Overall, the ‘ceasefire’ has almost certainly come closer to collapse in the past week than at any point since its implementation on 8 April. Tehran has expanded its stated criteria for renewed attacks against Israel in response to continued conflict in Lebanon, with expanded IDF operations in southern Lebanon likely to be exploited by Iran to undermine the ceasefire. In addition, escalation cycles linked to US-Iran confrontation in the maritime domain have intensified to their highest level yet, reflected in the scale of Iranian retaliatory strikes targeting Kuwait and Bahrain, and the resumption of strikes on Jordan, which had not been attacked since the 8 April ceasefire.

The exchange of strikes between the US and Iran following the loss of an Apache helicopter is almost certainly the most significant resulting from confrontation in the maritime domain since 8 April. As long as the competing blockades are maintained, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the Strait of Hormuz, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement. In addition to endangering the broader negotiation process, the cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against regional countries, first with the UAE and more recently against Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE has notably not been attacked since mid-May, which is likely related to the increased diplomatic engagement between the UAE and Iran.

Since 3 June, Iranian retaliatory attacks have likely shifted from sporadic post-ceasefire engagements to larger and more complex attacks. The targeting of Kuwait International Airport on 3 June was a notable escalation in the target profile of Iranian strikes since 8 April. This pattern has likely continued, evidenced by the 10-11 June attacks, whereby Kuwait International Airport was attacked again, and Iranian strikes expanded to Jordan.

Should an MOU be imminently reached, which President Trump claims could be as soon as this weekend, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved. Moreover, reported provisions within the MOU, such as the US blockade being lifted in proportion to the restoration of commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, provide multiple triggers for the potential MOU to break down. Finally, if the MOU only delays detailed nuclear talks for another 60 days, the main disputes during the pre-28 February negotiations would likely continue to complicate talks.

If an MOU/framework agreement is not agreed, there is a realistic possibility of Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in Jordan and the Gulf States further escalating as a result of continued US and/or Israeli strikes on Iran. On 10 June, President Trump stated in an interview that he is considering ordering new strikes targeting Iran’s power plants and bridges if Tehran does not sign an agreement, and also threatened the seizure of Kharg Island on 11 June. Previous similar threats issued by President Trump led to IRGC-affiliated media publishing lists of desalination and power plants across the Gulf States as potential targets for retaliation. Furthermore, Iran’s chief negotiator and parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, threatened that the Israeli strikes against Iran, in addition to the ongoing US naval blockade, have made US bases and assets in the region “legitimate targets”. The IRGC-affiliated media outlet, Fars, citing a senior Iranian official, directly reported that if Iranian energy infrastructure is attacked again, Iran will carry out analogous attacks against oil and gas facilities in the region.

The MOU reportedly involves the Strait of Hormuz being reopened immediately without tolls, with a return to pre-war shipping volumes within 30 days. Iranian state-owned media reported on 12 June that the MOU will not make a commitment regarding any transfer of management of the strait. While softening the language from “tolls”, regime and IRGC-linked media have repeatedly indicated that payments could still be imposed for transit under the guise of “environmental protection” or “service charges”. These actions likely indicate that Tehran is seeking to preserve leverage over the strategic chokepoint while gradually normalising a greater long-term role in its administration; a development unlikely to be accepted by the US and the international community, as they directly challenge maritime law and the principles of freedom of navigation.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Tehran had previously warned that strikes in Beirut “could derail the diplomatic track” and result in retaliation, with Iranian officials consistently insisting that the wider ceasefire extends to Lebanon. The IDF has committed significant resources to a ground offensive in Lebanon and has continued to conduct high-intensity airstrikes in southern Lebanon. Sustained IDF offensives in Lebanon will almost certainly be leveraged by Iran to undermine ongoing diplomatic efforts and could provoke further escalation cycles between Iran and Israel. There is a realistic possibility that Iran-Israel exchanges will result in a collapse of the wider US-Iran ceasefire.

High-intensity IDF operations in southern Lebanon have continued since the 7–8 April ceasefire and the separate unilateral ceasefire with the Lebanese government. These operations likely remained below Iran’s threshold for direct escalation, with Tehran likely seeking to preserve capability for a major escalation. Several IDF strikes in Beirut also were not met with a direct Iranian response. However, Iran’s recent escalation highly likely indicates that IDF strikes in Beirut are a redline that Iran is willing to enforce. Moreover, the IRGC’s threat of retaliation for IDF operations in southern Lebanon may indicate that Tehran’s threshold has been reduced, broadening the range of Israeli actions that may trigger a direct Iranian response.    

Israeli operations have continued in southern Lebanon, with an airstrike being conducted against the southern Lebanese city of Tyre on 9 June, following the issuance of an Israeli evacuation order for the entire city. There is a realistic possibility of this triggering further Iranian strikes against Israel, which could lead to further exchanges of tit-for-tat strikes that are likely to endanger the broader ceasefire.

Hezbollah have historically served as a key component of Iranian deterrence in the region, and its preservation is highly likely a strategic priority for Tehran. However, the regime’s focus on Lebanon and claimed suspension of negotiations also followed President Trump’s request for several amendments to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) being negotiated by the US and Iran.

It is highly likely that the Iranian regime, which is increasingly under the control of hardline IRGC commanders, calculates that it is willing to accept the risk of a return to full-scale conflict or a continuation of the current status quo rather than be perceived as conceding to US demands. By increasingly linking the status of the ceasefire to Lebanon, the regime likely also seeks to divert attention from and gain leverage over the two principal points of contention in negotiations: control of the Strait of Hormuz and the nuclear file.

