Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

The 30 August and 1 September strike exchanges between the US and Iran,  which were highly likely triggered by Iranian attempts to restore degraded leverage over the SoH, constitute the most significant kinetic escalation since late July. The 1 September US strikes likely represent the execution of an earlier reported CENTCOM plan, with reporting citing three US officials indicating that CENTCOM had developed a plan for limited, periodic strikes intended to prevent Iran from reconstituting the capabilities required to disrupt shipping in the SoH. The exchange highly likely does not represent a return to the large-scale operations conducted earlier in the conflict, with Washington’s primary intended instrument against Iran likely remaining economic pressure.

Despite this, the resulting deadlock likely imposes greater costs on Tehran than on Washington. Iran is therefore likely to become increasingly incentivised to initiate its own escalation to break it, which is likely to increase the risk that calibrated exchanges could develop into a major escalation or more sustained conflict.

Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly derived from its ability to disrupt transit through the SoH, and this leverage has likely been substantially eroded with the clearing of sea mines, the establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast and the rerouting of some Gulf exports away from the SoH entirely. A planned minelaying operation using rockets on 30 August almost certainly highlights that Tehran retains a strong incentive to restore its leverage over the SoH, despite the high risks of direct military confrontation with the US. Further Iranian attempts to mine the Strait or to intensify attacks on commercial shipping transiting the SoH are highly likely in the coming weeks, with these actions likely risking further kinetic exchanges.

Washington concurrently almost certainly retains a strong incentive to prevent Iran from restoring this leverage. Further US strikes comparable to the 1 September strikes are likely if it is assessed that Iran is reconstituting its ability to disrupt shipping. Moreover, Washington’s newly announced “tanker for tanker” policy, if sustained, is likely to further increase the threat to commercial shipping by providing Iran with an additional incentive to retaliate directly against tankers. US strikes against Iranian tankers also likely serve as a potential trigger for Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

Competing efforts to establish control over the SoH are highly likely to periodically lead to further kinetic exchanges, with Iran’s current course of action prioritising attacks on US military bases. However, these attacks almost certainly increase the risk of miscalculation or escalation. An Iranian strike resulting in US casualties would likely trigger a substantially larger US response, and reported Iranian civilian casualties, including the alleged strike on a wedding party, likely increase domestic pressure on Tehran to pursue a more forceful response.

Iran’s recent retaliation has continued to be directed against US military targets rather than the broader target profile threatened with the disproportionate retaliation principle, outlined in Iran’s new offensive doctrine on 26 August. This likely indicates that Tehran is continuing to calibrate its response to avoid provoking a broader and more sustained US response or a rupture with regional states. However, as economic pressure on Iran gradually increases and its ability to threaten shipping in the SoH is degraded, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will expand its targeting to include Gulf energy and export infrastructure in line with its new offensive doctrine, in order to impose greater costs, restore leverage, and bolster deterrence.

The 3 September offensive in Yemen launched by the Houthis constitutes the first such ground offensive and the most intense fighting since 2022, likely marking a major escalation. The immediate objective is likely the severing of the road linking Taiz city to Mocha, degrading the sustainability of Saudi-backed IRG positions on the western coast. This likely forms part of a broader Houthi objective to expand territorial control around the Bab al-Mandab, consolidating leverage over the strait. Should the offensive threaten a significant territorial reversal, it is likely that Riyadh will assess air intervention as necessary to prevent IRG collapse on the western coast. Direct Saudi intervention with air strikes will highly likely trigger a substantial increase in Houthi cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, particularly against airports, military bases, and energy infrastructure in Jazan, Asir and Najran. A major escalation with sustained Saudi involvement would also likely result in deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah and other major targets in Saudi Arabia.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Tailored travel intelligence is analysis developed around a specific traveller and journey rather than a destination in isolation. 

A pre-travel advisory can consider the traveller’s profile, exact itinerary, routes, accommodation, planned activities and current developments. The aim is not to provide more information for its own sake. It is to identify the information relevant to the decision being made and translate it into practical guidance. 

For organisations managing business travel, this can support travel approvals and duty of care. For executive security teams and family offices, it can also help determine whether existing arrangements remain proportionate to the individual and their movements. 

So when should security teams consider moving beyond standard country and city intelligence? 

The same destination can present different considerations for different people. 

A senior executive, public figure, family office principal or individual associated with a recognisable organisation may attract greater attention than a routine business traveller. Their role, public visibility, professional associations or planned engagements can change the nature of their exposure without changing the underlying country risk rating. 

This does not automatically mean protective security is required. It means the individual profile should form part of the assessment. 

A tailored pre-travel advisory can examine whether that profile introduces considerations that would not be apparent from destination intelligence alone. 

Country and city risk assessments answer an important question: what is the operating environment like? 

A complex journey creates another: what will the traveller encounter between each point? 

A trip may involve several cities, regional facilities, remote project sites, unfamiliar airports or long periods of overland travel. Conditions can vary significantly across one itinerary. 

The routes themselves may also matter. Road quality, checkpoints, demonstrations, transport disruption or access to medical support can all affect the practical risk of a journey. 

Where an itinerary extends beyond familiar locations, tailored analysis can provide a clearer view of the journey as a whole. 

Where someone is travelling is only part of the picture. What they are going there to do can be equally relevant. 

Consider two travellers arriving in the same city on the same day. 

One is attending internal meetings at an established corporate office. The other is visiting a remote facility, attending a public event, meeting government representatives or carrying out sensitive work. 

Their destination risk may be identical. Their exposure is not. 

A tailored travel risk assessment can consider the activities planned during the trip and identify whether they introduce additional security, reputational or operational considerations. 

Standing country and city intelligence gives decision-makers an understanding of the wider environment. Some journeys, however, take place at a point when conditions are changing quickly. 

Examples include elections, planned demonstrations, significant political developments, severe weather, transport disruption or a developing security incident. 

In these circumstances, the question is no longer simply: 

“What risks exist in this destination?” 

It becomes: 

“What could affect this traveller, in these locations, during these dates?” 

Time-specific intelligence can help security teams understand whether the itinerary should proceed as planned, whether the traveller needs additional information or whether reasonable adjustments should be considered. 

Not every tailored assessment is triggered by a single significant threat. Sometimes, the combination of several factors warrants closer analysis. 

A traveller may have a moderately elevated profile. Their itinerary may include an unfamiliar road movement. Their visit may coincide with demonstrations. They may also be attending a public-facing event. 

None of those factors necessarily changes the decision in isolation. 

Together, they may. 

This is where analyst judgement adds value. Rather than treating each risk factor separately, tailored intelligence considers how they interact and what that means for the traveller. 

Travel risk assessment should consider not only the likelihood of an incident, but also its potential impact. 

