Week 07: 07 – 14 February
Executive Summary
Americas (AMER)
Further unrest is likely in Panama after major union clashes with security forces in Panama City over a government bill.
Chilean authorities indicate that some of the current wildfires were likely intentionally ignited. A trend of wildfires being weaponised for political or criminal goals will likely grow across South America in 2025.
Europe, Middle East & Africa (EMEA)
A car-ramming attack in Munich, has almost certainly increased fears of political violence and terrorism ahead of the German election, with anti-migration rhetoric high and the far-right polling strongly.
Trump’s push for immediate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine will likely be exploited by the Kremlin to divide Ukraine’s allies. It is unlikely that an imposed peace on Kyiv could deter future Russian aggression.
Israeli and Hamas officials have likely agreed on a path for future hostage releases, but tensions in Gaza remain high. US President Trump’s “Gaza plan” comments are likely to further destabilise the already precarious truce.
The suspension of NGO operations in the Sahel are highly likely part of a wider attempt to curtail foreign oversight and will almost certainly exacerbate an already dire humanitarian situation.
SAF advances in Khartoum will likely set the conditions for offensives in western Sudan. However, further advances will highly likely result in high civilian casualties and compound the humanitarian crisis.
The offensive by Puntland forces in the Cal Miskaad mountain range, if successful, is highly likely to be a major blow to the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). The intensity of the clashes will likely intensify in the short term.
Asia-Pacific (APAC)
The ISKP bombing at a bank in Kunduz, northern Afghanistan, highly likely demonstrates the group’s ability to strike at will on Afghan territory and likely underscores growing security issues at the Afghan-Tajik border.
North, Central and South America
Panama: Violent confrontations between protesters and security forces
On 12 February, protests broke out among members of the Single National Union of Construction and Similar Workers (SUNTRACS) in Panama City. The demonstrations began as the National Assembly deliberated Law 163 which would reform the Social Security Fund (CSS), raising the retirement age and reducing pension amounts.
The protests also served to honour the memory of Al Iromi Smith Renteria, who was killed by the police on 12 February 2008, denounce Donald Trump’s statements regarding the Panama Canal, and protest the pro-US attitude of President Jose Raul Mulino’s government.
Protests escalated into clashes with Crowd Control units after they attempted to reopen the roads. The protesters threw projectiles at officers, injuring 16. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters and arrested at least 480 demonstrators, injuring at least 100.
Closures occurred across Panama City, including on Balboa Avenue, Via Tocumen, Howard, Via Espana, Transistmica, Ricado J. Alfaro, Centenario, Cincuentenario, and Brisas del Golf.
Solace Global Assessment:
In the wake of the protests, President Mulino declared that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic will audit SUNTRACS’s funds from different government entities.
Mulino called for a stop to collaboration with SUNTRACS, calling it a ‘terrorist union organisation.’ He also claimed that the government would ‘not allow pseudo-union anarchy in this country.’ Reforming the CSS has constituted a long-term ambition for Mulino to ensure its financial sustainability and he will likely not back down in the face of union unrest.
SUNTRACS is one of the largest trade unions in Panama, with approximately 40,000 members. The union is known for its militant class war unionism and leads Coordinadora de Unidad Sindical (CONUSI), the most radical major union federation in the country.
The union has coordinated several major protests in recent years, including a general strike in March 2024. Recently, SUNTRACS protested against the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s arrival in Panama in the wake of President Trump’s comments regarding the Panama Canal.
Other organisations including Coordinadora de Unidad Sindical (CONUSI) and the National Front for the Defense of Economic and Social Rights (FRENADESO) have denounced the government reforms.
SUNTRACs have demanded the release of the detained workers, claiming that ‘we will defend our comrades to the last consequences.’ Given SUNTRACS’s militancy, recent history of significant unrest, and likely unfulfilled demands, further demonstrations and clashes with security forces are likely.
Chile: States of emergency declared in most impacted regions due to the threat of wildfires
On 8 February, the President of Chile Gabriel Boric declared a state of emergency in the regions of Ñuble and Maule and imposed a 22:00-06:00 curfew in 12 communes of Araucanía due to the threat of wildfires. Large-scale efforts to combat the wildfires are ongoing, with 22 wildfires still active and 55 under control. Wildfires have impacted several regions, including Araucanía, O’Higgins, Bio Bio, Ñuble, and Maule. The fires have led to at least one death (in Maule), three injuries, and 28 destroyed homes.
Solace Global Assessment:
In February 2024, Chile’s wildfire season caused widespread devastation with an estimated 137 deaths, 1,100 injuries, 14,000 destroyed structures, and USD 4.39 billion in damages. The 2024-2025 Chilean wildfire season has not been nearly as severe due to comprehensive efforts made by authorities to control the fires. Authorities have suggested that a large part of the fires affecting La Araucanía are intentional, with President Boric stating they have well-founded reasons to believe so, with 14 people already arrested. The intentional starting of fires could be related to territorial grievances within indigenous Mapuche areas.
Intentionally ignited fires, exacerbated by dry conditions and high temperatures, is highly likely an increasing threat across South America. Widespread fires which caused large-scale destruction and disruption in Brazil in 2024 were, in many cases, highly likely intentionally started by criminal networks to clear land for illegal logging and agricultural purposes. In some instances, particularly Brazilian wildfires were suspected to have been intentionally started in defiance of local government crackdowns. This weaponisation of large-scale fires for political and criminal purposes is a trend that is likely to grow in 2025.
AMER Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Nicaragua continues to crack down on Catholics
On 9 February, the Nicaraguan foreign ministry released comments describing the Vatican as “depraved” and “paedophilic”, following a televised interview with Bishop Rolando Alvez, currently living in exile after being imprisoned for more than a year.
The regime of Daniel Ortega has targeted Catholic priests with arrests and deportations in the country since the local church supported large-scale student protests in 2018. Other Christian groups, including Evangelicals, have also been persecuted. The comments will likely be followed by further measures targeting local Catholic churches and communities.
The Vatican likely has few avenues to respond to the Nicaraguan regime’s policies and to incite change. Pressuring Washington to act may be one. However, while US Foreign Secretary Marco Rubio has recently criticised Nicaragua as an “enemy of humanity” alongside Venezuela and Cuba and has also threatened to block its participation in the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, Washington’s concern is mostly directed at the issue of migration.
Moreover, relations between the Trump administration and the Vatican are cold, after Pope Francis criticised Trump’s deportation plan and Washington appointed Brian Burch, an outspoken critic of Francis and Catholic charities aiding Latin American migrants, as its ambassador to the Holy See.
Ecuador presidential election heads to runoff
Ecuador held the first round of its presidential elections on 9 February, with incumbent President Daniel Noboa seeking re-election. However, the election resulted in a near tie with neither candidate securing an outright majority.
A second run will take place on 13 February, with Noboa hoping that his adoption of militarised security policies will help him secure the presidency. During the first round, Noboa ordered an increased security presence at all Ecuadorian ports of entry and temporarily closed the country’s land borders to prevent attempts to destabilise the election from armed groups.
There is a realistic possibility that similar measures will be introduced in the second round.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Stabbing at anti-Trump protest in Los Angeles leaves one wounded
A mass brawl reportedly broke out at a rally to protest President Trump’s mass deportation plan in downtown Los Angeles. The protest, on 7 February, followed six consecutive days of unrest.
According to witnesses, the attacker was not part of the demonstration but was instead “yelling incendiary things” at the protesters. Law enforcement has not yet confirmed the motive behind the attack, but given the political nature of the protest and the assailant’s reported behaviour, there is a realistic possibility that the stabbing was politically motivated.
Further attacks at similar rallies remain possible as tensions over the deportation plan continue to rise.
Colombian Defence Minister resigns in response to escalating violence
Colombia’s Defence Minister, Iván Velásquez, has resigned amid escalating violence, marking another high-profile departure from President Gustavo Petro’s cabinet as his government struggles to contain the spread of guerilla and narco-related violence.
Community leaders in the eastern Catatumbo region, where the National Liberation Army (ELN) first initiated its offensive, have been murdered and over 50,000 remain displaced.
Fighting has recently intensified in the western region of Chocó, where the ELN and Clan del Golfo are fighting over drug routes on the Pacific Coast and into Panama. The expansion of fighting is likely to continue and will likely overstretch the underfunded Colombian military which has suffered major budget cuts under the Petro administration, resulting in the grounding of critical aerial platforms like helicopter gunships, which have been vital in combating armed groups in the harsh terrain of the Colombian jungle.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Winter storms hit US Midwest, Great Lakes, Northeast and southeast Canada
Large parts of the US and Canada have been hit by a series of disruptive winter storms that have led to the issuing of winter weather alerts and hazardous conditions.
Winter Storm Harlow first brought significant ice accumulation to parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, causing downed trees and power lines. Harlow was followed by Winter Storm Iliana, which is currently bringing snowfall to the Great Lakes, the Northeast and parts of Canada, with hail affecting the Appalachians.
The heaviest recorded snowfall was 28 cm (11 inches) in Lowden, Iowa, while parts of Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa have seen 8-15 cm (3-6 inches). Milwaukee has recorded over 18 cm (7 inches). Southern Ontario and Quebec are also experiencing snowfall and icy conditions.
Winter Storm Jett will follow Iliana, bringing more snow to the Plains, Midwest, Northeast, and Canada, as well as heavy rain and potentially severe thunderstorms in the South. Multiple winter weather alerts have been issued warning of hazardous travel conditions.
Magnitude 7.6 earthquake in the Caribbean Sea briefly triggers tsunami warnings
On 8 February, the most powerful earthquake recorded globally since 2023 occurred approximately 202 kilometres southwest of the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean Sea, with a magnitude of 7.6 at a depth of 10km.
The earthquake briefly triggered numerous tsunami alerts or advisories for the Cayman Islands, Cuba, Honduras, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands, all of which were later rescinded. Despite the earthquake’s magnitude, the impact was ultimately minimal with little to no tsunami threat and only light shaking felt in the Cayman Islands.
Regional experts warn that the threat of a significant tsunami impacting the Cayman Islands is low but not zero. In some highly unlikely but possible modelled scenarios, it is deemed possible that Grand Cayman could suffer a tsunami wave impact up to approximately three metres following a high-magnitude earthquake emanating from nearby fault lines. While not comparable to the 30-metre tsunami that devastated parts of Japan in 2011, such a tsunami could still cause significant damage due to Grand Cayman’s low elevation.
Most of the Cayman Islands’ risk modelling and earthquake impact forecasting is funded by USAID. While modelling work in the Cayman Islands continues as of the time of writing, it is likely that the Trump administration’s efforts to defund USAID and make substantial cuts to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), if successful, will have a considerable impact on not only the efforts of earthquake modelling in the Cayman Islands but worldwide.
Europe, Middle East & Africa
Germany: Multiple injuries after car-ramming attack in Munich days before federal elections
On 13 February 2025, a car ramming incident in Munich, Germany left at least 28 people injured, including children. The suspect, a 24-year-old Afghan asylum seeker, drove a white Mini Cooper into a crowd of demonstrators near the city’s central railway station during a trade union protest. German counter-terrorism police have assumed responsibility for the investigation and the authorities suspect the incident was a targeted attack. The suspect was apprehended at the scene, with police firing a shot at the vehicle during the arrest. The investigation into the motives is ongoing.
Solace Global Assessment:
There are indications of an extremist connection with some sources suggesting that the suspect posted jihadist material on social media before the attack. The attack also occurred ahead of the Munich security conference, hours before the US vice president and the Ukrainian president were set to arrive in the city, which has likely raised the profile of the attack. The suspect had his asylum application rejected, but his deportation was suspended, which was likely a significant factor contributing to radicalisation and a motivation for the attack.
The attack has almost certainly contributed to heightened fears of political violence and terrorism in Germany, with the federal elections approaching on 23 February. Tensions over immigration and asylum policies are high, with many Germans fearing the growth of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. This has recently intensified after the centre-right Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) collaboration with the AfD.
On 31 January CDU leader, Friedrich Merz, sought support from the AfD to pass a bill known as the Influx Limitation Act, aimed at tightening asylum rules in Germany by implementing such measures as permanent border controls and turning back asylum seekers. This has been perceived as a breach of the “firewall” or “cordon sanitaire” strategy aimed at alienating the far-right, with widespread fears such a shift in strategy has legitimised the far-right.
This has sparked major protests across Germany with over 160,000 people demonstrating in Berlin on 2 February and more than 200,000 in Munich on 8 February. However, the growing popularity of the far-right has forced mainstream parties to promise to introduce stricter immigration and asylum policies, with increased deportations often being promised.
As the election approaches, the risk of political violence and terrorism will likely increase across Germany. Anti-far-right protests, counter-protests from far-right groups, and clashes with police are likely to continue, mirroring the violent confrontations seen during previous election cycles. The threat of terrorism, both far-right and extremist Islamist in nature, is likely to increase anti-migrant sentiment, calls for deportations and cancelled asylum statuses, with the Munich attack almost certainly exacerbating pre-existing tensions which will invariably be exploited by the far-right.
Ukraine: Trump pushes for immediate peace negotiations
On 12 February, US President Donald Trump announced that talks to end the war in Ukraine would begin “immediately”, after a “lengthy” phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The announcement followed US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth telling European allies at a defence summit in Brussels that a return to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders was “unrealistic” and ruling out NATO membership for Ukraine.
Beijing has also reportedly proposed to hold a summit between Putin and Trump to end the war in Ukraine. Trump has stated that he expects to meet Putin in Saudi Arabia, although no date has yet been set.
European leaders and NATO officials have so far reacted with concern, broadly commenting that Europe must be a full participant in any talks, rejecting an imposed peace on Ukraine, and stressing that any peace agreement must be long-lasting with provisions to ensure that the conflict could not easily recommence.
Solace Global Assessment:
Moscow’s strategic objectives in Ukraine are the ceding of Ukrainian territory (including the Donbas, Crimea and the land bridge which connects Crimea to mainland Russia) and permanent Ukrainian neutrality. At the start of the full-scale 2022 invasion, Russian war goals highly likely also included even more maximalist demands including the “denazification” (likely meaning the overthrow of the Kyiv government and the imposition of a rump puppet state in the east) and demilitarisation of Ukraine.
Kyiv’s strategic objectives include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all internationally recognised Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, as well as NATO membership or equivalent security guarantees to deter further Russian aggression.
The Trump administration’s objectives, while less clear, highly likely involve the ending of the Ukraine war as soon as possible (even with significant Ukrainian concessions and only weak security guarantees that are likely inadequate to deter further Russian aggression), the cessation or a significant reduction of US-expenditure on Ukraine, and access to USD 500 billion worth of Ukraine’s rare earth mineral deposits. The latter desire is almost certainly reflective of Trump’s broader agenda of transactional diplomacy.
While Trump stated that Ukraine has “essentially agreed” to hand over the mineral rights, Zelensky has reportedly not yet signed an agreement presented by the US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in Kyiv on 12 February.
It is likely that the Kremlin will actively seek to portray Russia as pursuing peace, while simultaneously escalating military operations in Ukraine to press for its more maximalist demands. Peace talks could serve as a strategic tool for Moscow to sow further division within Ukraine and amongst Ukraine’s allies to reduce military aid to Kyiv.
Nonetheless, with US military aid being a fundamental centre of gravity for Ukraine’s defensive efforts, Trump could force Kyiv to accept terms far short of its strategic objectives. The ceding of the territory south of the Dnipro River between the Donbas and Crimea, in addition to only limited security guarantees, would likely be the most difficult potential peace treaty conditions for Kyiv to accept.
With only limited security guarantees, there would be a substantial threat of Russia recommencing the war to achieve the Kremlin’s even more maximalist objectives after consolidating its position and reconstituting its forces.
Israel and Palestine: Hostage release delays, Trump comments, threaten ceasefire in Gaza
Fears regarding the stability of the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas have increased following delays in the planned release of Israeli hostages by the Palestinian militants. Israeli officials threatened the restart of hostilities on 10 February, and again on 14 February, putting in place a deadline for the release of further hostages by 15 February. The Hamas delegation in Cairo has stated its willingness to abide by the deadline and has scheduled three hostages to be released on 15 Saturday, but tensions in the Gaza Strip remain high, with occasional Israeli airstrikes reported.
On 12 February, at least one person was killed in an airstrike in Rafah that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated was targeting a weapons-smuggling effort. Hamas had justified the postponement of hostage release due to claimed Israeli violations of the ceasefire.
In Washington, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly reiterated his plan for the Gaza Strip, centred on the resettlements of residents to Jordan and Egypt and a US-led effort to rebuild and “control” the area. The White House’s plan has been widely rejected by regional and global powers. Jordanian King Abdullah rebuked the plan during a summit with Trump in Washington on 11 February, while Egypt’s President al-Sisi postponed a planned visit to the US in protest.
Solace Global Assessment:
The recent developments likely pose a considerable threat to the viability of the ceasefire. Hamas is highly likely currently facing a dilemma: its leaders likely consider it realistic that Israel will resume hostilities if they relinquish their main source of leverage, the remaining hostages. If they choose to do so, however, they likely assess that Israel is highly likely to use it as a casus belli (cause for war) to again intervene in Gaza.
In this situation, Hamas must almost certainly rely on credible guarantors of the pact to deter further Israeli intervention. Washington is the only power that can achieve this. However, Trump’s recent comments have almost certainly reduced its reliability for this role and therefore make it likelier that Hamas will choose to renege on the agreement.
In addition to threatening the stability of Gaza, recent developments have also threatened the stability of Jordan and Egypt themselves. While ostensibly allied to Washington, both Amman and Cairo have largely pro-Palestinian populations that oppose any plans for the resettlement of Palestinians. Both states are moreover targets for destabilisation operations by regional competitors and transnational extremist groups.
In the (so far, unlikely) case that Trump’s plan was to be implemented, Egypt would find itself bordering a US-controlled territory. This would almost certainly result in a significant increase in anti-US sentiment and likely boost Islamist factions and groups in Egypt. In the Sinai Peninsula, there is a realistic possibility that greater US involvement in neighbouring Gaza would embolden groups like the local branch of the Islamic State (IS-Sinai) to resume their low-intensity insurgency, which al-Sisi declared had ended in 2023.
Niger and Burkina Faso: Niger junta halts Red Cross operations, Burkina Faso junta suspends all NGOs
On 9 February, the junta government in Niger announced the closure of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s operations in the country. The junta has justified the action in response to reports that the ICRC was allegedly not adhering to regulations stipulated by the government. The move follows statements made by the Nigerien authorities in November, which expressed concerns about the European Union’s unilateral distribution of humanitarian aid to NGOs, which included the ICRC. According to the junta, the distribution of aid was ‘in disregard of the principles of transparency and good collaboration.’
On 10 February, Burkina Faso’s junta followed suit, imposing a blanket ban on all NGO activity operating without government permission. The directive follows concerns over security risks regarding unregulated NGO activity.
Solace Global Assessment:
The decision to ban the Red Cross in Niger and NGOs in Burkina Faso comes at a time when the countries are struggling with dire humanitarian situations caused by conflict with jihadist and separatist groups, as well as increasing international isolation. In Niger, the ICRC has provided medical care, food and other forms of support for decades and is assessed to have directly supported almost 150,000 people between January to June 2024.
In Burkina Faso, NGOs have also played a significant role in addressing humanitarian issues. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) helped over 130,000 individuals in 2023 with education, food security, shelter, protection, and water programs; Caritas Burkina Faso assisted 1.5 million individuals in 2018 with agriculture, emergency assistance, microfinance, food security, and access to social services programs.
These decisions to cease ICRC and NGO operations are likely a move to curb foreign influence and independent voices in both countries. The move comes amid reports that NGOs have been utilised by France to exert influence in the Sahel region. While this is disputed, the perceived historic involvement of Western countries in the Sahel makes it likely to be believed and may increase anti-Western sentiment in the region.
The move is almost certainly part of a wider trend, with the Sahel junta governments limiting the influence of foreign mining companies, militaries, and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This trend has likely grown for several reasons. The juntas likely perceive the operations of foreign organisations, as contributing to the legitimacy of criticisms from hostile groups, including violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and rival factions. More importantly, foreign entities provide oversight of government actions, often documenting and reporting on human rights violations, mismanagement, and the impact of conflict on civilians.
By expelling these groups, the juntas likely hope to diminish external scrutiny of their actions and incompetence. However, the expulsion of NGOs will almost certainly exacerbate humanitarian crises, increase internal scrutiny, and ultimately play into the hands of the VEOs. Extremist groups are likely to exploit the worsening conditions to expand their influence, recruit disaffected individuals, and position themselves as alternative providers of aid and security.
Sudan: Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) close to retaking Khartoum
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has achieved rapid advances in the capital Khartoum, capturing key strongholds previously held by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The SAF is reportedly on the verge of controlling all of northern Khartoum, however, the RSF still maintains control of vital ground such as the Soba Bridge on the River Nile.
The UAE, an alleged backer of the RSF, has called for a Ramadan ceasefire to be observed from 28 February to 30 March. However, Sudan’s Sovereign Council President has rejected talks with the RSF unless they lay down their arms, while army officials have dismissed ceasefire proposals unless the RSF retreats. Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aligned with the SAF, has proposed a roadmap to end the civil war, including the formation of a civilian-led government and free elections. The proposal has been submitted to the African Union (AU), the United Nations, and the Arab League for support.
Solace Global Assessment:
The recapturing of Khartoum would serve as a major military and political victory for the SAF. However, the SAF’s advance has been enabled by a heavy use of airstrikes and artillery resulting in high rates of collateral damage. With the SAF advancing, the RSF are likely to withdraw from the east bank of the River Nile and consolidate their forces in the west of the city, with the UAE proposal for a ceasefire providing more time to regroup.
The RSF’s regrouping coupled with their control of vital ground will likely slow the rate of the SAF’s advance and lead to higher rates of civilian casualties and displacement, with the SAF likely to conserve manpower through leveraging long-range fires.
Advances in Khartoum suggest that the SAF has seized the initiative which has likely been enabled by Russian support. On 13 February, Sudan and Russia finalised a long-standing agreement for a Russian naval base at Port Sudan. The base is almost certainly a strategic priority for Russia. Access to Port Sudan will enable Moscow to facilitate operations in Africa and achieve a permanent naval presence on the Red Sea, a critical sea line of communication with two strategic choke points that could be blocked in a time of war.
The capture of Khartoum and increased Russian support will almost certainly set the conditions for an SAF offensive aimed at defeating the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. During such an offensive, the RSF is likely to commit to a fighting withdrawal. This will likely involve indiscriminate attacks on civilians, especially as the SAF has ruled out negotiations, a precedent already set by the RSF.
SAF reprisal attacks on the civilian population are also likely. Reports indicate that activists, human rights defenders, and humanitarian workers are being accused of collaborating with the RSF. Lists have reportedly been circulated, identifying politicians, activists, medical professionals, public prosecutors, and members of protest groups as “partners of the RSF.”
The current civil war in Sudan has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with over 30 million people in need of aid. The establishment of a government in the capital would likely be beneficial for facilitating humanitarian aid into Sudan and its distribution across the country. However, future SAF offensives in western Sudan are likely to exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the short term by disrupting the delivery of aid, damaging vital infrastructure and increasing displacement.
Furthermore, the Trump administration’s 90-day freeze on foreign aid, which may be extended, has already severely impacted Sudan’s humanitarian efforts, leading to the Closure of 742 community kitchens serving over 816,000 people, with USAID providing 75 per cent of the funding. Civilian-led Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), which operate on a volunteer basis, have had to halt operations, leaving millions without access to essential food and medical supplies.
Somalia: Puntland forces continue costly offensive against Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) stronghold
Large-scale clashes which resulted in approximately 100 deaths were recorded on 11 February as Puntland forces advanced deeper into the Cal Miskaad mountain range, where ISS’s main strongholds are located. ISS forces reportedly attacked Puntland forces’ positions using at least 15 person-borne IEDs (PBIEDs) and one vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) on 11 February alone. At least 30 suicide bombings have been reported since the beginning of 2025.
The UAE and US have offered limited support to Puntland units, conducting airstrikes around Dhasaq on 10 February. Puntland sources continue to note the large presence of foreign fighters in ISS units, especially among the perpetrators of suicide bombings. Accounts of ISS’s total manpower vary considerably, from minimum estimates of 400 to maximums of over 1,000 fighters.
Solace Global Assessment:
The intensification of ISS’s suicide bombings makes the latest campaign reminiscent of larger-scale battles in Mosul and Marawi. In both cases, Islamic State (IS) forces opted to resort to more PBIEDs and VBIEDs to defend vital areas. The recent trends in Cal Miskaad likely reflect the mountain range’s importance for ISS. The large presence of foreigners among ISS units almost certainly showcases the Somali branch’s adoption of tactics used by larger IS branches as well as its close ties to the “core” of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
The recent advances by Puntland forces have been successful, with considerable casualties recorded on ISS’s side. Nevertheless, the attrition faced by the attacking force is likely to increase in the short term as Puntland forces continue to advance towards more fortified positions. There is a realistic possibility of a stalemate, with ISS retaining some control in the area and looking for opportunities to reform.
If ISS were to lose Cal Miskaad, the group would highly likely suffer a significant setback, which may have impacts on IS’s global network of branches. ISS, while smaller than other “provinces”, is a key hub for IS’ international flows of funds and fighters, particularly in Africa and the Arab Peninsula.
EMEA Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) walks away from coalition talks, deepening crisis
The FPÖ, led by Herbert Kickl, was tasked with forming a government after the centre-right People’s Party (ÖVP) failed to do so. Both major right-wing parties, therefore, have now been unsuccessful in their attempts to form a workable coalition.
President Alexander Van der Bellen now has the option of either calling for new elections or tasking the ÖVP with trying to form a government with the left. In both scenarios, the FPÖ is likely to benefit. Since the 2024 general election, where it finished first with 29 per cent of the votes, the FPÖ has increased its polling to around 35 per cent, meaning that another vote would likely see it increase its numbers in parliament.
On the other hand, the ÖVP has lost considerable public support and is now polling behind the Social Democrats (SPÖ), so, even if it were to form a cordon sanitaire with the left to keep the Freedom Party out of government, it would do so from an extremely weak position and would be exposed to FPÖ’s attacks.
Romania’s president resigns due to significant pressure from opposition
Klaus Iohannis announced his resignation on 11 February amid an impending parliamentary impeachment vote. Senate President Ilie Bolojan has replaced Iohannis and will act as the interim head of state.
Romania is currently undergoing a period of extreme political uncertainty after the second round of the presidential elections in December 2024 was cancelled by the constitutional court over alleged Russian involvement. The first round had unexpectedly been won by Calin Georgescu, a pro-Russia, anti-EU outsider with little political experience.
The unprecedented decision has almost certainly boosted Romania’s anti-establishment parties, particularly the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), which threw its weight behind Georgescu prior to the vote, and SOS Romania, whose leader Diana Sosoaca was barred from running at the elections.
AUR and other populist formations are highly likely to continue pushing for early presidential elections, possibly sooner than the government’s proposed dates in May.
First major blackout in Nigeria in 2025
On 12 February, Nigeria suffered its first major power outage of 2025, after recording 12 consecutive grid collapses in 2024. The Ikeja Electricity Distribution Company reported that the system outage affected all its customers, especially in Lagos, Abuja and Osun due to a line tripping on this axis, which disrupted many businesses and essential services.
The government has implemented several measures to improve the grid, including the privatisation of the power sector and increasing investment in infrastructure. However, inadequate maintenance, corruption, antiquated infrastructure, vandalism and extremist attacks on the grid have hampered major improvements.
Nigerians have expressed their discontent on social media, with historic blackouts fuelling civil unrest and resulting in higher rates of crimes, especially in urban areas when blackouts disrupt lighting and security systems.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Russia claims Ukraine is preparing for false flag attack against vessel in the Baltic Sea
Russia has claimed that Ukraine, with Western support, is preparing a provocation in the Baltic Sea by using Russian-made sea mines to destroy a foreign vessel. The aim, according to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), is to blame Moscow for the explosion, creating a pretext for NATO to intervene and potentially block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which would almost certainly heighten tensions.
This accusation likely serves several strategic purposes.- to sow distrust between NATO and Ukraine, to justify Russia’s own military actions in the Baltic, and to frame Ukraine as an unpredictable actor willing to escalate the conflict. Russia is also likely seeking to undermine peace efforts by portraying Ukraine’s leadership as desperate and willing to provoke further violence rather than seek a resolution.
Russia thwarts Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attack in Pskov
On 13 February, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) stated its agents had discovered and neutralised an ISKP cell planning a large-scale attack on the local train station. Pskov is a medium-sized city located near the Russian border with Estonia and far from ISKP’s Caucasus recruitment hotspots like Dagestan or Chechnya.
The discovery of an ISKP cell in Pskov is likely reflective of the group’s increasing focus on Russia as a desirable target. ISKP leaders almost certainly assess that the war in Ukraine has made Russia vulnerable to attack. Further ISKP operations in Russia remain highly likely and these will likely include both lone-wolf attacks, but also group-level, more sophisticated actions.
Stabbing in Dublin, Ireland, injures three
Multiple stabbing attacks occurred at several locations in north Dublin on 8 February. Authorities arrested one man, a Brazilian citizen, for allegedly carrying out the attack. As of the time of writing, no motive for the attack has been revealed. Due to the suspect’s migrant background, there is a realistic possibility that retaliatory violence and protests will occur in the short term in Dublin and other Irish cities. Mass riots have occurred in the capital following similar incidents involving migrants, or Irish citizens descended from migrants, most notably in November 2023 following a stabbing incident.
Grenade attack in Grenoble, France, injures 12
The incident occurred on the evening of 12 February at a bar near the Olympic Village quarter. Authorities have excluded a terrorism-related motive for the attack and have instead tentatively linked it to a “settling of scores”. Grenoble is near Marseilles, close to the Italian border, and is a hub for organised crime linked to drug trafficking, especially cocaine, in France. Violence associated with drug trafficking has increased significantly since the summer of 2024, following police operations and inter-group fighting that have created opportunities for violent competition between local groups.
Fitness influencer arrested in Spain for spreading Islamic State (IS) propaganda
The individual reportedly used his social media presence to spread IS content, often mixed with otherwise harmless workout and fitness material, to more than 100,000 followers across different social media platforms. The case likely illustrates a trend already seen in other cases of radicalisation and extremism of extremists’ efforts to “hijack” online communities and to weaponise them as tools to encourage violence and terrorist activity.
Major anti-Mafia operation in Palermo, Sicily
Italian authorities arrested 183 people during a large-scale raid on 10-11 February, which reportedly involved over 1,200 Carabinieri (Italy’s gendarmerie). Most of the arrested are accused of collaborating with Cosa Nostra, the Italian mafia in Sicily.
According to Italian media, the raid led to the discovery of Cosa Nostra operatives’ use of increasingly sophisticated logistics and communications, including encrypted messaging channels and sophisticated equipment. Those arrested include both older leaders and a large number of younger members of local mafia groups, almost certainly showcasing how organised crime in Sicily continues to recruit from younger and more disadvantaged demographics.
Compared to other “mafias” in Italy, such as the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta and the Campania-based Camorra, Cosa Nostra has been on the back foot for years due to multiple large-scale anti-crime operations and has shifted to “less visible” sectors like online gambling. The latest raid is likely to further weaken the organisation.
Small Yemeni-flagged fishing boats seized off the coast of Eyl, Somalia
On 9 February, a suspected pirate attack occurred against a Yemeni-flagged dhow off the coast of Eyl in northern Puntland. While the incident is still under investigation, a separate report indicates that suspects may have hijacked three small boats.
Hijacking small boats including skiffs and dhows is a tactic utilised by well-armed pirate groups to travel deeper into the Indian Ocean and target larger vessels. Most piracy in Somalia stems from Puntland, where economic opportunities are scarce, and Somali security forces are combatting the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab.
The large-scale clashes between Puntland forces and ISS in recent weeks have highly likely provided a vacuum for armed piracy groups to resume operations. The increase in counter-insurgency operations will highly likely enable local fishermen to carry out further attacks and hijackings on vessels.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Ebola cases continue to rise in Uganda
As of 14 February, the number of confirmed Ebola cases has risen to nine, with one confirmed death, since Uganda declared an outbreak of the disease in late January. Seven cases are being treated in Kampala and one in Mbale.
265 people who have been identified as having contact with the confirmed cases have been quarantined. Given that Ebola symptoms can take up to 21 days to appear, more confirmed cases will likely be announced in the coming weeks.
This latest outbreak is driven by the Sudan strain of Ebola, which has no approved vaccine. While there are currently approximately 2,400 vaccines in Uganda, they are for the Zaire strain behind outbreaks in the DRC. Furthermore, communication deficiencies from authorities and resistance from businesses have made tackling the outbreak more challenging.
Asia–Pacific
Afghanistan: Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) carries out suicide bombing in Kunduz
On 11 February, an ISKP militant detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) in front of a bank in Kunduz, where a large crowd of civilians and the Taliban were gathered waiting for their salary distribution. The blast killed the attacker, with reports varying on the number of other fatalities, ranging from five to over 25. In March 2024, ISKP carried out a suicide bombing with the same methodology in Kandahar.
On 12 February, reports emerged that ISKP attempted another suicide bombing, this time in Kabul, but that the attack was thwarted by local security.
Solace Global Assessment:
The attack is the second notable ISKP operation in the north of Afghanistan in recent weeks, the other being the (disputed) assassination of a Chinese citizen in Takhar, a region that borders Kunduz Province to the east. ISKP’s primary area of operations has traditionally been within Kabul and the eastern provinces like Kunar and Nangarhar. The attack therefore highly likely demonstrates ISKP’s improving reach, and how the group increasingly sees the north as a key area where to expand its presence.
Tajikistan, while not having had any recent large-scale terror attacks, has a growing domestic extremism problem. Factors including a lagging economy, combined with an extremely authoritarian government that has sought to neutralise and control religious institutions, have almost certainly created an environment that is extremely receptive to pro-IS radical propaganda. The border area with Tajikistan, which is poorly policed, remains a key entry point for foreign fighters seeking to join ISKP in Afghanistan.
With the Taliban preoccupied with cross-border tensions, as well as domestic rebel groups, ISKP is likely exploiting a weaker Taliban in peripheral regions.
In political terms, the choice of target likely also matters. ISKP propaganda accuses the Taliban government of being propped up by Western funds, which makes banks symbols of both Taliban rule and Western intervention.
The attack in Kabul is likely to undermine the Taliban’s ongoing assertion that they have defeated ISKP. There is a realistic possibility of further ISKP operations in the north in the medium term. More broadly, ISKP is highly likely to continue taking advantage of an overstretched Taliban, carrying out opportunistic attacks on civilians and Taliban forces to undermine Kabul’s tenuous hold on power.
APAC Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
UN suggests former Bangladeshi government complicit in crimes against humanity
A report by UN human rights investigators has accused the former Awami League government under ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of being complicit in crimes against humanity. The report indicates that the government’s brutal response to the student-led protests in 2024, which killed an assessed 1400 people, involved “an official policy to attack and violently repress anti-government protesters”.
The report also suggests that senior members of the government, including Hasina, were aware of and involved in serious offences. The report is likely to validate many of the narratives pushed by opposition groups, who have long accused the former government of authoritarianism, repression, and human rights abuses.
There is a realistic possibility that this will result in unrest and political violence targeting Awami League supporters, government-affiliated institutions, and religious minorities such as Hindus, who have historically been associated with the party.
South Korean president to face insurrection charges
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol will face his first preliminary hearing on 20 February on insurrection charges, while impeachment proceedings against him continue. His impeachment followed a failed attempt to declare martial law in December 2024, with the legislature removing him for constitutional violations. In January, he was arrested on separate criminal charges of insurrection.
The Constitutional Court is overseeing the impeachment process, while the Seoul Central District Court is handling the criminal trial. Impeachment proceedings are progressing rapidly, with some legal experts anticipating a verdict by mid-March.
However, Yoon’s legal team may seek to pause the impeachment by invoking a constitutional act due to the parallel criminal trial. The trial against Yoon will likely provoke several protests, with thousands of demonstrators continuing to rally across South Korea, both in support of and against the president.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
First US Navy ship transits Taiwan Strait under Trump administration
On 10 February, the USS Ralph Johnson, a guided-missile destroyer, and the USNS Bowditch, a survey ship, conducted a north-to-south transit through the Taiwan Strait. The transit marks the first US Navy passing of the Taiwan Strait since President Trump assumed office in January and likely served as a strategic message to Beijing, stressing the US’ right to exercise the freedom of navigation and its sustained support for Taipei.
China’s Eastern Theatre Command stated that it had monitored the passage and criticised the US action for sending “the wrong signals” and increasing “security risks in the region.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Almost 200 cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) detected in western India
As of 12 February, at least 197 cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) have been detected in the Indian state of Maharashtra, with the outbreak concentrated within the Pune region. The death toll is currently assessed at eight, with the first death in Mumbai recorded on 12 February.
GBS is a rare neurological disorder which affects the nervous system, leading to muscle weakness, numbness, and, in severe cases, paralysis. The disease can affect all people but typically follows a viral or bacterial infection. The death rate is generally low (3-7 per cent), however, in severe cases, complications such as respiratory failure, infections, or blood clots can be fatal. Authorities in the region have advised the public to drink boiled water and avoid the consumption of stale or undercooked food.
Island-wide power outage in Sri Lanka
On 9 February 2025, Sri Lanka experienced a nationwide power outage after a monkey came into contact with power lines at a substation in Panadura. The blackout caused widespread disruptions, including railway gate and warning system malfunctions, and the government issued an advisory urging water conservation.
Power was restored to most of the country within hours, however, the authorities had to introduce load-shedding on 10 and 11 February. However, the incident has almost certainly triggered major concerns over the vulnerability of Sri Lanka’s power grid to external disruptions and highlights a major lack of investment in the nation’s infrastructure.
Copyright © 2025 Solace Global Risk Limited. All rights reserved. No part of this document or content may be reproduced, copied, translated, sold, or distributed, in whole or in part without the consent of Solace Global Risk Limited.