Iran’s chief negotiator and parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, threatened that the Israeli strikes against Iran, in addition to the ongoing US naval blockade, have made US bases and assets in the region “legitimate targets”. Moreover, the IRGC-affiliated media outlet, Fars, citing a senior Iranian official, reported that if Iranian energy infrastructure is attacked again, Iran will carry out attacks against US oil and gas facilities in the region. There is a realistic possibility that further escalation between Iran and Israel will not be contained to a direct exchange between Iran and Israel, but could expand to renewed strikes targeting the Gulf States.

The involvement of the Yemen-based Houthis was almost certainly limited and primarily performative, but it highly likely serves as a key source of deterrence, given the militant group’s capacity to disrupt maritime traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and ability to target regional US allies from an additional axis. The Houthis’ limited involvement will likely increase pressure on Washington from its Gulf allies.

As long as the competing blockades are maintained, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the Strait of Hormuz, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. In addition to endangering the broader negotiation process, the cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against the Gulf States, first with the UAE and more recently against Kuwait and Bahrain.

The 3 June attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain following maritime confrontation were the largest-scale Iranian attack since the implementation of the 8 April ceasefire, and the targeting of Kuwait International Airport was a notable escalation in the target profile of the sporadic Iranian strikes conducted since 8 April. The attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain overnight 5-6 June involved the launching of at least ten ballistic missiles, likely indicating a continuation of this escalated scale of strike packages against the Gulf States in response to US-Iran confrontation in the maritime domain which leads to strikes against Iran.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

On 7 June, nearly 2.5 million Armenians will vote to elect the 9^th convocation of the National Assembly. The unicameral legislature has 101 members, elected for five-year terms across 13 electoral districts under a proportional representation system based on party lists. Seats are distributed proportionally among political forces that pass the electoral threshold: 4 per cent for parties, 8 per cent for alliances of up to three parties, and 10 per cent for alliances of more than three parties.

If a party wins the most votes but secures less than 54 per cent of seats, it receives additional seats to ensure a 54 per cent majority. Conversely, if a party wins more than two-thirds of seats, extra seats are allocated to opposition parties to limit the winning party’s share to a maximum of two-thirds. Four seats are reserved for representatives of national minorities. If no government is formed within six days of the publication of preliminary results, a second round must be held on the 28^th day between the two parties that received the most votes.

This election will be the first regular national election since 2017 and follows two snap elections triggered by the constitutional crises in 2018 and 2021. It is also the first election after Azerbaijan’s military takeover of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh in late 2023, after which the ethnic Armenian population fled to Armenia.

The incumbent prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, is expected to lead the governing Civil Contract party into the election for his third consecutive term. Pashinyan rose to power following Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution, when mass anti-corruption and anti-establishment protests forced the resignation of long-serving leader Serzh Sargsyan and brought Pashinyan to office on a reformist, democratic mandate. While Civil Contract’s failure to secure a majority in the March 2025 municipal elections in Gyumri raised fears over the party’s declining popularity, the party still dominates the polling, with the latest survey conducted by Breavis placing its support at 65 per cent. The opposition remains highly fragmented, with most parties polling between 2 and 12 per cent and largely comprising blocs seeking to revive ties with Russia.

Leading the opposition polling is Samvel Karapetyan of the Strong Armenia party on 12 per cent, a pro-Russian opposition bloc that emerged in late 2025. However, Karapetyan’s additional Russian and Cypriot citizenships mean that his legal eligibility to run in the election is disputed. The traditional opposition is led by former president Robert Kocharyan, who is associated with the Armenia Alliance, the main opposition bloc in parliament, and is polling at around 6 per cent. Kocharyan is broadly mistrusted by the public due to his association with the pre-Velvet Revolution political establishment. Polling between 2 and 4 per cent are Prosperous Armenia led by Gagik Tsarukyan, Mother Armenia led by Andranik Tevanyan, and the Democracy, Law, Discipline (DOK) Party led by Vardan Ghukasyan.

ASSESSMENT

The election is being framed as a referendum on relations with Azerbaijan and Russia. In August 2025, Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a joint declaration on the agreed text of a peace agreement, committing each side to progressing towards a formal signing and ratification. While the signing of the peace agreement depends on the adoption of a new constitution, which will require a referendum following the election, support for Pashinyan is largely centred around this issue. Pashinyan’s ousting would likely result in the end of the current peace deal with Azerbaijan.

The peace agreement would end a conflict that has been ongoing since 1988, when Armenian forces gained control of Nagorno-Karabakh during the collapse of the Soviet Union. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a rapid military operation in the territory, forcing the capitulation of Armenian forces and the fleeing of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians to Armenia. For this reason, the peace agreement is deeply divisive in Armenia, with public opinion split: 44 per cent in support and 41 per cent opposed. Supporters of the peace agreement argue that Armenia should stop tying its security to claims to Nagorno-Karabakh and open up economic opportunities with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Those who oppose perceive the government’s attempt to engage in a peace deal with Azerbaijan as legitimising Azerbaijan’s victory, which is largely considered a national humiliation for Armenians, and as an abandonment of Karabakh Armenians.

The Armenian Apostolic Church has engaged in heavy criticism of Pashinyan over his handling of Azerbaijan. Senior clergy and church-linked figures have been associated with anti-government protest activity, and in June 2025, Armenian authorities claimed they had foiled a coup plot involving Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan. This has provided a rationale for a crackdown on the church, with authorities arresting several clerics in the lead-up to the election. Approximately 95 per cent of Armenia’s population identifies with the Armenian Apostolic Church, and the church’s influence will almost certainly shape how the public votes, particularly among conservative, nationalist, and rural constituencies.

A Pashinyan re-election would likely move the formerly Moscow-aligned Armenia closer to the EU, which would pose a strategic threat to Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus. Armenia has historically been one of Russia’s key security and economic footholds in the region. However, Armenia suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a Russian-led regional security bloc, in February 2024, following the Nagorno-Karabakh war, with Armenia accusing the CSTO of failing to defend its territorial integrity. In March 2025, Armenia’s parliament adopted a law to launch the process of joining the EU. A shift toward the EU would not only erode Russia’s direct influence in Armenia but would also establish a regional precedent that could be adopted by Georgia, which would significantly erode Russian influence in the Caucasus.