A journey involving a CEO ahead of a major transaction, a principal travelling with family members or a team operating within a narrow project window may warrant additional planning even where the destination itself is not considered particularly high risk. 

The aim is not to overstate the threat. 

It is to understand the consequences if the journey does not go as planned and determine whether reasonable contingency measures should be in place. 

For some travellers, a relatively modest disruption can have a disproportionate operational, financial or personal impact. 

Intelligence should inform security measures, rather than simply justify them after a decision has already been made. 

If an organisation or family office is considering secure transportation, journey management, enhanced monitoring, additional check-ins or close protection, a tailored assessment can help determine what is proportionate to the circumstances. 

For example, analysis may identify that changing an airport transfer route and monitoring a particular event is sufficient. In another situation, the profile of the traveller and operating environment may support a higher level of security. 

The objective is the same in both cases: match the response to the assessed exposure. 

This also avoids the assumption that travel to a higher-risk destination automatically requires the highest level of protective security. 

Security teams now have access to significant volumes of intelligence. More information does not always lead to a better decision. 

The more useful question is: 

Does the traveller know what matters to them? 

A lengthy destination report may contain valuable intelligence, but the individual may need only a small proportion of it to make informed decisions during their journey. 

Tailored intelligence can translate the wider operating picture into practical guidance: what to be aware of, where additional caution may be appropriate, what could affect the itinerary and what action to take if circumstances change. 

For an executive travelling on business, this could relate to particular meetings, routes and locations. 

For a family office, different family members could require different advice despite travelling within the same country. 

The value lies in making intelligence relevant to the person receiving it. 

These intelligence products should not be viewed as alternatives competing with one another. Each provides a different level of context. 

A routine journey to a familiar location may be well supported by current country and city intelligence. 

A complex itinerary involving a high-profile traveller during a period of changing conditions may warrant considerably more context. 

The appropriate level should reflect the circumstances of the journey and the organisation’s or individual’s risk tolerance.  

Effective travel risk intelligence should help answer three questions: 

What is happening? What does it mean for this traveller? What, if anything, should we do differently? 

At Solace Global Risk, country and city risk intelligence provides the wider operating picture, while tailored pre-travel advisories consider the individual traveller and itinerary. 

Our intelligence analysts work as part of an integrated travel risk management model alongside Solace Secure and our 24/7 Global Security Operations Centre. This enables intelligence to support planning before travel, monitoring during the journey and coordinated response where required. 

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

Recent mutual exchanges between the US and Iran constitute the most significant kinetic escalation since late July. However, US strikes were limited and likely aimed at denying Iran the ability to mine the SoH, while Iranian retaliation remained focused on US military assets, indicating that both sides were seeking to contain the escalation.

The 30 August Iranian retaliation strikes likely do not constitute an application of the new Iranian offensive doctrine set out on 26 August. While the speed of the retaliation is consistent with the rapid response principle, the target set is more consistent with Iran’s previous targeting patterns than with the stated principle of disproportionate retaliation. This likely indicates that Tehran calibrated its response to avoid provoking a major US campaign or escalation with regional states.

Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly derived from its ability to disrupt transit through the SoH, and this leverage has likely been substantially eroded. CENTCOM’s announcement on 27 August that internationally recognised transit routes had been cleared of Iranian sea mines, alongside the establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast and the rerouting of some Gulf exports away from the SoH entirely, has likely restored a notable proportion of regional export capacity. The claimed planned minelaying operation using rockets on 30 August almost certainly indicates that Tehran retains a strong incentive to restore its leverage over the SoH, despite the high risks of direct military confrontation with the US. Further Iranian attempts to mine the strait or to intensify attacks on commercial shipping transiting the SoH are highly likely in the coming weeks, with these actions likely risking further kinetic exchanges.

If President Trump approves the reported CENTCOM plan for limited and periodic strikes against reconstituted Iranian minelaying, radar, air defence, and anti-ship missile capabilities around the SoH, this would almost certainly lead to Iranian retaliation against US installations in regional states following any US strikes. Moreover, such escalation cycles would almost certainly increase the risk of miscalculation, potentially broadening the conflict beyond limited and calibrated exchanges. There is a realistic possibility that in an effort to impose greater costs, restore leverage and implement its newly stated offensive doctrine to bolster deterrence, Iranian forces may expand the targeting profile for retaliation strikes to include Gulf state energy infrastructure, ports and airports.

The targeting of the UAE by Iran likely marks a notable shift. Iran has likely refrained from targeting the UAE in recent months for economic reasons. However, the Emirati claims of suspending trade and financial transactions with Iran, alongside the US secondary sanctions campaign, almost certainly threaten this key incentive for that restraint. Despite this, early reporting indicates the attack against the UAE was highly limited and likely performative. Therefore, the attempted attack was likely intended as a warning to the UAE against enforcing US measures or implementing its announced financial embargo.

Warning time for further Iranian attacks against regional states would almost certainly be minimal, as demonstrated on 30 August, when Iranian strikes followed the US strikes within hours. Travellers and expatriates in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE should anticipate short-notice air raid warnings, shelter-in-place instructions, and temporary airport or airspace closures, and should avoid proximity to military installations, which remain a key Iranian target priority.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

The combination of US Treasury messaging on economic coercion as a substitute for kinetic force, Rubio’s reported private assurances to allies, and the reported planning of returning diplomatic staff to regional posts indicate that the US is unlikely to initiate major offensive operations against Iran in the short term.

However, the risk that Iran now initiates offensive escalation has highly likely risen. Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly been derived from its ability to interdict transit through the SoH. This leverage has likely been recently degraded; the establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast, the widespread adoption of night-time dark transits, and the rerouting of Gulf exports away from the SoH entirely have likely restored a notable proportion of regional export capacity. Moreover, reported transit and export volumes are likely higher than publicly tracked figures indicate, due to the use of dark transits and ship-to-ship transfers used to obfuscate export activity.

The combination of degraded maritime leverage and intensified economic pressure through Operation Economic Outcast and the US blockade likely increases Tehran’s incentive to escalate militarily, both to demonstrate that the SoH cannot be transited without its consent and to restore its negotiating position before its remaining leverage is further degraded. Iranian escalation aimed at reasserting control over the SoH, restoring Iranian leverage and imposing costs on the US and its allies is likely in the coming weeks. Iran’s most likely course of action is to increase attacks against commercial vessels using the southern transit corridor and may also involve further limited mining operations. However, these actions will likely increase the risk of direct military confrontation with the US, which has yet to conduct any meaningful force reductions in the region.