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Car-Ramming in Central Munich: What We Know So Far
Intelligence cut off: 14:00 GMT 13 February 2025
At approximately 10:30 (local time), a car ramming occurred in the centre of the Bavarian city of Munich, at the intersection of Dachauer Strasse and Seidlstrasse.
According to witnesses, an individual drove a vehicle into a crowd of members of the Verdi labour union, who had gathered for a rally in the Königsplatz area. Other witnesses reportedly stated they heard some gunshots, but these testimonies could not be corroborated by authorities at the time of writing.
At least 28 people were injured in the attack, with “several” in critical condition. No deaths have been reported as of the time of writing.
The police arrested the perpetrator on the scene. According to local German media, the suspect is a 24-year-old Afghan national, who was known to local police for previous non-terror-related offences. Available information suggests that the perpetrator of the attack acted alone.
While the police blocked traffic in the area immediately adjacent to the site of the ramming, no reports of widespread traffic closures or disruptions were identified as of the time of writing. The Munich Security Conference, which will be attended by numerous world leaders and high-profile figures, is scheduled to be held in the centre of the city between 14 and 16 February

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Car-Ramming in Munich: Possible Terror Links and Election Impact
It is highly likely that the incident was terror-related. Its dynamics share considerable similarities with other cases of “lone wolf” terrorism recently recorded in Europe and North America.
The attack happened in a busy, high-visibility part of central Munich, and used an unsophisticated and easily accessible weapon.
Moreover, notable car-ramming attacks have occurred in Germany in the past, attaining extremely high visibility and likely inspiring copycats. These include a 2016 attack in Berlin, which killed 13 and injured 56, and the more recent attack in Magdeburg, on 20 December 2024, which killed 6 and resulted in hundreds of injuries.
The timing of the attack is likely linked to the upcoming German election, scheduled to occur in less than two weeks, and may have been meant to attain maximum visibility and possibly provoke further copycat actions.
The attack is almost certain to further increase the already high tensions surrounding the upcoming German elections, where the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is highly likely to register its best-ever result.
Considering the impacts of past cases of terrorism in Germany, it is highly likely that the attack in Munich will spark large-scale protests (and counterprotests), particularly in Bavaria. These, in turn, are likely to be desirable targets both for possible copycats and, possibly, for “retaliatory” violence.
The election campaign and voting process in Germany are likely to face an elevated terrorism threat, particularly in large and medium-sized urban areas, during their final days.
Travel Risk Advice: Safety Guidelines for Munich, Germany
- In Munich, abide by authority directions, avoid all gatherings and the area of Königsplatz, and plan for alternative routes.
- Closely monitor local news reports and government alerts.
- If in the event you become caught in the vicinity of an attack you are reminded to RUN – HIDE – TELL.
- If caught in the vicinity of an attack, seek immediate hard cover and leave the area if safe to do so. Continue to adhere to all instructions issued by authorities and obey any security cordons in place.
- Further attacks cannot be ruled out. Remain vigilant over the coming days and avoid large gatherings, public buildings, transport hubs and military infrastructure where possible.
- Expect and plan for significant security deployments and disruptions in Munich and other German cities before and during the elections.
- Avoid all large gatherings as a precaution, as these may be targeted by copycat attackers.
- Ensure that you always carry personal identification documents or copies.
- Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any losses in electricity.
- Monitor the Solace Secure platform and trusted local media for updates relevant to the conflict.
- The emergency number in Germany is 112.
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Executive Summary
Americas (AMER)
Mexico’s deployment of 10,000 troops to its northern border is almost certainly a reaction to the US tariff threat. There is a realistic possibility that Mexico’s actions will escalate tensions with the well-armed cartels.
There is a realistic possibility that Argentina’s designation of a radical Mapuche group as a terrorist organisation could escalate tensions resulting in more attacks on state and corporate interests.
Europe, Middle East & Africa (EMEA)
The deadliest shooting in Swedish history, which occurred in the town of Orebro, is likely a case of lone-wolf terrorism inspired by far-right ideology. Further attacks remain possible as more information is released.
Russian intelligence’s alleged sponsoring of a sabotage campaign targeting private vehicles in Germany is likely part of a broader attempt to polarise society and influence the upcoming elections.
A new Russo-Belarusian security pact will almost certainly be ratified by Russia’s parliament, and will likely significantly increase the threat of Belarus joining the war against Ukraine.
Turkey’s proposed involvement in counter-ISIS operations in Syria is likely a pretext to expand its operations against the SDF and Kurdish people in anticipation of a US withdrawal.
Iran’s rapid advancement of its nuclear weapons programme is almost certainly a response to the degradation of its conventional deterrents and a development that could decrease regional stability.
Asia-Pacific (APAC)
Record-breaking levels of snowfall in northern Japan will almost certainly continue to impact daily life and result in severe transport disruptions.
The ambushing of Pakistani troops by Baloch separatists is likely indicative of overstretched security services and a rapidly deteriorating security situation.
North, Central and South America
Mexico: Mexican government to deploy 10,000 troops to US border, as Trump pauses tariffs
This is the paragraph. Paste as uOn 3 February, the White House announced that it would pause the imposition of planned 25 per cent tariffs on Mexican goods after reaching a deal on the US-Mexico border. The deal calls for the deployment of at least 10,000 Mexican soldiers to the border, in efforts to stop cross-border flows of migrants, as well as smuggling of narcotics and firearms.
The deal occurs at a time of growing violence at the border. On 3 February, multiple gun battles occurred in the Mexican border city of Nuevo Laredo following the arrest of a local cartel leader, which resulted in the US consulate and airport briefly pausing operations. In the past weeks, there have been multiple cases of US border patrol officers exchanging fire with suspected cartel members near the border.
Solace Global Assessment:
The deployment of 10,000 troops is almost certainly a reaction to Trump’s economic coercion, and will highly likely have some impact on Mexico’s overall approach to combating organised crime in the country.
President Claudia Sheinbaum was elected on a platform similar to that of her predecessor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), which called for a “hugs not bullets” strategy for the cartel problem. This approach emphasised improving economic opportunity and reducing social issues in at-risk regions, rather than directly attacking the cartels. AMLO had remained a staunch supporter of this policy despite Washington’s appeals to change course.
Sheinbaum has, instead, gradually signalled a willingness to take a tougher line, also because of a significant reported increase in the number of murders and kidnappings during the president’s first months in power.
However, even if the deployment of 10,000 troops has an important political value, and has successfully paused the threat of US sanctions, it will not necessarily alter the situation at the border. The protracted threat of US economic sanctions will almost certainly force Mexico City to take measures to ensure an increase in narcotics and weapons seizures. This may result in an increase in clashes with local cartel units.
If the threat of government measures becomes unacceptable for the cartels, it could result in escalating violence targeting civil sector workers and politicians. Mexican cartels can in some cases match the firepower of state security forces, and recent trends highlight a growing militarisation of their units. For instance, cartels are increasingly producing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and deploying them via drones, using tactics that match those by armed militias and rebel groups in conflicts such as those in Myanmar and Syria. In states like Michoacan and Jalisco, cartels like the Jalisco Nueva Generation (CJNG) have systematically deployed drone-dropped IEDs to attack police forces and buildings.
Argentina: Buenos Aires to designate indigenous group a “terrorist organisation”
ThOn 4 February, Argentine National Security Minister Patricia Bullrich stated that she would designate an indigenous Mapuche group a “terrorist organisation” in response to the group allegedly starting numerous intentional fires in the Patagonia region.
The announcement follows a local media report in which the leader of the Mapuche Ancestral Resistance (RAM), Facundo Jones Huala, declared that sabotage is a legitimate form of struggle for the Mapuche people and claimed responsibility for several arson attacks in the Chubut region, at a time when Argentina is struggling with a series of wildfires, many of which are suspected to be deliberate. Huala also reportedly denied the existence of the Argentine state and called for an armed struggle against the Milei government.
Solace Global Assessment:
The Mapuche are an Indigenous people of South America, primarily living in Chile and Argentina, particularly in the regions of Araucanía, Los Ríos, and parts of Patagonia. Mapuche groups have raised long-standing demands for the return of their ancestral lands from the state or private companies. These demands typically take the form of political activism.
However, in the last two decades, elements of the Mapuche movement have become far more militant. In Chile, the Mapuche have been waging a renewed war against the government since the 1990s after Chile’s return to democracy. The Mapuche conflict in Chile has entailed arson attacks, sabotage and violent clashes with the Chilean police and military.
In response, Santiago has deployed military forces and special police units to suppress Mapuche groups and has used counterterrorism laws from the Pinochet era to detain key Mapuche figures.
In Argentina, there is a realistic possibility that the declaration of RAM as a terrorist organisation could energise the Mapuche movement and exacerbate tensions with the indigenous community. RAM only emerged in the early 2000s and is likely still in its infancy.
The use of counterterrorism laws, potential human rights violations, freezing of assets, expanded surveillance and a potential increased military presence in Patagonia could easily work in favour of RAM, enabling it to recruit more from an increasingly alienated Mapuche community. If mismanaged, the Mapuche movement in Argentina may adopt a more militant character, as observed in neighbouring Chile.
This could include arson attacks, sabotage against critical infrastructure, and destruction of forestry plantations, agricultural estates and even native forests, which the Mapuche have been known to target as a symbolic act against state and corporate interests.
AMER Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Trump sanctions International Criminal Court (ICC)
On 6 February, President Trump signed an executive order to authorise economic and travel sanctions targeting ICC staff and family members, if they are determined to be involved in investigations or prosecutions targeting US citizens or allies, namely Israel. The move has been condemned by the organisation, of which the US is not a member.
The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, alongside a leader of Hamas, in November 2024. Trump condemned the simultaneous issuing of these arrest warrants as immoral and baseless, suggesting that the Israeli PM should not be held in the same regard as the leader of the militant group. The ICC has stated that the sanctions are likely to undermine its work.
The decision follows the renewal of US aid packages for Israel and Trump’s controversial comments over US control of Gaza. The convergence of these developments is likely to galvanise pro-Palestinian demonstrations across the globe, viewing it as an endorsement of the Netanyahu administration’s handling of the Gaza conflict, who may seek to organise protests outside US embassies, Trump-owned businesses or other locations associated with US interests could also be targeted.
Greenland tries to “Trump-proof” itself
The government of Greenland has passed a series of measures designed to reduce the likelihood of foreign influence on its internal affairs while simultaneously calling for cross-parliamentary unity. On 5 February, Prime Minister Mute Egede called for snap elections, which would be held on 11 March, likely in the hope of giving his independentist party a stronger mandate to negotiate with Copenhagen and Washington. Coinciding with the call for new elections, the Greenlandic parliament passed laws to ban anonymous foreign contributions to electoral campaigns, as well as legislation to restrict the purchase of land to Greenlandic and Danish citizens and long-term residents only.
Argentines protest President Javier Milei’s Davos speech
Thousands of protesters gathered in central Buenos Aires on 2 February in response to the president’s remarks. During his speech at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, Milei rallied against “wokeism” and described a global struggle between free market capitalist and socialist forces, also praising US President Donald Trump and his billionaire ally Elon Musk.
Milei has repeatedly used international summits and events as opportunities to build positive relations with key right-wing leaders, particularly those in Washington and in European countries led by the right, such as Italy. It is likely that Milei adapted the speech’s rhetoric, which is directly borrowed from the American right’s domestic political messaging, to accompany Trump’s own speech at Davos, the first since he returned to the White House. A self-proclaimed “anarcho-capitalist”, Milei has often espoused conservative social rhetoric, despite it being ideologically contradictory to libertarian principles. On 5 February, the Milei administration announced that it, like the US, would also withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO), a further development that is likely to energise unrest in Argentina.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
US aid freeze threatens UN-backed mission in Haiti
The Trump administration has notified the United Nations that it is freezing some of the funding allocated to the Kenyan-led international task force in Haiti. The US has been the largest contributor to the UN-backed mission, which was launched in 2024 and was already struggling with funding. The aid freeze will present a major threat to the success of the mission and could shape the conditions for the gangs to assume almost full control of the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, where they already control an assessed 85 per cent. Criminal gangs are likely to be emboldened by this development and will likely respond with increased attacks on Haitian and international forces. In recent days, the Viv Ansanm gang coalition has been going door-to-door in one of the capital’s more prosperous neighbourhoods, attempting to target the country’s elite while indiscriminately killing civilians.
ELN warns Colombian government that it will not surrender
After launching an offensive against rival non-state groups in Colombia, which resulted in the deployment of government troops to the regions affected, the National Liberation Army (ELN) has vowed that it will never accept submission or surrender. The statement follows weeks of increased violence in the conflict-ridden parts of Norte de Santander and a gesture from President Petro which involved him pointing at an ELN base displayed on classified satellite-derived imagery. The gesture, which was accompanied by verbal threats, almost certainly indicates a major shift in the Petro administration’s policy of “total peace” and the championing of dialogue. The renewed conflict is likely to trigger a wave of attacks across Colombia, The ELN has a major presence in multiple departments of Colombia, especially in the border region, and is likely to stage attacks against the government, rival guerilla groups, organised crime groups and even the civilian population.
Ecuador to close borders and militarise ports of entry during election
President Daniel Noboa of Ecuador has ordered the closure of all borders between 8-10 February during the country’s presidential election. Noboa also ordered the immediate militarisation of all ports of entry in Ecuador and an increased military presence on the border. The orders have purportedly been issued in response to intelligence indicating that “narco-terrorists” are preparing to destabilise the country during the election, with regional cartels likely seeking to undermine Noboa after his administration introduced measures like those introduced by President Bukele of El Salvador, including mass detentions, states of emergency and increased security patrols.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Flooding in Recife, Brazil, threatens at-risk communities and informal settlements
Heavy rain, which started on 3 February, has resulted in local authorities issuing a maximum alert level on 4 February. According to the Pernambuco Water and Climate Agency (APAC), more than 110 mm of rain fell on parts of Recife in 12 hours. At least one person has been killed due to the severe weather event. Local schools closed and widespread traffic disruptions were recorded due to the floods. The risk of flooding in Recife is particularly high in informal settlements, or favelas. There are an estimated 295 favelas in Recife, where 360,000 people live, or approximately 24 per cent of the population. These are often located on hillsides, with poor drainage infrastructure, meaning that floods can result in buildings collapsing and severe mudslides affecting thousands of residents. The cramped layout of the settlements also makes evacuation and search and rescue operations extremely difficult.
Europe, Middle East & Africa
Sweden: Deadliest shooting in Swedish history at school in Orebro
On 4 February, a gunman opened fire inside an adult education centre in the Swedish town of Orebro, located approximately 200 kilometres from Stockholm, killing 11 people. The perpetrator, who was found dead at the scene, was a 35-year-old Swedish national with no criminal history who had reportedly previously been a student at the school. The shooting is the deadliest in Sweden’s history and has sparked a debate over Sweden’s gun laws.
Solace Global Assessment:
Swedish authorities have not released a possible motive for the attack but have not ruled out the possibility of an ideological motive. There are multiple elements, however, that the shooting in Orebro shares with recent cases of lone actor terrorism.
First, the shooting occurred at a school that primarily caters to migrants. Second, it follows the high-visibility case of an Iraqi, Sweden-based anti-Islam activist, who was recently killed on the eve of his trial. Third, the perpetrator reportedly changed into a “military uniform” prior to carrying out the shooting, according to witnesses. It is notable, here, that multiple perpetrators of far-right terrorist actions, including the Christchurch and Buffalo shooter, as well as the more recent perpetrator of the Eskisehir mosque stabbing attack, wore makeshift “uniforms”. Fourth, elements of the shooter’s profile resemble those of other “lone wolves”, including a history of social isolation. Finally, testimonies (and possible audio) exist of the shooter reportedly shouting anti-migrant slogans during the attack, although, as of the time of writing, these remain unverified by Swedish authorities.
These elements, taken together, make it likely that the shooting was a case of far-right and identitarian extremist violence, similar to other notable cases of lone wolf terror attacks. There is a realistic possibility of copycat attacks, as well as retaliatory violence, as more information regarding the shooting is released.
Germany: Russian-hired agents are alleged to have sabotaged vehicles to influence polls before elections
On 5 February, Der Spiegel released a report claiming that Russian intelligence hired German residents to carry out a deliberate sabotage operation targeting private vehicles in December. According to the report, more than 270 cars were found to have been damaged in Berlin, Brandenburg, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg by having sealant foam sprayed in their exhausts. The vehicles were also tagged with stickers promoting the German Green Party. German authorities reportedly arrested three German residents from Serbia and Bosnia, who confessed to having been recruited by Russian intelligence via the messenger app “Viber”, with the promise of EUR 100 for each sabotaged car.
Solace Global Assessment:
The operation is almost certainly a clear example of Russian intelligence’s use of “disposable” local agents for unsophisticated acts meant to sow confusion and disruption in target societies. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has established a de facto “gig economy” for sabotage across Europe. Russian sympathisers or people hostile to the state in which they live are identified online, often through social media analysis. Russian intelligence can then recruit them through a decentralised online network, utilising applications such as Viber. Disenfranchised individuals, often those with far-right tendencies, are then recruited to conduct acts like sabotage and arson at the behest of the Kremlin in exchange for remuneration via secure online payments of cryptocurrencies. These acts are then often conducted in a manner that seeks to attribute blame to another group. This strategy has provided Moscow with a low-cost and highly deniable method of disrupting or undermining target countries, without risking its intelligence operatives and demanding only minimal organisation.
Russia’s objective in orchestrating this sabotage campaign is likely to destabilise the German political landscape by sowing confusion and influencing the upcoming 23 February elections. The Greens are currently polling at 13 per cent, and their vote share may become fundamental in shaping a possible government coalition in an increasingly fractured German electorate. The aim was likely to tarnish the image of environmentalists and Green supporters by emulating acts that the more extreme elements of these groups have done before, such as sabotage of a Tesla gigafactory and vandalism of electric cars. If successfully attributed to the green movement, this could gain traction with the German far-right and continue to polarise the country. The destabilising effect of this one operation is likely to be limited. However, the aggregate effect of multiple Russian influence operations in both the physical and virtual world that have yet to be exposed in the open-source domain, is likely far more significant and likely to increase as the federal elections approach.
Belarus & Ukraine: Russo-Belarusian security pact presented to Russian parliament for ratification
On 5 February, a security pact between Russia and Belarus was presented to the Russian parliament (the Duma) for ratification. The pact, that was signed between Minsk and Moscow on 6 December 2024, has three key stipulations: The inclusion of Belarus under Russia’s protective ‘nuclear umbrella’ (meaning Russia will hypothetically use nuclear weapons to protect Belarus against external aggression), allowing the deployment of Russian military bases on Belarusian territory, and according to an independent Belarusian media outlet, the potential recruitment of Belarusian citizens to fight against Ukraine so as to defend “Russia’s territorial integrity”. Additionally, on 3 February, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence announced the start of ‘combat readiness checks’. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (SBGS) stated that while underway, the combat readiness checks do “not pose any threat to Ukraine” as no movement of equipment, personnel or strike formations along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border has been detected.
Solace Global Assessment:
The treaty has been given priority status by the Duma, and will almost certainly be ratified. Having won every presidential election since 1994, the president of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko won yet again another election on 26 January in a political system that is almost certainly highly undemocratic (Belarus has a low performance across all of the Global State of Democracy Initiative’s categories). Russia and Belarus have de jure been in a Union State since 1999, although de facto maintain independence from one another – the new security pact’s initial signing coincided with the 25th anniversary of the Treaty on the Creation of the Union State.
While Belarusian armed forces have not as of yet taken part in the war against Ukraine, the Kremlin used Belarus as a staging post for an offensive against Kyiv in the initial stages of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While this offensive was successfully repelled, it is almost certain that the Ukrainian military establishment has significant concerns about the threat posed by any further offensive from Belarus, enabled by the involvement of Belarusian armed forces. Such an offensive would likely severely overstretch Ukrainian forces, whose main efforts are currently the defence of the eastern front and holding the Kursk salient in internationally recognised Russia. Russia struggles with manpower shortages of its own, with North Korean troops being withdrawn from the front lines in the Kursk salient due to considerable casualty rates, so the potential addition of Belarusian troops is almost certainly highly desirable for the Kremlin. On 5 February, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned in a news conference with the UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy that Russia will deploy further forces on Belarusian territory later this year and that the Kremlin will “pull Belarus into the war”. Lukashenko’s position in Belarus is highly likely more fragile than Putin’s in Russia, and while Lukashenko has endeavoured to limit Belarus’ involvement in the war thus far, the inclusion of Belarus into Russia’s nuclear protection zone would likely significantly increase the chances of their direct involvement, especially if Russia has made guarantees to protect the Lukashenko regime domestically.
Syria: Turkey declares intent to join anti-ISIS coalition in Syria
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has stated that Turkey will join forces with Syria, Iraq and Jordan to combat the remnants of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He also suggested that Turkish operations would allow the US to sever its ties with Kurdish militants in Syria, a relationship that Ankara strongly opposes. Fidan also stated that the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), which form the spearhead of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), had only been guarding ISIS detainees in SDF-run prisons and have contributed little else to counter the resurgent threat of ISIS. Ankara has also reiterated its view that the SDF should be absorbed into the new conventional Syrian military.
Solace Global Assessment:
Turkey has long opposed the SDF, which it views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant group considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey and its allies. Turkey is also currently engaged in an offensive against the SDF in northern Syria, backed by its proxy force the Syrian National Army (SNA). Ankara is likely concerned that the SDF’s influence in Syria could bolster or embolden separatist movements within Turkey, threatening its national security. There is a realistic possibility that Turkey is using anti-ISIS operations as a pretext to increase its force posture in Syria, with its true objective being the suppression of Kurdish forces and the consolidation of control over key areas in northern Syria close to Turkey. In parallel, Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are currently discussing a potential defence pact that could result in Syrian forces being trained by Turkey and the establishment of Turkish airbases in central Syria. If agreed, Turkey will benefit from Iran’s loss of influence in Syria, be in a much stronger position to project strength into the Middle East and will be in a stronger position to counter Kurdish forces in Syria.
Using anti-ISIS operations as a pretext would likely appeal to the Trump administration. Trump has suggested that the US may entirely withdraw from Syria, where CENTCOM currently has approximately 2,000 troops to counter ISIS. Turkish involvement in a regional counter-ISIS coalition would likely be endorsed by Trump and help him facilitate a US withdrawal. However, ISIS has already demonstrated the early signs of a resurgence, with increased and more brazen attacks. If Turkey’s true goal is to suppress Kurdish forces under the cover of anti-ISIS operations while the US withdraws from both Iraq and Syria, it could inadvertently create an opportunity for ISIS to regroup. Ultimately, increased Turkish military presence in Syria could pressure the SDF into disbanding as a military organisation and integrating into the new Syrian forces, a shift that would weaken Kurdish forces in Syria, align with Turkey’s objectives, and simultaneously avoid alienating the SDF’s Western backers..
Iran: Tehran accelerating the development of a nuclear weapon
Reports indicate that Iran is expediting its development of a nuclear weapon, which could potentially enable it to acquire the capability in a matter of months. A secret team of engineers and scientists purportedly linked to the Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (SPND), has been involved in the process, an organisation that was pivotal in Iranian nuclear weapons research before 2003. This approach could shorten the time required to convert weapons-grade uranium (enriched to 90 per cent) into a nuclear weapon. The report states that Iran currently holds uranium enriched to approximately 60 per cent, considered near weapons-grade.
Solace Global Assessment:
As a result of the conflict in the Middle East, Iran has been left considerably weakened and lacks an effective deterrent. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has effectively defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip, significantly degraded Hezbollah in Lebanon and demonstrated its capability to strike Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The IDF also demonstrated its capability to strike deep within Iran, whilst also degrading much of Iran’s strategic air defence and ability to produce ballistic missiles. Furthermore, Tehran has lost a key ally in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime. This development has also fractured part of Iran’s Shia Crescent, disrupting ground lines of communication to Hezbollah, which was its main deterrent against Israel. With its conventional deterrence severely diminished, Tehran has likely calculated that its only viable option is to pursue a nuclear deterrent, which may lead to the Supreme Leader revoking his fatwa on nuclear weapons. Such a development is likely to raise the chances of escalation between Iran and not just Israel, but also the Gulf States, potentially triggering an arms race in the Middle East.
However, US officials have stated that Iran’s new approach to developing a nuclear bomb would only enable it to build an older-style nuclear weapon, commenting that such a warhead would not fit on a ballistic missile and be far less reliable than a modern nuclear weapon. This limits Iran’s ability to deploy such a weapon, with aerial delivery the most likely method. However, Israel and the Gulf States possess superior air and air defence capabilities, which are likely sufficient to intercept Iranian aircraft before they reach their intended targets. The main advantage of the new process is that it would significantly reduce the time that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would have to detect Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear bomb, which could provide Iran with a window to strike before the development of the capability is widely known.
The Trump administration has expressed that it will reinstate “maximum pressure” on Iran, specifically threatening Iranian oil exports. Trump has also expressed a willingness to engage in negotiations, but his primary objective is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Renewed sanctions will almost certainly exacerbate Iran’s already fragile economy, which is characterised by deep-rooted structural issues including mismanagement, corruption, nepotism, limited diversification, inflation, and high unemployment. Iran may be seeking to develop nuclear weapons for strategic leverage, viewing them as a means to enhance its deterrence and strengthen its position in any future negotiations. However, such a strategy may backfire if it provokes an aggressive response from an unpredictable White House, leading to further economic degradation. Such a scenario would likely intensify the pressure on the Iranian regime, potentially triggering greater anti-regime social unrest within the country. Alternatively or additionally, the ‘moderate’ president Masoud Pezeshkian was elected on a mandate to tackle the economic crisis by reducing sanctions. If Pezeshkian fails to do this, there is a realistic possibility of a radical backlash against his more moderate foreign policy posture, empowering the more hawkish anti-West military and theocratic establishment.
EMEA Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Far-right activists protest in London
At least six people were arrested on 1 February, during large-scale protests in central London by supporters of far-right figure Tommy Robinson. Robinson is currently serving an 18-month jail sentence for breaching a 2021 High Court injunction. Isolated clashes were reported as protesters entered the designated area for counter-protesters. The protests follow broader signals of a growing popularity of the far-right in UK politics, with early February polls projecting Nigel Farage’s Reform Party as the most popular party in the UK, having overtaken both the Conservatives and the ruling Labour Party. Farage and Reform have disavowed Robinson and his supporters to win Conservative Party voters; however, both sides have adopted similar political discourses and have received common endorsements. Most notably, Elon Musk endorsed and has reposted Reform with some regularity since mid-2024, only to then call on Farage to step down as party leader following the latter’s disavowal of Robinson. In turn, Musk then demanded Robinson’s release.
Protests against Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) and Alternative for Germany (AfD)
An estimated 50,000 people gathered in Vienna after the FPO was formally tasked with trying to form a government with the conservative People’s Party (OVP). While the FPO and OVP have previously been government partners, the FPO’s victory at the past elections makes it almost certain that if a deal were to be reached the far-right party would occupy a senior position in the coalition. The possible FPO-OVP deal follows the collapse of previous OVP-led talks with other “cordon sanitaire” parties, and has been under negotiation since early January. The latest wave of protests has likely been influenced by developments over the border in Germany, where tens of thousands of protesters continue to oppose the rising Alternative for Germany (AfD). On 3 February, an estimated 160,000 people rallied in Berlin in protest of a migration reform advanced by the Christian Democrats (CSU/CDU) with the AfD’s votes. While the bill failed to pass, further protests are likely to occur before the elections scheduled for 23 February.
Kosovo to hold parliamentary elections on 9 February
Kosovo’s parliamentary elections on 9 February will see 27 political groups competing for 120 available seats, with 20 reserved for minority representatives, including Serbs, Bosniaks, Turkish and Roma communities. However, tensions remain high between the central government and the Serb-majority communities in northern Kosovo, after Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s attempts to dismantle Serb-run parallel institutions. A victory for Kurti and his Self-Determination Movement party is likely to increase tensions with both Kosovo’s Serb communities and with neighbouring Serbia, potentially leading to unrest in the north of the country.
Uganda’s president to continue to prosecute civilians in military tribunals despite court ruling
On 1 February, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni declared that the government would continue to prosecute civilians in military tribunals. The declaration comes after a court ruling banned the practice on 31 January, declaring it unconstitutional, and ordering ongoing cases to be continued in civil courts. Museveni claims to be reluctant to abandon military tribunals given their use in pacifying Uganda’s restive northeastern Karamoja region. Uganda’s military courts have tried hundreds of civilians including opposition politicians and government critics. Kizza Besigye, the opposition leader, is facing the death penalty after being abducted in Kenya in November 2024 and tried in a military tribunal in Kampala. Museveni’s reluctance to shift power over to civil courts is almost certainly to retain a hold on power and prevent formal opposition blocs from forming. There is a realistic possibility that Museveni’s refusal to adhere to the court ruling will be used as a catalyst for unrest targeting perceived government corruption.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Azerbaijani forces carry out anti-Islamic State (IS) operation in Qusar
The raid’s target is the same northeastern district where an IS cell was discovered “by accident” in the late summer of 2024. At least eight IS fighters were reportedly killed. The operation is part of growing efforts by Baku to disrupt the Islamic State Caucasus Province (ISCP) from establishing a foothold in the country. IS’ operations in Azerbaijan are likely part of IS’ broader drive to improve its position in the Caucasus, especially in Dagestan, which Qusar borders. Azerbaijani reports identified the fighters as “Forest Brothers”. This term indicates members of the Dagestan-based Derbent Jamaat group, and may highlight a growing interplay between pre-existent Islamist groups in the area and IS (although, it may be a political move by Baku to avoid recognising the existence of IS on its territory). It is highly likely that the operation in Qusar will be followed by further counterterrorism efforts in the north. Given the strain of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russian forces are increasingly vulnerable to threats from IS. There is a realistic possibility that Moscow will pursue joint counterterrorism operations with Baku to combat the transregional terror group.
The US conducts airstrikes conducted on Islamic State Somalia (ISS)
The airstrikes took place in the Puntland region of Somalia, where security forces have been battling a jihadist insurgency since 2015. Sanctioned by President Donald Trump, the strikes targeted cave systems used by ISS militants and reportedly killed multiple jihadists, including senior leadership. After the strike, Trump took to Truth Social, stating ‘The message to ISIS and all others who would attack Americans is that ‘WE WILL FIND YOU, AND WE WILL KILL YOU!’ Occurring shortly after Trump’s inauguration, this is almost certainly a statement of intent for the administration after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appealed to Trump to not pull advisors from Somalia. While Trump has generally opposed direct US military involvement in conflicts, he has typically relied on airstrikes as a tool for counterterrorism, increasing their number significantly during his first administration. He will almost certainly utilise similar tactics during this administration as he seeks to withdraw US personnel from Syria.
Somali Puntland forces strike IS positions
Counterterrorism forces of the Somali breakaway region of Puntland have launched an operation targeting strongholds of the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) in the al-Miskaad mountain range. Puntland sources reported the killing of at least 57 ISS members in the operation, which likely constitutes a major escalation in the conflict against ISS. Coinciding with the operation, US airstrikes and joint US-UAE aerial surveillance operations were reported, likely indicating Washington’s growing concern for Somalia as a staging ground for IS operations. ISS has long been considered a “small” branch of IS. However, ISS has disproportionately grown in importance as a key transit hub for IS operations in the Middle East and South Asia from Africa, under the leadership of Abdul Qadir Mumin, who also likely acts as a leader in IS’ global operational planning. Puntland sources reported that “all” those killed in the recent raids were foreigners. While possibly exaggerated, it is highly likely that ISS’s growth has benefitted from inbound flows of fighters from the Arabian Peninsula, particularly from Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Intense fighting continues in the eastern DRC despite a unilateral ceasefire
On 3 February, a unilateral ceasefire effective from 4 February was announced by the AFC/M23 militant group which seized the city of Goma in North Kivu in late January. The ceasefire has almost certainly failed to end the heavy fighting in the eastern DRC. The government has denounced the ceasefire as “false communication”, and AFC/M23 advances have almost certainly continued along the main road toward the South Kivu capital of Bukavu, despite the ceasefire’s claim that they had “no intention of taking control of Bukavu”. AFC/M23 forces are reportedly now just 50km north of Bukavu. Fighting on 5 February was reportedly intense around Nyabibwe, and the DRC assembly president Vital Kamerhe stated that AFC/M23 forces reached the town of Ihusi after taking Nyabibwe. It is almost certain that significant developments in the conflict, such as the fall of Bukavu, will trigger violent unrest targeting foreign interests in Kinshasa and other major population centres.
Al-Shabaab gunmen abduct five officials in northeast Kenya
On 3 February, five chiefs were kidnapped by al-Shabaab gunmen in Mandera County, near the border with Somalia. The officials were reportedly travelling from Wargadud to Elwak town as they were abducted. The attack was likely carried out by Jaysh Ayman, al-Shabaab’s Kenyan wing responsible for several significant attacks in Kenya in recent years. This is the latest in a series of attacks by the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab in northeastern regions of Kenya, which aims to destabilise the region and undermine local governance. The persistent threat is also partially in retaliation to Kenya’s military presence in Somalia as part of the African Union’s peacekeeping missions, the latest being the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which ended on 31 December 2024, replaced by African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Despite the persistent activity in Kenya’s border regions, Kenya is highly unlikely to withdraw from AUSSOM, with the mission recently being endorsed by Kenyan President William Ruso, which will likely inspire further al-Shabaab activity in Kenya.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Locals evacuated after a wave of earthquakes hits Greek island Santorini
A series of earthquakes have impacted the Greek Aegean region, particularly impacting the islands of Santorini and Amorgos. The seismic activity, which began with over 200 earthquakes in late January, has led to significant disruptions, including the evacuation of at least 11,000 people from Santorini. The recent earthquakes, some reaching magnitudes as high as 4.9, have prompted authorities to close schools and restrict access to certain areas due to the risk of landslides. The situation remains dynamic as officials work to manage the impact of the ongoing seismic activity. Emergency services continue to urge the public to stay alert and heed safety warnings as the region navigates through this challenging period.
Niger bans Red Cross from operating on its territory
Orders to cease activities were issued to the Red Cross and other NGOs providing humanitarian aid to the Sahel country on 4 February. Nigerien authorities did not provide a reason for the decision, but it is highly likely that it is a further move against what the government perceives as “foreign influence”. The expulsion of Red Cross staff is highly likely to have a negative impact on the civilian population. In Niger, the Red Cross has played a fundamental role in guiding responses following severe environmental events, such as the September 2024 floods in Agadez, Diffa, Tahoua and Tillabery, which affected up to one million people.
Asia–Pacific
Japan: Record-breaking snow causes widespread disruption in northern Japan
Since 4 February, record-breaking snowfall has occurred in northern Japan. The snow has severely impacted everyday life and resulted in major transport disruptions. Japan’s second-largest island, Hokkaido, has been hit hardest by what the authorities are describing as “the strongest cold wave of the season,” forcing the authorities to issue snowstorm warnings for parts of the island. However, the situation is not limited to Hokkaido. Parts of northern Honshu have also received extreme levels of snowfall. The town of Shirakawa in Gifu prefecture received 129cm (47 inches) of snowfall in less than 48 hours, with multiple other locations reporting similarly high levels.
Solace Global Assessment:
Unstable atmospheric conditions in the area will likely cause significant snowfall in the coming days, leading to further disruptions. Major airports in Hokkaido, including Obihiro Airport and Kushiro Airport, have been forced to close their runways due to heavy snow accumulation, causing delays and cancellations. With more snowfall anticipated, additional airports in both Hokkaido and Honshu may be forced to suspend flights, further disrupting domestic and international travel. Furthermore, the knock-on effect of cancellations is affecting airport operations in parts of Japan less affected by snowfall. On 6 February, it was reported that All Nippon Airways was forced to cancel two per cent and delayed 22 per cent of flights out oof Tokyo International Airport (Haneda).
Other forms of transport have been severely disrupted and will likely remain so for the coming days. Thousands of snow ploughs have been deployed across the impacted areas but are unlikely to keep up with demand. As initial layers of snow freeze and become buried under fresh snowfall, hazardous travel conditions are likely to develop. Concealed ice on roads will increase the risk of road traffic accidents and delay bus and coach services. Rail travel will also likely be severely impacted, with ice accumulation on the tracks reducing traction, leading to delays and potential derailments. Ice accumulation on power lines coupled with strong winds may also cause lines to snap leading to power outages, which are likely to be exacerbated by an increased electricity demand for heating.
Pakistan: At least 18 soldiers killed in clashes with Baloch separatists
On 31 January, insurgents of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed 18 unarmed soldiers belonging to the Frontier Corps paramilitaries after ambushing their vehicle near the town of Kalat, near the Afghanistan border. Approximately 70-80 BLA militants ambushed the soldiers when they were attempting to dismantle a roadblock which had reportedly been erected by the BLA. Pakistani security forces responded quickly to the incident, killing 23 BLA militants in a series of subsequent operations in the region that were described as some of the heaviest fighting in Balochistan in recent years. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s office in Islamabad condemned the violence and the Pakistani Army stated that “sanitisation operations” will continue until the perpetrators are brought to justice.
Solace Global Assessment:
The number of militants involved in the attack suggests it was a planned assault, and the ambush of security forces attempting to remove roadblocks could be a developing tactic, technique, or procedure employed by the BLA, designed to maximise casualties of exposed and vulnerable targets. Acts of extreme violence, such as ambushes, are likely to become an increasingly common tactic for the BLA, given their effectiveness in generating compelling propaganda, attracting new recruits and undermining the perception of security in Balochistan. There is a realistic possibility that the BLA knew that the paramilitary soldiers were unarmed, which may indicate that the BLA has penetrated the Pakistani armed forces to some degree, enabling it to obtain vital intelligence. In response to the ambush, the Pakistani armed forces will almost certainly expand their operations against the BLA and other Baloch separatist groups.