Russia has engaged in a disinformation campaign to attempt to sway the election in favour of a pro-Russian candidate. This campaign has attempted to appeal to Armenian nationalists opposed to the peace deal with Azerbaijan, engaging in a smear campaign to portray Pashinyan as an anti-Armenian Western puppet. Additional campaigns have accused Pashinyan and other officials of involvement in “child sex trafficking”. They have also alleged that Pashinyan owns a multi-million-euro property in France and real estate in the UAE, and that he has imported radioactive waste from France for burial in Armenia.

Further reports have claimed that plans are underway to transport tens of thousands of Russian-Armenians to influence the vote. Russian authorities have also imposed restrictions on Armenian imports, including vegetables and wine, exploiting Russia’s position as Armenia’s largest market for agricultural produce, while threatening to suspend their agreement on preferential supplies of gas and petroleum products. Part of Russia’s influence operations has been to portray the EU as interfering in the Armenian election, laying the groundwork for claims of election manipulation should Pashinyan win. While 71 per cent of participants in a 5-11 May 2026 International Republican Institute (IRI) survey believe the elections will be free and fair, this approach could almost certainly trigger protests from nationalist groups in the aftermath of the publication of the election results.

The 7 June election is broadly perceived as a contest over Armenia’s geopolitical orientation, making it a highly divisive vote. For many voters, the election amounts to a referendum on Pashinyan’s pro-Western agenda and pursuit of peace with Azerbaijan, versus more nationalist, Russia-aligned alternatives. This has almost certainly deepened political polarisation. Although recent polling broadly favours Pashinyan and indicates Civil Contract are highly likely to sweep the election, earlier surveys indicated a narrower gap between Civil Contract and pro-Russian opposition parties.

A narrow victory for Civil Contract would highly likely give opposition parties, church-linked critics, and nationalist actors greater scope to claim that the election had been distorted by external influence, media imbalance, vote buying, intimidation, or counting irregularities. Russian messaging portraying Pashinyan as a Western proxy would highly likely reinforce this narrative and provide the opposition with a unifying theme around which to mobilise. In this scenario, protests would likely occur in Yerevan, concentrating around the Central Electoral Commission, Republic Square, parliament, government buildings, and major road junctions. Heavy-handed policing, arrests of opposition figures, or forceful attempts to clear protest sites would almost certainly increase the risk of clashes.

If the latest polling is accurate and Civil Contract wins by a wide margin, protests would be far less likely to gain significant traction, with opposition parties and aligned groups likely to struggle to convince non-aligned voters that the result had been swung by external influence or manipulation. Pashinyan would likely present a decisive victory as a strong mandate for his peace agenda, including normalisation with Azerbaijan, deeper EU integration, and reduced dependence on Russia. A decisive Civil Contract victory would also strengthen Pashinyan’s political mandate to pursue constitutional reform, which he has framed as necessary to facilitate a full peace agreement with Azerbaijan.

The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes across the region, remains high, with indirect negotiations on an MOU having faltered. Furthermore, the continuing competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz by the US and Iran continue to lead to hostile incidents in the maritime domain, which have repeatedly escalated into broader ‘tit-for-tat’ strikes impacting the Gulf States.

It remains unconfirmed whether indirect US-Iran negotiations over the MOU are continuing following the announced suspension of negotiations by IRGC-affiliated media due to Lebanon, and subsequent claims by President Trump of a fresh truce between Israel and Hezbollah. Previously, Tehran had warned that strikes in Beirut “could derail the diplomatic track”, with Iranian officials consistently insisting that the broader ceasefire includes Lebanon. Continued conflict in Lebanon, particularly IDF strikes against Beirut, almost certainly risks jeopardising the wider US-Iran ceasefire.

However, the regime’s reported decision to suspend negotiations also followed President Trump’s request for several amendments to the MOU. It is highly likely that the regime in Tehran, which is almost certainly increasingly under the control of hardline IRGC commanders such as Major General Ahmad Vahidi, calculates that it is willing to accept the risk of a return to full-scale conflict or a continuation of the current status quo rather than be perceived as conceding to US demands.

A collapse in MOU negotiations would not necessarily mean a return to full-scale conflict. Instead, the US and Iran could maintain their competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz with the aim of ultimately pressuring the opposing party to make concessions. Following the announced suspension of talks by IRGC-affiliated media, President Trump told US media that “going silent would be very good, and that could be for a long time”, adding that this would not mean a return to full-scale strikes, but the US blockade would be maintained.

As long as the competing blockades are maintained, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the Strait of Hormuz, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. In addition to endangering the broader negotiation process, the cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against the Gulf States, first with the UAE and more recently against Kuwait, and are likely to continue doing so while competing blockades are in place.  

Should a framework agreement/MOU be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved. Furthermore, reported provisions within the MOU, such as the US blockade being lifted in proportion to the restoration of commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, provide multiple triggers for the potential MOU to break down. Finally, if the MOU only delays detailed nuclear talks for another 60 days, the main disputes that blocked the pre-28 February negotiations would likely remain unresolved and resurface later.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. This is further reinforced by the 26 May threats issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader against regional countries which host US military bases. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes across the region, remains high despite the reported progress on a potentially imminent MOU. Moreover, the continuing competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz by the US and Iran continue to lead to hostile incidents in the maritime domain, which has repeatedly escalated into broader ‘tit-for-tat’ strikes which have impacted the Gulf States.

Outside of renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran triggering a return to full-scale conflict, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. This was most recently demonstrated by the 24-26 May and 27-28 May exchanges, both of which resulted in United States strikes against Bandar Abbas.