Attacks against Gulf state energy infrastructure, ports and airports, as well as US military installations, would represent a more significant escalation. The risk of this is highly likely to increase if Gulf states and other major trading partners comply with US sanctions and if Tehran fails to effectively circumnavigate the sanctions. Iran’s new SNSC head, Rezaei, has already made direct threats against regional energy infrastructure. Rezaei’s specific reference to export routes bypassing the SoH likely indicates that Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea infrastructure at Yanbu, alongside pipeline, port, and loading infrastructure in the UAE, particularly at Fujairah, is being framed by Tehran as legitimate targets if it assesses that the Gulf states are supporting the US economic campaign.

Moreover, the four principles outlined by the Iranian Artesh spokesperson, Akraminia, codify the lowering of Iran’s threshold for the first use of force and widen the scope of ‘legitimate’ targets. The pre-emptive action principle in particular almost certainly indicates an increased risk of Iran initiating an exchange. Akraminia cited the 28 July strike on Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan, despite a lack of US offensive action, as evidence for the doctrinal shift. The stated trigger, an adversary assembling personnel and equipment, is broad enough that routine force rotations, air defence deployments, or naval movements could be interpreted by Iran as indicators and warnings of an imminent attack and used to justify a pre-emptive strike, highly likely increasing the risk of miscalculation.

Iran had previously pursued a strategy of analogous targeting, whereby it would respond to attacks by striking broadly comparable targets across the region. However, the disproportionate retaliation principle likely represents a shift from this approach. The new doctrine likely indicates that Iran is willing to rapidly escalate and broaden the criteria for both the scale and type of targets it considers legitimate in the event of renewed escalation. The geographic targeting expansion makes explicit threats to adversary interests across the region, including energy hubs, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and undersea internet cables. However, this remains poorly defined and could extend to other targets.

Pakistani and Omani diplomatic activity in Tehran on 24 and 25 August highly likely reflects continued attempts by regional powers to prevent the collapse of the diplomatic track. However, with no direct US-Iran channel in place, Iranian preconditions highly likely unchanged, and Washington committed to escalating economic pressure to compel compliance, a near-term breakthrough is unlikely. The Iran-Oman track on the management of the SoH remains the most likely source of progress, although Iranian officials have consistently stated that an agreement with Oman would not open the SoH until the US meets Iran’s conditions in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

On 26 August, severe flash flooding struck Rasuwa District on the Nepal–Tibet border. Preliminary assessments indicate that the floods followed an ice-and-rock avalanche, which temporarily blocked an upstream river, forming a “lake”. The temporary dam subsequently failed, resulting in the release of a high volume of water into the Bhote Koshi and Trishuli rivers. A magnitude 4.4 earthquake was recorded at around 08:37 local time, which could have triggered the avalanche, although this has not been confirmed at the time of writing.

Authorities have reported at least 22 deaths, while hundreds of people remain unaccounted for. This includes 384 tourists reported out of contact, most of them foreign nationals, as well as 41 security personnel and several government employees. Disrupted communications and road access mean that casualty and missing-person figures are almost certain to rise as contact is restored with isolated communities.

The flooding caused severe damage in Rasuwa, including around Timure and Syabrubesi, and affected parts of Nuwakot and Dhading. The flooding caused severe infrastructural damage, affecting roads, bridges, health facilities and hydropower infrastructure. Damage along the Betrawati–Rasuwagadhi road has also disrupted access to the Chinese border and complicated rescue and relief operations.

Authorities issued warnings for communities along the Bhote Koshi, Trishuli and Narayani river systems regarding the risk of further flooding and landslides.

On the Chinese side of the border in Tibet, landslides and flooding affected the Gyirong area, with authorities reporting “major casualties”. Border infrastructure, roads and communications have also been disrupted, affecting cross-border movement.

On 30 August, Bissau-Guineans will vote in a referendum to approve a constitutional amendment, which was already unilaterally approved by the military-appointed National Transitional Council (NTC). The proposed constitution would preserve the formal description of Guinea-Bissau as a semi-presidential system but substantially strengthen the presidency. Voting will take place by universal, direct suffrage, with voters selecting “Yes” or “No” to the question: “[d]o you agree with the entry into force of the new Constitution of the Republic approved by the National Transitional Council?”

Under the proposed amendments, the president would serve as the head of state, direct the executive, and chair the Council of Ministers. The prime minister would remain the head of government but would become subordinate to the president. Accordingly, the president would appoint and dismiss the prime minister after consulting parliamentary parties, while retaining the power to dissolve the legislature. The National People’s Assembly, Guinea-Bissau’s parliament, would retain its legislative oversight functions, including confidence motions and approval of the government programme. It would also be renamed the National Assembly, with its membership reduced from 102 to 65 members. Additionally, parties which fail to secure at least four per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections could be dissolved. Critics have argued that the proposed changes would significantly weaken parliament’s ability to check the president, concentrating greater power in the presidency.

The vote forms part of the transition process established following the 26 November 2025 military coup. After the referendum, elections to restore civilian rule are scheduled for 6 December 2026. Transitional President General Horta N’Tam formally called the referendum through Presidential Decree No. 19/2026, after the Supreme Court assented to the process. According to a junta statement in December, neither N’Tam nor the current Prime Minister Ilídio Vieira Té will be allowed to run for president.

ASSESSMENT

Guinea-Bissau has grappled with chronic instability since becoming independent from Portugal in 1973, marked by repeated coups and ongoing political power struggles. The country has experienced at least ten successful or attempted coups, making it one of the most coup-prone countries in Africa. The most recent coup occurred in November 2025, when Guinea-Bissau’s military seized power days after the presidential election and amid competing claims of victory, but before the release of results that were widely expected to be unfavourable to President Umaro Sissoco Embaló.

The constitutional referendum is highly likely to pass. Guinea-Bissau’s shift towards a more presidential system is being framed as a means to reduce institutional conflict and political paralysis. Executive authority is currently ambiguously divided between the president and prime minister. Under Article 96 of the constitution, the prime minister-led government is the highest executive and administrative body. Conversely, Article 103 stipulates that the government is politically accountable to the president and the National People’s Assembly. This unclear division has repeatedly triggered disputes over control of the government, and only one president since 1994 has completed their term in office. As a result, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has recommended that the government draft and adopt a new constitution through referendum.

The constitutional reform will highly likely benefit the military-led transitional authority. While the government’s stated motivation is to end the repeated political deadlocks, the proposed constitutional amendments would substantially strengthen the executive ahead of the planned general elections. Alongside conferring popular legitimacy on a constitution drafted and approved under military rule, the changes would largely centralise authority in the presidency, giving one individual substantial control over the state. Additionally, it would enable the transitional authorities to decide the institutional structure under which the next government will operate, meaning that opposition parties’ powers could be significantly curtailed.

Although the transitional president and prime minister are barred from contesting the December election, the junta appears to be facilitating the return of deposed president Embaló. The Inclusive Patriotic Alliance-Cabas Garandi (API-CG), the Inclusive Alliance Platform-Terra Ranka (PAI–Terra Ranka), and human rights groups have accused the transitional authorities of clearing a path for Embaló while repressing rival political figures, including opposition leader Domingos Simões Pereira, who was detained following the 2025 coup and later placed under house arrest in January 2026. They have also criticised the exclusion of civil-society groups from the constitutional drafting process and called for the referendum to be postponed. By securing approval for the new constitution before potentially restoring Embaló to power, the junta is likely seeking to preserve substantial influence over the country through a proxy administration.

There is a realistic possibility of protests and localised violence due to the constitutional referendum. Following the November 2025 coup, hundreds of people demonstrated in Bissau to demand Pereira’s release, while several civil-society groups called for a general strike and a campaign of civil disobedience to restore “electoral truth”. Further protests took place in April 2026 after the killing of a civil-society activist, with demonstrators accusing the security forces of carrying out a politically motivated assassination. Although neither episode developed into widespread unrest, both involved clashes with the police, who used tear gas to disperse demonstrators. During the post-coup protests, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also accused the security forces of deploying lethal force, including live ammunition, against protesters.

There is also a realistic possibility that civil unrest could become widespread. Opposition and civil-society groups’ portrayal of the constitutional referendum as an attempt to legitimise military rule increases the likelihood that they will call for large-scale protests against what they regard as a sham transition process. Security forces’ previous use of live ammunition also raises the risk that initially localised demonstrations could develop into a broader movement if footage or reports of a severe crackdown circulate widely on social media. Demonstrations would likely be concentrated in Bissau, where almost one-quarter of the population lives. Focal points for demonstrations would likely include the presidential palace, the National People’s Assembly, and the National Electoral Commission.

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown. Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. The conflict will likely remain at a lower intensity in the short term, with neither side currently assessing that renewed large-scale operations are in its interests. However, as long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could break out with minimal indicators or warnings.

Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly been derived from its ability to interdict transit through the SoH, and that leverage has likely been recently degraded. The establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast, the widespread adoption of night-time dark transits, and the rerouting of substantial Gulf export volumes away from the SoH entirely have likely restored a notable although still significantly reduced proportion of regional export capacity. Reported transit and export volumes are likely higher than publicly tracked figures indicate, due to the use of dark transits and ship-to-ship transfers. Concurrently, the launch of Operation Economic Outcast on 24 August almost certainly removes any near-term prospect of sanctions relief for Tehran.

The combination of degraded maritime leverage and intensified economic pressure likely increases the incentive for Tehran to escalate militarily, both to demonstrate that the SoH cannot be transited without its consent and to restore its negotiating position before its remaining leverage is further diminished. Iranian offensive escalation over the coming weeks is therefore a realistic possibility. It is highly likely that Iranian forces will intensify attacks against vessels using the southern corridor, and there is a realistic possibility of attempts to place further mines on the approaches.

Attacks against Gulf state energy infrastructure, ports and airports, as well as US military installations, would represent a more significant escalation. The risk of this is likely to increase as Tehran comes under greater economic pressure, particularly given direct threats against regional energy infrastructure by Iran’s new SNSC head, Rezaei. Rezaei’s specific reference to export routes bypassing the SoH likely indicates that Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea infrastructure at Yanbu, alongside pipeline, port, and loading infrastructure in the UAE (particularly at Fujairah), are being framed by Tehran as legitimate targets if it assesses that the Gulf states are supporting the US economic campaign.

Pakistani and Omani diplomatic activity in Tehran on 24 and 25 August likely reflects continued attempts by regional powers to prevent the collapse of the diplomatic track. However, with no direct US-Iran channel in place, Iranian preconditions highly likely unchanged, and Washington committed to escalating economic pressure, a near-term breakthrough is unlikely. The Iran-Oman track on the management of the SoH remains the most likely source of progress, although Iranian officials have consistently stated that an arrangement with Oman would not by itself reopen the strait.

The Houthi-claimed strike against a Saudi tanker west of Yanbu on 24 August is consistent with the pattern of attacks against Saudi-linked shipping conducted since the Houthi maritime blockade was declared on 20 July, although notably north in the Red Sea. Further attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, and limited attacks against energy infrastructure and airports in southern Saudi Arabia, are highly likely in the short term. Further short-notice air raid siren activation, shelter-in-place instructions, and closures of Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports should be anticipated at minimal notice.

Continued intensified conflict between Saudi-backed IRG forces and the Houthis continues to represent the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce, and the risk that either side initiates a ground offensive remains elevated. A ground offensive by either party would highly likely result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and attack drone strikes against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis highly likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran, and deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of the kingdom also highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown. Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. The conflict will likely remain at a lower intensity in the short term, with neither side currently assessing that renewed large-scale operations are in its interests. However, as long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could break out with minimal indicators or warnings.

The US announcement of an intensified economic campaign, combined with Bessent’s statement that maximum economic pressure would likely preclude a restart in large-scale kinetic operations, likely indicates that the Trump administration is pivoting towards economic coercion as its primary instrument against Iran in the short term.

The principal escalation risk from the announced economic campaign is that the removal of any near-term prospect of sanctions relief likely reduces Tehran’s incentive to preserve the MoU framework, and likely increases the risk that Iran escalates militarily in order to impose costs and compel a return to its understanding of the MoU. Iranian officials stated on 17 August that Tehran had shifted to an offensive posture and threatened retaliatory action within weeks if the US failed to implement the MoU in full. Tehran is likely incentivised to exploit the widely reported US munitions shortage before the US has the opportunity to regroup and regenerate capability. This may result in intermittent Iranian attacks designed to force the US into further ammunition expenditure.

Furthermore, if the disclosed numbers transiting the US-controlled southern corridor in the SoH are accurate, this likely reduces the immediate economic pressure on the US to conclude a deal on the SoH, and increases Tehran’s incentive to further escalate attacks against vessels and/or escalate kinetically in other areas.

The ballistic missile warning issued in the UAE is the first such alert in months, with a false alarm in June and an alert in July for an attack that did not enter Emirati territory. The last confirmed Iranian attack against Emirati territory was in May. Iran has likely refrained from targeting the UAE more recently in the conflict for economic reasons, with the UAE having reportedly released billions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets, after having targeted the UAE with the most projectiles of any country in the region.

Prior to the current war, the UAE was Iran’s second largest trading partner after China. The implementation of a comprehensive trade and commerce embargo would almost certainly impose economic costs on Iran and likely indicate a hardening of the UAE’s posture. However, it remains unclear whether the Emirati MFA statement marks a tangible change in policy, or simply restates earlier publicly adopted policy in anticipation of further US sanctions on Iran. As of 21 August, Iranian flights continue to arrive in the UAE. However, if economic ties are significantly curtailed, Iran may have fewer incentives to exercise restraint towards the UAE, likely increasing the risk of renewed Iranian targeting during future escalation cycles.

The IRGC’s threat to deploy more destructive weaponry in a renewed conflict likely refers to an increased scale and complexity of missile and drone attacks, including larger salvos, manoeuvrable warheads and potentially cluster munitions with an extended kill radius. However, the IRGC has not stated what constitutes a renewed conflict or specified the threshold at which these capabilities would be employed. Should the conflict sustain its current intensity, it is unlikely that cluster munitions would be used directly against the Gulf states and Jordan due to the threat of escalation. However, in the event of a further major escalation, their use cannot be ruled out, with unconfirmed reports indicating that Iran previously used a cluster munition warhead against Bahrain on 14 July. Iranian cluster warheads release dozens of submunitions at high altitude, dispersing them over a radius of several kilometres. The use of cluster munitions almost certainly increases the risk of civilian casualties, in addition to leaving large quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Claimed limited Houthi attacks against an Aramco facility and Najran airport in Saudi Arabia on 20 August almost certainly reflect continuing Houthi prioritisation of attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure and airports, with further such limited attacks highly likely in the short term. Moreover, continued intensified conflict between Saudi-backed IRG forces and the Houthis continues to represent the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce, and the risk that either side initiates a ground offensive is likely increasing.

Claims that the Houthis have deployed approximately 2,000 fighters and rocket launchers to Yemen’s western coast in preparation for an advance south of Hodeidah, if confirmed, would likely indicate the intent to seize terrain overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The successful seizure of this key terrain would almost certainly improve the Houthis’ ability to disrupt maritime traffic and further threaten Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export route.

Commentary from Yemeni political figures indicates that Saudi Arabia is likely marshalling IRG forces to prepare for a range of contingencies without having taken a final decision to initiate a ground campaign, and that any Saudi-backed push would most likely focus on Hodeidah, through which the Houthis import Iranian arms. An operation against Hodeidah would almost certainly result in major Houthi retaliation against Saudi Arabia.

The launching of a Saudi-backed ground offensive against the Houthis or a Houthi ground offensive against the internationally recognised government (IRG) would highly likely trigger a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and attack drone strikes against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis would highly likely target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran, and deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of the kingdom would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown. Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could break out with minimal indicators or warnings.

However, the conflict will likely remain at a lower intensity in the short term, with neither side currently assessing that renewed large-scale operations are in its interests. The US is highly likely constrained by munitions shortages and is prioritising economic pressure through the blockade, while Tehran is almost certainly exploiting the pause to regenerate capability and retains the closure of the SoH as its principal source of leverage. The expiry of the 60-day truce period on 17 August without a resumption of major hostilities likely supports this assessment, and suggests that a de facto pause is likely to persist in the short term despite the absence of any publicly declared extension. The rotation of the USS Abraham Lincoln out of theatre without a corresponding increase in overall carrier presence is likely a further indicator that the US is not currently preparing for a major escalation.

US freedom of action against Iran has highly likely been constrained by the considerable depletion of US offensive and defensive munitions during the war. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a reprieve on SoH transit through an Iran-Oman deal will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran. The scale of recent US procurement supports this assessment, with the US Army awarding Lockheed Martin a contract worth up to USD 58.6 billion in late July for significantly increased Patriot interceptor production, and the US Navy awarding Raytheon USD 22.9 billion to increase Tomahawk production seventeen-fold over seven years. However, these contracts are unlikely to translate into meaningful capability in the near term, meaning Washington’s incentive to avoid a prolonged return to high-intensity operations will likely persist for months rather than weeks.

US CENTCOM has previously conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels in the SoH. These were followed by Iranian retaliation strikes launched against targets in regional states, particularly US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, while attacks against vessels transiting the SoH near Oman outside of Iran’s enforced routes have continued, US strikes have not recently followed these attacks. This likely reflects a current prioritisation in the Trump administration to avoid a full return to conflict and instead attempt to maintain pressure against Iran and achieve an opening of the SoH through the blockade and ongoing Iran-Oman talks. However, vessel attacks such as that conducted on 18 August, which has resulted in a crew casualty, remain a key potential trigger for renewed US-Iran strike exchanges.

Iran’s declared shift from a defensive to an offensive posture is likely intended primarily to compel the US back into the MoU framework. The absence of a specified deadline date likely indicates that Tehran intends to preserve flexibility and to avoid a fixed commitment that would oblige it to act. However, the stated posture shift likely increases the risk that in the coming weeks Tehran will attempt to break the deadlock through escalation calibrated to raise costs to the US. Iranian options reported by US media include the sabotage of internet cables in the Persian Gulf, the fomenting of civil unrest in regional states with large Shia populations like Kuwait and Bahrain, and “potentially even ground operations in Kuwait”.

Iranian escalation conducted through Iraqi militia proxies and the Houthis is also likely to form a component of any escalation, as it imposes costs on regional states while providing Tehran with deniability. A reported drone attack against the office of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region prime minister on 17 August, which Iraqi counterterrorism authorities stated was launched from the border area with Iran, is likely indicative of a continued Iranian willingness to conduct deniable attacks during the de facto pause in the wider conflict.

Further claimed Houthi attacks against Aramco facilities in Jazan and Najran almost certainly reflect continuing Houthi prioritisation of attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, with further such attacks highly likely in the coming week. This assessment is reinforced by warnings from Houthi media on 11 August that attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure would be expanded if Saudi Arabia continues to “stall” diplomatic efforts, with such attacks highly likely to be the primary form of leverage the Houthis can impose against Saudi Arabia. Further short-notice air raid siren activation, shelter-in-place instructions, and closures of Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports should be anticipated in southern Saudi Arabia at minimal notice.

Continued intensified conflict between Saudi-backed Yemeni internationally recognised government (IRG) forces and the Houthis, characterised by further exchanges of shelling, missile, and drone strikes between 14 and 18 August, almost certainly a continuation of the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce. Continued Houthi use of ballistic missiles and UAVs against Marib city and the port of Mocha likely indicates a continued intent to degrade Saudi-backed IRG command, logistics, and maritime resupply in preparation for potential full-scale fighting, while also likely seeking to deter a potential Saudi-backed ground offensive.

The most likely trigger for a major escalation remains a Saudi-backed IRG ground offensive against Houthi-controlled Yemen, although a Houthi pre-emptive offensive to seize Marib before IRG forces can be reconstituted is also a realistic possibility. Both of these scenarios would highly likely result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

The competing US and Iranian maritime blockades continue as of 14 August, with President Trump’s previous statements on “low-keying it” with Iran referring to continued economic pressure against the regime as opposed to major combat operations. The Trump administration currently highly likely regards the US blockade as its primary means of exerting leverage over Tehran to compel compliance. Likewise, Tehran almost certainly sees disruption to transit through the SoH as its primary form of leverage.