However, with widespread social unrest, sectarian violence and militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and periodic clashes with the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani military is likely already overstretched. This may explain the deployment of lesser-trained and less experienced paramilitary forces to Balochistan. Moreover, an expansion of Pakistani military operations in the area will almost certainly inspire a wave of reprisal attacks in Balochistan, which may migrate into other parts of Pakistan. Pakistan’s prime minister is currently conducting a state visit to China and it is almost certain that issues like the revitalisation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project will be high on the agenda. China has pledged support to Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts and has conducted military drills within the country. If the security situation continues to deteriorate, Beijing will likely pressure Islamabad to approve the deployment of Chinese security forces to protect Chinese works and assets linked to the Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI).
APAC Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Taliban deputy foreign minister flees Afghanistan after speech in favour of women’s education
Mohammed Abbas Stanikzai reportedly relocated to the UAE for “health” reasons. However, his departure followed an order by Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada to arrest him. The deputy foreign minister had recently given a speech in which he decried the Taliban government’s ban on women’s education, and reportedly privately criticised Akhundzada. The episode represents a rare but likely notable public spat between Taliban officials. It is highly likely that Akhundzada, whose hold on power faces significant domestic and foreign threats, will continue to respond harshly to perceived internal political threats. International pressure on the Taliban is likely to increase in the short and medium term. Notably, the interruption of USAID projects in the country, which amounted to more than USD 740 million in 2024 (and USD 3.7 billion since 2022) is highly likely to have severe humanitarian impacts and may result in widespread discontent directed towards the Taliban regime.
Modi’s Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) on track to win assembly elections in Delhi, India
The elections were held on 5 February, and the final results are scheduled to be released on 8 February. Early results show the BJP comfortably ahead of the incumbent Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). If these were to be certified, it would be the first BJP victory in the capital in 27 years. Moreover, they would represent a significant reversal of the 2020 results, where AAP won 62 seats out of 70. For Modi, the victory likely represents an important political result, as it gives the BJP further momentum following last year’s general elections which were won by the Hindu nationalist party but not as decisively as its leaders would have hoped. The AAP is a reformist and anti-establishment party, that came to power in Delhi in 2015 on a wave of anti-corruption sentiment.
Bangladeshi protesters attack Awami League assets
Civil unrest was recorded in Dhaka and other cities on 5-6 February, following ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s calls to her supporters, the Awami League (AL) party, to oppose the interim government. Protesters torched Hasina’s father’s former house in Dhaka and continued to attack suspected AL supporters. AL recently called for a two-week-long period of protests against the interim government, the first major protest appeal since the party was removed from power in August 2024. The vandalism by anti-Hasina activists was almost certainly a case of “bulldozer justice” (the protest had been called a “bulldozer procession” by some local activists), a form of mob violence that especially targets opponents’ physical assets, and often poses a threat to uninvolved bystanders.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Islamic State (IS) supporters start prison riot in Tajikistan
At least five inmates were killed and three guards injured in a riot on 3 February at the prison of Vahdat, Tajikistan. The riot was reportedly launched by a group of IS-affiliated inmates. The case continues to highlight how Tajikistan is a growing recruitment ground for IS. Not only is Tajikistan located close to some of the countries where IS already operates (Afghanistan), has carried out attacks (Russia), or aims to expand (China), but the highly repressive government, which has significantly curtailed freedom of worship, has likely been a key driver for radicalisation. Multiple notable recent attacks, including the Crocus Hall attack, were perpetrated by Tajik IS militants.
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) commander assassinated in Kabul, Afghanistan
A stabbing attack occurred in Kabul on 2 February, which resulted in the death of “Kohi”, nom de guerre of the commander of the BLA’s Majeed Brigade. Sometimes described as a “suicide” brigade, the Majeed unit is responsible for carrying out suicide attacks in Pakistan and is assessed as one of the more elite units within the BLA. The attack was likely a targeted killing of an important BLA unit linked to significant militant activity in Pakistan. Whilst no group has claimed responsibility for the killing, the BLA will likely assess that Pakistan was in some way behind the killing, which is likely to provoke BLA reprisal attacks in Pakistan.
Further IED attack on Thai security forces
On the morning of 7 February, four Thai police officers were injured when an improved explosive device (IED) detonated near a police booth in the Nong Chik district in the restless Patani province. There are currently no indications as to who planted the IED and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers were examining the area. However, there have been a series of often underreported IED attacks on the Thai police in the far south of the country, with Islamist separatist groups like the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) most commonly suspected. The frequency of the attacks may indicate a gradual resurgence of the South Thailand insurgency, likely fueled by internal divisions within the insurgency and systemic failures of peace efforts.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Widespread disruption after cold front brings heavy snow across South Korea
A cold front in South Korea has caused widespread disruption and is expected to last until at least 9 February, with icy temperatures recorded nationwide. Heavy snowfall has resulted in major transport disruptions, flight cancellations and multiple road accidents, including a 30-car pileup on the Sunchon-Wanju Expressway. The Korea Meteorological Administration has warned of continued snowfall in mountainous and inland regions, predicting up to 8 centimetres of additional snow in these areas and temperatures falling to as low as minus 17 degrees Celsius.
Flooding causes widespread disruptions in Queensland, Australia
Northern Queensland, Australia, is experiencing severe flooding due to a low-pressure system that has brought heavy torrential rains. Emergency warnings have been issued for fast-moving floods in Georgetown, with dangerous conditions prompting urgent advisories. At least two fatalities have been reported due to flood-related incidents since the onset of the severe weather. Authorities have also issued flood advice for the Burdekin region and urged residents in Hinchinbrook to conserve water as the flooding has disrupted power and water supplies. In Townsville, residents who had previously evacuated from areas such as Rosslea, Hermit, and Railway Estate have been allowed to return home. However, the region continues to face challenges, with water supply disruptions in Charters Tower and widespread internet and phone outages in Far North Queensland. A highway bridge between Ingham and Townsville collapsed, severing a critical access point for some towns.
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Driving Growth, Innovation, and Cybersecurity Excellence with Experienced Leadership
We are thrilled to announce David Wing as the new Managing Director of Solace Cyber. With over two decades of experience in the industry, David brings a wealth of knowledge, leadership, and strategic vision to our growing organisation.
20 Years of Leadership
David has spent the last 20 years in enterprise sales, leading and integrating teams that drive transformational business change across the end-to-end technology stack. His expertise extends to mergers and acquisitions (M&A), where he has successfully integrated cross-functional business operations while delivering significant revenue growth in acquired companies. At the helm of multi-department teams comprising approximately 200 professionals, he has played a crucial role in aligning business functions, optimising performance, and delivering real impact.

David Wing, Managing Director of Solace Cyber
David Wing on Joining Solace Cyber
Speaking about his decision to join Solace Cyber, David shared:
“Ever since the inception of Solace Cyber, I have closely followed its progression. When the opportunity arose to lead this exceptional team into the next stage of its journey, I knew it was the perfect fit. The cybersecurity landscape is constantly evolving, and this role allows me to leverage my expertise in an exciting and dynamic market while making a tangible difference for businesses. At Solace Cyber, we don’t just protect organisations—we help them navigate their darkest hours and emerge stronger. I look forward to working alongside our talented team to continue delivering life-changing security solutions for years to come.”
Pushing Boundaries and Setting New Standards
The leadership team at Solace Cyber also expressed their enthusiasm for David’s appointment:
“David’s proven track record of leadership, innovation, and driving growth makes him the perfect person to guide Solace Cyber through its next phase. His expertise in leading high-performing teams, combined with his deep understanding of cybersecurity and business transformation, will be instrumental in expanding our impact. We are confident that under his leadership, Solace Cyber will continue to push boundaries and set new standards in the industry.”
We are excited for this new chapter and look forward to the continued success and innovation that David will bring to Solace Cyber. Please join us in welcoming him to the team!
Brussels Metro Shooting Triggers Security Lockdown Across City
Intelligence cut off: 12:00 GMT 05 February 2025
On the morning of 5 February at approximately 06:15 local time, at least two individuals armed with Kalashnikov-style rifles opened fire at the entrance of the Clémenceau Metro station, located to the southwest of Brussels’ city centre. No injuries were reported during the shooting as of the time of writing, and suspects then reportedly fled inside the metro tunnel network. CCTV images captured the shooting, showing two people firing multiple bursts at an unidentified target.
As of the time of writing, the suspects remain at large. Belgian authorities have shut down Clémenceau station, as well as the nearby Brussels-Midi station, which serves as the terminal for the Eurostar train. Metro lines 2 and 6 have been shut down between Troon and Weststation, tram lines 4 and 10 have been interrupted between Noordstation and Churchill, and trams 51 and 82 have been interrupted between Anderlechtsepoort and Zuidstation.
Authorities have advised commuters to use alternative metro lines but have so far ruled out a complete shutdown of the metro system. Authorities have likewise created a response post at the Anderlecht town hall, located west of Brussels.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Major Traffic Disruptions Expected After Brussels Metro Attack
The shooting is likely linked to local organised crime. The Brussels-Midi area is a hotspot for drug dealing and other forms of crime. The timing of the attack may suggest it was primarily meant as intimidation. There are currently no indications that the shootings are linked to terrorism.
The shooting is highly likely to result in severe traffic disruptions throughout Brussels, and an increase in the deployment of security personnel to the city, particularly affecting the city centre and other high-traffic areas. Roadblocks will likely be set up by authorities on the main roadways in and near Brussels, including the E19, E40, E411, E429, and the ring road R0. Increased security presence near Brussels International Airport is also likely and may affect travellers arriving to Belgium or leaving the country.
Transport disruptions are highly likely to continue throughout 5 February. Eurostar services are likely to be delayed throughout the day.
Travel Risk Advice: Safety Guidelines for Brussels, Belguim
- If near Clémenceau Metro station, leave the area. Shelter in place until authorities issue an all clear.
- Closely monitor local news reports and government alerts.
- Monitor the X page of the Brussels Intercommunal Transport Company (STIB/MIVB) for updates.
- If in the event you become caught in the vicinity of an attack you are reminded to RUN – HIDE – TELL.
- If caught in the vicinity of an armed attack, seek immediate hard cover from any incoming gunfire or explosions and leave the area if safe to do so. Continue to adhere to all instructions issued by authorities and obey any security cordons in place.
- Further attacks cannot be ruled out as this attack may be part of a series of planned attacks. Remain vigilant over the coming days and avoid large gatherings, public buildings, transport hubs and military infrastructure where possible.
- Expect and plan for extensive transportation disruptions in Brussels.
- It is highly likely over the coming days that there will be an increased security presence across Brussels. Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
- Ensure that you always carry personal identification documents or copies.
- Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any losses in electricity.
- Monitor the Solace Secure platform and trusted local media for updates relevant to the conflict.
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Executive Summary
Americas (AMER)
The new Trump administration’s crackdown on migration and other controversial policies is almost certain to result in protests across the United States.
In Colombia, Venezuela’s alleged support of the ELN offensive is likely to sustain the guerilla group’s operations and lead to a deterioration in the security environment.
Europe, Middle East & Africa (EMEA)
Alternative For Germany (AfD) support for Christian Democratic Union (CDU) proposals in the Bundestag is almost certain to trigger unrest in Germany in the run-up to elections.
The resignation of the Serbian PM and mayor of Novi Sad are unlikely to curb current demonstrations, with protestors driven by broader concerns over corruption and government accountability.
Russia’s current main effort in Ukraine is almost certainly Pokrovsk, the capture of which will set the conditions for advances north and west and provide Moscow with more bargaining power.
A thwarted terror attack in Morocco likely indicates the growing ability of Islamic State affiliates to project influence across the continent.
Further unrest in Democratic Republic of the Congo capital Kinshasa in highly likely as M23 militia capture Goma and attempt to expand into South Kivu.
Asia-Pacific (APAC)
The discovery of large quantities of explosives near Sydney, Australia is almost certainly linked to growing cases of extremism, self-radicalisation, and antisemitic hate in the country.
Pakistan’s new amendment to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) bill will almost certainly be exploited to curb dissent and suppress the opposition.
North, Central and South America
United States: Migration crackdown provokes protests across multiple states
President Donald Trump has vowed to take an extremely restrictive line on migration. On day one of his presidency, Trump signed multiple executive orders targeting the US-Mexico border, including declaring a “national emergency” and ceasing some of the previous administration’s policies meant to allow migrants opportunities to more easily claim asylum in the US.
Trump also signed orders expanding the powers of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain undocumented migrants. On 29 January, Trump achieved the first legislative victory of his administration, with the approval of a law that allows ICE agents to detain migrants charged with an offence regardless of their immigration status.
In response to the administration’s policies, multiple protests have already occurred in large US urban areas, especially in southern states. Protests are likewise scheduled to occur on 1 and 2 February in multiple locations in Texas, including Arlington, Dallas and Houston, as well as in others states including Arizona, Oklahoma, California, Kansas, and New York.
Solace Global Assessment:
The protests scheduled for the weekend of 1-2 February are likely to represent the first major wave of unrest in the US since the inauguration. These protests are likely to be peaceful overall, although there is a realistic possibility of gatherings resulting in episodes of violence and vandalism, especially if co-opted by other protest movements such as the pro-Palestine movement.
The high visibility of Trump and some of his political allies, as well as some of the controversial policies enacted by the administration, are highly likely to be major drivers of unrest in the medium-to-long term.
In the United States, threats of “mass deportations” are likely to be met with considerable activism, including possible protests targeting transportation hubs such as airports. Other contentious policies not directly aimed at the southern border are likewise highly likely to draw unrest.
For instance, Trump signed an executive order on 29 January pledging to combat antisemitism, including by deporting foreign nationals deemed to have endorsed proscribed terrorist organisations. Pro-Palestinian groups in the United States have stated that the order is an attempt to silence their criticism of Israel’s policies in Gaza and the West Bank. If this order is implemented, there is a realistic possibility of it resulting in increased civil unrest, especially at large and politically active university campuses.
Colombia: Leaked documents indicate Venezuela supported recent ELN offensive
Diplomatic tensions between Bogota and Caracas have deteriorated in response to Colombian accusations that the Maduro regime sponsored the recent National Liberation Army (ELN) in northeast Colombia.
The ELN launched an offensive in mid-January in the Catatumbo region against rival guerilla factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and organised crime groups to secure control of lucrative narcotic production and smuggling routes. The offensive has involved attacks of rival factions and civilians, has killed an assessed 100 people, displaced around 50,000 and has overwhelmed local morgues and healthcare facilities.
The Colombian government has suggested that Maduro, who was recently re-inaugurated for his third term, either green-lit the operation or played an active role in planning it to establish indirect control of the cocaine-producing region.
Solace Global Assessment:
The ELN has operated within Venezuela for decades, originally in exchange for cocaine profits. However, the recent accusations imply that the Maduro regime is now using the ELN as a proxy force to establish control of the region.
Venezuela has also deployed around 2,000 troops to the border, ostensibly to aid displaced Colombians but critics have suggested the troops are supporting the ELN and securing drug trafficking routes. If true, Venezuelan support could help sustain ELN operations with funds and arms, increasing the likelihood of a protracted conflict.
President Petro has already declared a state of emergency for the Catatumbo region and multiple other municipalities, and has deployed government forces to combat the ELN- moves that have almost certainly jeopardised his previous plans for “total peace” through dialogue and negotiations.
The Petro administration has also offered a USD 700,000 reward for information on ELN leaders, signalling a shift towards a more aggressive security policy. However, given the ELN’s entrenched presence in the jungle and potential Venezuelan backing, military efforts are unlikely to dismantle the group’s operations. Conversely, the government’s strategy could trigger a wave of reprisal attacks across Colombia.
The government is engaged with the ELN in other parts of the country and there have been a series of improvised explosive device (IED) detonations throughout Colombia. Although attributing these attacks directly to the ELN is challenging, many have taken place in areas where the group has a well-established presence. If a ceasefire remains elusive, Colombia is likely to achieve its worst year for violence since the 2016 ceasefire agreement, with January 2025 already being marked as the worst month for violence since Petro assumed office.
Escalating violence is likely to result in the displacement of thousands more people, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, a rise in assaults on aid workers and healthcare professionals, a worsening humanitarian crisis, and the overstretching of local services. The ELN and other armed groups may also increase the kidnapping of foreign workers and tourists to raise funds, a tactic employed extensively in the past.
AMER Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
US pauses foreign aid programs for 90 days
The US State Department issued a “stop-work” order for all existing foreign assistance programs and paused new aid, following directives of one of President Donald Trump’s day-one executive orders. Waivers were issued for military financing to Israel and Egypt.
The pausing of aid is likely part of the new White House’s foreign policy that is characterised by transactional diplomacy, with the withdrawal of aid, or the imposition of sanctions, used to renegotiate international partnerships or to coerce compliance.
The aid freeze will likely have short-term implications in countries that rely on US shipments of medicine, food, or other humanitarian aid. This may allow China and other international competitors to bolster their relations with key partners in strategic regions.
Protests break out in Culiacan, Mexico, after children killed in attempted carjacking
Large-scale civil unrest erupted in the capital of Sinaloa state on 23 January and has continued, following the killing of two children and their father during an attempted carjacking. The recent incident has likely become a catalyst for local resentment against increasing cartel crime, and for authorities’ lack of success in fighting it.
Protesters in Sinaloa have particularly targeted Governor Rocha Moya, who has pledged not to resign. Increasing cartel violence, which is especially severe in states like Sinaloa, continues to be a major issue for the Mexican government.
With the US increasing diplomatic pressure, including via threats of coercive military and economic measures, on Mexico to deal with the cartels, there is a realistic possibility of President Claudia Sheinbaum choosing to move towards a harsher policing approach than her predecessor Lopez Obrador’s “hugs not bullets” policy.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Wave of copycat threats at US schools following Antioch Shooting
The shooting occurred on 22 January and resulted in one death. The perpetrator had published material online prior to the shooting praising various mass killers and espousing far right and white supremacist ideology and attempted to livestream the attack.
According to local media, at least eight other students, some as young as 12, have been arrested since the 22 January shooting for threatening to carry out copycat attacks. The shooting likely represents a notable incident as it highlights perpetrators’ symbiotic relationship with social media as well as the use of paradoxical and self-contradictory violent ideology; the attacker, a black student, repeatedly used white supremacist and Neo-Nazi imagery.
Kenyan police launches operation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti
Clashes between the international UN-mandated police force and gang members broke out on 27 January in the peripheral area of Kenscoff, located outside of Port-au-Prince at the foothills of the Chaine de la Selle mountain range. The operation was reportedly launched in response to an offensive from gangs originally from Carrefour, a town approximately 10 kilometres south of Port-au-Prince.
Local media reported that at least 20 gang members were killed. The attack in Kenscoff is notable as the area occupies a strategic position controlling the southern approach to Port-au-Prince, and as a link between the West and Southeast departments. Moreover, local media reported that the route via Kenscoff has become more important as it is an alternative to the gang-controlled National Road 2.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Two separate wildfires broke out near La Jolla, northwest of San Diego, on 23-24 January. The fires were fuelled by strong winds. While the La Jolla fires were contained relatively quickly, other blazes erupted in the following days, with one (the “Border 2” fire), adjacent to the US-Mexico border, burning more than 500 acres.
The White House and the state government of California continued to clash over responsibility for the fires’ severe damage. President Trump signed an executive order on 24 January to direct federal agencies to “override” California water management rules in order to combat wildfires. Critics of the executive order, including environmentalist groups, have accused the administration of trying to secure greater control over water resources in north California to benefit the agricultural industry in the area.
Winter storm causes widespread disruption in Hawaii, US
The winter storm that began impacting Hawaii on 29 January has caused significant disruptions across the state. The National Weather Service (NWS) has issued flash flood warnings for several islands, including Maui, Molokai, and Oahu, affecting over one million residents. The flash flood warning for Maui has been extended until 00:30 local time.
Severe thunderstorms and strong winds have resulted in widespread power outages, with over 54,000 Hawaiian Electric customers without power on Oahu, Hawaii Island, and in Maui County. Restoration efforts are ongoing, but Hawaiian Electric has urged customers to prepare for the possibility of extended outages.
In response to the severe weather conditions, several schools in Maui County will be closed on Friday ahead of the predicted peak of the storm. Meanwhile, on Kauai Island, the Kauai Island Utility Cooperative has reported that customers in Wainiha and Haena will remain without power until at least Friday morning due to limited access to transmission towers caused by the weather.
Residents are advised to remain vigilant and adhere to safety advisories as the storm continues to impact the region.
Europe, Middle East & Africa
Germany: Bundestag set to vote on controversial immigration law
The German parliament is set to vote on 31 January on a new and highly contentious immigration law known as the “influx limitation law”. The law has been advanced by the centre-right and conservative Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) bloc.
The law could pass through the Bundestag if supported by the controversial far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. The bill follows a recent controversial motion that passed recently which was advanced by the CDU/CSU bloc and passed with the support of the AfD. This motion was non-binding and proposed establishing permanent border controls and immediately detaining individuals who are required to leave Germany.
Solace Global Assessment:
The passing of the CDU/CSU motion with AfD support marks a major shift in the political landscape in Germany. It marked the first time that a motion in Germany’s Bundestag was passed with the backing of the AfD. This represents a break from the longstanding strategy of establishing a “firewall” against AfD collaboration and has resulted in significant criticism of current CDU leader Friedrich Merz, especially from the left-wing Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens.
Should the CDU/CSU law pass with AfD support, it will almost certainly provoke fears that the AfD is gradually being normalised within German politics, a trend that will almost certainly trigger large-scale demonstrations across Germany before the country’s general elections on 23 February.
The CDU strategy has likely been to move further right to counter the AfD, with current polls indicating that the far-right party is set to achieve a record 20-21 per cent of the national vote. However, this strategy has potentially backfired, as it has alienated many Germans, including within the CDU’s traditional base, already leading to protests across Germany.
The CDU’s drift to the right and greater participation of the AfD, is also likely to increase the threat of political violence and terrorism. The far-right are likely to feel emboldened by these trends and may interpret it as a legitimisation of their views. Furthermore, the increased measures and rhetoric aimed at migrants are likely to increase the risk of terrorism in Germany, with a series of recent attacks linked to the cancellation of asylum statuses or threats of deportation.
Serbia: PM resigns in response to major protests
On 28 January, Serbian Prime Minister Milos Vucevic resigned after months of student and civic protests that have gradually increased in size after originally being triggered by the November 2024 collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, which killed 15 people. Alongside Vucevic, the Mayor of Novi Sad, Milan Djuric, also resigned, citing the desire to prevent further unrest and division within society.
At the protest’s height, an estimated 55,000 protestors amassed in the capital Belgrade, with students establishing a blockade on the Autokomanda junction, a major intersection that links several key roads and motorways in the capital.
Human rights groups have warned of the government’s use of repression, indiscriminate force and mass arrests in response to the protests.
Solace Global Assessment:
The protests, initially sparked by the Novi Sad incident, almost certainly expanded into a broader movement condemning widespread corruption in Serbia. This movement gained support from students, universities, civil society groups, and various other segments of the population. Some estimates suggest that over 60 per cent of Serbians have endorsed the protests, which has likely increased in reaction to the government’s use of force.
The resignations of the prime minister and the mayor of Novi Sad were likely designed to curb the protest movement and were probably ordered by President Aleksandar Vucic; however, it is unlikely that the protests will subside in the near future. President Vucic has maintained an iron grip on power since assuming office in 2017 and has been accused of decreasing civil liberties and freedom of the press, and of fostering an illiberal regime.
The grassroots protest movement likely holds him partially accountable and views the current resignations as insufficient, with many demanding a complete change of government. President Vucic could call early elections to arrest the development of further protests. However, these will likely be boycotted by the opposition, a move that would undermine the legitimacy of his government.
In the short term, President Vucic will likely appoint a new prime minister, a move that is unlikely to quell the protests or address the broader dissatisfaction with his leadership.
Ukraine: Russia targets Pokrovsk to shape conditions for future operations
Russian ground forces in Donetsk Oblast are setting the conditions for an encirclement and the ultimate capture of the strategic city of Pokrovsk. Russian strategy has shifted away from costly frontal assaults to a gradual encirclement of Pokrovsk from the west, after bypassing Ukrainian defences.
On 30 January alone, Ukrainian forces claim to have repelled over 70 attacks in the Pokrovsk direction, with Ukrainian commanders complaining about insufficient manpower to defend the front lines, despite conducting a series of counterattacks.
Russian forces have also initiated smaller-scale attacks across multiple frontline sectors, including near Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar and in Zaporizhia Oblast.
Solace Global Assessment:
Current battlefield observations suggest that Russia’s current main effort is to seize Pokrovsk prior to any proposed negotiations. Pokrovsk is a major logistics node, the capture of which would almost certainly set the conditions for future Russian advances north towards Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, two of Ukraine’s major strongholds remaining in the Donbas.
Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are major industrial cities that both hold military and logistical significance. Both cities serve as critical logistics centres for Ukrainian forces defending the Donbas, both cities form part of Ukraine’s defensive lines, and Kramatorsk currently serves as the administrative centre of the Donetsk Oblast.
The fall of these cities would be a major blow to Ukrainian morale, would hugely disrupt Ukrainian defensive operations and would enable Russia to consolidate control over the Donbas. The capture of Pokrovsk would also enable future Russian advances west into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where Ukraine has rushed to improve its defences.
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is not one of the oblasts currently claimed by Russia. However, future Russian advances on this axis could ultimately help lead to Russia advancing towards the River Dnieper, a natural defensive barrier. This could help sever Ukraine in two and is likely one of the initial strategic objectives of the Kremlin.
The collective threat to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk, combined with the lack of assurances from the Trump administration, is almost certain to intensify pressure on the Zelensky administration to pursue negotiations, particularly as Ukraine continues to face manpower shortages and dwindling Western military aid.
Any further Russian territorial gains would significantly strengthen Moscow’s bargaining position, allowing it to dictate terms in future negotiations and potentially press for broader territorial concessions from Kyiv. Ukraine will likely be forced to divert considerable resources to the defence of Pokrovsk. However, as already demonstrated, Russian forces are likely to increase pressure across the line of contact, launching intensified attacks on multiple sectors. This strategy is aimed at overstretching Ukrainian forces, exploiting their manpower shortages, and preventing them from effectively consolidating their defensive positions.
Morocco: Islamic State (IS) plot foiled, four arrests made
On 26 January, Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (BCIJ) announced the arrests of four individuals in Had Soualem, a town in the Casablanca-Settat region, who had reportedly been planning to carry out an attack in Casablanca. According to authorities, the four had pledged allegiance to IS and had carried out advanced preparations for a coordinated attack at multiple locations, including scouting possible sites and obtaining material that could be used to make explosives. Moreover, authorities claim that the group was planning to travel to the Sahel to receive further training.
Solace Global Assessment:
Moroccan security has carried out multiple operations targeting Islamist extremist cells in the country in recent years. In August 2024, 50 suspected extremists were arrested in a joint operation across multiple cities.
The recent arrests are notable as the suspects seem to not have only been inspired by IS but have purportedly received online training from the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP)- a group they could have joined post the attack. The growing use of Morocco as a gateway to IS affiliates further south is likely further evidenced by the recent arrest of a US citizen, who had intended to travel to Morocco via France before heading south to join ISSP.
Morocco likely remains a desirable target for IS terrorists. The country has strong relations with neighbouring European states and is an important destination for Mediterranean tourism and business. Moreover, it has considerably improved its relations with Israel in recent years and has gradually liberalised, resulting in a considerable disenfranchised and conservative population receptive to radicalisation.
Finally, Morocco is strategically located on the northwest African coast with access to both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and acts as the key transit point in the western Mediterranean migration route to Spain and onwards to other parts of Europe. ISSP’s alleged involvement in the failed attack likely indicates a strategy of projecting IS’ influence outside of its current main area of operations in West Africa and the Sahel.
Transregional attacks are likely to increase IS propaganda campaigns, helping it attract recruits and funds in areas both under its influence and areas where it has little influence via online channels. IS’ long-term objective may also be to force countries like Morocco to focus counterterrorist operations internally, a strategy that could help it consolidate power and influence in the heavily destabilised Sahelian and West African states.
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): M23 militants seize Goma and begin advance towards Bukavu
Following days of fighting after the Rwanda-backed M23 militia’s advance into Goma on 27 January, relative calm returned to the city on 29 January. Hundreds have been killed and over 400,000 displaced in North Kivu since the beginning of 2025, according to the United Nations (UN). The UN has evacuated its non-essential and civilian staff from Goma to Kampala, Uganda. M23 militants began advancing from the town of Minova, captured on 21 January, towards South Kivu on 29 January. On 30 January, violent clashes occurred in Kalangala in South Kivu.
On 28 and 29 January, violent protests broke out in Kinshasa. Protesters engaged in looting and targeted several embassies including those belonging to the United States, France, Belgium, Rwanda, Kenya, and Japan. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters, and unconfirmed reports indicate that live ammunition was used. In response to violent protests breaking out in Kinshasa, the Congolese government has banned protests from 29 January. The US Department of State has updated their Travel Advisory Level from three to four, issuing a “do not travel” warning. Similarly, Belgium’s government has advised its citizens against travelling to the DRC.
While the border with Rwanda is officially open, unannounced border closures are likely. The Australian government has warned citizens of possible cross-border fire and advised against travel to the Rubavu district of Rwanda close to the border. Rwanda has claimed that at least nine citizens were killed in the cross-border fire.
Solace Global Assessment:
It is highly likely that M23 are attempting to push on to Kavumu, where Bukavu’s airport is located, in the coming days. More broadly, they are almost certainly aiming to capture Bukavu itself, South Kivu’s provincial capital. The quick advance is almost certainly aiming to take advantage of the current weakness of Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), who have so far failed to prevent M23 advances in previous months.
On 30 January, M23 rebel leaders livestreamed a press statement stating that the group plans to remain in Goma and expand its offensive. South Kivu’s governor, Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki, has banned all forms of navigation on Lake Kivu on 29 January. This is almost certainly an attempt to protect Bukavu’s northeastern flank from an amphibious M23 approach.
The M23’s capture of Goma and further expansion threatens major regional escalation. Burundian forces have reportedly been sent to South Kivu to help the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) defend Bukavu. Burundi and Rwanda generally have hostile relations, with each government accusing each other of supporting their respective opponents. There is a high risk of Rwanda-backed M23 clashing with Burundian troops, which would almost certainly increase tensions and raise the risk of regional conflict.
Rwanda’s foreign minister has stated that the country backs a possible ceasefire agreement between M23 and the DRC government, while reaffirming that Rwandan forces were not directly involved in the capture of Goma. UN peacekeeping chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix has asserted that there is “no question” of Rwandan troops assisting M23 in Goma. President Paul Kagame has denied allegations of supporting the Tutsi-led M23 but has consistently accused the DRC of collaborating with Hutu rebels, which he views as a threat to Rwanda.
Although Rwanda denies direct involvement, it is widely believed to provide military support to the group in an attempt to create a buffer zone and extract precious minerals from the DRC. The M23 militia’s continued territorial expansion, therefore, raises significant concerns over the escalation of tensions into a regional conflict, whereby the DRC perceives Rwanda as an aggressor violating its territorial integrity.
EMEA Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
French government again at risk of collapse
The government of François Bayrou was appointed in December 2024 after the previous Prime Minister Michel Barnier was ousted following attempts to pass a controversial budget. While Barnier tried to obtain the support of France’s right, Bayrou has courted the Socialist Party (PS). To do so, Bayrou has stated that he is open to renegotiating some particularly inflammatory parts of the budget, such as President Macron’s unpopular pension reform.
On 28 January, PS threatened to withdraw support from Bayrou and possibly support a no-confidence motion following some comments by the PM against migration. While the PS’ threats almost certainly reflect a reaction to the possible political impact of Bayrou’s comments, socialist leaders are also likely seeking to intensify pressure on the government in order to obtain more concessions. The PS’ political strategy highly likely aims to solidly establish the party as a force against Macron’s “austerity” policies, while simultaneously preventing a further haemorrhage of votes towards the more radical and populist La France Insoumise (LFI).
US billionaire Elon Musk speaks at Alternative for Germany (AfD) event
Musk has repeatedly endorsed the AfD, which is on track to obtain its best-ever electoral result at the 23 February elections according to current polls. Connecting remotely to the event hosted in Halle on 25 January, Musk further endorsed the party’s platform and claimed that it is “the best hope” for the country. In response, mass counterprotests were organised in Berlin and Cologne, with 100,000 and 20,000 attending respectively. Musk’s direct engagement in European politics in support of far-right parties may increase risks for US businesses and assets, including diplomatic missions, in Europe. Musk’s Tesla “Megafactory” near Berlin has notably been repeatedly targeted by activists, with a case of sabotage in March 2024 resulting in at least EUR 1 billion in damages.
More than 100,000 protests Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia
At least 60,000 people gathered in Bratislava on 24 January to protest against the Prime Minister’s perceived friendliness to Moscow. Last week, Fico had stated that the planned protests were part of an attempt by foreign forces and domestic fifth columns to stage a coup. In December, the Prime Minister travelled to Moscow to meet Putin, and more recently members of his party advanced the idea of leaving the EU. It is highly likely that the opposition will again attempt to push forward a no-confidence vote, as the pressure from civil society on the government continues to increase.
Lukashenko claims victory in Belarus elections
The authoritarian leader of the East European country claimed to have won a decisive victory, with more than 80 per cent of the vote, granting him a seventh term in office and prolonging his three decades of rule. The election result was not unexpected as Lukashenko’s regime has imprisoned or forced into exile virtually all opposition leaders. A notable development followed the elections as the Hungarian government blocked an EU joint statement condemning the vote as not “free and fair”. The symbolic move was almost certainly linked to the government of Hungary’s broader campaign to change the EU’s foreign policy towards Ukraine, or at least to obstruct support for Ukraine.
Italy arrests, then releases, Libyan police head under arrest warrant by the Hague
Osama Elmasry Njeem, the head of the Libyan judicial police who is accused by the International Criminal Court of multiple crimes including war crimes and crimes against humanity, was arrested earlier in January in Turin. On 21 January, Njeem was freed and repatriated on an Italian government plane. Italian authorities claimed that Njeem had been released due to a “procedural” error.
The episode was widely condemned by the opposition and civil society actors, who have accused Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of securing Njeem’s release and repatriation in order to maintain good relations with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), a key player in Meloni’s plans to control migrant flows in the Mediterranean.
On 28 January, Italian prosecutors stated they are investigating Meloni, alongside two government ministers, over the episode. There is a realistic possibility of protests in Rome, Turin, and possibly Milan and Bologna, during the weekend.
Protests at key oil ports in Libya
Protesters occupied the ports of Es Sider and Ras Lanuf, which represent key hubs for the export of oil from the Oil Crescent region of the country. The protesters demanded the relocation of oil companies’ headquarters to the area, citing the lack of economic development in the oil-producing region. The protests are relevant as they occur at a time when Libya’s National Oil Corporation is seeking to increase its output in line with other OPEC members.
Sahel juntas formally leave ECOWAS
The government of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali announced their formal exit from the regional bloc on 29 January. The announcement comes after a year of ECOWAS’ attempts to convince the three states to remain within the bloc.
The three junta states will now highly likely seek to pursue further integration within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the alternative bloc they have formed in opposition to ECOWAS. The development is likely to accelerate the disintegration of ties between the landlocked junta states and the coastal members of ECOWAS. It may further worsen regional instability, as the three juntas, despite Russian help, remain unable to contain growing Islamist insurgencies in their territories.
Sporadic protests in Mozambique but widespread unrest diminishes
Sporadic protests have broken out along the N4 Maputo-South Africa motorway following Trans-Africa Concession’s (TRAC) attempt to resume toll collection. The most recent blockade by protesters occurred on 29 January, whereby protesters blocked the road shortly after 07:00 local time (05:00 UTC) and continued until approximately 17:30 local time (15:30 UTC), when protesters voluntarily demobilised.
President Daniel swore in a new General Commander of the Mozambican Police (PRM), Joaquim Sive on 27 January. The appointment comes after Chapo dismissed Bernadino Rafael on 23 January. Chapo announced that Sive’s task is to “regain the people’s trust in the police”. Following likely top-down orders to refrain from the use of force, there is a realistic possibility that security forces will attempt to refrain from using tear gas and live ammunition in further cases of unrest.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Activist facing trial for Quran burning in Sweden killed
Salwan Momika had become a popular figure on social media as one of the most prominent faces of the 2023 Swedish Quran burning. He was scheduled to be sentenced alongside another man on 30 January for inciting violence. Momika was reportedly shot and killed on the night of 29 January in the town of Sodertalje, near Stockholm, while he was streaming on TikTok. Five people were arrested in connection with the shooting.
The global high visibility of the victim (Momika had more than 200,000 followers on X.com and videos featuring him have millions of views), plus the highly likely religious motive for the shooting, make the possibility of copycat violence highly likely. For the same reason, there is also a threat of “retaliatory” actions against Muslim communities in Sweden and other Western states.
Turkish forces arrest 100 in anti-Islamic State (IS) raid
The arrests, which occurred last week, were announced by Turkish officials on 29 January. More than 24 provinces were targeted in the operation, including Ankara and Istanbul. Overall, more than 900 suspected IS supporters were arrested in 2024.
Turkey remains a hotspot for IS recruitment and activity, due to its close proximity to the main areas of operations of IS in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its closeness to Europe and Russia, two key targets for IS operations. Turkey is moreover a high-value target due to its counterterrorism efforts in the region. There is a realistic possibility of IS reprisal attacks in response to the raids.
Syrian government intercepts arms shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah
On 25 January, Syrian border forces intercepted a shipment of arms intended for Hezbollah in Serghaya, Rif Dimashq. The interception followed the previous interdiction of a shipment of drones to Hezbollah which was stopped at the port of Tartus. It is highly likely that the shipments had been organised by Iranian-backed elements as part of Tehran’s efforts to rearm Hezbollah following the latest conflict with Israel. The new Syrian government has significantly boosted its diplomatic engagements with international partners and is likely interested in removing Western and Israeli concerns about Hezbollah’s efforts to replenish its arsenals.
The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) launches offensive against Boko Haram in Nigeria
On 27 January, pro-IS channels reported that ISWAP had attacked Boko Haram (JAS) fighters near the small village of Kachalla Kelluri, situated in Borno state at the border with Niger. IS sources claimed that at least 50 Boko Haram fighters were killed in the offensive.
In 2021, ISWAP forces killed Boko Haram leader Abubakar Sheaku in an offensive in Sambisa Forest, Borno State. Since then, the group has made considerable inroads in taking over territory previously occupied by Boko Haram, especially in the Lake Chad basin. Since 2023, Boko Haram has managed to recover some of its losses and has engaged in clashes with ISWAP. In April 2024, more than 100 dead were reported following clashes in the so-called “Tumbums” islands of Lake Chad.
Rapid Support Forces (RSF) intensify attack on al-Fashir, Sudan
At least 70 people were killed after RSF forces attacked the last functioning hospital in al-Fashir. The city is the last stronghold of the government in Darfur and has been under an RSF siege since May 2024. With the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continuing to make considerable gains in the country’s east following the beginning of their offensive in Khartoum, it is highly likely that RSF officials are aiming to clear al-Fashir and redirect forces towards the capital. Taking al-Fashir would also represent a significant political victory that is highly likely considered valuable by the RSF after the recent setbacks near Khartoum.
INTERPOL and AFRIPOL arrest 37 in anti-Islamist operation in East Africa
On 27 January, it was reported that coordinated November-December counter-terrorism operations across Africa led to the apprehension of 37 suspected terrorists and the seizure of illicit material, including both small and heavy arms. Arrests were made in eight countries, including Somalia, the DRC, Tanzania, and Kenya- where 17 individuals were detained.
The detentions include suspected Islamic State (IS) and al-Shabaab members, as well as other local terrorist groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The operations likely allude to greater international cooperation in Africa and the increased use of modern surveillance, particularly at ports of entry. However, the wave of arrests likely indicates the growing significance of Africa for transregional violent extremist organisations (VEOs) such as the Islamic State. IS has developed a network of affiliates across Africa, overseen by its General Directorate of Provinces, which is seeking to exploit porous borders, and overstretched governments to increase its influence.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Storm Eowyn damages energy infrastructure, causes prolonged outages in UK
At least 3,000 properties continued to suffer outages days after the storm made landfall, and more than 45,000 people were affected by outages in Northern Ireland throughout the period between 24 and 28 January. In total, power outages caused by the storm are estimated to have affected more than one million people. At least two deaths have been recorded, and more than five people were injured. The Met Office described the weather event as the “strongest storm in ten years”. Forecasts indicate that, despite Storm Eowyn’s dissipation on 27 January, strong winds are likely to continue throughout the 31 January – 2 February weekend.
UNRWA ban comes into effect in Israel and the West Bank
The Israeli government had passed a law banning the activities of the United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA), but the legislation only came into effect on 30 January, after a legal challenge to pause it was struck down by Israel’s Supreme Court. The Israeli government has accused UNRWA operators of collaborating with Hamas. UNRWA plays a fundamental role in the West Bank and Gaza, where it operates dozens of clinics. As of the time of writing, the United Nations has said that UNRWA clinics remain operational.
Asia–Pacific
Pakistan: President signs controversial amendment bill that expands social media controls
On 29 January, President Asif Ali Zadari gave his assent to a controversial amendment to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), a day after the amendment’s passage in the Senate. The bill had earlier been passed by the National Assembly on 23 January, causing condemnation from international human rights organisations and the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ).
The new legislation criminalises ‘fake news’, expands regulatory control over content and expands the powers of the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority through the establishment of a new Social Media Regulation and Protection Authority. According to the law, spreading “false and fake information” will now be punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine.
Solace Global Assessment:
The new laws are highly likely intended to be used by authorities to suppress dissent and target opposition supporters who use social media platforms to criticise the government. PECA was initially passed in 2016, and initial fears from activists and human rights organisations that the bill would be used to quash dissent have materialised in recent years during periods of unrest.
The major opposition party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) have led a large-scale anti-government protest movement since the 2022 ousting of the Imran Khan government, which dramatically escalated in 2023 following Khan’s arrest and subsequent imprisonment.
The PFUJ, Pakistan’s largest trade union for journalists, has announced plans for nationwide protests set to culminate in a ‘grand sit in’ in front of Parliament House in Islamabad on 14 February. Parliament House’s location in Islamabad’s ‘Red Zone’, gives authorities extensive powers to prohibit protests and public gatherings in the area – it is highly likely that any significant protests will be met by violent crowd dispersal methods from security forces and result in violent clashes.
Australia: Large quantities of explosives found by police in connection with planned antisemitic attack
An investigation has been launched by authorities following the 19 January discovery of a “caravan” containing enough explosive material to create a bomb with a blast radius of more than 40 metres, in the Sydney suburb of Dural. Alongside the explosives, police found a list of targets linked with the local Jewish community. Two people have been detained in connection with the discovery. One of them had reportedly already been charged for other antisemitic attacks. More than 100 counter-terrorism police have been assigned to the investigation.
Solace Global Assessment:
The discovery follows a significant increase in antisemitic and Islamophobic attacks in Australia. In December, an arson attack occurred at the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne, causing extensive damage and injuring one worshipper. It is almost certain that the rise in sectarian violence targeting Jews and Muslims has been driven by the conflict in Gaza and matches similar trends identified in other Western countries.
Australian authorities have described the latest incident as an “escalation” of the terrorism threat in the country, as it is the first time that large quantities of explosives are found alongside attack plans. The explosive retrieved by authorities reportedly consists of a compound that is commonly used for mining. Access to it requires a licence and proper security clearance, indicating that the perpetrators either acquired it “legally” through their work or stole it from a facility related to the mining sector.
APAC Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Stampede at Hindu festival in Uttar Pradesh, India, kills more than 30
The Maha Kumbh (“Festival of the Sacred Pitcher) is a Hindu pilgrimage whose location and date are decided via astronomical calculations and represents the largest single religious gathering in the world. In 2025, approximately 100 million people were expected to visit the festival location in Prayagraj over the course of 45 days starting on 13 January. A stampede on 29 January was reported after pilgrims tried to take a holy bath in the Triveni Sangam River, resulting in at least 30 deaths and more than 200 injuries. The massive influx of pilgrims to areas that have insufficient infrastructure poses a severe risk of similar events. There is a realistic possibility that protests will follow the recent incident.
Bangladesh’s Awami League calls for mass protests against Yunus governmen
The party of ousted long-time Bangladeshi ruler Sheikh Hasina called for mass demonstrations to take place between 1 and 18 February against the interim government of Muhammad Yunus. The protests will include a day-long Hartal (general strike) on 18 February. The protests are the most ambitious anti-government effort by the Awami League (AL) since Hasina was forced to flee the country following large-scale demonstrations in August 2024. Since the change in government, there have been multiple cases of political violence targeting AL members and sympathisers. These attacks have been mostly led by extra-parliamentary groups, and the Yunus government has de fact distanced itself from them. There is a realistic possibility of a sharp increase in sectarian political violence during the scheduled protest period.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Myanmar National Unity Government (NUG) leader claim 2025 is “tipping point” in the war
The NUG oversees the anti-junta People’s Defence Force (PDF) coalition. Acting President Duwa Lashi La claimed, in an interview with Al Jazeera, that anti-junta forces are looking to achieve a “Syria-like” resolution to the conflict in 2025. The president also called for international involvement in the conflict and for the cutting of financial lines to the junta. The NUG is likely seeking to maintain a balanced position with regional powers, including Beijing, the junta’s key backer. With junta forces continuing to lose ground and facing significant defections, the NUG’s moderate public diplomacy approach will almost certainly continue in order to push regional powers to increasingly consider a post-junta Myanmar to be aligned with their key interests.
Philippines suspends survey in South China Sea following tensions with China
On 25 January, a scientific survey was suspended after perceived harassment from vessels belonging to China’s Coast Guard and Navy. As two Philippine fisheries vessels approached Sandy Cay to collect sand samples, Chinese vessels reportedly conducted “aggressive manoeuvres” in their vicinity. In response to accusations by the Philippine Coast Guard, Beijing has claimed that Philippine vessels attempted to illegally land on the Tiexian Reef to collect sand samples. The cancellation comes after numerous instances of brinkmanship in the past weeks over contested waters in the South China Sea. Amid escalating tensions, Manila and Beijing met on 16 January and reportedly agreed to cooperate and resolve the territorial dispute.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Deadly floods and landslides in Malaysian Borneo.
At least five people have been killed and almost 8,000 evacuated from the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo as a result of heavy rainfall and flooding that has occurred since 28 January. The Malaysian Meteorological Department has issued a danger-level continuous rain warning for Sarawak and Sabah, effective until at least 31 January due to continued heavy rainfall. Major roads have been blocked due to floods and landslides, with further damage to infrastructure anticipated due to saturated ground. The rural interior regions of Sabah have been greatly affected, with the remoteness of these areas restricting access to resources, healthcare and other services.
Tropical Low 13U off the coast of Queensland, Australia.
Tropical Low 13U is currently impacting the northern coast of Queensland, Australia. The system has brought torrential rains, leading to widespread flooding in Townsville. Local media reports indicate that the heavy rainfall has caused substantial disruptions in the area. Disaster authorities have issued warnings for the region, predicting up to 19 inches of rain between Cairns and Townsville over the weekend. Residents are advised to stay informed and take necessary precautions as the situation develops.
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Rwanda Accused of Aiding M23 Rebels as Goma Falls to Rebel Forces
Intelligence cut off: 11:00 GMT 27 January 2025
At approximately 02:45 local time on 27 January, media spokespersons for the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group announced via a press release that their forces had successfully seized Goma, the capital of North Kivu Province in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Hours earlier, local media reported gunfire in the city’s outskirts, as M23 forces clashed with the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) following their capture of the nearby town of Sake.
Unconfirmed sources indicate that Rwandan forces crossed the border to assist the rebels in seizing Goma. Rwandan and Congolese forces have also reportedly fired at each other across the shared border.
Rwandan soldiers claim that 26 Congolese soldiers and one police officer crossed into Rwanda and surrendered. While the DRC-Rwanda border is reportedly officially still open, border clashes almost certainly prevent any movement.
On 25 January, the DRC severed diplomatic relations with Rwanda, long accused of supporting the M23 movement, and recalled its embassy staff from the country. The following day, on 26 January, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency session as the rebels advanced toward Goma. During the session, Congolese Foreign Minister Thérèse Wagner accused Rwanda of actions amounting to a “declaration of war“.
The extent of casualties and damage from the M23 offensive remains unclear. In the week preceding the Goma offensive, both M23 and Rwanda faced international condemnation after rebel forces killed 13 United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. M23-affiliated media later released footage showing FARDC soldiers tasked with defending Goma being disarmed and detained under UN peacekeepers’ supervision.
On 26 January, local media reported that hundreds of residents began fleeing Goma after news of M23’s capture of Sake. In recent weeks, M23 has seized key strategic towns, including Katale, Masisi, and Minova, in their advance toward Goma. On 27 January, a mass jailbreak reportedly occurred in Goma, hours after M23 entered the city. The prison held approximately 3,000 inmates and was set on fire during the prisoners’ escape. Deaths were reported, but no official figures have been released.
Goma international airport has been evacuated and has temporarily grounded flights due to the ongoing clashes.
Amid escalating tensions, Kenyan President William Ruto announced on the social media platform X that the East African Community (EAC) will convene an extraordinary summit within 48 hours. DRC president Felix Tshisekedi and Rwandan president Paul Kagame are both set to attend the summit. Ruto stated that the summit will aim to negotiate a ceasefire between M23 and the Congolese government while addressing long-standing tensions between the DRC and Rwanda.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Goma Crisis Deepens: M23 Offensive and the Impact on DRC-Rwanda Relations
Goma is a strategically significant city, rich in natural resources such as gold and cobalt, which represent critical economic interests for both the DRC and Rwanda. The alleged seizure of Goma by the M23 rebels follows weeks of captures of nearby towns and evacuations of civilians. Despite M23 claims that the city has been captured, there is a realistic possibility that it remains contested due to uncorroborated reports that fighting is still ongoing.
Despite recent conflict, the origins of instability in Goma trace back to the early 1990s. The conflict is deeply tied to regional ethnic tensions. Following the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, which killed at least 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus, over two million Hutus, including genocidal forces like the Interahamwe militia and the former Rwandan army (FAR), fled to the DRC. They established camps near Goma and launched cross-border attacks on Rwanda.
Rwanda intervened militarily in the DRC, leading to the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars. These wars drew in multiple nations and militias, leaving eastern DRC destabilised. The M23 rebel group emerged, primarily consisting of Tutsi defectors from the Congolese army. They seized Goma in 2012 and held it for two weeks, citing ethnic discrimination. Their alleged ties to Rwanda added further complexity to the conflict.
The fall of North Kivu’s capital and largest city is almost certain to trigger anti-government and anti-UN protests in Kinshasa and other major cities across the DRC. The rapid gains of the M23 offensive are likely to heighten criticism of the government’s handling of the crisis and the effectiveness of the UN’s role in the region. Such developments have historically led to widespread unrest and are often met with heavy-handed responses by Congolese security forces. The US Embassy in Kinshasa has issued a warning to travellers, anticipating significant protests in the capital on 27 January.
Travellers are strongly advised to stay clear of government buildings, foreign embassies, and UN-affiliated sites, as these are highly likely to become focal points for protests and violence. Protests are likely to be anti-Western in sentiment.
Widespread dissatisfaction over President Tshisekedi’s handling of the conflict additionally heightens the risk of political upheaval or attempts to overthrow his administration. In addition to the crisis in North Kivu, Tshisekedi’s presidency has been marred by controversies surrounding the 2023 presidential election and delays in the originally scheduled 2024 parliamentary elections.
Such controversies were ultimately viewed as triggers for a failed coup attempt in May 2024, marked by intense fighting near the presidential residence, Palais de la Nation, which left six people dead. The perceived weakness of Tshisekedi’s government heightens the risk of further coup attempts.
Tensions between DRC and Rwanda are likely to remain high during this period. Given previous wars were triggered by conflict in North Kivu, international actors will almost certainly attempt to prevent any further escalation. There is a realistic possibility that if tensions are not significantly reduced, the situation could escalate into a regional conflict.
Travel Risk Advice: Safety Guidelines Amid Rising Tensions in the DRC
- Closely monitor local news reports and government alerts.
- Avoid all non-essential travel to the DRC, particularly the eastern regions of North and South Kivu.
- Avoid all military installations, government buildings, and key infrastructure.
- Civil unrest and demonstrations are likely throughout the DRC. Travellers are advised to avoid all areas of unrest. Protests are likely in Kinshasa in front of government buildings, foreign embassies, and UN-affiliated sites.
- Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
- Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if stuck within DRC.
- The security situation in the DRC is likely to remain highly unstable in the coming weeks with the severance of diplomatic relations and involvement of regional armed forces, particularly in eastern DRC. There is a realistic possibility of ethnic tensions within the DRC.
- Evacuations and internal displacement will almost certainly lead to widespread travel disruption and congestion on major roads. Ensure vehicles are fuelled, consider alternative routes, and ensure that vehicles are loaded with additional fuel, water, food and other critical supplies.
- Confirm booked flights are running prior to checking out of hotels or travelling to the airport.
- Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities, and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any losses in electricity.
- Monitor the Solace Secure platform and trusted local media for updates relevant to the conflict.
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Executive Summary
Americas (AMER)
- It is likely that President Trump’s designation of Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organisations is primarily an attempt to apply pressure on the Mexican government to combat the cartels.
- There is a realistic possibility that the Colombian government’s military intervention against the ELN could jeopardise its “total peace” plans and trigger a wave of reprisal attacks.
- Targeted attacks on diplomatic vehicles in Haiti likely signal increasing gang confidence and attempts to limit foreign influence.
Europe, Middle East & Africa (EMEA)
- A Russian spy ship’s activities over the United Kingdom’s undersea critical national infrastructure is likely strategic messaging aimed at deterring continued support for Ukraine.
- President Trump’s executive order suspending all US foreign aid for 90 days is unlikely to significantly impact Ukraine’s war effort, and is highly likely not specifically targeted at Ukrainian aid.
- The mobilisation of SNA forces on three axes and sustained Turkish strikes likely indicate an imminent offensive against an increasingly overstretched SDF in Syria.
- The start of operation Iron Wall in Jenin almost certainly proves the West Bank’s growing importance following the ceasefire in Gaza. Further escalations in the area are likely.
- The Houthi announcement regarding a cessation of attacks against all but Israeli-owned or flagged vessels off the coast of Yemen will likely benefit global supply chains.
- Protests likely to decline in Mozambique despite clashes along major highway after authorities attempt to resume toll collection.
Asia-Pacific (APAC)
- There is a realistic possibility that other members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance will engage in ceasefire talks after China-brokered ceasefire between the military junta and MNDAA in Myanmar.
North, Central and South America
United States: Trump designates cartels and organised crime groups foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs)
Almost immediately after his inauguration on 20 January, President Donald Trump signed an executive order which designated drug cartels FTOs. After months of rhetoric aimed primarily at Mexican cartels, the executive order targeted multiple cartels throughout the Western Hemisphere, such as the Venezuelan-based Tren de Aragua and the primarily El Salvadorean based Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).
The order declared these organisations a threat to American safety, national security, and the stability of the Western Hemisphere. The order will also tasked Cabinet secretaries with recommending additional criminal organisations for FTO designation within the next 14 days. The order could permit the seizure of cartel assets, sanctions against US citizens dealing with these groups, and the denial of entry to the US.
Solace Global Assessment:
Many critics have questioned the efficacy of the executive order, suggesting that it will have few practical effects. Many of the tools and procedures granted under anti-terrorism laws are already in effect as part of broader counter-narcotics operations. Moreover, designating cartels as terrorist organisations does not provide legal authority for large-scale US military intervention in Mexico, something Trump has proposed on multiple occasions. This would require the approval from Congress and would violate Mexican sovereignty, unless the Mexican government consented to the deployment of US troops on its territory.
However, Trump has threatened to deploy US special forces to Mexico in raids against the cartels. This strategy would be possible under the president’s executive powers and would not require congressional approval.
However, the unilateral deployment of US special forces without Mexico’s consent would violate international norms, jeopardise diplomatic relations with Mexico and other Latin American nations, and would undermine trade with Mexico, the US’ largest trading partner. Furthermore, military operations against the well-armed and heavily funded cartels would be high-risk and likely lead to retaliatory attacks on US civilians, personnel and interests in both Mexico and the US. This is a scenario the incoming administration would likely seek to avoid.
The designation of cartels and organised crime groups as FTOs is more likely posturing from the new administration. This tactic is likely aimed at exerting maximum pressure on the Mexican government to do more to curb the power of the cartels and reduce the flow of narcotics into the US. The move will almost certainly appeal to domestic political audiences, given its prioritising of national security and border control, but is likely more significant in its symbolism rather than its practicality.
Haiti: One killed and several wounded after gangs target armoured vehicles
On 21 January, shortly before 08:00 local time, three vehicles were fired upon by armed gang members near Toussaint Louverture International Airport (PAP) in Port-au-Prince. Two of the vehicles were armoured and fitted with diplomatic plates; one was not armoured.
The vehicles were reportedly transporting India’s consul and staff as they were travelling to their offices in Sarthe. Five people were injured in total, with a sixth person killed. The two drivers and Jenny Handal Bitar, the daughter of the consul, were reportedly among those injured. This event comes the day after a US embassy van was fired upon.
Solace Global Assessment:
Given a similar incident has occurred twice in one week, gangs were almost certainly deliberately targeting foreign vehicles and diplomatic missions. Some reports indicate that this was likely a retaliatory action in response to recent police and Multinational Security Support (MSS) operations. The attack came one day before Colombian President Gustavo Petro was scheduled to visit; the first time any Colombian president has visited Haiti in over 20 years. By attacking foreign entities, Haitian gangs are likely aiming to send a message of deterrence against foreign involvement in the country.
The ongoing Kenya-led MSS operations, greenlit in October 2023 by the UN Security Council, have faced significant limitations in the form of a lack of funding, equipment, and personnel; it contains a force of just 800, 1,700 short of the intended target of 2,500. António Guterres, the Secretary General of the UN, has warned that if further money, equipment, and personnel are not provided, Haiti’s security institutions could collapse, and gangs could ‘overrun the entire metropolitan area’.
The struggle to control the gangs in Haiti will highly likely be exacerbated by President Trump’s decision to suspend foreign assistance programs for 90 days. Haiti is incredibly reliant on US aid for financial support for its police force as well as humanitarian and health programs. With the US constituting Haiti’s biggest donor, a cut in funding could reduce police capacity even further. Gangs will highly likely take advantage of this and capitalise on the 90-day review period.
Colombia: Colombia to wage war on leftwing guerillas
The Colombian government of President Gustavo Petro has vowed to wage war against leftwing guerillas in response to a surge in violence that has killed over 100 people and displaced nearly 40,000. The government has also declared a “state of internal emergency” and a “state of economic emergency”, which will grant the executive branch of government to pass certain legislation without congressional approval for up to three months.
The increase in violence has largely been attributed to the National Liberation Army (ELN), which has launched an offensive against rival groups, including Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, to establish control over strategic territories and drug trafficking routes. Fighting has been reported in at least three Colombian departments, with the majority of the fighting occurring in the northeastern Catatumbo region close to the Venezuelan border.
Solace Global Assessment:
As part of the emergency measures enacted by the government,thousands of troops will be deployed to the affected regions. This strategy marks a major shift in the Petro administration’s approach, which has been prioritising dialogue and ceasefire negotiations in its pursuit of “total peace”.
However, it is highly likely that many of the armed factions within Colombia have simply exploited this approach to regroup and rearm, fearing that peace would ultimately threaten their profits from the ultra-lucrative cocaine trade. The government, which has already suspended peace talks with the ELN, will likely prioritise the targeting of the leftist group.
However, the ELN is highly active across multiple regions of Colombia, including the northeast, southwest, midwest, and central areas. There is a realistic possibility that the government’s military intervention could trigger a wave of reprisal attacks across these regions, potentially exacerbating Colombia’s security environment.
These reprisals could include targeted attacks on military units and installations, government facilities, and infrastructure, such as oil pipelines and transport networks. This would further destabilise rural and urban areas, which is likely to result in more civilian casualties and higher rates of displacement.
AMER Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
US President immigration policy plans highly likely to drive civil unrest in urban centres
Donald Trump’s electoral campaign was characterised by promises of strict immigration reforms and an aggressive policy of mass-deportation. On day one of his presidency, Trump signed a series of executive orders that curtailed previous legal routes to enter the US for undocumented migrants at the southern border, declared a border emergency, and expanded federal authorities’ powers to enact deportations.
For example, as per the new executive decisions, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) units will be granted the ability to carry out enforcement actions at schools and churches, after the end of two directives limiting their powers of arrest in “sensitive” locations.
While no large-scale actions have been carried out as of the time of writing, protests have been planned and carried out in largely Democrat-leaning centres like Chicago, Boston, and Los Angeles since inauguration day. While these protests have so far been limited in scale, it is highly likely that immigration-related political developments will drive larger crowds in the coming weeks.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Kenya deploys more police officers to Haiti
Kenya has deployed an additional 217 police officers to Haiti to arrest the spread of gang violence and help stabilise the country. This takes the total number of Kenyan police officers in Haiti to over 600, with plans to increase the number to 1,000, under a UN-backed mission. However, the effectiveness of the international force remains unproven, with gangs still in control of the vast majority of the capital and large swathes of the country. It is now assessed that over 700,000 have been displaced and an estimated 5,600 people were killed in the Caribbean nation in 2024 alone.
Nicaragua launches volunteer police force
More than 4000 officers have been inducted since the group was formed in accordance with changes to Nicaragua’s constitution. A “Volunteer Police” had already existed in 2018, when it was widely deployed by the government to crush domestic opposition with near impunity. It is highly likely that the reinforced organisation, now more clearly institutionalised, will act as a de facto paramilitary supporting the regime of Daniel Ortega.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
US withdraws from World Health Organisation (WHO), Paris Climate Agreement
Both decisions had been widely expected to occur on day one of the second Trump administration. The WHO withdrawal is likely to significantly affect the organisation’s operations, as the US provides approximately 18 per cent of its overall funding. In particular, US contributions have been key to the WHO’s programmes to combat HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, as well as tuberculosis.
It is highly likely that the EU and China will take measures to bolster their position within health- and environment-related international agreements and organisations. While the US withdrawal from the WHO is likely to not fundamentally challenge the overarching support the organisation’s mission has abroad, there is a realistic possibility that the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement will bolster the political traction of international opponents of the framework, possibly leading to policy developments abroad.
Wildfires continue across Southern California in the US
Southern California continues to grapple with the effects of Santa Ana winds, which have triggered a series of wildfires and power outages across the region. The Hughes Fire is currently burning approximately 72 kilometres north of Los Angeles and has grown to over 10,000 acres, causing tens of thousands to evacuate; the fire has been 14 per cent contained.
The Laguna Fire near Camarillo has been brought under control, with firefighters reporting 70 per cent containment and no structural damage. Evacuation orders around the Cal State Channel Islands campus have been downgraded to warnings as the fire’s forward progress has been halted.
Meanwhile, the Gibbel Fire south of Hemet has also seen its forward progress stopped, with crews remaining on site to ensure the area is fully secured. In San Diego County, the Gilman Fire in La Jolla has been contained, allowing for the lifting of all evacuation orders, though road closures persist.
The Border Fire, now renamed Border 2 Fire, has expanded to 228 acres with no containment reported yet, as it burns in the Otay Wilderness Area near the Mexico border.
Europe, Middle East & Africa
United Kingdom: Russian spy ship suspected of mapping UK critical national infrastructure
On 20 January, the Russian Project 22010 oceanographic research ship “YANTAR” (IMO: 7524419) entered the English Channel and was observed operating in UK waters. This marks the second time in months that the YANTAR has been observed in UK waters.
In November 2024, the vessel was suspected of loitering over undersea critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the Irish Sea. The Royal Navy was tasked with tracking and monitoring the YANTAR on both occasions. In November, an Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) was authorised to surface near the YANTAR as a deterrent, signalling that the vessel was under covert surveillance by the UK.
Solace Global Assessment:
Officially, the YANTAR is a Russian oceanographic research vessel that is primarily used for deep-sea research and underwater rescue missions. However, the vessel is operated by the highly secretive Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), a branch of the Russian Ministry of Defence tasked with underwater warfare and intelligence gathering.
The YANTAR is one of the most capable vessels within GUGI, equipped with advanced sonar systems and capable of deploying a range of underwater assets, including remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), and deep-submergence vehicles (DSVs) that can interrogate depths up to 6,000m. This allows Russia to map some of the deepest undersea critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the oceans, the sabotage of which would be immensely challenging and time-consuming to repair.
However, considering the YANTAR’s strategic importance and the extent to which it is monitored by NATO intelligence assets, it is unlikely that the vessel was conducting nefarious activity. With the Trump administration anticipated to curtail aid to Ukraine, it is likely that European nations will be required to take on a greater responsibility.
The Kremlin, which is already suspected of conducting a reckless sabotage campaign across Europe which has included the severing of undersea cables, is likely sending a strategic message to Ukraine’s European allies. By deploying such assets in proximity to undersea CNI, Russia is communicating that it has both the capability and intent to escalate its sabotage campaign, with undersea sabotage providing a low-cost and highly deniable means of exerting pressure on Ukraine’s allies.
Furthermore, the extent of civilian vessels answering to Russian intelligence makes it almost impossible to accurately monitor Russian activity in the maritime domain and the heavy monitoring of vessels like the YANTAR likely provides opportunities for other vessels to exploit.
Ukraine: Trump tells Putin to stop “ridiculous war” and suspends all foreign aid for 90 days
Following his inauguration on 20 January, US President Donald Trump made statements and issued executive orders that gave the first indications of how the new Trump administration will handle the war in Ukraine.
Firstly, Trump made statements via social media that Putin is to blame for continuing the war, that Zelenskyy had told Trump “he wants to make a deal” and that Putin is “destroying Russia” by not ending the war. Trump threatened that unless Russia stopped the “ridiculous war”, the US would impose “high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions”.
Secondly, Trump issued an executive order titled “Reevaluating And Realigning United States Foreign Aid” that suspends all US foreign aid for 90 days, which caused concern regarding how US assistance to Ukraine would be impacted.
Solace Global Assessment:
The executive order is unlikely to significantly impact Ukraine’s war effort. The Biden administration made concerted efforts to “Trump-proof” Ukraine aid, due to Trump’s previous threats to end assistance to Ukraine, with pledged future commitments that cannot be easily suspended with presidential executive authority and NATO taking over the US in coordinating military aid to Ukraine.
The G7-led Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans initiative, the EU’s Ukraine Facility financial assistance program, the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs are all entirely unaffected by the executive order. However, there will nonetheless be a limited impact on Ukraine with foreign development initiatives regarding the restoration of destroyed critical national infrastructure (CNI) and demining being suspended.
It is highly likely that the main intended purpose of the executive order suspending USAID assistance programs relates to the Trump movement’s sociopolitical outlook – the stated “purpose” in the text of the executive order criticises how the “foreign aid industry and bureaucracy” has in many cases been “antithetical to American values” and has promoted ideas “that are directly inverse to harmonious and stable relations”. This is almost certainly in reference to USAID programs that have promoted LGBTQ+ issues, which have received significant criticism from Trump supporters.
What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which Trump will leverage his executive authority to impede the delivery of military assistance to Ukraine. Trump’s statements on social media likely indicate a focus on further economic sanctions as measures to coerce the Kremlin to engage in peace negotiations, as opposed to boosting military aid.
Syria: Turkish conventional and proxy forces continue attacks on SDF
Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have intensified attacks on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) around the Tishreen Dam area, a strategic location along the Euphrates River. Attacks have included the use of heavy artillery and rocket strikes; Turkish conventional forces have also conducted drone and airstrikes targeting SDF positions in areas such as Tal Tamr, Hasakah, and Kobani. The SNA has concentrated forces along critical lines of control, including at Ain Issa, Tal Tamr, and Kobani.
The SDF is also contending with attacks by Arab tribal forces in the Deir ez-Zur, which has forced the SDF to deploy reinforcements from the al-Hasakah area to Deir ez-Zur.
Prior to speaking at Davos, Syria’s new Foreign Minister, Assad al-Shaibani, highlighted the potential benefits of a “special relationship” with Turkey. Al-Shaibani suggested that such a relationship would provide the new Syrian government with access to Turkish technology, regional influence, and European relations. Al-Shaibani also stated that there is no longer any justification for the existence of the SDF, with talks to absorb the SDF into government forces ongoing.
Solace Global Assessment:
Turkish artillery, air, and drone strikes are likely shaping activity designed to degrade the SDF and disrupt its supply lines in preparation for a major offensive against SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. The concentration of SNA forces on three axes likely indicates a multi-pronged offensive against the SDF. Such an offensive combined with attacks by Arab tribal forces in Deir ez-Zur will almost certainly overstretch SDF forces, leaving them vulnerable across multiple fronts and likely unable to maintain control over the key territories they hold.
The pro-Turkey comments made by Syria’s foreign minister are likely strategically aimed at pressuring the SDF into aligning with the Syrian government and renouncing further claims for autonomy. In particular, al-Shaibani remarks that the SDF no longer has any justification for its existence underscores the new government’s view that the SDF is an illegitimate force since the collapse of the Assad regime and territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Without external assistance, the SDF is now likely left with two options: be absorbed into the new government’s forces or face military defeat at the hands of Turkey, the SNA, and Arab tribal militias.
However, in the event of a protracted conflict involving the SDF or if the SDF is forced into submission, there is a realistic possibility that this could embolden ISIS, other extremist groups, or former regime loyalists to exploit the resulting instability and potential security vacuums.
Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Israeli forces launch operations in Jenin, as ceasefire in Gaza holds
On 22 January, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units launched a large-scale operation, named “Iron Wall”, in Jenin. The operation is the first major military development following the signing of the ceasefire in Gaza, and the beginning of the second Trump administration in the US. Donald Trump, on day one of his presidency, removed sanctions on settler groups in the West Bank via executive order. On 19 January, settler groups attacked Palestinian residents in the villages of Jinasfut and Funduq, east of Qalqilya. Coinciding with the new IDF operations in Jenin, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other militant groups announced the creation of a “joint operations room” to coordinate activities in the West Bank.
In Gaza, the ceasefire deal approved on 17 January is so far holding, with the first hostage exchanges having been successfully carried out. Reports indicate that Hamas units are overseeing the return of displaced Palestinians to the north of the Gaza Strip.
In Israel, political pressure on the Netanyahu administration increased. On 21 January, the IDF’s Chief of Staff and the head of Southern Command resigned over the failures to prevent the 7 October 2023 attack. Opposition parties, led by Yair Lapid, likewise called on Netanyahu to resign. The leaders of the far-right parties within the government coalition, Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, continued to call for resuming hostilities following the completion of the first stage of the ceasefire.
Solace Global Assessment:
With the situation in Gaza having been at least temporarily cooled by the ceasefire, both Tel Aviv and the Palestinian militias are highly likely looking at the West Bank as an increasingly important area of operations.
For Hamas, which retains the strategic goal of expanding its political clout in the West Bank, the setbacks suffered by Iran in the region, the recent Palestinian Authority (PA) raid in Jenin, and the seeming willingness of the new US administration to allow Israeli forces and settlers a greater scope of operations in the area represent growing vulnerabilities. Efforts to coordinate more thoroughly with PIJ and other armed groups are therefore likely reflective of Hamas’ attempts to bolster its short-term resilience while allowing for more effective operations in contested areas like Tulkarm or Jenin.
For the IDF, the 42 days afforded by the ceasefire likely represent an opportunity to further weaken Hamas and PIJ in key West Bank strongholds, while simultaneously allowing the PA to “fill the political gap” left by their retreat.
In Gaza, Hamas will likely use the ceasefire to accelerate attacks on rival militias and local clans that threaten its authority in the area. Reports indicate that Hamas fighters have conducted raids against criminal gangs that were attempting to secure humanitarian aid, hence portraying themselves as a force for stability. Hamas will likewise almost certainly continue recruitment efforts to replenish its manpower.
The flow of internally displaced Palestinian civilians from the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone will also offer an opportunity to re-infiltrate the north of the Gaza Strip. Despite these opportunities, the loss of much of its pre-war infrastructure – including tunnels and arsenals – will hinder Hamas’ rearmament efforts. With Israeli troops still in control of the Philadelphi Corridor, the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt that served as a transit point for smuggled weapons, this is unlikely to change in the short term.
The volatility of Israel’s political situation makes it difficult to assess to what extent Ben-Gvir and Smotrich’s calls to resume the conflict after the first phase of the ceasefire are likely to be observed. If it were to resume hostilities, the Netanyahu government would almost certainly face redoubled international and domestic pressures.
There is also a likelihood that, in such a scenario, Tel Aviv would run into Washington’s opposition. Trump is likely to continue his first term’s foreign policy of improving relations with Gulf states, which however has as a premise the limitation of possible points of contention with key powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Therefore, the White House is likely to continue efforts to stabilise the situation in Gaza and to avoid the restart of a conflict that has minimal potential to advance American strategic interests in the Middle East.
Red Sea: The Houthis announced that only Israeli-owned or flagged vessels will now be targeted
On 19 January, the Houthi-linked Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) released a statement that the Houthis will cease attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, except for “vessels wholly owned by Israeli individuals or entities and/or sailing under the Israeli flag.” This followed the commencement of the ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and Hamas.
The statement promised that following the “full implementation of all phases of the [ceasefire] agreement”, the last remaining “sanctions” against Israeli vessels would be lifted. The statement also stipulated, however, that attacks against vessels affiliated with the US and the UK would recommence “in the event of any aggression” from “the aggressor state(s)”.
Additionally, on 22 January, the Houthis released the crew members of the MV GALAXY LEADER (IMO: 9237307), with the vessel’s hijacking in November 2023 having marked the start of the Houthi anti-commercial shipping campaign.
Solace Global Assessment:
Starting in November 2023, the Houthis attacked over 134 vessels in 12 months with uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), and ballistic and cruise missiles.
With 12 per cent of all global shipping previously having passed through the Bab al-Mandeb, a critical chokepoint for maritime trade routes between Europe and Asia, the Houthi campaign against merchant vessels had a global impact. The Red Sea trade corridor saw a 60 per cent decrease in use, due to the increase in insurance premiums and the danger posed to sailors.
The alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope involves markedly increased transit times and fuel costs, leading to container freight rates increasing by as much as 284 per cent.
The extent to which Houthi activity will genuinely alter following the Gaza Ceasefire will likely become clear in the next few weeks, although it is notable that the Houthis have not launched a successful attack against a vessel since November 2024. It is likely that the efforts of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a US-led naval coalition aimed at intercepting Houthi threats and Operation Poseidon Archer, a US-UK joint mission to strike Houthi capabilities within Yemen, have both helped to degrade Houthi strike capabilities. There is a realistic possibility that recent Houthi statements have been made to obfuscate their current limitations and critical shortages in weaponry.
Mozambique: Clashes with security forces break out along key motorway outside Maputo
On 18 January, ballot papers from the October elections were incinerated on the outskirts of Maputo. The administrative court rejected the civil society appeal to stop the process.
On 20 January, the swearing-in ceremony for members of provincial assemblies and governors took place and was attended by opposition parties.
On 23 January, protests broke out along the Maputo-South Africa motorway after Trans-Africa Concession (TRAC) attempted to resume toll collection. Protesters smashed through the gates and refused to pay, threatening to set the toll gate alight. Security forces intervened to remove heavy vehicles blocking access and used live ammunition to quell unrest.
According to local NGOs, approximately 314 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began.
Solace Global Assessment:
The toll gate rioting comes in response to TRAC attempting to reinstate tolls after approximately two months of not collecting them. Mondlane declared that tolls should no longer be paid in December, something he reiterated on 17 January.
The fact that opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane’s demands still resonate with Mozambique’s population despite Frelimo’s perceived victory suggests that he continues to hold sway over the public. However, despite clashes occurring between protesters and security forces, protests have largely decreased since Chapo’s inauguration, indicating that they may continue to diminish in both scale and frequency.
Furthermore, the opposition parties’ attendance at the swearing-in ceremonies indicates that they are ready to move on from protesting the election results; something that may be reflective of the broader population.
Mondlane has announced that he is not interested in joining the new government, though is ready to help find solutions. He has emphasised that he has no problem cooperating with the government if they respond to the questions he considers ‘essential for the people’. He has called for a new round of relatively small-scale protests every Friday at 13:00 local time during the first 100 days of Chapo’s presidency to pressure the government into acquiescing to his demands.
While Mondlane has outlined that he would consider the next steps if the government does not respond to his demands, there is a realistic possibility that demonstrations’ momentum will be relatively diminished in three months. Furthermore, the time enables the government time to present itself as a change from the previous administration, something that Chapo was keen to emphasise in his inauguration speech.
EMEA Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
UK government launches probe on Southport stabbings
The government of Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that a public inquiry will be carried out on the July attack, which killed three children and wounded ten others. On 20 January, the perpetrator of the attacks pleaded guilty to the murders, as well as additional attempted murder charges and charges related to the possession of an al-Qaeda training manual.
The attack’s aftermath resulted in severe protests and episodes of targeted sectarian violence, also fuelled by misinformation spread by online-based domestic and foreign far-right channels, in multiple cities across the United Kingdom. There is a realistic possibility of further civil unrest as the inquiry progresses.
Slovakia’s Prime Minister Fico survives no-confidence motion
The vote was raised by opposition parties who accused Prime Minister Robert Fico of shifting Slovakia towards Moscow’s orbit, and of threatening to take the country out of the EU and NATO. The vote, which would have likely failed as Fico holds a parliamentary majority, did not take place as the opposition MPs walked out.
On 20 January, Fico met with Erdogan in Ankara, where the two leaders advanced the idea of redirecting Russian gas supplies to Slovakia via the TurkStream pipeline, a move that considerably worried Brussels. Demonstrations are scheduled to take place in Bratislava on 24 January, and the government stated that it would take precautionary measures over “intelligence” over an alleged plan to carry out a coup against Fico.
Spanish football fans attacked by rival fans in Rome, Italy
Approximately 70 Real Sociedad were attacked by opposing Lazio fans in central Rome on 22 January, the day before a scheduled Europa League match. At least nine Spanish fans were injured with reports indicating that at least two were stabbed and “seriously” wounded.
Football-related violence is a common occurrence in Italy. Teams like Lazio are often supported by organised “ultras” (hooligan) groups that often have ties to far right and neofascist political groups or even organised crime. OSINT analysis highlighted how the attack was highly likely carried out because of political reasons, with pro-Lazio channels describing Real Sociedad fans as “leftists”.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Three bombings in one night in Sweden
At least two people were injured by a blast in Stockholm on the night of 17-18 January. Explosions are mostly used by organised criminal groups in Sweden and, while often targeting other groups or conducted for intimidatory purposes, often result in bystanders being injured.
Local media reports that 25 bombings occurred in December 2024, and 11 in the first half of January 2025. A growing organised crime presence in Sweden is likely to result in further attacks, especially in the peripheries of large cities. Moreover, as highlighted by counterterrorism researchers with regards to cases in France, there is a growing overlap between criminal gangs and extremist groups, with the latter seeking to obtain access to the former’s arsenals of weapons and improvised explosives.
Knife attack in Aschaffenburg, Germany kills two
Two people, including a two-year-old child, were killed in a stabbing attack in a park Aschaffenburg, Bavaria. According to local media, a man, later identified as an Afghan national who was slated for deportation, attacked a group of children from a daycare centre who were visiting the park.
Germany’s main opposition leader and likely next Chancellor, Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democrats (CDU), has called for a radical shift in Germany’s migration policy ahead of the February general election and criticised the current government for its handling of immigration and deportation processes. Political tensions are expected to intensify as the general election approaches, with migration almost certainly to be a central and controversial issue in campaign discussions.
Two Iranian supreme court justices killed in Tehran
The justices, who had occupied influential positions in Iran’s judiciary since the revolution and had reportedly adjudicated cases involving anti-regime protesters, were killed by a gunman who managed to enter the court on 18 January. A third judge and a bodyguard were also injured in the attack. The shooting follows numerous assassinations of prominent Iranian or allied figures on Iranian soil over the past year. There is a realistic possibility that the regime will use the killings as a pretext for retaliatory violence against regime opponents.
Lebanese military to receive US, EU aid to enforce ceasefire
Washington announced that it would provide USD 117 million, while Brussels pledged USD 62 million to bolster both the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF). The resources will be used to aid the Lebanese military efforts to enforce the demilitarised zone south of the Litani river that was established by the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire. More broadly, with Hezbollah at a historical low point in terms of capability, reinforcing the Lebanese military is highly likely seen by both the US and EU as a way to put significant pressure on the Shia militia.
Mali-based Africa Corps receive armoured vehicles from Moscow
On 17 January, reports from Mali identified a large number of Russian armoured vehicles, including tanks and armoured personnel carriers, being delivered to the local paramilitary forces under the control of the Russian Military of Defence. The delivery, which was initially incorrectly claimed by the Malian junta to be for its forces, is significant for multiple reasons.
First, it underscores Russia’s growing commitment to bolster its presence in Africa after its strategic defeat in Syria. Second, it likely further demonstrates how Moscow considers Bamako to be its key partner in the Sahel, and likely the most stable junta in the region. Finally, the shipment of heavy equipment to the Africa Corps demonstrates Moscow’s continued commitment to shifting its model for its footprint in the Sahel away from the more independent Wagner Group towards the “aligned” Africa Corps.
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continue making progress in Khartoum
The renewed offensive in the capital, where progress had stalled after initial SAF gains in late 2024, comes after the armed forces took control of the strategic town of Wad Madani to the south of the capital and cleared some operationally valuable towns to the capital’s north. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have reportedly been withdrawing units and equipment east of the Nile, likely to set up better defensive positions. The SAF’s primary objective is likely breaking the RSF’s siege of the Signal Corps base, located in the cities southwest.
Nigerian army kills dozens of Islamist fighters in Borno state
At least 76 fighters from Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) were killed, and a further 72 arrested, in recent operations by Nigerian forces in the northeastern Borno state. The military’s operations are almost certainly retaliatory following an uptick in Islamist groups’ activity in early 2025. On 13 January, ISWAP militants reportedly killed at least 40 farmers in Dumba. Days prior, a failed ambush on a military patrol resulted in 34 Islamists and six soldiers being killed.
Military deployed to northeast DRC to combat Islamic State-aligned group
Troops belonging to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been deployed to the northeast of the country following an attack on the village of Makoko on 15 January. The attack was conducted by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist group aligned with the Islamic State. The initial death toll has been revised to 30 and several volunteers were attacked in the area when attempting to retrieve bodies. ADF attacks in both the DRC and neighbouring Uganda markedly increased in recent years, likely taking advantage of the government’s prioritisation of the southeast, where the rebel M23 group is leading an offensive and has successfully seized major towns and key terrain.
M23 Movement seizes town on main supply route to Goma in DRC’s North Kivu region
On 21 January, Rwanda-backed M23 rebels seized the town of Minova in North Kivu, a key supply hub for the provincial capital Goma. According to local media, clashes occurred on 22 January in Bugulube across Lake Kivu and on 23 January around Sake. The fighting reportedly triggered an exodus of civilians from Nzulo, less than 16 kilometres from Goma.
This comes amidst steady territorial gains from the rebel group after fighting accelerated in October 2024. Recent gains over the past two weeks have reportedly led to over 178,000 displacements, according to the UN. M23 rebels will likely attempt to capitalise on their recent territorial gains and attempt to retake North Kivu’s provincial capital Goma. There is a realistic possibility that further government losses will ignite civil unrest in the capital Kinshasa, which are often anti-Western in their sentiment and violently suppressed by the police.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Fire at a ski resort in Turkey kills at least 78
On 21 January, a fire broke out at approximately 03:30 local time in the restaurant of the Grand Kartal Hotel in Kartalkaya in the Koroglu mountains in northwest Turkey. The high death toll is partially due to the inadequate fire safety measures at the hotel, despite the hotel’s popularity. While some survivors reportedly did not hear an alarm, the hotel’s fire extinguishing systems have been labelled as inadequate.
While the Turkish Culture and Tourism Minister Mehmet Nuri Ersoy stated that the hotel had a fire competence certificate, local mayor Tanju Ozcan stated that the fire department had not issued a positive report since 2007. Police have detained eleven people including the hotel owner as part of an investigation into the fire. Given the high death toll and perceived incompetence of the fire department, who were reportedly responsible for issuing the fire competence certificate, unrest targeting a tightening of legislation and safety standards at such resorts is likely.
Marburg outbreak confirmed in northwest Tanzania
Despite initial attempts to deny the suspected outbreak of the Marburg virus in the northwest Kagera Region, the Tanzanian government confirmed the outbreak on 20 January. The outbreak was confirmed after identifying at least one case in the 25 suspected cases.
The Marburg virus, a highly infectious and often fatal disease, is similar to Ebola and is transmitted to humans from fruit bats and monkeys; it has a very high fatality rate if not treated. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) is deploying a multidisciplinary team and committing USD 2 million to support Tanzania in containing the Marburg virus outbreak, focusing on surveillance, diagnostics, case management, and community engagement.
Asia–Pacific
Myanmar: Ceasefire brokered between junta and major rebel group
On 18 January, Myanmar’s junta government and the ethnically Chinese Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) signed a China-brokered ceasefire which came into immediate effect. The ceasefire came after months of pressure from Beijing, and was finally agreed in the seventh round of peace talks in Kunming, China. The MNDAA have reportedly agreed to pull its forces out of several key positions including Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State which was captured in August 2024. The ceasefire terms dictate that full withdrawal must be completed by June.
However, the group has reportedly maintained many of its gains since the offensive beginning October 2023, also known as Operation 1027. Fighting has resumed elsewhere; on 20 January, Myanmar’s military junta bombed the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)-controlled Nawnghkio town in Shan state and carried out two bombing runs in the People’s Defense Forces-controlled Khampat Town in Tamu Township, Sagaing Region on 21 January.
Solace Global Assessment:
The MNDAA is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA), which consists of two other groups, the TNLA and the Arakan Army (AA). The Alliance has been engaged in an ongoing offensive against the military junta since October 2023. During the offensive, the groups captured a significant amount of territory consisting of several towns and border crossings with China in Shan State.
So far, there are no indications that the other two members of the TBA are party to the ceasefire. After securing the ceasefire between the MNDAA and the military junta, Beijing will likely turn its attention to the other two members. The TNLA indicated in November that they are ready to engage in peace talks and the AA followed suit in December, providing a potential pathway for another China-mediated ceasefire.
While the ceasefire presents an opportunity for both sides to de-escalate tensions and engage in further peace talks, its staying power remains to be seen. A China-brokered January 2024 ceasefire between the military junta and the TBA lasted approximately five months, breaking down in June amid continued air and artillery strikes on insurgent-controlled areas and mutual mistrust. Furthermore, while the other two members of the alliance have indicated a willingness to talk, they are not yet party to a ceasefire agreement.
As part of its strategy to pressure the MNDAA into a ceasefire, Beijing closed China’s borders with northern Shan State in June 2024, cutting supplies to citizens residing in MNDAA-controlled territory. In the aftermath of the ceasefire, The Chin Shwe Haw border crossing between China and northern Shan State has been opened, allowing a resumption of trade. This is crucial for China’s economic interests, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Sino-Myanmar pipelines. A reduction in tensions in Myanmar is also key to securing the China-Myanmar border and safeguard regional security since instability in border regions could trigger influxes of refugees.
APAC Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Thailand legalises same-sex marriage
Thailand has become the first country in Southeast Asia and the third in Asia (following Taiwan and Nepal) to legalise same-sex marriage. The new law grants equal legal rights to same-sex couples, including financial, medical, and adoption rights, and will likely contribute to a cultural shift in Thailand which could reverberate in other parts of Southeast Asia. However, opinion polls indicate that public support was overwhelmingly in favour of the new legislation, parts of Thailand remain deeply conservative and a backlash from more traditional segments of society is possible.
Impeached South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol facing insurrection charges
President Yoon, who was impeached following his attempt to declare martial law, is currently facing charges of insurrection and abuse of power. His impeachment hearing at the Constitutional Court in Seoul has seen significant police presence and sparked protests from both supporters and opponents. He has defended his actions again, stating his declaration of martial law was meant to inform the public of the dangers of an opposition-controlled National Assembly.
Police have also sought arrest warrants for two officials from the presidential security service accused of obstructing investigations related to Yoon’s arrest. The situation has been marked by unrest, with multiple arrests made during protests in support of Yoon. The former president has been detained and moved to solitary confinement. His impeachment hearing continues to draw large crowds and requires substantial police deployment to maintain order. Further unrest is likely as the legal process unfolds.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Chinese national killed in northeastern Afghanistan
The targeted attack occurred on the night of 21-22 January in the Takhar province, near the border with Tajikistan. A Chinese national and a Taliban official were killed in the attack, which also wounded other Chinese and Afghan nationals. The attack was claimed by a group called the National Mobilisation Front (NMF), as well as by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). The NMF is an anti-Taliban, anti-ISKP group, which claims to be mostly formed of pre-Taliban Afghan military members.
The NMF justified the attack by stating that the target was a Chinese envoy working with the Taliban intelligence department. While attacks on Chinese nationals have grown in neighbouring Pakistan, they are rare in Afghanistan. The simultaneous claim of the attack by two groups that are ideologically and militarily opposed to each other underscores the high value of Chinese assets and citizens as targets for multiple militant forces. It is likely that attacks on Chinese targets have a strong symbolic value compounded by high visibility for these groups, which thus use them for propaganda and recruitment purposes.
Pakistani intelligence chief visits Bangladesh to improve intelligence sharing
For the first time in decades, the head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has visited Bangladesh, where he was received by Lieutenant General Muhammad Faizur Rahman of the Bangladesh Army. The visit is partially aimed at establishing an intelligence-sharing network between the two countries but has raised concerns due to Rahman’s suspected ties to Islamists and Pakistan.
There are fears that this renewed engagement could lead to subversive activities targeting India, especially through cross-border operations with India suspecting that ISI has long worked with extremist groups that maintain a presence in both India and Bangladesh. The visit follows a series of interactions between Bangladesh and Pakistan, suggesting a thaw in their previously hostile relationship.
Quad member states meet to discuss future policies for Indo-Pacific
On 21 January, the Quad member states of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan convened in Washington to focus on major security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region. Salient talking points were the strengthening of free trade and a shared commitment to upholding democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
The was the first Quad meeting since the return of President Trump and occurred only a day after Trump’s inauguration, likely indicating a renewed focus on strengthening the alliance and prioritising regional security concerns, particularly in response to China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and its unilateral actions in support of its extensive territorial claims.
Childcare centre targeted in anti-Semitic attack in Sydney, Australia
On 21 January, a childcare centre in Sydney was set on fire in what authorities are deeming the latest incident in a growing trend of anti-Semitic attacks in Australia. The centre, which is located adjacent to a Jewish school and synagogue in the east of the city, was also sprayed with anti-Semitic graffiti. Australia has witnessed a major spike in both anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attacks since the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, with at least six reported incidents in Sydney over the past two months.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Landslide kills at least 19 in Indonesia
The landslide occurred on 21 January in the city of Pekalongan in Central Java following heavy rains that started on the day prior. The rainy season in Java runs from November to March and often triggers flooding on the island. Hilly areas such as those affected by the recent landslides are at a higher risk of flash floods and landslides, and the lack of flood-resistant infrastructure can often complicate search and rescue efforts, as well as making floods’ impact worse.
Further rain is expected in the coming days which could exacerbate flooding and trigger further landslides. Several people still remain missing and casualty figures may rise in the coming days.
Taiwanese undersea cables cut
Two undersea cables connecting Taiwan and the Matsu Islands were reported to have been completely severed on 22 January. Taiwanese authorities claimed that the damage was due to environmental factors and degradation, and that no “suspicious vessels” were reported to have transited near the cable.
Repairs are expected to be completed by late February and a backup system, which uses asynchronous satellites, was activated meaning that the recent damages will highly likely not result in significant disruptions. The incident, which is the fourth cable disruption reported in 2025, is still likely to worry Pacific powers, as it cannot be separated from the growing trend of deliberate, state-sponsored sabotage of undersea infrastructure.
Magnitude 6.4 earthquake in central Taiwan
On 20 January, a magnitude 6.4 earthquake struck Chiayi County in central Taiwan. The earthquake caused significant damage and disruptions and resulted in at least 26 injuries, with the majority occurring in Tainan, and others reported in Yunlin and Chiayi.
The earthquake also led to widespread power outages, with up to 7,000 customers affected in Kaohsiung and 12,000 households in Tainan’s Baihe District experiencing temporary power loss. Structural damage was observed in various areas, including the collapse of multiple residential buildings in Tainan’s Nanxi District, where several people were initially trapped. Approximately 30 households in Tainan’s Yujing District were evacuated due to damage in a multi-story residential building.
Taiwanese authorities have warned of potential aftershocks, with magnitudes possibly reaching 5.0 near the earthquake’s epicentre.
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Executive Summary
- The largest Ukrainian long-range attack against Russia in the war so far will almost certainly lead to significant Russian retaliation strikes against urban centres.
- If confirmed, the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel will highly likely allow for a short term improvement in the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.
- There is a realistic possibility that violent unrest will decline in Mozambique following President Chapo’s inauguration.
- There is a realistic possibility that another attack on the police in Thailand is indicative of an intensification of the southern Thailand insurgency.



AMER
Venezuela: President Nicolas Maduro sworn in for third term.
Bolivia: Former President Morales supporters organise protests in La Paz.
EMEA
Ukraine: Ukraine launches largest ever long-range attack on strategic targets within internationally recognised Russia.
Syria: Syrian administration carries out multiple security operations
Israel and Gaza: Israeli and Hamas officials on the verge of reaching ceasefire.
Mozambique: President Chapo inaugurated after disputed election and widespread unrest.
Southeast Africa: Cyclone Dikeledi impacts Madagascar, Mayotte and Mozambique.
APAC
South Korea: Authorities arrest President Yoon Suk Yeol.
Thailand: Nine rangers and one tourist injured by bomb in restless south.
North, Central and South America
Venezuela: President Nicolás Maduro sworn in for third term
On 10 January, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was sworn in for his third term despite widespread allegations of electoral fraud during the presidential election. Few international leaders attended the inauguration and only two Latin American leaders were present, President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and President Miguel Díaz-Canel of Cuba, both of whom share Maduro’s far-left authoritarian stance.
Protests occurred in the run-up and during the inauguration but did not reach the levels witnessed during the presidential election. The US, UK and the EU imposed new sanctions on the Maduro regime following the inauguration, with US sanctions including an increased reward for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to USD 25 million from USD 15 million.
Maduro denounced sanctions as an “economic war” on Venezuela and threatened to seize Puerto Rico from the US.
Solace Global Assessment:
Maduro’s third term will likely be marked by continued and widespread repression of the opposition, with the regime overly dependent on the military and police to ensure its survival. The scale of protests during the inauguration was likely limited by the arrest of key opposition leaders, a tactic that will almost certainly continue as Maduro consolidates power and curbs the influence of the opposition, civil society groups, journalists and any other critic of the regime.
The low international turnout and the imposition of new sanctions reflect the broader international condemnation of Maduro’s presidency and its lack of legitimacy. These trends will likely push Caracas further towards the orbit of states hostile to the West, including Russia, China and Iran despite BRICS recent rejection of Venezuela- a move caused by Brazil’s veto.
Maduro’s threat towards Puerto Rico is almost certainly sabre-rattling designed to rally his base, with Venezuela lacking the military strength to mount any viable challenge to the US. However, now that Maduro has begun his third term, there is a realistic possibility of increased hostilities with Guyana, with Venezuela claiming the oil-rich Essequibo region. As Maduro consolidates his grip on power, he may seek to intensify these tensions to distract from domestic issues and rally nationalist support.
Bolivia: Former President Evo Morales supporters march on La Paz
Supporters of former Bolivian President Evo Morales marched on Bolivia’s administrative capital, La Paz on 13 January. Protestors have clashed with police on multiple occasions and have tried to gain entry to government buildings, including the vice-presidency building. The police have deployed crowd dispersal methods in response, including the use of tear gas.
The protests, predominantly led by Bolivia’s Indigenous community, are partly a reaction to the reissuance of an arrest warrant for Morales in December for charges of statutory rape. However, they are also fuelled by economic hardship and a belief that President Arce is using legal charges against Morales to diminish his influence ahead of the August 2025 presidential election.
Solace Global Assessment:
With inflation reaching ten per cent, major fuel shortages, critical shortages in imported goods and a lack of foreign reserves, Bolivia is potentially heading for a major economic crisis that will likely sustain unrest until the 2025 presidential election and potentially beyond.
However, the protests, particularly those led by Bolivia’s Indigenous community, have likely exacerbated the country’s economic challenges. Roadblocks, which have become a common tactic in these demonstrations, have significantly disrupted the flow of goods and services, particularly along major supply routes where they have often been erected. The roadblocks are assessed to have cost the economy in excess of USD 2 billion and have exacerbated inflation and fuel supply issues.
The prolonged targeting of Morales combined with the police’s forceful response to indigenous protests, is likely to lead to an increased mobilisation of the indigenous community and heightened tensions, with previous examples suggesting that such tactics only fuel more unrest.
With mounting economic pressures, continued unrest and heightened tensions, Bolivia is likely to enter into a cycle of political instability, further deepening the economic crisis and likely shaping the conditions for a volatile and often violent run-up to the 2025 presidential election.
AMER Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
US to remove Cuba from “state sponsors of terrorism” risk and ease sanctions
The announcement is likely to be one of the last major foreign policy moves made by the Biden administration and follows the precedent set by the Obama White House. Donald Trump reversed President Obama’s move towards the end of his first term, and it is likely that the same will happen once the transition is completed. It is therefore unlikely that this development will be anything more than a symbolic gesture before the return of the Trump administration, with the incoming president likely to sustain his tough stance on the Caribbean nation.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
US presidential inauguration to occur on 20 January
President-elect Donald Trump is set to be inaugurated on 20 January for his second term in office, an event that will likely bring severe traffic disruption to central Washington D.C. and a massive security deployment of around 25,000 military and law enforcement personnel.
The highly visible nature of the ceremony makes it an attractive potential target for violent extremists, including domestic and foreign actors. While FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that no specific or credible threats have been identified, this does not rule out the possibility of an attack. Self-radicalised lone actors pose the greatest threat, particularly given the relative ease of obtaining firearms in the US compared to other Western nations. Security agencies have also warned of potential disruptions from anticipated protests,
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Over one million now displaced within Haiti
The United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) has stated that over one million people, more than half of whom are children, have now been displaced within Haiti due to escalating gang violence. This figure is three times that of December 2023 and is largely in part to the gangs’ near-total control of Port-au-Prince and other highly populated areas.
The agency warned that shelters are overcrowded, and access to basic necessities such as food and water remains critically limited. Deportations from neighbouring countries, mainly the Dominican Republic, have exacerbated the humanitarian strain, which aid agencies are struggling to deal with.
The IOM has called for urgent aid and long-term solutions; however, with the gangs consolidating power in the capital and disrupting air travel from the island nation, major improvements are unlikely without a major international intervention.
Flooding crisis in eastern Brazil
Since 12 January, the flooding crisis in eastern Brazil has worsened due to ongoing heavy rains, with at least 26 deaths and 3,270 displaced in Minas Gerais as of 16 January. Sixty-three municipalities are under a state of emergency, and emergency responders are overwhelmed by calls in Divinopolis.
Other affected states include Bahia, Pernambuco, and Sergipe, with specific warnings for Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. Authorities have issued warnings for continued heavy rains, which will highly likely lead to more severe flooding and a high threat of major landslides.
Europe, Middle East & Africa
Ukraine: Ukraine launches largest long-range strikes against Russia in war so far
Overnight on 13-14 January, Ukraine conducted a large-scale series of long-range strikes against multiple targets on multiple axes between 200-1,000km into Russia. The attack reportedly used six UK-provided Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and US-provided ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), in addition to at least 146 one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs, or attack drones).
The targets included an oil refinery and oil storage facility, glide bomb and cruise missile warehouses, chemical plants, a thermal power plant and military-industrial facilities. These targets were struck in the oblasts of Bryansk, Saratov, Tula, as well as in the Republic of Tatarstan.
Solace Global Assessment:
In the largest such attack by Ukraine against Russia in the war thus far, the strikes were primarily conducted against strategic, rather than tactical, targets. Strategic long-range strikes seek to degrade a state’s ability to wage war by destroying the basis of that state’s military capability.
The attack, therefore, likely indicates to the incoming Trump administration and other key Western allies that Ukraine is capable of continuing the fight against Russia for some time yet. There is a realistic possibility that while Ukraine only has a limited number of Western-provided advanced missile systems, Ukraine has built up a substantial stockpile of domestically produced OWA-UAVs that it can use to conduct further periodic large-scale strategic attacks into Russia.
The attack emulated the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of large-scale Russian long-range attacks, by layering large quantities of cheap OWA-UAVS that can overwhelm air defences with advanced missile systems. With the advent of the OWA-UAV, this is highly likely a new universally applicable tactic of warfighting to penetrate advanced modern air defence, which will almost certainly be replicated by other state militaries as well as capable non-state actors (such as the Houthis in Yemen).
Russia is highly likely to retaliate. The November 2024 decision by the Biden administration to allow the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow against targets in internationally recognised Russian territory led to large-scale Russian retaliation strikes. The retaliation strikes included the use of the new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).
There is a realistic possibility that in addition to the regular large-scale attacks against Ukrainian critical national infrastructure (CNI), such as a 14-15 January series of strikes, Russia will launch a notably significant wave of attacks against Ukrainian urban centres. These attacks could include the use of Oreshnik (largely due to its symbolic value) and the indiscriminate targeting of civilian targets.
Syria: Syrian administration carries out multiple security operations
On 11 January, intelligence officials of Syria’s new government announced they thwarted a plan by the Islamic State (IS) to bomb a Shiite shrine in the Damascus suburb of Sayyida Zeinab.
On 14 January, local channels reported the arrest of the Egyptian citizen Ahmad al-Mansur, who had reportedly sought to start an Islamist movement, named the “January 25 Revolutionaries”, to launch an insurrection against Egyptian leader al-Sisi.
On 15 January, other reports indicated that HTS forces had killed Bassem Hussam al-Din, the commander of a Latakia-based militia that had threatened the transition government weeks ago and had reportedly kidnapped multiple security forces members.
Solace Global Assessment:
The new Syrian administration is likely focusing significant efforts on domestic security and counterterrorism as it seeks to bolster its domestic and international credibility as a long-term administrator for the country. At home, the administration is balancing multiple possible vectors of instability. The various anti-Assad rebel groups and splinter units that have remained armed after the regime’s fall may increasingly become attractive springboards for foreign-backed efforts to destabilise Syria, or may develop into radical formations.
Abroad, the new Syrian administration has taken considerable steps to reassure regional powers, as well as the West, of its viability as a diplomatic partner. The immediate decapitation of the January 25 movement can likely be interpreted in this light. Additionally, Syria’s forces counterterrorism operation against IS is a political victory for the new government, which has pledged to protect religious and ethnic minorities in the country.
Israel and Gaza: Ceasefire agreement on the verge of approval
During this reporting period, representatives of Hamas and the Israeli government negotiating in Doha reportedly reached a “breakthrough”, making the approval of a ceasefire in Gaza imminent. By 16 January, reports indicated that the two sides agreed on a three-phase ceasefire framework.
During the first phase, which is to last 42 days, hostilities will end, and Israeli troops will withdraw to the border, retaining control over the Philadelphi corridor at the Gaza-Egypt border. Surviving Israeli hostages as well as the remains of those who died in captivity would then be exchanged for Palestinian prisoners (with a 30:1 or 50:1 ratio, the latter for women and underage hostages). Gradual hostage exchanges would then continue, while humanitarian aid to Gaza would be considerably boosted.
In phase two, also 42 days-long, Israeli forces will completely withdraw from Gaza. Phase three will mostly focus on reconstruction efforts.
On 16 January, the final approval to the agreement was reportedly delayed by internal disagreements within the Israeli government. Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich’s party “Religious Zionism” threatened to pull support from Netanyahu’s government if the deal were to be approved. Similarly, hard-right Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir also threatened to quit.
A meeting to finalise the ceasefire’s approval was delayed and is scheduled to be held on 17 January.
Solace Global Assessment:
The ceasefire achieves some but not all of the Netanyahu government’s stated war goals. It achieves the liberation of the remaining hostages and secures, at least for a period, Israeli control over the vital Egypt-Gaza border. However, the ceasefire does not include the disbandment of Hamas. While Hamas’ has been significantly weakened and depleted by the war and is unlikely to be able to fully replenish its strength during the ceasefire, it has survived the conflict. Hamas will almost certainly use the ceasefire to reinfiltrate parts of Gaza, especially in the north, and to carry out operations against other Palestinian militias operating in Gaza, which have threatened its authority.
In the short term, the ceasefire is almost certain to boost the delivery of much-needed aid to Gaza. This is likely to be compounded by renewed humanitarian efforts by EU and Gulf states. After phase one, there is a realistic possibility of the ceasefire breaking down, especially if the hard-right parties that support the Netanyahu government retain their maximalist positions. The first foreign policy actions of the Trump administration, set to begin on 20 January, are likely to be crucial for the viability of the ceasefire.
In Israel, the ceasefire will highly likely threaten the stability of the Netanyahu administration. The hard-right and pro-war activists are likely to see the ceasefire as “betraying” the goal of destroying Hamas in Gaza. Conversely, anti-war activists, generally on the left, will accuse the Netanyahu government of arbitrarily prolonging the war. Anti-government sentiment from both the left and hard right will likely result in large-scale demonstrations in Israeli urban centres.
If sustained, the ceasefire is likely to have an impact at the international level. A prolonged truce followed by reconstruction will likely lead to a reduction in pro-Palestine protests, although this will likely increase should either party renege. However, the threat posed by radicalisation after the war almost certainly will remain extant, with a high chance of lone-actor attacks in the West regardless of the ceasefire’s success.
Southeast Africa: Madagascar, Mozambique and Mayotte hit by Tropical Cyclone Dikeledi
After starting as a tropical depression in the Indian Ocean, the storm Dikeledi intensified into a tropical cyclone with maximum windspeeds of 169km/h. On 11 January, Cyclone Dikeledi made landfall in northern Madagascar, causing widespread flooding, landslides and heavy rainfall, resulting in at least three deaths.
After making landfall, Dikeledi weakened into a tropical storm and tracked west in the Mozambique Channel south of Mayotte and Comoros. In Mayotte, at least 14,500 people sought refuge in emergency shelters and heavy rainfall caused flooding and landslides.
The storm then again intensified into a cyclone and briefly made landfall in Mozambique east of Nampula on 13 January, before tracking south. In Nampula, authorities report at least five deaths, over 5,000 houses destroyed, and 35,000 people affected.
Solace Global Assessment:
The most severe storm of the current South West Indian Ocean cyclone season so far, Cyclone Chido, devastated the French overseas department of Mayotte in December 2024. Mayotte was far less impacted by Dikeledi, although the ongoing recovery efforts from Chido have highly likely been impeded.
This current cyclone season is forecast to run from November 2024 to April 2025 (excluding Mauritius and the Seychelles, which is forecast to end in May 2025). The island nations and overseas territories in the South West Indian Ocean are highly vulnerable to the impact of cyclones.
In the event of a severe natural disaster, evacuation options for business travellers and employees in the region would be limited to difficult and costly maritime options in the event of critical airport closures.
Mozambique: President Chapo inaugurated after disputed election and widespread unrest
On 15 January, Frelimo candidate Daniel Chapo was inaugurated as President of Mozambique. In his inauguration speech, Chapo announced several measures, promising to slim down government, reduce the number of ministries, and scrap the central-level State Secretariats. He stated that he would redirect the money to education, health, agriculture, water, roads, and energy.
As the third day of the announced three days of strikes, protests occurred across several cities in Mozambique including Maputo and Nampula. Demonstrations occurred directly outside the inauguration ceremony. Security forces responded with live ammunition and tear gas, killing at least eight people. Footage was shared on social media of security forces hitting an unarmed woman. According to local NGOs, approximately 303 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began.
On 17 January, Frelimo is set to destroy all ballot papers from the October 9 general election. The destruction is set to take place publicly at the District and City Elections Commissions ‘before representatives of candidates, political parties, coalitions of political parties, groups of proposing voters, observers, journalists, and voters in general’, according to the National Elections Commission (CNE). On 8 January, the Public Integrity Center (CIP) reportedly filed an appeal with the Administrative Court to halt the destruction of the ballots.
Solace Global Assessment:
It is highly likely that Chapo is attempting to present himself as a reformer to portray a distinction between his ministry and the previous government. Now Frelimo have successfully inaugurated their candidate, they will likely attempt to appease protesters with reforms. While the destruction of the ballot papers will likely be incendiary in the immediate term, with protesters likely attempting to storm the District and City Elections Commissions, it may inject a sense of defeatism into opposition forces since they will no longer able to concretely prove that the election was fraudulent.
Opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane has declared that he is the legitimate head of state and will announce a program for the ‘first 100 days of his term in office’ on 17 January at 15:00 local time (13:00 UTC). Given he does not have access to state resources, these measures will likely be highly symbolic. He has previously stated that Mozambique requires a new flag; this will likely feature on the agenda. Mondlane has also indicated an end to the protests over the coming months as he implements his shadow government. While the details are yet to be released, this is highly likely to take the momentum out of the demonstrations, which have relied on Mondlane’s organisation since the election.
There is a realistic possibility that Chapo’s inauguration marks a turning point for unrest in Mozambique. The inauguration period has now ended, and Frelimo will almost certainly aim to portray Chapo as a fresh leader with ambitions to better the population, as reflected in Chapo’s inauguration speech. Furthermore, international pressure will likely decrease as other countries set out to strengthen relations with Mozambique’s new government.
Whether demonstrations continue to escalate is almost certainly dependent on Mondlane’s announcement on 17 January. While security forces attempting to arrest Mondlane would also almost certainly incentivise demonstrations, the government has, so far, refrained from taking such measures. It is likely they will continue to refrain from inflaming demonstrations. Without a clear route to power, the widespread perception that Frelimo have “won”, and exhaustion from the economic disruption from the unrest, there is a realistic possibility that demonstrations will gradually diminish over the coming months.
EMEA Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
German far-right congress blocked by 10,000 protesters
The demonstrators blocked the entrance to the planned event, in the east German town of Riesa, Saxony, which had been organised by the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. Germany is holding general elections on 23 February, and the AfD is polling at 21 per cent, which would be the party’s best-ever result in national elections. Party leader Alice Weidel was nominated as the AfD’s official candidate for the chancellorship despite the disruptions. Further protests against the far-right are almost certain in the run-up to the elections, with previous demonstrations attracting hundreds of thousands of participants.
Davos summit likely to drive civil unrest in Western urban centres
The World Economic Forum (WEF) will host its annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, between 20 and 24 January. The Davos summit is a preferred target for environmentalists, anti-capitalist left-wing groups, and other organisations, and is likely to attract protests. Civil unrest is highly likely to occur in Davos itself, causing some disruptions. Other protests are likely to occur in large Western urban centres, like London, Paris, or Brussels. There is a particularly high likelihood of small-scale symbolic actions by anti-WEF groups, including actions meant to disrupt public transport in target cities.
Thousands demonstrate in Belgrade
On 12 January, 20,000 people gathered in a student-led anti-government protest outside the Constitutional Court of Serbia in Belgrade to commemorate victims of the railway station roof collapse in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024 which left 15 dead. The roof collapse has been blamed on sloppy reconstruction work due to corruption; the Novi Sad railway station building was renovated in a deal with Chinese state companies.
A separate protest also occurred in Nis. Protesters demanded that those responsible be brought to justice. The unrest follows a series of protests which occurred in November and December 2024. The demonstrations reflect a broader frustration with perceived failings of the government. President Aleksandar Vucic is increasingly perceived as shifting towards autocratic rule by curbing democratic freedoms and infringing on civil rights. Further unrest in Serbia is highly likely.
Former Georgian prime minister hospitalised after beating by unidentified individuals
Anti-government protests have continued in Georgia, with levels of political violence escalating. Alongside the deployment of draconian riot police tactics against protesters, the role of pro-government plainclothes provocateurs continues to increase. Called “Titushky” by opposition supporters, a Ukrainian name which derives from the pro-Russian “thugs” who frequently attacked pro-European Ukrainians during the Euromaidan movement, they have highly likely been used to suppress the pro-European movement in Georgia with violence.
On 15 January, footage surfaced showing unidentified men attacking participants of a strike that had gathered in central Tbilisi. On 14 January, Giorgi Gakharia, a former prime minister of Georgia between 2019-2021 who now leads the For Georgia opposition party, was hospitalised after being severely beaten in the lobby of the Sheraton hotel in Batumi. The attack, highly likely conducted by “Titushky”, is likely indicative of an increasingly violent crackdown on the Georgian opposition.
Nawaf Salam is the new Lebanese Prime Minister
Nawaf Salam is the head of the International Court of Justice and was widely supported by Christian, Druze, and Sunni members of parliament, while the Shiite representatives, Hezbollah and its ally the Amal Movement, failed to field a candidate. The appointment of Salam is a political setback for Hezbollah and may underscore a greater boldness by its Lebanese opponents to confront its position as an informal “second military” in Lebanon.
Last week, President Joseph Aoun vowed to ensure that only the state retains control of all arms in the country, a statement that was obviously directed at Hezbollah. While no concrete measures are in place to disarm Hezbollah, such a plan is almost certainly too ambitious to be implemented by the Lebanese government.
More realistically, Salam could work to reduce Hezbollah’s influence in the judiciary and legislature while directing “kinetic” efforts to ensure the continuation of the ceasefire agreement with Israel south of the Litani river, a move that may also send positive signals to Lebanon’s southern neighbour and its allies in Washington.
Mali forces seize gold stocks at Canadian mining company site
The government of Mali began enforcing a provisional order to seize gold at the Loulo-Gounkoto site operated by the Canadian Barrick Gold mining company. The move follows Mali blocking gold shipments by the company, and detaining company employees. It almost certainly continues to highlight the worsening security and viability of Western private actors in the Sahel. There is a realistic possibility that similar developments will follow in Burkina Faso, Niger, and potentially Chad.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
NATO to increase force posture in Baltic Sea after multiple cables cut
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has initiated operation “Baltic Sentry” in response to a rise in suspected incidents of underwater sabotage that have primarily targeted undersea internet cables. The operation will include the deployment of frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and autonomous vehicles, including uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).
The operation will almost certainly involve an increase in surveillance on suspected Russian “shadow fleet” vessels, civilian flagged vessels that are alleged to work at the behest of Russian intelligence. However, with Russia’s shadow fleet estimated to contain hundreds of vessels, the NATO task group will likely struggle to actively monitor and deter Russia vessels capable of engaging in Russia’s maritime grey zone strategy.
Anarchist activist firebombs Italian army barracks
On the night of 13 January, a barracks operated by the Carabinieri (Italy’s gendarmerie) in Borgo San Lorenzo, near Florence, was attacked with Molotov cocktails, causing some damage but no injuries. An individual, reportedly an Anarchist activist, was arrested in connection to the incident. There is a realistic possibility that the firebombing was linked to ongoing anti-police protests in central and northern Italy, which have been sparked by the killing of a 19-year-old during a police chase.
Armenia to join global coalition against the Islamic State (IS)
Armenian and American officials announced the beginning of closer defence cooperation between Armenia and the United States, including the former joining the global coalition against IS. Politically, the announcement follows previous Armenian efforts to pivot towards the West following the significant deterioration of its relations with Moscow, following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The announcement almost certainly highlights a growing US interest in the Caucasus, where IS presence is growing through the increased recruitment of Islamic State-Caucasus Province (IS-CP) . In late 2024, an IS-CP cell was discovered in north Azerbaijan and IS-CP has recently claimed attacks in Dagestan, Russia.
Spanish tourist reportedly kidnapped in southern Algeria
Uncorroborated reports indicate that on 15 January a female Spanish tourist was kidnapped from near the southern Algeria town of Tamanrasset, approximately 300km away from the borders with Mali and Niger. The woman was then taken across the border to Mali, where much of the northern region remains largely lawless.
Reports suggest that the woman was captured by militants belonging to the Islamic State Sahel Province, an affiliate of the Islamic State that has grown substantially because of the destabilisation of the Sahel. The kidnappers will now likely attempt to secure a ransom from the Spanish government to fund future operations.
Russia and Iran scheduled to sign 20-year strategic pact
On 17 January, the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin are scheduled to meet in Moscow and sign strategic partnership deal that will govern relations between Russia and Iran for the next 20 years. The deal is claimed to include the further expansion of bilateral ties in trade, investment, transportation, and humanitarian sectors, as well as a deepening of cooperation in defence and security.
Russo-Iranian cooperation is already significant, with Iran supplying Russia with large quantities of Shahed series one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs), attack drones that Russia uses to conduct almost daily attacks against Ukraine. In 2024, the Kremlin made a similar strategic partnership with Pyongyang, leading to the deployment of over 10,000 North Korean troops which are currently engaged in high-intensity combat operations against Ukraine in the Kursk salient. It is unlikely, however, that Iran will send troops.
The agreement is an immediate challenge for the shortly forthcoming Trump administration, with Trump having previously adopted a distinctly hawkish foreign policy posture towards Iran. The agreement likely indicates that Moscow is unwilling to distance itself from Tehran and risk losing critical attack drone supplies in an effort to appease Trump.
Niger and China sign pipeline security memorandum
On 14 January, the Chinese pipeline operator WAPCO signed a framework covering security at its Niger-based operations. The development not only highlights China’s growing economic and strategic footprint in the Sahel, partially accelerated by the West’s retrenchment but also likely Beijing’s growing worries about Islamist groups targeting its assets and citizens in at-risk countries. Attacks on Chinese economic interests have been pervasive in Pakistan, and there is a high likelihood that as China’s footprint grows, African Islamist groups, particularly those affiliated with transregional groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, will increasingly target Chinese interest in the region.
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) make progress in Gezira state, take Wad Madani
SAF units reportedly pushed out Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from the city in Gezira state. Wad Madani is a key logistical hub on the Blue Nile, which controls supply routes to Khartoum, located just to its north, and to eastern regions of the country. The offensive is likely to be important for future SAF efforts to secure control of Gezeira state. There is a realistic possibility that the capture of Wad Madani will strengthen the Sudanese government’s position in Khartoum, where SAF advances have recently resumed.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Icelandic authorities increase aviation alert level in response to seismic activity
On 14 January, the Icelandic Meteorological Office elevated the aviation alert level from green to yellow as a precaution. The decision was taken after 130 earthquakes were detected beneath Iceland’s Bardarbunga volcano, provoking concerns over an eruption. The earthquakes included a magnitude 5.1 tremor and 17 others registering above magnitude 3, likely indicating magma accumulation beneath the volcano. The volcano is one of six volcanic systems located under Europe’s biggest glacier Vatnajokull, and in the event of a subglacial eruption, there is a substantial risk of an ash eruption and subglacial flooding
Marburg outbreak suspected in northwest Tanzania
An outbreak of Marburg Virus Disease (MVD), a severe haemorrhagic fever with no known treatment or vaccine, is suspected in Tanzania’s Kagera region, near the borders with Rwanda and Burundi. Nine suspected cases have been reported, including eight deaths, resulting in a case-fatality ratio of 89 per cent. Healthcare workers are among the affected.
The World Health Organization (WHO) has raised concerns about the potential for further spread, particularly given Kagera’s position as a transit hub with frequent cross-border movement. A recent MVD outbreak in Rwanda, which affected 66 people and caused 15 deaths, was declared over in December 2024. In response, rapid response teams have been deployed, a mobile laboratory and treatment centres have been established, and ongoing laboratory tests and contact tracing are underway.
Asia–Pacific
South Korea: Authorities arrest President Yoon Suk Yeol
On 15 January, authorities detained Yoon after he failed to comply with multiple summonses from police and investigators. Yoon stated that he would cooperate with investigators but criticised his arrest as illegal. Investigators have 48 hours to question him at the corruption agency’s headquarters in Gwacheon before applying for a detention warrant that could extend his detainment for up to 20 days. On 17 January, South Korea’s anti-corruption agency stated that it would seek to extend Yoon’s detention. Yoon’s defence team is seeking a review of his arrest warrant, and his impeachment trial is set to continue.
The arrest followed a standoff at the presidential residence in Seoul, where authorities faced resistance from Yoon’s supporters and the acting chief of presidential security, who was subsequently detained for obstruction. Approximately 3,000 police officers were deployed to arrest Yoon. A similar incident occurred on 3 January, whereby authorities were prevented from arresting Yoon after being blocked for approximately six hours. The situation remains fluid, with Yoon’s legal team negotiating for his voluntary appearance before investigators.
Solace Global Assessment:
Yoon is the first sitting president of South Korea to be arrested. He reportedly faced hours of questioning after his arrest but has not yet been charged. If found guilty of insurrection, Yoon faces the prospect of a heavy fine or life imprisonment. The crime also technically carries the death sentence, but this outcome is highly unlikely due to a long-standing moratorium on executions.
Yoon’s arrest constitutes an important step in restoring normality in South Korean politics. Since Yoon’s declaration of martial law on 3 December, uncertainty has persisted after Yoon refused to step down despite efforts by opposition forces to impeach him, which eventually succeeded on 14 December. The longer Yoon resisted arrest, the greater the chances of further unrest and clashes between his supporters and anti-Yoon movements and government forces. Furthermore, the authorities’ failure to arrest Yoon constituted a source of embarrassment for South Korea’s security forces. If Yoon successfully evaded arrest, it may embolden politicians to curb democratic institutions to retain power.
Thailand: Thai police targeted in IED attack in restless south
On 13 January, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated near Muang Pattani police station in Thailand’s southern province of Pattani, injuring nine paramilitary rangers and one Malaysian tourist. The bomb was attached to a motorcycle, which was left by a suspect who fled on foot. Police cordoned off the area and jammed mobile phone signals, fearing that suspected insurgents might have planted a second bomb to ambush officers.
Solace Global Assessment:
This attack adds to a growing series of militant assaults in southern Thailand, a region long plagued by insurgent activity, largely attributed to separatist Islamist groups such as the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the New Pattani Revolutionary Front (BPP). Although the latest attack did not result in fatalities, it marks yet another example of the increased use of IEDs by separatist groups in the region.
These attacks have largely escaped international attention, partly due to the lack of high-profile casualties and the Thai authorities’ efforts to downplay the violence to protect the tourism industry and foreign investment. However, the increase in attacks may indicate a resurgence of the insurgency, with peace talks failing to make meaningful progress.
On 16 January, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra visited the three southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, despite the threat of militancy. Her visit was likely a bid to reassure the public and demonstrate the government’s commitment to the restive south, as well as to reassure Chinese visitors, millions of whom visit Thailand during the Chinese Lunar year which begins on 29 January.
APAC Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan sentenced to 14 years in prison
The sentence is linked to a corruption case. Khan was accused of exchanging government land for favours by a major real estate developer. Khan, who has been in prison since August 2023, is the leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and remains hugely popular in the country and among the Pakistani diaspora community. PTI activists and other supporters have staged sporadic large-scale protests since Khan was imprisoned.
In November 2024, protests led to multiple cities in Pakistan being paralysed, six deaths, and over 1,000 arrests. There is a high likelihood that this development will lead to further protests. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility of civil unrest in cities with a large Pakistani community, including London and other UK urban centres.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Pakistani army expands operations against Baloch militants
At least 27 militants, most belonging to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), have been killed by Pakistani army operations in the restless Balochistan province. Army operations targeted several militant hideouts, as well as weapons and ammunition depots, resulting in the capturing of lethal material. The raids were initiated after a series of BLA and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) which killed multiple government troops.
However, both militant groups have responded with IED attacks on government forces. This is likely to demonstrate strength and to exploit the current overstretching of the Pakistani military which is also contending with a border conflict with the Afghan Taliban, an increase in attacks attributed to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and a wave of sectarian violence in the west of the country.
Beijing deploys its largest coastguard vessel in the Philippines’ waters
On 14 January, Beijing deployed a 164.89-metre-long coastguard vessel 5901 (IMO: 9756028) nicknamed “The Monster” approximately 77 nautical miles off the coast of Philippines’ Zambales province. Manila criticised the act as intended to ‘intimidate fishermen’ and reflective of Beijing’s ‘increasing aggression’. In response to the vessel’s presence, the Philippine Coastguard deployed two of its largest vessels and demanded the withdrawal of the vessel from its exclusive maritime economic zone (EEZ).
On 17 January, the Philippine navy conducted drills near the contested Scarborough shoal in the South China Sea, an act almost certainly conducted in response to perceived Chinese aggression. This incident constitutes the latest spat amid frequent brinkmanship between Philippine and Chinese maritime forces around the contested waters.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Magnitude 6.9 earthquake off Miyazaki, Japan
On 13 January, a magnitude 6.9 earthquake struck off the coast of Miyazaki Prefecture in Japan, prompting a tsunami advisory for coastal areas in Miyazaki and Kochi prefectures. The Japanese meteorological agency reported multiple aftershocks with magnitudes between 3 and 4.1. Following the earthquake, evacuation orders were issued for the coastal areas of Takanabe and Kadogawa. A 10-centimetre wave was observed at Cape Muroto and Tosashimizu, while tide gauges reported a 20-centimetre sea level rise at Miyazaki and Aburatsu ports.
The tsunami advisories and warnings were later lifted, with no reports of significant damage. In the aftermath, local authorities reported minor disruptions, including water outages in the Ikime area of Miyazaki due to apparent pipe damage. At least one person sustained minor injuries in Oita Prefecture. Authorities have called for people to remain alert for further strong tremors in the week following the earthquake.
Eruption of Mount Ibu in Indonesia
On 16 January, Mount Ibu in Indonesia’s North Maluku region erupted Authorities have initiated evacuations for approximately 3,000 residents living in the vicinity of the volcano. As of the latest reports, 182 individuals have taken refuge in evacuation centres. The Indonesian disaster agency has issued a warning to the public to refrain from engaging in activities within a three-mile radius of the volcano’s active crater. Emergency responders have been deployed to manage the situation, following the elevation of the alert status to its highest level. The eruption has prompted swift action to ensure the safety of the local population, which numbers around 13,000 people.
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Executive Summary
- Further destruction is almost certain as wildfires continue to tear through Southern California.
- Significant protests are highly likely to continue in Venezuela as Maduro is inaugurated and will almost certainly be met with violent suppression by the regime.
- A major attack in northern Benin is almost certainly indicative of the growing threat posed to West African countries by jihadist groups highly active in the Sahel junta states.
- Significant unrest is highly likely in Mozambique as the formerly exiled opposition leader Mondlane returns to Maputo.



AMER
Canada: Prime Minister Trudeau resigns
USA: Multiple wildfires spread through Southern California
Venezuela: Arrests and planned protests ahead of Maduro inauguration
EMEA
Austria: Far-right party gets mandate to form government
Ukraine & Russia: Ukrainian forces launch limited counteroffensive in Kursk
Benin: Benin army sustains heavy losses after attack in the north
Chad: 24 individuals appear to attempt to storm presidential palace
Mozambique: Opposition leader Mond-lane arrives in Maputo
APAC
China: 7.1 magnitude earthquake hits southern Tibet
Taiwan: Taipei accuses China of underwater sabotage
North, Central and South America
Canada: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau resigns
On 6 January, Justin Trudeau, who has served as Canada’s prime minister since 2015, announced that he would step down as the leader of his party, with the leadership election scheduled for 9 March.
Federal elections are scheduled to be held in Canada by 20 October 2025. The main opposition party is the Conservative Party, which currently polls between 20 and 24 points ahead of the Liberal Party. Furthermore, recent polls indicate that the Liberals risk falling behind the New Democrats, Canada’s third-largest party.
Solace Global Assessment:
Trudeau’s resignation follows significant internal pressures within the Liberal Party, as well as considerable domestic and international political setbacks. Trudeau’s political situation had likely become close to unrecoverable following the resignation of long-term ally and Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland in December, who openly accused Trudeau of failing to do enough to meet the challenge posed by US President-elect Donald Trump’s call to impose heavy tariffs on Canadian goods. Freeland’s resignation mobilised large parts of the Liberal Party to increase their calls for the prime minister to step down.
However, even prior to December, Trudeau’s position had gradually deteriorated following repeated setbacks at home and abroad. Canada’s severe cost of living crisis, marked by significant housing shortages, has particularly affected some of the Liberals’ key constituencies.
Domestic protests, such as the COVID-19 and trucker’s protests, a stagnant economy characterised by rising inflation, and growing concerns with immigration also influenced by developments in Europe and south of the border, have all likely contributed to damage Trudeau’s popularity.
On the international stage, the Canadian government has been heavily criticised by pro-Palestine groups, it has engaged in an ongoing diplomatic crisis with India over the alleged targeted assassination of a Sikh independence activist on Canadian soil and has clashed with the incoming US administration.
While a new candidate may boost the Liberal Party’s chances at the elections, it remains highly likely that the Conservatives will win decisively. The first weeks and months of the Trump administration are likely to be particularly crucial. If the promised tariffs are implemented, these are likely to have extremely negative effects for the new Canadian administration. In fact, there is a realistic possibility that Washington will leverage the Liberals’ extremely precarious political position to extract concessions in the areas of security, foreign policy, and trade.
United States: Significant wildfires tear through Southern California
As of 10 January, fast-moving wildfires are currently ongoing in California. At least five separate blazes are currently ongoing around the Pacific Palisades (Palisades Fire), Pasadena (Eaton Fire), Sylmar (Hurst Fire), Acton (Lidia Fire), and Hollywood Hills (Sunset Fire) neighbourhoods of Los Angeles.
The Palisades Fire has burned through over 20,000 acres, causing significant damage, including the destruction of beachfront homes in Malibu; it is approximately six per cent contained. The Eaton Fire has spread to nearly 14,000 acres and is zero per cent contained. The Kenneth Fire has impacted approximately 960 acres and is 35 per cent contained. The Hurst Fire has grown to 800 acres and is 37 per cent contained. The Lidia Fire has grown to approximately 400 acres but is 75 per cent contained.
Mandatory evacuation orders have been issued for nearly 180,000 people in Southern California. Ten deaths have been reported so far. Over 1,400 firefighting personnel have been deployed to combat the blazes and Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency.
Major roads including Sunset Boulevard and part of the Pacific Coast Highway became gridlocked as residents fled the wildfires. Highway lanes near Topanga Canyon Boulevard closed due to the wildfire’s fast expansion. Drivers abandoned their cars on Sunset Boulevard, forcing The Los Angeles Fire Department to deploy bulldozers to Sunset Boulevard to allow fire crews to pass abandoned vehicles.
Solace Global Assessment:
The fires began on 7 January after a bush fire was caught by a windstorm, spreading the fire into surrounding areas. California is currently affected by the northeasterly Santa Ana winds of approximately 100 km/h, which are caused by high pressure over the Great Basin. These winds have fuelled many of California’s worst wildfires in the past, including the 2018 Woolsey fire, which killed three people.
Peak wildfire season in California typically occurs between July and October each year. Although wildfires are unusual in January, high winds have combined with particularly dry conditions in California to contribute to fertile conditions for the wildfire to spread. Rains of over 0.25 centimetres have not been experienced in Southern California since May 2024. The Santa Ana winds have exacerbated the dry conditions by reducing the humidity levels.
Fire hydrants have reportedly run out of water in the Palisades area. While water tanks are currently being used to supply water to fire fighters, this severely limits the extent to which the fire department can tackle the ongoing wildfires. The reason for the water shortage is currently unknown, but water shortages at fire hydrants may occur because of power outages, high demand during large fires, broken water mains, or drought conditions. Given the recent dry weather, the issues are likely influenced by low water supplies in Southern California.
In the aftermath of the wildfires, residents who have had their property destroyed are likely to ask questions regarding the lack of water in the fire hydrants. Much of California’s water infrastructure was built in the 1960s and 1970s, lacking advanced modern technology and prone to leaks and inefficiency. Furthermore, Los Angeles mayor Karen Bass cut the fire department’s budget in 2024 by approximately USD 17 million. Given California has one of the highest water needs in the US, the federal and state authorities are likely to come under increasing pressure to modernise California’s water infrastructure in the months following the wildfire and increase fire department spending.
Venezuela: Opposition arrests ahead of Maduro inauguration and planned protests
Ahead of President Nicolas Maduro’s inauguration for a third six-year term on 10 January, the Venezuelan opposition has warned of a surge in arrests of activists and opposition figures.
Prominent arrests have included press freedom advocate, Carlos Correa, opposition politician Enrique Marquez and briefly, the leader of the opposition, María Corina Machado.
The arrests coincide with planned protests against Maduro’s inauguration, with opposition groups continuing to dispute the results of July’s presidential election, which they allege was marred by fraud and voting irregularities. Several foreign nationals have also been detained on suspicion of conspiracy or sabotage.
Solace Global Assessment:
The increase in arrests is likely strategic messaging by the Maduro administration aimed at limiting the extent of planned protests during his inauguration. The strategy, whilst limited to only a handful of prominent individuals, has likely been designed to limit the abilities of key individuals to mobilise protests across Venezuela, as well as rally international support. The detention of foreign nationals is a common occurrence in Venezuela and is often done to portray the idea that the opposition is corrupt and influenced by enemies of the state. Moreover, foreign nationals with current or past associations with foreign governments or militaries are most at risk of being detained, regardless of their true motivations.
Despite the arrests, major disruptive protests in multiple Venezuelan towns and cities during the inauguration are highly likely and will almost certainly be violently suppressed by the government. There is also a realistic possibility of targeted attacks on the inauguration. In 2018, two uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) detonated explosives in Caracas near where Maduro was addressing the Bolivarian National Guard. While some have dismissed this as a false flag attack aimed to bolster support for the regime, the high-profile nature of the inauguration and proliferation of UAV technology likely increase the credibility of such a threat.
AMER Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Greenland PM pushes for independence as Trump row resumes
The Prime Minister of the Danish autonomous territory, Mute Egede, called for an acceleration of the process to secure independence from the Danish crown. Greenlandic independence is contemplated under the self-rule law of 2009, which posits that it would need to be approved via a referendum. While Egede is part of a well-established independentist movement, the recent comments were almost certainly prompted by US President-elect Donald Trump’s call for the US to buy the strategically important territory from Denmark. In addition to massive reserves of natural resources, Greenland is positioned to strategically control the Arctic, an area where both the US and Russia are increasingly looking to strengthen their positions.
Trinidad and Tobago prime minister to resign before end of term
Prime Minister Keith Rowley announced his plans not to seek re-election and to vacate his post before the end of his term in August 2025. The announcement comes at a time when Trinidad and Tobago struggles with increasing rates of gun violence, which have prompted the government to issue a state of emergency. The ruling People’s National Movement (PNM) will now have to nominate a replacement for Rowley, who will be then appointed by the President.
Venezuela and Paraguay sever diplomatic ties
On 6 January, Venezuela and Paraguay severed diplomatic ties after Paraguayan President Santiago Pena expressed support for Venezuela’s opposition. Pena spoke with opposition leaders and backed Edmundo Gonzalez, who is in exile and whom the opposition claims won the 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections, after an election marred by accusations of fraud.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Artificial intelligence reportedly used in Las Vegas Cybertruck attack
On 31 December, US Army solider Matthew Livelsberger detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) inside of a Tesla Cybertruck outside of the Trump International Hotel in Las Vegas. Authorities have confirmed that Livelsberger had used the AI chatbot ChatGPT to plan the attack, which would mark the first known use of the platform in support of the development of an IED. The incident has triggered concerns over how easily available AI can be exploited for nefarious means and will likely contribute to demands for stricter regulations on AI platforms.
Central American police arrive in Haiti to reinforce United Nations mission
The first group of a planned 150 military police officers, mostly from Guatemala and El Salvador, arrived in the country to bolster the UN mission, which has so far been led by their Kenyan counterparts.
UN operations in Haiti have so far been relatively unsuccessful at deterring and containing the gangs that control much of the country. The gangs have implemented a terror-reliant strategy, characterised by attacks on hospitals, airports, civil society groups and NGOs, aimed at preventing other actors from establishing control in parts of Haiti, and at maintaining the local civilian population reliant on criminal networks.
It is highly likely that the new deployments will result in a harsh reaction by local gangs, who may accelerate attacks on transport hubs in Port-au-Prince, or carry out killings among the local civilians.
With no involvement by major international players like the US or France, it is unlikely that small countries’ deployment of police forces will manage to stabilise the situation in Haiti in the short term.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Polar vortex in the US and Canada
A polar vortex continues to bring severe winter weather to the US and Canada, prompting widespread disruptions. Georgia’s Governor Brian Kemp has declared a State of Emergency ahead of a winter storm expected on 10 January.
Tennessee’s National Weather Service issued a winter storm warning for Middle Tennessee, forecasting major travel disruptions. In Virginia, Henrico and east Goochland counties remain under a boil water advisory due to storm damage at a Richmond water treatment plant.
Schools in North Texas, including districts like Denton, Dallas, and Fort Worth, have closed for 9 and 10 January. The polar vortex has already triggered a state of local disaster declaration in Saline County, Kansas, after record-breaking snowfall. Power outages have affected thousands in Kentucky, southwestern Indiana, and southeastern Illinois, with restoration ongoing. In Richmond, water production has resumed, though the boil water advisory continues.
Extreme heat and wildfire threat across Chile
Chile’s National System for Disaster Prevention and Response (SENAPRED) has issued multiple yellow alerts across the country warning of intense heat. Yellow alerts have been issued for the Valparaiso, Bio Bio, Maule and metropolitan region which includes the capital, Santiago. Temperatures are set to approach 40 degrees Celsius in several places and are likely to cause or exacerbate many of the wildfires Chile is currently struggling to contain.
Europe, Middle East & Africa
Austria: Freedom Party (FPÖ) gets mandate to lead government
On 6 January, Herbert Kickl, the FPÖ leader, was tasked by President Van der Bellen with forming a new government, after Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) leader and Chancellor Karl Nehammer failed to do so.
FPÖ won the most votes, 28.8 per cent, at Austria’s parliamentary election in September, while the OVP finished second with 21 per cent.
ÖVP’s efforts to form a coalition with the Social Democrats and the liberal Neos failed over disagreements on key policy issues, leading Nehammer to hand in his resignation as chancellor (Nehammer will be replaced on 10 January by Alexander Schallenberg, who will rule until a new government is appointed).
Solace Global Assessment:
As every other Austrian party has refused to form a coalition with FPÖ, the party’s only option is to make a deal with the ÖVP. The FPÖ has already been in multiple governing coalitions with ÖVP, always as a junior partner (2000-2005, 2017-2019). This time, the party will almost certainly demand the chancellorship, as well as other key government roles. FPÖ currently bargains from a position of strength, as a decision to walk away from the talks would highly likely trigger new elections, where the party would almost certainly improve on its previous vote tally (currently, polls project FPÖ would win 36 per cent of the vote, with ÖVP falling to 21 per cent).
A government led by Kickl, were it to follow FPÖ’s stated policy proposals, would almost certainly drive an increase in civil unrest in Austria.
Some of FPÖ’s pledges are extremely controversial, such as the restriction of welfare benefits to citizens alone, the banning of “political Islam”, and “remigration” – the return of citizens of non-European ethnic backgrounds to the countries their families originate from.
In addition to almost certainly clashing with multiple European institutions and treaties, these proposals are likely to provoke a reaction from multiple civil society actors both on the left and the centre and may likewise drive an increase in political violence. Moreover, FPÖ’s anti-Islam policies are likely to be leveraged by extremist actors to drive recruitment in Austria, increasing the risk of radicalisation and terrorism.
Ukraine & Russia: Ukrainian forces launch a limited counteroffensive in the Kursk salient
On 5 January, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) launched a limited mechanised offensive against Russian positions in the Kursk salient. AFU forces advanced northeast of Sudzha into Berdin and Novosotnitskii. Initially, the Ukrainian General Staff described the operation as a “new offensive”, however, the Telegram statement was later edited to remove this. Russian forces, meanwhile, reportedly attacked the villages of Malaya Loknya, Sverdlikovo, and Leonidovo from the Kursk salient’s western flank.
Solace Global Assessment:
The surprise August 2024 Ukrainian offensive into Kursk Oblast rapidly captured ground and temporarily shifted the ‘narrative’ of the conflict. By successfully capturing ground in internationally recognised Russian territory, Kyiv was highly likely hoping to divert considerable Russian forces from offensives in Donetsk and to provide a ‘win’ in the face of increasing Russian momentum in the war. The Kursk offensive, however, was contained without a strategically decisive diversion of forces (the deployment of North Korean personnel to the Oblast is almost certainly part of this effort) and Russia has been gradually but slowly pushing back Ukrainian forces in the north and west of the Kursk salient over the last few months.
It is likely that the current limited offensive operation by the AFU in the east-northeast of the salient has been calculated to exploit potential weaknesses in Russia’s defensive position – Russian forces have focused offensive efforts in the north and west. A breakthrough in the vicinity of Berdin could threaten the outmanoeuvring of Russian forces positioned in the salient’s north, although the diversion of Ukrainian forces from defensive efforts elsewhere in the Kursk salient is risky and has likely factored into the past week’s attempted Russian advances. In addition to the potential tactical advantage, there is a realistic possibility that the limited Ukrainian counteroffensive could have been a probing operation to test the strength of Russian defences in support of a more significant future counteroffensive – Kyiv likely seeks to have a ‘win’ before Trump is inaugurated on 20 January and any territorial gains could put it in a stronger position during anticipated peace negotiations.
Any notable Ukrainian advances would highly likely be met by retaliation by the Kremlin, as part of Russia’s strategy of deterrence. The most likely retaliation would involve significant (larger than in general) long-range strikes using missiles and one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) against Ukraine’s major urban centres, possibly using the new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The use of the Oreshnik with a non-nuclear conventional warhead has likely enabled Putin to reduce nuclear brinkmanship, by providing a means of escalatory retaliation without having to resort to a tactical nuclear strike.
Benin: Benin armed forces suffer major casualties in northern attack
On 9 January, the Benin army suffered heavy losses after one of its most well-defended positions was attacked in the north of the country. Beninese troops had been stationed in the area to prevent cross-border attacks from neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, where there are ongoing Islamist insurgencies. The military did not disclose a casualty count; however, the main opposition party has suggested around 30 soldiers were killed in the attack.
Solace Global Assessment:
The attack marks one of the worst losses for the Benin Armed Forces since the escalation of the Islamist insurgencies in the Sahel.
No group has currently claimed responsibility for the attack; however, it is highly likely that it was conducted by the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). JNIM, which has initiated an insurgency in neighbouring northern Togo, is likely attempting to achieve several objectives in Benin and the wider West African region.
JNIM’s strategy likely involves establishing a buffer zone by destabilising the areas of countries adjacent to its key area of operations in Burkina Faso and Niger. Such a buffer zone would provide JNIM greater freedom of movement and fix regional militaries within the coastal nations, limiting their ability and will to deploy resources to the Sahel.
A destabilised northern Benin would also provide JNIM with greater opportunities to increase both its revenue and recruitment, with major attacks demonstrating its growing capabilities.
Should JNIM succeed in recruiting disenfranchised Muslims from Benin, this will provide the extremist group with expanded local knowledge and capabilities but would also free up Sahelian fighters to focus on operations within the Sahel itself.
Moreover, with the sustained trend of Western forces being expelled from the region, extremist groups like JNIM will find it easier to expand their operations unless countries like Benin agree to the hosting of Western forces on their soil.
In the long term, if JNIM successfully destabilises the north and establishes a presence there, it could expand its operations further south, ultimately threatening coastal capitals like Porto-Novo and Lomé- coveted targets due to their strategic location and symbolic value.
Chad: Chadian authorities claim to have repelled attack on presidential palace
On 9 January, Chadian authorities claim that 24 individuals armed with knives and machetes attempted to storm the presidential palace with President Mahamat Deby Itno inside. According to authorities, some vehicles appeared to break down at the entrance of the palace before the assailants walked out and stabbed the four entrance guards, killing one. Guards reportedly shot at the assailants, killing 18 and arresting six, repelling the attack.
Solace Global Assessment:
The apparent attack comes shortly after Chad held elections, with results planned to be released on 15 January. There is significant speculation regarding whether the incident was conducted by Boko Haram, a rival military faction, another armed insurgent group, staged by the government, or the result of confusion with an armed group of civilians. Given the reliance on knives and machetes and relative disorganisation, the attack is unlikely to constitute a coup attempt by a rival military faction.
While Boko Haram typically uses firearms and explosives, there is a realistic possibility that the assailants were associated with the terrorist group, who may have been taking advantage of the withdrawal of French forces in December 2024.
Alternatively, a government-staged coup attempt would likely provide the government with a pretext to bolster security ahead of expected protests. However, authorities appear to be playing down the significance of the attack, implying they were akin to drunken “Pieds Nickeles”. This could indicate an attempt to minimise the threat of armed groups and project stability ahead of the expected election victory. Alternatively, there is a realistic possibility that security forces mistakenly perceived a group of workers as a threat and shot them before they could attack the presidential palace.
Mozambique: Opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane arrives in Mozambique
According to local NGOs, approximately 289 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began. The most recent “TurboV8” phase resulted in the highest death toll of any phase so far and was set to be followed by the “ponta de lança” (spearhead) phase. However, this stage was subsequently postponed due to fears of opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane’s assassination. Supporters threatened to block all roads if Mondlane did not appear live on Facebook,, which he did on 6 January.
After announcing his return to the capital Maputo, Mondlane arrived in Mozambique on 9 January ahead of the 15 January inauguration of President-elect Daniel Chapo. Mondlane asked his supporters to “welcome” him at Maputo International Airport (MPM) at 08:05 local time. After greeting Mondlane, a procession of people accompanied Mondlane’s car from the airport to the centre of Maputo. Mondlane then spoke at the Mercado Estrela at approximately 10:00 local time, whereby he reaffirmed his claims of an election victory. Security forces subsequently used live ammunition and tear gas in central Maputo to disperse crowds gathered in support of Mondlane, reportedly charging at the crowd and triggering a stampede.
Solace Global Assessment:
Despite speculation over whether authorities would attempt to arrest Mondlane upon arrival, Mozambique’s Supreme Court has announced that no arrest warrant has currently been issued. However, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has reportedly opened proceedings against Mondlane as the architect of the unrest. If the government targets Mondlane via arrest or assassination, significant unrest will almost certainly take place. In the long term, however, the loss of Mondlane’s leadership may enable the government to suppress demonstrations through curfews and mass arrests, with protests likely to diminish in the absence of his ability to mobilise the opposition.
On 6 January, Frelimo announced the next key dates in the electoral process. In addition to the inauguration of the parliament and president on 13 and 15 January, the date for the destruction of the 9 October election materials was announced as the 22 January. If the government is still in power on 22 January, demonstrations will almost certainly occur on this date as it will likely be perceived as the final step in the government’s consolidation of power following the election. There is a realistic possibility that protesters will target Frelimo offices, particularly in Maputo, in order to prevent the potential destruction of evidence of alleged electoral fraud.
Mondlane continues to state that he will take office on 15 January and that he will announce further details of the new phase of unrest titled “ponta de lança” (spearhead). Significant demonstrations are almost certain in the lead up to the inauguration. There is a realistic possibility that Frelimo will use Mondlane’s presence in country and attempt to inaugurate himself as president as proof of an ongoing coup. If this happens, the government will likely accelerate efforts to crack down on demonstrations and delegitimise Mondlane, who will pose a significant threat to the government’s legitimacy given he appears to have the backing of the majority of the population.
EMEA Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Romania sets date for presidential election repeat
The new vote will take place in two rounds on 4 and 18 May. The previous elections were annulled by the judiciary after the first round on 24 November 2024 as Calin Georgescu, a virtually unknown independent candidate who largely campaigned on social media espousing anti-establishment, anti-NATO and anti-EU positions, won the most votes. The Constitutional Court’s decision was explained as a reaction to allegedly widespread Russian meddling in the campaign, although no claims of direct interference in the voting process were reported.
Georgescu’s bid for the presidency has been boosted by the first vote’s annulment, and he remains the favourite to win in May. However, there is a realistic possibility that Georgescu will not be allowed to run, as the Constitutional Court may declare him ineligible over funding irregularities during the first campaign. If this were to happen, there would be a high likelihood of severe civil unrest in Romania, with other anti-establishment candidates and parties likely to throw their political weight behind Georgescu.
Georgian protests continue as non-recognition bill set to be proposed by US Congress
Anti-government protests continue in Georgia, notably on Orthodox Christmas Eve (7 January) when thousands set off from churches and converged at the church opposite the parliament building. A bill is set to be introduced to the US Congress that will prohibit recognition of the Georgian Dream government. The bill is quoted as making specific reference to Bidzina Ivanishvili, the oligarch and founder of Georgian Dream who was sanctioned by the US in December 2024.
Salome Zourabichvili, a figurehead for the pro-Europe opposition who was ousted as president in a contested December indirect election, continues to claim to be the legitimate president of Georgia. On 9 January, Zourabichvili told journalists that she will travel to the US to attend Donald Trump’s 20 January presidential inauguration, after being invited by a US Congress member.
There are numerous US politicians sympathetic to the pro-Europe Georgian opposition movement – it is likely that significant international pressure from the US would embolden the protest movement, but also further isolate the Georgian Dream government which could accelerate its alignment with Moscow.
Lebanon’s parliament elects new president after two-year vacancy
Following two rounds of voting held in Lebanon’s parliament on 9 January, the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Joseph Aoun, was elected as the fourteenth President of the Lebanese Republic.
The presidency must be occupied by a Maronite Christian, according to Lebanon’s constitution. As Lebanon is a parliamentary republic, the presidency is a predominantly ceremonial role, though can still wield considerable discretionary reserve powers. The presidency has been vacant since 2022 due to political divisions, with Lebanon’s political system struggling since the end of the previous president’s, Michel Aoun (not related), term. Lebanon has struggled with the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut port explosion, chronic economic crisis and Israel’s military operations against Lebanese Hezbollah.
Joseph Aoun’s election will likely bolster Lebanon’s political stability. With approval from the US, Aoun’s election is likely indicative of the declining influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon after being severely degraded by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). As per the terms of the ceasefire agreement, the IDF’s 60-day withdrawal period from Lebanon expires on 26 January – with this deadline looming, fears regarding the state of the ceasefire, if the IDF continues to occupy areas of southern Lebanon, have likely pressured Lebanese lawmakers to elect Aoun who will continue to have a key role in maintaining the ceasefire.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Attempted attack on Belgian prime minister
On 6 January, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo was targeted in a knife attack outside his home, though the perpetrator was arrested. Little is currently known about the assailant; however, the incident likely reflects a broader rise in violent attacks on political leaders. Uncorroborated reports indicate that the alleged attacker had attempted a similar attack on the US Embassy in Brussels in April.
Greek Anarchists plan “International Week of Action”
The organisation Revolutionary Struggle (RS) has announced a week of political action (between 10 and 16 January) in support of two of its members currently imprisoned in Chalcis. RS has claimed responsibility for carrying out bombings at multiple Greek ministry buildings, the Athens Stock Exchange, the Bank of Greece, the US Embassy in Athens, and IMF offices. There is a high likelihood that Anarchists will carry out attacks in the coming days, likely targeting buildings. There is a realistic possibility that other European Anarchist groups associated with RS, especially in Italy, Spain, and Germany, will carry out actions during the “week of action”.
Attack on Israeli vehicles near al-Funduq, West Bank, kills three and injures eight
The shooting was reportedly carried out by at least three individuals, who targeted civilian vehicles transiting on Route 55. While no claims of responsibility have been made for the attack, it was praised by other Palestinian militias. Israeli sources claimed that the attackers have been nevertheless identified as residents of Jenin. The attack will likely prompt an escalation in Israeli raids in the area, with additional incidents in the West Bank likely leading to increased clashes between Israeli settler communities and Palestinians.
Mali forces capture Islamic State leader
The armed forces of Mali announced the capture of Mahamad Ould Erkehile, alias Abou Hach, who is one of the key leaders of the Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP), formerly Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS). The operation leading to Abou Hach’s capture was carried out in the Amasrakad area of the Gao region.
There is a high likelihood that ISSP operatives will carry out retaliatory attacks against Malian security forces and civilians. Since the death of its leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi in 2021, ISSP has sought to restructure its presence in areas of operations, gradually and partly shifting towards a strategy aimed at establishing a structured governance of local populations. This has however made its leaders more visible, allowing junta forces and their allies to carry out more successful decapitation strikes.
Ivory Coast to cut military ties with France
President Alassane Ouattara has announced that French troops are expected to leave the country in January. This makes the country the sixth to have cut military ties with Paris in Africa. The setback in the Ivory Coast follows Senegal’s and Chad’s recent ousting of French forces, and the previous fallout of relations between Paris and the Sahelian juntas.
France will likely have to turn to other regional powers to maintain a presence in the region. The reduction of France’s footprint elsewhere in West Africa and the Sahel has largely coincided with the growth of Russian operations in the region.
However, with Russia’s overextension having been demonstrated in Syria, and also through Wagner and Africa Corps forces’ failures in the Sahel, it is highly likely that the retrenchment of Western forces will leave a security vacuum that could be exploited by regional Islamist groups, who maintain a strategic aim to expand their presence towards the African coast.
M23 Movement captures strategic town in North Kivu
On 5 January, the M23 Movement captured the mineral-rich town of Masisi, the capital of the Masisi territory, 80 kilometres from North Kivu’s provincial capital Goma. Masisi is strategically important due to its richness in agriculture, livestock, and minerals as well as its access to Goma, a long-term target for M23.
Some conflicting reports indicate that the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) alongside its allies, the Wazalendo, a group of irregular forces allied with the military, may have regained control of Masisi. The mixed reporting indicates that the territory is likely contested, with the FARDC launching offensives to recapture the town.
The M23 rebels have recently made significant gains in North Kivu, seizing control of Katale near Masisi. Fighting in other areas of Masisi territory, including Sake and Ngungu also occurred over the past week, reportedly causing approximately 100,000 people to be displaced.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Storm Floriane causes disruptions in France and Sweden
Storm Floriane caused significant disruptions across Europe, starting in France on 6 January with orange weather alerts being issued due to strong winds. The worst-hit regions in northern France, such as Charleville-Mézières, Châlons-en-Champagne, and Bar-le-Duc, experienced gusts between 80 and 110 km/h. Rail travel was particularly affected due to cancellations, delays, and speed restrictions.
The winter storm then moved across the North Sea into Sweden, bringing violent wind speeds and heavy snowfall, leading to extensive travel disruptions. The Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute issued 28 weather warnings. Train routes were closed due to fallen trees and debris, and public transport services were delayed or cancelled.
Storm Dikeledi, tracking towards northern Madagascar, forecast to become tropical cyclone
Forming on 7 January in the southern Indian Ocean, the low-pressure storm system Dikeledi is tracking westwards towards northern Madagascar. The storm is forecast to strengthen into a tropical cyclone with potential maximum windspeeds of 179 km/h and is expected to make landfall in northern Madagascar between 11-12 January. The Madagascan regions most likely to be impacted are Diana, Sava and Ambatosoa.
In addition to Madagascar, Mozambique and Malawi could also be impacted, with meteorological authorities from both countries issuing statements urging their populations to monitor for potential weather warnings. Depending on the direction the storm system takes, the French overseas island of Mayotte could also be impacted.
Mayotte was recently devastated by Cyclone Chido in December 2024, it is likely that heavy rainfall from Dikeledi could further hamper ongoing recovery efforts.
Asia–Pacific
China: 7.1 magnitude earthquake hits southern Tibet
At 09:05 local time (01:05 UTC) on 7 January, a powerful magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck Tingri County in southern Tibet. The epicentre was located approximately 80 kilometres north of Mount Everest at a depth of ten kilometres. The main tremor was followed by aftershocks of above 5.0 magnitude. The earthquake has caused widespread damage across Tingri County, including the city of Shigatse. Tremors were also felt in neighbouring countries, including Nepal and northern India, although no significant damage has so far been reported in these locations.
Initial reports confirm at least 126 fatalities, with more than 1,000 buildings damaged or destroyed. While the mountainous Tingri County is scarcely populated, approximately 7,000 people live within 20 kilometres of the epicentre. The city of Shigatse, the second largest in Tibet, has around 800,000 residents. Local sources reported that the earthquake has disrupted local power and water supplies, and damage to local roadways has also been recorded. In January, the area has daily minimum temperatures of below -15 degrees Celsius, and daily average temperatures of -7.5 degrees Celsius.
Solace Global Assessment:
The earthquake is one of the deadliest China has experienced in recent years. On 23 January 2024, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Xinjiang, China. The death count was significantly lower, however, with only three deaths. In 2008, a large earthquake in Sichuan province killed nearly 70,000 people. Southwestern regions of China are frequently affected by earthquakes. This is largely due to the region lying at the convergence zone of the Indian Plate and Eurasian Plate, which periodically releases tectonic stress as earthquakes. Furthermore, the region has numerous active fault systems including the Longmenshan Fault Zone, which triggered the 2008 earthquake, and the Xianshuihe Fault Zone.
The Lhasa block, also known as the Lhasa terrane, is a significant geological region in southern Tibet, situated between the Bangong-Nujiang suture zone to the north and the Indus–Yarlung Zangbo suture zone to the south. This positioning generates north-south compression, resulting in crustal shortening and uplift, as well as west-east stress, which drives lateral crustal movements. These geological processes play a crucial role in the formation of the Himalayas and significantly impact regional fault systems and seismic activity. Several aftershocks were felt in Tibet and Nepal; further aftershocks are highly likely in the coming days.
The government’s response to the earthquake is likely to be viewed through the lens of historical Tibetan grievances. Given the mountainous topography of the region and potential aftershocks, relief efforts will likely be hampered, potentially opening the government up for criticism regarding its effectiveness at governing in the region. In the aftermath of the earthquake, there is a realistic possibility that those sympathetic to Tibetan independence will scrutinise the government response and call for self-determination.
Taiwan: Taiwan accuses China of deliberate undersea sabotage
Taiwanese authorities are investigating a Chinese-linked ship which they suspect of deliberately dragging its anchor over an undersea fibre optic cable which connects Taiwan to the US. The Cameroon-registered and Tanzania-flagged vessel Shunxing 39 (IMO: 8358427) was briefly detained by Taiwan’s coastguard on 3 January but was subsequently released. Chunghwa Telecom of Taiwan stated that services across the island were largely unaffected and that it had promptly redirected data through alternative cables.
Solace Global Assessment:
Unconfirmed reports indicate that this may be the 21st Chinese attempt to sever Taiwan’s undersea internet infrastructure. As an island nation, with approximately only a dozen undersea internet cables landing on its shores, Taiwan is highly vulnerable to undersea sabotage. Despite attempts to accelerate its development of satellite-based backup systems to ensure connectivity during crises, this technology is in its infancy and cannot provide adequate redundancy. China likely calculates that the severing of multiple cables simultaneously would help to isolate Taiwan and hugely damage its economy. It is highly likely that if this is observed, it would be indicative of shaping activity for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.
Like Russia, China commands a huge fleet of civilian-flagged vessels which answer directly to the state. Beijing has almost certainly observed Russia’s increased use of civilian vessels to conduct low-cost, hard-to-prove, and deniable acts of undersea sabotage and will likely continue to incorporate this into its own “grey zone” strategy. While China’s primary target for undersea sabotage is Taiwan, there is a realistic possibility that these incidents will migrate to other regions, particularly those heavily dependent on critical undersea infrastructure. This could include areas in the South China Sea, in the waters around South Korea and Japan, and further afield as China continues to expand its maritime presence.
APAC Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Second arrest warrant issued for President Yoon Suk Yeol
A fresh arrest warrant has been issued for President Yoon after police failed to execute the first one, which ended 6 January. Investigators were prevented from entering the presidential palace, blocked by supporters and security. The chief prosecutor, Oh Dong Woon, has declared that he will “prepare thoroughly” for the second attempt to arrest Yoon, implying that it may be the final opportunity to arrest him. Yoon will almost certainly use his security and supporters again to prevent investigators from executing the warrant. On 9 January, Yoon declared that he would accept the decision of the Constitutional Court if it decides to back the impeachment case. This is almost certainly with the aim of moving on from the incident and dissuading prosecutors from conducting further attempts to arrest him.
Indonesia to joins BRICS
Jakarta’s bid to join the group was approved in 2023. Indonesia’s accession to BRICS almost certainly represents a major development in the country’s traditionally “non-aligned” foreign policy stance However, it is unclear to what extent it will trigger significant regional security developments. Indonesia, like fellow BRICS member India, maintains warm ties to the West, and is concerned about China’s footprint in the region. There is a realistic possibility that Indonesia’s foreign policy will continue to maintain elements of non-alignment while using BRICS to improve Jakarta’s range of foreign policy options.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Eight police officers and driver killed in Maoist attack in Chhattisgarh, India
On 6 January, a bomb blast killed at least eight police officers and a driver. The bomb was reportedly planted by Maoist Naxalite group in the latest of a series of attacks targeting security forces. The Naxalite movement began in 1967 in West Bengal and gained traction in Chhattisgarh in the late 1980s. The government has responded by deploying paramilitary forces and local police to combat the Naxalite group. While the intensity of the insurgency has seen a decline in recent years, it is an ongoing challenge for the government, with sporadic attacks occurring in central India.
Bomb blast injures three police officers in southern Thailand
An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in front of a school in Sai Buri on 3 January. The device was reportedly placed near a “stop” sign the police left near the school while they were off duty. It is highly likely that the perpetrators of the blast were local separatist insurgents. A low-intensity civil conflict has been ongoing for more than 50 years in southern Thailand, including the Patani region where Sai Buri is located, driven by groups like the Patani United Liberation Organisation, which aim at separating the majority-Malay Muslim south from the rest of the country. Local media posited that the blast may have been planned to coincide with the 20th anniversary of a raid on a military camp in the Cho Airong district of Narathiwat, which represented a significant escalation in the civil conflict.
Former Cambodian politician assassinated in Bangkok
On 7 January, Lim Kimya, a 74-year-old former Cambodian opposition lawmaker and dual Cambodian-French citizen, was fatally shot in Bangkok’s Old Quarter shortly after arriving from Cambodia. Thai authorities have issued an arrest warrant for a 41-year-old motorcycle taxi driver suspected of the murder. The suspect is believed to be a Thai national and has acted as a hitman. Lim Kimya was associated with the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), an opposition group dissolved ahead of the 2018 election amid controversial treason charges. Human Rights Watch has called for a thorough investigation, noting the harassment of former CNRP members by the Cambodian government. Despite denying any involvement, there are major suspicions that this was an assassination sponsored by the Cambodian government which could trigger a diplomatic spat between the two Southeast Asian countries.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Increase in hMPV cases in China
China is dealing with a rise in human metapneumovirus (hMPV) cases, particularly in the north of the country, as well as other seasonal respiratory illnesses like influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). However, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) confirm that these levels remain within the expected seasonal range, and there is no indication of a pandemic-like threat. China’s healthcare system is operating within capacity, with hospital utilisation lower than the previous year, and no emergency response has been initiated. Symptoms are typically mild, resembling the common cold or flu, with severe cases being rare and mostly affecting vulnerable populations.
Fire at market in Zhangjiakou, Hebei province, China kills at least eight
At approximately 08:40 local time on 4 January, a fire broke out at the Liguang vegetable market, a busy market in Zhangjiakou, killing eight and wounding 15. The blaze took approximately two hours to extinguish. Relaxed building codes in China increase the likelihood of fires. Furthermore, traditional markets in China are typically tightly packed, exacerbating the risk to shoppers by making it difficult to escape potential fires.
Copyright © 2025 Solace Global Risk Limited. All rights reserved. No part of this document or content may be reproduced, copied, translated, sold, or distributed, in whole or in part without the consent of Solace Global Risk Limited.
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Power Outages and Evacuations Across LA Amidst Growing Wildfires
Intelligence cut off: 15:00 GMT 08 January 2025
Fast moving wildfires are currently ongoing in California. At least three separate blazes are currently ongoing around the Pacific Palisades (Palisades Fire), Pasadena (Eaton Fire), and Sylmar (Hurst Fire) neighborhoods of Los Angeles.
The Palisades Fire has burned through over 3,000 acres, causing significant damage, including the destruction of beachfront homes in Malibu; the Eaton Fire has spread to 1,000 acres; the Hurst Fire has grown to 500 acres. None of the wildfires have been contained as of the time of writing.
No deaths have been reported so far. Over 1,400 firefighting personnel have been deployed to combat the blazes and Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency.
Mandatory evacuation orders have been issued for over 80,000 people in Southern California. The Palisades Fire has triggered mandatory evacuation orders for the Pacific Palisades and surrounding areas. Residents in Malibu not currently under evacuation orders have been informed that they should prepare for evacuation anyway due to the how fast the wildfires are moving. A smoke advisory is in place around the Malibu Coast, Santa Monica, and Beverly Hills.
The Eaton Fire has prompted mandatory evacuation orders for the area north of Orange Grove/Rosemead Boulevard, east of Lake Avenue, and west of Michillinda Avenue. The Hurst Fire has triggered evacuation orders for northwest Sylmar and surrounding areas.
Major roads including Sunset Boulevard and part of the Pacific Coast Highway became gridlocked as residents fled the wildfires. Highway lanes near Topanga Canyon Boulevard closed due to the wildfire’s fast expansion. Drivers abandoned their cars on Sunset Boulevard, forcing The Los Angeles Fire Department to deploy bulldozers to Subset Boulevard to allow fire crews to pass abandoned vehicles.
The extreme conditions have resulted in widespread power outages, affecting more than 200,000 customers in Los Angeles County. Emergency shelters have been opened at Westwood Recreation Center and Ritchie Valens Recreation Center for evacuees from the Hurst and Palisades fires.

Map of the Palisades, Eaton, and Hurst fires to the north and west of Los Angeles.
SOLACE GLOBAL COMMENT
Evacuation and Response to 2025 LA Wildfires
The fires began on 7 January after a bush fire was caught by a windstorm, spreading the fire into surrounding areas. California is currently affected by the northeasterly Santa Ana winds, which are caused by high pressure over the Great Basin. These winds have fuelled many of California’s worst wildfires in the past, including the 2018 Woolsey fire, which killed three people.
The winds have reached speeds of approximately 100 km/h, and could reach 160 km/h in the mountains and foothills, areas which have not experienced substantial rain for months. Winds are expected to worsen on 8 January and continue into 9 January. They will highly likely continue to spread the wildfire, despite the fire department’s efforts.
Peak wildfire season in California typically occurs between July and October each year. Although wildfires are unusual in January, high winds have combined with particularly dry conditions in California to contribute to fertile conditions for the wildfire to spread. Rains of over 0.25 centimetres have not been experienced in Southern California since May 2024. The Santa Ana winds have exacerbated the dry conditions by reducing the humidity levels.
Fire hydrants have reportedly run out of water in the Palisades area. While water tanks are currently being used to supply water to fire fighters, this severely limits the extent to which the fire department can tackle the ongoing wildfires. The reason for the water shortage is currently unknown, but water shortages at fire hydrants may occur because of power outages, high demand during large fires, broken water mains, or drought conditions. Given the recent dry weather, the issues are likely influenced by low water supplies in Southern California.
The northeasterly winds are reportedly pushing smoke southwest towards Malibu. The South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) predicts that PM2.5 levels will remain in the Unhealthy category in the Air Quality Index. Authorities have advised that residents utilise respirators when outside.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Wildfire Spread in Southern California: High Winds and Infrastructure Strain
The fire department will highly likely continue to struggle to contain the fires. Increasing windspeeds and dry conditions already make it difficult to prevent the fast spread of the fire. This issue is exacerbated by the water shortages in the Palisades area, which is the location of the largest wildfire. Furthermore, the high windspeeds have meant that they have been unable to launch firefighting aircraft.
Given windspeeds are set to increase over the course of 8 January, wildfires are highly unlikely to die down over the next 24 hours. Despite the fire department utilising bulldozers to clear roads, the large quantities of abandoned vehicles will highly likely continue to hinder fire fighting operations.
Fire hydrants running out of water is not unprecedented. Recently, fire departments encountered low water pressure when tackling wildfires in Camarillo, California in November 2024, causing two water pumps to become inactive. While this slowed firefighting efforts, firefighters prioritised life-saving missions over protecting property and reportedly reduced the potential fatalities. Similar focus will almost certainly be employed in the Palisades area, where there is a water shortage.
In the aftermath of the wildfires, residents who have had their property destroyed are likely to ask questions regarding the lack of water in the fire hydrants. Much of California’s water infrastructure was built in the 1960s and 1970s, lacking advanced modern technology and prone to leaks and inefficiency. Given California has one of the highest water needs in the US, the government is likely to come under increasing pressure to modernise California’s water infrastructure in the months following the wildfire.
United Airlines has issued a travel waiver enabling itinerary changes for flights booked out of Hollywood Burbank Airport (BUR) and Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) between 7 and 9 January. Some flights into BUR, situated approximately in the middle of the three wildfires, have been diverted to LAX because of smoke from the fires. LAX has not yet had significant flight disruptions but is approximately 30 kilometres south of the Pacific Palisades.
The Palisades fire is currently burning in a westerly direction, according to the Los Angeles Fire Department. Therefore, there is a realistic possibility that LAX will avoid significant disruptions. However, if there is a shift in winds causing the Palisades fire to spread further south, then it will likely result in significant airport disruptions. While significant shifts in Santa Ana winds are unlikely, changes in the pressure systems could influence the wind direction.
Travel Risk Advice: Precautions for LA Wildfire Zones
- Adhere to all evacuation warnings issued by authorities promptly.
- Do not attempt to extinguish fires on your own; leave firefighting to professionals.
- Pack a grab-and-go bag containing essential items such as water, a flashlight, a portable charger, important documents, non-perishable food, and first aid supplies.
- Stay informed by monitoring local news and official updates regarding the wildfire’s spread.
- Familiarise yourself with the locations of government-designated evacuation shelters.
- Wear protective clothing, including long-sleeved shirts, long trousers, gloves, and an N95 mask, to safeguard against smoke and heat exposure.
- Avoid using water unnecessarily if firefighters are operating in your area, as resources may be limited.
- Plan multiple escape routes in advance, considering possible congestion or blockages caused by fires.
- If driving, keep windows closed and set your vehicle’s air conditioning to recirculate to minimise smoke exposure.
- Drive cautiously and at reduced speeds in areas with poor visibility due to smoke.
- If you plan to fly, confirm flight status with your airline to avoid complications from cancellations.
- Do not return to your home until authorities officially declare it safe to do so.
- Be aware that smoke may persist in the air even after the wildfire is extinguished. Continue wearing an N95 mask when returning to affected areas.
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Widespread Damage in Tibet: Earthquake Strikes Near Mount Everest
Intelligence cut off: 11:00 GMT 07 January 2025
At 09:05 local time (01:05 UTC) on 7 January, a powerful magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck Tingri County in southern Tibet. The epicentre was located approximately 80 kilometres north of Mount Everest at a depth of ten kilometres. The main tremor was followed by aftershocks of above 5.0 magnitude. The earthquake has caused widespread damage across Tingri County, including the city of Shigatse. Tremors were also felt in neighbouring countries, including Nepal and northern India, although no significant damage has so far been reported in these locations.
Initial reports confirm at least 95 fatalities and over 130 injuries, with more than 1,000 buildings damaged or destroyed. While the mountainous Tingri County is scarcely populated, approximately 7,000 people live within 20 kilometres of the epicentre. The city of Shigatse, the second largest in Tibet, has around 800,000 residents.
Local sources reported that the earthquake has disrupted local power and water supplies, and damage to local roadways has also been recorded. In January, the area has daily minimum temperatures of below -15 degrees Celsius, and daily average temperatures of -7.5 degrees.
The Chinese Air Force has initiated rescue efforts and deployed drones to the affected area. At least 1,500 firefighters and rescue workers have also been dispatched, alongside supplies including cotton tents, quilts, and folding beds.

7.1 Magnitude earthquake recorded at 01:05 UTC, 7 January 2025. United States Geological Survey ShakeMap, MMI Contours
SOLACE GLOBAL COMMENT
Geological Context of 2025 Tibet Earthquake
The earthquake is one of the deadliest China has experienced in recent years. On 23 January 2024, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Xinjiang, China. The death count was significantly lower, however, with only three deaths. In 2008, a large earthquake in Sichuan province killed nearly 70,000 people.
Southwestern regions of China are frequently affected by earthquakes. This is largely due to the region lying at the convergence zone of the Indian Plate and Eurasian Plate, which periodically releases tectonic stress as earthquakes. Furthermore, the region has numerous active fault systems including the Longmenshan Fault Zone, which triggered the 2008 earthquake, and the Xianshuihe Fault Zone.
The Lhasa block, also known as the Lhasa terrane, is a significant geological region in southern Tibet, situated between the Bangong-Nujiang suture zone to the north and the Indus–Yarlung Zangbo suture zone to the south. This positioning generates north-south compression, resulting in crustal shortening and uplift, as well as west-east stress, which drives lateral crustal movements. These geological processes play a crucial role in the formation of the Himalayas and significantly impact regional fault systems and seismic activity.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Relief Challenges in Tibet: Topography, Aftershocks, and Political Scrutiny
While the United States Geological Survey measured the earthquake’s magnitude as 7.1, the China Earthquake Networks Center recorded a magnitude of 6.8. Differences in earthquake readings is relatively common due to the utilisation of different magnitude scales, algorithms, frequency sensitivity, distance from the epicentre, and the complexity of the fault movement.
Several aftershocks have already been felt in Tibet and Nepal; further aftershocks are highly likely in the coming days. While the aftershocks are unlikely to reach a similar magnitude to the initial earthquake, further aftershocks of approximately 5.0 magnitude may still occur. This could further damage structures that have already been weakened by the initial tremor and hinder relief efforts.
Power and water have been significantly disrupted in the region, which could further exacerbate humanitarian issues as residents cope with the aftermath. More deaths will almost certainly be confirmed as authorities verify fatalities amidst ongoing rescue efforts.
Shigatse, the closest city to the epicentre, is regarded as one of Tibet’s holiest cities and contains the Tashilhunpo Monestary which houses the seat of the Panchen Lama, a central figure in Tibetan Buddhism, second only to the Dalai Lama. It is an important pilgrimage site for Tibetan Buddhists. Furthermore, because of its proximity to the Nepalese border, it is an important trade hub. The earthquake will almost certainly disrupt trade through the region as recovery efforts continue.
The area is also a notable tourist site. Since Tingri county is located at the foot of Mount Everest, tourists often base themselves in the region. Mount Everest sightseeing tours have been cancelled in the aftermath. However, no significant damages were recorded at Mount Everest base camp.
The government’s response to the earthquake is likely to be viewed through the lens of historical Tibetan grievances. Given the mountainous topography of the region and potential aftershocks, relief efforts will likely be hampered, potentially opening the government up for criticism regarding its effectiveness at governing in the region. In the aftermath of the earthquake, there is a realistic possibility that those sympathetic to Tibetan independence will scrutinise the government response and call for self-determination.
Travel Risk Advice: Precautions for Tibet Erthquake Zones
- Closely monitor local news reports and government alerts
- Expect aftershocks. Be prepared to Drop, Cover, and Hold On in case of further tremors.
- During a tremor:
- If outside, avoid entering buildings. Move away from buildings, trees, streetlights, and overhead lines.
- If inside, pick a safe place, such as under a sturdy table or desk, or against an interior wall. Stay away from windows and heavy furniture. Do not leave until the shaking stops.
- If evacuating a building, always use the stairs.
- Be alert to fires and falling debris.
- Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
- Follow evacuation orders and travel to government-designated shelters if it is safe to do so.
- Ensure important documents and medications are safely stored.
- Prepare an emergency “go bag” with essentials, including bottled water, batteries, important documents, and medications.
- Confirm flights are operating before checking out of hotels or travelling to the airport.
- Prepare for potential power outages, communication disruptions, and travel delays.
- Avoid damaged buildings and affected areas until authorities declare them safe.
- Management should maintain communication with affected individuals until the situation is fully resolved.
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Solace Global Risk Expands with Acquisition of Independent AI Platform Nuraling to Elevate Security Offering
Solace Global Risk has officially acquired Nuraling, an independent artificial intelligence innovation, bringing tailored machine learning solutions to Solace Secure and other services. This collaboration strengthens our commitment to safeguarding people, assets, and reputations, offering our clients unparalleled control, privacy, and precision in managing risks globally.
Empowering Clients Through Advanced Technology
Nuraling’s platform empowers organisations to protect sensitive data, making it ideal for sectors where privacy and intellectual property are paramount. This ensures companies can leverage machine learning while maintaining full control of their AI capabilities.
Scalable Solutions: Nuraling’s adaptive AI capabilities cater to both technical and non-technical users, fostering seamless scalability.
Tailored Data Privacy: Ensures operational and travel data are securely managed.
Decision Accuracy: By flagging uncertainties in analysis, Nuraling reduces risks linked to premature or incorrect conclusions.
Seamless Integration into Solace Secure
With Nuraling, Solace Secure evolves into a dynamic tool that combines AI precision with human expertise. The platform will provide enhanced proactive risk insights, without compromising data integrity or overwhelming users with alert fatigue.

Leon Storey, Founder & Head of AI at Nuraling
David Peach, CEO and Founder of Solace Global Risk expressed his enthusiasm about the acquisition: “Welcoming Nuraling and Leon (Storey) to Solace Global represents an important step in our commitment to innovation and excellence. By integrating Nuraling’s technology, we are positioning Solace Global Risk and the wider Group to remain at the forefront of the industry, enabling us to support our clients with intuitive, secure, and reliable solutions. This acquisition aligns with our core mission to protect people and assets, ensuring peace of mind for organisations navigating challenging risk landscapes.”
Leon Storey, Founder & Head of AI at Nuraling commented: “Nuraling’s strategic roadmap for 2025 will see its technologies applied to bolster Solace Global Risk’s offerings through targeted use cases. This will enhance client confidence in both routine operations and high-stakes scenarios, supporting Solace’s promise of going further to deliver personal, agile, and technology-driven solutions.”
With this acquisition, Solace Global Risk underscores its unique position as an independently owned risk management provider, combining the agility of innovative technology with expert human insight.
Together, Solace and Nuraling will lead the way in shaping the future of risk management, ensuring that clients continue to operate safely and securely, wherever their journey takes them.
DISCOVER MORE
Enhancing resilience and business continuity planning
Solace Global Risk is a leading provider of comprehensive risk management solutions, serving clients globally with a commitment to excellence. With a worldwide presence and a team of seasoned experts, Solace Global Risk empowers organisations to navigate complex risk landscapes with confidence and resilience.
Journey Risk Management
Global Security and Threat Intelligence
Risk Management Software
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Travel with confidence
Your duty of care doesn’t end the moment your people set foot in their destination – and neither does ours.
From transfers to ongoing security and emergency evacuations, our travel risk services always have you covered.
Arm yourself with the knowledge to avoid a potential threat from turning into a crisis. Intelligence advisories give you tailored reports to anticipate possible disruptions, mitigate risk and help you make well-informed decisions, faster.
Give your people peace of mind when they travel for work, so they remain focused on the job at hand. We mitigate risks, manage incidents if they occur, and support your people with security advice or help in a crisis.
Executive Summary
- The IS-inspired lone wolf attack in Louisiana almost certainly shows IS’s growing ability to motivate terrorist action in the West. There is a realistic possibility of copycat attacks.
- A government crackdown on unrest highly likely in the lead-up to Chad election results on 15 January.
- There is a realistic possibility that ongoing protests against abductions in Kenya could escalate, with many of the issues that sparked unrest in June unresolved.
- A border conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan is likely to further over-stretch Pakistani security forces and present militants with opportunities to attack.



AMER
USA: IS-linked New Year’s vehicle attack in New Orleans
Haiti: Gangs attack reopening of Haiti’s largest hospital
Trinidad & Tobago: Government declares state of emergency
EMEA
Finland: Finnish authorities board Russian vessel suspected of sabotage
Georgia: Protests continue as new anti-West president inaugurated
Azerbaijan & Russia: Plane bound for Chechnya crashes in western Kazakhstan
Syria: New leader indicates agenda for Syria as SNA-SDF clashes continue
Kenya: Widespread civil unrest over abductions
Chad: First parliamentary, municipal, and regional elections in a decade
Mozambique: At least 176 dead in “TurboV8” phase of unrest
APAC
Afghanistan & Pakistan: Taliban launch attacks after Pakistani strikes
South Korea: Difficulties executing arrest warrant for Suk Yeol Yoon
North, Central and South America
USA: IS-inspired terrorist attack in New Orleans, Louisiana
During the New Year’s celebrations, a man rammed a vehicle into crowds gathered on Bourbon Street in the city’s historic French Quarter, killing 15 and injuring more than 30. The attacker also engaged in a firefight with intervening police officers before being killed.
After the attack, the perpetrator was identified as a US citizen who reportedly had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), and an IS flag was retrieved from the back of the vehicle used to carry out the attack. Videos from the perpetrator’s Facebook page, posted prior to the attack, included multiple statements of support for the Islamic State. The FBI stated that agents found an unused improvised explosive device (IED) in the vehicle.
Solace Global Assessment:
Initially, US law enforcement agents stated that they believed that the perpetrator did not act alone. This assessment, which was then refuted, was almost certainly due to the use of multiple weapons used or present during the attack, most notably IEDs.
The attack nevertheless shares many similarities with other “lone wolf” attacks in Europe and North America. The attacker targeted a busy, high visibility area (the French Quarter, a popular tourist destination in New Orleans and a symbol of the city’s history and culture), used low-complexity and easily obtainable weapons (noting that firearms are more easily accessible in the US compared to most West European countries and that the IEDs prepared by the attacker resembled rudimentary “pipe-bombs”), and made multiple symbolic gestures, such as releasing video pledges of allegiance to IS or carrying and IS flag, that clearly associated his actions to the extremist group.
The timing of the attack also further demonstrates how public holidays and celebrations are often targeted by lone actors due to their high visibility.
It is almost certain that the attack was inspired by other IS attacks that used vehicles as primary weapons. In 2017, a man who had pledged allegiance to IS drove a pickup truck into a bike path in Manhattan, killing eight; in 2016, more than 80 people were killed when another IS supporter used a truck to attack a Bastille Day celebration in Nice; in the same year, another truck attack at a Christmas market in Berlin killed 12.
In the United States, vehicle attacks have not solely been carried out by groups or individuals affiliated with IS. In 2017, a man rammed a car into a crowd that was protesting a far-right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, killing one. In 2020 alone, more than 60 car attacks were recorded targeting protesters linked with the Black Lives Matter movement.
There is a realistic possibility that the New Orleans attack will result in further copycat attacks. Online propaganda channels, which are often only loosely affiliated with the Islamic State act as independent broadcasters of pro-IS narratives, and are almost certain to capitalise on the attack to call for further action targeting civilians in the United States and Europe.
In this sense, it is important to note that the number of IS-related arrests in the US increased to 14 in 2024, from nine in 2023. Of these 14, five entailed concrete attack plots, with varied targets including Christian and Jewish places of worship, as well as political events (election day) and other high-visibility events (a pride parade in Phoenix).
Haiti: Gangs attack reopening of Haiti’s largest hospital
On 24 December, the coalition of gangs known as the Viv Ansanm attacked the reopening of the State University of Haiti Hospital in Port-au-Prince, the country’s largest medical facility. The attack resulted in at least four deaths, including two Haitian National Police officers, and more than 15 injuries, several of which were journalists.
The hospital was set to reopen following a previous gang attack in February which had forced it to suspend operations. One of the prominent Viv Ansanm leaders, Johnson “Izo” André, claimed responsibility for the attack and stated that the gang coalition had not authorised the reopening of the hospital.
The attack also led to dismissal of the Haitian health minister who has been temporarily replaced by the country’s justice minister.
Solace Global Assessment:
The reopening of the hospital was set to be widely covered by the media and serve as a significant achievement for the Haitian government, marking a rare instance of progress amidst widespread violence and instability. The gangs almost certainly attacked the hospital to undermine both the government’s credibility and its ability to restore essential services, with media coverage offering them an opportunity to gain widespread publicity. Furthermore, it is likely that the gangs would have interpreted the reopening of the hospital as a direct challenge to their own power, likely setting a precedent for future attacks.
Most hospitals in Port-au-Prince are now in gang-controlled territory or remain inaccessible due to the extent of violence. The attack on State University of Haiti Hospital combined with these wider trends has hugely disrupted the provision of healthcare in Haiti and will likely lead to a further increase in medical professionals fleeing the country (estimates suggest 40 per cent have already fled) as well as denying the opportunity to train new ones.
NGOs and non-profit organisations will likely be forced to take on even greater responsibility to meet growing healthcare needs but are already overstretched, underfunded, and themselves frequently targeted by gang violence. The collapse of Haiti’s healthcare system is likely to exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation, resulting in increases in disease outbreaks, preventable deaths and levels of food insecurity.
Trinidad and Tobago: Government declares state of emergency in response to criminal activity
Trinidad and Tobago’s government declared a state of emergency on 30 December in response to the growing criminal activity in the country. The most recent incident involved the gunning down of five men in a neighbourhood on the outskirts of Port of Spain in an act of vengeance over a murdered gang member. The measure reportedly comes in response to advice from the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, who has stressed the threat to public safety.
The state of emergency is set to last 15 days, after which time the government will be able to vote on its extension for up to three months. The measure will give the police and army authority to detain individuals without charge and search properties without a warrant. No curfew or ban on public gatherings will reportedly be part of the emergency measures.
Solace Global Assessment:
The state of emergency is the first since Covid measures were introduced in 2021 and comes as high-calibre automatic firearms are increasingly used by criminal gangs. Murders have reportedly reached 623 out of a population of 1.5 million in 2024, placing the country’s murder rates as among the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Gangs are largely responsible for the homicide rate increase; they have taken advantage of the country’s proximity to Venezuela, porous borders, and transportation routes to Europe and the US to ship narcotics. In the wake of the recent spate of killings, the police reportedly expect an increase in reprisal shootings between criminal gangs.
The measures will expand the powers of security forces to crack down on criminal gangs in the country to make it uncomfortable for them to operate. Reducing the prevalence of firearms is a target of these emergency measures, with security forces increased powers to search individuals and properties a key deterrent. People found in the company of anyone owning firearms are also liable to arrest to disrupt criminal gang networks.
Exploiting states of emergency to crack down on criminal gangs have been used by other Latin American countries with varying degrees of success. El Salvador’s March 2022 state of emergency led to the arrest of over 81,000 individuals, significantly increasing the country’s safety. Honduras implemented similar measures in December 2022; while the number of murders dropped by 356 in the first two months compared to the same period in the preceding year, gang violence is still a prevalent issue in the country.
To combat the gang violence, these countries utilised the state of emergency to crack down on the gangs with mass arrests and the use of the military, measures which would not have been constitutionally possible without the government decree. It is highly likely that Trinidad and Tobago will follow similar tactics to these countries, using the state of emergency to crack down on gangs with significant force.
The state of emergency has been imposed as the country prepares for a general election to be held before August 2025. Opposition leader and former prime minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar is expected to pose a significant threat to Prime Minister Keith Rowley’s People’s National Movement. These emergency measures, therefore, are highly likely influenced by public perception of Rowley’s administration, which is projecting itself as tough on crime.
AMER Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Thousands of Cubans march on US Embassy
On 20 December, tens of thousands of Cubans, led by Raul Castro and President Miguel Diaz-Canel, marched in front of the US embassy in Havana to protest Washington’s long-standing sanctions on Cuba and over concerns of harsher sanctions under President-elect Donald Trump. Cuba has recently suffered from a range of economic issues including inflation, systemic power outages and severe shortages of essential goods, which many Cubans blame the US for and have been the drivers of civil unrest against the Cuban government.
The march, organised by the incumbent government, is likely an attempt to deflect hostility away from the government but may also signal a shift in Cuba’s approach to the US, especially with mounting fears of harsher sanctions under Trump.
El Salvador lawmakers overturn metals mining ban
On 23 December, El Salvador’s legislature has voted in favour of overturning a ban on metals mining in a bid to boost economic growth and granted the government sole authority over mining activities. The country was the first in the world to impose a ban, which had been in place for seven years. President Nayib Bukele has been striving to overturn it since taking office in 2019.
Environmental groups oppose the overturning of the ban, with the Economic and Social Development Santa Marta Association (ADES) labelling it “the biggest attack on water, health, and life in El Salvador”. Bukele has defended the move, emphasising El Salvador’s gold reserves. The move will likely attract significant foreign investment and boost employment, something which is key for El Salvador’s debt-ridden economy. However, water contamination is a significant issue which led to the ban in the first place and environmentalists have staged demonstrations against the government measures.
President-elect Donald Trump threatens to return the Panama Canal to the US
On 21 December, Trump claimed on X that the Panama Canal fees are ‘ridiculous’ and that if they are not reduced then he ‘will demand that the Panama Canal be returned to us’. Trump also emphasised that the canal is under threat of falling under China’s influence. The canal is a vital waterway for trade; over 40 per cent of consumer goods traded in 2023 between north-east Asia and the US east coast were reportedly transported through the canal.
Fees have increased in recent years due to droughts, which have reduced the canal’s capacity and driven up variable rates. Trump’s rhetoric is in line with his America First agenda, which aims to reduce perceived exploitation of the US’ goodwill. The ‘canal giveaway’ was a source of humiliation for many in the US, who view it as a loss of a key strategic asset. Pressuring Panama’s authorities to reduce operating costs for US businesses and reduce Chinese influence is, therefore, likely perceived to be a popular measure.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Likely car bomb detonates outside Trump Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada
On 1 January, a Cybertruck manufactured by Tesla exploded outside the entrance to the Trump Hotel in Las Vegas. The truck’s driver, a former Green Beret, was killed, and seven people were injured in the explosion. According to local authorities, the truck, which had been rented hours before the explosion, was found to be filled with fireworks and fuel canisters. It is highly likely that the incident was a planned attack, rather than an accidental detonation.
In addition to the presence of fireworks and fuel (the Cybertruck is an electric vehicle) on the scene, the brand Tesla is owned by billionaire Elon Musk, who has been a key player in Donald Trump’s 2024 electoral campaign. While the attack’s dynamics make it highly likely that it was planned, the perpetrator’s motive remains so far unclear.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
90-day environmental emergency declared in Peru after oil spill
On 20 December, a leak was detected as oil was being loaded onto a tanker belonging to state-owned company Petroperu on Las Capullanas beach. The spill reportedly covers an area of approximately 10,000 square metres of seawater and has spread to at least seven beaches. Wildlife including birds and marine fauna has reportedly been significantly affected by the spill.
The public prosecutor’s office has launched an investigation regarding environmental contamination against the company, which has been engaged in cleanup efforts. During the state of emergency, authorities must carry out recovery and remediation work at the affected locations.
Bridge over Tocantins River in Brazil collapses.
On 22 December, the Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira Bridge, which connected the towns of Estreito in Maranhão and Aguiarnopolis in Tocantins, Brazil, collapsed. The collapse sent vehicles, including tankers with hazardous chemicals, into the Tocantins River. 11 people were killed because of the incident.
Search and rescue operations have been ongoing, with six people still reported missing. The local government and emergency services have been actively involved in the recovery and search operations. The Brazilian transportation minister has issued an emergency decree to expedite the rebuilding of the bridge. Despite the hazardous materials involved, the governor of Maranhão has emphasised that there is no risk of contamination to the Tocantins River; water collection from the river has resumed. Investigations into the cause of the incident are ongoing.
Nationwide power outage in Puerto Rico.
On 31 December, Puerto Rico experienced a power outage that affected over one million customers due to a technical fault at a transmission facility in Costa Sur. The blackout led to widespread disruptions, including the suspension of the Tren Urbano rail service and affected essential services like hospitals and medical centres in San Juan.
Power restoration efforts began immediately but there were renewed outages affecting more than 300,000 customers on 1 January. The exact cause of these subsequent outages was unclear, as it was not determined whether they were due to planned load shedding or technical faults. By 2 January, 99 per cent of customers reportedly had their power restored. While efforts to stabilise the power grid are ongoing, further disruptions are likely.
Europe, Middle East & Africa
Baltic Sea: Finnish authorities board Russian “shadow fleet” vessel suspected of sabotage
On 26 December, Finnish police and border guards boarded and seized the Cook Island-flagged crude oil tanker, Eagle S (IMO: 9329760), after it was suspected of conducting undersea sabotage. On 25 December, an undersea electricity cable, the Estlink 2, was damaged in the Baltic Sea, disrupting the delivery of power between Estonia and Finland.
Preliminary investigations have discovered anchor drag marks on the seabed several kilometres in length suspected to have been caused by the Eagle S. Upon boarding the vessel, it was discovered that the tanker was equipped with transmitting and receiving devices designed for espionage, allowing it to monitor NATO naval and aircraft activities.
Solace Global Assessment:
The Eagle S incident follows a series of suspected undersea sabotage incidences in the Baltic attributed to Russia, whereby civilian-flagged vessels have been accused of conducting highly deniable forms of sabotage, primarily targeting vulnerable seabed infrastructure with anchors. The incident likely highlights Russia’s increasing use of commercial vessels which form part of its “shadow fleet” as part of a wider hybrid warfare strategy used to deter support to Ukraine.
The discovery of surveillance equipment on board the vessel also likely suggests that the vessel is directly linked to Russian intelligence, which has likely tasked it to monitor NATO assets and where to conduct sabotage.
Despite NATO promises to increase patrols in the Baltic, the active monitoring of potentially hundreds of repurposed civilian vessels directed by Russian intelligence will almost certainly be incredibly challenging, especially with NATO military assets also tasked with monitoring Russia’s conventional military capabilities. Moreover, the boarding of a vessel is difficult due to legal constraints, the need for international cooperation, potential diplomatic fallout, and operational challenges.
Consequently, it is almost certain that Russia will continue to exploit this disruptive yet low-cost and highly deniable form of sabotage as the West continues to pledge support for Ukraine.
Georgia: Anti-West president inaugurated as pro-Europe president refuses to step down
Following a controversial presidential election, Mikheil Kavelashvili was sworn in as Georgia’s new president on 29 December. The election was conducted with an indirect electoral college whose makeup was derived from the contested October 2024 parliamentary election. Kavelashvili, an anti-West ally of the ruling Georgian Dream party, is set to replace Salome Zourabishvili, a pro-Europe figurehead for the anti-government protest movement which has gripped Georgia since October 2024.
Zourabishvili has refused to step down, labelling the presidential election illegitimate, but has vacated the presidential palace.
Major protests have continued across Georgia, primarily in Tbilisi but also in other cities such as Batumi. Protests of varying size and intensity have been organised in Tbilisi in the vicinity of Georgia’s parliament building every day for the past 37 days as of 3 January. While mostly peaceful, the more significant protests have been marked by violent clashes and draconian riot police enforcement methods; the protests during the inauguration on 29 December led to at least seven arrests.
Solace Global Assessment:
Zourabichvili’s decision to vacate the presidential palace was likely made due to the potential threat of arrest, with multiple political opponents (including the prime minister) having called for her arrest if she did not step aside. If Zourabishvili is arrested, intense protests will almost certainly break out in support of her, likely marked by violent clashes.
The founder of the ruling Georgian Dream party, the oligarch and former prime minister Bidzina Ivanishvi, is almost certainly the most influential figure in Georgian politics, essentially constituting the de facto political leader of the country. In a notable development, the US has imposed sanctions on Ivanishvi due to the claimed erosion of democratic institutions and human rights abuses by security forces. These sanctions include the freezing of his US assets and follow earlier imposed sanctions against senior Georgian Dream interior ministry officials, as well as UK sanctions.
While the EU’s parliament is considering imposing sanctions, these proposals have been hampered by countries perceived to be pro-Russian, namely Hungary and Slovakia.
Unless deposed, it is highly likely that the Georgian Dream government will take Georgia closer into Russia’s sphere of influence. The suspension of EU accession talks has notably led to the most significant escalation in protests. The protest movement, therefore, is likely an existential moment for Georgia towards either a western-aligned pro-Europe or anti-West pro-Russia future. While this fear has almost certainly sustained the protest movement, the feasible options for ousting the ruling Georgian Dream party are slim and it is unlikely that significant concessions that cannot be easily undone will be granted.
Azerbaijan & Russia: Plane bound for Grozny, Chechnya crashes near Aktau in western Kazakhstan
On 25 December, An Azerbaijan Airlines flight en route from Baku, Azerbaijan to Grozny, Chechnya crashed during an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan. The crash resulted in at least 38 fatalities and 29 hospitalisations.
Initial reports suggest that the aircraft was likely hit by shrapnel from a Russian surface-to-air missile while flying over Grozny where Russian air defences were reportedly targeting Ukrainian drones. While Russian officials have speculated that the crash occurred because of a bird strike or exploding oxygen tank, the damage appears consistent with Russian surface-to-air missiles. This has yet to be officially confirmed, however.
Azerbaijan Airlines has suspended flights to several Russian cities, citing potential safety risks. Russian President Vladimir Putin has issued an apology to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev for the incident, acknowledging that it occurred in Russian airspace.
Solace Global Assessment:
Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has expressed anger at Moscow’s handing of the incident. After the plane was shot down, emergency landing permission in Russian territory was allegedly denied, something which could have potentially led to fewer fatalities. Moscow’s lack of acceptance of responsibility has caused significant outrage in Azerbaijan, notably from state-owned and pro-government media, which has recently typically avoided criticising Russia.
This incident comes amidst Moscow and Baku’s relationship having strengthened in recent years. This is largely due to Moscow’s de facto enabling of the Azerbaijani incursion into Nagorno Karabakh in September 2023, which was formerly an autonomous Amenia-aligned breakaway state that was internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan.
Russian peacekeeping forces stood back to enable the Azerbaijani military offensive before withdrawing completely. Russian support for the Azerbaijani offensive occurred despite Armenia, Azerbaijan’s regional rival, being a member of the Russian-led military alliance Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Baku, likely in response to Moscow’s enabling of Azerbaijan’s presence in Nagorno Karabakh, has avoided taking a side in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Yerevan has since announced its intention to leave the CSTO.
Despite Azerbaijan not being a member of CSTO, economic, diplomatic, and cultural factors make good relations important for each country. Russia is one of Azerbaijan’s key trading partners, with Russian companies investing significantly in Azerbaijani energy and infrastructure. Furthermore, Azerbaijan has the largest Russian presence in the South Caucasus and Russian is widely spoken in the country. Simultaneously, a significant Azerbaijani diaspora resides in Russia.
Despite this high-profile plane crash representing a point of tension for the two nations, their shared interest in maintaining good relations makes a major diplomatic severing undesirable for each country. Therefore, a significant worsening of relations is unlikely in the aftermath of the plane crash, despite public anger.
Syria: New Syria leader sets out agenda for country’s future as clashes continue in northern Syria
The de facto leader of Syria and the emir of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Golani), gave an interview with Al Arabiya on 29 December in which he laid out an agenda for Syria’s future. Some of the key points made included a transitional process involving a constitution writing process which may take three years, elections which may take four years (that will require a comprehensive population census prior), the dissolution of HTS, no federalisation and the integration of Kurdish forces into the new Syrian military, and the maintenance of a relationship with Russia.
Furthermore, pro-Assad supporters killed at least 14 interior ministry troops on 26 December near Tartus, one of the deadliest attacks by regime loyalists since the overthrow of Assad by rebel forces.
Clashes and military operations have continued in northern Syria between the Kurdish-led and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Turkish-led Syrian National Army (SNA) with support from the conventional Turkish military. The most intense fighting has occurred in the eastern countryside of Manbij in the vicinity of the strategically important Tishreen Dam, despite a Pentagon statement on 30 December that claimed a ceasefire “is holding”. The Turkish Air Force has provided close air support (CAS) for the SNA, and the Turkish military has conducted extensive artillery strikes on numerous villages.
Solace Global Assessment:
Iran is likely to be the state actor that loses most from Syria’s new geopolitical direction. Notably, al-Sharra made a particular effort to be conciliatory regarding Russia, despite Moscow’s key role in militarily supporting the Assad regime (which included indiscriminate bombing campaigns against previously rebel-held urban areas such as Aleppo and Idlib). Al-Sharaa stated that Russia is the “second most powerful country in the world” and Syria has “strategic interests” with Russia.
The Russian military still maintains a presence in Syria, although significantly reduced since the lightning HTS-led offensive that overthrew the regime. There is a realistic possibility that a deal may be reached between Russia and Syria’s new government that formally allows Russia to continue its leasing of the Hmeimim airbase and Tartus naval base.
China’s exclusion is notable, with a sizable contingent of Uyghurs from the Chinese territory of Xinjiang fighting for HTS. Uyghurs have been given senior military roles in Syria’s new armed forces – it is likely that the strong anti-Beijing sentiment of HTS’ Uyghur fighters will factor into Damascus’ new foreign policy towards China.
The largest threat to stability in post-Assad Syria likely remains the status of the Kurdish-led SDF-controlled areas of north-northeastern Syria. Al-Sharaa, in addition to other senior HTS figures, has explicitly stated that federalisation will not be pursued. This highly likely presents a challenge to the prospective future autonomy of Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria.
Without substantial support from the US (which may be limited due to the incoming Trump administration, with Trump stating a desire to be disentangled from Syrian affairs) and amidst the ongoing conflict between Turkish-led forces and the SDF (which may further escalate), it is likely that aligning themselves with HTS is one of few options for the SDF to avoid an escalation in conflict that could pose an existential threat to the Kurdish population.
While Turkey has given substantial support to HTS, HTS are almost certainly far less influenced by Ankara than the SNA and al-Sharra has expressed that the Kurds are “an integral part” of Syria. This has highly likely conditioned an SDF statement that they are ready to cooperate with al-Sharra to be the “nucleus of the Syrian army”, despite the significant risks posed to the Kurds by the SDF losing its autonomy through integration.
Kenya: Widespread civil unrest over Abductions and protests
In mid-December, protests were sparked in Kenya over the alleged abduction of critics of the President William Ruto-led Kenya Kwanza government. The allegations stipulate that the government has illegally apprehended dozens of people who were believed to be involved in the June protests sparked by deeply unpopular taxes.
The Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC) estimates that over 80 people have gone missing, with at least seven more being abducted since mid-December. Small-scale protests that were primarily organised in central Nairobi have spread to other parts of the capital and have also been recorded in other major population centres, including Mombassa, Eldoret, Embu and Kisumu.
Protests have also grown in size and have led to several instances of violent clashes with the police, the deployment of tear gas and multiple arrests, including the arrest of an opposition senator who had publicly criticised the abductions.
Solace Global Assessment:
The government’s continued abductions, use of crowd dispersal measures and arrest of opposition figures will highly likely sustain protest activity which is likely to increase in scale and spread to other cities. Following the June protests and proposed tax increases, the Ruto administration remains deeply unpopular, especially with the youth who have been the instigators of much of the unrest.
Critics have even warned of a general trend of democratic backsliding and a return to the repressive use of tactics that were witnessed under President Daniel Moi (1978-2002), which was marked by the detention, torture and disappearance of critics, journalists, activists and members of the opposition.
Moreover, despite the withdrawal of many of the controversial planned tax increases following the June protests, multiple new taxes will be introduced in 2025 that will help shape the conditions for more unrest.
In 2024, there were an estimated 1,800 demonstrations held across Kenya, indicating the level of dissatisfaction with the current administration. Most of these protests also continued despite the government’s use of force, which in some cases involved the firing of live ammunition. Given the underlying drivers and unresolved grievances that have previously contributed to unrest, there is a high likelihood that the current anti-abduction protests will be co-opted, especially by Kenya’s youth, and develop into violent unrest comparable to the protests observed in June 2024.
Chad: First parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections in a decade
On 29 December, Chad held its first parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections in over a decade. 8.3 million people are registered to vote in Chad and voted for legislators in a 188-seat parliament, 95 of which are required for a majority.
The election was marked by significantly low voter turnout, with opposition parties, including the primary opposition party, the Transformers Party, boycotting the election over concerns about the credibility of the electoral process, raising concerns over the election’s transparency and fairness.
The election was marked by significant repression, with the Chadian National Election Management Authority (ANGE) prohibiting pictures and photographs of the results, citing the threat of manipulated results being uploaded. Furthermore, online newspapers were banned from broadcasting videos related to the election on 4 December. ANGE has declared that vote counting is under way and provisional results are expected by 15 January.
Solace Global Assessment:
Since the death of President Idriss Déby in 2021, Chad has been led by a transitional military government led by the former president’s son, Mahamat Déby, who has run as part of the Patriotic Salvation Movement. These elections mark a key transition point in the move away from military rule, with the election formally ending the “transitional period”. The elections were initially promised in 2020 but were postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Chad is the first of the recently coup-hit Sahel countries to hold elections. Déby, whose family has ruled Chad since 1991, will almost certainly claim victory in the provisional results.
Many opposition figures have criticised the elections as fraudulent. Déby has been criticised over utilising the elections to consolidate power. Security forces reportedly killed opposition candidate Yaya Dillo, Déby’s biggest challenger, in February 2024. According to a poll issued by the Center for Development Studies and the Prevention of Extremism, 50.94 per cent of respondents claimed that they did not believe in the credibility of Chad’s electoral authorities. More than 90 per cent of the registered voters reportedly adhered to opposition calls for election boycott. Without full opposition participation, human rights organisations including Amnesty International have claimed that the election is likely to be unfair.
Given the widespread view in Chad that the elections are fraudulent, civil unrest is highly likely as ANGE publishes the provisional results, with small-scale demonstrations already held in the capital N’Djamena. Chad’s government, which has previously cracked down on protests with live ammunition, tear gas, arbitrary detentions, and media censorship, will highly likely turn to these measures again if unrest reaches a significant level. Notably, after Déby postponed elections due in October 2022, security forces killed over 100 people with live ammunition after demonstrations erupted against the government.
Mozambique: At least 176 dead in “TurboV8” phase of unrest
The most recent phase of unrest, labelled “TurboV8”, was sparked in response to the Constitutional Council ruling in favour of the government on 23 December. It has constituted the most violent phase yet, with at least 176 deaths, and has triggered the FCDO to issue an advisory against all but essential travel to Mozambique. In the “TurboV8” phase, demonstrations occurred across major cities in Mozambique including Maputo, Beira, and Nampula. In Maputo, protesters set several buildings on fire. In Beira, protesters blocked multiple roads and set tyres on fire. In Maganja da Costa and Namicopo, armed individuals reportedly invaded police stations.
Most bus services from Maputo to other provinces have been halted after protesters vandalised the main terminal in the city. There is a fuel shortage in Maputo and Matola due to fuel stations being targeted by protesters. Security forces responded to unrest with tear gas and live ammunition. According to local NGOs, approximately 261 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began.
On 25 December, at least 6,000 inmates escaped from the maximum-security Central Prison of Maputo following prison riots whereby prisoners overpowered guards and seized their weapons. Among the escapees were Islamic State Mozambique (ISM/Shabaab Cult) militants. Around 13,000 people have reportedly crossed the border into southern Malawi via the Shire River and Ruo River to escape the unrest. A further 1,000 have requested asylum in Eswatini. This is indicative of the lack of end in sight and continued deterioration of the country’s security situation.
Solace Global Assessment:
Opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane has set 15 January as the date to be sworn in as president, the same day Frelimo candidate Daniel Chapo is set to be sworn in. Mondlane has laid the groundwork for potential rule in 2025, expressing that he will remove the weapon from Mozambique’s flag, revise its constitution, and change the names of streets named after communists. Furthermore, he has called for Mozambicans to elect their own regional leaders in elections on 6 and 7 January. Unrest will almost certainly continue until the government steps down, something that is unlikely to happen without significant pressure, with demonstrations highly likely to increase in intensity as 15 January nears.
Opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane has announced a new phase of unrest titled “ponta de lança” (spearhead). While he was set to announce the details on the phase on 2 January, this was postponed. Mondlane has indicated that this phase will encompass a “five-day tolerance” period for international humanitarian and investigative organisations to assess alleged human rights abuses by security forces.
Mondlane has declared the prison break a calculated government move to distract from the protests and manipulate public opinion. This is unlikely to be the case; however, since the addition of more IS fighters to the ongoing insurgency in the Cabo Delgado region will almost certainly further strain government resources as it diverts assets to tackle the insurgency. The inmates, likely calculating that law enforcement resources are strained and unable to focus on securing the prison, almost certainly used the context of the protests to take advantage of reduced security measures. This prison escape will likely add to the pressure from demonstrations.
EMEA Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Anti-government protests in Albanian capital
On 23 December, Albania’s main opposition party, the Democratic Party, organised protests in central Tirana to demand a technocratic caretaker government ahead of the May 2024 elections. The demonstrations, led by recently released party leader Sali Berisha, accused Prime Minister Edi Rama’s left-wing government of corruption and election manipulation. The protests blocked several main intersections in the capital and police intervened after 90 minutes, leading to clashes. Further protests are likely ahead of the May elections, especially as the accusations of corruption, government overreach and electoral manipulation are damaging Albania’s progress towards EU integration.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announces plans to change Turkey’s constitution
On 21 December, Erdoğan renewed his long-standing aim for a new constitution upholding ‘democratic, inclusive, and libertarian’ values during a speech in Muğla in southwest Turkey. Erdoğan is currently serving his third and apparently final term, with the next presidential election not due until May 2028.
By creating a new constitution, it is highly likely that Erdoğan will seek to eliminate constitutional limits on presidential terms, which would allow him to run for president again in 2028. If Erdoğan proceeds with measures to amend the constitution, significant unrest is highly likely.
According to local news polls, 66.3 per cent of the Turkish population oppose a constitutional amendment which would enable Erdoğan to run in 2028. A successful referendum on Turkey’s constitution was held in 2017, with the population voting to change the country from a parliamentary system into a presidential republic. Another amendment would almost certainly help Erdoğan further consolidate power.
Protests in Iran over economic conditions
Merchants and business owners in Tehran’s historic bazaar staged a rare strike on 29 December to protest rising inflation and the soaring devaluation of the Iranian rial, which has surpassed 810,000 to the dollar. The strike, initially led by shoe sellers, quickly spread to other sectors and key commercial hubs. Merchants cited skyrocketing raw material costs, reduced consumer demand, and widespread closures of workshops as driving factors, with over a third of the population now living below the poverty line. While security forces were deployed and gatherings subsided by day’s end without reported violence, the unrest highlights the dire economic state of Iran under US-led sanctions which could become more common and potentially violent if the incoming Trump administration increase sanctions on Iran.
Zimbabwe abolishes the death penalty
On 31 December, President Emmerson Mnangagwa approved a law to abolish the death penalty with immediate effect. The death penalty has not been used since 2005, largely because of a general reluctance to take up the job of state executioner. Mnangagwa has publicly opposed the death penalty since 2017, leveraging his presidential powers several times to commute death sentences of inmates. By the end of 2023, approximately 60 people were on death row; they will be re-sentenced. Zimbabwe will be the 113th country globally to abolish the death penalty, according to Amnesty International.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Rare mass shooting in Montenegro
On 1 January, a mass shooting in the town of Cetinje resulted in the deaths of 12 people, excluding the gunmen who died by suicide. The shooting occurred after an altercation at a bar and is almost certainly an isolated incident. However, this is the second mass shooting in three years in Cetinje and the incident will likely spark calls for stricter gun control in Montenegro and may lead to protests similar to those witnessed in neighbouring Serbia after it suffered two mass shootings.
Palestinian militants increase rate of attacks in north Gaza Strip
Between 30 and 31 December, Israeli sources reported a growing number of “multi-wave” attacks by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters on Israel Defence Forces (IDF) positions near Jabalia. These attacks, which were carried out by reportedly groups of up to 30 fighters at a time, were larger than any attack on Israeli forces in Gaza in recent months. According to the IDF, approximately 100 Palestinian fighters were killed during the attacks. The IDF has been seeking to clear Jabalia for months, after isolating the northernmost refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, and Israeli forces assess that approximately 200 fighters remain in the area.
Nigerian military strike kills civilians on Christmas Day
On 25 December, a Nigerian military airstrike killed at least 10 people and injured several others in the northwestern Sokoto state. The operation was reportedly targeting the newly formed Lakurawa terrorist group that may have links to regional jihadist coalition, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).
The strike follows a series of largely aerial Nigerian military operations that have accidentally killed civilians which has led to calls to review targeting procedures and enhance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, with such strikes likely enabling extremist groups’ recruitment and propaganda campaigns.
The Nigerian government has conducted a probe into the strike and has determined that the fatalities were attributed to “secondary explosions” and not airstrikes, a claim that will likely be widely refuted.
Clashes between Somali and Ethiopian forces
On 23 December, Somali and Ethiopian forces reportedly clashed in the border town of Doolow in Somalia’s Gedo region. The incident occurred amidst heightened tensions between Mogadishu and the Jubaland region, which recently elected its president for a third term in elections viewed as illegitimate by the federal government.
Ethiopia, which has forces situated in the country as part of the peacekeeping African Union transition mission in Somalia (ATMIS), has been accused of backing Jubaland against the government in a bid to stabilise Ethiopia’s eastern border against al-Shabaab. Since the controversial Jubaland election on 25 November, Somali federal forces and Jubaland Derawish forces have clashed several times as Mogadishu attempts to assert control over Somali territory.
According to Mogadishu, Ethiopia violated its sovereignty which ‘will not go unanswered’. This incident comes shortly after a Turkey-brokered treaty between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa to settle the Somaliland port dispute. Given that this treaty has done little to prevent clashes, further tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa are highly likely.
UN authorises new peacekeeping mission in Somalia
On 27 December, the UN adopted the resolution for a new peacekeeping mission, African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which will support the deployment of up to 12,626 personnel and replace the existing African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The mission aims to support Mogadishu in its ongoing conflict with the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab, which is currently waging an insurgency in Somali territory.
Mogadishu is still deciding which countries will contribute troops. Ethiopia, a focus of recent tensions, is notably excluded from the mission. Egypt, a regional rival of Ethiopia, has announced plans to participate in the mission. Burundi’s government has declared that it would not contribute troops due to a lack of consensus with Mogadishu over troop numbers.
While AUSSOM will help Mogadishu combat the insurgency, its effectiveness will likely be limited. ATMIS encountered significant challenges and was not able to significantly degrade al-Shabaab. Mogadishu, amidst ongoing struggles to consolidate power over Somalia, will likely continue to struggle against ongoing al-Shabaab and Islamic State insurgencies despite the peacekeeping presence.
Islamic State Somalia Province (ISSP) launches large-scale attack in Puntland, Somalia
On 31 December, ISSP forces launched a large scale attack on Puntland forces in Dharjaale. According to available Puntland sources, ISSP forces used multiple suicide bombers and suicide vehicle borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) to attack their military targets, killing at least 20.
In the attack’s aftermath, pro-IS channels noted how the operation was led by foreign fighters, mostly from North Africa and the Arab Peninsula. The large scope and sophistication of the operation and the use of foreigners almost certainly demonstrate the growing importance of the Somali branch of IS, led by Abdul Qadir Mumin.
Mumin, who some reports (likely incorrectly) identified as IS’ “Caliph”, has a large influence over the group due to ISSP’s central role in routing flows of funds to other African and Asian IS branches.
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) kill 21 civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
The series of attacks began on 21 December after the ADF made an incursion into the village of Robinet in the North Kivu region, killing six civilians. On 22 December, the ADF entered the neighbouring village of Kodjo and killed 12 more civilians. Three more civilians were killed on 25 December after the ADF entered Makele, another village in the area.
The attacks all happened around the resource-rich Manguredjipa and represent a fresh escalation of terror attacks in the region. The ADF is a militant Islamist group that originated in Uganda in 1995 and pledged allegiance to Islamic State in 2019.
While both DRC and Ugandan forces are currently fighting the ADF, they have been unable to contain the group, which has expanded its operations since 2021 and conducted numerous attacks targeting civilians in both the DRC and Uganda. Further attacks targeting civilians in North Kivu are highly likely in the coming weeks.
Journalist arrested in Tehran as possible “retaliation” for US-backed arrests of IRGC supporters
An Italian journalist, Cecilia Sala, was arrested in Tehran days after arriving in the country over an unspecified “violation” of Iranian law. The arrest took place days after two Iranian citizens were detained in an international police operation coordinated by Washington, over allegedly providing material support for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). One of the two suspects, Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi, was arrested at the Milan airport, where he landed on a flight from Turkey. The arrests could precipitate a diplomatic crisis between Tehran and the European Union at a time where the Pezeshkian administration is cautiously signalling its willingness to improve its relations with Brussels.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Nigeria establishes emergency response centre to address Lassa fever outbreak
Nigeria has activated an emergency response centre to address a Lassa fever outbreak that has killed 190 people and infected 1,154 across six states this year. The disease, transmitted through contact with rodent-contaminated items or bodily fluids, peaks during the dry season (October to May). The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) categorised the risk as high, with the response centre coordinating efforts to manage the viral haemorrhagic illness, which causes symptoms ranging from fever to death. Lassa fever is classified by the WHO as a priority disease due to its epidemic potential and the absence of approved vaccines.
Sudan suspends participation in hunger monitoring system
On the eve of a critical report expected to reveal famine spreading to five regions in Sudan, the Sudanese government has withdrawn from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) system, citing concerns about sovereignty and the reliability of IPC reports. The decision will almost certainly reduce the ability of external actors to access the humanitarian situation on the ground and will likely undermine the efforts of aid agencies and NGOs operating in the country, where an estimated 25 million people are experiencing crisis levels of hunger.
DRC government releases most Chinese nationals held for illegal mining
On 25 December, the DRC government released 14 of 17 Chinese nationals arrested over the operation of an illegal gold mine after they were unable to provide the necessary documentation. The arrests were part of a broader crackdown on illegal mining in the resource-rich country. The government has struggled to maintain control of these resources amidst armed groups and unlicenced mining companies exploiting them illicitly.
Asia–Pacific
Afghanistan & Pakistan: Taliban attack Pakistani border posts after airstrikes in Afghanistan
On 24 December, Pakistani airstrikes targeted alleged Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan/Pakistani Taliban (TTP) camps, training facilities, and rear areas in Afghanistan’s Paktika province. The strikes reportedly caused multiple civilian casualties, as claimed by the Afghan Taliban, with the UN supporting these claims with credible evidence. In response, the Afghan Taliban summoned Pakistan’s envoy in Kabul to protest the attack. On 28 December, the Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on Pakistani border posts, with violence primarily concentrated in the Waziristan region in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on the international border.
Solace Global Assessment:
Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan likely reflect an escalation in its counter-terrorism operations against the TTP, which has long used the border areas as a safe haven to sustain its activities and has been supported by the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has endured its worst year of terrorist attacks in a decade, which have increased since the Taliban retook power in Afghanistan.
With limited resources to conduct a major ground offensive in parts of Pakistan where the TTP hold influence, Pakistan likely calculates that airstrikes within Afghanistan are its best course of action to degrade the TTP whilst retaining its own combat power. Moreover, Pakistan is under pressure from China to address its security challenges to protect Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments.
Consequently, there is a realistic possibility that Pakistan will increasingly use airstrikes within Afghanistan, with ground forces overstretched due to ongoing insurgencies, terrorist attacks and widespread civil unrest.
The Afghan Taliban is unlikely to attempt to restrain TTP activities over fears of a backlash and defections to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Other efforts, such as relocating TTP militants deeper into Afghanistan or diplomatic engagements have largely failed. These trends will likely sustain the current hostilities and invite further Pakistani attacks within Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s response will likely include increased attacks on Pakistani military outposts in the border regions but could also include the sponsoring of major TTP attacks within Pakistan. Whilst primarily based in the border regions, the TTP is known to have sleeper cells and networks throughout Pakistan and has previously conducted mass casualty attacks in cities like Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi and Lahore.
The current cross-border conflict could signal a dangerous cycle, with both sides unlikely to back down, increasing the risk of broader regional instability and increased attacks within Pakistan.
South Korea: Prosecutors issue arrest warrant for impeached president Suk Yeol Yoon
The South Korean judiciary has been actively pursuing legal actions against Yoon and other officials involved in the martial law declaration. The South Korean court has issued arrest and search warrants for Yoon on charges related to sedition and abuse of power. The prosecutors have been consulting with police to execute these warrants, which are set to expire on 6 January.
However, Yoon’s legal team argues that the requirements for his arrest have not been met, and they question the prosecutorial authority to investigate sedition. Acting president Han Duck-soo has also been impeached over his refusal to appoint judges to the Constitutional Court, a move that opposition lawmakers claim was politically motivated. The finance minister Choi Sang-mok has assumed the acting presidency.
Solace Global Assessment:
It is unclear whether investigators will be able to execute the warrants before they expire. Yoon’s security team have blocked investigators from entering the presidential office grounds and Yoon’s residence for searches. On 3 January, police forces called off an arrest operation after they were blocked for six hours. Yoon continues to retain a support base among the population. There is a realistic possibility that protesters will prevent police from arresting Yoon, something that has occurred in the past after authorities have attempted to arrest politicians in the past. Further attempts to arrest Yoon will almost certainly be met with resistance.
Several military officials also face charges over the declaration of martial law. The commander of the Intelligence Command and the Army Chief of Staff, among others, have been arrested or indicted for their roles in the martial law implementation. These actions reflect the broader efforts by South Korean authorities to hold accountable those who participated in what is viewed as an unlawful and politically motivated imposition of martial law.
As the Constitutional Court prepares for the next hearing in Yoon’s impeachment trial set for 3 January, the political and legal challenges facing South Korea remain acute. The outcomes of these proceedings will have significant implications for the country’s governance and the future of its democratic institutions.
APAC Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Shia communities stage protests across Pakistan
Shia groups and communities are staging indefinite sit-in protests across multiple Pakistani cities, including Karachi and Lahore, to condemn sectarian violence that has been targeting Shia Muslims in northwestern Pakistan since late November. The protests, which include blockades in Karachi and Kurram District’s Parachinar, have caused significant disruptions, particularly in Karachi, where major intersections and key roads, including routes to Jinnah International Airport.
Despite the imposition of a state of emergency in the areas where Shia communities are being targeted, the violence is unlikely to decrease in the short term given the wealth of security issues the government is being forced to contend with, including Baloch uprisings, Taliban assaults on the border and other forms of militancy.
There is a realistic possibility of the protests increasing and spreading to other cities, leading to further transport disruptions, clashes with the police and the issuing of Section 144s by the authorities.
Significant transport disruption in Punjab during farmer’s protest.
On 30 December, farmers in Punjab, supported by transporters, workers, traders, and religious groups, caused an effective shutdown between 07:00 and 16:00 local time. The shutdown included a suspension of bus services, train cancellations, and over 200 major highway blockages. Protesters are demanding a debt waiver, pensions, frozen electricity tariffs, the withdrawal of police cases, the reinstatement of the Land Acquisition Act, and justice and compensation for victims of the 2021 Lakhimpur Kheri vehicle-ramming, drive-by shooting, and mob lynching. Jagjit Singh Dallewal, the leader of the protesters, has been hunger striking for over a month, refusing all medical treatment. Further disruptions are highly likely.
Hong Kong issues new arrest warrants for pro-democracy activists.
In a move that has been condemned by the US and other Western nations, Hong Kong issued arrest warrants for six overseas pro-democracy activists and bounties of HKD one million on 24 December. The activists face charges of secession, subversion, and collusion with foreign forces under the national security law which has been used extensively to quash dissent but at the expense of Hong Kong’s reputation as an international finance hub.
Authorities impose curfew in Noumea and three neighbouring municipalities in New Caledonia
French officials have imposed a curfew in the capital Noumea and three neighbouring municipalities on 1 and 2 January, following months of unrest related to a proposed constitutional change. The curfew, which comes just weeks after the previous one was lifted on 2 December, is a response to the ongoing tensions and concerns about potential public disorder during the festive season. The reinstatement of the curfew also follows a rise in road fatalities since the lifting of the previous curfew. The traditional car parades which typically take place in Noumea over the festive season have been cancelled as a result of the curfew. The authorities are likely aiming to curtail any further accidents or violent incidents, as the region grapples with social unrest.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
State of emergency declared in parts of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province
On 23 December the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) provincial cabinet approved the imposition of a state of emergency in the districts of Kurram and Khyber in response to the deteriorating security situation in the region. Months of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia communities has resulted in hundreds of deaths through violence and an estimated 120 children have died as a result of medicine shortages caused by road blocks according to a former minister. However, relief efforts will likely be delayed by militant and Taliban attacks along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan.
Bangladeshi Christian homes set on fire on Christmas Eve
On Christmas Eve at least 17 homes belonging to the minority Christian community were set on fire in the Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts area. This act is likely further evidence that the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has led to the emboldening of extremism in Bangladesh, with attacks on the Hindu minority community also having been widely reported since the changing of the government.
China’s President Xi threatens Taiwan in New Year’s speech
China’s President Xi Jinping reiterated in his New Year’s speech that China’s “reunification” with Taiwan is inevitable, warning against pro-independence forces. The veiled threat follows a year marked by an increase in Chinese military incursions in Taiwan’s waters and air space, with almost daily violations, including several exercises simulating the encirclement of the island nation. Whilst most of this activity has been designed to intimidate Taiwan, isolate Taipei and normalise Chinese military presence in the area, the increase in military activity has almost certainly heightened the risk of miscalculation that could trigger a broader conflict. On 3 January, China doubled down on its stance by imposing sanctions on 45 US entities accused of providing arms to Taiwan, further escalating tensions.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Plane crashes at South Korea’s Muan Airport
On 29 December, a Jeju Airlines flight crashed at Muan Airport in South Korea. Emergency services confirmed that 179 of 181 passengers were killed, with two individuals rescued from the wreckage. The crash led to the closure of Muan Airport until 1 January, affecting all domestic and international flights. The South Korean transport ministry reported that a bird strike warning was issued shortly before the crash, and eyewitnesses captured video evidence of an engine failure just before the aircraft crash-landed. As of 30 December, South Korean officials reported that one of the two black boxes from the crashed plane was retrieved but partially damaged. The investigation into the cause of the crash is ongoing, with the damaged black box potentially hindering progress. Hundreds of people gathered at the airport in the aftermath to express their frustration at the length of time body identification has taken. Jeju Air chief executive Kim E-bae was barred by authorities from leaving the country pending investigation into the cause of the crash.
Authorities tackle wildfires in Australia’s New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory
On 30 December, 52 wildfires simultaneously occurred in New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory. Residents in parts of the Tamworth Local Government Area were advised to prepare to evacuate due to a wildfire burning to the south of the town. Earlier in the season, crews successfully took control of the Scrubby Gully Road Fire near Walcha, which had burned through 172 acres of grassland. The high number of uncontrolled fires signifies a continued risk and the need for vigilance and preparedness in the affected areas. Further wildfires are almost certain during Southeast Australia’s wildfire season which runs from December to February.
Vanuatu hit by a 6.1 magnitude earthquake
The earthquake occurred on 22 December approximately 30 kilometres west of Port Vila at a depth of 39.9 kilometres, resulting in no casualties or significant damage. The tremor occurred five days after the country was struck by a 7.3 magnitude earthquake. The initial earthquake killed 14 and injured 200, causing significant damage to the country’s infrastructure. In response to the earthquakes, Australia operated military flights delivering humanitarian aid and flying 568 citizens out of the country. Vanuatu is in the seismically active Pacific Ring of Fire region, which accounts for 90 per cent of the world’s earthquakes. Further earthquakes can occur spontaneously and may trigger tsunami warnings.
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