Unlike the previous US strikes against Bandar Abbas, the 24-26 May escalation cycle extended over a period of days with multiple rounds of attack and retaliation. In addition to endangering the broader negotiation process, the cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against the Gulf States, first with the UAE and more recently against Kuwait, and are likely to continue doing so while competing blockades are in place.  

Should a framework agreement/MOU be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved. Moreover, reported provisions within the MOU, such as the US blockade being lifted in proportion to the restoration of commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, provide multiple triggers for the potential MOU to break down. Finally, if the MOU only delays detailed nuclear talks for another 60 days, the main disputes that blocked the pre-28 February negotiations would likely remain unresolved and resurface later.

Iranian adherence to any interim framework is likely to be undermined by the IRGC, which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. This is further reinforced by the 26 May threats issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader against regional countries which host US military bases. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

On 1 June, general elections are set to take place in Ethiopia, the seventh held under the post-1995 constitutional order. Voters will elect 547 members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR), the lower house of Ethiopia’s parliament, for five-year terms. Members are elected in single-member constituencies through a first-past-the-post system. Voters do not directly elect the prime minister. Instead, the House of Peoples’ Representatives selects the prime minister, meaning the party or coalition that secures a parliamentary majority is expected to form the government. Council elections, electing 2,916 regional councillors, will also be held across 12 regions, as well as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, with those councils subsequently electing representatives to the House of Federation, Ethiopia’s upper house.

Incumbent Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will lead the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) into the election, following its dominant victory in 2021, which resulted in the party securing 457 of the 547 seats in parliament. The National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), a right-wing Amhara ethnic nationalist party led by Belete Molla, is the most visible opposition party, but it currently holds only five parliamentary seats. Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA), a liberal party led by Berhanu Nega, holds just four seats. Two Oromo nationalist parties, the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), led by Merera Gudina and Dawud Ibsa Ayana, respectively, boycotted the 2021 election. The OFC is fielding candidates in the 2026 election to preserve its legal registration, while the OLF has signalled readiness to contest the election.

Amid widespread instability due to ongoing civil wars in Amhara and Oromia, as well as heightened tensions in Tigray, election officials are implementing a three-tier security classification system nationwide. Red areas will be designated unfit for voting, yellow areas require mitigation, monitoring, or additional security measures, and green areas are stable enough for normal electoral operations. In previous elections, seats were left vacant in constituencies where voting could not take place, with polls postponed or cancelled in some areas because of insecurity, logistical constraints, or political disputes.

ASSESSMENT

While Prime Minister Ahmed has declared this is the “best” election to date, with 47 registered parties and nearly 11,000 candidates, several challenges remain. The legitimacy of the upcoming election has already been called into question, with tensions in multiple major regions, including Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray, where limited participation is likely to result in claims of election manipulation. This is exacerbated by the fact that most parties participating in the election broadly align with the PP, allowing the government to present the election as competitive without risking any real competition. Opposition parties are expected to remain largely sidelined, as they were in 2021, when the PP won 96.8 per cent of parliamentary seats. It is highly likely that PP will again secure an overwhelming victory. 

Furthermore, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) faces significant legitimacy challenges. In 2021, NEBE struggled to register internally displaced persons, a problem that is highly likely to continue in 2026, given Ethiopia’s continued displacement crisis and the absence of a recent census. Although the African Union (AU) assessed the 2021 election as broadly “peaceful” and “orderly”, the International Republican Institute/National Democratic Institute (IRI/NDI) observer mission concluded that the process “fell short of key standards concerning human and civil liberties, electoral campaigning, adequate security for all parties, and overall peace and security.” 

These shortcomings are likely to negatively influence perceptions of NEBE’s neutrality and capacity in the upcoming election. This is particularly since many areas are excluded from voting, and displacement and administrative gaps are likely to result in inaccurate voter rolls, under-registration, and contested results. As a result, even if NEBE can administer polling in secure areas, the election is likely to face renewed questions over inclusivity, competitiveness and national legitimacy.

Amhara

The designation of some areas in Amhara as “red”, which means unfit to vote, almost certainly threatens to exacerbate regional tensions. While Amhara and Oromia are two of Ethiopia’s most populous regions, the ongoing internal armed conflicts in both regions render accurate polling near impossible. In Amhara, conflict has been ongoing since the federal government’s 2023 decision to dismantle regional special forces. At least 12,000 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced. The fragmented Fano armed movement controls over 80 per cent of rural territory, with the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) largely restricted to major towns and highways. In March 2026, Fano issued a warning that any entity assisting the electoral process will be considered “enemies of the Amhara people equal to the government”. Voting will almost certainly be restricted to urban areas under government control, and many citizens are unlikely to vote due to the risk of polling stations or voters being targeted by Fano. 

Oromia

The situation is similar in Oromia, where the OLA has fought government forces since 2018/2019, with at least 5,000 people killed. The insurgency has seen civilian killings, mass kidnappings, and numerous transport strikes with enforced road closures. On 23 March, OLF-OLA issued a statement dismissing the election as a “performance staged for foreign consumption” and claiming that over 70 per cent of the country is inaccessible for voting.

The OFC and, despite its criticism of the election, OLF’s potential participation almost certainly gives the 2026 election more formal pluralism than a complete boycott would, with the government able to present the presence of Oromo nationalist parties as evidence of inclusion. However, OFC leader Gudina has argued that opposition parties cannot safely move, campaign, list candidates, organise observers, or mobilise supporters outside Addis Ababa. As with Amhara, the restrictions on polling in Oromia are highly likely to deepen the grievances of excluded populations. Even so, OFC and OLF participation highly likely lowers the risk of major electoral violence in Oromia, with armed groups unlikely to target polling infrastructure.