US CENTCOM has previously conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels in the SoH. These are typically followed by Iranian retaliation strikes launched against targets in regional states, particularly US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, while Iranian attacks against vessels transiting the SoH near Oman outside of Iran’s enforced routes have continued, US strikes have not recently followed these attacks. This likely reflects a current prioritisation in the Trump administration to avoid a full return to conflict and instead attempt to achieve an opening of the SoH through the ongoing Iran-Oman talks.

US freedom of action against Iran has highly likely been constrained by the considerable depletion of US offensive and defensive munitions during the war. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a 60-day or more reprieve on SoH transit will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran.

Continued divergence in Iran’s negotiating position from different figures is likely attributable to factional competition in Tehran. The absence of a fully coherent regime in Tehran almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with or purposely undermine any agreement made by Iran’s civilian government and negotiating teams, as observed after the signing of the MoU.

Iranian forces have almost certainly exploited any US cessation of strikes to improve their offensive and defensive positions. This has likely involved the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, the importation of new equipment, and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should regular active fighting resume.

Fundamentally, the conflict has likely now entered a lower-intensity phase in which neither party currently assesses that renewed large-scale operations are in their interests. The US is highly likely constrained by munitions shortages and is ostensibly prioritising economic pressure through the blockade, while Tehran is almost certainly exploiting the pause to regenerate capability and retains the closure of the SoH as its principal source of leverage. Consequently, a formal lapse of the 60-day truce period on 17 August is unlikely in itself to trigger an immediate resumption of large-scale strikes, and a de facto pause would likely persist without any publicly declared extension. However, the situation almost certainly remains fragile with multiple triggers for rapid escalation, particularly the ongoing maritime blockades.

The claimed 13 August Houthi attack against an Aramco refinery in Jazan almost certainly reflects continuing Houthi prioritisation of attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, with further such attacks likely in the coming week. This assessment is further reinforced by warnings from Houthi media on 11 August that attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure would be expanded if Saudi Arabia continues to “stall” diplomatic efforts, with such attacks highly likely to be the primary form of leverage the Houthis can impose against Saudi Arabia.

The escalation in fighting between Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) forces and the Houthis, with further exchanges of shelling and strikes observed between 13 and 14 August, is almost certainly the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce. The concentration of fighting in Marib, al-Jawf, and Taiz corresponds closely to the axes along which Houthi forces were advancing before the truce. The Houthi use of ballistic missiles and UAVs against Marib city and the port of Mocha likely indicates an intent to degrade Saudi-backed IRG command, logistics, and maritime resupply in preparation for potential full-scale renewed fighting, in addition to a likely intention to deter a potential Saudi-backed ground offensive.

The most likely trigger for a major escalation remains a Saudi-backed IRG ground offensive against Houthi-controlled Yemen, although a Houthi pre-emptive offensive to seize Marib before IRG forces can be reconstituted is also a realistic possibility. Both of these scenarios would highly likely result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

Greater control over the SoH has almost certainly been a long-term objective for Tehran. Control would not only give the regime a potential source of funds by extracting fees, but bolsters its deterrence, with Iran’s closures of the SoH having almost certainly been its most important source of leverage in the conflict. Tehran’s insistence that an arrangement with Oman will not by itself reopen the SoH almost certainly reflects an intent to retain that leverage until wider concessions are secured.

Continued divergence in Iran’s negotiating position from different figures is likely attributable in part to factional competition in Tehran. The replacement of Zolghadr with Rezaei on 9 August likely reflects an attempt to consolidate control over decision-making and highly likely strengthens Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-aligned influence over any agreement reached. The absence of a fully coherent position in Tehran almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with or purposely undermine any agreement made by Iran’s civilian government and negotiating teams, as observed after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

The competing blockades from both the US and Iran remain in place as of 11 August. Previously, US CENTCOM has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels in the SoH, with Iranian retaliation strikes then being launched against targets in regional states, particularly US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, while Iranian attacks against vessels transiting the SoH near Oman outside of Iran’s enforced routes have continued, US strikes have not recently followed these attacks. This likely reflects the Trump administration’s current prioritisation of securing an opening of the SoH through the ongoing Iran-Oman talks.

Military constraints deriving from the depletion of a considerable percentage of both US offensive and defensive munitions in the war thus far have highly likely limited US freedom of action against Iran. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term as a means to end the conflict, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a 60-day or more reprieve on SoH transit will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran.

Iranian forces have almost certainly exploited any US cessation of strikes to improve its offensive and defensive positions, as supported by an Iranian military spokesperson who openly stated on 2 August that Iran “fully exploited” the MoU to improve its capabilities. This has likely involved the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, the importation of new equipment, and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should regular active fighting resume. Moreover, it is likely that a restart of US CENTCOM operations against Iran characterised by the targeting of Iranian infrastructure would trigger retaliation strikes targeting regional energy infrastructure, ports and international airports.

The claimed postponement of Iraqi militia retaliation on 7 August was likely a product of Iraqi domestic political pressure rather than a decision by Tehran to de-escalate, most likely reflecting the interest of Shia Coordination Framework parties in avoiding further US-Saudi strikes and in protecting the PMF’s position ahead of the government’s 30 September deadline for placing all weapons under state control. The IRI has stated explicitly that the decision is a deferral, and Iraqi militias almost certainly retain both the capability and the intent to strike Saudi and US targets. Any resumption would highly likely occur with minimal indicators and warnings.

Attacks originating from Iraqi territory would most likely target energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province and Riyadh, replicating the drone attacks that Riyadh attributed to Iraqi militias in late July, and there is a realistic possibility that these would be deliberately coordinated with Houthi attacks from the south. Simultaneous attacks from both northern and southern axes would likely force Saudi Arabia to disperse aircraft, radar, and air defence systems across multiple directions, potentially overstretching air defences and exposing gaps in coverage.

Continued Houthi attacks against Saudi-linked vessels, southern Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-backed Yemeni IRG forces almost certainly demonstrate the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which will highly likely remain as long as the Houthi “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia is enforced. The 9 August strike against the Jazan refinery indicates that the Houthis are highly likely to continue targeting Saudi energy infrastructure.

A Saudi ground offensive into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen would almost certainly result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

At 07:34 local time (12:34 UTC) on 10 August, a magnitude 7.4 earthquake was detected 5 kilometres east of San José del Palmar, Chocó Department, Colombia, at a depth of 107 kilometres, according to the United States Geological Survey (USGS). The earthquake was felt as far as Venezuela and Ecuador.

Choco province Governor Nubia Carolina Córdoba-Curi has declared that injuries have been reported and there is severe damage to buildings. Videos and local media reports also indicate major damage in several cities. Buildings were reported to have collapsed or partially collapsed in Cali, Pereira and Manizales. Footage also reportedly showed significant structural damage in Pereira, damage to a cathedral in Manizales, and structural damage in Medellín’s San Diego suburb.

Residents evacuated buildings in northern Bogotá, over 200 kilometres east of the epicentre, while buildings were also evacuated in Barranquilla. However, the mayor of Bogotá, Carlos Fernando Galán, reported that no structural damage was reported aside from some cracks in buildings. There have been no confirmed casualty figures or a comprehensive official damage assessment.

Despite a relative reduction in US strikes against Iran and concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

Greater control over the SoH has almost certainly been a long-term objective for Tehran. Control would not only give the regime a potential source of funds by extracting fees, but bolsters its deterrence, with Iran’s closures of the SoH having almost certainly been its most important source of leverage in the conflict. If accurate, the Iran-Oman proposal being reported as close to agreement would essentially give Tehran the ability to leverage passage through the SoH to advance its objectives for at least a 60-day period. This has been strongly opposed throughout the conflict by the US and several regional states, with this dispute having likely been the key trigger for the collapse of the MoU.

Reporting regarding the potential SoH agreement has been contradictory, with no text having been published and conflicting information being briefed. In part, the divergence in briefings is likely attributable to Iranian factional competition. On 4 August, a senior hardliner politician in Iran stated that lawmakers were gathering documents for the impeachment of Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, and a senior cleric with family connections to the Supreme Leader said on 3 August that President Masoud Pezeshkian has been warned his next resignation request would be accepted. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with or purposely undermine any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government and negotiating teams.

The competing renewed blockades from both the US and Iran remain in place as of 7 August. Previously, US CENTCOM has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels. If further such strikes are conducted, these would highly likely be followed by Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in regional states, most likely US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain given recent target prioritisation by Iranian forces.

Military constraints deriving from the depletion of a considerable percentage of both US offensive and defensive munitions in the war thus far have highly likely limited US freedom of action against Iran. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term as a means to end the conflict, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a 60-day or more reprieve on SoH transit will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran.

As demonstrated since the end of the 13 consecutive nights of US strikes against Iran on 24 July, with numerous subsequent attacks originating from Iraq being conducted against regional targets, the IRGC is likely to continue leveraging regional proxies to inflict sustained pressure on the Gulf states while remaining below the calculated threshold for significant escalation directly against Iran.

Iranian forces have almost certainly exploited any US cessation of strikes to improve its offensive and defensive positions, as supported by an Iranian military spokesperson who openly stated on 2 August that Iran “fully exploited” the MoU to improve its capabilities. This will likely involve the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, the importation of new equipment, and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should regular active fighting resume. Moreover, it is likely that a restart of US CENTCOM operations against Iran characterised by the targeting of Iranian infrastructure would trigger retaliation strikes targeting regional energy infrastructure, ports and international airports.

Continued Houthi attacks against Saudi-linked vessels, southern Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni IRG forces almost certainly demonstrate the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which will highly likely remain as long as the Houthi “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia is enforced. Saudi-Houthi tensions have almost certainly rapidly further deteriorated, with the Houthi targeting of Yemeni IRG forces in particular likely linked to earlier reporting regarding joint Saudi Arabia-IRG preparations for a potential ground offensive against the Houthis.

A Saudi ground offensive into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen would almost certainly result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Moreover, as reflected in the warning given by a senior Saudi official, an escalation in attacks against Saudi Arabia may be characterised by simultaneous attacks from both Houthi-controlled Yemen and Iraq, and may occur regardless of whether a ground offensive is launched against the Houthis. A renewed northern attack axis would likely force Saudi Arabia to disperse aircraft, radar, and air defence systems across multiple directions, potentially overstretching air defences and exposing gaps in coverage.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite a relative reduction in US strikes against Iran and concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

Greater control over the SoH has almost certainly been a long-term objective for Tehran. Control would not only give the regime a potential source of funds by extracting fees, but bolsters its deterrence, with Iran’s closures of the SoH having almost certainly been its most important source of leverage in the conflict. If accurate, the Iran-Oman proposal being reported as close to agreement would essentially give Tehran the ability to leverage passage through the SoH to advance its objectives in perpetuity. This has been strongly opposed throughout the conflict by the US and several regional states, with this dispute having likely been the key trigger for the collapse of the MoU. However, indications from reports on 4 August suggest that the Trump administration may now be willing to grant this concession.

The competing renewed blockades from both the US and Iran remain in place as of 4 August, with Iranian forces continuing to conduct attacks against vessels attempting to transit the SoH outside of Iran’s enforced routes on 2-3 August. Previously, US CENTCOM has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels. If further such strikes are conducted, these would highly likely be followed by Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in regional states, most likely US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain given recent target prioritisation by Iranian forces. However, Washington is likely incentivised to refrain from such strikes if the Trump administration is confirmed as having backed the Iran-Oman SoH management deal.

Military constraints deriving from the depletion of a considerable percentage of both US offensive and defensive munitions in the war thus far have likely limited US freedom of action against Iran, but regional pressure also reportedly played a critical role in convincing President Trump to allegedly cancel a planned “massive attack” against Iran. Notably, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly personally urged President Trump on 1 August to de-escalate. However, according to senior Gulf officials briefing US media, some Gulf states such as the UAE have lobbied President Trump in recent days to instead take more decisive action against Iran.

There is almost certainly significant concern among regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, that US strikes against Iranian infrastructure will trigger considerable Iranian retaliation against regional oil and gas infrastructure, as repeatedly threatened by the IRGC and Iranian officials. Growing air defence shortages will also likely degrade the ability of regional countries to sustain continued Iranian attacks, and would likely improve the penetration rates of further attacks from Iran, its proxies in Iraq, and the Houthis.

As demonstrated since the end of the 13 consecutive nights of US strikes against Iran on 24 July, with numerous subsequent attacks originating from Iraq being conducted against regional targets, the IRGC is likely to continue leveraging regional proxies to inflict sustained pressure on the Gulf states while remaining below the calculated threshold for significant escalation directly against Iran.

Moreover, the Houthi attack against Najran Airport almost certainly demonstrates the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which will highly likely remain as long as the Houthi “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia is enforced. Saudi Arabian retaliation for the Najran Airport strike would highly likely trigger further Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, with Houthi attacks most likely to target international airports, military bases, and energy infrastructure, particularly in Jazan, Asir, and Najran.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Thirteen consecutive nights of high-intensity US strikes from 11-23 July were highly unlikely to have sufficiently degraded Iranian long-range military capabilities or compel it to agree to US demands. Iran has pursued a strategy characterised by the increased use of proxy forces, enabling it to sustain regional pressure, preserve its remaining missile and drone capabilities, and reduce the exposure of launch sites inside Iran.

However, Iran has also conducted limited direct ballistic missile attacks in recent days, including missile strikes against US forces in Jordan, demonstrating that it retains the capability and willingness to escalate directly, restore deterrence, or respond to renewed US military action. These attacks have likely demonstrated Iran’s ability, whether directly or indirectly, to sustain a region-wide campaign despite increased military pressure.

Kuwait has been the Gulf country most targeted by Iran during this period of escalation, and one of the most targeted throughout the conflict. It is likely that, at this point in the conflict, Iranian officials assess that striking Kuwait entails a lower risk of retaliation compared to launching major strikes against states with larger conventional forces like Saudi Arabia or the UAE, as these have also demonstrated the willingness to strike Iran or Iran-affiliated groups. It is, however, likely that the targeting of a Chinese-owned building was unintentional and possibly the product of a targeting error. While Iran has repeatedly targeted locations hosting foreign workers in the Gulf, the recent escalation period has been limited to US military facilities.

The 29 July drone attack on US-owned vessels in port in northern Egypt also illustrates the continued reach of Iran and its allies beyond the immediate Gulf conflict zone. The Damietta strike, likely conducted by the Yemeni Houthis, was likely aimed at demonstrating to regional powers Iran’s ability to inflict economic damage and disrupt commercial operations beyond the immediate vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz. Notably, the strikes occurred as Saudi Arabia is seeking to redirect oil shipments from the BaM to the Suez Canal.

The announcement of the MMDA with the participation of 14 states, including several regional powers, was highly likely prompted by the intensification of Houthi activity and the strikes on Damietta Port, which expanded the regional scope of the conflict. However, it also reflects the overall interest of Gulf States in maintaining the region’s international waterways and preventing Iran and Iran-backed groups from establishing effective control over them.

Reports of Houthi operations alongside Iraqi Iran-aligned groups would, if confirmed, highly likely indicate increased coordination between members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”, as well as growing Iranian investment in Iraq as a staging ground for operations targeting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Iraq’s importance for Tehran has almost certainly increased since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and joint operations rooms between Iran-aligned Iraqi militias and the Houthis have existed since at least 2024, with the groups previously carrying out joint attacks against Israel.

Saudi Arabia’s position in Yemen has likely improved following the January 2026 offensive that led to the collapse of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council, and the capture of Aden by the Saudi-backed government forces. However, carrying out a military offensive against the Houthis would almost certainly expose several Saudi cities, as well as critical energy infrastructure, to Houthi targeting.

The collapse of the pause in strikes almost certainly reflects the ongoing fragility of the situation in the region, with the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) having de facto broken down over currently irreconcilable differences between the US and Iranian positions, with control over the Strait of Hormuz remaining the main obstacle to a viable agreement.

It is likely that the competing blockades, as well as the growing involvement of the Houthis and Iraqi militias in the conflict, are increasing the risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the region. A further geographical expansion of Iranian attacks, or a sustained increase in strikes against Saudi territory, is likely to prompt additional Saudi or US-Saudi strikes against Iran-backed forces in Iraq and/or Yemen. Direct Gulf-state strikes on Iranian territory remain unlikely. However, there is a realistic possibility that an attack causing substantial casualties or damage to critical infrastructure would trigger retaliation, although such action would carry a significant risk of accelerating region-wide escalation. Iran has highly likely factored this risk into its targeting decisions, with its acknowledged strikes since 28 July primarily directed against US military facilities hosted by regional states rather than those states’ own military or civilian infrastructure.

Both the US and Gulf States’ freedom of action is likely to be constrained by the expenditure of munitions, including missile interceptors, throughout the war. Growing air defence shortages will likely degrade Gulf States’ ability to sustain continued Iranian attacks and will likely improve the penetration rates of attacks from Iranian proxy groups in Iraq and Yemen. Iranian forces are likely to continue leveraging regional proxies to inflict sustained pressure on the Gulf states while remaining below the threshold for significant escalation.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite the pause in US strikes against Iran and concurrent pause in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown with minimal indicators and warnings. Critically, it is highly likely that the key trigger for the breakdown of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), continued Iranian attempts to exert long-term control of the SoH, remains extant.

The competing renewed blockades from both the US and Iran officially remain in place. As long as the competing blockades are maintained, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. Any US kinetic activity against Iran-linked vessels and/or a direct confirmed Iranian attack against a vessel transiting the SoH likely risks a rapid return to a cycle of US strikes against Iran and Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in the Gulf states and Jordan.

The US pause in strikes has likely been conditioned first by an assessment that the intensity of US strikes being conducted had reached the limit of their effectiveness. For context, the US struck approximately 1,000 targets during the recent 13 consecutive nights of bombing, primarily against assets in southern Iran around the SoH (although they did notably likely expand in geographic scope near their conclusion), compared to 13,000 targets in the war’s initial phase until 8 April. According to unspecified sources briefing US media, the CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper recommended to President Trump to cease operations around the SoH due to an exhaustion of possible designated bombing targets.

Second, the expenditure of US munitions through the war, particularly air defence interceptors, has been so great that this is likely acting as a constraining factor on US freedom of action. Open source estimates indicate that the US used around a third of its total pre-war stockpile of precision munitions in the war against Iran, up to 80 per cent of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) air defence interceptors and 61 per cent of Patriot interceptors. Also according to unspecified sources briefing US media, the US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Dan Caine, has privately warned that a shortage of air defence interceptors could lower the ability to counter Iranian strikes against US forces and allies in-region. However, Adm. Cooper has reportedly countered that escalated US strikes would degrade Iranian capabilities sufficiently to counterbalance the limited stocks of air defence interceptors.

Iranian forces are almost certain to exploit a US cessation of strikes to improve its offensive and defensive positions, particularly around the SoH currently. This will likely involve the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, and the restoration of damaged systems such as coastal radars. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should active fighting resume.

The IRGC is likely to exploit the use of regional proxies, particularly Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq, to continue low-level attacks against regional states. The attack drones intercepted over Jordan on 27 July, for example, were likely launched from Iraq. Following the implementation of a ceasefire on 8 April, several attacks were conducted in the following weeks which were attributed to Iranian proxy forces in Iraq. These forces likely offer Tehran the capability to sustain kinetic pressure while maintaining plausible deniability and remaining sub-threshold for significant escalation.

Alternatively, the Houthis in Yemen are almost certainly not under the same level of control by the IRGC as other regional Iran-backed groups, and are overall likely to continue pursuing objectives against Saudi Arabia autonomously from the broader US-Iran conflict. Houthi strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure will highly likely follow any further Saudi strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen conducted in retaliation for Houthi attacks against Saudi-flagged vessels. However, the compounding Houthi threat to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, alongside continued disruption in the SoH, highly likely continues to increase Tehran’s leverage through the simultaneous disruption of two critical maritime chokepoints.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: