeks. The IS-affiliate an-Naba magazine claimed that IS was responsible for the attack on Azeri forces. If these claims are true, then it is highly likely that the militants were affiliates of the Caucasus Province of IS (ISCP), the branch of the group that was responsible for the 23 June attack in Derbent and Makhchkala, Dagestan.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) authorities sentence 37 to death after failed coup

The prisoners include three American citizens, a Belgian, a UK citizen, and a Canadian. They were captured following a suspected coup in May, which involved an attack on the home of a government ally. The attack was almost certainly carried out by the “New Zaire Movement”, a group linked to Christian Malanga, a DRC politician who was killed in the attack and had previously lived in political exile in the US. The DRC allows the death penalty, but had a moratorium on it for two decades, which was only lifted in March, making executions in this case likely to occur. There is a realistic possibility of international involvement affecting the sentences faced by the six dual citizens.

Comoros President stabbed, attacker found dead in cell days later

Comoros President Azali Assoumani was stabbed during a funeral procession and received minor injuries to his hand on 14 September. Days later, the suspect that had been arrested in connection with the stabbing was found dead on the cell where he was being detained. The alleged perpetrator of the attack was a 24-year-old soldier, with no clear personal or ideological motive.

Three firefighters dead due to Portugal wildfires

At least 50 wildfires are currently active in the country, and approximately 5,300 firefighters have been deployed to combat them. The fires have caused multiple roadway and railway closures, and are likely to have significant protracted effects on the mainland. Despite the end of the hottest months of the year and a higher volume of precipitation than usual, temperatures in Portugal and Spain continue to be around 30 degrees during the warmest part of the day, which facilitates the outbreak and spread of fires.

Kenya invests more resources to combat Mpox

Kenyan officials committed USD 52 million on 15 September after five cases of Mpox were confirmed in Taita Taveta, Busia, Nairobi, Mombasa and Nakuru. It is highly likely that the actual number of cases is much higher. The rapid transnational spread of Mpox has led the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention to declare its first-ever Public Health Emergency of Continental Security.

On 16 September, Typhoon Bebinca made landfall in Shanghai as a category 1 storm with maximum recorded windspeeds of 151 km/h. 400,000 people were evacuated, 56,000 rescue workers were deployed, and 30,000 homes lost power. Bebinca caused severe travel disruptions, with mass flight and train service cancellations, and widespread business closures occurred as Shanghai authorities issued a weather alert at the highest level. Considerable port disruptions also occurred in Shanghai and Ningbo, with vessel bunching at the ports disrupting departures from container terminals. One injury was reported in Shanghai.

Typhoon Bebinca eased into a Tropical Storm, moving into Jiangsu province, causing two deaths in Zhoushi Town after a high-voltage power line fell. Then, on 19 September, a second named storm hit Shanghai, Tropical Storm Pulasan. Pulasan twice made landfall, first in Zheijiang Province and then in Shanghai later in the day. The storm caused torrential rainfall, with local precipitation records being broken in parts of Shanghai. While some parts of Shanghai experienced notable flooding, no reports of serious damage or casualties have been reported thus far as a result of Pulasan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Typhoon Bebinca is the most powerful tropical cyclone to hit Shanghai in over 70 years, since the 1949 Typhoon Gloria. Tropical Storm Pulasan, meanwhile, is the 14^th named storm in the Asia Pacific region this year, with the highly powerful Typhoon Yagi having recently caused significant damage, disruptions and deaths in the Philippines, China, Vietnam and Myanmar.

Disruptions in Shanghai over the past week have been extensive, however, the level of damage and casualties has been remarkably low, almost certainly due to Shanghai’s very high level of development, the substantial state capacity afforded to response operations, and the rigorous preparedness and resiliency measures deployed.

Climate change is highly likely a significant factor in conditioning the measured worsening of annual tropical storm seasons internationally, as warmer seas highly likely cause stronger storms. China is the world’s biggest carbon emitter, though the United States has a significantly higher per capita emission rate. Some studies suggest that predicted levels of climate change could lead to large portions of the most populated and developed region of China, in and around the North China Plain, experiencing severe habitability challenges by 2100 on current trajectories. This is due to the threat posed by “wet-bulb temperatures”, the phenomenon where both humidity levels and temperatures are so high that evaporative cooling via sweating in humans is limited to the extent that humans will very quickly die from hyperthermia.

China has made substantial investments into renewable energy and now has more renewable power capacity than any other country in the world. It is highly likely that these policy decisions have been made due to China’s particular vulnerability to climate change. It is likely that Beijing will make increasingly strong diplomatic efforts to make combatting climate change an international priority as climate change continues to worsen.

A man was sentenced to 14 months in prison for “sedition” after pleading guilty to wearing a t-shirt with the slogan “liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times”, associated with the 2019 protests. The individual is the first person to be charged, convicted and sentenced under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), the new national security law in effect since March 2024.

Solace Global Assessment: 

At least 12 other people have been arrested for sedition since the SNSO was enacted. The new legislation is almost certainly aimed at nullifying the possibility of further anti-Beijing protests, and is part of broader Chinese efforts to diminish civil society and opposition forces in Hong Kong. The recent crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong has likely de facto ended most aspects of the “one country, two systems” framework in place since the UK handed over the territory in 1997.

It is highly likely that, in addition to its political implications, the strict implementation of the SNSO will also increasingly affect Hong Kong’s competitiveness as a global hub for finance and business. Combined with high US-China tensions, Beijing’s growing influence and oversight over the city has likely contributed to accelerating the exodus of foreign companies to other business-friendly locations in Southeast Asia. Between 2019 and 2021, the number of global companies that had their regional headquarters in Hong Kong decreased by approximately 13 per cent, many having relocated to Singapore.

At the same time, however, much of this decrease has been compensated by an influx of Chinese companies, likely contributing to maintaining Hong Kong on an upward economic trajectory in 2023 and 2024.

Presidential election in Sri Lanka set to take place on 21 September

The election has been tightly contested, with the economy being the key issue, and the outcome will likely be close. After collapsing in 2022, Sri Lanka’s economy has struggled to recover with inflation rates almost reaching 70 per cent. With 38 candidates running, the front runners are the incumbent President Ranil Wickremesinghe, the leader of the opposition Sajith Premadasa, and Anura Kumara Dissanayake.

Wickremesinghe became President in 2022 after his predecessor was forced to flee Sri Lanka due to widespread unrest stemming from the economic crisis and is a centre-right liberal conservative. Premadasa is a centrist who wishes to change some conditions in the International Monetary Fund’s USD 2.9 billion bailout programme. Dissanayake is contesting the election as part of the National People’s Power (NPP) coalition, a left-wing coalition that includes the far-left People’s Liberation Front, which Dissanayake leads.

Sri Lanka uses a limited ranked voting electoral system where voters preferentially rank candidates. Almost every presidential election since 1982 has resulted in a candidate winning a majority in the first count. This election, however, is likely to go to second or even third counts. Polling indicates that Dissanayake is the most likely to win the first count, although the accuracy of Sri Lankan polling is unreliable. With the first preference centre and centre-right vote split between the other two frontrunners, it is likely that Dissanayake will fare worse in any additional counts.

North Korea conducts multiple missile tests

South Korean and Japanese authorities have reported that North Korea conducted missile testing twice in one week, on 18 and 19 September. The missiles were primarily short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), with North Korean state media (KCNA) claiming that they were new Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5) designs with “super-large warheads”. KCNA additionally claimed a test of a “strategic cruise missile”. The new missile design is highly likely an iterated Hwasong-11 (KN-23) design with a larger warhead. Hwasong-11s have highly likely been used by Russia in its war against Ukraine, according to Ukrainian state prosecutors who examined missile debris, though Moscow and Pyongyang deny this. The missile tests are likely part of North Korean efforts to speed up the development of the new missile variant to sell to Russia.

Taliban suspends Polio vaccinations in Afghanistan

The decision was taken despite the increase in polio cases recorded in Afghanistan, 18 in 2024, up from six in 2023. Taliban officials did not provide an explanation for the move, which was announced days before the scheduled beginning of a September immunisation campaign. The lack of immunisation is likely to not only affect Afghanistan, but also neighbouring states and especially border regions in Pakistan, due to the high influx of Afghan migrants and refugees.

Tropical Storm Soulik makes landfall in northern Vietnam

At approximately 14:00 local time on 19 September, Tropical Storm Soulik made landfall in Quang Tri province, northern Vietnam. Expected to follow a similar trajectory to the recently devastating Typhoon Yagi, the storm has prompted mass evacuations in both Quang Tri and Binh provinces. While Soulik’s strength is far weaker than Yagi, the lingering devastation from Yagi’s recent impact will likely exacerbate the storm’s impact on northern Vietnam and neighbouring Laos.

Flooding from Typhoon Yagi kills at least 226 people in Myanmar

Although Yagi, which had earlier hit Hainan, China and northern Vietnam, was significantly weakened, Myanmar is highly vulnerable to the impact of flooding. The ongoing civil war in Myanmar means that a third of Myanmar’s population already required humanitarian aid, and many of the worst impacted regions are difficult to access for already highly limited rescue operations. The major cities of Naypyidaw and Mandalay also experienced significant floods. Shan State, which has had considerable heavy fighting during the civil war, was also particularly impacted. The rebel forces that control most of Shan State are almost certainly under-resourced to deal with the floods, exacerbating the impact.

Hezbollah members have been using pagers for years, due to operational security concerns regarding Israeli tracking of cell phones. A speech by Hezbollah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah in February encouraged members to discard their cell phones, which led to more widespread adoption of pagers amongst the rank-and-file. As well as being used by Hezbollah members throughout Lebanon, pagers were distributed to members and allies in Iraq, Syria and Iran and the pager detonations injured at least 14 people in Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

The attacks were highly likely conducted by Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency. Historically, responsibility has not been publicly claimed by Israeli officials for Mossad operations conducted abroad, therefore it is highly unlikely that an official claim of responsibility will be made for the attacks.

While there has been speculation that the attacks involved hacking into the devices to cause the batteries to explode, this is almost certainly untrue. While overheated lithium-ion batteries can combust and in rare instances, cause small explosions, the explosions were almost certainly caused by small quantities of military-grade high-explosives.

The model of pagers that detonated were mostly Gold Apollo’s AR924 model. Hezbollah had reportedly ordered over 5,000 pagers, before distributing them to members. Gold Apollo, a Taiwanese company, has stated since the attack that these models were manufactured on license by the Budapest-based company BAC Consulting. Gold Apollo additionally stated that they had encountered issues with remittances from BAC, and that payments had come through the Middle East. According to three intelligence officers briefed on the operation who spoke to the New York Times, BAC Consulting was an Israeli front posing as an international pager producer.

The walkie-talkies that detonated, meanwhile, were primarily IC-V82 models from the Japanese company ICOM. ICOM has stated that they ended production of the model 10 years ago. It is highly likely that Mossad similarly infiltrated the supply chain for the walkie-talkies.

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Second presidential debate, Trump sentencing delayed, and 6 January 2025 security plans.

Former President Donald Trump and current Vice President Kamala Harris participated in their long-awaited presidential debate on 10 September. The debate was the first between the two candidates, but the second in this electoral season, as current President Joe Biden dropped out of the electoral race following a widely criticised performance in his own debate with Trump in June.

Days prior, Judge Juan Merchan, who presided over the hush money trial of the former president in Manhattan, delayed the sentencing to 26 November, to be after the presidential election. In May, Trump was convicted of 34 felony counts of falsifying business records. The maximum sentence that Trump could receive is two years in prison, though such a sentence is unlikely. On 5 September, Trump also pleaded not guilty to federal charges over alleged attempts to interfere with the 2020 election, in a separate case.

Solace Global Assessment: The postponement of Trump’s sentencing is likely to reduce the risk of civil unrest and violence prior to and immediately after the election. However, there is still a realistic possibility of unrest occurring during the remainder of the electoral season. During the debate, the former president repeated claims that the 2020 election results were fraudulent. Trump’s 2024 running mate, J.D. Vance, also separately echoed these views and criticised the results’ certification process for the 2020 election. Moreover, local media have highlighted a growing number of local officials that have either hinted at, or outright threatened, not to certify the 2024 election results if they perceive that they are affected by “irregularities”. Recent notable cases include new Georgia State Election Board rules that instruct county boards to conduct “reasonable inquiries” before certifying the election results, and a lawsuit in Michigan against a county board member who stated that he would refuse to certify the 2024 electoral results if the election were to be “stolen”.

The likelihood of another incident like the 6 January Capitol attack occurring has been significantly reduced by planned security measures and is therefore highly unlikely. On 11 September, the Department of Homeland Security declared the 2025 results’ certification date a “National Special Security Event”, meaning that considerable security – including federal, state, and local assets – will be deployed to secure the Capitol and other key areas in Washington D.C. Nevertheless, a realistic possibility remains of civil unrest at a local level, especially in states where officials have raised doubts about their willingness to certify the election results.

Judicial reform bill approved by Senate after protesters storm the Senate chamber.

The controversial judicial reform bill was approved by the Mexican Senate in the early hours of 11 September, after protesters had stormed the Senate chamber on 10 September. The judicial reform bill proposes that approximately 7,000 state and federal judges, including the Supreme Court, will be replaced by popular elections that will take place in 2025 and 2027. The bill additionally reduces experience and age requirements for multiple judicial roles. Protesters against the bill broke through the door of the Senate chamber using pipes and chains, with security forces deploying tear gas and fire extinguishers. As a result of the incursion, the Senate took a temporary recess, before reconvening and approving the bill.

Solace Global Assessment: The storming of the Mexican Senate by protesters almost certainly marks a further escalation in the anti-judicial reform unrest that has intensified in the last few weeks. Unions representing many of Mexico’s 55,000 judicial workers started an indefinite nationwide strike on 19 August, and on 3 September were joined by the Supreme Court justices.

Protests were initially notably peaceful, until a demonstration by striking judiciary workers blocked access to the Congress building on 3 September before the Chamber of Deputies approved the bill. The drivers of unrest, therefore, have been the Congress votes in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. With the bill now approved by both houses of Congress, all that remains now is for the bill to be ratified by the state legislatures, which will highly likely occur.

President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum will be sworn in on 1 October, and it is highly likely that judicial reform will be the biggest issue she will face at the start of her administration. On the one hand, there is a realistic possibility that unrest will decrease as the opportunities to stop the bill have been almost exhausted. On the other hand, however, it is more likely that unrest will take a more disruptive and violent character. The bill has spooked investors, with concerns that it may undermine the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) trade pact, and has been met with international condemnation, notably drawing criticism from the US ambassador.

The Peso has weakened by 17% since the landslide victory for the Morena party in the 2 June elections, and a former central bank official has stated that a recession next year is likely.

Venezuelan opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez lands in Madrid.

Gonzalez, who is the most prominent opposition figure in the country alongside Maria Corina Machado, went into hiding following the 28 July election, staying at various diplomatic offices and residences in Caracas. From Madrid, Gonzalez will highly likely use the freedom to speak publicly to gather international support against Maduro. However, it is also highly likely that the Maduro regime will use Gonzalez’s escape as a pretext for increasing accusations of foreign interference and “treason” by opposition forces. This, in turn, may grant the government greater legitimacy to suppress remaining civil society groups and non-aligned figures.

Venezuelan authorities revoke Brazil’s custody of Argentina’s diplomatic offices.

The decision was justified with the accusation that Brazilian officials were using Argentine offices to stage acts of terrorism. The decision will likely result in retaliatory moves in Brazil, and will likely further isolate the Venezuelan government by weakening Brazil’s mediating role. Members of the opposition are currently sheltering in the Argentine ambassador’s residence in Caracas, and the decision by Venezuelan authorities has a remote possibility to be a prelude to a more forceful violation of diplomatic rights in Venezuela.

USA “Terrorgram” leaders charged with allegedly inspiring terrorism.

The transnational collective’s name refers to the social network Telegram. It espoused white supremacist ideology and praised past far-right lone wolf terrorists as “Saints”, in efforts to motivate further attacks. American authorities accuse the two informal “leaders” of the collective of inciting at least three specific terror attacks – an anti-LGBTQ shooting in Slovakia, which killed two, a planned attack in New Jersey, and the recent stabbing outside a Mosque in Turkey. If convicted, the two face up to 220 years in prison.

The development is likely important and may become a key legal precedent in the prosecution of stochastic terrorists. The term “stochastic” identifies a “probabilistic” type of terrorism, where radical messages and calls to violence are indiscriminately spread within a target community (usually online) with the expectation that one or more members will act upon them. Stochastic terrorists are difficult to prosecute as they are not often involved in the planning and organisation of attacks, and maintain some plausible deniability regarding their involvement. There is a remote chance of violent retaliatory actions by Terrorgram supporters in the US.

Canadian counterterrorism arrests Pakistani citizen over 7 October terror plot.

The man was arrested on 7 September over an alleged plan to attack the Jewish community of New York City on the anniversary of the Hamas attack in southern Israel. The individual was almost certainly a self-radicalised lone wolf but nevertheless planned to carry out the attack in the name of IS. 7 October, as well as the 11 October Yom Kippur holiday, are likely to be at a particularly high risk from extremist action targeting both Jewish and Muslim places of worship in Western countries.

El Salvador police chief dead in helicopter crash.

Since 2019, Mauricio Arriaza Chicas was a central figure in implementing the crackdowns on local gangs spearheaded by President Bukele, which led to up to 80,000 arrests and a drastic reduction in murder rates. Chicas was travelling with Manuel Coto, a former credit union head, who was accused of money laundering and was being transported back to El Salvador. Bukele expressed suspicions about the incident’s cause.

South California wildfires destroy homes and cause mass evacuations.

At least three major wildfires erupted in southern California on 8 September. The fires have been especially difficult to contain, highly likely exacerbated by protracted hot and dry conditions in the region, and have expanded particularly quickly due to strong winds. As of 12 September, the fires have destroyed at least 100,000 acres of land, injured 13, and destroyed approximately 40 homes.

All three fires pose a direct threat to the greater Los Angeles urban area, and reports of Californian state firefighting resources being overstretched likely indicate that efforts to contain the blazes will continue throughout the weekend.

Hurricane Francine makes landfall in Louisiana, USA.

Making landfall as a category 2 hurricane, Francine hit southern Louisiana on late 11 September. The storm had maximum record windspeeds of 157 km/h, but quickly weakened into a tropical storm post-landfall. The New Orleans area experienced heavy rainfall, and flash flood emergency warnings were published by authorities. There have been no reported deaths or injuries as of the time of writing, and the storm was downgraded into a tropical depression on 12 September over Mississippi.

Tropical Storm Illeana forms south of Baja California Sur, Mexico

On 12 September, Tropical Storm Illeana formed in the North Pacific, roughly 400 kilometres south of the tip of Baja California Sur, Mexico. Initial forecasts anticipate the storm will bring heavy rainfall, strong winds, and storm surges to the peninsula, as well as to the states of Michoacán, Colima, and Jalisco over the weekend. There is a realistic possibility of localised travel disruptions and damage to physical properties in affected coastal areas.

Bolivia declares a state of emergency due to wildfires.

Over the past three months, wildfires have destroyed an estimated ten million acres of land, especially in the states of Beni and Santa Cruz. The Bolivian government announced that it will seek international support to combat the fires, which have additionally caused disruptions in La Paz and other urban centres.

On 11 September, IDF officials stated that Israeli forces have degraded Hamas forces in Gaza to such a great extent that Hamas is no longer able to operate as an organised military force. However, they also claimed that the complete destruction of Hamas may take approximately another year. The report seems to be based on a captured letter written by Khan Yunis Brigade leader Salameh prior to his killing in July, where the Hamas official claims to only retain a fifth of his personnel, ten per cent of his rocket arsenal, and less than half of his stocks of anti-tank and small calibre munitions.

On the same day, two Israeli strikes on a school building in Nuseirat killed at least 18 people, including six workers of the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency UNRWA. The organisation stated that the strikes resulted in its highest death toll in a single incident throughout the war. The al-Jaouni school had been targeted by Israeli strikes four other times since October 2023.

Solace Global Assessment: The IDF’s assessments of Hamas’ continuing degradation as a viable combat force are likely accurate. The Palestinian militant group has been likely cut off from its main sources of smuggled resources and weapons, Egypt, via the protracted Israeli occupation of the Philadelphi Corridor, and the destruction of much of the tunnels in the area. Satellite imagery from late August showed that Israeli forces had begun paving a road extending six kilometres inland along the corridor, likely an important signal of Tel Aviv’s intention to retain a presence at the Egypt-Gaza border. Hamas, moreover, has likely lost much of its most experienced personnel and morale is highly likely poor.

Nevertheless, Hamas likely retains some capacity to operate small units from densely populated areas previously cleared by Israeli forces, in efforts to inflict protracted attrition on IDF units. Hamas also likely maintains some political leverage via the dozens of hostages still under its control. The new “guidelines” for the treatment of captives issued by the group, which state that its fighters will kill Israeli hostages if IDF troops approach their location, are highly likely aimed at deterring raids by Israeli forces.

Additionally, these measures likely reflect decreasing confidence amongst the Hamas leadership in the organisation’s capability to keep the hostages.

The killing of six UNRWA workers highlights the continuing severe threat to non-combatants in Gaza posed by IDF aerial strikes. Moreover, the strike likely indicates the continued erosion of deconfliction processes in Gaza – whereby humanitarian organisations share their locations, operations and movements with militaries and armed groups.

The administrations of the US and Iraq reached a preliminary deal which would result in the full withdrawal of US and coalition forces from Iraq by the end of 2026. Partial withdrawal will begin in 2025. The deal follows six months of negotiations, and now requires the final approval from Washington and Baghdad. The deal was reached amid increased attacks by Iran-backed, Iraq-based forces on US bases in the country, which this year have killed three US troops and injured dozens more.

Solace Global Assessment: The deal will likely directly benefit Iran and allow Tehran’s proxy forces greater freedom in carrying out operations in Iraq. In return, it may result in a growing volume of Israeli strikes in the country, as Tel Aviv will likely increasingly bear the brunt of containing Iran’s proxy operations.

However, IS still carried out up to 200 attacks in the two countries in the first half of 2024, and likely retains considerable operational capacity. Despite a post-2019 tendency to under-report attacks and territorial control, IS core likely remains the political centre of the global terrorist network. A resurgent IS core may benefit from a decreased Western presence in the area, as well as the growing assets and expertise of other branches, like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), in Afghanistan, and the Islamic State Greater Sahara Province (ISGSP) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), in the Sahel.

Local media reported on 11 September that six humanitarian workers of the NGO ALIMA were kidnapped by an unspecified armed group in the sub-prefecture of Liwa. At least one of the six was shot dead, while three escaped. The remaining two humanitarian workers are unaccounted for as of the time of writing.

Solace Global Assessment: Incidents affecting aid workers in Chad are less common that in other neighbouring Sahel states. According to the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD), there has been one case of kidnapping of aid workers in the country in 2024, with one victim. The kidnapping occurred in Dona Manga, in the country’s south.

The latest case, instead, occurred in the Lake Chad basin area and was therefore likely carried out by one of the Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the area. These include Boko Haram and their rivals the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The kidnapping of aid workers in the area is mostly conducted for ransom, as both local and foreign nationals working for NGOs are perceived as being far wealthier than the general populace.

Due to a lack of state resources to combat local militant groups, targeting NGO workers can be a relatively low-risk effort, especially in regions affected by a security vacuum such as Lake Chad. In general, the risks faced by NGO workers in the Sahel have increased in recent years, while not reaching the severity of the Sudan area. This is likely due to the worsening domestic stability of local authorities, and the growing strength and scope of terrorist groups operating in the region.

Barnier promises new French government “by the end of next week”.

The centre-right politician and newly appointed prime minister is considered by Macron – and, according to some polls, by a slim majority of the French electorate – to be able to compromise with the main parliamentary forces to end the months-long political crisis that followed the European elections.

However, it is unlikely that Barnier’s picks will be able to satisfy the two radical forces in parliament, the far-right National Rally (RN) and the populist, left-wing France Unbowed (LFI). The latter, alongside much of the rest of the New Popular Front (NFP) coalition, has already vowed to support a no confidence vote against the new government.

This means that Barnier will likely be forced to make some important concessions to RN. However, here, RN’s commitment to oppose fiscal reform may prove impossible to accept, as the Barnier-appointed government will only have weeks before the 1 October draft budget deadline. If the Barnier government fails to survive, it is almost certain that the NFP and RN will renew calls for new elections, and there is a likewise high likelihood of severe civil unrest.

Germany begins temporary border controls.

The measure, which is initially scheduled to be in place for six months, follows the terror attack by a radicalised Islamist in Munich, who targeted the Israeli consulate on the anniversary of the 1972 Olympics massacre. It is also likely an attempt by the government coalition to toughen counterterrorism measures after two state-level positive results by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). In late September, state elections will be held in Brandenburg, and the high likelihood of another AfD positive result threatens the stability of the current government.

Abdelmadjid Tebboune predictably re-elected president of Algeria.

Tebboune reportedly won 94 per cent of the vote, after campaigning with the support of the military and the National Liberation Front (NFL). Turnout was low, at a reported 23 per cent, and opposition figures boycotted the election citing the likelihood of fraud. In an unusual move, Tebboune challenged the election results, and particularly the reported turnout rate. There is a realistic possibility of civil unrest following the elections, although this is unlikely to reach the same severity of the 2019 protests.

President Faye dissolves Senegal’s parliament in preparation for upcoming snap-elections

Faye assumed office in April 2024, the first opposition politician to win an election in Senegal’s post-independence history. The decision to hold legislative elections three years earlier than expected is largely attributed to the parliament’s opposition to President Faye’s proposed reforms. The current majority in Senegal’s National Assembly belongs to the United in Hope coalition, founded by former President Macky Sall.

Sall’s controversial presidency saw widespread and often violent protests, particularly by Senegal’s youth, who are largely represented by Faye’s PASTEF party. With the elections approaching, there is a realistic possibility that the tensions witnessed during Sall’s tenure could resurface, potentially instigating renewed civil unrest.

Danish gang-member arrested after antisemitic group attack.

The individual, alongside other accomplices, allegedly carried out an arson attack against a Jewish individual’s residence. The 21-year-old is allegedly a member of a group with links to the street gang Loyal to Familia (LTF), a group based in the Nørrebro district of Copenhagen. In recent years, LTF is one of the main gangs that have tried to expand into Sweden, where there is a greater network of organised crime groups. The case is notable as there is a realistic possibility that it highlights the overlap between organised crime and extremist activity in Denmark, a trend that was already observed in other European cities like Marseille.

Chechen couple sentenced to prison for Antwerp, Belgium, terror plot .

According to authorities, the two had made concrete plans to attack the Jewish quarter as well as an LGBTQ bar. The couple had reportedly self-radicalised, but also contacted Islamic State (IS) members on Telegram and received instructions and guidance on how to carry out the attack. The case likely highlights the considerable overlaps and complex relationship between patterns of self-radicalisation and vertical organisation. Belgium is a desirable target for Islamists as the seat of key EU institutions, and has previously acted as a base for terrorist cells planning attacks in neighbouring countries, especially France.

Russia claims involvement of Finland and Sweden in drone attacks in Murmansk

Ukraine has conducted drone attacks in the Murmansk region since 11 September. According to Russian sources, three Ukrainian drones were shot down on 11 September, with a further two shot down on the following day.

Russian military-affiliated sources have stated that no Ukrainian drones have successfully hit targets in the Murmansk region. Notably, a source linked to the Federal Security (FSB) claimed that the drone attack on 11 September originated from Finland. Furthermore, a prominent Russian military blogger, “Kotenok”, has hinted at a possible Sweden’s involvement in Thursday’s attack due to a Swedish surveillance plane flying near the Murmansk border.

However, no official Russian source has not echoed this latter claim. There is a remote possibility that these accusations could lead to further tension in the region, and greater Russian aggressive moves at its northwestern borders.

Israeli forces strike Masyaf, Syria.

On 9 September, Israeli forces launched a missile strike in the vicinity of Masyaf, targeting facilities reportedly being used by Iranian and Iran-affiliated groups. According to NGO sources, the strike killed at least 25 people, including a number of civilians. There is a realistic possibility of retaliatory strikes on Israeli cities by local Iranian proxy groups or by other members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”.

Terror attack at Allenby Bridge, Jordan-Israel border.

On 8 September, an individual opened fire on Israeli workers at the border crossing with Jordan, killing three. The bridge, also known as King Hussein Bridge, is the only active Israel-Jordan border crossing, and is therefore almost certainly a high-value target for extremist action. The attack was carried out with a pistol and was unsophisticated, which suggests that the attacker was likely not affiliated with any specific terrorist group. Iran and its proxies have increasingly sought to smuggle weapons to organised groups inside Jordan, and the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict has favoured anti-government sentiment inside the kingdom. Similar incidents, which force a security response, likely put a high level of political pressure on authorities’ efforts to retain some stability and popular support.

Dozens of “armed bandits” kidnap travellers in Zamfara, Nigeria.

The kidnapping of an as of the time of writing still unspecified number of travellers occurred on 12 September, just hours after the expiration of a deadline for payment requested by a local bandit leader, known as Bello Turji, and the deployment of increased military assets to the area. The region of Zamfara is extremely underdeveloped, and authorities exercise only partial control over it. It is highly likely that the kidnapping case, is linked to the high level of organised militia activity in the area, and there is a likelihood that it relates to the recent extortion attempt.

Anti-air travel and miscellaneous groups plan “International Day for the Ban on Night Flights”

Dozens of activist groups, almost entirely based in Western Europe, have released a joint statement protesting night flights and calling for a day of sensibilisation on 13 September. While no planned protests were identified, there is a realistic possibility that activists, especially in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands (where the movement is most present) will seek to stage disruptions and protests at or near international airports. These, in turn, may affect travel and business.

Nigeria dam collapse provokes severe floods, displaces thousands

Heavy rains in Borno State, northeast Nigeria, caused the Maiduguri dam to overflow and collapse on 10-11 September. The resulting flooding has affected, according to authorities, up to one million people, with at least 30 reported fatalities at the time of writing. Nigeria’s northeast suffers from poor infrastructure and a lack of authority presence, meaning that rescue efforts are often delayed or impossible.

Moreover, the security situation in Borno is further worsened by the active Boko Haram insurgency. The severity of the floods is likely to result in a sharp number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria’s northeast, and will almost certainly further stretch already insufficient government response assets.

Repeated extreme weather events moreover have a direct negative impact on food security, with young people and at-risk demographics particularly affected, and directly contribute to increases in violent crime. Boko Haram, as well as other violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and bandit groups, have taken advantage of disasters to carry out recruitment efforts among the displaced or dispossessed.

Dengue fever epidemic declared in Central African Republic (CAR).

The CAR’s Minister of Health, Pierre Somsé has declared an epidemic after 13 cases of Dengue fever was declared by the national epidemiological surveillance system in the cities of Bangui and Bimbo. Dengue fever, also known as “tropical flu”, is an infectious, mosquito-borne disease caused by a virus of the same name.

The incident rate of dengue fever in the CAR has significantly increased and is now classified as a ‘re-emerging’ disease. The development reflects the wider trend in rising dengue infections across Africa, with over 270,000 cases and 753 deaths reported across 18 African Union (AU) Member States between 2019 and June 2024.

Ganesh Pandal riots show looming threat of sectarian violence.

On 8 September, a number of individuals reportedly pelted a pandal (a temporary structure erected to celebrate a Hindu god) with stones in Surat, Gujarat. The episode resulted in a riot, and in at least 30 arrests. In the days following the incident, authorities began demolishing irregular settlements in the area, in a move that observers identified as retaliatory targeting of the local Muslim community (although authorities claimed that the demolitions were planned weeks in advance).

Solace Global Assessment: The case almost certainly represents the latest escalation in sectarian, religion-based conflict in India, and there is a realistic possibility that it will lead to an increase in violence in the state.

There is a significant threat of sectarian mob violence in India, with recent cases particularly involving the Hindu and Muslim communities. Local and national officials of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have repeatedly encouraged mob violence – including “bulldozer justice” – against Muslim minorities, and studies have found a correlation between BJP state rule and sectarian anti-Muslim violence.

The BJP is the ruling party in Gujarat, and officials and sympathisers have likely deliberately increased sectarian tensions. During the electoral campaign for the 2024 elections, Gujarat BJP officials accused opponents of unfairly “giving quotas” as “other backward classes” (OBC, a designation that entails some access to reserved government jobs and higher education posts) to Muslims. In March, Muslim students carrying out Ramadan prayers at the University of Gujarat were reportedly attacked by a “Hindu mob”. In September, BJP members were accused of arbitrarily enlisting local secondary school students as party members.

Alongside internal development, sectarian violence in India has also likely been influenced by social media-based disinformation, with radical groups using international developments as instruments to stoke domestic violence. For instance, the recent cases of anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh following the ousting of Sheikh Hasina, have been reposted and likely inflated by Hindu nationalist influencers and pages in India. OSINT analysis shows that the recent Gujarat case has also been broadcast online as a case of concerted anti-Hindu violence, and there is a realistic possibility that increased attention will result in further calls for retaliatory violence.

Typhoon Yagi kills almost 200 people in northern Vietnam.

Typhoon Yagi made landfall in northern Vietnam on 7 September as a Very Strong Typhoon with windspeeds of 149km/h. 199 people have so far been killed, with over 800 injuries and 128 people still missing. The death toll will almost certainly rise. The deaths were primarily caused by flash floods and landslides in the northwestern Lao Cai province, which borders China. One hamlet in Lao Cai, Lang Nu, was entirely swept away by a flash flood, leading to at least 42 deaths and 52 missing. On 9 September, the Phong Chau bridge in Phu Tho province collapsed. Flood waters from the Red River led to Hanoi neighbourhoods on its banks being flooded, with thousands being evacuated. Power and drinking water has been cut since 11 September. 

Solace Global Assessment: Yagi is the strongest typhoon in Asia this year, having earlier made landfall in Hainan, China on 6 September as a Super Typhoon. In Hainan, four people were killed and 95 injured, with an estimated USD 9.26 billion in total damages. While Yagi considerably reduced in strength before hitting northern Vietnam, the impact has been far greater. This is almost certainly due to the increased vulnerability of Vietnam, which results from architectural practices, resiliency and preparedness measures, and state capacity. Even weakened, Yagi was the strongest typhoon to hit Vietnam in three decades. The flooding in Hanoi is likely the worst in two decades, with warehouses and export-oriented hubs in the east of Hanoi closing. While Sapa, a popular tourist destination for trekking, is located in the worst affected province, Lao Cai, the area is a particularly impoverished part of Vietnam. This highly likely further increased the population’s storm vulnerability. The Australian Foreign Ministry has announced the provision of USD 2 million in humanitarian relief funding, and rescue operations are ongoing.

Kyrgyzstan removes Taliban from list of banned organisations.

The move follows a similar recent one by Kazakhstan. The Kyrgyz government likely has a security interest in normalising relations with the Taliban, as it likely assesses the survival of the current Kabul regime to have a positive effect on regional stability. Moreover Bishkek, like nearby Dushanbe, is almost certainly worried about the possibility of a power vacuum in Afghanistan resulting in a growing Islamist activity in the region.

While primarily active in Afghanistan, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has increased recruitment and fundraising activities beyond the country’s borders. Normalisation with neighbouring central Asian states will also likely be a prelude to similar developments in the Taliban’s relations with Russia and other key regional powers.

Anti-war demonstration in Melbourne, Australia, ends in dozens of arrests and injuries.

Approximately 3,000 protesters clashed with police while attempting to disrupt an expo for weapons manufacturers. Protesters reportedly threw Molotov cocktails and acid bottles at police, which responded with tear gas and stun grenades. At least 39 arrests were made on the day, and more than 100 people were injured.

Due to the violence and increased media exposure of the protest, there is a realistic possibility that it will lead to further cases of civil unrest in the city. Events such as the arms expo in Melbourne constitute high-desirability targets for protesters due to their extremely high visibility.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacks Shiites on pilgrimage in Afghanistan.

On the morning of 13 September, reports and footage emerged of an ISKP ambush on unarmed Afghan Hazara Shia pilgrims at the border between the provinces of Daikundi and Ghor. Reports indicate that the pilgrims were returning from Karbala, a key location in Shia history. The deliberate attack on pilgrims is likely meant to continue undermining Taliban claims that ISKP has been neutralised, and that Kabul retains full authority over the country. Moreover, although unconfirmed, reports indicate that, in the Ghor province, local Taliban offices have been comprehensively infiltrated by ISKP, with Taliban resources being redirected to train and equip Islamic State fighters.

Over 50 killed after Myanmar’s military bombs Arakan Army prisoner of war camp

On 8 September, Myanmar’s military bombed a prison camp in Maungdaw, killing at least 50 according to yet unverified reports released by the rebel Arakan Army (AA), which operates in Rakhine State. The AA claimed that junta have increased the volume of their bombing campaigns. Pro-junta forces likely see bombing rebel-held areas – including civilian targets – as a way to erode civilian confidence in rebel forces, and to disrupt local logistics.

With the junta continuing to lose territory to the better-motivated and increasingly larger rebel forces, there is a realistic likelihood of further increases in bombing campaigns.

North Korean state media disclose image of uranium-enrichment facility

The image marks the first public disclosure of a uranium-enrichment site since photos of the Yongbyon nuclear complex were released in 2010. North Korean authorities almost certainly saw releasing the image as a way to deter South Korea, the US, and their allies. However, the image may also assist Seoul and Washington in refining estimates of North Korea’s current nuclear capabilities, following satellite images in recent years that indicate significant expansions at the Yongbyon complex.

Tropical Storm Bebinca moving towards China in Philippine Sea.

Bebinca is currently a Severe Tropical Storm, with windspeeds of 110 km/h. The storm is forecast to strengthen into a Typhoon, or even a Very Strong Typhoon, before making landfall in densely populated eastern China on 15-16 September. Within the cone of uncertainty, which is the predicted possible paths the storm could take, are the Chinese areas of southern Jiangsu Province, Shanghai and Zheijiang Province (with the cities of Ningbo, Hangzhou, Taizhou and Wenzhou all liable to be potentially affected).

The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) predict that the storm could have a high humanitarian impact, which is based on the forecast maximum sustained wind speeds, exposed population and vulnerability.

Bebinca will likely enter the Philippine area of responsibility on 14 September and is expected to bring sporadic heavy rainfall or thunderstorms to Manila and other areas of Luzon.

On 15-16 September, the storm is predicted to go past or through the Japanese islands of Amami and Okinawa, with authorities warning of possible landslides and flooding. The area of China that will likely be most impacted is highly developed, with extensive state capacity as well as rigorous storm preparedness and resiliency measures. Nonetheless, Bebinca will likely cause widespread disruptions and impact.

Two hundred evacuated due to volcanic threat in the Philippines

Kanlaon Volcano is located in the centre of the Negros Island. Authorities issued alerts for the area in June, after initial seismic activity. On 11 September, further activity, including sulphur dioxide emissions and more than 300 minor volcanic quakes, prompted authorities to issue an evacuation order for nearby villages due to the risk of a serious eruption.

Volcanic activity could interfere with travel and economic activity elsewhere on the island. In June, flights to Bacolod-Silay International Airports were briefly interrupted due to the volcano’s activity.

Haiti expands state of emergency to cover entire country.

On 5 September, the Haitian government announced that it was expanding the current state of emergency to cover the entire country. Haiti’s Ouest department, home to the capital Port-au-Prince, was placed under a state of emergency on March 3 under former Prime Minister Ariel Henry due to escalating violence and mass prison escapes.

The emergency was extended to other areas, including Artibonite, Centre, and Nippes, which have also experienced severe violence. The announcement also follows widespread protests after the suspension of services at Haiti’s largest hydroelectric dam which has left huge swathes of the country without power.

Solace Global Assessment: Haiti’s expansion of the state of emergency has likely been timed to coincide with the arrival of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Blinken is set to conduct a diplomatic visit to Haiti on 5-6 September where he will meet with Prime Minister Garry Conille to discuss Haiti’s democratic transition. Conille has only been in power for three months and despite the recent deployment of a UN-backed Kenyan security mission, authorities have failed to make much progress in combating the criminal gangs that now control an estimated 80 per cent of the country.

The expansion of the state of emergency is likely aimed at attracting more foreign aid and assistance, with the US currently being the largest contributor. The Kenyan force, which was deployed in June, only consists of 400 police officers, and their effectiveness has been curtailed by salary payment issues. Moreover, the domestic security services are almost certainly underfunded, and overstretched and have been limited to only a few minor operations, with the gangs often outnumbering and outgunning the police.

Conille’s strategy is likely intended to convince Blinken to both increase US contributions but also to secure additional support from the international community. However, foreign assistance will likely be partially dependent on steps towards democratic transition, a process that currently appears unachievable with the gangs exerting so much influence across the country.

Judicial reform bill passed by lower house, despite escalating unrest.

On 3 September, protests led by striking judiciary workers took place outside the Mexican Supreme Court and Congress against the controversial judicial reform bill. The demonstrations blocked access to the Congress building, leading to lawmakers instead gathering in a gymnasium to start the voting proceedings. The Supreme Court additionally released a statement on 3 September that they would be joining the strike, following an 8-3 vote. Despite the protests, the bill was passed on 4 September by the lower house and will now go to the Senate.

Solace Global Assessment: The bill’s most controversial measures involve the direct election of approximately 7,000 judges, magistrates and Supreme Court justices, along with the removal and lowering of several requirements. Critics warn that the bill will politicise the judiciary, lessen the strength of checks and balances against the ruling Morena party, and enable organised crime to exert greater influence over the Mexican judicial system.

The Morena party is only one seat short of the required supermajority in the Senate, and it is highly likely that the bill will pass. President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum’s swearing-in ceremony will take place on 1 October, and she has indicated that the reform package will be one of the first priorities for her administration.

The indefinite nationwide strike by judiciary workers began on 19 August, and demonstrations have taken place in several cities across Mexico. The decision by the Supreme Court to join the strike is highly likely to lend further legitimacy to the protests, which are unlikely to subside in the coming weeks.

While the unrest has been generally peaceful thus far, the blocking of roads and access to Mexico’s congress is an escalation in the tactics employed by the demonstrators, likely indicative of increasing desperation to stop the bill. It is likely that as the legislation further progresses towards being signed into law, unrest will intensify.

Trucker protests paralyse Colombia’s transport network.

Widespread trucker protests have erupted across Colombia following the government’s decision to increase diesel prices. On 31 August, the government raised the price of diesel by 1,904 Colombian pesos or 45 US cents per gallon. In protest, truckers have cut off many of Colombia’s largest cities by staging roadblocks on the nation’s major highways. On 4 September, Colombia’s ombudsman stated that there were at least 127 demonstrations being held across 13 regions, with 42 of them consisting of total road blockades.

Solace Global Assessment: The almost 21 per cent increase in diesel prices by the government has been claimed as fair and justified on the grounds that the country has long subsidised prices. Prices have been held for four years at just over 9,000 pesos but the government has stated that this was fiscally unsustainable and was costing it over one trillion pesos a month.

However, truckers have argued that the immediate and high price increase is set to push their businesses to bankruptcy. Truckers have also likely been frustrated by the removal of subsidies as it has coincided with a huge increase in government spending elsewhere by Colombia’s leftist President Gustavo Petro.

Trucker protests have led to major supply chain issues, reducing the amount of food arriving at wholesale markets. If sustained, the trucker protests are likely to result in price increases and could spark unrest within major cities like Bogota, Medellin and Cali. Colombia’s largest state-owned oil and gas company, Ecopetrol, has also warned that the protests will affect the production of hydrocarbons and fuel supplies across the country.

This trend has been exacerbated by a spate of attacks on Colombia’s pipeline infrastructure in areas held by the National Liberation Army or ELN, following the end of a fragile ceasefire agreement.

Pro-Palestine protests likely to resume on US campuses.

Classes in multiple US colleges that were the epicentres of pro-Palestine protests, including Columbia University, began during this reporting period. It is highly likely that pro-Palestine groups will resume protests from the 6-8 September weekend, and that these will include attempts to start campus “encampments” and, more likely, disrupt local roadways and public transport.

First US presidential debate scheduled for 10 September.

Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump are set to participate in their first debate at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia on 10 September. Given the recent assassination attempt on Donald Trump and the degree of political division in the US, the debates will almost certainly involve heightened security measures and will likely attract large demonstrations in support of a range of issues, most likely the conflict in the Middle East.

Venezuela issues arrest warrant for opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez.

Gonzalez and co-leader of the opposition Maria Corina Machado are currently believed to be in hiding in Venezuela, while other prominent opposition members have either escaped or sought refuge in diplomatic offices in the country. The arrest order is almost certainly meant to reinforce the government’s legitimacy, and may be a prelude to more violent suppression of remaining opposition groups and individuals associated with Gonzalez. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that authorities are aiming to provoke the expatriation of Gonzalez and Machado, likely aiming to link their positions with foreign adversaries of the Maduro regime, while also reducing their ability to coordinate domestic protests at a later date.

US sailor detained by Venezuelan authorities.

According to Pentagon officials, a US Navy sailor was detained in Caracas on 30 August and is currently being held by the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). The detained US service member was reportedly not on approved leave or official travel, and his purpose in-country is currently unknown. On 2 September, the US Justice Department seized a plane belonging to Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, which will likely impede the sailor’s release. It is a realistic possibility that the detention is a result of Venezuelan hostage diplomacy. It is additionally, however, a realistic possibility that the detention relates to concerns from Venezuelan authorities regarding subversive anti-regime actions from US nationals, heightened since the failed 2020 coup plot Operation Gideon that was led by an ex-US service member.

Loggers killed by indigenous group in Peruvian Amazon.

On September 3, two loggers were killed and two others are missing after a clash with the Mashco Piro, an isolated indigenous community in Peru’s Amazon. The conflict occurred in the Madre de Dios region where loggers have been clearing a trail. Confrontations between loggers and indigenous tribes are like to increase as the logging, both legal and illegal, of the Amazon increases. The Peruvian government is investigating the incident, under pressure from local rights groups who claim that the government is failing to recognise indigenous territory.

Continued row between Brazilian judiciary and Elon Musk.

The judiciary of Brazil ordered the owner of X.com, Elon Musk, to uphold the country’s ban on the social network, which followed the platform’s refusal to comply with court orders regarding the removal of profiles spreading disinformation. Musk initially refused to comply with the latest order and has increasingly accused the Brazilian government of ideologically motivated censorship. Musk’s involvement in Brazilian politics has been praised by supporters of former President Bolsonaro, who have called for protests against the Supreme Court on 7 September.

Haiti’s main hydro-electric plant ceases to operate.

On 3 September, Haiti’s state-owned power company, Electricité d’Haiti (EDH), reported that output from the Peligre hydroelectric plant had ceased due to protests over power distribution, with protestors demanding that energy be redistributed beyond the capital, Port-au-Prince. The plant, which provides most of Haiti’s hydroelectric power, has been offline since 2 September, worsened by damage to two transformers and disrupted access due to gang control. Only 49 per cent of Haitians reportedly now have grid access, with the energy blackout likely to further exacerbate many of the country’s current issues, including crime, displacement and the humanitarian situation.

August worst month in two decades for Brazilian wildfires.

Satellite-derived data from Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (Inpe) has indicated that August was the worst month for wildfires in the country since 2010. The 38,266 fire hotspots identified in the Amazon in August were nearly twice the amount observed in the previous month. Warmer temperatures and drier vegetation have provided conditions conducive to the spread of wildfires, many of which are started deliberately to clear land for cattle pastures. Multiple investigations are currently underway looking into possible criminal involvement in the starting of wildfires. Furthermore, deforestation has decreased the rainforest’s long-term ability to maintain moisture, suggesting that future wildfires will increase in scale and frequency.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) wins first state parliamentary election in Thuringia.

In addition to winning 32.8 per cent of the votes cast in the central German state, the party also received the second most votes in Saxony, 31 per cent. The results represent the first time that a far-right party has won an election in Germany since the Second World War.

Solace Global Assessment: The AfD is unlikely to enter the state’s government, as the remaining parties are likely to adopt a strategy of alliances similar to that used by their French counterparts to prevent Le Pen’s National Rally from obtaining power. Still, the result is notable as it is the first time that the AfD has won a state election and is likely to have a significant impact on German politics.

Compared to other European far-right parties – for instance, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy or Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, which have moderated some of their positions in order to court moderate right votes – the AfD’s continued rise has not coincided with a notable change in its proposed policies. In Thuringia itself, the party is led by Björn Höcke, who was found guilty by German courts for using Nazi rhetoric twice. It is likely that the AfD’s victory will prompt civil unrest in Thuringia, Saxony, and in large urban centres in Germany.

There is a realistic possibility that increasing popular support for the AfD will be seized by far-right and identitarian groups to carry out demonstrations and symbolic disruptive action. Finally, the positive performance (15.8 per cent of the vote in Thuringia and 11.8 per cent in Saxony) of the new Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance party (BSW) is also notable. BSW was founded in January 2024 after breaking away from The Left party, and it represents a left-wing populist, socially conservative and nationalist formation that rejects Berlin’s support for Ukraine and the environmentalist policies of the rest of the left.

On 22 September, elections are scheduled for Brandenburg. Polls predict an AfD win (with more than 24 per cent of the vote) and show a realistic chance for BSW to come third or fourth. Another AfD victory, and continued BSW growth, are likely to seriously damage the current governing coalition’s perceived legitimacy. They may, furthermore, create questions about the viability of the SPD-CDU coalition.

Finally, it is important to note that there has been a rise in lone-wolf Islamist attacks in Germany, and media associated with groups like the Islamic State (IS) have called for further attacks following the Mannheim stabbing in late May. It is possible that the AfD victory, even if not directly resulting in the passing of new policies in the short term, will drive a rise in extremist activity in Germany.

Largest West Bank operation of the war ends, Hamas shares new hostage policy.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) declared, on 6 September, that their almost two-weeks-long raids in Jenin, Tulkarem and Tubas have ended. The large-scale operation, which has resulted in at least 33 deaths and 140 injuries, including the head of Hamas in Jenin, was described by Israeli authorities as a response to a growing number of attacks on Israeli settlers and citizens in the West Bank and Israeli territory. In Gaza, Hamas announced a new policy of killing Israeli captives if IDF forces approach areas where they are being held, following the recovery of six hostages’ bodies who had reportedly been shot by their guards, The policy reportedly dates back to June. The reports on the deaths of the six hostages prompted further protests in Israel calling for the Netanyahu administration to reach a ceasefire deal. Protests in Israel were particularly severe in Tel Aviv, with at least 550,000 demonstrators gathering in the city.

Solace Global Assessment: The question of the control over the Philadelphi corridor likely remains the main obstacle in the way of a ceasefire deal. On 4 September, Israeli officials stated that IDF positions at the border with Egypt would be assessed at the war’s end. For Tel Aviv, maintaining control of the Philadelphi corridor is crucial to depriving Hamas of lethal aid and degrading its capabilities. Hamas leaders are likewise highly likely aware of the general degradation of their fighting strength, and of the skills of the fighters that they are able to recruit from the Palestinian population – whose survivability rate has decreased in recent months.

The new hostage policy – which was notably only announced months after its first apparent implementation, likely reflects Hamas’ growing concern over its ability to hold and transfer hostages whilst under pressure from IDF operations. The tactic may also be indicative of a new strategy aimed at undermining Israeli resolve and applying pressure on the Netanyahu administration.

The executions will almost certainly fuel further unrest in Israel and could put pressure on Tel Aviv to accept ceasefire demands that are more favourable to Hamas. However, the often indiscriminate nature of the Israeli campaign to date would suggest that it is unlikely to cause a major shift in Netanyahu’s demands. Moreover, the hostages are Hamas’ main source of leverage. Executing them en masse would diminish this leverage and reaffirm Netanyahu’s stance that Hamas needs to be completely destroyed as a military and political force.

Rival Libyan legislatures jointly agree to appoint new central bank governor.

On 3 September, Libya’s two rival legislative bodies jointly signed a statement agreeing to appoint a central bank governor within 30 days. Previously, on 18 August, long-term governor Sadiq al-Kabir was unilaterally dismissed by the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), which increased tensions In Libya. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) is responsible for holding Libya’s oil revenues, with Libya’s oil reserves being the largest in Africa. The crisis at the CBL has had a wide-ranging impact on Libya’s economy, hampering the payment of state salaries and ordinary transactions.

Assessment: The agreement is likely to reduce tensions in Libya, which have in recent weeks been at their highest since the 2020 ceasefire between the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA, now the GNU) and the Benghazi-based Libyan National Army (LNA).

The LNA has been highly likely instrumentalising the flow of oil, causing shutdowns and reduced operations at several oil fields including Libya’s largest, the Shahara oil field. Mass LNA troop mobilisations in the west and southwest of the country, particularly in the vicinity of the strategically significant Ghadames Airport, have caused great concern that Libya is on the verge of renewed civil war.

While the agreement to resolve the crisis at the CBL will likely lessen tensions in the short term, and will likely alleviate the threat of economic crisis, it still remains a realistic possibility that renewed conflict could break out in Libya between the rival governments.

Over 100 killed in Islamist attack in northeast Nigeria.

On 1 September, approximately 150 armed militants suspected of belonging to the Islamist group Boko Haram conducted an attack on the village of Mafa, Yobe State in northeast Nigeria. The militants arrived on motorcycles armed with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades and then began to indiscriminately attack locals and set fire to multiple homes and businesses. Original estimates put the death toll at just under 40; however, most revisions have now placed the death toll at over 100.

Solace Global Assessment: The attack took place in northeast Nigeria, where an Islamist insurgency primarily led by Boko Haram has lasted for 15 years and has taken the lives of approximately 40,000 people. It is almost certain that Boko Haram operates within this area with a high degree of freedom and is likely exploiting the increased destabilisation of the wider Sahel region to conduct increased cross-border operations. This attack closely resembles the recent Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) attack in Burkina Faso which killed as many as 500 people. Boko Haram has traditionally employed a range of tactics, including suicide bombings, mass kidnappings and raids or armed assaults.

However, there is a realistic possibility that the success of JNIM’s attack, the overstretching of Nigerian security services and the growing strength of Boko Haram have inspired it to transition towards more hit-and-run raids using motorcycles. These attacks enable Boko Haram to attack isolated villages and then swiftly withdraw before the military can be deployed to the area.

Additionally, by targeting small villages, Boko Haram may force military commanders to spread their resources thinly, making it challenging to allocate sufficient support to defend future potential targets. Of note, unconfirmed reports indicate that militants left the area and rigged the roads leading to it with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), highly likely in an effort to delay the arrival of the armed forces. The scale and sophistication of the attack likely indicate a growth in Boko Haram’s organisational and logistical capacity, which have likely been facilitated by the group’s alliances with regional bandits and ability to exploit safe havens in border areas.

These attacks are likely to continue and will undermine the government’s authority and its ability to provide security, a development that is likely to lead to civil unrest against the government in Nigeria’s north- a trend that has been witnessed throughout the region.

Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier appointed new French Prime Minister.

Barnier is a representative of the Gaullist right adjacent to the Republicans (LR). His appointment ends a two-month-long period of uncertainty that followed the National Assembly elections. The move is likely to be followed by concessions to the right, particularly Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN), which will be crucial to surviving a no-confidence vote. Barnier’s appointment is almost certainly going to be received extremely negatively by the left-wing coalition, the New Popular Front (NFP), which had suggested Lucie Castets as a potential prime minister. The NFP was seemingly moving towards collapse due to tensions between its two main members, the Socialists (PS) and the populist France Unbowed (LFI). However, with Macron turning to the right rather than the PS, the left is likely to call for large-scale anti-Macron demonstrations in the coming weeks. As numerous far-left groups threatened violent action if LFI was kept from governing, there is a high likelihood of sabotage.

Pro-Palestine protests likely to increase in intensity in Western Europe.

It is likely that pro-Palestine protests will increase in intensity in September in European countries that have had major protest movements, especially in large urban centres. This is due to multiple factors: the beginning of the academic year, the overlap with multiple Palestine-related anniversaries (i.e. Black September, Oslo Accords), and the approaching one-year anniversary of the 7 October attack.

Volkswagen (VW) cost-cutting plans are likely to provoke civil unrest in Germany.

Senior representatives of the automotive industry giant, which employs about half of its 600,000 workers in Germany, have announced that they are considering cutting production in Germany to relocate plants to other more competitive markets, where labour costs are lower. The announcement is likely to translate into concrete policies, as VW has recently had a decline in profits and competitiveness, especially in the growing electric vehicle market. There is a high likelihood that further pressures will result in labour union reactions, including strikes and protests, in areas that host VW plants.

Major transport strikes organised across Italy.

A series of public transport and air travel strikes have been organised across Italy and are set to begin on 7 September. Strikes over worker conditions for ground operations workers, air traffic controllers and baggage handlers are set to cause major disruptions at Rome’s Fiumicino and Olbia, Milan Malpensa, Florence Amerigo Vespucci and Pisa Galileo Galilei airports. A nationwide rail strike organised for 9 September will be closely followed by a nationwide public transport workers’ walkout will almost certainly cause major disruption on Italy’s train, bus, tram and underground services.

Kosovo closes institutions that serve Serb minority.

On 31 August, Kosovar authorities closed five institutions in the north that served the ethnic Serb minority, a move that escalated tensions with Serbia. Kosovo’s local administration minister, Elbert Krasniqi, stated that these institutions violated Kosovo’s constitution and laws. US officials expressed worries that the move could destabilise the region, a concern that has likely been amplified by Russia’s recent attempts to sow division in the area, including treating Bosnia’s breakaway Republika Srpska as a recognised state. The head of Mitrovica Citizens’ Association, a Kosovar Serb group, has announced the blockade of all administrative border crossings with Serbia in North Kosovo in response to Kosovo’s actions.

Two US marines attacked by mob in Turkey.

Ten individuals were arrested for attacking two US marines in the centre of Izmir. The perpetrators were reportedly part of a nationalist and left-Kemalist (the ideology based on the ideas of Turkish 20^th century leader Ataturk) group known as the Youth Union of Turkey. The arrests have been challenged by the group, and there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory protests by the Youth Union in Izmir and other cities where it has a strong presence, including Istanbul. The actions may also lead to similar attacks on US personnel within Turkey.

Algerian President Tebboune likely to win re-election on 7 September.

The vote, which has been protested by the opposition for being rescheduled to September rather than the customary date in December, is likely to be affected by low voter turnout and government interference. Tebboune’s highly likely re-election could result in protests in Algiers and other cities, albeit these are unlikely to reach the severity of the 2019 protests.

Senegal likely to look to the West for counterterrorism operations.

The newly elected government of Senegal, which has espoused an overall anti-West rhetoric and has previously made diplomatic gestures in favour of the neighbouring Sahel junta states, asked for more international cooperation to tackle local jihadist groups during a visit by Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez. It is highly likely that the move is a response to the failure of the junta states’ counterterrorism operations, which are becoming increasingly reliant on Russian help which has yet to curtail the rate of extremist attacks. The Islamist groups operating in the Sahel likely aim to reach the comparatively richer coastal West African states, as part of growing ambitions to develop territorial entities.

Islamist lone wolf attack in Munich.

The attack occurred on 5 September, near the Israeli consulate and a Holocaust Museum. The attacker almost certainly carried out the attack to coincide with the 52^nd anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, where members of the Palestinian organisation Black September took hostages and killed 11 Israeli athletes. The Munich attacker was killed by police, and no other casualties were recorded. The attack is notable due to the use of a long-barrel rifle by the perpetrator as, in Europe, most lone-wolf attacks involve bladed weapons. According to police reports, the attacker was a self-radicalised 18-year-old supporter of the Islamic State (IS). In 2023, he had reportedly already been investigated by authorities for terrorism-related offences. The attack continues the trend of notably young lone wolves, likely underscoring the growing effect of online self-radicalisation.

Houthis reportedly attack two oil tankers in the Red Sea, including Saudi flagged vessel.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that the Houthis struck the Panama flagged MV BLUE LAGOON I and the Saudi flagged MV AMJAD on 2 September with two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and one one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV). Neither vessel was seriously damaged. The Houthis and Saudi Arabia, after being engaged in a seven-year conflict between 2015-2022, are participating in ongoing peace negotiations and have generally abided by a cessation of fighting since 2022. Both vessels were sailing in close proximity to each other, and it is likely that the Houthis accidentally struck the MV AMJAD. The AMJAD’s owner, Saudi shipping firm Bahri, “unequivocally affirm[ed] that AMJAD was not targeted”, and the Houthis omitted any mention of the AMJAD in their claim of responsibility. This highly likely indicates that both parties are keen to avoid jeopardising peace negotiations.

Prison break in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) results in more than 100 deaths.

The escape started after a riot broke out in the Makala prison of Kinshasa. Authorities responded violently and the resulting clashes killed at least 129 and injured 59. DRC prisons are highly overcrowded, and the government has recently sought to release some inmates convicted of low-level offences to alleviate the pressure. There is a realistic possibility that the combination of overcrowding and insufficient police resources will provoke further riots and prison break attempts.

Uganda opposition leader Bobi Wine shot by police.

Bobi Wine was initially elected as an independent but joined the opposition National Unity Platform party prior to the 2021 presidential election. In early 2024, he announced that he would again run in 2026, challenging Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda since 1986. The autocratic government of Uganda is characterised by a strong symbiotic relationship between government, the judiciary, and security forces, and there is a high likelihood that the shooting was a deliberate attempt on the opposition leader’s life. Due to Bobi Wine’s domestic and international popularity, it is likely that the case will spark significant unrest.

At least one tourist dead following flash floods in Mallorca, Spain.

The individual died while hiking in the area of the Torrent de Pareis, in the Tramuntana mountain range. Approximately ten other people were also trapped by the floods before being rescued. On 2-3 September, extreme weather, with severe showers and localised flash flooding, affected various coastal areas throughout the Mediterranean, including parts of Greece, central Italy and eastern Spain.

Protest bill approved ahead of planned demonstration by main opposition party.

On 5 September, the Pakistani Senate passed the ‘Peaceful Assembly and Public Order Bill 2024’ law. Pending further approval, the law is set to be implemented before a planned major 8 September demonstration by the main opposition party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in support of the jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan. The proposed legislation will empower Islamabad officials to ban assemblies in designated areas, with participants in unauthorised protests liable to receive prison sentences of up to three years.

Solace Global Assessment: In 2023, large-scale civil unrest frequently occurred in Pakistan after attempts to arrest Khan. Initially, the protests were managed by police with riot control measures such as tear gas and water cannons. Later demonstrations led to military deployment and internet shutdowns. Critics view the bill as a government tactic to suppress opposition and the bill’s passage is likely to heighten tensions.

The 8 September demonstration had already been rescheduled from 22 August following the withdrawal of permission by officials, and it is likely that authorities will attempt to suppress the upcoming rally. It is highly likely that violent clashes will occur in Islamabad during the protest. The bill reflects the government’s unstable position following contentious elections in February 2024 and will likely exacerbate levels of violence in future protests that are not granted official permission.

Garment workers protest for higher pay in industrial areas.

Protests by garment factory workers in early September, mainly in key industrial areas such as Gazipur and Narayanganj, resulted in the closure of 130 garment factories. Their demands include higher wages, maternity leave and other concessions. The protesters vandalised factories and vehicles, as well as blocked roads, which resulted in the deployment of military and police forces. Although some workers continued to work throughout the protests, factories were forced to close in order to protect their employees from the violence. The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) stated that unspecified “outsiders” were responsible for the violence. The protests initially focused on the demands of garment workers, but then reportedly escalated when outsiders joined the demonstrations, gathering outside factories demanding jobs and pressuring workers to join the protests. In response to the protests, the government has increased security in industrial areas, which allowed the factories to reopen on 5 September.

Solace Global Assessment: These protests are the first significant labour action in Bangladesh’s garment sector since the new interim government took office in August. Although there is increased security in the areas where protests took place, tensions are still likely to persist because a negotiated settlement between the garment workers and BGMEA has not yet been reached. The BGMEA has suggested that the unrest may be linked to the current political instability of Bangladesh, with tensions remaining high since the resignation of the prime minister on 9 August following weeks of deadly protests. Although an interim government has been established to restore law and order, it is likely that groups may be exploiting this to gain access and control of the garment market. On top of this, the ongoing mass floods across Bangladesh have meant factories have had to grapple with production stoppages. The political instability and financial strain the BGMEA are facing mean it is unlikely that the BGMEA will meet the demands of the protests, which would highly likely generate further unrest.In October and November 2023, garment workers’ strikes led to violent clashes with police, with at least three deaths and factories being set alight. There is a realistic possibility that equivalent levels of violence could occur again as a result of the ongoing industrial disputes.

Super Typhoon strength storm Yagi makes landfall in Hainan.

Tropical Cyclone Yagi made landfall in Hainan, China, on 6 September. The storm made landfall at Super Typhoon strength, equivalent to a category 5 hurricane, with maximum windspeeds recorded of 241km/h. Yagi had earlier impacted the northern Philippines on 3-4 September as Severe Tropical Storm Enteng, killing 16 people. Luzon was the most impacted. Yagi then moved past Hong Kong and Macau, causing disruptions.

The Chinese Central Meteorological Agency has issued a red typhoon warning for Hainan and Guangdong, the highest warning possible. Over 400,000 people were evacuated on the southern Chinese coastline.

Solace Global Assessment: Yagi is the second-strongest Tropical Cyclone to occur anywhere in the world in 2024. It is the largest storm to hit Hainan since 2014 when Typhoon Rammasun killed at least 88 people and caused over USD 6.25 billion in damages. Hainan is a tropical holiday destination, referred to as “China’s Hawaii”. In anticipation of the Super Typhoon, Hainan was brought to a standstill, with businesses, schools and transport being halted. While the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area was spared notably severe impact, the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai bridge and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange were closed.

The impact in Hainan, where Yagi has made landfall as a Super Typhoon, is highly likely to be worse. Meteorologists have warned that the scale of damage in Hainan could be “catastrophic”. The rigorous preparedness measures by Chinese authorities will, however, significantly aid in mitigating the worst possible outcomes.

Yagi is forecast to weaken from a Super Typhoon to a Very Strong Typhoon once it moves past Hainan, before weakening further to Typhoon strength just before making landfall in northern Vietnam. Four airports have already been closed in northern Vietnam, including Hanoi’s Noi Bai International Airport. Despite Yagi’s greatly increased strength over southern China, it is a realistic possibility that Yagi will cause more fatalities in Vietnam due to Vietnam’s higher level of vulnerability.

Putin visits Mongolia despite ICC arrest warrant.

The state visit likely represents an effort by Putin to highlight that, despite its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Russia is not internationally isolated. The visit is also likely to reflect ongoing Russian efforts to begin transitioning from its reliance on Europe as the main market for its fossil fuels. Russia and Mongolia have continued talks regarding the construction of a pipeline connecting the two countries.

Pope Francis tours Southeast Asia.

Pope Francis has arrived in Indonesia as part of his 12-day tour of Southeast Asia where he will visit Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Indonesia. In Jakarta, the Pope and Grand Imam Nasaruddin Umar of Istiqlal Mosque pledged to combat religious violence and environmental degradation, highlighting interfaith unity through a symbolic event at the mosque.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) carries out suicide bombing in Kabul.

ISKP had previously carried out a suicide bombing in Kandahar, one of the Taliban’s main strongholds. Its attack outside a Kabul government office, which killed at least six, is likely meant to further demonstrate the group’s ability to strike the Taliban’s administrative centres. Taliban authorities have continuously minimised the threat posed by ISKP, which nevertheless continues to be the Islamic State’s most active and likely most capable “province”.

South China Sea confrontations continue at Sabina Shoal.

Manila and Beijing accused each other of deliberately ramming each other’s vessels in an incident on 31 August at the disputed Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea. Aggressive confrontations between Chinese and Filipino vessels have occurred multiple times in recent months at the Second Thomas Shoal, and a deal was reached in late July that was hoped to de-escalate the situation. However, the new incident at the Sabina Shoal, in addition to a reported vessel collision there on 19 August, highly likely indicates that tensions remain high in the South China Sea with a new flashpoint for confrontations at the Sabina Shoal.

Monsoon rains cause deadly flooding in southern India.

Higher than average monsoon rains resulted in the deaths at least 33 people in southern India between 1 and 3 September. Significant flooding occurred as a result of the annual monsoon season since June. Forecasts indicate that the heavy rainfall will continue into late September. While the monsoon season is an annually recurring issue, this year’s monsoon will ultimately highly likely cause a greater level of impact than in previous years, exacerbated by La Nina weather conditions that will likely develop in September. Officials from the India Meteorological Department (IMD) indicate that the withdrawal of the monsoon season will likely be delayed as a result of developing La Nina weather conditions.

Military doctors deployed in South Korean hospitals due to ongoing strikes.

The measure was announced by the health ministry on 2 September to try to alleviate shortages in medical staff. Thousands of junior doctors have been conducting strikes since February 2024, in protest of government plans to drastically increase annual medical school admission caps. While authorities dispute claims by the national association of medical school professions that the medical system is on the verge of collapse, the deployment of military doctors is likely indicative of serious concerns that the staff shortage has drastically impacted the provision of healthcare.

Congressional commission approves controversial judicial reform bill.

On 26 August, a commission in the lower house of Mexico’s Congress approved a judicial reform package, enabling a final debate to take place in the newly-elected Congress next month. The ruling Morena party, who won a landslide victory in June, will hold a two-thirds supermajority in the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies and are only one seat short in the Senate.

The most controversial measure in the judicial reform bill involves a plan to have approximately 7,000 judges, magistrates and Supreme Court justices elected by popular vote. Additionally, the bill scraps a 35-year age limit, lowers experience requirements, and reduces the size of the Supreme Court. The overhaul of the judiciary is planned to be enacted in stages, with staggered judicial elections taking place in 2025 and 2027.

In reaction, both the US and Canadian embassies expressed serious concerns, which led to Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) announcing a pause in relations with these embassies on 27 August. Unions that represent many of the 55,000 judicial workers in Mexico previously launched an indefinite nationwide strike on 19 August, later joined by Mexico’s association of federal judges and magistrates, in protest against the potential reform package.

Solace Global Assessment: 

AMLO, the popular outgoing president who has enjoyed high approval ratings and will be replaced by his successor Claudia Sheinbaum in October, frequently clashed with the courts during his presidential term. The Supreme Court in particular, impeded the implementation of several of AMLO’s initiatives. In response, AMLO has frequently described the Mexican judiciary as corrupt. Proponents of the judicial reform bill argue that it will address endemic corruption in the judiciary. It is highly likely, however, that the bill will further empower the ruling Moreno party. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) held uninterrupted power for 71 years until 2000, effectively making Mexico a single-party state during this period. While constitutional reform has addressed some of these historic issues in Mexico’s democracy, critics of the judicial reform argue that its passage will give the Moreno party too much power without adequate checks and balances.

While purportedly intended to tackle corruption, the bill’s passage would likely enable organised crime to exploit judicial elections for their own ends. During Mexico’s elections, the cartels regularly assassinate candidates and engage in voter suppression. If judges are directly elected, it is highly likely that cartels will attempt to subvert the democratic process, undermining the strength of the judiciary in tackling organised crime. The strikes against the bill have temporarily weakened Mexico’s fragile justice system, and it is likely that the strikes will continue and potentially escalate if the bill passes through both houses.

Large wildfires continue in Brazil, authorities suspect criminal cause.

Record-breaking wildfires are ongoing across the Amazon, Cerrado savannah, Pantanal wetland and the state of Sao Paulo in Brazil. So far, two people have died as a result of the fires, in Urupes. 48 cities declared a red alert due to poor air quality. The smog has impacted cities such as Brazil’s capital, Brasilia, as well as Sao Paulo, Manaus, Porto Velho, Rio Branco and Sao Jose do Rio Preto. In Sao Paulo state, a crisis cabinet was set up to tackle the fires, and the Brazilian environment minister declared that Brazil is “at war” with the fires on 25 August.the paragraph.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Authorities suspect that organised crime gangs are largely responsible for the fires. While a federal prosecutor has stated that there is so far no conclusive evidence that the arson has been coordinated, there are several indications that criminal gangs are likely involved.

Firstly, of the 3,500 fire alerts in southeastern Sao Paulo state, over half were raised on the same day, 23 August. The State Agriculture Secretary later told media that the starting of fires in different locations at the same time indicates coordination and criminal intent. Secondly, according to Brazilian President Lula da Silva, no fires caused by lightning strikes were detected by Brazil’s national fire monitoring centre. Thirdly, Brazilian police have arrested four people linked to the fires, with two men caught on security cameras setting fires.

Some of the suspects have reportedly told police that the fires were set in retaliation against crimefighting efforts. It is likely that the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) gang, one of Brazil’s largest and most powerful organised criminal groups, are connected to the fires. Authorities have recently engaged in a campaign to tackle the PCC’s illicit adulterated fuels trade, which is the most likely trigger for retaliation by the PCC. In 2006, the PCC unleashed a wave of violence across Sao Paulo state which killed over 150 people.

While human involvement in Brazilian wildfires is not uncommon, mainly due to illegal deforestation and agricultural practices, the potential weaponisation of wildfires by criminal gangs is a concerning new development. With a relatively low number of resources, manpower and technical skill, the setting of wildfires can have a significant, highly visible and widespread impact that overstretches resources and capabilities.

The effects of the current fires are being felt in several major Brazilian cities, which are covered in smog. It is likely that if the fires are indeed the result of coordinated organised criminal actions, gangs will continue to deploy the tactic in future when the need for retaliation arises. There is a realistic possibility that gangs elsewhere in Latin America may be inspired by the weaponisation of wildfires and deploy the tactic themselves.

Honduras to end extradition treaty with the US.

On 28 August, Honduras announced that it would terminate its century-old extradition treaty with the US following US concerns over a meeting between Honduran and Venezuelan defence officials about drug trafficking. President Xiomara Castro condemned what she saw as US interference in Honduran politics. The treaty had facilitated the extradition of prominent figures, including former President Juan Orlando Hernandez, convicted in the US on drug charges. The treaty’s termination likely signals Honduras’ alignment with Venezuela and a deterioration in US-Honduran relations which could harm US efforts to combat drugs trafficking.

Protests and government crackdown continue in Venezuela.

Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado called for peaceful protests and international pressure to oust Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, on 27 August. This follows a 22 August decision by the Supreme Court of Venezuela, which is made up of Maduro loyalists, to certify the contested 28 July election result. The election result was highly likely rigged by the regime, with several indications that the opposition won a landslide victory. The regime has since launched a crackdown, and on 27 August, leading opposition figure and lawyer Perkins Rocha was allegedly “kidnapped” by security forces.  An opposition demonstration occurred in Caracas on 28 August, attended by Machado, which was smaller than prior protests. There had been a relative lull in unrest in the past fortnight, highly likely due to the impact of government suppression in arresting protest leaders and the threat of reprisals. While Machado’s call for a revival of anti-government protests is likely to temporarily increase unrest in Venezuela in the short term, it is likely that the extent of the regime’s crackdown will severely curtail the opposition’s organisational capability.

Haitian military starts recruitment drive to combat gang violence.

The Haitian government has launched a huge recruitment drive for its military in a bid to combat escalating gang violence, with gangs controlling 80 per cent of the country. Thousands of Haitian youth are seizing the opportunity, likely as it is one of the few sustainable sources of revenue in a country plagued by poverty and unemployment. However, after being disbanded in 1995 and only reinstated in 2017, it is likely that the military is ill-equipped to deal with the well-armed and organised gangs. Haitian forces have also initiated a joint operation with the recently deployed Kenyan police to oust gangs from one of Port-au-Prince’s most dangerous neighbourhoods. However, the Kenyan police have not yet been paid by the UN, which, if this continues, could impact the effectiveness of the intervention force.

US warns of increased violence in Culiacan, Sinaloa.

The US Embassy in Mexico issued a security alert on 29 August warning of violence and security concerns in Culiacan, Sinaloa province. The alert has warned of the potential for violence across the state but has not provided further details. The alert has likely been published in response to the recent arrest of the Sinaloa Cartel’s leader, “El Mayo” and the son of El Chapo Guzman which has created a power vacuum in Mexico’s most powerful organised crime group.

Central Bolivia struggles to contain wildfires.

The central Bolivian department of Santa Cruz is grappling with a severe environmental crisis, as over 27 wildfires rage, mainly in the Chiquitania region. These fires, exacerbated by extreme drought and strong winds, have devastated 26 of the department’s 56 municipalities and burned nearly 2 million hectares, surpassing the damage caused by the 2019 fires. The situation is particularly dire in municipalities such as San Ignacio de Velasco, San Matías, Santa Ana, and Concepción, where conditions remain favourable for further fire spread. Moreover, Bolivia lacks the personnel and resources to effectively curtail the spread of the fires and will likely be forced to ask for international aid. Fires have significantly worsened air quality, severely affecting vulnerable populations like children, the elderly, and those with respiratory conditions.

Brazilian state of Rondônia declares state of emergency.

The Brazilian state of Rondônia has declared a state of emergency for 180 days valid from 26 August due to the impact of forest fires. The number of fires has doubled compared to August 2023, with nearly 6000 so far in 2024. The fires have hugely disrupted agriculture, river navigation and the local economy. The state is also suffering from water shortages due to a prolonged drought, which is forecasted to last for the next 90 days. The major city of Porto-Velho has not recorded significant rainfall for three months. Water levels on the Madeira River, which runs through the states of Rondônia and Amazonas, have reached their lowest level since 1964 and will likely disproportionately affect riverine communities.

Widespread power outages reported across Venezuela.

Power outages were reported in at least 17 Venezuelan regions, including the capital Caracas on 30 August. The outages are similar to the ones in 2019 which began just before the presidential election and lasted for several months afterwards. The 2019 outages resulted in at least 43 deaths after disrupting the country’s healthcare facilities, transport, industry, and water services. President Maduro blamed both the 2019 and current outages on “sabotage”; however, the likelihood is that Venezuela has suffered a huge reduction in technical expertise following a brain drain of skilled workers.

Macron rules out appointment of prime minister from New Popular Front.

On 26 August, the office of French President Emmanuel Macron stated that following consultations, Macron has ruled out the appointment of a prime minister from the left-wing coalition New Popular Front (NFP).

The June and July snap legislative elections resulted in a hung parliament, with the NFP, Macron’s centrist Ensemble party, and the far-right National Rally (RN) parties winning most of the available seats. Of these, the NFP won the most seats. The RN stated earlier on 26 August that the party would block any prime ministerial appointment coming from the NFP. In reaction, the NFP has announced a refusal to engage in any new consultations unless they are to discuss the nomination of their candidate, Lucie Castets, as prime minister. 

Solace Global Assessment: The NFP is an electoral alliance between the far-left France Unbowed (LFI), the Socialists, the Greens and the Communists. Of these, Mélenchon’s LFI has the most seats. While Castets, is affiliated with the centre-left Socialist Party, it is likely that her confirmation that she would appoint LFI ministers led Macron to conclude that her appointment would be politically unworkable. This is due to the threat of no-confidence motions against a government with LFI ministers. In recent political history, since the establishment of the French Fifth Republic’s strong presidential system in 1958, coalition negotiations have not been a common feature of the French political process. The current stalemate is unlikely to be resolved with a stable, lasting solution. The NFP and NR are likely to both seek to exploit the political chaos to oust Macron, whose presidential term is set to end in 2027, via a call for an early presidential election, should the stalemate not be resolved. The LFI has called for large demonstrations on 7 September, a day before the end of the Paris Paralympic Games, and the Communists have called for a “big popular mobilisation” in the coming days. It is highly likely that civil unrest will increase in France, after a lull during the Olympic Games. Due to the high-security measures that will be enforced during the Paralympic Games in Paris, it is likely that demonstrations will be met with a vigorous police response, which would in turn likely lead to violent clashes.

Al-Qaeda-linked militants killed hundreds on road to capital.

On 24 August, the Burkinabe town of Barsalogho was targeted in a major militant attack. Current estimates assess that as many as 200-500 people were killed in the attack and hundreds injured, most of whom were reportedly civilians. The attack has been claimed by the al-Qaeda-linked Jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The military government was reportedly aware of an impending attack and ordered troops, Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) and civilians to hastily erect defences. JNIM ambushed the defenders in the open, firing indiscriminately on those within the defensive area until reinforcements of Burkinabe troops and the VDP managed to repel the attack.

Solace Global Assessment: The Barsalogho attack marks the worst terrorist attack in Burkina Faso’s history and clearly demonstrates how much the security situation has deteriorated since the expulsion of Western forces. Moreover, with the junta government’s expulsion of Western forces in neighbouring Niger and Mali, violent extremist organisations (VEOs) have been presented with favourable conditions to achieve their objectives. JNIM in particular have exploited the regional destabilisation to expand their operations across the Sahel. Whilst VEOs like JNIM do not typically govern territory in the same manner as a state, it is now assessed that JNIM controls approximately 40 per cent of Burkina Faso as well as huge parts of Mali and Niger.

The attack has almost certainly increased pressure on the junta government and forms part of JNIM’s strategy to target isolated government-held towns to undermine the junta’s authority. Barsalogho is strategically important because the next town is Kaya, located in north-central Burkina Faso, which hosts the last major government military base before reaching the capital, Ouagadougou.

JNIM is likely to continue to employ such brutal tactics to further undermine the regime and also to force civilians to flee as it advances towards Ouagadougou. The current Islamist insurgency, which involves multiple VEOs, has led to multiple coup attempts. This is likely to result in the junta prioritising regime security over counter-insurgency efforts, leading to greater instability and more attacks.

After the expulsion of Western forces, the junta has relied on external support from Mali under the recently formed Alliance of Sahel States and to a lesser extent Russian mercenaries. With Mali facing a similar situation, it is not in a position to send serious reinforcements without jeopardising its security. Russian forces are currently conducting more offensive operations in Mali with limited success. The junta may look to the Kremlin for additional support, although with the war in Ukraine, Russian forces are likely overstretched. If Burkina Faso fails to secure significant external support, it will likely set the conditions for VEOs to expand their operations into the northern parts of coastal West African states like Benin, Ghana and Togo.

Strike set for UK’s busiest airport.

On 31 August, more than 600 Border Force passport control workers at London Heathrow, the UK’s busiest airport, will go on strike for four days. This will then be followed by nearly three weeks of work-to-rule action where workers will do no more work than what is contractually obliged. The strike will almost certainly lead to significant disruption and could have knock-on effects for other UK-based airports.

State elections in Germany’s Thuringia and Saxony.

On 1 September, state elections will be held in Thuringia and Saxony. Recent polls indicate that the German far-right party, Alternative for Germany (AfD) is leading the race and has likely capitalised on the recent attack in Solingen. However, they are unlikely to win a majority, and the remaining parties will be highly reticent to form a coalition with the AfD. Another party polling well is Sahra Wagenknecht’s new Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) party, a left-wing nationalist, populist and Eurosceptic party. If both parties perform well, the remaining parties will face a challenging decision on coalition partners, as both parties advocate for agendas that significantly diverge from those of the central government.

Azerbaijan to hold parliamentary elections.

On 1 September, Azeris will go to the polls in parliamentary elections after President Ilham Aliyev dissolved parliament in June. Over fears of electoral fraud, nearly 300 election monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will observe the polls, an organisation that recently criticised the 2024 presidential election for its lack of transparency and choice. Aliyev’s New Azerbaijan party will almost certainly win the election and may increase its current majority.

CENTCOM kills al-Qaeda affiliate leader in Syria.

On 23 August, forces from the US Central Command (CENTCOM) killed the Hurras al-Din senior leader Abu-’Abd al-Rahman al-Makki in a targeted kinetic strike in Syria. Al-Makki was a Shura Council member of the al-Qaeda affiliate responsible for conducting terrorist operations in Syria. The killing could temporarily disrupt Hurras al-Din’s operations but may also inspire reprisal attacks on US forces in the region.

Israeli forces conduct largest operation in West Bank in months.

On 27 August, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) began an extensive military operation in the West Bank, launching raids in Nablus, Qabatiya, Silat al Khartia, al Fara refugee camp, Jenin refugee camp, and Nour al Shams refugee camp.

The operation has involved hundreds of personnel accompanied by drones, making the operation the largest in the West Bank for months. On 29 August, Israeli forces killed five alleged Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants, reportedly in a home next to a mosque in Tulkarm near the Nour al Shams refugee camp.

According to the IDF, one of those killed was Mohammed Jaber, known as Abu Shujaa, a commander of the local PIJ branch. Abu Shujaa is suspected to have been involved in several terror attacks, namely the June murder of an Israeli citizen in the city of Qalqilya, West Bank. Local media reports that at least 17 people have been killed in this week’s West Bank operation thus far.

The IDF has generally refrained from regularly conducting such large-scale operations in the West Bank, and the United Nations (UN) has issued a statement urging Israel to cease the operation. It is likely that such targeted operations in the West Bank will continue, due to its use as a base of operations for terrorist attacks against Israel. While the Fatah-controlled Palestinian National Authority (PA) in the West Bank are highly unlikely to react to the operation with any military response, it is likely that the relatively substantial IDF presence in the West Bank will generate civil unrest.

Egypt delivers arms to Somalia.

Egypt has delivered military aid to Somalia for the first time in over four decades in a move that will almost certainly escalate relations with Ethiopia. The move follows a recent security pact between Egypt and Somalia, partially motivated by Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland, which seeks independence from Somalia. Egypt has also offered to send troops to Somalia for a new peacekeeping mission, raising the risk of a proxy conflict between the two nations that have been at odds for years over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

AU and UN planning new Somali peacekeeping mission.

The African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) are planning a new AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia, set to replace the current mission which ends in late 2024. The AU endorsed this successor mission in June 2024, developed a strategic plan in August, and submitted it to the UN Security Council for approval.

This new mission, named the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), will maintain a similar force size to its predecessor, ATMIS, with around 11,911 personnel. AUSSOM will focus on ongoing peace-building efforts, such as providing security and countering al-Shabaab, while international partners and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) will handle state-building tasks. If the peacekeeping mission does not materialise, al-Shabaab and other militant groups will almost certainly be in an advantageous position to increase their attacks, expand their influence and undermine the SFG.

Torrential rain leads to major landslide near Naples, Italy.

A catastrophic landslide caused by torrential rain has killed at least two people near the town of San Felice a Cancello, located approximately 30 kilometres (19 miles) northeast of Naples, Italy. The area that collapsed had already been severely weakened by a wildfire that destroyed much of the vegetation. Southern Italy has been facing extreme temperatures and heavy rainfall, creating conditions ripe for flash floods, landslides, and other environmental disasters, which have been further worsened by deforestation.

World Food Program to launch investigation in Sudan.

The UN’s World Food Program (WFP) has launched an investigation into senior officials in Sudan for alleged fraud and for obfuscating the Sudanese army’s role in obstructing aid deliveries. Other allegations include mismanagement, misleading donors, and the disappearance of resources. Sudan is now facing its worst humanitarian crisis in decades as a result of the civil war. 80 per cent of health facilities are out of service, millions have been displaced and around 20 million are faced with food insecurity.

Dozens killed by bursting dam in eastern Sudan.

At least 30 people have been killed and hundreds missing in eastern Sudan after a dam burst which flooded at least 20 villages. Surging waters caused by torrential rain overwhelmed the Arbaat Dam on 25 August, just 40km north of Port Sudan, the country’s current de facto capital and home to the central government alongside international diplomats, aid agencies and thousands of displaced people. The dam was the main source of water for Port Sudan, which is also home to Sudan’s largest port and working airport, where most international aid is received. Flooding caused by the collapsed dam will almost certainly hinder humanitarian efforts which have already been greatly impeded by the civil war.

Houthis to allow assistance to damaged oil tanker in the Red Sea.

The Houthis have reportedly agreed to tugboats and rescue vessels accessing the stricken oil tanker SOUNION (IMO: 9312145) in the Red Sea. The Houthis are responsible for immobilising and damaging the Greek-flagged vessel during an attack on 21 August, and the tanker has since been abandoned. On 29 August, the Houthi media published footage showing Houthi militants boarding the abandoned vessel and detonating explosives on deck. Carrying 150,000 tonnes of crude oil, there are serious concerns that unless controlled, the leaking of oil could lead to a “potential environmental catastrophe”.

A major spill from the vessel could potentially be one of the largest vessel oil spills in history. The Pentagon has stated that the vessel appears to be leaking oil, however, Aspides, the EU mission in the Red Sea, has since stated that the area around the SOUNION is free of oil. If an oil spill occurred, Houthi Yemen would highly likely be impacted considering its dependence on fishing, which has highly likely motivated the Houthi decision to allow assistance to the vessel.

BLA conduct series of attacks under “Operation Herof”.

On 25 August, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) launched “Operation Herof” in the Balochistan region. The operation began with a complex attack that used vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) at Bela Camp to gain access to the Pakistani military facility. This was followed by BLA squads entering the compound and killing 24 Pakistani soldiers with small arms fire. BLA militants then conducted a series of attacks across the region targeting Pakistan’s security services, and critical national infrastructure (CNI) including railways, and the seizure of major highways. The BLA’s Commander-in-Chief, Bashir Zeib Baloch, stated that the declared intent of the operation was to force the Pakistani government into ceasing its operations in Balochistan. The operation included at least 800 BLA militants, took place in 12 cities across nine districts, and according to the BLA, resulted in the deaths of over 100 Pakistani troops. The BLA established roadblocks and checked the identities of people on highways, shooting 23 identified as non-local migrant workers from the Punjab region.

Solace Global Assessment: The attacks began on the 18^th anniversary of the death of a Baloch nationalist leader, likely suggesting that the BLA are continuing a trend of conducting attacks on important Baloch dates. The series of BLA attacks was likely organised to demonstrate the group’s growing capabilities and ability to launch multiple coordinated complex attacks. The successful partial seizure of a Pakistani military camp and control of highways are further evidence of the BLA’s capabilities and will likely jeopardise Pakistan’s attempts to incorporate the region into China’s Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI). The targeting of essential elements of the BRI, such as roads and railways, was likely designed to deter foreign investment and to send a strategic message that the BLA will not allow the exploitation of local resources. The purported mass execution of Punjab labourers was also likely aimed at achieving these objectives. The central government is increasingly having to turn to labour imported from other parts of Pakistan due to Baloch resistance. High-profile BLA attacks on non-Baloch labour are highly likely to increase to deter future migration into the region. The overall success of the BLA attacks and its ability to provide real-time information about the attacks combined with sophisticated propaganda videos are likely to drive BLA recruitment and funding, further contributing to its operational capabilities.

Pro-democracy journalists charged with sedition.

On 29 August, two editors who led a pro-democracy newspaper, Stand News, were tried by a Hong Kong court and found guilty of sedition. Chung Pui-kuen and Patrick Lam, could now face up to two years in prison. The case marks the first ruling against journalists in Hong Kong since the territory’s handover from the UK to China in 1997. The ruling has been condemned by rights groups as a nefarious campaign against the freedom of the press.

Solace Global Assessment: The case forms part of a wider campaign in Hong Kong aimed at suppressing dissent, and freedom of speech and will likely serve as a precedent for future rulings as Beijing consolidates its control over the territory. Beijing’s ability to stifle the opposition in Hong Kong has been greatly augmented since the introduction of the controversial National Security Law (NSL), which has been in effect since 2020. The NSL was introduced under the justification of combating secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion of foreign forces, although Beijing’s interpretation of these acts likely differs vastly from many in Hong Kong. Whilst the NSL has been greatly successful at curbing dissent, the Stand News editors were actually charged under a colonial-era sedition law. Beijing’s tactic was likely an attempt to deflect from the NSL by adhering to existing legal frameworks but with the same outcome. The case and the wider effort to suppress dissent are unlikely to provoke civil unrest after the crackdown following the 2019-20 protests. However, it will likely damage Hong Kong’s reputation and contribute to deterring foreign investment in one of the world’s major business hubs.

Typhoon Shanshan makes landfall in Kyushu.

The strongest typhoon in the 2024 Pacific typhoon season thus far, Shanshan had maximum windspeeds of 213 km/h and average windspeeds of 157 km/h just before landfall. The typhoon made landfall on the southwestern Japanese island of Kyushu on 28 August. Over 5.2 million people were given evacuation orders.

At least four deaths and 45 injuries have been reported thus far, with three of the deaths being attributed to landslides. Kagoshima and Miyazaki Prefecture were the most severely impacted areas, with damaged residences, overturned cars, flooding, and landslides. Over 250,000 people were left without power, primarily in Kagoshima Prefecture.

Several major international companies suspended operations at their facilities in the area. No impact was reported at Sendai Nuclear Power Plant. In Oita Prefecture, level 5 emergency warnings, which indicate threat to life, were issued for the cities of Yufu and Usa, after the Miyakawa River burst its banks and possible flooding from the Yakkan River.

Solace Global Assessment: Authorities have described Shanshan as one of the strongest storms to ever hit Kyushu. After moving through Kyushu, Shanshan weakened into a tropical storm and is currently moving through Shikoku island. While the storm caused mass disruptions, the level of humanitarian impact has been low relative to the storm’s strength. This is due to Japan’s low vulnerability to tropical cyclones, as the country has comprehensive preparedness and resiliency measures.

The mass evacuation orders issued by authorities almost certainly significantly reduced the death toll.  The storm is forecast to further weaken into a tropical depression and continue moving eastwards over the weekend. While substantially weakened, authorities are concerned that the warm and moist air around the storm that caused heavy rainfall far from the main body in Kyushu will continue to cause adverse weather over the coming days.

On 30 August, tens of thousands were asked to evacuate Tokyo due to landslide warnings, with three Tokyo rivers, the Meguro, Nogawa and Sengawa being issued level 4 warnings. It is highly likely that torrential rain will continue across large areas of Japan over the weekend, disrupting travel and causing factory and office closures.

Myanmar junta commits to 2025 elections.

Myanmar’s military junta has promised to hold a general election in late 2025 but with voting to be staggered due to security concerns. However, junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has made the same promise since 2021 when the military ousted Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party remains disbanded. The announcement has been largely dismissed by the opposition who likely assess that it will be mired in fraud and only used as a mechanism to legitimise military rule. The junta is also likely using the promise of elections to deter the ethnic rebel forces that continue to seize territory from the military.

BJP strike paralyses transport in India’s West Bengal.

On 28 August in West Bengal, thousands of protesters, mainly Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) workers, blocked trains, halted buses, and forced shops to close in response to the brutal rape and murder of a trainee doctor. The BJP called for a 12-hour state-wide protest strike, following clashes with police who used tear gas and water cannons to disperse a recent march. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP party is in opposition in the state and may seek to conduct further protests to undermine the All-India Trinamool Congress coalition which leads the eastern state.

Thailand’s Pheu Thai to exclude military-backed party from coalition.

Thailand’s Pheu Thai Party will exclude the Palang Pracharat Party from its coalition in forming the next government after Palang Pracharat leader Prawit Wongsuwon’s absence from a key parliamentary vote. Despite this, Pheu Thai is confident of securing a strong coalition with over 300 seats. This decision underscores ongoing tensions with military-backed factions, reflecting deeper political rifts and potentially impacting the stability of the new government as Pheu Thai aims to consolidate power and distance itself from military influences.

Multiple attacks through Indian union territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

Throughout the reporting period, there have been multiple attacks and counter-terrorism operations throughout multiple districts in the Indian-administered union territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The territory is set to hold its first elections in over a decade starting in mid-September. Militant attacks are likely to increase in the run-up to the elections, with violent extremists’ intent on influencing the elections.

PLA to conduct military exercises on China-Myanmar border.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has initiated joint air-ground patrols along the border with Myanmar after property in China was damaged by cross-border artillery fire. On 27-29 August elements from the Southern Theater of the PLA conducted live-fire exercises, likely aimed at sending a message to rebel ethnic forces. China is likely becoming increasingly concerned over an overspill of the conflict and the war has decreased cross-border trade. Beijing’s ultimate objective is likely to pressure the warring sides into peace talks, a development that will likely increase its influence in the country.

Cholera warning across Nepal.

The Ministry of Health and Population in Nepal has advised all residents to boil water or purify it before use after identifying 22 cholera cases in the past two weeks. The real number is almost certainly higher as most of the country is not under active surveillance for the disease. The ministry has also warned of increased transmission rates as the dry season approaches due to the increased mixing of waster with decreasing water sources.

Mass flooding in Bangladesh causes devastation.

Heavy rainfall resulting from annual monsoon conditions has caused significant floods, with Noakhali, Cumilla, Laxipur, Feni, Chattogram and Moulvibazar being most impacted. Over 5.7 million people have been affected, with around 500,000 displaced. So far, at least 20 people have died. It is highly likely that the death toll will continue to rise, with rescue and relief operations are ongoing. Water from upstream rivers in India has worsened the floods, with Indian authorities releasing water from dams. Because of this, it is likely that anti-Indian sentiment will increase in Bangladesh, which could result in further attacks on Hindus.

Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has opened an investigation after an e-mail was sent to 125 Jewish-linked organisations on 21 August. The e-mail stated that bombs had been planted on their premises and that they would be detonated that day. No bombs have been identified by the RCMP with investigations still underway. The e-mail was sent to Synagogues, Jewish schools, Jewish community centres and other Jewish-linked institutions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly unlikely that there is a genuine bomb threat and that this is part of a wider campaign to instil fear and disrupt the lives of the Jewish community. The e-mail is reported to be very similar to one sent to at least 100 hospitals, companies, shopping centres and government institutions in India. This suggests a coordinated effort and early investigations are attempting to identify the sender’s IP address.

Canada has likely been targeted for its Jewish diaspora, estimated at 400-450,000 and India for its staunch support of Israel, and there is a realistic possibility that the sender has connections to both countries given the large Indian diaspora in Canada. Whilst there may be no direct threat to life from the incident, it almost certainly indicates a rise in antisemitism in Canada that is also reflected in many other Western countries.

Several Jewish schools in Canada have been targeted in shootings that were likely designed to scare the Jewish community rather than kill as they were often done at night. These trends will almost certainly continue in parallel to developments in the Middle East and are likely to increase in severity with ceasefire talks showing little promise and the situation in Gaza rapidly deteriorating.

On 19 August, the official gazette of the government of Nicaragua published a list of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) whose activities would be banned. Additionally, the government announced that it would move to confiscate assets owned by the groups. Most of the banned NGOs are religious groups, and the move thus continues the policy of widespread government crackdowns on local Church authorities. However, other humanitarian organisations, including the Red Cross, are also banned.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In total, the government has so far shut down approximately 5,000 civil society groups. The Catholic Church has been a particularly prominent target, likely due to its continuing importance for Nicaragua’s largely Christian population and its role as a mediator in past anti-government protests.

The Nicaraguan government has been headed by Daniel Ortega for almost half a century. The Ortega regime faced one significant challenge in the waves of protests between 2014 and 2019 but has almost certainly managed to significantly decrease the opposition’s viability and traction in the country, forcing the majority of leaders into exile. The latest wave of bans, which also interests cultural institutions (such as chess clubs), is highly likely meant to accelerate a shift towards the complete government oversight of civil society actors, with surviving NGOs forced to establish formal ties with government departments that highly restrict their freedom of operations.

The Ortega regime has also recently increased its efforts to establish intelligence and policing partnerships with Russia, approving in March the establishment of a Russia-funded police training centre in Managua, which highly likely provides a stable foothold for Russian intelligence to operate in the country. In late June, suspicions of Russia increasing intelligence activity in Nicaragua were raised by American observers, who reported on possible Russian-Nicaraguan cooperation to create a signals intelligence (SIGINT) base in the country similar to the (likely) one in Lourdes, Cuba. Ortega is likely to continue increasing moves to coup-proof the regime, including increased intelligence cooperation with Cuba, Russia, and Venezuela.

In the immediate term, the latest wave of bans is almost certain to significantly decrease the security of foreign travellers and humanitarian workers in Nicaragua, increasing the threat of violence and arbitrary detention by local police. Most importantly, the disappearance of foreign humanitarian organisations is highly likely to worsen the extremely precarious conditions faced by the Nicaraguan people, nine out of ten of whom are estimated to live in poverty.

The Argentine Federal Police (PFA) announced the arrest of seven individuals allegedly part of a network of Salafi extremists, ideologically inspired by the Islamic State (IS) and other violent extremist organisations (VEOs), planning attacks in the country. The arrests occurred in Mendoza, and shortly after the 30th anniversary of the bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, which was however carried out by Shia extremists.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While South America likely remains a low-priority target for transnational Islamist extremist organisations, it is highly likely that Argentina’s risk profile is higher than that of its neighbours. This is due to structural factors as well as recent political developments. First, Argentina has the largest Jewish community in South America, assessed as numbering slightly less than 200,000. Jewish institutions and religion have a comparatively large prominence in Argentina’s social fabric, and, relatedly, the Argentine Jewish community has strong links to Israel. Due to the country’s long-standing economic woes, Argentinian Jews have migrated to Israel (the practice of “Aliyah”) in large numbers, especially since the early 2000s, and there are now around 50,000 Argentine Jews and descendants in Israel.

Second, the presidency of Javier Milei has resulted in the country’s adoption of a highly internationally visible pro-Israel policy, and Milei has also reportedly raised the possibility of converting to Judaism. In the context of the ongoing war in Gaza, these elements almost certainly make Argentina a high-profile possible target for Islamist VEOs.

It is highly unlikely that the arrested individuals’ relationship with IS went beyond mere “admiration”, as there are currently no credible indications that the group has directly sought to form cells in the country. However, Islamist VEOs have long exploited the tri-border area (TBA) between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to conduct illicit activity and generate funds for operations. There is a realistic possibility that independent (and possibly more radical) groups are taking advantage of the lack of state presence in the area to pursue similar activity.

The arrests are relevant as they are likely to have an impact on Argentina’s domestic security approach to counterterrorism. Earlier in August, Defence Minister Luis Petri filed a bill that would allow the military to take over some policing operations in situations of “terrorism”. Domestic NGOs and government opponents have criticised the bill on the basis that it does not define the threat, and that it grants the armed forces too much influence over domestic policing. The arrest of the group may increase the chances of the bill passing in parliament.

Canadian rail union dispute shuts down major railroads

On 22 August, Canada’s top railroads, Canadian National Railway (CN) and Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CPKC), locked out over 9,000 unionised workers, leading to a major rail stoppage. The dispute arose from failed contract negotiations, with both the railroads and the Teamsters union blaming each other for the impasse.

The work stoppage poses a significant threat to North American supply chains and could result in billions of dollars in economic damage, with Moody’s estimating daily costs of over CAD 341 million. The Canadian government has urged the parties to resolve the conflict but has not yet intervened.

US House Republicans publish report accusing Biden of impeachable conduct

The report alleges that the President committed offences that meet the bar for charges of abuse of power and obstruction, with some allegations dating back to his vice-presidency. Similar reports have historically resulted in Congress impeachment votes. However, the Republican Party lacks the votes to impeach the President, and therefore the report can highly likely be considered a political move in light of the upcoming election, and of Republican candidate Trump’s own past impeachment and ongoing trials.

US Supreme Court blocks Biden administration rule on gender identity-based discrimination

The ruling prevents the federal administration from implementing the rule, which focuses primarily on education institutions, against state wishes, and can be considered a victory for the conservative camp, which maintains a majority in the judicial branch. There is a realistic possibility that anti-transphobia protests will be staged in Washington D.C. and in Republican-led states in response to the ruling.

Mexican federal court employees strike over proposed reform

The legislation was proposed by outgoing President Obrador, who leaves office in late September and would force judges to stand for election, also removing established barriers preventing inexperienced graduates from immediately becoming judges. While Obrador justifies the proposed reform as a way to combat corruption, opponents worry that it would remove the judiciary’s independence and open opportunities for clientelism and to reduce the executive branch’s accountability.

Las Vegas teenager indicted of planning IS-inspired lone wolf attack

The individual was arrested in November 2023 after a tip was sent to authorities about one of his posts on the online platform Element – an encrypted messaging app – where he announced the planning of an attack. The case continues to highlight the shift, also seen in Europe, towards increasingly younger lone wolves planning attacks. Las Vegas, due to its visibility, famous nightlife scene, and notoriety as a gambling hub, is likely a particularly desirable target for Islamist terrorists. IS unsuccessfully tried to claim that the perpetrator of the 2017 Las Vegas shooting had been affiliated with the group.

Leaked US Nuclear strategy document emphasises Chinese, Russian, North Korean threat

The document dates to March and highlights the rapidity in the growth and diversification of China’s nuclear weapons stockpile. The document also called for the establishment of a revised strategy called “Nuclear Employment Guidance”, to be reviewed every four years, which focuses on the possibility of coordinated challenges from Russia, North Korea and China. It is likely that the policy reflects the growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea.

Leader of the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel (CJNG) arrested in Mérida, Mexico

Adrian Miguel Jarquín, alias “El Chaparrito,” was arrested on 19 August after being a fugitive for two years. Jarquín is considered to be one of CJNG’s main leaders and is allegedly particularly involved in the group’s smuggling operations based in the port of Manzanillo, a key hub for the entry of narcotics in Mexico. In 2022, Jarquín was released from prison and allowed to continue his trial without precautionary detention and subsequently escaped. The arrest has a realistic possibility of decreasing CJNG’s operational capacity in Manzanillo and may create a power vacuum in the area, possibly favouring an increase in inter-gang violence.

Third prison break in a year in Haiti results in 12 prisoners killed

On 16 August, prisoners broke out of a detainment facility in the coastal town of Saint-Marc. The breakout was reportedly caused by an escalated internal protest. However, it is almost certain that gangs played a role in favouring the breakout, or at least in arming the detainees, 12 of whom died in firefights with intervening authorities. The case highlights the continuing security and policing vulnerabilities in Haiti, which remain likely still severe despite the arrival of hundreds of Kenyan troops as part of a UN-backed mission.

US sanctions former Haitian president for drug trafficking

The US government has imposed sanctions on Haiti’s former president, Michel Joseph Martelly, over allegations of drug trafficking. Martelly, who served as president from 2011 to 2016, has been accused of abusing his influence to exploit the current chaos in Haiti to profiteer from the narcotics trade. Martelly is thought to have established connections to multiple Haitian gangs that are involved in the smuggling of cocaine, much of which ends up in the US.

The US government has also accused him of being involved in money laundering at the behest of the gangs. Martelly is not the first Haitian senior politician to be accused of such criminal enterprises and their involvement has significantly contributed to the current destabilisation of Haiti. This endemic corruption at the highest levels of office continues to undermine governance and will make it difficult for the country to achieve stability.

Hurricane Ernesto makes landfall in Bermuda

The hurricane made direct landfall over Bermuda on 17 August, causing mass power outages. While the category 1 storm was projected to cause potentially deadly flooding and notable damage, the British Overseas Territory was relatively unscathed, with the Minister of National Security reporting no injuries or major incidents. This was highly likely conditioned by Bermuda’s strong hurricane preparation and resiliency measures.

Ernesto, which moved past Newfoundland, Canada on 20 August, eventually weakened into a post-tropical cyclone. The storm’s remnants caused unseasonably high rainfall and increased wind speeds in parts of the UK and is forecast to likely contribute towards a low-pressure system that will bring further poor weather in the UK next week.

Oil spill affects Morrocoy National Park in Venezuela

The oil spill originated from the El Palito refinery operated by the state-owned oil company PDVSA, which has important ties to the Venezuelan armed forces. It is highly likely that the spill will result in increased discontent with the Venezuelan authorities and may result in an increase in sabotage actions against PDVSA assets. The company’s operations have historically been characterised by extreme levels of corruption, and the delayed response to the spill may result in greater environmental impacts within the Golfe Triste area.

Brazil to establish action plan to tackle forest fires in Amazon and Pantanal regions

The Brazilian federal government has developed a joint action plan with state governors to tackle forest fires in both the Amazon and the Pantanal wetlands. The plan will involve establishing Inter-Federal Multi-Agency Fronts, which will unite agents from various public institutions to collaborate with state and local authorities in preventing new fire outbreaks. Forest fires, which have been exacerbated by human activity and climate change, have led to over two million acres being burned in the Pantanal in 2024.

On 18 August, the head of the information technology department at the Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya (CBL), Musaab Muslamm, was abducted by an “unknown party”. This led to the crucial entity, responsible for holding the revenues from Libya’s vast oil reserves, temporarily shutting down operations.

The Government of National Unity (GNU), the Tripoli-based authority which contests sovereignty over Libya with the Libyan National Army (LNA), then unilaterally fired the central bank’s governor, Sadiq al-Kabir. Al-Kabir, a powerful figure who has led the bank since 2011 when Gaddafi was overthrown, rejected the decision and stated that he would continue in his role as normal. Muslamm was released on 19 August, leading to a resumption of operations at the CBL.

Additionally, the LNA engaged in fighting with armed Chadian groups near gold mines at the Chad border on 18-19 August, and National Oil Corporation (NOC) engineers claimed on 19 August that the Shahara oil field’s production has resumed limited operation following an earlier shutdown following significant LNA troop movements earlier in August.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the context of substantial LNA mobilisation and the movement of several LNA battalions to southwest Libya near the Algerian border and the Shahara oil field, the upheaval at the CBL will likely further inflame tensions in Libya. The GNU (formerly GNA) and LNA agreed to a ceasefire in 2020 after the LNA failed to take Tripoli, ending a six-year civil war. For the last four years, despite sporadic clashes between armed groups, Libya has enjoyed relative calm. In early August, LNA forces led by Saddam Haftar, the son of the LNA’s leader Khalifa Haftar, mobilised en-masse in Fezzan, southwestern Libya. This led to the Shahara oil field, Libya’s largest oilfield, being taken offline. Libya controls Africa’s largest oil reserves, and the flow of oil from Shahara is highly likely being instrumentalised by the LNA to exert pressure on Tripoli.

The LNA troop movements have multiple possible strategic objectives. The LNA claims that the mobilisation is aimed at border security, however, this is unlikely. It is likely that the LNA wish to secure Ghadames Airport, which holds vital strategic importance. Full control of Ghadames and its surroundings would allow the LNA to isolate the northwestern GNU territory centred around Tripoli from southern GNU forces, facilitate control of border crossings with Niger, Algeria and Tunisia, and ultimately fulfil the LNA desire to fully control the entire south of Libya, from east to west. The Ghadames crossing between Algeria and Libya is closed, despite agreements in recent years for its reopening. Algerian military forces have been placed on high alert as a result of the LNA buildup around Ghadames.

Concurrently, full control of southwestern Libya will allow the LNA to implement with greater effect a recently signed trade agreement with the junta in Niger, which highly likely involves the transfer of weapons for oil. The operations against Chadian armed groups are highly likely due to this trade deal, which currently relies on Nigerien weapons coming to Libya via Chad.

It is highly likely that recent August events have generated the most severe tensions in Libya since the 2020 ceasefire. In response to the recent tensions, the embassies of France, Germany, Italy, the UK and US have issued a joint statement expressing significant concern. On 13 August, the LNA-aligned House of Representatives unanimously approved a motion that the GNU is illegitimate and now out of power, which has no de facto legal consequence but gives the LNA a legitimising cause to renew hostilities. It is a realistic possibility that heavy fighting between the GNU and LNA will soon resume, focused on control around Ghadames.

On 18 August, a botched suicide attack in Tel Aviv injured a civilian. Both Hamas and PIJ claimed responsibility for the action. The attack was the first Hamas suicide bombing since 2008, and the group has threatened more attacks. In Gaza, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) operations are ongoing, with fighting reported in Khan Yunis. On 20 August, IDF units retrieved the bodies of six hostages.

Ceasefire talks have continued in Cairo after last week’s round in Doha. The US and Israeli delegations have expressed some cautious optimism, especially after Egypt dropped its demands for a clear timeline for the IDF’s withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor, and after Iranian officials stated that they will “delay” retaliation while negotiations are ongoing. Hamas representatives have rejected the latest round of talks, stating that Israel has advanced unacceptable conditions.

In northern Israel, Israeli forces launched airstrikes in the Bekaa Valley following a Hezbollah strike in Western Galilee which killed an IDF soldier.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The suicide bombing carried out by Hamas is likely an important development in the conflict. Suicide bombings are almost universally condemned by the international community and a successful attack targeting civilians could weaken Hamas’ negotiating position and potentially influence Israel to withdraw from ceasefire talks. The length of the conflict and scale of the destruction are likely to contribute to increased radicalisation and provide Hamas with volunteers willing to conduct suicide attacks. This methodology may also indicate a decrease in Hamas’ combat capabilities and capacity to conduct more complex attacks outside of Gaza, with Israel recently claiming that Hamas’ Rafah Brigade has been completely defeated.

Cairo’s recent acceptance of Israel’s demand for a sustained IDF permanence at the Gaza-Egypt border likely represents an important diplomatic defeat for the Palestinian militant group. Allowing the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor will dislocate Hamas from its main facilitation route for lethal aid, reducing its ability to sustain combat operations and enforce its authority. Long-term, Hamas’ reduction in strength is likely to provide opportunities for alternative administrators in Gaza, such as the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Iran’s statement about waiting until the end of ceasefire talks to retaliate for Israel’s assassinations, or potentially refraining entirely if a deal is reached, is likely to further increase pressure on Hamas. Hamas’ likely reaction is to refuse to accept the current ceasefire conditions and to pressure Iran and its proxies to adopt a more aggressive stance towards Israel. Hamas will intend to set the conditions to persuade Israel to accept ceasefire terms that are more favourable to itself.

Iran has continued to produce rhetoric and conduct actions indicating that it is planning on conducting a direct attack on Israel. Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials have repeatedly signalled their intent to retaliate on Iranian state media but have stressed that it will happen “at the suitable time and place” and that Iran’s retaliation will be larger than the previous attack. Iran’s Permanent Mission to the UN has even suggested that Iran’s Axis of Resistance could conduct a ground offensive into Israel. Conversely, Iranian officials have also indicated that an attack could be delayed if progress is made in ceasefire negotiations.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly unlikely that Iran will sponsor a ground offensive into Israel, and this is the most likely trigger for a regional escalation that Tehran cannot afford. Such a scenario would involve Iran’s most capable proxy force, Hezbollah, invading Israel from the north. Currently, Hezbollah serves as one of Iran’s primary deterrents against Israel and Iran has spent decades facilitating lethal aid into Lebanon. A Hezbollah ground attack will almost certainly result in an IDF offensive into southern Lebanon, expanded air strikes and would significantly degrade Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Tehran cannot afford this whilst it is still attempting to produce a nuclear deterrent, especially as Hamas has been severely degraded.

Iran’s most likely course of action is still a coordinated rocket, missile and drone strike with its proxy forces but has delayed retaliating for several reasons. Firstly, it does not want to jeopardise current ceasefire negotiations despite a high likelihood of collapse. Secondly, Iran is likely trying to exert psychological terror on the Israeli public. Lastly, Iran is delaying for reasons relating to planning and logistics. Iran is attempting to reassert its deterrent but without escalating. This will demand a carefully planned attack that penetrates Israeli air defence, demonstrating Iran’s ability to directly attack Israel, but without resulting in heavy civilian casualties. However, the delay has allowed the US to enhance its force posture in the region, likely forcing Tehran to reassess the nature and timing of an attack. Should Iran decide that a direct attack on Israel without escalating is too hard to achieve, it may seek to target Israeli interests via alternative means. This could include attacks on Israeli “secret bases” in third countries like Iraq, or the assassination of Israeli

After a week-long lull in Houthi attacks against merchant shipping, the Houthis attacked two vessels in one day on 21 August. The first was against the Greek-flagged oil tanker SOUNION (IMO: 9312145), 77 nautical miles west of al-Hudaydah, Yemen. Initially, two skiffs approached the merchant vessel, resulting in a brief exchange of small arms fire. Later, three unidentified projectiles struck the vessel, causing a fire onboard and disabling the engine. The vessel was abandoned on 22 August and is now adrift.

Secondly, the Houthis attacked the Panama-flagged bulk carrier SW NORTH WIND I (IMO: 9514004), 57 nautical miles south of Aden, Yemen. The vessel reported a total of five explosions in close proximity to the vessel, with no damage reported. Then, on 22 August, the vessel came under renewed attack west of al-Hudaydah, Yemen. Whilst being followed by two skiffs, an uncrewed surface vessel (USV) struck the vessel on its portside beam and detonated, resulting in minor damage without breaching the hull.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The SW NORTH WIND I’s security team failed to destroy the USV with small arms fire, highly likely attempting to replicate the PUMBA’s successful deployment of this countermeasure on 20 July when small arms fire ostensibly detonated a Houthi USV before it could make contact. It is likely that this countermeasure will not be consistently replicable, due to the accuracy and luck required.

Commonalities between these two new incidents highlight the likely increasing role of skiffs in carrying out Houthi intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to fix and track merchant vessels to increase the accuracy of subsequent attacks. Houthi ISR capabilities have likely been significantly degraded due to merchant vessels disabling their automatic identification systems (AIS) broadcasts, and the withdrawal of the Iranian spy ship BEHSHAD in April.

The persistence of these Houthi attacks, particularly on the SW NORTH WIND I, which was separately attacked over multiple days, is also notable, likely suggesting that the Houthis are increasingly concentrating force against individual target vessels. These attacks also likely point towards the increasingly layered nature of Houthi anti-vessel operations which now integrate skiffs conducting ISR and armed with RPGs, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and USVs.

It is likely that the successful disabling of the SOUNION will embolden the Houthis to increase their rate of vessel attacks in the coming weeks, reflecting earlier patterns.

The Kenyan government has announced plans to reintroduce certain tax measures that had been previously scrapped on 26 June in response to deadly protests. The finance minister, John Mbadi, stated that not all taxes will return. However, certain measures, including an eco-levy on most goods, are necessary to fund essential government expenditures such as teachers’ wages. On 20 August, the Supreme Court of Kenya overruled an appeal that declared the finance bill unconstitutional which will pave the way for the government to introduce elements of the contentious tax bill.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The reintroduction of the tax bill, even if limited, will likely reignite civil unrest across the country with a high likelihood of violent incidents. Previous civil unrest resulted in the deaths of at least 50 people, hundreds of arrests and widespread disruption. Critics of the bill are already suggesting that it will target basic goods that will increase the cost of living, with the original bill targeting goods like bread, cooking oil and other commodities.

Moreover, the protests have primarily been youth-led, many of whom are unemployed and capable of quickly organising protests via social media. After repealing the original tax bill, President Ruto fired much of his cabinet but has remained in power despite widespread calls demanding his resignation. Many Kenyans likely hold him personally responsible for the deadly protests and for failing to address many of the underlying issues such as the cost of living, unemployment and corruption.

Future demonstrations are likely to take on a distinct anti-Ruto character which could unify and energise various factions that oppose his rule, leading to larger and more sustained protests. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is backing some form of economic reform programme in Kenya, which is being described as necessary to secure more funding. This indicates that the Ruto administration is under external pressure and has no option but to reintroduce elements of the controversial tax bill.

Anti-Islam protests scheduled for 24 August in Sweden

Anti-Islam protests have been organised in Stockholm, Gothenburg, Orebo and Kristianstad for the 24 August. Heightened security measures will be in place and there is a high likelihood that the demonstrations will attract counter-protests, potentially leading to incidents of violence.

French far-left leader threatens Macron with impeachment, causes rifts in coalition

Jean-Luc Melenchon, the leader of the far-left populist part France Unbowed (LFI) reiterated appeals to President Macron to appoint his coalition’s candidate, Lucie Castets, as the country’s new prime minister. The appeal also contained a threat of starting an impeachment procedure if Macron does not comply with LFI’s demands. Melenchon’s appeal was rejected by the other parties of the coalition, including the Socialists (PS). LFI activists have called for civil unrest if Castets is not selected, and there is a high likelihood that, if the left-wing coalition cracks due to disagreements over relations with Macron’s executive, LFI-linked activists will seek to stage large and disruptive demonstrations to force a decision, possibly resulting in violence and vandalism.

Anarchist activists claim vandalism of Northvolt offices in Hamburg, Germany

As part of an ongoing campaign of direct action by anarchist against the building of the North Bothnia Line railway project in Sweden, anarchists claimed they vandalised the Northvolt offices in Hamburg on 19 August. The protestors claim they injected butyric acid through the office door and then glued the doors. Butyric acid, made from rancid butter, has historically been used by anti-whaling activists due to its highly unpleasant odour.

The North Bothnia Line is contentious due to its planned location in the indigenous Sami people’s area of northern Sweden. Earlier on 9 August, activists vandalised an Implenia AG office in Vienna, Austria using spray paint. Both Northvolt and Implenia AG are involved in the North Bothnia project.

The transnational nature of this direct-action campaign highly likely indicates a concerted and well-organised effort by multiple different anarchist groups cooperating across national borders. It is likely that companies associated with the North Bothnia project will continue to be targeted in the coming weeks.

Multiple Neo-Nazi demonstrations in Saxony

On 17 August, around 400 Neo-Nazi activists tried to disrupt an LGBTQ event in Leipzig, in the German state of Saxony. On 10 August, a crowd of approximately 700 activists marched through the town of Bautzen, also in Saxony.

The groups that are reported to be associated with the protests in Saxony include “Deutsche Jugend Voran” (DJV, a name taken from a division of the Hitler Youth), Jung und Stark (JS), as well as a banned far-right group known as “Division 45”. Saxony remains a stronghold of far-right groups in Germany, and statistics on right-wing violence in Saxony for 2023 report an approximately 20 per cent increase compared to 2022.

In Germany, as in other Western European states, a trend can be observed of far-right groups seeking greater territorial control in areas where they already have a footprint, while staging more symbolic demonstrations in cities that have a higher visibility. Areas and cities including Lyon in France, Verona and Rome in Italy, and Madrid in Spain have a particularly high activity from local far-right groups.

Demonstrations scheduled in Berlin and for 24 August

The scheduled demonstrations, which will take place in front of the Chancellery, follow the closure of the Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg (IZH). IZH was a Shia Muslim centre in Hamburg which authorities closed over deep ties to the regime in Iran. Counter-demonstrations are also scheduled to take place. Due to the nature of the event, and the overlap with the demonstrations in Sweden (see beginning of section), there is a realistic possibility of disorders and violence breaking out.

Belarus deploys a third of its army to Ukrainian border

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that the deployment is in response to increased Ukrainian activity at the border, a claim that appears highly likely unsubstantiated. It is almost certain that the deployment of Belarusian troops near the border is meant to warn Kyiv’s Western allies against providing further help to Ukraine – including by relaxing constraints on the use of Western-procured munitions in Russia – by threatening regional escalation of the conflict.

Ukraine bans Russia-affiliated religious organisations, including the Orthodox Church

The draft law approved by the parliament prohibits the religious activities of groups associated with Russia. While the Russian government has successfully coopted the Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of propaganda and legitimisation of its offensive in Ukraine, the Moscow Patriarchate continues to have significant influence among the Russian minorities of Ukraine. The decision will likely spark domestic unrest in Ukraine, and Moscow will leverage the development to launch information operations targeting Orthodox Christians in Europe, the Middle East and North America.

Suspected Kenyan serial killer escapes from police station

On 20 August, the individual, who is allegedly responsible for dozens of murders, escaped from a police facility in Nairobi alongside 12 Eritrean nationals. The high domestic media profile of the case makes this police failure particularly significant, and it will likely contribute to inflaming already high anti-government and anti-police sentiment.

CIA Director in Bosnia due to secessionist concerns

CIA Director William Burns visited Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina on 20 August to address concerns over the “worrying secessionist rhetoric and actions” from Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Serb entity, Republika Srpska, led by pro-Russian President Milorad Dodik. Dodik has refused to adhere to Western sanctions on Russia and has threatened secession for decades. A separate conflict in Europe would almost certainly play into the Kremlin’s hands by diverting attention and resources from Ukraine. Dodik has visited Russia multiple times and in recent visits, Russia has used the Republika Srpska’s flag rather than that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, suggesting Moscow’s support for its secession.

Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) ambushes Red Cross convoy in Niger

The targeted attack took place in the region of Diffa and killed 14 of which at least eight were Red Cross staff. ISWAP and other branches of the Islamic State (IS) commonly attack humanitarian organisations as part of their strategy to force the local populations to become reliant on them for welfare. ISWAP has recently increased its operations in Niger and, although it remains relatively weaker than Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, it has multiplied efforts to gain a territorial presence, by imposing “taxes” on controlled villages and conducting da’wah (proselytising) activities.

Sudanese military to send a delegation to Cairo discussions

After the Transitional Sovereign Council, the ruling government in Sudan on behalf of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), did not attend US-led peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland, they have stated they will send a delegation to Cairo to have discussions with US and Egyptian officials. The SAF’s absence from the Geneva talks had generated major doubts about the prospects for a peace settlement to the Sudanese Civil War between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has now been ongoing for 16 months.

The delegation to Cairo, however, likely indicates that the SAF is considering a willingness to participate in future negotiations should certain conditions be met. The main points of contention raised by SAF officials have been the lack of implementation of the Jeddah agreement, which entailed RSF forces withdrawing from civilian areas, and the United Arab Emirates’ presence at the talks, who have highly likely supported the RSF.

As recently as 16 August, RSF forces reportedly attacked several villages, according to local media. In recent months, the momentum of the civil war has been on the most part favourable to the RSF, and it is likely that continuing RSF advances have coerced the SAF leadership to not rule out future peace negotiations.  

Large fires in Madeira, Portugal

The fires have consumed 5000 hectares by 19 August, or approximately 5 per cent of the island’s total surface area. Due to dry and hot weather conditions, fires on the island have spread rapidly and posed extreme difficulties to firefighters, with authorities stating that they expect the fires to subside “after running out of fuel”. Increasingly common and severe fires are likely to continue having severe economic impacts on residents and businesses in southern European maritime tourist destinations.

First Polio case identified in the Gaza Strip after 25 years

The disease is particularly dangerous for children under five. It spreads via aerosol, faeces or contamination, and progressively affects the nervous system causing paralysis. Currently, much of the sewage disposal infrastructure in the Gaza Strip has been destroyed, favouring the accumulation of waste in areas that are extremely densely populated. The WHO and other international organisations have called for a vaccination campaign to begin in late August. However, this is highly likely dependent on the approval of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas.

For weeks, the internet in Pakistan has been extremely slow, with the government blaming the high number of domestic users for overburdening domestic capacity. Activist groups have instead increasingly raised warnings of a growing threat of government efforts to build a “firewall” to separate Pakistan from global online information spaces, thus imitating China and other states in Asia. Since the 2023 riots linked with former Prime Minister Imran Khan last year, the Pakistani government has increasingly curtailed access to social media platforms. Earlier this year, a new law allowed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) a much greater reach in intercepting private citizens’ communications.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The growing efforts by the Pakistani government to curtail the local information space while granting ISI greater reach are highly likely reflections of self-perceived growing instability. Outside of its long-standing socioeconomic issues, Pakistan’s security environment is deteriorating due to a greater traction of regionalist movements – such as the Baluch independence movement – and ongoing tensions with neighbours in India and Afghanistan, the latter continuing to provide a safe haven for Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs).

Moreover, the continuing popular support for Khan, as well as the anti-foreigner sentiments linked with growing Chinese operations in the country, likely represent important worries for Islamabad. Faced with these popular and regionalist movements, the Pakistani government may seek to follow the Chinese lead in building a highly controlled information space. In doing so, however, Islamabad is likely to encounter a fundamental obstacle in its inability to provide indigenous online alternatives, including an independent digital infrastructure, capable of meeting public demand.

In turn, it may therefore be forced to rely on China-sourced assets and platforms to offset some of the economic costs, thus contributing to a regionalisation of Asia’s information spaces. A growing opacification of the Pakistani information space is highly likely to have extremely adverse consequences for humanitarian operators in the country. A decreased flow of information, combined with Pakistan’s extremely precarious security situation, may multiply the risks of humanitarian actors operating in at-risk regions, for instance by decreasing their capacity to respond to security incidents in a timely manner.

On 22 August, tens of thousands of protestors amassed in the former capital, Jakarta, as well as other major cities, including Padang, Bandung, Surabaya, Makassar, Yogyakarta and multiple other locations. Protestors attempt to storm the Indonesian parliament, and the House of Representatives, forcing the police to use tear gas and water cannons to disperse crowds. The protests were triggered by parliament’s decision to overturn a Constitutional Court ruling which reduced the threshold for local legislative seats needed by parties to field candidates for regional elections. Parliament postponed the amendments in response to the unrest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The proposed law change involved raising the threshold for parties to nominate candidates in regional elections. Previously, the Constitutional Court had lowered this threshold to below 10 per cent from the original 20 per cent. The Constitutional Court’s original ruling would have effectively allowed smaller parties or coalitions with fewer seats in local parliaments to field more candidates at the regional level. The ruling government, which is dominated by supporters of the outgoing President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), would have seen this as a mechanism to increase the influence of the opposition. The change opened the door for opposition figures like Anies Baswedan, a critic of the government, to run for influential positions such as the Jakarta governor.

Parliament’s decision to reverse this change has almost certainly been seen as a manoeuvre to maintain its power and reduce the voice of the opposition. Moreover, it has likely sparked fears over a constitutional crisis between the executive and the judicial branches, by eroding the checks and balances in Indonesia’s democratic system. It is also part of a broader strategy by Jokowi and his supporters to consolidate power, which has led to accusations of authoritarianism, corruption, and nepotism. These moves have galvanised activists, students and even celebrities against the government, with protests rapidly mobilised on social media.

Whilst the government has responded by postponing its amendment, it is currently unclear whether parliament will reconvene before the start of regional elections on 27 August. If parliament attempts to hastily pass the law before the local elections, it is almost certain widespread and sometimes violent protests will erupt across the country.

Taliban ban UN special rapporteur from entering Afghanistan

The Taliban have barred the UN-appointed special rapporteur Richard Bennett from entering Afghanistan, after accusing the UN of spreading propaganda. Bennett, appointed in 2022 to monitor Afghanistan’s human rights record, has been critical of the Taliban’s treatment of women and girls. The Taliban’s decision to deny Bennett a visa reflects their growing resistance to international scrutiny, particularly concerning human rights. This move could further isolate Afghanistan diplomatically and complicate efforts to address human rights violations, especially against women, under Taliban rule.

Protesters attempt to storm Pakistan’s Supreme Court over blasphemy ruling

On 20 August, thousands of protestors attempted to storm Pakistan’s Supreme Court in Islamabad over a ruling in a blasphemy case, forcing the police to use crowd dispersal methods like tear gas. The protest was organised over the granting of bail to Mubarak Sani. Sani had been accused of blasphemy in 2019 for distributing pamphlets advocating for his Ahmadiyya religious beliefs- a messianic Islamic movement often persecuted by the Sunni majority. The incident likely reflects the sensitivities of blasphemy laws in the country, which can often lead to huge and sometimes violent demonstrations.

Pakistani opposition schedules nationwide strike for 28 August

The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party has called for a nationwide shutdown strike on 28 August to protest alleged misgovernance, economic issues, rising electricity prices, and endemic load shedding. The protests are likely to only cause moderate disruption, and the authorities are likely to issue Section 144 orders in areas with a high turnout.

India PM Modi to visit Ukraine and Poland

The diplomatic visits will take place starting on 21 August. Modi’s recent visit to Russia attracted considerable criticism from Western observers, and the Indian leader likely sees meeting Zelensky as an opportunity to outwardly demonstrate the continued foreign policy “non-alignment” espoused by India. At the same time, the visit to Poland may offer an opportunity to further India-EU talks, especially in crucial strategic areas such as technology-sharing and security cooperation.

India doctors resume work but protests continue

After a trainee doctor was raped and killed by a hospital security guard in Kolkata, widespread doctor and nurse strikes paralysed much of India’s healthcare system. This resulted in the suspension of most non-emergency procedures and major protests across the country. After reassurances from India’s Supreme Court to improve safety measures at hospitals, doctors have resumed work. However, some protests are still ongoing and there are backlogs within India’s healthcare system after 11 days of strikes.

Thai opposition criticises Constitutional Court and vows to continue

The former leader of the recently dissolved Move Forward Party (MFP), Pita Limjaroenrat, who has been banned from Thai politics for a decade has vowed to continue his agenda and demanded that Thailand reform its judiciary. MFP’s dissolution was followed by the Constitutional Court removing the then prime minister, Srettha Thavisin, within the same week and resulted in 134 Thai academics and legal experts releasing a statement suggesting that the court had overstepped its jurisdiction and damaged the public’s trust.

Thailand’s new Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the daughter of controversial magnate Thaksin Shinawatra, was then sworn in on 18 August. Whilst her premiership may partially placate the reformist camp, the Shinawatra family’s continued domination of Thai politics will likely aggravate the conservative establishment.

Loyalist to outgoing Indonesian president appointed leader of Golkar party

On 21 August, the Golkar party appointed Bahlil Lahadalia as its leader. Bahlil is a loyalist to outgoing president Joko Widodo, commonly known as Jokowi. Jokowi has consistently held high approval ratings but is scheduled to leave office in October 2024 due to presidential term limits.

It is likely that Jokowi has attempted to implement a political dynasty, and a Constitutional Court ruling in 2023, chaired by Jokowi’s brother-in-law, lowered minimum age limits which will allow Jokowi’s eldest son to become the vice-president in October. Efforts to make his youngest son the deputy governor of Central Java, however, have been thwarted by a 21 August Constitutional Court decision to not change minimum age limits for regional elections. The appointment of Bahlil will highly likely contribute towards Jokowi maintaining a high degree of political influence once he leaves office.

Pakistan imposes Section 144 Punjab due to terror threat

On 21 August, Pakistani authorities implemented Section 144 in the Punjab province which bans all public gatherings and protests. The order will last until 24 August and has been imposed over the threat of terrorism. However, Section 144 is often used to deny public assembly and stifle the opposition and has likely been implemented to disrupt rallies organised by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.

Chinese and Philippine vessels collide in disputed South China Sea

China and the Philippines have traded accusations after vessels from their respective coast guards were involved in a collision near the disputed Shabina Shoal in the South China Sea. Beijing has suggested that the Philippines vessel purposefully collided with the Chinese vessel. Manila has accused the Chinese Coast Guard of aggressive manoeuvres, a tactic it has become notorious when reinforcing its maritime claims. The repeated confrontations threaten to further escalate tensions in the South China Sea, potentially drawing in external powers like the US which has recently increased defence cooperation with the Philippines.

Indonesia to host major multi-national military exercise

Indonesia’s Super Garuda Shield 2024, starting on 26 August, will involve joint military exercises with at least 19 countries, including the US, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Originally launched in 2009, this annual exercise aims to “safeguard a free and open Indo-Pacific region” and has become one of the largest multinational military exercises in the area, with significant US participation. While China likely perceives the exercise as a challenge to its regional influence, Indonesia and China maintain friendly relations and have conducted joint military exercises. However, a recent treaty signed between Australia and Indonesia may indicate a gradual shift away from non-alignment.

Australia and Indonesia sign treaty-level defence agreement

On 20 August, Australia and Indonesia signed a treaty-level defence cooperation agreement which allows their militaries to operate in each other’s countries. This agreement likely signals a thawing of relations over Australia’s historic support for East Timor and potentially a strategic shift by Indonesia away from non-alignment. The agreement, which follows from the AUKUS alliance, will likely be interpreted by China as yet another development designed by the West to counterbalance its influence in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra may seek to develop further bi-lateral defence relationships or strengthen existing ones as it aims to contain an increasingly assertive China.

At least nine Bangladesh districts at risk of major flooding

Bangladesh’s Ministry of Water Resources has issued emergency flood notices for the districts of Feni, Sunamganj, Moulvibazar, Habiganj, Comilla, Noakhali, Chittagong, Laxmipur and Khagrachari. 12 rivers are currently above the danger line due to heavy rains further north in India. Increased rainfall is likely to result in widespread flooding that will impact millions of people.

Thailand identifies first case of new mpox strain

Authorities in Thailand have reported that they have identified the first case of the new strain of mpox, Clade 1b, in the country. The case involves a European man working in an unnamed African country where there is an ongoing outbreak. Thailand’s Department of Disease Control has tracked down over 40 people who are thought to have been in contact with the patient, who will now be monitored for 21 days. However, the patient flew to Thailand via a Middle Eastern country and a thorough contact trace is highly unlikely.

Landslide kills several in Thai tourist resort Phuket

At least eight people have been killed in the popular tourist resort of Phuket after heavy rain triggered a landslide which crashed into a luxury villa. Rescue efforts are ongoing, with as many as 50 buildings affected by the landslide and multiple people assessed as currently trapped. Monsoon rains have battered much of Thailand with further landslides highly likely.

US President Joe Biden stated on 14 August that the government of Panama is planning to start repatriating migrants that cross into the country via the southern Darien Gap, a tract of extremely dense jungle which is unavoidable for South American migrants seeking to reach the US via land.

The first major policy undertaken by the new government of Panama, led by President Jose Raul Mulino, was to strike a deal with the US, whereby Panama would carry out repatriations on US-funded flights. More than 500,000 migrants crossed the Darien Gap in 2023.

Solace Global Assessment: 

For Washington, the deal with Panama is part of a broader effort to decrease land-based flows of migrants via Central America, which is increasingly being used by migrants from other parts of the world. US diplomats are also trying to strike a deal with Costa Rica, which is expected to be similar to the one with Panama. By pushing for multiple deals with friendly regional governments, US officials are highly likely trying to put in place a stronger deterrent to migrants, while simultaneously accounting for border control failures.

The Darien Gap remains an extremely dangerous stretch of land, with extremely little infrastructure, that is for the most part controlled by organised Colombian gangs, such as the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces. This, alongside widespread corruption at the Colombia-Panama border, means that efforts to police the gap will likely only be partially successful even with increased funding and manpower. Still, increased border controls may make the land-based route less attractive.

The alternative, which is considerably more expensive and risky, is likely to be a sea-based route between the Colombian island of San Andrés and the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. The maritime route to Nicaragua is also likely to increase in attractiveness if a second deal with Costa Rica is approved, as it would bypass both countries.

An increase in maritime migration is likely to pose further risks. First, the crossings from San Andrés are often attempted on small vessels, which often capsize leading to mass drownings. Smugglers operating the crossings often overload the boats, greatly increasing the chance of sinking, and a growing volume of departures from San Andrés may result in a proportional increase in the number of deaths.

Second, the maritime route is assessed to cost each migrant more than three times as much as the Darien Gap route, and therefore is likely to further increase the chances of migrants being exploited by traffickers, potentially leading to increased rates of forced labour, sexual abuse, debt bondage and other forms of exploitation.

Edmundo Gonzalez, Maria Corina Machado, and the other leaders of the Venezuelan opposition have issued a call for global protests to take place on 17 August. The announcement comes weeks after the results of the Venezuelan elections were published, granting a third term to President Maduro. The results – which have been contested by domestic and international observers – caused almost immediate protests, which were met with violent repression by authorities, the clampdown being nicknamed “Operation Knock Knock” by regime supporters.

As of the time of writing, more than 1300 people have been arrested in Venezuela, and the opposition leaders, who recently have become objects of a criminal investigation, remain in hiding.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The announcement is likely a reflection of the worsening domestic position of the opposition, following the Maduro regime’s success in quashing the protests that broke out after the electoral results were announced. Despite the large international support, the opposition has likely failed to gain traction with the military and other government-backed militia which constitute the backbone of the regime’s security apparatus.

The call for protests is likely to result in large-scale disruptions in countries that have a large Venezuelan diaspora. Notable demonstrations are likely to take place in Colombia, especially in Bogota, where large pro-opposition protests already occurred on 3 August. Other likely hotspots for demonstrations include the United States, particularly the state of Florida, where most of the US Venezuelan diaspora is concentrated, and in Spain where there are almost 500,000 Venezuelans.

There is a realistic possibility that smaller demonstrations will occur within liberal democracies and will be staged outside Venezuelan diplomatic missions. There is a high likelihood that actors friendly to the Maduro regime will carry out actions meant to undermine or disrupt the protests – for instance deploying agitators or provoking police intervention – or launch information operations to discredit the opposition.

Inside Venezuela, the regime will highly likely use the protests as a pretext to accuse the opposition of being backed by foreign powers. This will take the form of increased nationalistic messaging meant to provoke a rally around the flag effect, and possibly executive measures meant to further curtail the space for dissent. Importantly, accusations of foreign collaboration and meddling may be used by the regime to further restrict the activities of foreign NGOs in the country.

In January, the Venezuelan parliament began discussing a law that restricts NGOs’ ability to receive funds, imposing a series of bureaucratic hurdles that are almost certainly meant to disrupt their operations.

Large-scale rail strikes threaten Canadian exports

Canada’s two largest railway companies, Canadian National Railway (CNR.TO) and Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CP.TO), could simultaneously stop operations due to a deadlock between them and the Teamsters labour union over scheduling and wages. The rail companies have threatened to lock their employees out of their workplaces on 22 August if a deal is not reached.

A similar stoppage was prevented earlier in the year following government intervention, and this earlier resolution has ignited current calls by grain shippers and other industry groups for the government to intervene again. Annually, Canada’s railways transport around CAD 380 billion worth of goods. Consequently, a halt would almost certainly cause losses of tens of millions of dollars and spillover effects across Canadian markets.

Moreover, the stoppage could have an adverse impact on Canada’s trade relationship with the USA, as 75 per cent of Canada’s goods exports head south of the border. Most US cereal imports originate from Canada, and strike-driven supply chain disruptions are likely to impact market prices in the US.

US Democratic Convention to be held in Chicago

On 19 August, the Democratic Party will hold its National Convention in Chicago where it will officially unveil Vice President Kamala Harris as its presidential candidate. The convention is anticipated to attract 50,000 supporters and will include high-profile figures such as former president, Barack Obama and the Clintons.

Strict security measures will be in place, especially after the attempted assassination of Donald Trump, and police have warned that they will not tolerate any rioting or major demonstrations, with pro-Palestinian protests likely to exploit the publicity of the event for their movement.

Peruvian government pass law preventing prosecution for crimes against humanity.

The legislation prevents prosecutions of alleged crimes committed prior to 2002. The measure is almost certainly meant to appease senior military officials and former President Alberto Fujimori. Fujimori was allegedly implicated in the use of death squads to quash the Shining Path – the rebel Communist Party of Peru – in the 1990s. The measure is likely to result in protests and widespread international condemnation.

Brazil plans to strengthen ties with China.

The President of Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, has said he will discuss a “long-term strategic partnership” when he meets with the President of China, Xi Jinping, after the G20 leaders’ summit in November. Lula has confirmed that he doesn’t want Brazil’s relationship with the USA to be jeopardised due to new links with China, but is eager to strengthen the economy and improve diplomatic ties.

Trump campaign hacked

On 10 August, former US President Donald Trump’s staff said that their campaign had been targeted by hackers, leading to insider documents being leaked to the press. The campaign accused “foreign sources hostile to the United States” of carrying out the attack. Although Iran was not named directly, it is clear that, following reports that a plot to assassinate Trump was launched by Tehran, the Shia regime is likely the prime suspect.

Mass shooting in Clarendon, Jamaica

On 12 August, eight people were killed and eleven injured after a mass shooting in the Clarendon area of Jamaica. Jamaica’s prime minister has urged anyone with information to come forward and a national security council meeting was convened on 13 August. The incident is likely related to an ongoing feud between rival gangs but has raised concerns over a bloody gang war in the area.

Colombian President Petro claims rebel plot to assassinate him

According to the president, Ivan Mordisco, the commander of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), a breakaway group of the rebel Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), had hired a drug trafficking group to carry out the targeted assassination. While no independent verification of the claims was released, the case highlights the continuing decrease of relations between the government and units of the EMC, after a ceasefire between the two broke down in July due to ongoing violence.

Canada’s first “State of Wildfires” report underscores climate change impact

The report is the first of a planned series covering yearly wildfires globally. The report found that, while the total number of acres burned in 2023-2024 was slightly below the average of previous seasons, wildfire-related carbon emissions increased by 16 per cent. This increase was almost certainly due to the severe wildfires in Canada, whose Boreal forests emit larger quantities of stored carbon when burned.

The report also assesses that the probability of “extreme fire seasons” has increased “significantly” due to anthropogenic climate change, with regions such as Canada and Amazonia particularly affected.

Hurricane Ernesto impacts Caribbean and heads towards Bermuda

Hurricane Ernesto formed in the Atlantic Ocean 300 miles east of Antigua on 5 August. The hurricane passed over Antigua and the Leeward islands, causing 4-6 inches of rain, before clearing the islands on Tuesday morning and heading towards Puerto Rico, where around half of the population was without power. Furthermore, more than half a foot of rain had fallen, interrupting water filtration processes, leaving 120,000 water customers without drinking water.

The hurricane hit the Virgin Islands leading to 28,000 people left without power. Ernesto changed course northwards and is currently heading towards Bermuda. Hurricane warnings have been issued for Bermuda, with warnings that it could become a Category 3 storm by the time it gets to the island. Residents of Bermuda are being urged to prepare for the worst.

The storm is not expected to pass over mainland USA, but warnings of life-threatening surf and rip currents on the east coast have been issued as far north as Canada.

Denmark has placed pressure on Sweden to restrain the growing cross-border gang violence, following the arrest and charging of 10 Swedes in the country for crimes including attempted murder and weapon possession. In recent years, policing cooperation between Nordic countries has increased. The Danish government has particularly called for joint efforts to strengthen border controls with Sweden to tackle the issue.

Solace Global Assessment: 

More than half of the individuals arrested in Denmark are minors. This almost certainly underscores the established practice by Denmark and Sweden-based gangs to employ underage individuals to carry out violent and drug-related offences. Minors are less likely to receive harsh jail sentences and are more difficult to detect and track when conducting cross-border operations. Moreover, minors are likely more vulnerable to being groomed by gang members. Sweden-based gangs are known to target vulnerable children, at times breaking them out of youth homes with promises of desirable and status-enhancing rewards, such as clothes, money, and drugs.

The Danish government has increasingly sought to secure its borders, and the attempts to crack down on cross-border gang operations are likely a reflection of a broader approach meant to avoid the spillover of crime trends within Danish borders. There is a realistic possibility that the implementation of stricter measures by Danish officials will result in domestic civil unrest, as well as have diplomatic consequences within the EU. At the same time, an internationalisation of the gang networks of Sweden could affect Sweden’s relations with its European neighbours.

Finally, the use of minors by gangs may increase rates of radicalisation. While still not conclusive, recent data seems to show that, since the COVID-19 pandemic, the average age of “lone wolves” in Europe has decreased, with more than a dozen individuals under 20 years of age arrested in connection with terrorist plots in Europe in 2024 alone. As gang and extremist networks often overlap, with multiple lone wolves having previously engaged in gang-related activity, the greater participation of minors in organised crime groups may result in more radicalisation. As these groups tend to have access to firearms and other weapons, there is a realistic possibility that this trend could lead to more severe or sophisticated attacks.

Iran has rejected recent calls for restraint from several Western nations regarding a retaliatory attack on Israel for the assassination of Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah, Ali Khamenei, has stated that Iran must respond and that it would face “divine wrath” for failing to do so, a sentiment which has been echoed across Iranian media.

The US has continued to enhance its force posture in the region by accelerating the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG) which is equipped with F-35C fighter jets, and publicly declaring that it has deployed a nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN) to the region. Hezbollah has continued its drone and rocket attacks on northern Israel and the Golan Heights with multiple attacks a day. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has mobilised more forces in northern Israel near the Lebanon border and IDF have conducted military exercises at the Haifa Naval Base to simulate defence and attack scenarios in northern Israel, including the maritime space.

Ceasefire talks in Doha, Qatar scheduled for 15 August are set to continue through to at least 16 August. Ceasefire talks have included US, Egyptian, Qatari and Israeli officials but have not included Hamas who have refused to attend on the grounds that Israel is deceiving to prolong the war and even expand it to a regional conflict.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The most likely course of action for Iran is a layered drone, missile and rocket attack coordinated with its proxy forces throughout the Middle East. However, Iran has likely delayed its attack for numerous reasons. Firstly, Tehran will want to observe how successful the current ceasefire talks are, with Hezbollah also indicating that a ceasefire could delay or even cancel its retaliation for the assassination of one of its senior commanders. However, with Hamas refusing to attend, ceasefire talks are unlikely to produce any significant progress.

Moreover, accepting a ceasefire will not be tolerated by the more extreme elements of Netanyahu’s coalition, with far-right leader Ben Gvir threatening to leave the coalition if a ceasefire is agreed upon before the destruction of Hamas, an unlikely and hard-to-qualify situation. Iran has likely been forced to delay due to issues regarding logistics, planning and coordination, especially if it has to supply proxy forces throughout the region. The delay will also have a psychological effect on Israeli citizens and will likely help Iran achieve some degree of operational surprise, increasing its chances of penetrating Israeli air defence.

Lastly, Iran is set to deliver hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia for its war in Ukraine. Russia may be pressuring Iran to delay until it secures delivery of these and withdraws its personnel from Iran who are currently training on these systems. Iran’s delay has enabled the US increase to its force posture in the region, which may influence the scale of Iran’s expected attack. The CSG, which involves escorting destroyers, combined with the SSGN, has not only increased the US air defence capability in the region but also hugely increased its air and sea-launched cruise missile capability in the region. This is likely to influence Tehran’s decision-making process and serve as a deterrent to a major escalation.

There is a realistic possibility that Israel’s enhanced force posture in the north is shaping activity for a future offensive into southern Lebanon. This course of action will likely be triggered by mass casualties from a Hezbollah attack, with the IDF’s most probable limit of advance the Litani River not to provoke hostilities with wider Lebanese society. However, this would likely be supported by expanded air strikes in northern and central Lebanon against Hezbollah high-value targets.

The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has declared the “monkeypox” or “Mpox” outbreak a public health emergency across the continent, particularly due to its severe impact on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Limited reporting indicates that since January, Africa has recorded at least 38, 465 Mpox cases and almost 1,500 deaths.

The continent-wide warning has been issued in response to the Clade Ib strain, a subtype of the virus, spreading to at least 16 countries, including Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, the DRC, South Africa, Uganda and Kenya.

On 15 August, the Swedish government confirmed the first case of the new Mpox variant outside of Africa, with one person diagnosed in the Stockholm area.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Africa CDC’s declaration marks the first time it has used its continental security powers, granted in 2022, to address a major outbreak. The declaration underscores the CDC’s assessment that a coordinated and proactive approach across the continent is required to curtail the spread of Mpox. However, the provision of medical services in Africa is hugely dependent on foreign aid. Without foreign intervention from organisations like the World Health Organization (WHO), it is unlikely that the spread of the virus will be effectively managed, likely a motivating factor for the Africa CDC to declare it a continent-wide emergency.

The disease, which is characterised by a range of symptoms, including fever, muscle aches, skin lesions, rashes, headaches, fatigue and swollen lymph nodes typically has a global death rate of three to six per cent. However, the new Clade Ib strain is assessed to be more virulent and have a higher death rate. Early estimates indicate that the death rate may be as high as five per cent for adults and ten per cent for children, making it the most deadly strain of Mpox currently identified. Most new cases of Mpox are sexually transmitted but there is also evidence to suggest that the new strain can spread between people more easily than previous strains. These factors have led to concerns that the virus will spread beyond Africa, especially if the new strain can spread without symptoms, a key factor which can determine the severity of an epidemic.

The Africa CDC is currently assessing that 10 million Mpox vaccines are needed in Africa and is currently negotiating for 200,000 from international partners. However, there are major shortages and delays due to regulatory approvals and logistical demands. Moreover, if the virus continues to spread outside of Africa, there is a realistic possibility that vaccines will be diverted to other regions, with Europe previously managing the 2022-23 outbreak through rapid vaccinations.

Latest UK gas-fired powered station approval likely to drive environmentalist unrest

On 14 August, the London High Court dismissed a legal challenge against a BP-backed project to create a gas-powered power plant, to be constructed in the Teesside area of northeast England. The legal challenge had been supported by environmentalist groups.

As environmentalist groups in the UK have increasingly sought to cause business and transport disruptions in response to adverse legislative and judicial developments, there is a high likelihood of “retaliatory” action following the latest setback. Activist groups’ protests are likely to take the form of road blockades and symbolic gestures, although there is a realistic possibility of sabotage action targeting energy infrastructure. This latter course of action presents a much lower chance of arrest and detection, and it may become more popular following the increasing number of harsh sentences given by UK courts to environmentalist activists who participated in road blockades and other high-visibility actions.

The EU and Elon Musk engage in row over hate speech online

The EU’s digital commissioner Thierry Breton warned X.com owner Elon Musk not to amplify “harmful content” online, after Musk conducted an interview with Republican candidate Donald Trump on 12 August. The interview, which was marred by technical problems, was singled out by Breton as a possible driver of disinformation and violent speech in the EU.

The EU previously sanctioned X.com in January 2024 for failing to respect its social media laws. Under Musk’s ownership, X.com has increasingly become a hotspot for the spread of disinformation, as well as extremist content. There is a realistic possibility, also considering the recent disinformation-fuelled riots in the UK, of further EU action targeting X.com. This, in turn, may have important spillover effects for European information spaces.

YouTube bans Portuguese far-right party’s channel

On 13 August streaming giant YouTube banned the channel of the Portuguese ultranationalist group, Grupo 1143 due to violations relating to hate speech unearthed by an enquiry by the New York Times. Grupo 1143, which is named after the year Portugal became a sovereign nation, has organised anti-immigration and anti-Muslim protests throughout the country and its leader, Mario Machado, has served time for assault and racial discrimination.

There is a realistic possibility that the banning of the group’s YouTube channel could lead to organised protests or reprisal attacks, with Grupo 1143 linked to attacks on Portugal’s immigrant community.

Thousands of Slovaks protest government’s democratic backsliding

On 12-13 August, almost 20,000 Slovaks took to the streets of Bratislava to protest recent government actions that they see as undermining the rule of law and democratic freedoms. The opposition is urging Brussels to hold the Slovak government accountable.

Frustrations with Prime Minister Robert Fico’s coalition, including the ultranationalist Slovak National Party, have intensified after several controversial developments. These include the dismissal of the directors of the Slovak National Theatre and National Gallery by Culture Minister Martina Šimkovičová, the release of former special prosecutor Dušan Kováčik following an appeal by Justice Minister Boris Susko, and Fico’s plans to disband the National Crime Agency.

Opposition leaders and European lawmakers from Progressive Slovakia warn that these actions represent a systemic erosion of democracy, with protests expected to continue. The European Commission has yet to respond but faces growing pressure to address Slovakia’s democratic backsliding.

Controversial Bulgarian anti-LGBT law set to pass

Bulgarian President Radev has refused to veto an anti-LGBT law passed by the country’s parliament, indicating that it will be passed into law. The law is an amendment to the Pre-School and School Education Law, which bans “non-traditional sexual orientation” education in schools.

The law has already provoked demonstrations on the streets of Sofia and in the major port city of Varna. Further protests against the law are likely and the government’s endorsement of anti-LGBT sentiment could embolden far-right counter-demonstrations, which may lead to violent confrontations.

The passing of the law may also strain Bulgaria’s relationship with the European Union, which upholds principles of equality and non-discrimination.

Opposition leaders arrested in Tanzania

On 12 August, police arrested the leaders of the main opposition party CHADEMA as they prepared to attend a meeting in the country’s southwest. Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who came to power in 2021, has supervised some progress towards democratisation, including lifting bans on political rallies. However, this “liberalisation” has remained extremely constrained, and the government almost certainly remains determined to quash local opposition.

Along with the party’s leaders, dozens of youth wing members were also arrested. The party’s leaders were released on bail on 13 August. There is a realistic possibility of the crackdown resulting in civil unrest, possibly leading to further police intervention.

Woman left paralysed after being shot by the Iranian religious police

According to reports, an Iranian citizen was shot by the religious police for not complying with the country’s strict religious dress laws. The religious dress laws are largely unpopular with the Iranian population, and cases of spontaneous protest and non-compliance have continued following the brutal crackdown of the 2022 unrest that followed the police’s killing in custody of Mahsa Amini.

There is a realistic possibility of further protests being caused by the latest case, albeit these are unlikely to match the severity of those in 2022. The government’s response to the shooting may provide a signal of the extent to which reformist President Pezeshkian intends to challenge the influence and control of the hardline religious police.

Guards open fire to deter migrant crossings in Poland

A video was shared on social media reportedly showing Polish officers opening fire to deter migrants from storming the border fence at the Poland-Belarus border. The incident, dated 11 August, is possibly the first case of implementation of a law, passed last month, that allows border guards to fire live bullets if threatened. The case did not result in any fatalities.

However, further incidents may drive protests in Poland and other European countries. In the medium term, increasingly harsh policing at the Polish borders could drive migrants to attempt to reach the EU via the Baltic states, further north.

White supremacist lone wolf attack at Mosque in Eskişehir, Turkey

At least seven people were wounded on the morning of 13 August as an 18-year-old individual, armed with a knife and an axe, attacked bystanders at a park near a local Mosque before being arrested. The attacker published a manifesto online before the stabbing and live-streamed the terror attack on X.com via a body-worn camera.

The content of the manifesto, the use of body-worn livestreaming, and multiple neo-Nazi symbols worn by the attacker make it almost certain that the individual espoused a white supremacist ideology and sought to imitate the 2019 Christchurch Mosque shooter. Copycat attacks by white supremacists have regularly taken place over the last decade. As almost all of the attackers are radicalised online, their actions share important similarities, namely “performative” elements – such as live streaming the attack or writing a manifesto – the selection of high-visibility targets, and the promotion of an ideology that combines racist imagery and themes with online subcultures, including non-terror-related ones.

The attacker’s manifesto called for copycat actions, and there is a realistic possibility of further attacks. Finally, the attack is notable as it is the first lone wolf attack in Turkey to explicitly draw inspiration from the Christchurch one, which emphasises the global reach of online white supremacist subcultures.

Iran Central Bank (CBI) targeted in cyberattack

On 14 August, the computer systems of CBI and other banks in the country went offline, with disruptions among the largest ever caused by a cyberattack targeting the Iranian public sector. Responsibility for the attack remains unclear, but there is a realistic possibility that it was carried out by anti-regime hacktivist groups.

In March, a hacker group – known as “API” – infiltrated the Iranian state railway company, resulting in a confidential documents leak. In December 2023, the regime accused the Israeli “Predatory Sparrow” group of carrying out a cyberattack on the country’s fuel stations.

Sudanese rebel group declares famine in southern states

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) has warned of a hunger catastrophe in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains and parts of Blue Nile state, with 20 per cent of families facing severe food shortages and 30 per cent of children suffering from malnutrition. The potential famine is being attributed to the ongoing civil war and poor harvests. The population in these regions has swelled to almost four million due to displacement from other parts of the country. The war between the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has exacerbated food insecurity, with both sides accused of humanitarian access and destroying food infrastructure.

Turkey mediates dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia

Ethiopia and Somalia have made significant progress in resolving a dispute triggered by Ethiopia’s agreement with the breakaway region of Somaliland, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Tension originally arose after Ethiopia signed a memorandum with Somaliland, under which Ethiopia would lease a 20-kilometre stretch of Somaliland’s coastline to guarantee port access and increase trade, in exchange for recognising Somaliland’s independence. Somalia has stated that the deal is a violation of its sovereignty and has gone as far as threatening war.

Turkey’s mediation efforts have focused on ensuring Ethiopia’s sea access while respecting Somalia’s territorial integrity, with a third round of talks is scheduled for September.

Sierra Leone court hands out tough sentences for those involved in 2022 coup attempt

A military court in Sierra Leone has sentenced 24 soldiers to prison terms ranging from 50 to 120 years for their roles in a failed coup attempt against President Julius Maada Bio’s government in November 2022. The soldiers were part of a group of 27 men court-martialled for attacking military barracks, prisons, and other locations, leading to over 20 deaths and the release of around 2,200 inmates. A military jury found most of the accused guilty on charges including mutiny, murder, and theft.

The sentencing follows earlier severe convictions of civilians and security personnel involved in the coup attempt and has likely been orchestrated to deter future coups in a region where they are becoming more frequent.

Germany investigates possible sabotage at military barracks near Cologne

On 14 August, a German military base near Cologne airport was sealed off, and thousands of soldiers were advised not to drink tap water due to potential contamination after a possible act of sabotage. The Cologne-Wahn base, which houses 4,300 service personnel and 1,200 civilian employees, is being investigated by police, military police, and German intelligence agencies. The base is also home to military aircraft used by the German government. Authorities have refused to comment and water samples have been taken away for further analysis.

The potential act of sabotage follows a wider European trend with incidents of sabotage reported at military or arms facilities in Poland, the UK, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and several other countries. While there are no indications as to who may have unlawfully accessed the Cologne base, NATO has recently cautioned about a series of hostile actions orchestrated by Moscow, including sabotage and cyberattacks. However, recent low-sophistication sabotage attacks across Europe have highlighted their effectiveness and the high level of plausible deniability involved, indicating that various actors hostile to the German state could be responsible for this incident.

Germany issues arrest warrant for Ukrainian Nord Stream suspect

German authorities have issued an arrest warrant for a Ukrainian diving instructor “Volodymyr Z.” over the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea near the island of Bornholm in 2022. He is suspected of carrying out the attack with at least two others, also believed to be Ukrainian citizens. The pipelines, key conduits for Russian gas to Europe, were damaged by explosions in September 2022, leading to international investigations.

While the suspect was last known to be living in Poland, authorities believe he has since fled to Ukraine. There is currently no evidence linking the suspects to the Ukrainian government, although it is unlikely that ordinary citizens would have been able to conduct such a complicated attack without state help. If Ukraine refuses to help, it may undermine Germany’s support for the war effort.

Greece struggles with record heat and wildfires near capital

Hundreds of firefighters have been battling a massive wildfire in the northern suburbs of Athens, which began in the northeastern Attica region on 11 August. Thousands of residents were evacuated as the fire spread to schools, hospitals, and fuel stations, with multiple explosions reported. The first fatality of the summer wildfire season was confirmed when a woman’s body was found in Vrilissia.

In response, Greece activated the European Civil Protection Mechanism, seeking assistance from EU countries. With containment efforts ongoing, the extent of the damage remains unclear, and Greece is facing what could be its hottest summer on record with further wildfires almost certain.

Dozens killed in garbage landslide in Kampala, Uganda

On 10 August, a garbage landslide in Kiteezi in Uganda’s capital, Kampala killed at least 30 people and dozens remain missing. The garbage landslide followed heavy rains that triggered extensive flooding across East Africa. The landslide occurred in the middle of the night and buried informal homes whilst their occupants slept. The Kiteezi waste dump serves as Kampala’s only landfill, a city with a metropolitan population of 6.7 million.

Residents have long complained over the hazardous conditions but the collection of rubbish serves as a major source of income for many of the area’s residents. There is a realistic possibility that the increasing death toll and lack of government regulation or accountability could trigger localised unrest.

Throughout the reporting period, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has intensified its attacks against Pakistani forces and infrastructure across Balochistan.

On 14 August, the BLA targeted a rally organised by the Pakistani military in Mand Soro with a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED), but avoided civilian casualties through the timing of the attack. On the same day, BLA fighters conducted an attack on Pakistani positions in Sepin Tangi, Harnai, killing two soldiers and injuring three.

The previous day, on 13 August, the BLA attacked a Pakistani military post in Shah Mardan, Kalat, using rockets and small arms fire, causing both casualties and financial losses. In Rakni, Harnai, BLA fighters disabled a mobile spy tower installed by Pakistani military and intelligence agencies by setting fire to it.

In Gwadar, the BLA executed a series of attacks on 14 August, including a remote-controlled bomb explosion in Pishukan that injured two Pakistani personnel. The day also saw bomb explosions in Jiwani and Pasni and the discovery of additional bombs in Panwan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

BLA attacks have almost certainly been timed to coincide with Pakistan’s Independence Day on 14 August to maximise the publicity of the attacks and subversion of the central government. Whilst these attacks have been publicly attributed to the BLA, there is a high chance that they have also involved other Baloch groups such as the Baloch Liberation Front. These attacks may set a precedent for future waves of Baloch attacks which could be designed to coincide with other important dates such as 27 December or the “Baloch Martyrs’ Day” which honours Baloch fighters who have died in the struggle for independence.

BLA attacks have largely been coordinated against targets associated with the security services and are almost certainly being designed to minimise civilian casualties. This strategic approach is likely to help the BLA maintain legitimacy and support among Baloch communities, ensuring that their struggle is seen as a targeted effort against perceived oppressors rather than a direct threat to innocent civilians.

These attacks continue to disrupt Pakistan’s plans to get the Gwadar International Airport fully operational by 14 August. The airport is an integral part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a 3,000km corridor and the main component of China’s Belts and Roads Initiative. Detering Chinese investment and operations in Balochistan is one of the BLA’s and BLF’s primary objectives. Baloch groups have accused Pakistan and China of resource exploitation, economic marginalisation and environmental damage. Chinese workers are one of the few civilian demographics targeted by Baloch militants.

China has publicly criticised Pakistan for its inability to protect Chinese workers and interests. This has led Beijing to demand widespread counterterrorism operations by Pakistan and also a request to deploy Chinese security personnel to Pakistan, which so far Pakistan has refused. The recent surge and scale of Baloch attacks may force Pakistan to reconsider. However, the deployment of Chinese security personnel to Pakistan will likely justify the Baloch narrative, provide propaganda material, increase recruitment and potentially lead to more frequent and complex attacks on both Chinese and Pakistani security services.

On 14 August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks with the leader of the Myanmar junta in Naypyidaw after months of revel offensive have strained relations between the neighbouring countries. Border security was one of the main topics discussed and Wang publicly expressed China’s opposition to the war, with much of it occurring near its border China has promised to provide technical support and aid to the junta in exchange for a national election.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Beijing’s increased involvement in the Myanmar civil war is almost certainly being driven by the destabilisation of the areas that border China. It follows the rebel’s recent capture of Lashio, a major trading town in Shan state that forms part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, the proposed election will almost certainly be dismissed as a sham by Western nations after the disbandment of multiple parties by the junta.

Moreover, there is a high likelihood that many of the ethnic rebel groups will refuse to take part in a national election after seizing the initiative in the war. Many of their parties have been disbanded and their ultimate aim is likely greater autonomy or outright separation, suggesting a truce will be hard to secure. The continuation of the war is creating a dire humanitarian situation in Myanmar and there are also increasing reports of war crimes committed by all sides involved but primarily the junta forces.

Furthermore, both the junta and some of the rebel forces are likely exploiting the fog of war to target the predominantly Muslim ethnic Rohingya. In one recent drone and artillery attack, up to 200 Rohingya were killed and 300 injured as they were attempting to flee the country to Bangladesh from Rakhine state. One of the largest rebel groups, the Arakan Army has blamed the junta for the massacre, with the junta blaming the rebel group. This attack forms part of a wider picture which has included the torching of Rohingya homes and the forcible recruitment of Rohingya men for frontline operations.

The attacks will almost certainly force the displacement of the Rohingya creating a surge in internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar and a further deterioration in the humanitarian situation. It may also lead to a refugee crisis in Bangladesh, with its largest refugee camp, Cox’s Bazar struggling to cope with around one million refugees. As conditions worsen, more Rohingya may attempt to flee by sea to neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. These journeys are incredibly dangerous, place the Rohingya in a position to be exploited by criminal gangs and smugglers and in many cases they are not accepted by the destination countries.

On 14 August, Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin was dismissed from office after Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled that he had breached ethics regulations for appointing a cabinet minister who had a criminal conviction. Srettha, who was in power for less than a year, is now the fourth Thai prime minister in 16 years to be removed by a verdict from the Constitutional Court.

The ruling coalition, which holds 314 out of 493 seats in the Thai House of Representatives and is dominated by the Pheu Thai Party, was then provided two options to nominate for prime minister. The first choice was, Chaikasem Nitisiri, a former attorney-general and justice minister. The other choice was Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the 37-year-old daughter of the ousted former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra- a man who has spent decades challenging Thailand’s conservative establishment and royalist military.

On 16 August the coalition decided to nominate Paetongtarn.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The dismissal of Prime Minister Srettha is likely further evidence of Thailand’s democratic backsliding after the recent dissolution of the reformist Move Forward Part (MFP). The removal of Srettha not only demonstrates the establishment’s almost unchecked power but could signal an end to the uneasy truce between it and Pheu Thai.

It is unlikely that the establishment will be able to block the Pheu Thai coalition from nominating a prime ministerial candidate as they control a majority in parliament. However, mechanisms exist to enable the establishment to block a candidate’s appointment. The Senate, which is largely appointed by the military, must also endorse parliament’s decision. The Constitutional Court can challenge the legality of the nomination, and the election commission can challenge the eligibility of Thai members of parliament. Should the establishment leverage any of these options after removing Srettha and dissolving MFP, there is a high likelihood of disruptive protests in Thailand- demonstrations that could evolve into a wider pro-democracy movement like those observed in 2020-21.

Conversely, the appointment of another Shinawatra will almost certainly be interpreted as Thaksin running Thailand from behind the scenes. Paetongtarn ‘s nomination will likely galvanise the establishment’s base and lead to accusations of corruption and nepotism. Several protests have erupted in the past relating to the Shinawatra family, most notably the 2006 anti-Thaksin protests championed by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or “Yellow Shirts”- movements that typically provoke a reaction from the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), or “Red Shirts”.

Doctors protest following rape and murder case in Kolkata, India

More than 8,000 Indian doctors and other healthcare professionals have launched a strike, paralysing non-emergency services across multiple states including West Bengal, Maharashtra, Goa, and Uttar Pradesh. The doctors are protesting unsafe working conditions, after one of their colleagues, a 31-year-old trainee medic, was raped and killed at a public hospital.

Moreover, some reports have emerged indicating that the victim’s college initially tried to cover up the murder, telling her family that she had “committed suicide”. These have further inflamed public outcry, with doctors calling for strikes at a national level. Gender-based violence continues to be an extremely severe issue in India, which continues to rank among the most affected countries globally.

Moreover, healthcare workers are at a disproportionately higher risk of violence, and a study from 2023 assesses that up to 75 per cent of health workers in India have been victims of physical or verbal abuse at some point in their careers.

Japan’s Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, stands down

The 14 August announcement ends the prime minister’s three-year tenure, which was marked by a major corruption scandal and the decline of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) popular support. The LDP has remained in power for much of the past 70 years but has faced a significant decline under the current administration.

No opposition party likely has enough traction to challenge LDP as of now. However, Kishida’s resignation could have important implications for the 2025 elections. An increasingly unstable LDP could further discourage foreign investors and have negative impacts on Japanese markets.

Indonesia set to open new capital in Nusantara

The inauguration of Indonesia’s new capital is set to take place on 17 August. The new capital, which is far from being completed, will be located in the province of East Kalimantan on the island of Borneo.

The construction of a new capital has been contentious and plagued with environmental concerns, especially deforestation and a loss of biodiversity. It also threatens to displace indigenous people and costs are anticipated to spiral out of control.

The creation of a new capital underlines the vulnerability of Jakarta, which is mired by overcrowding, pollution, congestion but most importantly is sinking, with 40 per cent of the metropolis now assessed as being below sea level.

Taliban celebrate three years of rule in Afghanistan

On 14 August, the Taliban marked the third anniversary of their return to power, which included a military parade outside a former US air base near Kabul.

The Taliban have consolidated their grip on power in that time, imposed harsh restrictions on women and girls, detained hundreds of journalists and presided over economic decline. The Taliban government are yet to be formally recognised by another government and is plagued by internal divisions. Its continued control will almost certainly lead to further human rights abuses and severe humanitarian issues.

Anti-Hindu sectarian violence on the rise in Bangladesh

Following the collapse of the Hasina government and the prime minister’s escape to India, the transition government of Bangladesh has noted the increase of sectarian violence against Hindu temples and private property, as well as reported cases of lynchings and mob attacks.

The government’s collapse has almost certainly opened a security vacuum that domestic and Islamist groups are seeking to fill. These include both well-established groups, like Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJeI), and smaller Islamist formations that have so far had little impact on Bangladeshi society. For instance, a small branch of the Islamic State, known as the Bengal Province (ISBP) was formed in 2014 and has remained active, especially via online propaganda. The government’s collapse, combined with broader trends within IS including its shift away from its historic centre in Syria and Iraq, may present an opportunity for ISBP to intensify operations, including by carrying out attacks and recruitment campaigns.

Moreover, the increased prominence of sectarian violence in Bangladesh may have spillover effects outside of the country. Sectarian violence involving Hindus and Muslims in the Indian subcontinent has at times drive unrest in countries that have a large south Asian diaspora, such as the UK and Canada. The most notable example is the 2022 Leicester riots, however, the Bangladesh protests have more recently driven unrest in the UK, with clashes recorded in July in the Whitechapel area of London.

Taiwan to conduct military exercises

Taiwan is set to hold military exercises off its eastern coast on 20 August. The exercises will involve the live-firing of multiple air-launched missile systems by Taiwan’s air force along the east coast and near Orchid Island. The exercise is likely aimed at countering Chinese attempts to encircle the island and enforce a blockade, and will likely to be met with a major Chinese demonstration of strength.

More than 100 people dead in India due to heavy rains and landslides.

The death toll surpassed 100 on 12 August. Authorities have also closed more than 220 roads, including four national highways, due to landslides, in the state of Himachal Pradesh. The floods that have affected the north Indian state since the past weekend have likely been exacerbated by the poor state of local infrastructure, with multiple reports of river banks collapsing, as well as the mountainous local terrain, which concentrates water flows towards valley settlements and complicates rescue efforts.

North Korea announces it will reject foreign aid after severe floods.

Regime officials reportedly rejected offers by South Korea, although it is unclear if they will also turn down Russian offers to provide help. The approximately 15,000 people displaced by the floods in Sinuiju will be moved to Pyongyang. Due to North Korea’s extremely strict government control, public unrest remains highly unlikely.

New Zealand charity distributes sweets contaminated with methamphetamine.

Authorities in New Zealand are racing to recover sweets distributed by the homeless charity Auckland City Mission after it was discovered that several of the sweets were contaminated with the drug methamphetamine. Preliminary reports indicate that the sweets contain as much as 300 times the lethal dose of the synthetic stimulant.

The sweets have already hospitalised three people and are wrapped in the label of the Malaysian brand Rinda. Disguising narcotics as sweets is a common cross-border smuggling tactic and the current assessment is that the sweets were donated to the charity by accident.

 However, only 16 sweets have been recovered and the authorities are unaware as to how many have been distributed. The full recovery of the sweets is highly unlikely, with each one reportedly worth around USD 600.

The UN-backed peacekeeping mission to Haiti, led by Kenyan police forces, has made some very limited progress in its efforts to take back control of the country from the gangs that continue to fuel ongoing chaos and violence.

In late July, Kenyan forces started shifting from their initial strategy of taking control of key points – including hospitals and police stations – in favour of an area-based approach. While gangs have conducted some frontal assaults on police forces during the initial stages of deployment, especially in Port-au-Prince, they have reportedly increasingly switched to a strategy of hit-and-run attacks on Kenyan officials.

At the same time, gangs continue attacking the few remaining operational welfare providers, with an assault on a Church-run children’s institute – resulting in looting – reported on 7 August. On 2 August, a UN report called for a greater deployment of international forces to Haiti. The report included data signalling that, despite the arrival of foreign troops, crime levels in Haiti remain extremely severe, particularly rates of homicide and sexual violence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the Kenyan forces have encountered significant limitations in meaningfully securing areas previously under gang control. While some reports of Kenyan forces taking over settlements on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince have emerged, no evidence signals that Kenyan police are carrying out “government-building” operations there, and there is a high likelihood that gangs are able to re-infiltrate areas that the UN mission previously cleared.

Consequently, it is almost certain that the main success of the mission so far has been the re-taking of important logistical and government buildings, ensuring some service provision to residents. Gangs’ capacity to attack police stations and other institutions has likely not been affected by the deployment of Kenyan forces, whose “permanent” presence likely only deters operations in some parts of Port-au-Prince.

While trying to inflict some attrition on the Kenyan forces, gangs’ main efforts are likely still aimed at retaining control of the local population to ensure reliance on their criminal networks. Recent gang efforts (led by a group called “400 Mawozo”) to take control of the Ganthier area, near the border with the Dominican Republic, likely illuminate the gangs’ interest in controlling the flows of refugees towards their neighbours.

Government forces in Venezuela have cracked down on protests with increasing brutality and success. At least 2,200 people have so far been arrested since the vote, and hundreds have been injured, with at least 24 deaths recorded according to human rights groups in the country.

On 8 August, the Maduro regime announced that in-country access to social media platform X would be cut for ten days. Two days prior, the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB), the country’s military, reiterated its “absolute loyalty” to Maduro, rejecting appeals from the opposition leaders to topple the regime.

Government officials have also opened criminal proceedings against opposition leaders including Maria Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez, on charges of inciting insurrection.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As covered in last week’s assessment, it is highly unlikely that the military would defect and join anti-regime forces. This is due to the regime’s effective coup-proofing measures, including fostering an environment of uncertainty and insecurity among the highest echelons of the armed forces, pushing for greater oversight of Cuban intelligence, and playing the military against other government militias. It is also due to the opposition’s failures to address the military’s main incentive to back the regime – the direct economic benefits they receive from having a direct stake in oil export operations.

Two weeks after the election, there likely is no realistic path for the opposition to take power. In the short term, it is highly likely that repressive measures will successfully reduce the severity of public demonstrations. This will, in turn, highly likely result in severely increased threats for humanitarian workers and travellers in the country.

Still, it is likely that the regime will need to grant some concessions to reduce the wave of civil unrest that followed the vote. These are almost certainly going to be targeted inducements aimed at satisfying the middle class and bureaucratic intelligentsia. In order to accomplish this, the regime is likely to increasingly look to deepening ties with Russia and China, and to take precautions to reduce the impact of the further wave of sanctions that is highly likely to be imposed by the EU and US on Caracas in the coming weeks.

US Vice President and Democratic candidate Harris picks running mate

Minnesota Governor Tim Walz was not initially considered to be the likeliest candidate for the position. However, Walz was likely selected due to his relative appeal (compared to other potential nominees like Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro) to the left wing of the party, with no notable controversies that could upset progressive voters and a strong record on green issues. Moreover, the Democrat presidential candidate likely sees in Walz a chance to win over some moderate Republican voters disillusioned with Trump.

In Chile, mass blackouts disrupt flights, cause civil unrest

On 6 August, power outages affecting up to 1.2 million people were recorded in Chile, after severe weather damaged energy infrastructure. The blackout resulted in large demonstrations, with protesters clashing with police and blocking roads leading to airports in Pudahuel and Santiago, as well as other urban centres. Large blackouts have become somewhat common in Chile, with one in June affecting 400,000 people, and are often linked to severe weather conditions. Further protests could disrupt travel and business across the country, resulting in larger economic costs.

Multiple clergy members arrested for criticising Nicaraguan regime

The Nicaraguan government has illegally detained at least 13 priests, deacons, and members of religious congregations, the most significant instance of persecution against the  Catholic Church in 2024. Most of these arrests have targeted clergy from the Diocese of Matagalpa, whose Bishop is exiled from the country.

The Catholic Church remains one of the few organisations in Nicaragua that openly criticises the regime of President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo which has expanded its crackdown on civic institutions since 2018 in an attempt to silence the opposition. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that Nicaragua has ordered the expulsion of the Brazilian ambassador, due to the Lula administration’s criticism of the government’s repression of the Catholic Church

Costa Rican authorities crack down on US-bound international human trafficking network

On 6 August, Costa Rican authorities raided 18 sites linked to an international human trafficking network operating between Ecuador and the US. The operations were coordinated with the US and Panama, leading to the arrests of 21 people. Gangs were charging an average of USD 14,000 to illegally smuggle migrants from Ecuador to the US. Most migrants were Ecuadorian but many were also from further afield, including from Africa and Asia.

Costa Rica is now considering a similar deal to the one recently agreed between the US and Panama, whereby Washington will fund the deportation of US-bound migrants from the host country. Organised and violent crime groups in the region are increasingly turning to human trafficking due to the high profit margins, high demand and lower risk of detection and prosecution.

US avocado demand leads to violence and environmental damage in Mexico

Mexican authorities have indicated that as many as 80 per cent of the avocado orchards in the state of Michoacán have been established illegally and their increased cultivation is being driven by US demand. The illegal expansion of avocado orchards and circumvention of Mexico’s environmental regulations are leading to high rates of deforestation, damage to the local ecology, depletion of local water resources and exacerbating drought. High profits have attracted the involvement of the cartels, who have employed violence and intimidation to suppress dissent, displace local communities and extort payments from farmers.

Brazilian farmers attack indigenous activists in Mato Grosso do Sul state, injuring 11

The attack took place on 5 August, as the activists sought to retake land scheduled to be cleared for farming operations. The farmers’ reportedly set fire to tents where some of the activists were staying and fired rubber bullets. Increasing numbers of clashes between farmers and indigenous people have been recorded as pro-farmer lobbies are currently seeking to amend Brazil’s constitutional provisions that grant indigenous groups claims to their ancestral lands.

The UK government, led by newly-elected Prime Minister Keir Starmer, has begun implementing stricter measures, including arrests for incitements to violence online, to curb the sectarian violence that has affected much of northern England, as well as cities in southern England and Northern Ireland, following the stabbing of multiple children at a dance class in Southport, which killed three.

On 9 August, a 28-year-old man was arrested for encouraging rioters to attack a hotel housing asylum seekers in Leeds via social media. At the same time, the government has also put in place measures to expedite the sentencing of rioters. As of 8 August, UK police assessed that more than 480 arrests had been made in connection with the riots, and at least 150 charges had been brought forward, and stated that both numbers are rapidly rising.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the intensity of the protests has decreased during the week, there is a realistic possibility of a further increase during the weekend. The harsher measures put in place by the government are likely to lessen the scale of the unrest, as they place a deterrent on further riots while simultaneously dismantling spaces for online organisation.

While the initial protests that followed the stabbing were community-driven, the increase in tensions has allowed extremists, mostly online-based, to gain a prominent role in fuelling the violence. A possible indication of social media’s prominent role is the notably young age of many of the rioters. According to British police, more than a quarter of people charged so far are under 21 years of age, with some of the individuals arrested as young as 11.

Still, it is unclear to what extent the Starmer government will be able to effectively reduce the impact of online radical discourse. Much of the extremist material currently fuelling the riots is produced outside of the United Kingdom, mostly by users based in continental Europe or the US, and it is unlikely that Westminster will be able to create a legislative framework that is able to deal with these channels without compromising the openness of the British information space in the immediate term. Moreover, the threat posed by social media-based extremist discourse will almost certainly extend well beyond the current crisis, with a high likelihood of commentary regarding the riots continuing to drive radicalisation among UK-based youth. While the deterrents put in place by the government may discourage large gatherings, there is a realistic possibility of a change in the nature and scope of sectarian violence in the medium term, entailing a movement towards targeted, lone-actor violence.

Iran has repeatedly conducted actions and promulgated narratives indicating that it will take this course of action, including the issuing of multiple Notice to Air Missions (NOTAMs) aimed at communicating an aerial attack is imminent. On 7 August, the Iranian armed force-run media outlet Defa Press suggested that Iran should target Israel from multiple directions to disperse Israeli assets, thereby exposing targets.

Iran has also published information relating to what targets it has already decided to strike, although this may be disinformation. The list includes Israeli military bases and government sites like the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv, the Israeli Knesset building in Jerusalem, and eight airbases spread across Israel. Iran also named civil infrastructure sites like airports, gas fields, and power plants throughout Israel.

Iran’s most powerful proxy force, Lebanese Hezbollah, has also vowed to retaliate for the assassination of one of its senior commanders, Fuad Shukr. On 7 August, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah, warned that Israel should prepare for any scenario and that Hezbollah is poised to strike Israel either as part of a wider Iranian-sponsored attack or independently of Tehran.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The US, Russia and other external actors are championing diplomatic efforts in order to de-escalate the situation and avert a wider conflict. There is a realistic possibility that Iran seeks a peaceful resolution, with reports indicating that Tehran may relinquish its plans to attack Israel in exchange for a ceasefire in Gaza. However, after the assassination of Haniyeh and the appointment of the more militant Sinwar as Chairman of Hamas’ Political Bureau, Iran will likely struggle to persuade Hamas to accept a ceasefire at this time.

Iran’s most likely course of action is to conduct a similar attack to the layered missile, rocket and drone attack in April. However, it is assessed that 99 per cent of the threats heading to Israel were either intercepted by Israeli air defence or US, UK and Jordanian jets. Iranian proxies have probed Israeli air defence for several months to identify weaknesses or gaps in coverage. Furthermore, Iranian media’s repeated discussion of the attack and the release of potential targets spread across Israel has been designed to disperse Israeli air defence. However, the US has increased its force posture in the region and is likely in a better place to intercept threats- a course of action it will almost certainly pursue to manage escalation.

To effectively penetrate Israel’s air defence, Iran may be forced to leverage its proxy forces more to strike Israel. Threats launched from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq will provide less early warning and reaction time for both Israel and collation forces. However, if Iran is too successful it may inadvertently escalate.

Iran’s primary goal is likely to effectively penetrate Israeli air defence with multiple ballistic missiles as these could be nuclear-armed in the future, suggesting that Iran’s main effort is not to kill Israeli citizens, only to demonstrate capability and bolster its deterrence. For this reason, Iran will likely prioritise military sites over population centres.

However, if Hezbollah adopts a divergent path, many of its crude and indiscriminate rocket systems will pose a credible threat to settlements in northern Israel, including population centres as far south as Acre, Haifa and Nazareth. Hezbollah attacks will almost certainly provide the Netanyahu administration the pretext to severely degrade the militant group on Israel’s border. This would almost certainly involve expanded strikes in northern and central Lebanon against high-value targets, but depending on the scale of a Hezbollah attack could trigger a limited ground offensive into southern Lebanon by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF).

On 2 August, the al-Qaeda aligned Somalia-based jihadist group, al-Shabaab (AS) conducted a mass casualty complex attack at the popular Lido beach in Mogadishu. The assailants targeted the area late on a Friday when residents of the city typically congregate at seaside restaurants and cafes. A suicide bomber detonated his device, which was then followed by several gunmen opening fire on civilians. It is currently estimated that at least 37 people were killed in the attack and over 200 injured, marking one of the most deadly attacks in Mogadishu in 2024. On 5 August, hundreds of Somali citizens gathered near the attack site to protest AS and to show that they had not succumbed to the group’s attempts to intimidate.

Solace Global Assessment: 

AS, which has now been fighting an insurgency against the Somali government for almost 20 years, has targeted the Lido area multiple times before. The area is an upmarket area of Mogadishu with enhanced security protocols, often frequented by foreigners, international diplomats as well as Somali government and military staff. An AS attack here clearly demonstrates AS’ capability to target any part of the capital and serves to undermine the authority of the central government.

In 2022, a Somali government offensive against AS resulted in the group ceding much territory to government forces backed by international support from the African Union (AU), local clans and drone strikes by the US and Turkey. Initial optimism fuelled by the offensive’s success led Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to announce that AS would be defeated within months or reduced to just a few isolated pockets of influence. However, as an insurgent force, AS does not rely on holding territory and has been able to continue its operations by transitioning to guerrilla tactics and blending into civilian populations.

In recent months, AS has managed to reclaim ground from the government in its traditional strongholds in central and southern Somalia, likely providing it with more freedom of movement and greater capacity to conduct operations. To compound the current situation, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is set to end in late 2024, with responsibility for all security operations set to be transferred to the Somali National Armed Forces. The AU’s drawdown will almost certainly lead to an overstretching of government forces who are also having to contend with other militant groups, Puntland and Somaliland separatist movements and the looming threat of war with Ethiopia.

Moreover, it is unlikely that the government can independently deal with the financial costs or logistical demands to combat AS and has also become over reliant on fragile clan support. A resurgent AS will almost certainly seek to exploit these conditions and exact revenge by reclaiming lost territory and by increasing attacks within Somali government-held territory, with Mogadishu being the most coveted target.

Catalan separatist leader Puigdemont evades capture after appearance in Barcelona.

Former Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont defied his Spanish arrest warrant by returning to Barcelona and appearing at a pro-independence rally on 8 August. The separatist leader addressed thousands of supporters, calling for the revival of the Catalan independence movement. In 2017, large-scale unrest and an independence referendum that was not recognised and deemed illegal by Madrid, led to a significant political crisis in Spain. Puigdemont has been in a self-imposed exile from Spain since 2017, wanted for alleged embezzlement.

It is suspected that Puigdemont evaded capture from authorities with the assistance of a police officer. It is likely that civil unrest will increase in Barcelona from pro-independence protestors, galvanised by Puigdemont’s surprise appearance. It is also likely that anti-independence protests will increase across Spain, especially in Madrid, with criticism of authorities for failing to capture Puigdemont likely to be a major theme.

Turkey bids to join South Africa’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) case against Israel.

The lawsuit accuses Israel of committing the crime of genocide in Gaza. The move follows from previous anti-Israeli gestures and statements by the Turkish government. It is highly unlikely that this development will affect the war in Gaza, and Ankara likely sees it as a way to increase its domestic support.

Provincial governor of Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) suspends Chinese mining.

China has important economic interests in the DRC. The northeastern Haut-Uélé province has the Kibali Gold Mine, one of Africa’s largest, and is rich in rare earth materials. DRC authorities claimed that the suspension was caused by non-compliance with standards for the prevention of environmental degradation. However, Chinese mining practices are well-known, and it is more likely that the ban is part of larger re-negotiations of mining terms, with local officials seeking a bigger share of the profits.

Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba to visit Malawi, Zambia and Mauritius.

The diplomatic trip follows the collapse of Ukraine’s relations with the Sahel junta states and is almost certainly an attempt to counter Moscow’s growing diplomatic clout in Sub-Saharan Africa. Kuleba’s efforts are highly likely to mostly cover grain exports from Ukraine to Africa – especially Malawi and Zambia, who have growing populations combined with extreme economic deprivation – and will likely not focus on minerals (which remain Russia’s main focus in the continent). Mauritius, the most economically competitive country in Africa, may be of particular interest to Kyiv due to its potential in the context of post-war reconstruction.

Controversial South Africa healthcare reform goes ahead despite opposition.

The legislation overhauls the healthcare system by limiting private provider’s ability to restrict access to care and set their own prices. President Cyril Ramaphosa signed the bill before the May election, highly likely in an unsuccessful attempt to increase electoral support for his African National Congress (ANC) party. The ANC’s main government ally, the pro-market Democratic Alliance (DA) is strongly opposed to the bill. The bill’s rollout could lead to intra-government tensions, possibly having an impact on civil unrest in South Africa.

Three Taylor Swift concerts in Vienna cancelled due to fears of Islamic State (IS) attack.

Authorities arrested two individuals in connection with a possible plot to attack venues hosting the concerts in Vienna. However, the concerts were still cancelled due to fears of additional IS affiliates still undetected. The two suspects are 18 and 19, and pledged allegiance to IS online. This highly likely continues to highlight the global trend of Islamists managing to radicalise younger individuals, using social media as a primary tool.

IS has increased efforts to target Western cities, and this international outlook is line with its growth in the Sahel, Somalia, and Afghanistan. High-visibility events, such as the Olympics or large cultural and sporting events, are likely desirable targets. By seeking to target a Taylor Swift concert, the suspected terrorists were almost certainly aiming to replicate the media effect of the Manchester Arena bombing of 2017.

The arrests were featured heavily in propaganda by the Austrian chapter of the far-right group Generation Identity (GI). GI is likely seeking to expand its political influence after a period of relative decline.

A stabbing in Holon, Israel, kills two and injures two more.

Lone wolf attacks remain a major threat in Israeli urban areas. There is a realistic possibility that the profile of the victims – two senior citizens – will result in retaliatory mob violence, especially against Israel’s Arab population.

Russia cancels Houthi arms supply.

Reports indicate that the Kremlin has cancelled its plans to arm the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. Initial indications suggested Russia was seeking to arm the militant group in response to the Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to attack mainland Russia with US-derived weapons. The delivery would have included capable anti-ship weapon systems such as anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), a development that would increase the Houthis’ ability to conduct attacks in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden.

Pressure from the US and more importantly, Saudi Arabia likely persuaded Russia to abandon these plans, fearing it would lose influence in Arab countries. However, unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian military advisors have visited Yemen, likely to train and advise the Houthis on how to use their existing weapon systems more effectively against international shipping.

UK Foreign Office issues urgent travel alert for Djibouti.

The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has issued an urgent travel alert for the East African country of Djibouti, warning of the “very likely” threat of terror attacks. The alert warns that transport hubs; hotels, restaurants and bars; shopping areas; religious events; sporting events; and military bases are likely targets, with the US, France, China, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all maintaining a constant military presence in the highly strategically placed country.

Few details are specified in the alert, which is likely predicated on credible but classified intelligence. However, Djibouti’s involvement in counter-al-Shabaab operations under the African Union has likely made it a coveted target for the al-Qaeda-aligned group.

US forces complete withdrawal from Niger.

US forces have completed their withdrawal from Niger after leaving their Air Base 201 in Agadez, northern Niger. 800 service personnel had already withdrawn in early July, with 200 following on 5 August, after the junta demanded US forces leave over a year ago. The base was primarily being used to operate US drones against al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated groups throughout the Sahel region.

The loss of this strike and intelligence capability will almost certainly degrade Nigerien forces’ ability to counter these threats but has opened the door for greater Russian involvement. The US has also cited concerns over Iran wanting to access Niger’s mineral wealth, most notably its vast uranium reserves which Washington believes it is wanting to use in its nuclear programme.

Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) kidnaps two Russians in Niger.

A video was shared by the al-Qaeda affiliated group on 3 August, showing the two who are identified as being employees of a Russian mining company. The case highlights the ongoing security vacuum in Niger, with neither Russia or the military alliance between the three neighbouring juntas likely able to contrast a growing Islamist presence at this time. Extremists will likely continue to target foreign nationals, especially those associated with the mining industry, which is attracting foreign influence to the region.

Torrential rainfall in Yemen results in at least 40 deaths.

Heavy rainfall in Houthi-occupied western Yemen led to at least 40 deaths as a result of flooding.

On 7 August, humanitarian organisations announced that they had begun deliveries of vital aid to affected areas. It is likely that the impact of the floods is worsened firstly by the poor record of basic service delivery by the Houthi administration, and secondly by the challenging threat environment for aid workers. There have been multiple reports of aid workers being abducted by Houthi authorities, due to suspicion of espionage.

While reduced, rainfall is forecast to continue through next week. It is likely that even moderate rainfall will pose challenges, due to the lack of adequate drainage and flood-resistant infrastructure in a region that historically has not had much rainfall.

Zimbabwean government assesses that cholera outbreak has ended.

Zimbabwe originally declared a state of emergency in November last year, after 7,000 suspected cases were reported, and dozens of deaths. The severity of the 18-month-long outbreak was almost certainly worsened by the 2022 shortage in cholera vaccines, which forced the International Coordinating Group (ICG) to temporarily change the vaccine regime from the usual two doses to one. Moreover, as cholera is transmitted via contaminated water or food, countries with less robust water infrastructure are at a much higher risk of outbreaks. The latest estimate of the outbreak’s impact is a total of 34,550 suspected cases (of which 4,200 confirmed), 631 suspected deaths, and 88 confirmed ones.

Amid heavy rainstorms across southern China, flash floods occurred in areas of the Sichuan. The floods affected 265 households and damaged multiple power lines. Eight people were killed and at least 19 are missing. Moreover, north China is suffering from a heat wave, with fears of drought, triggering concerns about farm production. While severe weather has become more common, there have been calls from Chinese policymakers for better disaster prevention in preparation for more severe weather conditions, including both droughts and floods.

Solace Global Assessment: 

China’s flood season lasts predominantly between May and September, peaking from mid-July to mid-August. Over the last two months, multiple severe environmental events have been recorded, with landslides and flooding killing over 150 people. The Chinese government has said that the rainfall and subsequent flooding have led to a doubling of the economic losses caused by natural disasters in July from the previous year, amounting to a total loss of CNY 76.9 billion (USD 10.1 billion) from natural disasters, an estimated 88 per cent of this being due to the heavy rain and floods.

In total, extreme weather events are assessed to have affected around 26 million people across China, with an estimated 1.1 million relocated, 12,000 houses destroyed, and 157,000 damaged, as well as 2.42 million hectares of crop affected in July alone. Severe and protracted damage from extreme weather events may increasingly become a driver of popular dissatisfaction towards local and national governments. Civil unrest has the potential to occur across affected regions in response to perceived government inaction or unpreparedness for the floods.

Other ongoing social issues may also contribute to a general dissatisfaction towards Beijing’s ability to provide welfare. The central government is currently debating plans to raise the retirement age by an average of five years, a decision which has been met with widespread dissatisfaction. Broader political developments could further drive local grievances with the government, adding to pre-existing discontent. Protests erupted in multiple cities at a similar time last year after the government channelled water from swollen rivers to populated areas, to prevent Beijing from flooding. The inhabitants of the area flooded, Zhuozhou in the Hebei Province, protested the measure, and were met with a harsh response from the police. The 2023 episodes may serve to deter protests linked to the current floods. In addition, the Chinese government may have learned from their previous mistakes and has this year allocated flood relief funding for five provinces, which may be able to settle and reassure the public.

On 8 August a 7.1 magnitude earthquake occurred off the coast of Kyushu, Japan. Tsunami warnings were issued and strong shaking was felt in Miyazaki. A small number of residential buildings were damaged, with one collapsing, in areas such as Osaki town in Kagoshima prefecture.  At least 16 people were injured. No major damage or deaths have been reported, and nuclear power plants were unaffected. While the 7.1 earthquake’s impact was relatively minimal, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) issued an advisory warning that the probability of a megaquake occurring in the Nankai Trough is several times higher than usual

Solace Global Assessment: 

The warning indicates an increased likelihood of a megaquake, which typically refers to magnitude 8 and above earthquakes. However, the advisory has almost certainly been issued as a precaution, rather than a definitive prediction. The Nankai Trough, located south of Japan, hosts a significant fault, the Nankai megathrust. Megathrust earthquakes, such as the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, which was magnitude 9.1, pose a significant risk. Worst-case scenario estimates predict that over 200,000 people could be killed as a result of a Nankai Trough megaquake. The most at-risk areas are on Japan’s southern Pacific coast.

In the next 30 years, seismologists estimate that there is a 70 to 80 per cent chance of a Nankai Trough megaquake occurring. Although the JMA are not able to accurately predict exactly when and where the earthquake will occur, they have urged residents on Japan’s Pacific coast to reaffirm their preparedness and take precautions over the next week. Japan has rigorous earthquake preparedness measures. The use of advanced earthquake-resistant technologies, infrastructure resilience, stringent building codes, and thorough disaster response plans all contribute towards making Japan highly resistant to the impact of earthquakes. However, extremely powerful earthquakes such as the 2011 earthquake are still capable of causing widespread damage and large numbers of fatalities.

As a result of the warning, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has cancelled a scheduled 9 August visit to central Asia, which almost certainly indicates a high level of concern. Multiple companies are taking precautionary measures, such as reviewing business continuity plans and conducting drills, and major utility companies are preparing their communication networks and readiness protocols. It is almost certain that the elevated state of earthquake preparedness will continue over the next week.

On 5 August, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Skeikh Hasina fled to India and resigned after weeks of widespread civil unrest, ending 15 years of her rule. Bangladesh’s president dissolved the parliament on 7 August, clearing the way for new elections. Thousands of protesters defied a military curfew, storming her official residence and setting parts of it on fire.

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, currently in Paris, has agreed to lead a transitional government. However, Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman has announced that an interim government would be formed, with the military set to govern the country until the next round of elections. The military has stated that it will lift the current curfew, address the injustices of the Hasina administration and restore normalcy.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The resignation of Hasina and the promise of new elections will almost certainly end much of the current unrest. Recent unrest was triggered by a High Court’s decision to reimpose a controversial jobs quota system, and authorities employed high levels of violence to curb civil unrest, leading to the deaths of at least 300 people. The most likely outcome is that a new government is formed in which the military, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the recently banned Islamist party, share posts.

However, while major unrest directed towards the government is likely to significantly decrease, there are early indications that there may be a new wave of civil unrest emerging in Bangladesh. Hasina’s Awami League party championed secularism and Hindus in Bangladesh are largely thought to have voted for the party. Hindus, who make up approximately eight per cent of the population, have frequently been targeted in the past when the Awami League has lost power. Reports on social media suggest that violent mobs have attacked and looted Awami League offices and Hindu properties and temples throughout the country, leading India to evacuate most of its non-essential embassy staff.

The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, which represents the country’s religious minorities, claims that as many as 300 Hindu homes and 20 temples have been damaged in the attacks. If the attacks continue to escalate, there is a realistic possibility that sectarian violence will spread throughout the region, with Hindu nationalists in India or further afield, targeting the Muslim population in reprisal attacks.

On 7 August, Thailand’s Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the Move Forward Party, (MFP) the party which received the largest amount of votes in the 2023 election but whose leader at the time, Pita Limjaroenrat, was blocked from his attempt to become prime minister. The court also banned the party’s executive committee from participating in Thai politics for ten years. The court’s decision follows a ruling in January which stipulated that MFP’s pledge to reform Thailand’s controversial lèse-majesté laws was unlawful. Pita stated that the movement would continue by establishing a new party with new leadership.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Thailand’s courts have dissolved political parties and banned popular politicians several times in the past in order to prevent reformist movements from challenging the country’s conservative establishment, which has consolidated its power after a military coup in 2014. In 2018, the Future Forward Party (FFP), a progressive party similar to the MFP, was established. The FFP emerged as the third-largest party in the House of Representatives after the 2019 elections. The FFP was subsequently dissolved and its leaders barred from politics in 2020 after accusations of violating election laws, with many believing these charges had been manufactured by the conservatives.

The dissolution of FFP led to widespread protests in Bangkok and several other major cities, largely driven by the Thai youth who accused the government and judiciary of colluding together to suppress political opposition and undermine democracy. The initial protests evolved into a wider pro-democracy movement that attracted tens of thousands of participants to multiple protests. Protestors demanded constitutional reforms, the resignation of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, and a reduction in the monarchy’s power, which persisted into late 2021. Protests were often marked by violent clashes with the police, resulting in at least four deaths, over 150 injuries, hundreds of arrests, the closure of public services, and disruption to transport.

The most likely course of action for MFP and its supporters will be to reconstitute the party under a different name and with new leadership. However, there is a realistic possibility that the MFP’s dissolution will spark protests across the country that could evolve into a wider pro-democracy movement.

Pakistani Islamist party Jamaat-i-Islami announce end of sit-in protest in Rawalpindi.

The Islamist political party Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) announced on 9 August that it is ending its two-week sit-in after negotiating an agreement with the government. The deal includes the establishment of a task force to tackle issues with independent power producers (IPPs), reduce electricity bills, and the lowering of certain taxes. The sit-in involved thousands of participants occupying a road at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi. JI leaders insisted, however, that the sit-in would resume if the government does not fulfil its promises.

Fijian Prime Minister to visit China.

Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka will visit China from August 14 to 21 in a move aimed at strengthening their strategic ties amidst growing geopolitical competition in the Asia-Pacific region. The visit follows Fiji’s decision to maintain a policing cooperation deal with China, which has raised concerns in Australia, highlighting the broader contest for influence between China and the United States in the region.

The visit also coincides with important regional discussions at the Pacific Islands Forum, underlining the broader context of regional security and strategic planning. This visit could potentially elevate Fiji-China relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership, reflecting China’s ongoing efforts to deepen its influence in the Pacific over the US.

Australia raises terror threat level.

The Australian government has raised its terror alert from “possible” to “probable” citing the concerns of security officials regarding a major increase in extremist views online. The probable category is level three out of five and indicates that officials believe that the probability of an attack is over 50 per cent. Sources from the country’s main domestic intelligence agency Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) indicated that extremism has increased across “all ideological spectrums” and that the current Israel-Hamas conflict has been a major driver in the rise of extremism.

Three explosions detonate in Thailand’s Patani province.

On 9 August, three bombs exploded in the vicinity of a police station in Muang Patani, Patani province. The first bomb was detonated near a fishing pier and was followed by two subsequent blasts close to the original explosion. One person was injured and has been taken to hospital. Patani province is one of Thailand’s four primarily Muslim provinces where many people speak Malay as a first language and are seeking separation from Thailand. The group most active in Pattani, is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which has led an insurgency for several decades and has carried out multiple attacks throughout Thailand.

Severe floods in Nepal kill more than 160, displace hundreds.

Nepal and its neighbours’ monsoon season occurs between June and August and is marked by torrential rain that can easily damage poorly erected informal settlements. In Nepal, at least 167 people have died, and more than 4,000 households have been displaced. Nepal’s uniquely mountainous topography almost certainly contributes to making search and rescue efforts more difficult, and to leaving affected communities at a higher risk of isolation from authorities.

There is a high chance of La Nina conditions, marked by the cooling of the middle Pacific Ocean’s surface, developing this year by September. La Nina tends to coincide with more severe monsoon seasons which, although boosting agricultural yields, are likely to further exacerbate damage in the Indian subcontinent.

North Korea offered humanitarian aid by Russia.

Severe rainfalls and floods have caused damage and disruptions in North Korea’s northwest, reportedly isolating more than 5,000 residents and damaging up to 4,000 homes. The Russian offer of aid further demonstrates the growing security and diplomatic partnership between the two countries which has largely been characterised by the exchange of military technology.

On 29 July, the Venezuelan electoral commission released the official data for the previous day’s vote. According to the officials, incumbent President Maduro was re-elected with 51.2 per cent of the vote.

The opposition, which has recently encountered numerous institutional challenges including the barring of leader Corina Machado from running for president, claimed the results were unfair. An alternative exit poll released by the opposition indicated that they had received approximately 70 per cent of the popular vote.

Following the vote, protests broke out in various part of Venezuela, with authorities (and paramilitary groups affiliated with the government) intervening to violently quash them. Dozens of protesters have been injured or killed as of the time of writing.

Numerous states, including the US, have officially recognised the opposition’s victory, while other regional powers, including Brazil, have called for Venezuela to release concrete proof of its claims.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The election results have almost certainly been doctored, and multiple reports indicate widespread manipulation of the voting process. The protests, no matter their severity, are, however, for now, unlikely to result in a reversal of Maduro’s claims and the opening of a pathway towards democratic transition.

The Venezuelan military, the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) and other security forces in the country remain loyal to the government, and there is only a remote possibility that this will change due to popular pressure. The FANB’s fidelity can likely be explained via the repeated economic concessions that the Maduro regime has granted the military, including management positions in the company’s national oil company PDVSA, and much of the capital allocated for the National Development Fund.

Moreover, over the past months, Maduro has taken advantage of a respite in the US-led sanctions regime – following the government’s agreement to hold free and fair elections – to increase its oil exports, thus guaranteeing a vital influx of funds to be allocated towards ensuring the retention of the military’s support. The armed forces are also unlikely to defect as the regime has “coup-proofed” them, by allowing Cuban intelligence to oversee their commitment to the government (including by independently purging officers), and by playing the FANB against other security institutions, like the Bolivarian National Guard and Bolivarian National Police.

Finally, the opposition has also failed to gain traction among senior military officials. Instead, Machado’s plans to liberalise the Venezuelan oil market directly threaten their vital source of funds, making it an unpalatable option.

After reneging on its promise to hold free and fair elections, further sanctions will likely be imposed on Venezuela. This will further isolate Caracas and accelerate its shift towards states hostile to the US, such as Russia, China and Iran. However, this development may also harm the US, which could lose much of its remaining leverage on Venezuela. Unconstrained by US influence, Venezuela could seek to damage Washington in multiple ways.

First, it could further seek to stimulate migrant flows towards Central America, forcing Washington to either devote even more resources to help Central American states’ border control efforts or face a worsening situation at its southern border. Even more importantly, the Venezuelan government could increasingly seek to allow continental (and extra-continental) drug flows towards the United States. In 2023, reports credibly proved that the Maduro regime, and its top military officials, have benefitted from allowing the transit of Colombian cocaine through the county’s territory. Following further isolation, Venezuela may also look to increasingly benefit from the traffic of drugs manufactured in and outside of the Americas, potentially becoming a landing hub for Chinese-made fentanyl.

Brazilian government data showed that Amazon rainforest fires affected more than 11,400 hotspots in July, the highest number for that month since 2005. In June, 17,500 square kilometres were burned, the largest area since 2005. The wildfires are occurring during a period of drought and extremely high temperatures. The high volume of fires in the Amazon rainforest and the Pantanal wetlands at its borders continue to threaten native peoples living in the area.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The presidency of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva started on premises that were completely different from those of its predecessor Bolsonaro. Lula has committed to stop deforestation by 2030, and has campaigned on preserving the Amazon and its native peoples.

On 31 July, the president signed another law trying to curb deforestation. The latest fires highly likely demonstrate the ongoing severe weaknesses and failures of the Lula administration to protect the Amazon. Compared to Europe, there is a higher incidence of human-caused fires in the Amazon. Many are started by farmers or herders, seeking to clear large areas of forests at little cost.

In addition to being a consequence of the impacts of climate change, the records set during this summer almost certainly reflect a policing failure on the authorities’ part.

Importantly, the ongoing vulnerabilities of the Brazilian government’s strategy to fight deforestation, and the criminality often associated with it, are likely to further perpetuate threats to aid workers, Indigenous people, and activists in the area. In the 2012-2022 decade, around 90 per cent of the almost 2,000 environmentalist activists killed globally were killed in Latin America. One in five murders took place in the Amazon rainforest in 2022. In Brazil, 34 activists were killed in 2022.

Logging, mining, and farming companies, some of which operate almost completely illegally, often deploy quasi-paramilitary groups that carry out targeted killings, torture, and intimidation operations. Lack of government response, or insufficient assets deployed, is likely to continue contributing to a failure to address these fundamental threats, consequently forcing activists to face high risks.

The government’s inability to protect the Amazon either through illegal activities or other reasons has also historically been a major trigger for Indigenous protests throughout Brazil and the wider Amazon region.

Canada tries to reduce temporary immigration

The Canadian government announced on 1 August that it would implement measures to reduce the number of temporary migrants arriving in the country, and will postpone plans to award resident status to undocumented migrants. The shift comes after months of pressure from right-wing parties, as well as numerous security issues – including multiple cases of extremist violence and planning, and political assassinations linked with foreign powers.

There is a high likelihood that a crackdown on immigration will result in localised protests in large Canadian urban centres. Moreover, it may not resolve the government’s woes, as the opposition is unlikely to be satisfied by planned measures, which may nevertheless also upset the government’s liberal electorate.

Trump campaign crushes Project 2025

On 30 July, the director of the controversial Project 2025, a plan spearheaded by the Heritage Foundation to lobby a possible second Donald Trump administration to approve far-right, socially conservative policies, resigned. The resignation was explained by Heritage Foundation members as due to “pressure” from the Trump campaign and followed Trump directly rejecting the project and its organisers.

The move by Trump is likely an attempt at winning undecided, centre-right voters, and to remove one of the Democrat Party’s main campaign targets. Still, Trump likely assesses that Project 2025 can retain some utility due to its proponents’ interest in the question of staffing the next Republican administration with pre-vetted, ideologically committed officials and bureaucrats, which would afford the possible two-term president more room for manoeuvre compared to the 2016-2020 period.

Largest prisoner swap since the Cold War between the US and Russia

On 1-2 August, the US and Russian governments, as well as some European US allies, exchanged two dozen prisoners, with the swap taking place in Ankara. Many of the prisoners released by the US and its European allies had ties to Russian intelligence services. Among the most notable ones is Vadim Krasikov, who had been serving a life sentence in Germany for carrying out an assassination in Berlin.

On the Russian side, the released prisoners include political opposition members Ilya Yashin and Oleg Orlov. The last comparable swap took place in Vienna in 2010. At that time, Sergei Skripal, who would later be targeted by Russian intelligence with the Novichok nerve agent in Salisbury, was among the prisoners released by Russia.

Islamist groups spread anti-US propaganda, encourage lone wolf attacks

During this reporting period, OSINT analysis revealed multiple social media campaigns launched by Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs) calling for lone-wolf attacks in the United States. The campaigns were mainly driven by media associated with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The former is likely the most active branch of the Islamic State (IS) abroad and was responsible for various high-profile attacks including the Crocus Hall and Dagestan attacks in Russia. The latter is smaller, but, following the appointment of a new Emir, has increasingly sought to incite violence abroad.

Two likely drivers of the increase in Islamist propaganda have been the attempted assassination of Donald Trump – which was used to incite further attacks on Western, and particularly US, leaders – and the most recent developments in the Israel-Hamas war.

Russian warships visit Cuba for the second time in two months

On 27 July, a small group of Russian warships from Russia’s Baltic fleet docked in Cuba. The visit follows another one in June, which included a nuclear submarine and frigate. These port calls are routine but normally only occur about once a year. US officials have dismissed the threat.

However, Putin has recently warned of a new Cold War-style missile crisis after the US decision to deploy nuclear-capable long-range missiles to Germany that could strike Russia within ten minutes. Putin has suggested that Russia would station similar missiles in striking distance of the US, with Cuba serving as an obvious base, with these deployments potentially serving as strategic messaging to Washington.

Russia is also seeking to establish a network of international naval bases to aid bluewater operations after losing this capability after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Cuba a long-coveted destination.

Early indications that Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel is fragmenting

After their recent apprehensions, Sinaloa Cartel figures “El Mayo” and Guzmán López have made court appearances in Texas. The arrest of senior leadership may lead to the further fragmentation of Mexico’s most powerful cartel, which reportedly now operates almost as four independent factions. Continued fragmentation will likely result in increased competition and associated violence within the cartel and rival cartels may seek to capitalise on these perceived weaknesses.

Wildfires continue in British Columbia, Canada

On 30 July, up to 349 wildfires were reportedly burning in the Canadian province of British Columbia. In Alberta, the wildfire responsible for destroying up to a third of the town Jasper’s structures last week has been extinguished. Officials have received criticism for poor wildfire management practices. Reduced temperatures and rainfall have aided the efforts of authorities to tackle the spread of wildfires, however as temperatures are forecast to rise again in the coming days, the spread of wildfires will likely continue.   

Forecasts predict Tropical Storm Carlotta to become a hurricane on Friday

The storm, the third named one to form in the Eastern Pacific in 2024, has air speeds of above 100 kph and is expected to affect the coasts of west-central mainland Mexico and the Baja California peninsula during the weekend. Storm formation in the Pacific will almost certainly be affected by the likely development of the La Nina phenomenon. While, in the Atlantic, La Nina reduces wind shear and makes storms more likely to form, in the Pacific it has the opposite effects, making phenomena like Carlotta less likely.

On 29 July, a 17-year-old attacked a children’s dance class in Southport, England, killing three and wounding eight. No motive has been identified as of the time of writing, but it appears certain that the attacker deliberately targeted the dance class, making the attack a likely case of lone-wolf terrorism.

On 30 July, protesters gathered in the city and clashed with police, injuring at least 22 officers, and tried to set fire to a local Mosque. On the following day, clashes between police and a few hundred protesters took place near Whitehall, London, as well as in Hartlepool – where rioters set fire to a police car – in Manchester, where police were pelted with rocks, and in Aldershot, where protesters gathered outside a hotel where migrants are housed.

Notably, no credible media coverage alleged that the attacker was Muslim, only that he had Rwandan heritage, a primarily Christian country. Nevertheless, open-source analysis revealed that, in the hours after the attack, far-right channels began promoting narratives linking the attack with Islamist terrorism.

On the day before the stabbing, former English Defence League (EDL) co-founder Tommy Robinson organised a large demonstration in London, the second in the space of a few months. On 28 July, Robinson was arrested but subsequently released on bail. Robinson then fled to the continent to avoid a possible trial for contempt of court.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the protests were not solely driven by far-right groups, there is a high likelihood that UK-based identitarian movements sought to exploit the attacker’s background to drive civil unrest in a way beneficial to their cause. In particular, far-right channels, both in the UK and from other Anglophone countries, immediately began promoting conspiracy theories and fake narratives alleging that the attacker was Muslim, almost certainly to direct local residents’ outrage towards the local Muslim community.

In this sense, the incident can likely be considered to mirror previous cases of misinformation-driven unrest and sectarian violence in countries like India and Egypt. In these cases, as in the recent Southport one, the rapid spread of false narratives online prompted both an intensification of violence among local protesters, and helped drive the influx of more ideologically-committed individuals from other parts of the UK. While the protests in Southport saw notable participation of the local community – and therefore were not simply “far-right” – it is highly likely that identitarian groups managed to coopt the unrest, leading to the later violence in London, Manchester, Hartlepool and Aldershot.

The far-right London protests, as well as the large turnout of rioters and protesters at these locations, possibly highlight a resurgence in the British far-right. Over the past decade, far-right and identitarian groups in the UK have not managed to organise actions similar in scale and severity to those staged by their European counterparts. Historically, UK far-right politics were centred on small parties, like the British National Party (BNP), who had a fundamental interest in breaking into mainstream politics. This “normalisation” objective was likely a restraining factor on the development of neofascist and identitarian militant groups and collectives similar to those in continental European countries like France or Italy, which have historically had a primarily extra-parliamentary focus. With the decline and eventual collapse of BNP in 2013, the rise of the EDL and even smaller groups like Britain First (BF) only partly saw a move towards exclusively militant politics – with the latter still hoping to achieve recognition as an “accepted” party. However, during the 2024 electoral campaign, increasing far-right activity was recorded, especially targeting British Muslims. Tommy Robinson and other former EDL members have likely successfully began leveraging online media, thus mostly abandoning local support-building, to achieve “viral” status for their identitarian efforts and ideology.

The 28 July protest, and the riots of 30-31 July, almost certainly underscore the growing success of this online-based approach. Even if remaining outside the UK, it is highly likely that Robinson will continue to encourage sectarian violence in the country. Finally, a likely relevant factor in boosting online far-right recruitment and operational efforts is that of language. UK-based channels are almost certainly more significantly influenced by American ones, and by English-language discourse coming from Europe and beyond. While the large diversity of narratives and discourses likely disincentivises local organising or the mainstreaming of specific grievances, it likely contributes to amplifying the otherwise limited media capabilities of UK far-right groups.

In the early hours of 26 July, fires were reported at multiple signal boxes and electricity installations at five stations scattered across the north of France, all serving lines leading to Paris. The damage that resulted affected the first weekend of the Olympics, causing massive delays. In the following days, further cases of sabotage, targeting energy and telecommunications infrastructure, were reported in various – often isolated and rural – parts of the country, resulting in further limited disruptions. Left-wing activists opposed to the Olympics have been arrested in connection with the fires and sabotage.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There is a strong anti-Olympic Games movement in France that has its ideological roots in the extreme and anarchist left, but also overlaps considerably with other activist networks, including the environmentalist one. The action on 26 July, and the further simultaneous sabotage of multiple telecom installations, demonstrates at least a level of organisational capacity on the part of the saboteurs. This has led some observers to speculate that responsibility for the act fell on foreign intelligence services (likely, Russia).

Reports of Russia both directly employing its intelligence assets to carry out operations or, more frequently, funding and indirectly ordering dissatisfied activists and individuals within target countries to attack local sites have been widespread. There is a realistic possibility that some of these recent cases of low-sophistication sabotage were indirectly sponsored by the Kremlin. However, it is important to note that these sabotage actions are extremely low-cost in terms of the tools required, and their targets are often so isolated as to be impossible to defend or monitor. Consequently, there is a higher likelihood that the action was carried out by anti-Olympic protest groups, with third-country influence likely only playing a limited role, if any at all.

Regardless of attribution, actors, both inside and outside France, have likely monitored the success, deniability and complications regarding investigating these attacks and may seek to imitate them- as recently demonstrated by the sabotage of a German railway. While unlikely to have been directly responsible for this case, it is almost certain that Moscow is currently seeking to disrupt the Olympics and to destabilise or undermine France by carrying out cyber, information, and other operations. It is almost certain that, in the coming weeks, further sabotage actions will be attempted by a variety of different groups. These actions are likely to affect travel and business and could be so severe as to directly threaten life.

On 30 July, the Hamas Political Bureau Chairman, Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated when staying at an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force facility in northern Iran. Haniyeh had reportedly only been in Iran for a day and was attending the inauguration of the new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Pezeshkian has vowed to make Israel regret what he declared was a cowardly action. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei has stated that avenging Haniyeh’s death is Tehran’s duty, and Iran’s formidable IRGC has stated that Israel will face “a harsh and painful response” from Iran and its allies- almost certainly referring to Tehran’s wider network of proxy forces.

The assassination of Haniyeh was the second major strike conducted by Israel, with Hezbollah’s second in command, Fuad Shakr killed in southern Beirut less than twelve hours earlier.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Haniyeh’s assassination in the Iranian capital will be a huge embarrassment for Tehran and raises questions over the regime’s ability to protect the leaders of its strategic proxy forces within its territory. The attack demonstrates Israel’s ability to infiltrate Iran and strike high-value targets (HVTs), a strong warning to the regime itself and any proxy force leader.

Little is known about how the assassination was conducted but imagery of the targeted strike indicates that the weapons system had a small payload. Reports vary as to whether it was an explosively laden drone, short-range missile or bomb smuggled into the complex months before. All of these systems indicate that the attack was likely conducted or set up from within Iranian territory, an act that would severely undermine Iranian security.

Moreover, Israel’s ability to locate, track and target Haniyeh within such condensed timeframes indicates a high level of intelligence penetration into Iran and significant weaknesses in Iranian counterintelligence. The nature of the attack and intelligence flaws may also point towards Israel being able to leverage inside help from disaffected Iranians. Many Iranians are greatly dissatisfied with the regime and there are even indications of grassroots support for Israel, largely driven by the repressive nature of the regime which has killed and abused thousands.

There is evidence to suggest that Israel’s 19 April retaliatory strike on an Iranian military site was conducted with quadcopters from within the country.

An attack within Iran itself during a presidential inauguration will be interpreted as an attack on the country’s sovereignty and honour, a situation that will likely warrant a stronger response from Tehran. While Iran has promised severe consequences, it will have to factor in several variables before it retaliates. A major escalation will likely see increased sanctions on Iran and jeopardise Pezeshkian’s attempts to reconcile with the West. A major escalation will likely be met with Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear programme sending it back years, a development the regime will want to avoid as it is closer than ever to achieving a nuclear deterrent, one of the regime’s primary objectives.

For these reasons, Iran may seek to conduct a sub-threshold attack that sends a statement to Israel without provoking a regional conflict. Its first option is to leverage its proxy forces to conduct a coordinated missile and drone attack similar in nature to the April attack. To increase the success of this attack it may use its proxy forces to strike from closer range, providing Israel and its allies less time to provide early warning and prepare air defences. In such a scenario, debris from intercepted projectiles will pose a major risk to anyone in Israel and countries on the approach, such as Jordan, as evidenced by the April attack.

To avoid direct escalation, Iran may rely on Hezbollah and other proxy forces to strike Israel from Lebanon. This strategy allows Iran to preserve its own military assets and maintain plausible deniability, reducing the risk of direct conflict. With an arsenal of approximately 150,000 rockets and missiles, combined with its expertise in both conventional and unconventional tactics, Hezbollah is well-positioned to inflict damage on Israel while serving Iran’s interests.

Another option available to Iran is to attack Israeli interests or Jews globally, a tactic Iran has done numerous times before. For the people of Gaza, Haniyeh’s assassination may be to their detriment. Haniyeh was crucial in fostering diplomatic channels despite his limited influence in Gaza itself. His death may lead to a complete collapse of current ceasefire negotiations and may embolden hardliners within Hamas, potentially leading to a halt in peace talks and prolonging the conflict.

On 27 July, a multi-day battle concluded between the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), supported by Wagner Group, against Tuareg and Al-Qaeda insurgents. Approximately 50 or more Wagner combatants were killed in the battle, marking the biggest defeat for the Russian state-funded private military company (PMC) since they were deployed to Mali in 2021. The battle took place in Tinzaouaten in the far northeast of Mali, near the Algerian border.

Reportedly, a FAMa and Wagner armed convoy, consisting of approximately 20 vehicles, was deployed to find Tuareg insurgents. A Wagner statement on Telegram claims that their contingent, led by Sergei Shevchenko (callsign “Pond”), was initially successful in repelling attacks by Tuareg militants over multiple days, though suffered casualties. A sandstorm on 25 July then, however, forced the convoy to retreat into Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) territory, a jihadist affiliate of al-Qaeda. Regrouped Tuareg fighters then reportedly ambushed the convoy on 26 July. Forced onto disadvantageous low ground, the column was attacked by substantial numbers (allegedly close to a thousand fighters), leading to a rout. Retreating forces were then ambushed by JNIM fighters, who fought alongside Tuaregs according to some sources, though this has not been verified.

The Tuareg rebels fought under the banner of the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PSD), a coalition of Azawad Tuareg rebel groups. On 29 July, the Kyiv Post published a photograph depicting Tuareg rebels holding a Ukrainian flag, with what appears to be a Ukrainian advisor. A Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) official stated that Ukraine provided Azawad forces with key intelligence for the attack although a BBC investigation suggests that this photograph was likely doctored.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The heavy losses suffered by the Russian PMC group is a major defeat in their ongoing campaign in Mali. Following their failed mutiny, Wagner Group was reorganised by Russian authorities with a renewed focus on its operations in the African theatre. Renamed to Africa Corps by the Russian Ministry of Defence in late 2023, Wagner Group is treated with suspicion by Russian military authorities, who likely aim to gradually replace long-serving Wagner veterans in the Sahel with new Africa Corps personnel.

The PMC have played a pivotal role in anti-insurgency operations in Mali since late 2021. After the May 2021 Malian coup, the junta sought to replace the military capability lost by withdrawn French and international forces. Wagner Group filled this vacuum, in exchange for access to highly profitable mines. This dynamic is almost certainly currently replicating in Niger, where Nigerien junta forces have recently suffered major defeats. Wagner have already deployed instructors to Niger.

The severe defeat in Tinzaouaten, however, is likely to influence the risk tolerance of Africa Corps commanders, which may factor into any future decisions regarding increased deployments to Niger. With already limited manpower, it is unlikely that Wagner will launch more deep operations into highly contested Malian territory in the coming months, which may enable insurgents to make further territorial gains. Additionally, the Russian military establishment may seek to exploit the defeat to accelerate the replacement of Wagner veterans with more loyal Africa Corps personnel.

The CSP-PSD are an Azawad Tuareg group. While the Malian military campaigns against CSP and JNIM overlap, the Azawad rebel coalition is primarily separatist, and not aligned with jihadism. The possible direct collaboration between Tuareg and JNIM forces in the battle, however, would be a notable development. The claims of Ukrainian involvement would be a significant development in the scope of Ukraine’s overseas operations. Though unconfirmed, there are strong suggestions that Ukraine has already previously deployed special forces in Sudan to fight against Russian paramilitary forces. Ukrainian intelligence (HUR) may just be engaging in information warfare, their possible involvement in the Malian battle raises several prospects. Firstly, it is likely that such a success would encourage HUR to emulate the tactics elsewhere, further expanding the geographic scope of the Ukraine War. Secondly, the involvement of JNIM in the battle is problematic, and HUR are likely to have received criticism from Western partners for potentially empowering jihadists. Thirdly, such Ukrainian involvement in the Sahel would likely accelerate the strategic realignment of the post-coup juntas in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, driving these governments further into the sphere of Russian influence.

On 1 August, Nigerian police and troops increased security measures in Lagos, Abuja and multiple, other cities in anticipation of nationwide protests. The protests are over the country’s poor governance, soaring inflation, the deflation of the Naira currency and several other issues. The protests have been scheduled from 1 to 10 August and have been observed in multiple Nigerian towns and cities as well as long major roads such as the Abuja-Kaduna highway, leading to traffic congestion.

Nigerian police issued a statement saying that they are on nationwide alert and directed to “act and deal decisively” during anti-government demonstrations. Police action has included the use of tear gas and other crowd dispersal methods, including the firing of live ammunition. By Friday morning, the head of Amnesty International in Nigeria reported that at least 13 protesters had been killed and over 300 arrested. Multiple curfews have been enforced, including 24-hour curfews in Borno Starte and Kano State.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests in Nigeria follow the recent doubling of the minimum wage that was ultimately accepted by many of the country’s unions. However, the rise was much lower than what many were demanding and the rise has failed to offset the Tinubu administration’s devaluation of the Naira in June 2023 and January 2024. Under Tinubu, food inflation in Nigeria currently stands at 40 per cent, the highest in three decades and the reintroduction of fuel subsidies has drained almost half of Nigeria’s oil revenues, curtailing the government’s ability to invest.

In the south of Nigeria, the economic situation is likely the main driver of the protests. In the north, concerns over Nigeria’s security are likely providing more energy to the unrest. Unchecked banditry and a resurgence in Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and other extremist attacks have almost certainly increased concerns over internal security in the north. Many Nigerians in the north have been displaced by endemic violence and the growing threat of kidnappings, with extremist groups almost certainly exploiting the continued destabilisation of bordering Niger. The Federal Government has tightened security at the borders, likely out of fears of cross-border incursions from militant groups seeking to exploit the unrest and current overstretching of the security services.

With the nationwide protests set to last for several days, multiple scenarios could surface that would likely exacerbate the unrest and likely result in an escalation in violence. As observed in Bangladesh, the government’s excessive use of force is likely to sustain demonstrations. The government’s refusal to agree to any of the protestors’ demands could also catalyse more protests. Given the country’s complicated tribal, ethnic and religious dynamics, there is always a possibility of the protests provoking existing tensions. Lastly, extremists may attempt to target large crowds and undermine the government’s ability to provide security, a development that will likely aggravate the current unrest.

On 26 July, South African police detained 95 Libyan nationals after a morning raid on a suspected secret military training camp near the town of White River, approximately 350 kilometres east of Johannesburg. Police issued a statement indicating that the Libyans had entered the country on study visas to train as security guards but initial police investigations suggest that they have received military training. According to South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority, the Libyan nationals will now be charged for misrepresentations on their visa applications. The authorities are now investigating to ascertain if there are any more illegal bases in other parts of South Africa.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The discovery of a secret military training camp has raised concerns that violent extremist organisations (VEOs) have exploited South Africa’s huge private security industry to train militants in third parties where they would likely attract less attention. There is currently no clear indication as to what group or movement the Libyans are associated with. However, Libya has been in a state of civil war since 2011 after the NATO-backed overthrow of long-term ruler Muammar Gaddafi.

The Libyan government has denied any knowledge of this operation and initial investigations indicate that the men are from eastern Libya, an area currently under the control of General Haftar’s Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA). Moreover, the LNA which currently controls most of Libya receives funding from several external actors, such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Russia as well as from its own oil revenues. This places it in an advantageous position to fund the external training of soldiers within South Africa’s highly developed private security industry.

VEOs affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ) have a presence in Libya, particularly in the south of the country. However, militant groups like these would more likely exploit Libya’s and the wider region’s instability and ungoverned spaces to conduct training at this scale, would be under more foreign surveillance and would likely struggle to finance this level of training.

The UK’s Conservative Party announced its party leadership candidates

Following a disastrous general election, the leader of the Conservative Party and former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak resigned from his post. A successor will be nominated at the party’s September conference, after votes by party MPs and party members. Suella Braverman, former Home Secretary and representative of the right-wing of the party, opted not to run citing differences with the majority of conservative MPs.

Of the six candidates, Priti Patel, Kemi Badenoch and Robert Jenrick represent the party’s right wing, the latter being in the same current as Braverman. James Cleverly, Tom Tugendhat and Mel Stride are close to Sunak and are portraying themselves as “unity” candidates. It is highly likely that, to cover from the threat posed by the Reform Party, the Tory leadership contest will see a shift of the party to the right.

Pay deal likely to end doctor’s strikes in UK

Months of strikes by the UK’s junior doctors may come to an abrupt end after the new Labour government agreed to increase their pay by over 22 per cent. The deal was announced on 29 July by the Labour government and the British Medical Association (BMA), which represents around 50,000 junior doctors. The decentralised nature of the protests was not hugely disruptive, however, the strikes have overburdened an overstretched National Health Service (NHS) and interrupted the provision of healthcare.  

Macron surprisingly approves Moroccan line on Western Sahara

On 30 July, French President Macron released a statement in support of Morocco’s 2007 plan on Western Sahara. The Algerian government reacted by immediately recalling their ambassador in Paris, thus sparking a diplomatic crisis during the Olympics. Macron’s statement likely reflects the changing balance of power in northwest Africa, with Algerian influence waning thanks to decreasing French reliance on its oil (about eight per cent of the oil imported by France is Algerian) and a growing appeal of Morocco as a diplomatic and trading partner.

Spanish PM’s wife under investigation for corruption

On 30 July, Spain’s socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez refused to testify as a witness in a judicial investigation into his wife. The case involves allegations of corruption and influence peddling against his wife. Sanchez and his wife deny the allegations and have denounced them as baseless and orchestrated by right-wing political foes, including the legal activist group called Manos Limpias, or “Clean Hands.” Previous cases of corruption against Pedro’s wife have resulted in thousands of supporters rallying behind the prime minister on the streets of Madrid with similar scenes likely as the case develops.

Turkey blocks Instagram, gives no explanation

On 2 August, Turkish authorities blocked Instagram in the country, without however making any public announcement about the ban, nor giving any explanation for it. It is highly likely that the ban is linked to previous accusations, raised by Turkish government officials, that the social network was censoring tributes to Hamas leader Haniyeh.

Israeli far-right attacks detention facility

On 29 July, far-right, religious fundamentalist politician Zvi Sukkot and other far-right Zionist leaders led crowds of supporters to storm the Sde Teiman detention camp, near the Israeli-Gaza border. Nine IDF reservists were held at the base, facing possible charges for allegedly sexually abusing a Palestinian prisoner. The protesters broke into the facility’s perimeter and succeeded in pressuring authorities into later releasing the accused.

Reports of the alleged rapes have highly likely demonstrated growing cracks within the Israeli parliament and coalition, with the radical right continuing to gain significant political traction, and members of it (including Likud party politicians) either denying the suspects’ alleged crimes or outright defending them. The riot likewise demonstrates a growing domestic threat from nationalist-religious extremists, capable of organising quickly to carry out violent actions.

ANC expel former South African president from party

South Africa’s former president, Jacob Zuma, has been expelled from the African National Congress (ANC) party for supporting the rival party uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in May’s parliamentary election, which led to the ANC losing its majority for the first time since the apartheid era. Zuma has 21 days to appeal and challenge the expulsion. Despite his tenure being marred by corruption scandals and economic decline, Zuma still commands a lot of support in South Africa and his supporters could trigger unrest.

The EU and US impose sanctions on Rwanda-backed M23 group

The new wave of sanctions targeting M23 leaders, which were announced on 26 July, is highly unlikely to affect conditions on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) eastern provinces, where M23 rebels, supported – according to new UN reports – by thousands of Rwandan troops, continue to advance against the overstretched local military. Recently, M23 has likely increased GPS-jamming to disrupt air traffic in the mineral-rich North Kivu region. M23 advances will almost certainly continue accelerating the illegal trade of minerals to the detriment of the DRC and the benefit of Rwanda and of large multinational companies.

Islamist extremist Anjem Choudary sentenced by UK court

Following his conviction on charges of running a multinational terrorist network. UK radical preacher Anjem Choudary was sentenced to a minimum of 28 years in prison following a multinational operation involving US, UK and Canadian security forces. There is a realistic possibility of protests and retaliatory lone-wolf attacks following the sentencing. Unlike other leadership figures in extremist organisations, Choudary maintained an extremely visible media presence, appearing in multiple mainstream legacy media broadcasts since the early 2000s.

Erdogan threatens to send Turkish forces to Israel

Turkish President Erdogan, the leader of a NATO member state, announced, on 28 July, that Ankara has the capability to invade Israel over the war on Gaza. The statement is almost certainly primarily an effort to bolster the president’s support among the Turkish electorate, which is widely pro-Palestinian. Still, Erdogan’s threats are also likely aimed at putting further pressure on NATO allies to adopt a more neutral stance in the conflict and to effectively restrain Israel’s policies in Gaza.

Sabotage conducted against German rail network

German authorities are investigating an arson attack on the railway line between Hamburg and Bremen which occurred on 29 July. In an attack reminiscent of recent arson attacks in France before the Olympic ceremony, unidentified perpetrators set fire to a cable shaft near Bremen’s Bürgerpark using an incendiary agent. Germany’s state security agency (Bundeskriminalamt) is now investigating whether the attack was politically motivated but has not released any information regarding suspects.

Spanish man dies from Ebola-like disease

The man had reportedly been bitten by a tick, and developed symptoms associated with the Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF). The disease is extremely dangerous, with no vaccine available and a mortality rate of 40 per cent – depending on age and health factors. Increasingly hot summers have favoured the reproduction of ticks in Spain, increasing the transmission rate and extending the period of the year during which the disease is most prevalent.

Bangladesh, including Dhaka, Sylhet, Chattogram, Rangpur, Barishal, and Bogura. Local police forces have used crowd control measures such as tear gas and sound grenades to disperse crowds and maintain public order.

Since student protests over Bangladesh’s job quota system erupted in mid-July, it is estimated that over 200 have been killed, largely as a result of the police firing into crowds and over 10,000 people have been detained. The most recent “March for Justice” protests were organised by the Students Against Discrimination movement over the mass killings, arrests, attacks and disappearances of civilians.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Students have been protesting for over three weeks against efforts to reinstate quotas in civil service jobs for relatives of veterans from the country’s 1971 war for independence from Pakistan. This system allocated a third of public sector jobs to this demographic- a system deemed unnecessarily exclusionary to the student population, many of whom are struggling to secure jobs. The government’s violent suppression of these protests has inspired a new round of protests that have taken on a much wider geographical footprint within the country.

Moreover, the protests now involve a much wider cross-section of Bangladeshi society, including teachers, parents, civil society members, and cultural organisations. Thousands of people have also changed their profile pictures on social media to a red colour in a sign of solidarity with the students. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government has denied responsibility, deflecting the blame to the main opposition parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Jamaat-e-Islami Party for the unrest, the latter of which has now been banned under anti-terrorism legislation. This has led to a government crackdown on the opposition.

Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, the European Union, has postponed talks over a new economic deal over the government’s actions. The diversity of people now involved in the protests, the government’s continued use of force and detentions, the crackdown on the opposition and the refusal of government officials to resign over the violence are likely to sustain unrest for days to come. The ongoing protests and government responses could lead to increased international pressure and widespread civil disobedience, disrupting daily life and economic stability. If the government maintains its hardline stance, it risks alienating the youth and wider society, fostering a stronger opposition and larger protest movements- trends that may deter foreign investment and disrupt supply chains in a country with huge textile, agricultural and manufacturing sectors.

One month after Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) announced the creation of an Urdu-language media division on 28 June, ISKP published their first issue of a dedicated Urdu language Nida-e-Khorasan (Voice of Khorasan). Urdu is the national language of Pakistan, and widely spoken by Muslims in northern India and Kashmir. The publication had significant content dedicated to Kashmir.

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) also published a new issue of its Urdu-language magazine, Nawai Ghazwa-e-Hind (The Voice of the Battle of India) magazine, which similarly focused on Kashmir.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The publications of two Urdu-language pieces focused on Kashmir by the rival transnational jihadist groups ISKP and AQIS highly likely indicate a strategic shift by both groups, seeking to exploit a recent surge in violence in Jammu and Kashmir. While the much smaller AQIS has historically specifically targeted Urdu-speaking jihadist sympathisers with their publications before, the new publication by ISKP reveals a notable development in their propaganda strategy. 

Founded in 2014, ISKP seeks to establish a caliphate in Afghanistan. ISKP has grown to be one of the most capable and ambitious transnational terrorist organisations in the world, successfully having carried out multiple attacks internationally. This year alone, ISKP are thought to be responsible for both the 3 January Kerman bombings that killed over 100 people in Iran, and the 22 March Crocus City Hall attack that killed 145 people in Moscow, Russia.

ISKP’s propaganda and outreach have proven to be highly successful at enabling fundraising and recruitment from the former-Soviet Union in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and European authorities have arrested multiple suspected jihadists from these regions for plotting terrorist attacks. On 31 May, a Chechen who was in communication with ISKP was arrested in France for an alleged plot targeting the Paris Olympics, and on 4 July, nine suspects from Central Asia in contact with ISKP were arrested in Germany and the Netherlands.

Al-Azaim is ISKP’s media outlet, a considerable transnational propaganda network that exploits sectarianism and the challenges faced by minority groups across Central and South Asia. “Media jihad” is considered a crucial strategy by ISKP, and the Voice of Khorasan publication is ISKP’s primary propaganda instrument. The development in ISKP propaganda towards targeting Urdu-speaking populations threatens to grow ISKP’s influence in Pakistan, India, Jammu and Kashmir, and amongst global diaspora populations.

In Pakistan, where Urdu is the national language, ISKP are thought to be primarily responsible for a recent targeted assassination campaign in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The newly published edition of Voice of Khorasan makes specific reference to Pakistani military figures, and ISKP are likely seeking to exploit sectarian tensions against Pakistan’s Shia minority.

In India, the regular circulation of anti-Hindu propaganda indicates ISKP efforts to exploit the marginalisation of India’s significant Muslim minority population. In Jammu and Kashmir, a union territory administered by India with a Muslim majority in Kashmir, there has been a recent surge in militant attacks targeting Hindus. ISKP are highly likely seeking to exploit a perceived power vacuum in Kashmiri jihadist networks, evidenced by the new Voice of Khorasan’s focus on Kashmir.

Globally, particularly in Europe, ISKP’s expansion of media efforts targeting Urdu speakers will likely broaden ISKP’s appeal amongst extremist sympathisers in Urdu-speaking diaspora communities.

Thai court to consider dissolving Move Forward Party

On 7 August, the constitutional court of Thailand will rule as to whether or not it should dissolve the progressive Move Forward political party. The party, which won the most seats in the 2023 elections, has been targeted by Thailand’s conservative base and military for some of its policies such as reform of the country’s strict lèse-majesté laws. The party has great appeal with Thailand’s youth and a move to dissolve the party is likely to trigger protests, as evidenced by the 2020 dissolution of the Future Forward Party.

Calls for renewed protests in France’s New Caledonia

Cellule de Coordination des Actions de Terrain (CCAT), the main independence group in New Caledonia has called for renewed protests in the coming days in an attempt to abolish the electoral reform bill once and for all. The CCAT is likely attempting to exploit France’s current focus on the Olympics and the event’s publicity fir its own cause.

The United States Pacific Command (PACOM) has announced that it will upgrade its military command in Japan in response to the growing threat from China. As part of the overhaul, the US will increase its coordination with Japanese forces and the US Forces Japan would be upgraded to a joint force headquarters with expanded missions. The move also aligns with Japan’s gradual shift from post-war pacifism, characterised by increased defence spending and more military cooperation with South Korea and the US. The move will almost certainly be condemned as escalatory by China who will likely conduct reactionary military drills in a demonstration of strength.

Canadian warship passes through the Taiwan Strait

On 1 August, the Canadian frigate transited through the Taiwan Strait, passing through an area that China claims as part of its territorial waters. The transit, which drew Beijing’s ire, was likely meant to send a signal following last week’s transit of four Chinese and Russian bombers in close proximity to Alaskan and Canadian airspace. Both US and Canadian officials are likely increasingly willing to respond to Chinese (and Russian) shows of force in the Pacific.

Series of landslides kills hundreds in Indian state of Kerala

On 30 July, a series of landslides in Kerala has resulted in the deaths of at least 166 people with an estimated 200 still missing. Hundreds of homes were destroyed in Wayanad by two massive landslides following five times the normal rainfall, causing the Eruvazhanji River to overflow and submerge villages.

Rescue efforts have been hindered by adverse weather and washed-away roads which have disrupted access to the affected locations. The extent of the damage has likely been compounded by the practice of building informal houses on unstable hill terrain and the clearing of forests for plantations. This has compromised the soil and reduced vegetation interception, increasing the area’s susceptibility to landslides.

High temperatures recorded in China’s east coast

On 2 August, temperatures of above 40 degrees Celsius were recorded in China’s east coast regions, with particularly severe heat recorded in Shanghai and Hangzhou. July 2024 had the highest temperatures on record for that month in China, and Chinese authorities issued warnings for other provinces further inland. Extremely high heat can result in power outages and the overwhelming of electrical infrastructure. In densely populated urban centres, this is not only highly likely to have a severe economic impact, but may also result in the breakdown of public services, increased wait times for healthcare services, and other developments likely to pose a threat to residents and travellers.

Whilst Israel is widely expected to be behind the assassination it has refrained from commenting on the event and has stated that the Israeli military is conducting a situational assessment. An attack this deep into Iran and on such a sensitive target will be seen as a major embarrassment for Iran. Although the term “raid” typically implies a tactical operation with a physical presence within Iran, this is highly unlikely and the attack most likely involved some form of missile. Israel’s ability to strike so deep into Iran suggests major deficiencies in Iran’s air surveillance and air defence network.  

Reports also indicate that Haniyeh had only arrived in Iran on 30 July. Israel’s ability to locate, track and target Haniyeh within such condensed timeframes indicates a high level of Israeli intelligence penetration into Iran and significant weaknesses in Iranian counterintelligence. Israel’s attack on the Hamas leader has demonstrated that it can attack anywhere within Iran – a threat the regime will be cognisant of.  

Iran is also closer than ever to achieving a nuclear deterrent, one of the regime’s primary objectives. A major escalation with Israel will almost certainly see this project targeted, likely sending it back years. Iran’s new president is seeking a path towards reconciliation with the West after years of sanctions that have crippled the Iranian economy. A major escalation will jeopardise these attempts and invariably lead to Iran’s greater isolation, the imposition of more sanctions and increased internal pressure on the regime.  

While Iran has promised severe consequences and will likely have to show some level of force, Iran will need to factor in these variables before it decides to escalate. 

The immediate effect of Haniyeh’s assassination may be the collapse of current ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas. Perceived as a moderating influence in Hamas, Haniyeh’s relative pragmatism was considered vital to diplomatic efforts. While he served as Hamas’ political leader, his de facto power over Hamas in Gaza was limited, with the more hardline Yahya Sinwar leading in Gaza. Sinwar, a battle-hardened militant, contrasts with Haniyeh, who acted more like a conventional politician.  

Although Haniyeh’s leadership was largely symbolic, he was pivotal in fostering and maintaining diplomatic channels with key regional actors, essentially serving as the face of Hamas’ international diplomacy. Based in Qatar, Haniyeh was a key influence in ongoing ceasefire negotiations between Hamas and Israel, brokered by Qatar, Egypt, and the US.  

While not directly engaged in day-to-day negotiations, his death is likely to jeopardise ceasefire talks. The Qatari prime minister has questioned the viability of the talks following Haniyeh’s killing, and Egypt’s foreign minister called the attack a “dangerous escalation” that undermines negotiations. It is a realistic possibility that Hamas may pull out of the negotiations entirely as a result of his death.  

Furthermore, it is likely that Haniyeh’s death will empower hardliners within the political wing of Hamas, and Haniyeh’s replacement as Hamas’ political leader is likely to be less willing to engage in peace talks – a development that would likely prolong the war in Gaza and sustain associated civil unrest throughout the globe.  

Haniyeh’s funeral will be held in Tehran on 1 August at 8 am local time before his body is transferred to the Qatari capital of Doha for burial on 2 August. Any coordinated response by Iran will likely occur after Haniyeh’s funeral.  

Iran’s attack in April consisted of an assessed 350 rockets, missiles and drones launched by both Iran and its proxy forces throughout the Middle East. This attack was in response to the killing of senior members of the IRGC’s Quds Force within Syria. An attack within Iran itself during a presidential inauguration will be interpreted as an attack on the country’s sovereignty and honour, a situation that will likely warrant a stronger response from Tehran. 

The assassination of Haniyeh also follows the recent decapitation strike on a senior Hezbollah commander, with indications that Hezbollah too will respond with force. The effect of these double assassinations will be to galvanise The Iranian-led resistance against Israel. 

The most obvious form of retaliation by Iran and its proxies will be to launch a similar attack to the one observed in April. This would consist of Iran and all of its proxy forces firing projectiles near-simultaneously at Israel and from as many axes as possible to overwhelm Israel’s advanced air defence network. Such an attack would likely prioritise the targeting of Israeli military installations rather than population centres. Tehran will likely attempt to conduct an attack that will fall below what it calculates is Israel’s threshold for a major escalation, while still large enough to demonstrate strength, intent and capability. 

However, debris from projectiles intercepted by Israeli air defence systems will pose a major risk to anyone in Israel and even in countries on the approach, such as Jordan, as evidenced by the April attack. In addition, the recent Hezbollah-linked rocket attack in the Golan Heights which killed 12 children, demonstrated the inaccuracy of unguided rocket systems which make up the bulk of Hezbollah’s arsenal. 

To avoid escalation, Iran may seek to rely solely on its proxy forces, especially Hezbollah as it knows it can hurt Israel from Lebanon. This approach provides Tehran with multiple advantages. Firstly, Iran can retain its own strategic military capabilities such as its ballistic missiles. Most importantly, by leveraging its proxy forces, Iran can maintain some degree of plausible deniability, thus reducing the chances of a direct conflict. Hezbollah’s current arsenal of some 150,000 rockets and missiles, its experience in guerilla warfare and its use of conventional and non-conventional tactics puts Hezbollah in an advantageous position to inflict losses on Israel at the behest of Iran.   

Another option available to Iran will be to target Israeli interests on the global stage. Iran has a legacy of attacking Israelis or Jews way beyond the borders of Israel and there have been examples of this since 7 October. In November 2023, authorities in Brazil uncovered an alleged plot linked to Hezbollah to attack Jews in the country. In 1994, 85 people were killed in Buenos Aires, Argentina when a bomb detonated at the Amia Jewish cultural centre – a terrorist act that Argentina claimed was carried out by Iran. These attacks indicate the scope of Iran’s reach and its willingness to conduct offset action on the global stage- an option that may be attractive as it provides a high level of plausible deniability and is unlikely to trigger a regional escalation. 

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On July 27, a rocket hit a football pitch in Majdal Shams, a Druze town in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, killing 12 children. Israeli authorities have blamed Hezbollah for the attack. Explore the possible responses Israel might take following this Hezbollah rocket attack, including military actions and potential retaliation scenarios.

While there was initial speculation that Hezbollah would open up a northern front against Israel, Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah has been distinctly cautious to avoid major escalation. Nasrallah likely determines that the risks of a major conflict with Israel are too great, and would jeopardise Hezbollah’s path to political legitimacy.

Following an IDF operation that killed a prominent Hezbollah commander on 11 June however, Hezbollah launched over 200 rockets into northern Israel on 12 June. Tensions rose dramatically, with Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz subsequently threatening all-out war and the IDF confirming on 18 June that operational plans for an offensive into Lebanon had been approved. In response, Nasrallah threatened war with “no rules” and “no ceilings”, even threatening to strike targets in Cyprus, however, this was largely viewed as a propaganda move intended to project strength and rally support, rather than as a feasible military strategy.

The 27 July rocket strike caused the highest civilian death toll in Israeli-held territory since the 7 October raid. The victims were members of the Druze community, an Arab minority group that adheres to an Abrahamic faith system separate from Islam, Christianity or Judaism. An estimated 150,000 Druze live in Israeli-held territory, primarily in the north, though many Druze refuse Israeli citizenship and identify as Syrian. Israel has occupied the Golan Heights since the Third Arab-Israeli War with Syria in 1967. The funeral held on 28 July was distinctly apolitical, and Druze leaders have called for de-escalation.

Despite Hezbollah’s denials, the rocket attack was likely conducted by the Lebanese militant group. On 27 July, an IDF operation killed four Hezbollah fighters, and Hezbollah subsequently claimed to have launched two rocket strikes in retaliation, with one using a Falaq-1 rocket targeting Maale Golani which is approximately two kilometres away from Majdal Shams. The IDF has since released images of Falaq-1 debris found in Majdal Shams and claims that the rocket was launched from southern Lebanon.

It is highly unlikely that the Majdal Shams football pitch was the intended target. Hezbollah have consistently attempted to avoid major escalation by responding to Israeli operations with what they calculate to be sub-threshold attacks, likely intended to deter further IDF operations while not giving Tel Aviv the pretext for a full-scale operation into Lebanon. However, unguided surface-to-surface rocket systems such as the Falaq-1 are unsophisticated and prone to inaccuracy.

In response, Israel has promised a “harsh” but contained response. Senior Israeli defence and diplomatic sources have indicated that Tel Aviv wants to avoid a full-scale war which could provoke a wider regional conflict. Similar sentiments have been briefed to the media by Hezbollah officials.

On 28 July, the Israeli Security Cabinet authorised Netanyahu and the Israeli Defence Minister to decide the “manner and timing” of military operations in retaliation to the 27 July attack. While the IDF conducted a series of strikes in eastern and southern Lebanon on 28 July, it is unlikely that this operation constitutes the extent of Israel’s response and it is likely that a more intensive military operation is forthcoming. Solace Global assesses the three following scenarios to be the most likely possible outcomes:

SCENARIO 1: Increased IDF strikes in Lebanon and Syria

The most likely course of action by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) will be to conduct air and drone strikes against strategic high-value targets (HVTs) in Lebanon and Syria. The IDF has already responded by conducting limited strikes on key Hezbollah figures within southern Lebanon and cross-border shelling on Hezbollah frontline positions.

However, previous IDF responses to major Hezbollah attacks have not been confined to southern Lebanon and have included strikes within Hezbollah’s strongholds in the suburbs of south Beirut and strikes on strategic targets within the north of Lebanon. Targets within Lebanon will likely include Hezbollah command and control centres (C2), weapons caches, logistic nodes and senior leadership to degrade and demoralise Hezbollah’s forces.

Targets within Syria will likely extend to sites linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). IDF targets in Syria will likely prioritise weapons depots and other targets associated with the facilitation of lethal aid into Lebanon. Early indications are that Hezbollah has begun to reposition many of its strategic weapon systems like precision-guided missiles to complicate the IDF’s targeting process in anticipation of IDF strikes.

SCENARIO 2: IDF Limited Ground Offensive

The IDF’s second most probable course of action is to execute a limited offensive into southern Lebanon up to or just beyond the Litani River. This operation would aim to clear Hezbollah positions and push their rocket sites further north, thereby creating a buffer zone and enhancing security in northern Israel by reducing the range from which Hezbollah rockets can be launched. However, current indications are that the IDF’s Northern Command has yet to be significantly reinforced which would be a key indicator and warning of a major offensive.

Most importantly, current ceasefire negotiations with Hamas have not yet reached an agreement. Failure to reach a ceasefire with Hamas will force the IDF to maintain significant resources in Gaza and any redeployment of forces north will almost certainly be exploited by Hamas. Western diplomats have urged Israel to de-escalate and Israeli officials have suggested that their goal is to “hurt” Hezbollah without dragging the Middle East into a regional war. Fears of a major diplomatic backlash and further international isolation may deter the Netanyahu administration from pursuing a large-scale offensive into southern Lebanon.

Israel will also be cognisant of the military challenges involved with an offensive into southern Lebanon. The 2006 conflict revealed significant challenges, including higher-than-expected casualties and an underestimation of Hezbollah’s strength and tactics. Hezbollah has only improved its military capabilities since then and entrenched its positions. A full-scale conflict with Hezbollah would also result in a major escalation of Hezbollah strikes into Israel, with some of the militant group’s more capable weapon systems able to target the entirety of Israel.

It would also be a trigger for an escalation in attacks from Iran’s Axis of Resistance throughout the Middle East, including the Houthis in Yemen and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) throughout Iraq and Syria. This would invariably include increased rocket, missile and drone attacks on Israel from multiple axes. While Israel was able to withstand the Iranian-led 13 April attack, Israel’s defence was hugely guaranteed with allied assistance. The attack also revealed certain limitations in Israel’s air defence network, issues that have been further highlighted by recent Houthi drone strikes. An Israeli-provoked major escalation may not be met with the same level of external assistance, especially from Arab nations, and will likely be larger than the previous attack on Israel.

There is a high likelihood that a major increase in Iranian proxy missile, rocket and drone attacks will lead to numerous casualties within Israel. Such a development will increase internal pressure on the Netanyahu administration which is already having to deal with episodic civil unrest- potential pressure that will likely make the option of targeted strikes more appealing.

SCENARIO 3: Hezbollah seek to de-escalate

A third and least likely development is that Hezbollah takes the initiative to de-escalate by withdrawing its military capabilities north of the Litani River, which runs approximately 30 kilometres north of the Israel-Lebanon border. This move would be in accordance with the United Nation’s Security Council Resolution 1701 which forbids the Shia paramilitary force from maintaining a military presence south of the Litani.

Hezbollah’s senior leadership has repeatedly stated that it does not want a major war and is likely only conducting limited attacks into northern Israel to project strength and undermine Israel. Hezbollah’s strategy in recent years has been characterised by attempts to remodel itself as more of a legitimate political force. Though withdrawing military capabilities may be interpreted as a sign of weakness, it would provide Hezbollah with the opportunity to maintain most of its military capabilities and Hezbollah would still be in a position to exercise considerable political influence within southern Lebanon.

This influence could be jeopardised if it engages in a full-scale conflict with Israel that would degrade both its military and political capabilities. According to Lebanon’s Foreign Minister, Abdallah Bouhabib, Hezbollah is ready to commit to this course of action, although these sentiments have yet to be echoed by Hezbollah itself. This move may also secretly be endorsed by Iran. Tehran has spent decades facilitating lethal aid to Hezbollah, helping it become Iran’s primary proxy force which serves as a strategic deterrent to Israel. It is estimated that Hezbollah’s arsenal now amounts to some 150,000 rockets and missiles. This capability poses a significant threat to Israel, and if Hezbollah’s arsenal were launched near-simultaneously and coordinated with other Iranian proxy forces, it would likely overwhelm Israel’s air defences and lead to substantial casualties. Iran is unlikely to relinquish this strategic deterrent until it can ensure its own security, which it anticipates will be achieved through the development of a nuclear weapon.

However, if Iran assesses that Israel’s most probable course of action will only involve targeted strikes rather than a full-scale military engagement, it may reconsider endorsing this strategy. This is because targeted IDF strikes against Hezbollah would limit the immediate threat to Iran’s strategic deterrent, reducing the urgency to de-escalate.

Although it is unlikely that a full-scale all-out war will break out between Hezbollah and Israel, tensions are at their highest since the 7 October attack and some form of expanded military action by the IDF in Lebanon is almost certain.

Many countries have issued or reiterated travel advisories to their citizens to avoid all travel to Lebanon and to evacuate immediately if they are already present in the country. These countries include the US, UK, France, Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark and Australia.

Due to the escalation in tensions, flight disruptions are ongoing at Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY). Several airlines, including Lufthansa, Turkish Airlines, Aegian Airlines, FlyDubai and Air France have cancelled flights scheduled to depart from BEY.

While most flights are still operating as of 30 July, it is likely that more significant flight disruptions would follow any significant IDF operation, threatening to leave travellers in Lebanon stranded. Even more limited military interventions that do not result in a No Fly Zone being enforced threaten to cause mass flight cancellations, due to the high costs of war risk insurance for airlines.

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In the early hours of 31 July, the head of the Hamas political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, was killed in what has been described as “a treacherous Zionist raid on his residence in Tehran”, according to the Palestinian militant group. Iran vows retaliation. Discover the latest updates and potential impacts.

On 21 July, US President Joe Biden announced that he would be ending his bid for re-election in 2024, and instead endorsed his Vice President Kamala Harris. Biden’s announcement followed weeks of speculation about the president’s health and fitness that followed a dismal debate performance against Republican nominee and former President Donald Trump.

Following the debate, Biden was asked to step down by senior Democrats and major party donors. Harris’ new presidential bid was met with considerable enthusiasm from the party, with the incumbent vice president raising more than USD 100 million in donations in a matter of days.

Trump has questioned the legality of the swap and has not indicated if he will debate Harris.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The announcement is likely to affect Trump’s chances of election in 2024. The former president narrowly escaped an assassination attempt at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, and subsequent polls indicated that his popularity among voters slightly surpassed Biden’s. Harris is, on paper, a stronger Democrat candidate against Trump, and the party leaders are likely betting that she will be able to better reach on-the-fence voters than the current president.

The Republican Party is likely still struggling to adjust its electoral narratives in the aftermath of the Pennsylvania assassination attempt. While Trump called for unity and pluralism in his post-shooting appearance at the Republican National Convention (RNC), other senior members of the party reiterated old conspiracy theories and illiberal talking points. The discrepancy almost certainly demonstrates the entrenchment of “Trumpism” in the GOP, and the recent assassination attempt highly likely unified the party base away from the moderate wing of the party.

Moreover, Trump’s campaign recently received notable endorsements, most importantly from multiple tech billionaires including Elon Musk, owner of X.com. While Harris’ success in quickly amassing the support of the key Democrat electorate, the momentum of Trump’s campaign may prove hard to stop.

Finally, Trump’s language, which seemingly identifies Harris as an “illegitimate” candidate, could have serious security implications. If Trump were to lose the election, these discourses could be leveraged by the ex-president and by militant right-wing activists to dismiss the 2024 elections as fraudulent. While a repeat of the attempted “January 6” insurrection is highly unlikely, such developments could drive cases of domestic terrorism, civil unrest, and other forms of politically motivated violence. 

On 25 July, the US Justice Department announced that the co-founder and suspected current leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada was arrested in El Paso, Texas. During the joint Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operation, Joaquin Guzman Lopez, the son of Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán, the cartel’s other co-founder, was also arrested.

The exact details of the operation have yet to be released. However, early reports indicate that the cartel members were lured onto a plane supposedly heading to the south of Mexico which actually flew to the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Sinaloa Cartel is considered the largest drug supplier to the US and in recent years has hugely increased its smuggling of fentanyl to the US, a drug which is now the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18 to 45. Their apprehension may temporarily disrupt the cartel’s operations but is unlikely to have any meaningful long-term effect regarding disruption or deterrence.

Their capture could lead to a power vacuum within the Sinaloa Cartel which is likely to trigger infighting among cartel factions, a scenario that will almost certainly lead to violent clashes on the streets of Mexican territory which they control, including the major cities of Culiacan and Durango, and even parts of Chiapas in the far south. Long-term, the arrest of the leadership may lead to increased fragmentation of the cartel, another scenario that will almost certainly lead to increased violence.

Rival cartels like the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) may interpret this lack of leadership as a weakness and seek to exploit this opportunity to expand their influence and control over lucrative areas. This is most likely to manifest itself in the areas disputed between the Sinaloa Cartel and rival cartels. One prominent example is the major tourist city of Tijuana, where territorial disputes have been fierce given the city’s strategic location near the US border and the lucrative tourist market within Tijuana.

Throughout the reporting period, there has been a spate of attacks attributed to dissident groups belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC) guerilla group. The majority of the attacks have been targeted at the Colombian army or police and most were located in southwest Colombia, particularly in the Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Huila departments. However, there have also been several militant attacks in Colombia’s northeastern department of Arauca close to the Venezuelan border.

On 24 July, suspected FARC dissidents dropped a grenade onto a football field in El Plateado, Cauca department, killing a 10-year-old boy and injuring at least a dozen injuries. The attack took place during the middle of a cultural and sports week being held in the district and marks the first deadly use of a drone in Colombia’s war with FARC.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Attacks in southwest Colombia were likely conducted by more than one FARC dissident group, with several rejecting President Petro’s plans for “total peace”. Several dissident groups, including the Carlos Patiño front and the Second Marquetalia are known to operate in the area and are vying for control of a main drug trafficking route to the South Pacific known as the Micay Canyon and much of its surrounding environment. The IED attack was likely in response to the refusal of local residents to expel army troops from the area- an established tactic of many of the dissident groups.

Several of the other attacks can likely be attributed to the largest FARC dissident group, Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC). The government ended a ceasefire agreement with FARC-EMC on 16 July and has recently arrested several of the group’s leaders, with attacks potentially being a form of retribution. FARC-EMC is assessed to have as many as 4,000 fighters and operates in over 200 of Colombia’s 1,100 municipalities. Increased attacks across Colombia are likely a result of these developments, with simultaneous attacks across the country potentially overstretching Colombia’s armed forces.

This trend will be exacerbated if FARC-EMC coordinates or cooperates with other dissident groups like the Second Marquetalia, with both groups known to work together in the past to capitalise on the lucrative drug trade. FARC militants have increasingly used drones to drop munitions on targets, a tactic that has been used to good effect in the Middle East and Ukraine. This will likely become an established tactic of FARC, with drones offering a level of accessibility in Colombia’s rural and mountainous environment, and one that will help them engage superior government forces at a distance.

Should there be a major escalation in fighting, then it is almost certain that the kidnapping risk across the country will increase as this has traditionally been a major source of revenue for FARC dissidents.

Netanyahu gives fourth address to US Congress.

On 24 July, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered his fourth address to a joint session of the US Congress in Washington DC, seeking support for Israel’s war in Gaza. Protests against the war greeted Netanyahu outside and inside Congress, with Representative Rashida Tlaib holding a sign calling him a “war criminal.”

Netanyahu denounced the protesters and accused the International Criminal Court of false accusations. Despite ongoing ceasefire negotiations, Netanyahu reiterated a hardline stance, calling for increased US military aid to ensure a decisive victory against Hamas.

Panama security forces scheduled to start deporting migrants

Panama’s security forces are scheduled to start deporting migrants who try to enter the country through the southern Darien Gap. The new government campaigned on an anti-migrant platform and quickly signed a deal with the US to receive funding for its deportation efforts.

Polls suggest President Maduro will lose the Venezuelan presidential election

The Venezuelan presidential candidates have been holding their last rallies with the election set to take place on 28 July. Current polling indicates that the incumbent President Nicolás Maduro is set to lose the election to former diplomat Edmundo González. However, it is likely that Maduro will refuse to concede the election reminiscent of the presidential crisis of 2019.

The 2019 crisis resulted in widespread civil unrest, political instability, human rights abuses and frequent violent clashes between protestors and the security services. The event was accompanied by extensive sanctions on Venezuela which exacerbated an already fire humanitarian crisis and pushed Caracas towards US adversaries like Russia, China and Iran.

Cartel kills senior Mexico City police figure

On 22 July, Mexico City’s head of intelligence and police operations, Milton Morales Figueroa, was killed in a suspected drug cartel hit while on a family outing in Coacalco. The attackers emerged from two SUVs and also injured two others. The attack on a senior capital officer follows a similar 2020 ambush on then-police chief Omar García Harfuch. The assassination of such a prominent official will almost certainly lead to major police operations with the arrest or killing of cartel members likely to inspire reprisal attacks.

Migrant boat capsizes killing 40 Haitian migrants

On 19 July, a boat fire was reported to have killed at least 40 Haitian migrants. The fire began as the group were attempting to reach the Turks and Caicos Islands. Haitian citizens are reportedly increasingly taking desperate and dangerous measures to escape the island, which continues to have high levels of gang-led violence despite the arrival of Kenyan police. Northbound sea routes are likely appealing to Haitians due to the closure of the Dominican Republic border to the east.

Wildfires spread across the US and Canada.

Wildfires have spread across parts of Canada and the US, forcing thousands to evacuate their homes. In Alberta, Canada, the major tourist town of Jasper faced flames reaching 100 meters high, spreading five kilometres in less than 30 minutes, resulting in up to 50 per cent structural damage and the evacuation of 25,000 people.

In the state of Oregon, the Durkee Fire has burned almost 270,000 hectares, is threatening multiple small towns and killed hundreds of cattle. In California, a man was arrested for allegedly starting the Park Fire, which rapidly grew from 567 to 50,585 hectares, prompting the evacuation of over 4,000 people in Butte County and Chico.

Both regions are battling severe wildfire conditions, with international firefighting support being deployed to Canada.

Bolivian authorities declare state of emergency due to extreme weather

The department of Santa Cruz has declared a state of emergency, scheduled to persist until the end of the year. Authorities cite extreme weather that has led to a combination of torrential rainfall leading to flooding and landslides, droughts, and wildfires.

The response to wildfires in eastern Bolivia has been hampered by fuel shortages. It is likely that large-scale deforestation has contributed to the spread of wildfires in the region, and local authorities are likely to struggle to contain their spread due to the logistical challenges involved, exacerbated by fuel shortages.

In the early hours of 26 July, large-scale disruptions were recorded in much of the French high-speed rail network. During the night between the 25 and 26 July, unknown perpetrators allegedly set fire to rail infrastructure in different parts of the country, near the towns of Arras, Courtalain, Pagny-sur-Moselle, leading to widespread delays. The sabotage action coincided with the opening of the Olympic Games in France.

Solace Global Assessment: 

At this stage, it is impossible to attribute responsibility for the sabotage to any single actor. Two scenarios can be considered the most likely based on previous cases and plots to disrupt the Olympics.

First, there is a realistic possibility that the sabotage was carried out by anti-Olympic Games activists associated with the French far-left. These groups have repeatedly warned that they will disrupt the game if President Emmanuel Macron does not acquiesce to their demands to appoint a left-wing government led by the New Popular Front, the coalition that obtained the largest number of representatives at the recent snap National Assembly elections.

Alternatively, the low-sophistication sabotage could be an example of a hybrid operation sponsored or conducted by a foreign state actor, most likely Russia. Russian or pro-Russian actors have recently been linked to multiple fires or cases of sabotage against infrastructure and in other European countries. France has recently allowed Ukraine to fire French-derived weapons into mainland Russia and has even suggest that French troops could be deployed in some capacity to Ukraine. Moreover, a foreign intelligence service likely has the logistical and operational capabilities to conduct simultaneous sabotage actions like the ones observed on the night of 25-26 July.

The effectiveness, ease and desirability of low-level sabotage make it likely that more incidents will occur during the Paris Olympics. The recent disruption of a Tesla “gigafactory” near Berlin, caused by environmentalists setting fire to an electricity pylon, demonstrates the effectiveness of targeting exposed infrastructure for causing significant disruption. Targeting exposed infrastructure in rural or isolated areas requires minimal expertise and only basic tools, making such actions particularly attractive to saboteurs. Furthermore, with the current high threat of terrorism, it is likely that the French authorities are currently overstretched and largely incapable of assigning substantial resources to lesser threats.

On 24 July, German authorities banned six Islamic institutions with links to the Islamic Republic, identifying them as “outposts” for the Tehran regime to spread its ideology and influence in Europe, and as vehicles to provide financial support to the Lebanese armed group, Hezbollah. Authorities also ordered raids on 53 properties, including a major Hamburg Mosque.

The German Interior Ministry stated that the organisations espoused a militant form of Shia Islam with the goals of radicalising Persian diasporas and other Shia groups in Germany in support of Iran’s activities in the Middle East and, possibly, to carry out terrorist activity in Europe.

The raids come only a week after German and Spanish police detained four individuals accused of trafficking drone parts to Hezbollah via civilian-owned companies registered in Europe.

Solace Global Assessment: 

One of Iran’s strategic objectives is to spread its revolutionary ideology abroad. Iran has long sought to establish groups and institutions abroad that can further its interests and has used religious freedom laws to operate these with little risk of intervention by host countries’ authorities. Iran’s foreign operations are likely unique as they combine a military and civilian component. Military activities include covert operations and the accumulation of assets, including weapons and improvised explosives, for possible terrorist use. Already in 2020, US State Department figures warned that “Hezbollah [was] gradually building up stockpiles of weapons on European soil”.

Civilian activities have two fundamental goals: spreading Tehran’s brand of Shiism to local Shia communities and pooling local communities’ funds to be remitted to its proxy groups in the Middle East, thus indirectly funding terrorism. The drone-parts case falls into this category. In the United Kingdom, a similar scheme was discovered in April 2024, with prosecutors reporting that the London-based Islamic Centre of England redirected around GBP 240,000 of Covid-19 pandemic-period furlough scheme funds to militant groups in the Middle East.

It is highly likely that Iranian operations in Europe have intensified in the aftermath of 7 October, and that Tehran has sought to capitalise on the wave of support for the Palestinian cause to advance its geopolitical interests in target European countries, especially Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The recent setbacks in Germany and the United Kingdom are likely to have a short-term effect on Iranian operations. However, Tehran-linked organisations are likely to be able to effectively reorganise, also using less traceable payment methods (including cryptocurrencies and Hawalas) to maintain remittance flows towards Iran itself and Iranian proxies.

On 19 July, the Houthi Movement in Yemen achieved their first successful fatal drone attack on Israel after a one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV) managed to penetrate Israeli air defence and strike Tel Aviv. The UAV hit an apartment building around 100 metres from the US Consulate, killing at least one individual and injuring at least 10 others. Rather than taking a direct course, the drone reportedly followed GPS waypoints, transiting over the Mediterranean Sea before heading east to strike Tel Aviv.

The Houthis have claimed that the attack involved their new “Yafa” drone which purportedly is a modified Iranian-made Samad-3 UAV with an improved 2,600-kilometre range and decreased radar signature. On 20 July, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted a retaliation strike on Yemen, marking the first time Israel has struck back at the Houthis despite hundreds of attacks.

IAF strikes targeted several military and dual-purpose sites in al-Hudaydah (al-Hodeidah), a major port city under Houthi control. Targets included the port’s energy infrastructure and loading facilities, including 20 fuel depots and multiple container cranes, leading to a huge fire at the port, three deaths and around 80 people injured. A spokesperson for the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) commented that the strikes were conducted to disrupt Iran’s facilitation of lethal aid to the Houthis and that the port had effectively been shut down.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The success of the Houthi drone attack was likely determined by multiple factors. The Houthis have been conducting reconnaissance in force against the IDF’s air defence network, probing for gaps and attempting to identify any vulnerabilities. With Israel faced with Hezbollah to the north, Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq and Syria primarily on its eastern flank and Hamas and the Houthis to the south, it is likely that IDF air defence coverage in the west of Israel was limited.

The Houthis exploited this by approaching Tel Aviv from the Mediterranean Sea which likely caught the IDF off guard. The Houthi’s Yafa drone likely followed a series of GPS waypoints, obfuscated its route by using established civilian flight corridors and exploited the terrain to avoid detection by coalition military assets deployed to the area.

The small and slow-flying projectile, which would ordinarily have a small radar cross-section, was likely improved further by developments in Houthi drone technology- invariably with Iranian assistance. Early indications suggest that the Yafa is made from composite materials like plastic or carbon rather than metal. Such a development would make it lighter and provide it with greater range but would also make it harder to detect on legacy radar systems calibrated to identify metallic objects.

Israel’s advanced air defence network, comprised of the Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow System amongst others, has capable radar systems that can detect a wide range of aerial threats including those made from composite materials. However, these systems are harder to detect and provide air defence operators less reaction time, especially if early warning isn’t provided by allied forces- a factor that was pivotal in April 2024, when Iran and Iranian-backed proxies launched over 350 drones, missiles and rockets towards Israel.

Other Iranian proxies will almost certainly emulate the successful tactics of the Houthis. This could undermine Israel’s venerated air defence and force the IDF into reevaluating its tactics and technology. One immediate response might be to re-position air defence to improve coverage on the western flank. However, such a move could lead to other areas being less protected, a major vulnerability considering the degree of omnidirectional threats.

In the long term, the IDF will likely need to enhance its detection capabilities. Ukraine has successfully incorporated an array of acoustic sensors to provide early warning from Russian aerial threats, a capability that is lacking in Israel’s air defence network. However, these improvements are not immediately achievable and if Israel’s air defence is jeopardised, the IDF may be forced into actively degrading the Houthi’s capabilities with further strikes. It is too early to assess to what degree the IAF strikes have degraded or deterred the Houthis.

The strikes have likely benefitted Houthi propaganda with recent statements indicating that their immediate action will be a comprehensive response as part of their fifth phase of operations. This will almost certainly include an increase of attacks against Israel itself but also an escalation of Houthi attacks against merchant shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, with recent indications suggesting the Houthis have improved the lethality and accuracy of their maritime operations through the increased use of uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).

During the reporting period, up to four or more significant battles have reportedly taken place between Nigerien junta forces and jihadist groups in Niger, resulting in potentially hundreds of casualties.

The first battle allegedly occurred on 20 July in Ikarfane, near the Mali border, where Islamic State–Sahel Province (IS-Sahel, formerly known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara or ISGS) reportedly assaulted a Niger Armed Forces column consisting of 200 soldiers, potentially killing at least 30.

The second occurred on 21 July in the village of Tassia in the Tillaberi region, northwest of Niamey near the Burkina Faso border. The defence ministry announced that 21 were killed in the attack, with three days of national mourning to be observed.

The third battle is speculated to have taken place in Tankademi in the Tahoua region on 21 July, near the Mali border. While unconfirmed, potentially 237 Nigerien soldiers were killed in this single large-scale ambush by hundreds of IS-Sahel fighters who were speculated to be heavily armed and equipped with armoured vehicles.

The fourth battle is claimed to have taken place on 22 July, near the village of Foneko in the Tillaberi region. An official statement on state television announced a preliminary death toll of 15.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The past week is likely to have been the most violent in Niger since the military seized power in the July 2023 coup. The information space in Niger is complex and it can often take weeks for incidents to be confirmed. It is, therefore, a realistic possibility that the details regarding specific battles are inaccurate.

The main jihadist groups active in Niger are the Islamic State-affiliated IS-Sahel and al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusr al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Jihadist groups have been engaged in an insurgency for almost a decade in Niger. Since the coup, however, their activity has risen dramatically. This is highly likely due to a combination of declining state capacity and reduced international support. On 11 July, IS-Sahel conducted a raid at the high-security Koutokale prison near Niamey, claiming to have freed over 200 militants. Since then, further attacks reportedly occurred on 12 July, 17 July, and 18 July, the latter allegedly being conducted by JNIM against a Chinese convoy.

It is highly likely that the intensity, extent and geographic spread of attacks by jihadist groups in July indicate that the control exerted by Niger’s security forces is rapidly deteriorating. The junta has adopted a distinctly anti-Western posture, requesting France and the US withdraw all their troops. Prior to the coup, Niger was a crucial partner for the West in the fight against jihadist groups in the Sahel. Up to 40 per cent of Niger’s budget was funded by international partners, and both France and the US contributed considerably to anti-jihadist military operations.

Post-coup, Western withdrawal is highly likely to have diminished Niger’s security profile. While a contingent of US forces are still deployed in Niger, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) announced on 24 July that their withdrawal will be completed in early August, as per the demands of the junta. The junta has sought closer ties with Russia, who sent 100 Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) personnel in April, and Turkey has reportedly deployed over 1,000 Syrian mercenaries to aid in counterinsurgency. However, it is unlikely that the resources provided by Russia and Turkey will be sufficient to make up for those lost by Western withdrawal.

Niger’s counterinsurgency capacity has likely been severely degraded, which has been exploited by insurgents and attacks will likely continue over the coming weeks. There is a realistic possibility that declining security in Niger will lead to significant ungoverned space, areas that can be used as a base of operations by jihadist groups to conduct attacks in the wider region.

The Kpékankandi outpost in northern Togo’s unsettled Savanes region was attacked on 20 July leading to the deaths of 12 Togolese soldiers and at least 40 militants. The attack has been claimed by the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) Islamist group. The outpost is located close to the border with Burkina Faso where JNIM have a long-established presence. The Togolese army has deployed reinforcements to the area in order to enhance its defence posture.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Savanes region remains in a state of emergency which was first introduced in June 2022 after a series of attacks on Togolese security services and civilians. It is almost certain that JNIM are exploiting an incredibly destabilised Burkina Faso as a safe haven to conduct cross-border attacks into neighbouring Togo. Militants across the region have been afforded a wide area of ungoverned space and increased freedom of movement following multiple military coups, including in Burkina Faso, that have replaced Western-leaning civilian governments with military juntas.

This shift has resulted in the expulsion of Western military forces from Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, leading to an overstretching of domestic forces that have lost access to the advanced military capabilities of nations like the US and France. Furthermore, deterring cross-border attacks into Togo is likely a low priority for the Burkinabe government as they deal with a host of insurgent forces on multiple axes. Togo has increasingly been seen as a stable environment and has attracted heavy foreign investment, particularly from Western countries.

JNIM’s strategy is likely to undermine this notion by destabilising its northern region, a region which is primarily Muslim where JNIM is likely seeking to expand its recruitment of potentially disenfranchised locals. Local recruits could then be exploited to expand JNIM’s operations within northern Togo, with similar trends being observed in nearby Benin and the Ivory Coast. Moreover, Togo, Benin, the Ivory Coast and other West African countries have contributed to initiatives such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the Accra Initiative, both aimed at containing terrorism within the Sahel. Previous involvement in these initiatives invariably makes these countries legitimate targets for violent extremist organisations (VEOs) like JNIM.

Most importantly, creating emerging threats within these countries will force governments to allocate resources to internal issues, thus degrading their ability to contribute to regional counter-terrorism initiatives under organisations like the UN or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Long-term, VEOs like JNIM, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP) likely harbour the intent of expanding their operations further south towards the coastal regions of these countries. These are areas where Western interests are disproportionately located, including tourist resorts which would offer VEOs a coveted high-profile target, as demonstrated by AQIM’s 2016 attack on the Grand-Bassam resort in the Ivory Coast.

Large environmental protests in La Rochelle, France

Large-scale protests took place in the French region of La Rochelle. The protests were organised by environmentalist groups that are opposed to the construction of artificial water collection basins for irrigation. While La Rochelle is a primarily rural and sparsely populated area, there is a high likelihood that the protesters will seek to extend disorders to Paris and other Olympic host cities in order to obtain higher exposure.

Two killed in housing development collapse in Naples, Italy

On 23 July, two people were killed and over a dozen injured in Naples when the walkway of a public housing development – in the Scampia suburb, known for severe levels of poverty and organised crime presence – collapsed. The incident will likely spark civil unrest in Italy, especially in the south and targeted at national government institutions.

Blackouts lead to civil unrest in the Krasnodar region of Russia

Civil unrest occurred in the Krasnodar region on 20 July due to ongoing blackouts. The loss of power has likely been caused by abnormally high heat currently affecting the region. Authorities responded relatively mildly to the rare protest, with the local governor acknowledging the protesters’ grievances. However, multiple arrests were reported. Russian authorities appear to be aiming to suppress potential civil unrest while avoiding broader demonstrations by not resorting to excessively harsh repression in these localised protest incidents.

European Union announced talks with Armenia to relax visa rules

European Union officials announced they will begin talks with Armenia to relax visa rules. The development likely represents a further signal of Armenia’s movement towards the West and away from Russia’s sphere of influence. While Yerevan has long been one of Moscow’s key Caucasus allies, relations between the two countries soured following the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Opposition leader sentenced in Tunisia for vote buying

A Tunisian court sentenced Lofti Mraihi, the main opposition leader, to eight months in prison for “vote buying”. Tunisian President Kais Saied has implemented increasingly authoritarian measures and is seeking re-election at the next elections in October. The announcement is likely to drive civil unrest, which authorities will highly likely meet with further draconian measures, including arbitrary arrests and violent intervention.

Bangladeshis sentenced for protesting own government in UAE

The UAE has sentenced 57 Bangladeshi migrant workers for holding protests within the Gulf State. The protests were aimed at the Bangladeshi government over the recent student protests, not at the Emirati government. However, protests not authorised by the UAE’s Ministry of Interior are highly illegal with the government likely attempting to deter other forms of unrest or future activity that challenges or undermines its rule.

Anti-corruption protestors warned by Uganda’s hardline president

Uganda’s hardline President Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled the country for almost four decades, has warned protesters that they are playing with fire and anti-corruption demonstrations were organised across the country. The Ugandan authorities have already arrested several protestors and have recently cracked down on the opposition. The country’s main opposition leader, Boni Wine, commands a lot of influence among the country’s youth and the government likely fears that Uganda could face protests of a similar scale and nature as the ones that are ongoing in Kenya.

UK radical Islamist preacher convicted

Radical Islamist preacher Anjem Choudary was found guilty of directing a terrorist organisation by a British court. Choudary, despite serving a prior conviction for supporting the Islamic State (IS) and contributing to radicalising individuals in the UK, continued to head a renamed iteration of the banned organisation al-Muhajiroun, which also established a chapter in the US. The arrest and later conviction were the product of a joint investigation involving UK, US, and Canadian counterterrorism units.

US bombers conduct patrol over Finland near Russia’s strategic assets

US Air Force B-52 strategic bombers conducted their first-ever flight over Finland on 21 July whilst being escorted by Finnish fighter jets. The nuclear-capable were intercepted by Russian fighter jets after flying close to Russia’s strategic Kola Peninsula, home to multiple NATO-facing military bases, Russia’s Northern Fleet and much of the Kremlin’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent. The event is almost certainly reflective of the geo-political shift that has occurred after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, causing Finland to renege decades of neutrality and join NATO.

German national sentenced to death in Belarus

A German national has been sentenced to death in Belarus, the only country within Europe that still applies the death penalty, according to Germany’s Foreign Ministry. The Belarussian authorities have not stated on what grounds he has been charged, however, rights groups suggest that it is related to the Kalinouski Regiment, a group of anti-government Belarusian exiles fighting for Ukraine.

Rare mass shooting in Croatia

A man allegedly killed five at a retirement home in Daruvar, killing at least six on 22 July. It is possible that the case will result in similar anti-gun protests as those seen in Serbia following another recent attack.

US reporter guilty of espionage in Russia.

A Russian court found US reporter Evan Gershkovich guilty of “espionage” and sentenced him to 16 years in a penal colony. Gershkovich is the first US journalist sentenced for espionage since the Cold War. It is almost certain that, as with other recent examples, the case results were doctored and skewed by Russian officials in order to put further pressure on US diplomacy. It is highly likely that Moscow will now seek to exchange  Gershkovich for useful nationals currently held in US detention.

No progress made concerning north Cyprus

The 50th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of north Cyprus did not result in the hoped renewal of dialogue between the Cypriot and Turkish sides. Turkish President Erdogan reiterated Ankara’s long-standing stance of the rejection of a federal unitary state in favour of a two-state solution for the island.

Canadian citizen flies to Israel to attack IDF

A Canadian citizen was shot and killed by Israeli soldiers after allegedly trying to attack them with a knife near the Gaza border. The incident is likely to strain diplomatic relations between the two countries and will likely drive civil unrest in Canada.

IED at Kenya border town likely detonated by Somalia-based al-Shabaab

At least five people were injured at a restaurant in the Kenyan town of Madera after an IED was initiated. The attack was likely conducted by al-Shabaab militants operating in the area which is near to the Somali border near al-Shabaab strongholds. Local police have suggested that the restaurant is often frequented by non-locals who were likely the target of the attack.

Al-Shabaab attempt to seize three army bases in southern Somalia

On 22 July, al-Shabaab militants attempted to take over three Somalian army bases in the south of the country in a region only recently captured by government forces. Government forces claim to have repelled the attack and killed over 80 militants after receiving intelligence of the attack, leading them to abandon the army bases and then encircle al-Shabaab’s fighters. Al-Shabaab is likely attempting to reassert its influence in the Jubaland region after ceding territory to the government which has developed alliances with local clans.

Landslides kills over 200 in southern Ethiopia

On 21-22 July, two landslides in southern Ethiopia’s Gofa Zone have killed at least 257 people. The death count is likely to increase as rescue operations continue with some assessments suggesting as many as 500 dead. The first landslide is thought to have killed as many as 50 people, with the remaining deaths largely caused by the second landslide which engulfed many attempting to assist with rescue efforts. While landslides are common during Ethiopia’s July to September rainy season, experts have suggested that they will become more common as a result of climate change.

Severe weather forecasted in South Africa’s Western Cape

Severe weather is expected to persist in Western Cape Province through July 27, with Orange Level 5 and Yellow Level 4 rain warnings in effect. Flooding, landslides, and strong winds are likely to cause disruptions, including potential evacuation orders, utility service interruptions, and impacts on transportation and businesses.

On 25 July, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) released a statement claiming that it had seized the Tatmadaw junta’s Northeastern Regional Military Command headquarters in Lashio, the largest city in Myanmar’s northern Shan State home to around 150,000. The ethnic Kokang rebel group claims that the headquarters was seized after intense fighting with junta forces which surrendered en masse and claimed that “the liberation of Lashio will mark a historic victory in our revolution.”

The commander of Burmese People’s Liberation Army, another group fighting alongside the MNDAA, confirmed the capture of the regional military command headquarters. MNDAA forces are now conducting clearance operations throughout the city.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The capture of the junta’s headquarters Northeastern Regional Military Command headquarters in Lashio was the MNDAA’s primary objective in its war with the junta and if confirmed marks the first military command to fall since the 2021 coup. The loss is also the first major defeat for the junta since the collapse of a Chinese-brokered ceasefire in May. Such a defeat will almost certainly embolden Myanmar’s other rebel groups which are conducting a multi-axis offensive across the country.

The MNDAA’s control of Lashio will enable it to secure a strategic foothold in Shan State that will help facilitate future operations. Despite much damage to roads and reports of landmines, the MNDAA could leverage the city’s infrastructure to establish or improve supply lines and strengthen its command and control. Holding the city will also likely help drive both propaganda and recruitment efforts.

Lashio also sits along a major trade route between Myanmar and China. China maintains good relations with the junta but reports also suggest that it benefits greatly from informal trade and cross-border smuggling associated with rebel forces. If the MNDAA’s capture of Lashio leads to a more stabilised Shan State, Beijing may be deterred from intervening in any capacity. The state’s stabilisation may additionally result in improved access for humanitarian organisations.

However, after such an embarrassing defeat, it is likely that junta forces, which are afforded complete air superiority, will respond with increased air strikes on rebel forces in Lashio resulting in high levels of civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

On 24 July, Typhoon Gaemi made landfall in Taiwan. The typhoon reached maximum wind speeds of 231 kilometres per hour. Forming in the Philippine Sea, Typhoon Gaemi initially tracked past the Philippines between 20-23 July. The tropical cyclone worsened seasonal monsoon rains in the most populous island in the Philippines, Luzon. Torrential rainfall caused flooding and landslides, with at least 20 fatalities. Manila experienced significant flooding which caused widespread disruptions. Approximately 600,000 people in the Philippines have been displaced by the torrential rains.

In Taiwan, at least three deaths have been reported, with hundreds of injuries. The typhoon caused mass power outages, flooding, school and office closures, flight disruptions and the closing of financial markets. Additionally, a tanker and cargo ship were sunk due to the strong winds, with three other vessels running aground. The most serious of these is the sinking of the Philippines-flagged MT TERRA NOVA, which was carrying approximately 1.4 million litres of industrial fuel oil. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is currently attempting to contain the oil spill.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Typhoon Gaemi is the most powerful tropical cyclone to impact Taiwan in eight years, reaching a maximum classification of Category 4 before making landfall. In addition to the high wind speeds, the impact was exacerbated by an unusual looping path that meant the typhoon’s inner core hit Taiwan’s east coast twice. Taiwan is highly typhoon-resistant, due to considerable investment into typhoon-resistant infrastructure and comprehensive disaster preparedness and response plans. While disruptions were widespread, it is almost certain that Taiwan’s typhoon resiliency measures spared the island from a far greater impact.

While the typhoon did not make landfall in the Philippines, the considerable flooding caused a far greater impact than in Taiwan, illustrating the Philippines’ vulnerability to severe weather. In the days preceding the typhoon, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr highlighted flood prevention in his State of the Nation address. While he has since ordered authorities to expedite disaster response efforts, it is likely that the typhoon’s impact will raise further questions about the Philippines’ weak disaster preparedness.

Furthermore, the oil spill resulting from the sinking of MT TERRA NOVA stretches several kilometres, and a spokesman of the Philippine Coast Guard warned that the spill could be the largest in the country’s history if not contained. Gaemi made landfall in Fujian province in mainland China on 25 July, prompting authorities to suspend transport services and close schools. While Gaemi has weakened to a Tropical Storm, heavy rainfall will likely continue to cause disruptions in China over the coming days.

Relative calm in Bangladesh following Supreme Court decision

Following large-scale violent unrest in Bangladesh sparked by a high court decision to reimpose controversial public sector job quotas, there has been relative calm since the Supreme Court overturned the decision on 21 July. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has attributed the recent deadly unrest in the country to political opposition, asserting that the imposition of a curfew was a necessary measure for public safety.

The violence resulted in over 150 fatalities and the arrest of more than 1,000 individuals, including several senior opposition leaders. The government has stated that the curfew will be lifted and internet services reinstated when the situation improves. However, protestors have demanded the resignation of Hasina and government accountability for the violence, indicating that future demonstrations are likely.

Cambodia opposition leader convicted of defamation

A Cambodian court has convicted opposition leader Teav Vannol of defamation and imposed a USD 1.5 million fine for comments he made about the country’s democracy. In an interview with Nikkei this February, Vannol, president of the Candlelight Party, criticised the administration of Hun Manet, the son of long-time leader Hun Sen.

The Candlelight Party was excluded from last year’s general election, which saw Hun Sen’s party win a landslide. The court’s decision, which Vannol intends to appeal, reflects ongoing concerns about political freedom in Cambodia. The move indicates the severe consequences for dissent and follows similarly harsh verdicts against environmental activists deemed critical of the government.

Vietnamese frigate docks in Russia in sign of growing military cooperation

The Vietnamese missile frigate, the HUNG DAO, conducted a port call in Russia’s Vladivostok on 24 July. The Russian-made vessel’s port call is likely reflective of growing military cooperation between the two countries and follows the recent trip of President Putin to Vietnam. Russia is likely trying to entice Vietnam into its sphere of influence and covets long-term access to Vietnam’s deep-water port at Cam Ranh Bay, a facility used extensively during the Cold War which enabled Russia’s Pacific Fleet to conduct bluewater operations.

Taiwan begins annual war games

Taiwan began its annual Han Kuang war games on 22 July, aimed at stimulating the repelling of a Chinese invasion. This year’s iteration is designed to be as realistic as possible, dialling down on military pageantry and focusing on crucial elements like nighttime operations and operating with severed lines of communication.

The drills also include live fire exercises on Taiwan’s outlying islands near the Chinese coast, as well as a civil defence drill in major cities. This comprehensive approach likely aims to demonstrate Taiwan’s capability to leverage all its resources and strategies in a unified effort to deter a Chinese invasion at a time when tensions are increasingly strained.

The Philippines and China reach an agreement in the South China Sea

On 22 July, the Philippines and China reached an agreement to de-escalate tensions at the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. The deal aims to manage the dispute through dialogue without either party compromising on their territorial claims and follows a series of aggressive actions from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Chinese Coast Guard toward the Philippines Navy.

The deal will allow the Philippines to resupply its forces at the shoal but denies Manila the right to bring in construction materials used to fortify the area. The deal may set a precedent for other Southeast Asian nations that have territorial disputes in the South China Sea, including Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.

Islamist militants attack government forces in the south of the Philippines

On 20 July, Dawlah Islamiya militants attacked Filipino forces with small arms fire in Shariff Saydona Mustapha, Mindanao. One soldier reportedly died in the attack. Dawlah Islamiya (DI), formerly known as the Maute Group, is affiliated with Islamic State (IS) and regularly launches attacks against security forces on the southern island of Mindanao.

In March, DI militants ambushed army personnel in the same region, Maguindanao del Sur, killing four. It is highly likely that the group will continue to launch attacks in Mindanao over the coming months.

Several dead in Pakistan during Hyderabad heatwave

According to local sources, at least eleven people have died due to a heatwave in Hyderabad, Pakistan. The death toll is likely to further increase in the coming days, as the region continues to record temperatures of around 40 degrees Celsius, likely worsened by high humidity levels. If the casualties increase considerably, there is a realistic possibility of localised civil unrest breaking out.

Major bridge collapses in Shaanxi province, China

A bridge in the Shaanxi province collapsed on 19 July, killing 11 people. The collapse was caused by floods, which are affecting much of north and central China, as well as by poor infrastructure standards. It is highly likely that, as China continues to be unable to resolve long-standing issues of poor construction quality and materials, further episodes will occur.

18 dead in plane crash in Kathmandu, Nepal

A Saurya Airlines plane crashed shortly after take-off from Kathmandu on 24 July, killing 18 people and injuring the pilot who was the sole survivor. The plane was heading for maintenance in Pokhara and crashed in challenging conditions with low visibility, factors that will likely raise questions concerning the safety record of Nepal, an impoverished country that has to rely heavily on air travel due to its mountainous terrain.

Severe weather forecasted in eastern and northern regions of Japan

Severe weather is forecast to impact most of Japan through 26 July, with warnings for landslides and flooding in eastern and northern regions, and potential lightning, tornadoes, strong winds, and hail in western and northern areas. Evacuation orders are in effect for tens of thousands in affected areas, with significant flooding and landslides reported. Disruptions to transport, utilities, and businesses are expected, and flight delays and port closures may occur due to adverse weather conditions.

Asalha Puja: Increased Threat of Violence Against Buddhist Temples During Dharma Day Celebrations

The Buddhist festival of Asalha Puja, or Dharma Day, takes place on 20 July. The celebration is one of the major ones for Buddhists and it commemorates the Buddha’s first sermon. As with other religious holidays, there is an increased threat of targeted violence against Buddhist temples, especially in countries with large Buddhist minorities.

Shravana Month Begins on 22 July

The Shravana month of the Hindu calendar begins on 22 July. The month is important due to its symbolic connection with the monsoon season in the Indian subcontinent. For Hindus, the month is connected to the deity Shiva, and devotees carry out a series of religious practices, including fasting and pilgrimages. Whilst the festival is typically peaceful, there have been many instances of sectarian violence and heightened tensions in the past.

Olympic Games Set to Begin in France on 26 July Amidst High Terrorism and Unrest Risks

The Olympic Games are scheduled to begin in France on 26 July and continue until 11 August. More than 15 million visitors are expected to arrive in Paris alone during the Games, which have one of the largest audiences of any sporting event. More than three billion people reportedly watched the last Olympics in Japan. Due to their profile and media attention, there are important terrorism and civil unrest risks associated with the Games.

On 13 July, former President Trump was shot and wounded by a lone gunman while speaking at a rally in the battleground state of Pennsylvania. The would-be assassin managed to wound Trump’s ear, as well as kill one attendee and injure a further two before being killed by law enforcement agents. It is unclear what the shooter’s motive was, and US security and intelligence services initiated multiple inquiries to understand how the shooter managed to reach a vantage point from where he could take aim at Trump.

Only two days later, Trump, who also selected Ohio senator JD Vance as his running mate for 2024, was endorsed at the Republican Party’s Annual National Convention (RNC) as the party’s official candidate.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Very little information exists about the attacker, who had a negligible online footprint and unremarkable background, and it is difficult to say whether he was inspired by a particular ideology, or simply by a desire to obtain notoriety. As of the time of writing, no “manifestos”, statements, or other perpetrator-generated material often associated with lone actor terrorists has been found, suggesting that the shooter did not fit within that profile, but may have been motivated by non-ideological factors.

The large volume of conspiracy theories publicised on social media in the assassination attempt’s aftermath suggests that foreign powers are likely seeking to conduct information operations to increase political instability in the US. The episode likely represents a possible driving factor of increased risks of domestic terrorism in the US, especially retaliatory action by self-proclaimed vigilantes. Any updates regarding the shooter’s motive and background will almost certainly cause further division in the United States.

Trump’s announcement of JD Vance as his running mate ends speculation concerning the direction of his campaign. Vance represents the Republican right, particularly the rural, white working class that forms a core demographic base for Trump. Vance is a self-described nationalist and is expected to remain loyal to Trump’s “MAGA” platform, and his nomination likely represents a key indicator of the tilt of the Republican party towards Trump’s populist camp, matching a decrease of the influence of the centrist, neoliberal wing of the GOP.

Moreover, Vance is a young candidate (only 39 years of age) and may represent an important asset in shaping a post-Trump GOP, as the former president cannot run again if he is re-elected. Finally, picking Vance as a running mate over other possibilities may foreshadow some of the foreign policy lines of a possible second Trump administration. Vance has repeatedly stated that he is uninterested in Ukraine and has questioned the American consensus for supporting Kyiv’s war efforts. Trump, has announced that he would immediately end the war if back in the White House, possibly hinting at forcing Ukraine to the negotiating table by threatening the withdrawal of aid. Such a scenario would almost certainly create significant difficulties for the US’ European allies, who are still struggling with procurement and support for Ukraine, and would likely be ineffective without American contributions.

On 18 July, Argentina’s Jewish community marked the 30th anniversary of the 1994 Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) Jewish center bombing in Buenos Aires which killed 85 people. President Milei pledged to rectify decades of inaction and inconsistencies in the investigation into the attack which was the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentina’s history.

Argentina’s top criminal court has attributed blame to Iran for the attack and has suggested that the attack was conducted by Hezbollah militants under the operational command of Tehran. Milei has instigated plans to try suspects in absentia and has committed to improving Argentina’s national intelligence to prevent future attacks. Iran continues to refuse to extradite the suspects and has repeatedly ignored international arrest warrants.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Argentine prosecutors have also charged Iranian officials alongside members of Hezbollah for the 1994 AMIA attack as well as a separate attack in 1992 on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 22 people. In addition, in January 2024 Argentine police apprehended three men from Lebanon and Syria suspected of planning a terrorist attack in Argentina when it was hosting the Pan-American Maccabiah Games, which brings together thousands of Jewish athletes.

Argentina is home to the largest Jewish community in South America at an estimated 200,000-300,000 and there are an estimated 50,000-70,000 Argentine Jews residing in Israel. Furthermore, President Milei is a staunch supporter of both the Jewish community and Israel and has publicly toyed with the idea of converting to Judaism. He has also taken a divergent path from most South American leaders concerning the Israel-Hamas conflict. In January he visited Israel, declared unwavering support for Tel Aviv and recently designated the Iranian-backed Hamas militant group as a terrorist organisation.

These developments have likely made Argentina a target for Iranian-sponsored terrorism, particularly against its large Jewish community. Argentina has heightened surveillance and border controls to prevent the infiltration of Iranian agents from Venezuela and Bolivia where they are suspected of having a considerable footprint. Iran’s most capable proxy force, Hezbollah is also known to have a strong presence within South America, especially in the lawless tri-border area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina- all countries that also have a large Lebanese diaspora where Hezbollah has likely been able to establish ties and exploit for cover.

Hezbollah’s main operations here entail the financing of operations in the Middle East through their connections to South American organised crime where Hezbollah are suspected of being involved in money laundering, drug trafficking and other illicit activity. The group likely sees Argentina’s Jewish community as a legitimate target within the context of the current conflict and a deniable attack sponsored by Iran would help demonstrate Tehran’s reach and operational capabilities.

Milei’s decision to strengthen intelligence and anti-terrorism measures will also likely put it on course for future conflict with Hezbollah, which Argentina has already designated a terrorist organisation. If the Milei administration attempts to dismantle Hezbollah’s invaluable criminal operations, the group may be coaxed into reprisal attacks against the Argentine government, a course of action that may also be endorsed by Iran with indications that it too is involved and profits from illicit activity within South America.

US President Joe Biden Tests Positive for Covid-19

US President Joe Biden tested positive for Covid-19 on 17 July. The development is likely to damage Biden’s re-election bid further and continue to raise worries regarding the president’s health and fitness.

Peru Extends Detention of Ex-President Castillo

Peru’s judiciary has announced that it is extending the pre-trial detention of former President Pedro Castillo by 18 months while an investigation against him on charges of rebellion continues. His apprehension resulted in protests from his base and the judiciary’s plans to sentence him to over 30 years in prison may ignite further unrest in the South American country.

US Receives Intelligence on Iranian Plot to Assassinate Trump

CNN reported on 16 July that the US received intelligence regarding an Iranian plot to assassinate former President Donald Trump. This was almost certainly unrelated to the assassination attempt that took place in Ohio. However, the reports are likely to bring more scrutiny and criticism towards US intelligence and security service, considering the security gaps that allowed the Ohio shooter to get within range of Trump.

Trump Plans to Designate Mexican Cartels as Terrorist Groups, Proposes Military Action if Elected

Former US President Trump has announced plans to designate Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organisations should he secure victory in November. Under his plans, the Pentagon will be ordered to make proper use of US special forces who will be deployed to attack cartel leadership and infrastructure, as well as deploy the US Navy to enforce a blockade on the cartels. Such plans have almost no chance of being endorsed by the Mexican government; however, his plan to deploy US troops to the Mexican border is likely to rally his base as the election looms.

Venezuelan Opposition Leader’s Security Chief Arrested

Opposition members in Venezuela have reported that the chief security officer for opposition leader Maria Corina Machado was arrested. Machado, alongside other opposition candidates, has been barred from competing at the 28 July elections on clearly untenable technicalities. Still, the decimated opposition retains a much higher support than the ruling government, as the few available polls show. It is highly likely that further intimidatory gestures, and possible crackdowns, will continue over the next weeks. The vote is also almost certain to lack transparency, and the result will likewise highly likely be doctored to benefit the Maduro regime.

Midwest Storms Cause Widespread Power Outages and Tornadoes

On 14-16 July, the Midwest of the US experienced extreme weather, with powerful storm systems causing tornadoes and heavy rainfall. Across the region, over 500,000 energy customers were left without power as a result of the storms. Illinois was particularly impacted, and Chicago suffered from major disruptions. The number of tornado warnings issued was abnormally high for the region, with one tornado even being recorded as touching down in Chicago.

New York State Declares State of Emergency After Severe Storms and Tornadoes

The Governor of New York State declared a statewide State of Emergency on July 16, following severe storms and several tornado touchdowns. The storms caused major damage in the City of Rome and significantly impacted areas in Madison County, with one death reported.  110,000 customers lost power across New York State.

7.4 Magnitude Earthquake Strikes Northern Chile

On 18 July, a 7.4 magnitude earthquake hit northern Chile near the Argentina border. The earthquake has not resulted in any immediate casualties but has led to multiple power outages in the wider region.

On 13 July, Israeli forces carried out an airstrike with multiple 2,000-pound bombs on a housing complex in Khan Yunis. The attack, which reportedly killed more than 20 Palestinians, also resulted in the death of Ali Hassan Salameh, the head of Hamas’ Khan Yunis brigade, and, more crucially, possibly Mohammed Deif, the military leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the second most senior Hamas leader in Gaza after Yahya Sinwar. The killing of Deif, which Israeli officials have not yet confirmed, would make this the most high-profile decapitation strike of the Hamas-Israel conflict so far.

Further south, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units are continuing operations in Rafah, as well as clearing tunnels near the Philadelphi Corridor. On 18 July, the Israeli Knesset voted to reject a recognition of a Palestinian state, even following a resolution to the current conflict.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recent developments in the Gaza Strip are likely to have concrete impacts on the future of the conflict, although they will likely not translate into a short-term change in the ongoing attrition stage of the war, where half-depleted Hamas cells continue to carry hit-and-run attacks on IDF forces that are operating in previously cleared areas. The killing of Deif is likely to impact the senior Hamas leadership in Gaza in terms of its effectiveness and organisational capability in the short-term. Deif is considered to be the main architect behind the development of the logistical and training system of Hamas over the last decades, and replacing him will not be easy.

At the same time, Hamas has the advantage of having a decentralised structure, as ongoing Israeli operations have favoured the development of separate chains of command, also giving junior officials the chance to become familiar with operating in a warzone, which will make the immediate impact of Deif’s loss more manageable.

Both Hamas and Israel likely still consider their strategic objectives in the war to be attainable. The latter will have been encouraged by the recent decapitation strikes and the Knesset’s refusal to recognise a future Palestinian state is likely sending a strong message to Hamas and its allies, Israel’s international partners and dovish elements within Israeli society.

In the short-to-medium term, IDF forces are likely to continue clearing operations in the Philadelphi corridor, seeking to further destroy the complex network of tunnels that is Hamas’ main supply line into Gaza. Simultaneously, the decapitation strike on Deif highly likely corroborates early reports that the Hamas leadership in Gaza has relocated to Khan Yunis, rather than Rafah, and especially to the area of the city overlapping with the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone where they can hide within the civilian population and coax the IDF into causing high civilian casualties.

Islamic State (IS) operatives carried out an attack at the Muharram congregation in Mutrah, near Muscat, on 15 July. The attack coincided with the Islamic holiday of Ashura, which is particularly sacred to Shias as it commemorates the death of Husayn ibn Ali, the third Shia imam. Six people were killed and 28 injured during the shooting. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Yemeni province of IS (ISYP).

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is notable as it was the first-ever IS operation in Oman. However, the country has long been a desirable target for multiple reasons. First, the country has close relations with other regional powers and with Iran, as it plays an important mediation role in the context of the ongoing Yemen and Red Sea crises. Attacking the Omani state and possibly reducing international perceptions of its stability could impact the progress of its mediation, leading to greater and more prolonged instability, one of IS’ fundamental goals.

Oman is also a relatively tolerant state compared to its regional neighbours, and much more multireligious. The majority are Ibadi and there are also significant Sunni and Shia minorities, the latter of which are deemed as heretics or rafidi by IS. It is highly likely that the simple availability of multiple Shia targets, with little security to guard them, was the key driver of the attack.

ISYP, like the other IS branches, has the ultimate strategic goal of toppling local regimes to restore an Islamic Caliphate, starting, in this case, from the south of the Arabian Peninsula. Notably, ISYP has likely increased its activity and gained relevance in recent years due to its closeness to the Somali province branch (ISSP), which, according to recent reports, could be headed by the group’s current “caliph”, who allegedly has personal ties to the Yemeni branch and has spent considerable time in Yemen. ISSP, which benefits from less pressure compared to the IS branches in the Middle East, continues to play a crucial role in channelling funds to the more active IS branches in Afghanistan (the Khorasan province, or ISKP) and the Sahel (the West Africa province, ISWAP).

ISYP almost certainly benefits from a close connection to ISSP, both by guaranteeing the inbound and outbound transit of fighters, and even senior members of IS, between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and by being the first step in rerouting funds and assets from Africa towards Asia. There is a remote possibility that the Oman attack is linked to a reported spike in IS attacks further north, in Syria and Iraq. A connection between the two theatres could signal a return in IS’ planning and coordination capacity between different provinces, possibly hinting at a growing IS ability to carry out transregional complex attacks.  

On 15 July, two merchant vessels were attacked by the Houthis in the Red Sea. The MT BENTLEY I, a Panama-flagged, Israel-owned and Monaco-operated tanker vessel transporting oil from Russia to China was initially attacked by one uncrewed surface vessel (USV) and two crewed small boats. The Houthis later launched an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) towards the vessel. These attacks were unsuccessful in disabling the vessel, with no notable damage or any injuries reported.

In a separate incident, the MT CHIOS LION, a Liberian-flagged, Marshall Islands-owned and Greek-operated crude oil tanker was impacted by a USV, causing damage. No injuries were reported.

Additionally, on 19 July, the Singaporean-flagged MV LOBIVIA was reportedly struck by unknown projectiles in the Gulf of Aden. While the vessel suffered damage, no injuries have yet been reported.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The increased use of USVs by the Houthis in their ongoing campaign against merchant shipping highly likely indicates an evolution in Houthi tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). On 12 June, the Houthis struck the bulk carrier MV TUTOR in the Red Sea with a USV, killing one crewmember and disabling the vessel. This marked a significant operational success for the Houthis. Since then, the Houthis successfully used USVs to attack the MV TRANSWORLD NAVIGATOR on 23 June, and the MV SEAJOY on 27 June.

United States Central Command, who are engaged in military operations against the Houthis as part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, have additionally reported destroying 27 USVs since 12 June, compared to a prior total of 26 USVs since their first identified use by the Houthis on 4 January. This almost certainly indicates a significant uptick in the use of USVs by the Houthis, emboldened by their successful attack against the MV TUTOR.

The Houthis pioneered the operational use of USVs when they attacked a Saudi frigate with a USV in January 2017, and currently maintain an arsenal of both uncrewed weaponised skiffs as used against the MV TUTOR, as well as purpose-built craft called Tufan or Blowfish that carry far more powerful warheads. The Houthis claimed the attack against MV Transworld Navigator was conducted with the largest of these Tufan USVs, the Tufan-3 which they claim carries a 1000-1500 kilogram warhead.

The weaponised skiff USVs provide effective camouflage against countermeasures, amplified by the Houthi use of dummies as used in the TUTOR attack, ostensibly appearing to be ordinary crewed fishing vessels. The Tufan USVs, however, carry far more powerful warheads and travel at higher speeds. USVs are exceptionally difficult for merchant vessels to counter, and unless intercepted by naval forces, have proven to be more effective than ASBMs, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) at causing impacts.

The main weakness of Houthi USVs, compared to those used by Ukraine in the Black Sea, is that they are not fully autonomous, relying on a human pilot for the initial line of attack, requiring the use of motherships. Merchant vessels, however, are not equipped to counter USVs and must rely on their hull strength to withstand impacts if naval forces are not successful in intercepting the USVs beforehand. While the sole use of a USV is generally incapable of sinking a merchant vessel (though this is not impossible), a good hit on a weak point, such as the engine compartment, can immobilise a merchant vessel which then makes the vessel far easier to hit with secondary strikes by missiles and drones. This TTP was used effectively against the Tutor.

It is highly likely that the evolution of Houthi TTPs to increasingly use USVs substantially increases the threat to merchant shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

New Far-Right Group Emerges in EU Parliament

After the recent creation of the Patriots for Europe (PfE) group by the far-right parties of countries including Hungary, France, Italy, Czechia and Austria, a further identitarian EU Parliament party, named Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), was officially constituted. The group, which, among others, includes smaller French, Bulgarian and Polish members, is centred on the leadership of the radical right Alternative for Germany (AfD). With 25 members (14 of which are AfD, following the party’s record performance at the European elections), the group is the smallest in the European parliament. Politically, it is virtually indistinguishable from PfE, and its existence is almost certainly only the product of AfD’s “toxicity” for other European identitarians.

The growth of various far-right parties has likely significantly destabilised the centre-right status quo centred on friendly relations between the centrist European People’s Party (EPP) and the right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and may therefore further shift the EPP towards working with the left-wing groups in the EU Parliament. The recent re-election of EU Parliament President Roberta Metsola as part of a deal between EPP and the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) likely further signals this trend, as, more importantly, does Ursula von der Leyen’s successful bid for a second term as European Commission President. On 18 July, von der Leyen was re-elected with the support of much of the EPP, S&D and Greens, with ECR showing only limited support.

This is highly likely a serious issue for Giorgia Meloni’s formation, which now finds itself at a real risk of becoming a minoritarian formation, “stuck” between a left-oriented EPP and two “unelectable” far-right groups.

Welsh First Minister Resigns Amid Donation Scandal

The First Minister of Wales, Vaughan Gething, resigned on 17 July following controversies over his acceptance of GBP 200,000 as a campaign donation from a businessman convicted over environmental offences, and for sacking a government minister. The development may develop into an early challenge for the new UK Labour government, whose Welsh chapter will now have to elect a successor.

Poland Passes Law Allowing Live Fire to Stop Migrants at Border

The parliament of Poland approved a law that allows border security and police forces to fire live ammunition to stop attempts by migrants to cross the border. The law specifically restricts the use of weapons to cases in which other deterrents fail. However, the law’s allowance for “pre-emptive” uses of firearms creates a likelihood of abuses of power. Russia and Belarus are currently favouring migrants’ attempts to reach the Polish border as a tool to destabilise Poland and the wider EU.

EU Parliamentarians Call to Suspend Hungary’s Voting Rights

On 16 July, a group of 63 EU parliamentarians called for Hungary to have its voting rights rescinded following Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s visits to Moscow and Beijing. Hungary holds the EU presidency for this month, and Orban has used the opportunity to launch an impromptu “peace tour” of Europe’s geopolitical adversaries. The move has no legal basis and will not result in a tangible change. Its proposal is instead almost certainly an attempt to further put pressure on Hungary and continue distancing the bloc from its rogue member.

Russia Restricts WhatsApp and YouTube

The Russian government has increasingly slowed down or restricted applications and websites including WhatsApp and YouTube, under the justification of preventing extremist groups’ activities. UK intelligence sources state that Moscow will likely ban YouTube altogether in September. Compared with China, which has built an alternative online space separate from the World Wide Web, Russia relies on many European- and American-based companies and sites. The bans on mainstream sites like YouTube and WhatsApp will likely prompt Russia to increasingly adopt Chinese alternatives, thus increasing reliance on Beijing, or develop its own platforms, although it is unlikely that Russia has the indigenous assets to do so.

Gambia Upholds Ban on Female Genital Mutilation

Lawmakers in the Gambia narrowly voted to uphold a ban on female genital mutilation (FGM), striking down proposed legislation that would have made the country the first to remove a ban on the practice, which affects an estimated 75 per cent of women between 15 and 50. While FGM is not religiously sanctioned, Islamic groups have pushed to remove the ban, which entails penalties for people carrying out or assisting in the practice. The vote is likely to continue helping civil society, state, and foreign humanitarian actors in the difficult fight against FGM in the Gambia.

Rwandan President Paul Kagame Re-Elected with Over 99% of Vote

As expected, Rwandan President Paul Kagame was re-elected with more than 99 per cent of the vote. Kagame has been Rwanda’s leader for more than two decades, and his victory at this year’s vote was guaranteed after prominent critics were barred from competing. Kagame’s government is almost certain to continue its militaristic foreign policy in Africa, marked by formal troop deployments and support for paramilitary groups like M23, while also reaching out to Western states.

Kenya Faces Unrest After Arrest of Alleged Serial Killer

In Kenya, the arrest of an alleged serial killer, responsible for reportedly more than 40 murders, has driven localised civil unrest and has contributed to re-ignited protests in areas that saw severe anti-government unrest in the past week. Cases of violence targeting police forces have been recorded in Nairobi. It is highly likely that the case will drive further protests and discontent towards authorities in the short term. Kenya’s President Ruto is set to address the nation on 19 July in a bid to curtail the anti-government protests. However, much of the nation is still demanding his resignation and his speech could help increase current tensions and translate to more unrest.

UK Labour Government Launches Defence Review

The new Labour government of the UK has launched a defence review as promised in its manifesto. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has p