Tigray

During the general elections, the post-war Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) was expected to give way to a regular elected regional council. In May 2025, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was deregistered by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), meaning Tigray’s dominant political force is effectively unable to contest the 2026 elections. Additionally, the House of Federation has ruled that elections for the HPR will be held in five contested constituencies, but without corresponding elections for Tigray regional council seats under Tigray’s administration. This means that the vote has been perceived as politically illegitimate, with the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) stating that “territorial integrity is non-negotiable”.

Tensions have escalated over the past year, with clashes between the Tigray Defence Force (TDF) and the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) in early 2026. On 8 April 2026, the government unilaterally extended the mandate of the TIA, raising doubts over whether Tigray would transition from the interim administration to an elected regional council and regular constitutional governance through the 1 June electoral process. On 5 May, in response to the mandate extension, the TPLF replaced the government-backed leader, Tadesse Werede, with Debretsion Gebremichael, who had been Tigray’s leader during the 2020-2022 conflict. This was part of a reinstatement of the Tigray Government Assembly (parliament), which has displaced the TIA as the governing framework and revived the pre-war regional government structure. Tadesse warned that such a move would annul the 2022 Pretoria agreement, which ended the civil war which killed over 100,000 and displaced nearly three million.

The restoration of the pre-war parliament almost certainly increases the risk of a renewed confrontation in Tigray, particularly if either side attempts to militarily enforce its claimed authority. The 2020 conflict began after the TPLF rejected the government’s decision to postpone national elections and held its own regional election in Tigray, which the government declared illegal. The government’s handling of the elections in Tigray has been highly likely perceived as an attempt to retain control over the region and prevent its transition to self-governance. By declaring an end to the interim administration, the TPLF are almost certainly threatening the legal-political basis of the post-Pretoria Agreement transition. The election will highly likely reflect the ongoing fracture between the government and Tigray’s leadership and could serve as a flashpoint for either side to attempt to exert its control over the region, which almost certainly risks reigniting the conflict.

Because of the restricted participation in the conflict regions, limited civil unrest is highly likely. Demonstrations have taken place in Addis Ababa over tensions in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray in recent years. The regions’ partial exclusion from the upcoming elections, combined with the escalating dispute over Tigray, almost certainly raises the risk of demonstrations during the election. Addis Ababa hosts an estimated 500,000 to one million Tigrayans, with the federal government perceived to be sidelining Tigrayan self-determination in favour of continuing the TIA led by the government-backed Tadesse.

However, any unauthorised pro-opposition rallies are highly likely to see a severe crackdown, while authorities will likely allow some smaller, less overtly anti-government demonstrations to take place under heavy monitoring. For example, in February 2025, Tigrayans living in Addis Ababa held a peaceful anti-war rally, but were forced to submit slogans to the Addis Ababa Administration for approval. Other planned pro-Tigray rallies in November 2024 were banned by the government, with the organisers placed under arrest. Should demonstrations proceed without permission, security forces are likely to respond forcefully, using tear gas and mass arrests to deter further demonstrations, imposing internet outages to disrupt mobilisation, and potentially using live ammunition if protests escalate and threaten key government sites or security forces.

On 31 May, up to 41 million Colombians will be eligible to vote in the country’s presidential elections, which will decide the successor to incumbent President Gustavo Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking immediate re-election. If no candidate secures 50 per cent of the vote on 31 May, a run-off between the two candidates that secured the most votes will be held on 21 June.

With Petro ineligible, polls have identified three candidates who have a realistic chance of winning. Senator Iván Cepeda Castro, the candidate of the Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact, PH), currently leads the polls. PH is a left-wing alliance formed in 2025 by Petro, consisting of four parties: Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union), Polo Democrático Alternativo (Alternative Democratic Pole), the Partido Comunista Colombiano (Colombian Communist Party), and Humane Colombia (Humane Colombia). Cepeda has built a strong and diverse base and has intensified efforts to reach out to indigenous rights groups in regions such as Cauca.

Cepeda is widely expected to reach the second round. Consequently, two right-wing candidates are likely competing for the second runoff spot. Abelardo de la Espriella, of the Movimiento de Salvación Nacional (National Salvation Movement, MSN), has emerged as a populist right-wing figure with a platform and rhetoric similar to Latin American leaders like El Salvador’s Bukele or Argentina’s Milei, rooted in calls to dismantle the “establishment”, slash regulation, and crack down on organised crime. Senator Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático (Democratic Centre, CD) is a more centrist right-wing candidate, often categorised under the term “Uribismo”, after the policies of former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who also endorses more hardline security policies.

The presidential elections will take place only months after the latest parliamentary contest, in March. This vote was marked by very low turnout (just over 50 per cent) and returned a fragmented chamber. The parties of the three leading candidates all achieved positive results: PH increased its seat share by five, with both CD and MSN increasing their numbers.

The campaign has been dominated by security concerns amid a major increase in militant violence across Colombia. In the past year, there have been several high-profile assassinations of political candidates, most notably the June 2025 killing of Miguel Uribe Turbay, one of the early competitors to become CD’s presidential candidate, and multiple cases of intimidation. In April 2026, Valencia claimed that an armed group had planned an assassination attempt targeting her, while President Petro alleged the existence of a plot to assassinate Cepeda.

In April and May, there have been several cases of journalists and party activists being killed, with the murders being linked to organised crime and armed groups. On 16 May, gunmen assassinated two members of de la Esprella’s campaign staff in Cubarral, Meta Department, while a member of Valencia’s electoral staff had his armoured vehicle fired upon, also in Cubarral. On 22 May, gunmen opened fire on a PH office in Flandes, Tolima Department.

ASSESSMENT

The election is widely seen as a referendum on President Petro’s flagship Paz Total or “Total Peace” policy. Petro, a former guerrilla of the leftist M-19 group, has prioritised dialogue and negotiated settlements with Colombia’s armed groups over coercion or expanded security operations under the policy. Cepeda, who was one of the principal architects of Total Peace and has served as one of Petro’s main negotiators, advocates for the continuation of the policy, despite growing scepticism. Conversely, both leading right-wing candidates have promised to abandon Total Peace and adopt more aggressive measures to combat organised crime and militancy, likely partially inspired by El Salvador’s Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) approach, which has spread throughout Latin America over the last three years.

Total Peace was implemented in 2022 and has achieved some limited successes. The policy has resulted in the creation of formal negotiation channels with several armed groups, temporary ceasefires, and the demobilisation of some smaller factions. However, it has almost certainly failed to deliver a sustained reduction in violence, curb illicit economies or dismantle the primary armed groups, with groups like the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN), the FARC dissident group Estado Mayor Central (Central General Staff, EMC), and the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan, AGC) still highly active across multiple regions of the country. Critics have argued that armed groups, many of which have evolved from political movements into profit-driven criminal networks, have simply exploited Total Peace and its associated ceasefires to regroup, consolidate territorial control, expand recruitment and increase extortion and other illicit revenue streams.

According to NGO Ideas para la Paz, armed groups now have approximately 27,000 fighters (up from an estimated 15,000 in 2022). Armed groups are firmly embedded within local populations, have increasingly been able to operate freely in their respective areas of influence, and have expanded territories under their control, resulting in violent competition over strategically valuable areas for narcotics production, smuggling or other illicit enterprises, such as illegal mining. Currently, the only major group the government is in negotiations with is the AGC, a violent drug cartel that has doubled its territory under Petro and increased its ranks by almost 150 per cent.

Armed groups have also emulated global trends by increasingly adopting advanced weapon systems to carry out attacks, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which they have used to drop explosives on police and military positions, often posing a direct threat to civilians. In 2025, the Ministry of Defence recorded 333 drone attacks, up from 61 the year prior.

Total Peace came under increased scrutiny in 2025, in response to an escalation of the Colombian internal conflict. Several armed groups conducted high-profile “offensives” across the country or increased attacks, primarily to expand territorial control and expand illicit economies, but also likely to challenge state authority and strengthen their bargaining position ahead of the presidential election. This has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians and likely the worst humanitarian situation in over a decade, with Colombia also currently hosting as many as 3.5 million Venezuelan refugees. Attacks on security forces and critical transport routes have increased, as has disruption to business operations in conflict-affected departments such as Catatumbo, Cauca, Valle del Cauca and parts of Antioquia. By some estimates, as many as ten million people now live under the influence of armed groups.

In January 2025, the ELN launched an offensive against FARC-dissident groups in the Catatumbo region, a key border area with Venezuela, which led to more than 100 deaths and the displacement of 50,000 people. In December, the ELN launched another series of attacks, which also affected the city of Cali, Colombia’s third-largest city and a major economic and transport hub, in the Valle del Cauca department.  

The EMC also escalated attacks in 2025 and has continued to do so in 2026. EMC’s first escalation cycle was in early 2025; however, the most significant shift was observed in June 2025, when the militant group launched a wave of coordinated attacks across the Cauca and Valle del Cauca departments, demonstrating a more organised capacity and intent to disrupt security forces, transport routes and urban centres.

Most militant attacks have concentrated on state security forces; there has been a major increase in civilian casualties. Reporting from the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) indicates that there were 965 people injured or killed by explosives, most being civilians. The report also documented 282 cases of violence against health workers related to ​the armed conflict, and 308 new disappearances. While an increased civilian casualty toll is likely partly attributable to the indiscriminate nature of explosive devices, several high-profile attacks indicate that civilians have likely been deliberately targeted or that armed groups are increasingly willing to accept civilian casualties to achieve their objectives.

The most notable of these incidents was the 25 April 2026 detonation of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), near the town of Cajibio, in the department of Cauca in southwest Colombia. The explosion, which occurred approximately one month ahead of the election, killed at least 21 people and injured dozens, and resulted in major transport disruption on one of Colombia’s most important transit corridors. Reports indicate that the bomb was detonated after assailants stopped traffic by blocking the road with a bus and another vehicle, actions that likely indicate the intent to maximise civilian casualties. The attack, which was the most brutal against civilians in decades, coincided with a series of coordinated attacks in the Valle del Cauca and Cauca departments, that was immediately attributed to the EMC.  

Militant offensives and an escalation in attacks have significantly undermined Total Peace and increasingly forced the Petro administration to adopt a more coercive approach, characterised by increased military deployments, enhanced security measures, increased operations aimed at killing or capturing militant senior leadership, and closer security cooperation with international partners, particularly the US, despite the Washington’s sustained criticism of Petro and its own controversial operations against narcotics smuggling just outside of Colombian territorial waters.

Petro’s gradual shift has almost certainly influenced the actions of militant groups. Under increased pressure and facing the threat of expanded military operations and foreign involvement, attacks like the April VBIED and other high-profile attacks are likely aimed at undermining state control and influencing the future course of action of not just the current government, but also other presidential candidates. The strategic message being sent is that government operations attempting to contain the influence of armed groups or disrupt their operations will be met with significant and costly armed resistance.

With internal security assessments almost certainly determining there is a credible risk of increased militancy up to and during the election, the Colombian government has implemented heightened security measures. Measures include the planned closure of all borders with Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Venezuela between 30 May and 1 June. More than 248,000 uniformed personnel, roughly equally provided by the police and military, will be stationed at polling stations as part of “Project Democracy”. States more exposed to armed conflict, such as Cauca, will have a higher volume of personnel deployed.

The EMC and the ELN have announced unilateral “ceasefires” between 20 May and 10 June to coincide with the vote. However, these ceasefires are unlikely to be reliable indicators of reduced election-related risks and may be attempts to distance themselves from political violence. Moreover, ceasefires are unlikely to extend to intimidation, movement restrictions or “armed strikes”, vote tampering, or other non-violent measures designed to influence turnout and local voting behaviour. During the March 2026 Colombian parliamentary elections, local election observers reported potential irregularities at more than 1,000 polling stations.  Colombian armed groups are also very decentralised, and there is a realistic possibility that ceasefire declarations made by senior leadership will not be uniformly adhered to by local commanders of factions.

Most importantly, the self-declared ceasefires do not cover the potential second round on 21 June. Polling indicates that no candidate is likely to achieve more than 50 per cent of the vote, with the second round likely to feature Cepeda against one of the right-wing candidates that has promised a much tougher stance on armed groups. As it is likely that most of the supporters of the losing right-wing candidate will shift to the remaining right-wing contender, the second round is likely to be perceived as a direct contest between an attempt to restore Total Peace and a marked shift towards expanded security operations. This would likely increase the incentive for armed groups to influence the election and could increase the risk of high-profile attacks aimed at deterring the incoming administration from abandoning the negotiation process.

The 2026 presidential election will almost certainly be highly consequential for the future trajectory of Colombia’s internal armed conflict. A Cepeda government will likely remain committed to Total Peace and reopen dialogue with armed groups, assessing that a change in president could be interpreted as an opportunity to stabilise negotiations and reverse the recent path of President Petro. However, while such a course of action has the potential to reduce violence in Colombia, it is likely to play into the hands of the armed groups, which will likely continue to exploit the policy to consolidate territorial control, expand illicit economies, delay demobilisation and potentially increase their leverage in future negotiations.

A victory by a right-wing candidate would likely result in the rapid abandonment of Total Peace. Both de la Espriella and Valencia would likely expand security operations and deploy increased resources to Colombia’s most affected areas. Both would also likely explore options to expand security cooperation with the US, mirroring developments seen elsewhere in Latin America. This could potentially involve Colombia joining the “Shield of the Americas”, increased intelligence-sharing, and even a possible pathway for US kinetic operations on Colombian territory, a development that has recently been observed in Ecuador.

However, recent developments in Colombia likely illustrate limitations to a more hardline approach. Offensives and reprisal attacks likely indicate that armed groups have yet to be deterred by expanded government operations, and incidents like the April Pan-American Highway attack or attacks within major population centres likely indicate a continued willingness to escalate despite the threat of state retaliation. Moreover, Colombia’s armed groups are well-embedded within the civilian population, highly decentralised and are adept at exploiting Colombia’s mountainous, jungle and borderlands to evade security operations. The imposition of security strategies observed elsewhere in Latin America is likely to be of limited effectiveness, given the resources required to combat multiple armed groups operating in challenging terrain on several fronts, with expanded security operations likely to provoke retaliatory attacks aimed at undermining the state’s efforts to curb militancy and disrupt illicit economies.

The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes against the Gulf States and Jordan, remains high despite reported progress on a potentially imminent MOU.

The two parties are likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines. The Trump administration continues to make demands for meaningful concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly the removal of Iran’s HEU, and stated it will not accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. However, a statement on social media written by President Trump on 25 May said that the HEU must be turned over to the US or “destroyed in place or, at another acceptable location” with the observance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This likely represents a concession on US demands, with Tehran having previously indicated willingness to consider dilution of its HEU in Iran, although it is unclear whether this would fulfil President Trump’s continued demand for its ‘destruction’.

Iranian negotiators have reportedly indicated a willingness to open the Strait of Hormuz without tolls in exchange for an end to the US blockade. However, Iran’s foreign ministry stated on 25 May that it will instead charge fees for “environmental protection”. With control over the Strait of Hormuz having been a long-term strategic objective for the Iranian regime, it is highly likely that Tehran will continue to leverage the strait as far as possible for income.

Continuing conflict in Lebanon risks jeopardising the wider US-Iran ceasefire, with Iranian officials telling the media an Israeli attack on Beirut or its southern suburbs “could derail the diplomatic track”. Since Prime Minister Netanyahu recently announced an escalation in Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah, the IDF has not yet conducted any strikes in Beirut. However, strikes were conducted in Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahiyeh) as recently as 7 May, and further such strikes would likely impact the fragile US-Iran negotiations.  

Outside of renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran, there remains a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. This most recently manifested with the 24-26 May escalation, which resulted in US strikes against Bandar Abbas. Unlike the previous US strikes against Bandar Abbas during the de facto ceasefire on 7 May, which also resulted from continued conflict in the maritime domain, the currently ongoing escalation cycle has extended over a period of days with multiple rounds of attack and retaliation. In addition to endangering the negotiation process, there is a realistic possibility of further Iranian retaliation strikes being soon launched against regional targets, particularly the UAE, in response to the US strikes against Bandar Abbas.

Should a framework agreement be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are likely to remain unresolved.

Moreover, Iranian adherence to any interim framework is likely to be undermined by the IRGC, which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. The 26 May threats issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader against countries which host US military bases underscore that Iranian retaliation to a resumption of full-scale conflict would likely involve renewed strikes against Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines. The Trump administration continues to make demands for meaningful concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly the removal of Iran’s HEU, and stated it will not accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.

However, Tehran reportedly continues to refuse the removal of its HEU out of the country and has pushed for delaying comprehensive nuclear negotiations until after the US blockade is lifted, in addition to continuing its claim over the Strait of Hormuz with its newly formed “Persian Gulf Strait Authority”.

There is a realistic possibility that both Washington and Tehran will finalise the draft agreement being mediated by Pakistan and progress to a further round of negotiations. The likelihood of a resumption of US strikes on Iran, followed by retaliatory strikes across the Middle East, will almost certainly increase if the draft agreement fails to proceed.

Should a framework agreement be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved.

Moreover, Iranian adherence to any interim framework is likely to be undermined by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position, as exemplified by the competing briefings from senior Iranian officials regarding the Supreme Leader’s directive on Iran’s HEU stockpile, almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government.

Ultimately, with the IRGC having increasingly consolidated control in Iran, it is likely that the IRGC-controlled regime elements will be unwilling to make significant concessions, which can be perceived as giving in to the US, preferring instead a renewed full-scale conflict. However, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration may calculate that the economic and political costs of the war have become so great that it is willing to accept a compromised end state, which involves only marginal movement from Tehran compared to what was on the table prior to the conflict’s outbreak on 28 February.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, since the ceasefire, Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz and regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities. Furthermore, the assessments indicate that Iran still fields 70 to 75 per cent of its transporter erector launchers (TELs) used for launching ballistic missiles, and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments highly likely suggest that despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Outside of renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran, there remains a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. If the US resumes the previously paused Project Freedom initiative, which involves using US naval forces to escort commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz to counter Iran’s current de facto control over the strait, this would almost certainly further increase the risk of escalation from the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE outside of a return to full-scale regional conflict.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

US President Donald Trump has threatened on multiple occasions since the implementation of the ceasefire on 8 April to renew strikes against Iran if demanded concessions are not made in the diplomatic track. This has likely reduced the credibility of US threats to compel compliance in Tehran, although it is highly likely that Iranian forces have maintained the highest possible readiness under the assumption that full-scale war could restart on any given day.

The Iranian peace proposals have reportedly included demands for sanctions relief, an end to the US naval blockade, withdrawal of US forces from areas close to Iran, the full release of frozen assets, reparations, guarantees against further attacks, an end to the war on all fronts (including Lebanon), and recognition of Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. According to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reports, the US have rejected reparations, demanded a transfer of Iran’s stockpiled HEU to the US, and only agreed to release 25 per cent of Iran’s frozen assets. Furthermore, the reports claim that the US is providing no guarantee against further US or Israeli strikes in future if subsequent more comprehensive negotiations fail.

Fundamentally, the two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines, particularly regarding the nuclear file. The Trump administration continues to make demands for meaningful concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme as part of an initial peace agreement, whereas Tehran continues to push for delaying nuclear negotiations until after a peace settlement is reached. However, the US blockade is almost certainly currently the main leverage imposed against Iran; it is unlikely that the Trump administration will be willing to relinquish its primary leverage without having gained meaningful concessions on the nuclear file.

US officials have briefed that the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE carried a unified message to President Trump that negotiations should be given more of a chance as the Gulf States would ‘pay the price’ for a return to conflict. Two Middle East officials additionally briefed that the US and Israel are engaged in the largest preparations since the 8 April ceasefire implementation for potential renewed strikes against Iran, claiming that they could be as “early as this week”.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, since the ceasefire, Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz and regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities. Furthermore, the assessments posit that Iran still fields 70 to 75 per cent of its transporter erector launchers (TELs) used for launching ballistic missiles, and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments highly likely suggest that despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several more months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Outside of renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran, there remains a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. If the US resumes the previously paused Project Freedom initiative, which involves using US naval forces to escort commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz to counter Iran’s current de facto control over the strait, this would almost certainly further increase the risk of escalation from the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE outside of a return to full-scale regional conflict.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz, which escalated between 3 and 8 May, have almost certainly increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict, with the US and Iran essentially in a stalemate. Washington almost certainly intends to pressure Iran to make concessions on the nuclear file via its blockade, due to an assessment that Iran only has a limited time remaining to store oil before it is forced to shut in its oil production. Tehran highly likely calculates that the US will be unable to tolerate a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz due to the high economic and political costs.

There is a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE.

The UAE has likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE in the short term. The emerging reports of the UAE’s previous direct involvement in the conflict as an active combatant against Iran will likely further contribute towards the increased prioritisation of the UAE as a target.

Other contributing factors for the UAE’s prioritisation as a target by Iran include: Fujairah’s critical role as an oil export terminal which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz; the UAE’s increasingly close security partnership with Israel; and the likely increasing isolation of the UAE among the Gulf States and growing rivalry with Saudi Arabia which significantly increased following the failed UAE-backed Southern Transition Council (STC) offensive in Yemen and Saudi-backed counteroffensive in December 2025-January 2026, a rift which has likely culminated in the UAE’s recent withdrawal from OPEC.

Tehran likely seeks to further isolate the UAE, which is publicly the most hostile Gulf State against Iran, from the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with its prioritised targeting, widening the gap between the current de-escalatory approach in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s hawkishness.

The reports of Saudi strikes against Iran during the war likely resulted in an opposite effect to those conducted by the UAE, reducing rather than increasing Iran’s willingness to attack Saudi territory. Riyadh likely ordered limited, calibrated attacks to restore deterrence, and Tehran likely views an escalation with Saudi as higher risk,  given Saudi Arabia’s greater military capacity, strategic depth and regional influence.

Following the Saudi strikes against Iran, reports indicate that de-escalation took place in the week before the 8 April ceasefire implementation, with 105 projectiles being launched against Saudi Arabia between 25-31 March and just over 25 between 1-6 April. Moreover, the UAE has effectively completely cut diplomatic contact with Iran, unlike Saudi Arabia, which has maintained regular contact with Iran, and it is likely that the reported Saudi strikes led to diplomatic contacts and an informal agreement to de-escalate.  

With the current diplomatic track facing major difficulties, Washington may conclude that a return to conflict is the only means of forcing compliance from Tehran. If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.

Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, since the ceasefire, Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz and regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities. Furthermore, the assessments posit that Iran still fields 70 to 75 per cent of its transporter erector launchers (TELs) used for launching ballistic missiles, and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments highly likely suggest that despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several more months depending on the rate of expenditure.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: