Authorities had anticipated the protests and took pre-emptive measures by setting up roadblocks at several entry points to Nairobi’s Central Business District and blocking roads near the country’s parliament building with razor wire. A large police presence was also reported in Mombasa ahead of the planned demonstrations. Early morning commuters and overnight travellers were stuck at checkpoints, with security forces only letting some vehicles through.

Armed individuals have been accused of attacking protesters, with an armed group attacking the headquarters of a human rights NGO in Nairobi on 6 July. Civil society groups have claimed that they are colluding with security forces. The group reportedly consists of at least 25 individuals on motorbikes armed with clubs and stones. If they target protesters today, it will highly likely escalate the unrest and spark clashes between protesters and security forces.

An executive affiliated with the shipping company which owns the MAGIC SEAS stated that the vessel was also targeted by missiles, which started fires in the forecastle near the ship’s bow and in its second hold, damaging the vessel’s fuel tanks and hitting the engine room. At 1530 UTC, the CSO reported that the crew were preparing to abandon ship, with all crew having abandoned ship by 1553 UTC. The crew were confirmed as rescued by a passing merchant vessel at 1900 UTC. The vessel remains abandoned and is taking on water.

Hours after the attack, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted multiple airstrikes against Houthi targets in Al Hudaydah, Ras Isa and Salif in Yemen. The IAF also reportedly targeted the GALAXY LEADER (IMO: 9237307), which was hijacked by the Houthis in late 2023.

It is almost certain that the GALAXY LEADER was struck due to long-standing concerns that the vessel has been used as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) asset, with the Israeli military having previously stated that the Houthis had installed a radar system on the vessel to track vessels in the region following multiple strikes on the Houthi’s coastal radar infrastructure.

Cast your minds back to a time when business‑travel advice was little more than a colour‑coded map and a tidy list of “dos and don’ts.” Those days are gone.

The world is moving again – faster than before the pandemic – and today’s travellers are not anonymous employees headed to a pin on a map. They are individuals with intersecting identities, unique expectations, and very real vulnerabilities.

This shift demands that we change the fundamental question. Outside of extreme situations, no longer do we ask, “Is Mexico City safe to travel to?” Instead, we ask, “How will this traveller experience Mexico City, given their medical history, cultural background, or any number of personal factors?”

By moving from place‑centric thinking to a people‑first mindset, risk assessments evolve into living profiles that adapt in real time based off the profile. Guidance becomes dynamic, arriving exactly when it matters, whilst privacy is elevated from a compliance tick‑box to a moral imperative.

Consider what happens when we enrich a traveller’s profile – voluntarily, and always under their control – with up-to-date profile attributes, from language fluency to mobility constraints. A powerful risk-intelligence engine can then align raw, real-time data with personal relevance, transforming generic alerts into guidance that feels timely, empathetic, and, above all, useful. Yet none of this works unless trust sits at the core.

A privacy‑first architecture minimises data collection, encrypts what is stored, and gives the traveller full authority over when and how their information is activated. Safeguarding identity traits must become as routine as safeguarding a passport number.

What does this look like on the ground? Let’s think like the people we want to support. Opening an app and seeing a narrative that speaks to you as an individual, perhaps etiquette during Ramadan for a first-time traveller in the Gulf, or a heads‑up on local insulin availability for someone managing diabetes. Practical options could also appear, like the choice to attend a meeting remotely, an alternate routing through a lower‑threat transit hub, or the contact details of a vetted local guide who speaks your native language, or security-recommended restaurants post-meeting, whilst you wait during a delay? No one is forced to reveal private details, but those who opt in unlock an unprecedented layer of protection and confidence.

As we look ahead, this shift towards personalised, real-time support doesn’t just reflect a technological evolution – it aligns with the rising expectations of the next generation of business travellers. Millennials and Gen Z have already shaped consumer experiences with their demand for relevance, autonomy, and digital convenience. But it’s the emerging cohort of professionals – those coming into leadership in the next five to ten years – who will redefine what good looks like in corporate travel.

They will expect services that anticipate their needs before they arise. For them, hyper-personalised travel risk management won’t be a premium feature; it will be an expected part of the value proposition. This generation won’t just value safety – they’ll expect it to be smart, contextual, and adaptive to their lifestyles, work styles, and identities. The leap from personalisation as a marketing tactic to personalisation as a duty of care will become the new benchmark for progressive employers and security providers alike.

Where is the frontier? It lies in the partnership between human and machine. Predictive analytics already correlate flight delays, social‑media sentiment, and healthcare capacity in near real time. Algorithms will not be replacing aspects of human judgment, but they can augment our insight, handing us the right information at precisely the right moment. Together, they form a co‑pilot (no pun intended) model in which machines crunch vast, fast‑moving data and humans deliver context, empathy, and final judgment.

Our future conversations around travel or crisis, especially when aiming to engage teams across our businesses in a meaningful way, need to be one that centres people, respects their privacy, and empowers everyone to explore the world on equal footing.

Demonstrations and clashes with security forces broke out on 25 June in multiple cities in Kenya. The protests, which initially began in Nairobi, have now expanded to other cities including Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Nyahururu. According to Citizen TV, protests are also taking place in Eldoret, Kakamega, Narok, Busia, Makueni, Nyeri, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Machakos, Homa Bay, and Kirinyaga. Demonstrations are reportedly taking place in at least 20 of the country’s 47 counties. While precise numbers are unconfirmed, thousands of demonstrators have taken to the streets.

In Nairobi, large crowds have occupied parts of the Thika Road highway, and protesters have blocked streets in the Zimmerman area. Demonstrators are reportedly heading towards the city centre, highly likely aiming to reach the parliament. Security forces have deployed tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowds, particularly in the central business district and outside the city hall. One protester in the capital city was reported to be injured after being struck on the head by a tear gas canister and at least eight people have been shot, according to local news.

Reports from Matuu in Machakos County and Molo in Nakuru County indicate that police have opened fire on protesters, resulting in at least two deaths and several injuries in both locations. Eyewitnesses in Matuu claim that the violence occurred when protesters attempted to enter a police station.

The unrest has led to significant disruptions. Kenya Railways announced the suspension of commuter trains in Nairobi due to the ongoing protests. Additionally, the Kenyan government has taken steps to control the flow of information, with the Communications Authority ordering TV and radio stations to cease live broadcasts of the demonstrations.

Local NTV and KTN stations report that security forces raided their transmission centres and turned off their signals. NetBlocks has reported disruptions to the Telegram messaging service across Kenya, following a government ban on media platforms covering the protests live. Multi-media organisation The Standard Group has declared that it will continue to broadcast despite the attempted ‘news blackout’.

Opposition leaders Kalonzo Musyoka and Eugene Wamalwa have joined demonstrators in Nairobi, laying wreaths outside parliament in honour of those killed during demonstrations last year which killed an assessed 60 people. Former Chief Justice David Maraga is also taking part in the protests. They have called on police to exercise restraint and have condemned police brutality.

Strategic Intelligence for Global Security & Risk Leaders

As the conflict between Israel and Iran intensifies, with confirmed US airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, the risk of regional escalation is rapidly increasing. For organisations with global operations, personnel in affected areas, or exposure to Middle East supply chains, access to trusted, real-time insight is essential.

Last Thursday, Solace Global’s intelligence team delivered a high-priority briefing to clients, providing clarity on the evolving security landscape. The session explored Israel’s strategic intent, Iran’s military response, and the rising likelihood of further US involvement.

LIVE WEBINAR

On June 21, at approx. 2300 GMT, the US Air Force & Navy carried out attacks at three Iranian Nuclear sites. The attack has been confirmed by US President Donald Trump following days of tit-for-tat strikes between Israel and Iran.

Solace Global clients will receive these alerts and extended assessment through Solace Secure and through the GIS Subscription. We are advising clients on all potential scenarios, ensuring businesses are prioritising their people, assets and their Operational Resilience.

Next Israel-Iran Conflict Security Briefing: Thursday 26th June 2025

Solace Global will host a follow-up briefing this Thursday, offering updated analysis and forward-looking scenarios to inform your planning.

To access this and future sessions, sign up to our intelligence subscription service

At approximately 03:30 local time on 13 June, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted a series of coordinated airstrikes targeting multiple locations and senior figures across Iran associated with Iran’s nuclear program as part of  ‘Operation Rising Lion’.

Targets included the Natanz Enrichment Complex; nuclear-related facilities in Qom, Markazi, Kermanshah, and Hamadan; and multiple locations in Tehran. Israeli sources have also claimed to have completed a ‘broad strike’ on Iranian air defence systems in western Iran, resulting in the destruction of dozens of radars and surface-to-air missile launchers (SAMs).

Iranian state media claim the strikes resulted in dozens of fatalities and casualties. Among those reportedly killed are Hossein Salami, Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, and senior nuclear scientists Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi and Fereydoun Abbasi.

The strikes form part of a broader Israeli strategy aimed at dismantling the IRGC leadership and disrupting Iran’s nuclear programme. The attack follows days of escalating tensions, fuelled by stalled US-Iran negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.

Israel has declared a state of emergency, closed its airspace, suspended operations at Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) indefinitely, and  Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned Israeli citizens that they may have to spend extended periods within air raid shelters. Public offices and educational institutions across the country will remain closed until at least 20:00 local time on 14 June. Emergency services have been placed on high alert, and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have bolstered their presence in the Occupied West Bank

Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has vowed that Israel will face ‘severe punishment’ for the strikes on its nuclear program. On 13 June, Iran launched 100 uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) in response to the Israeli strikes.

Airspace restrictions have been imposed across Iraq, and flight operations at all Iraqi airports have been suspended as a precautionary measure. Multiple reports indicate that explosions have occurred in various locations across Iraq. Although the nature and cause of these incidents remain unconfirmed at this stage, uncorroborated reports suggest facilities associated with Iranian proxy forces have been targeted.

Jordan has closed its airspace and has stated that it will not tolerate violations of its airspace. Air raid sirens have been activated in the capital, Amman, and Jordanian state media has announced that the Jordanian Armed Forces have intercepted drones that have entered its airspace. Jordanian officials have warned citizens not to gather in the street due to the threat of falling debris from intercepted aerial threats.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a statement affirming that Israel “took unilateral action against Iran” in what Israel has described as a necessary act of self-defence. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu characterised the pre-emptive strikes as a military operation aimed at “rolling back the Iranian threat to Israel’s survival.”

Despite repeated denials from senior US officials regarding any direct involvement in the strikes, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has accused the United States of assisting in the operation. IRGC officials have vowed a “strong response from Iranian forces” against Israel and US forces in the region.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced via social media platform X, that they are “in contact with Iranian authorities regarding radiation levels” that may increase as a result of the attack.

India’s aviation minister has stated that rescue teams have been mobilised. The Chief Minister of Gujarat has stated that officials have been instructed to carry out ‘immediate rescue and relief operations’ and to make arrangements on a ‘war footing’. A green corridor for injured passengers has been arranged to ensure priority at the hospital. The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has been sent from Delhi to investigate the cause of the incident.

While the cause of the crash is unclear, the loss of signal shortly before the crash indicates a critical systems failure is likely. There was high visibility of six kilometres, and there were light surface winds, so a weather-induced accident is unlikely. An investigation into the cause of the incident will almost certainly be quickly carried out by the DGCA and Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), who will attempt to recover the black boxes (flight data and cockpit voice recorders) to determine the nature of the crash.

The last fatal plane crash in India occurred at Kozhikode International Airport (CCJ) in 2020, where the plane skidded off the runway and crashed into the ground. 21 people were killed and over 100 were injured.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will likely declare a day of national mourning over the victims of the crash as casualty figures become clear. If the cause of the crash is deemed to be due to poor maintenance, regulatory failures, or negligence, demonstrations are likely to occur outside the airport or outside government buildings.

There will almost certainly be significant flight disruptions over the coming hours. Flight tracking sources indicate that incoming domestic flights have been diverted back to their airports of origin, and departure flights have been cancelled.

In Los Angeles, the protests have seen the most violence in the Downtown area, which authorities have declared an “unlawful assembly” area. The unrest has resulted in vandalism, the erection of barricades, reports of looting, and the throwing of projectiles, including Molotov cocktails, at law enforcement. Furthermore, both local law enforcement and federal forces have deployed tear gas, rubber bullets, stun grenades, pepper spray and pepper balls, and used mounted units as part of crowd control operations.

The worst-impacted locations in Los Angeles include the area around the Metropolitan Detention Center, with demonstrators blocking the nearby Highway 101 and setting fire to Waymo driverless taxis; the Los Angeles Federal Building; the Fashion District; Paramount; and Compton.

On 7 June, US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of 2,000 National Guard troops to the Los Angeles area, which has since been doubled to 4,000. 700 US Marines have been additionally activated for potential deployment; however, they are unable to directly participate in civilian policing unless the Insurrection Act is invoked, which the Trump administration has not done as of the time of writing.

The deployment of the National Guard and Marines has been met with staunch opposition by the Governor of California, Gavin Newsom, with the National Guard deployment being the first without a governor’s approval since 1965.

In the days following the initial outbreak of unrest in Los Angeles, “solidarity” protests broke out in multiple other US cities. Of these, the most significant protests took place in San Francisco, where close to 150 people were arrested following violent clashes near a downtown ICE office; Santa Ana, where tear gas and flashbangs were used against protesters outside the Santa Ana Federal Building; and New York, where 24 protesters were arrested at Trump Tower.

On 25 and 26 June 2025, the annual NATO Summit is set to take place in The Hague, Netherlands, for the first time since the founding of NATO in 1949. The event is set to host approximately 8,500 visitors, consisting of approximately 45 heads of state, 45 foreign ministers, 45 defence ministers, 6,000 delegates, 2,000 journalists, and 800 guests.

The summit is occurring within the context of the Trump administration consistently distancing itself from NATO, major developments in the war in Ukraine, and European NATO leaders increasingly discussing the necessity for capable European defence and deterrence against Russia that is independent from US support. While an official agenda has not been published, the summit will almost certainly address defence funding and membership status for its member states, in addition to boosting NATO defence capabilities.

The summit will almost certainly trigger significant travel disruptions and heightened security threats in the Randstad area from 22 to 27 June.

Numerous security measures will be implemented during the summit. 27,000 police officers, approximately half of the Dutch National Police force, are set to be deployed across the two days, supported by 5,000 armed forces personnel and special forces teams on 24-hour standby.

Patriot air defence systems and counter-drone installations will reportedly be used to defend the summit from aerial threats. F-35 fighter jets and Apache patrols will also occur over the city and along the coast. An air exclusion zone will operate over a 22-kilometre stretch of coast between the Hook of Holland and Noordwyk.

Security will be prioritised at the World Forum (where the summit will be taking place), Huis ten Bosch (where the leaders will dine), and the Grand Hotel Huis ter Duin (where President Donald Trump will likely reside).

Significant travel disruptions should be expected during the week of the NATO Summit. The World Forum is approximately 30 minutes from two of the Netherlands’ largest airports, Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (AMS) and Rotterdam The Hague Airport (RTM).

Significant airport disruptions are almost certain, particularly at Schiphol, where the Polderbaan Runway will be closed to air traffic between 21 and 27 June. With the Buitenveldertbaan Runway currently under maintenance, commercial air traffic will be reduced by between 25 and 30 per cent during this period, with an estimated 100,000 passengers likely to face cancellations or rescheduling. This may increase traffic at The Hague airport as flights reroute.

Transport disruptions will also affect road travel. Authorities are set to close roads to transport world leaders on the A4, A5, A44, N44, and N440 from 22 to 27 June, which will almost certainly disrupt travel between Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam. The N434 will also be closed in the afternoon and evening of 25 June. Local and regional roads around the Hague, Wassenaar, Katwijk, Noordwijk, Haarlemmermeer, Leiden, and Rotterdam will also be closed, making several areas difficult to reach. Large-scale diversion routes have been set up.

The most congested periods will highly likely be late 23 June, early 24 June, and late 25 June. Triple the normal traffic volumes are to be expected at least 450 kilometres around the periphery of the World Forum. In anticipation of major traffic disruptions, the Dutch government have warned people to avoid the central Randstad region between 23 and 26 June, advising residents to work from home as much as possible and to use public transport if travel is necessary. Public transport will likely be overcrowded as people avoid driving disruptions and follow government advice, likely leading to an increase in petty crime.

There will almost certainly be civil unrest in the days around the event. An international protest has already been organised for 22 June at Koekamp near the Hague Central Station by the Dutch Counter Summit Coalition for Peace and Justice. A “Counter Summit” conference has been scheduled for 21 to 22 June, which may draw additional protesters to The Hague.

Authorities have designated specific areas for demonstrations, with small-scale protests allowed around the World Forum, and larger-scale protests limited to the Malieveld. While the demonstrations will likely be peaceful, the high levels of security during the summit raise the possibility of clashes between protesters and security forces.

There will likely be a heightened risk of cyberattacks and espionage, perpetrated mostly by Russia. Typical hybrid threats from Russia, in its campaign to gain a competitive advantage over its Western adversaries, include disinformation campaigns, sabotage, and cyberattacks.

Disinformation, particularly on social media platforms like X, will likely be used to sow confusion and undermine confidence in authorities; fake security, transportation, or health and safety alerts online are a potential method. Espionage could additionally target business travellers as hostile actors attempt to access confidential and proprietary information. Public Wi-Fi networks are a likely target, with perpetrators aiming to steal personal data or credentials.

Cyberattacks and sabotage targeting essential services such as transport infrastructure pose another threat, with perpetrators incentivised to cause disruptions to reduce the summit’s credibility.

There is an increased threat of terrorism, resulting from the high visibility of the event. Before the event was announced, the Netherlands’ National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) placed the country at a threat level four, indicating a “substantial” risk of terrorist attack.

A recent attack took place on 27 March 2025, where a mass stabbing occurred near Dam Square, injuring five individuals. The perpetrator was a Ukrainian citizen from Donetsk; the motive is still unclear, but he has been charged with attempted murder with terrorist intent.

While the high levels of security likely lower the risk of coordinated attacks by violent extremist organisations (VEOs), lone actor attacks are more difficult to mitigate against and predict for intelligence agencies. Lone actors typically use unsophisticated opportunistic methods, including vehicle ramming, knife attacks, and arson.

Police stated that they are not currently treating the incident as a terror-related act. They moreover stated that they consider it an “isolated incident” and are not looking for further suspects.

The 2024 Nakba Day protests were the most extensive to occur in connection with the commemoration. Several gatherings that were attended by tens of thousands of attendees were recorded in several cities, with hotspots concentrated in Western Europe and in large North American urban centres. On 18 May 2024, protests in London were attended by an estimated 250,000 people, with smaller gatherings in Manchester, Leeds, Cardiff, and Edinburgh among other cities. Large-scale protests were likewise recorded in Barcelona, Madrid, Milan, Bologna, Berlin, Paris, Marseille, Toulouse and other large European urban centres.

In North America, Nakba Day coincided with several large-scale protests, with major demonstrations occurring in cities including New York City, Toronto, Washington, D.C., Miami, Cleveland, and Portland.

In both Europe and North America, university-based groups have been particularly active in spearheading the unrest, making campuses hotspots of demonstrations. Student groups at, among others, Columbia University in New York, Sorbonne and Sciences Po, in Paris, and Amsterdam University staged large-scale demonstrations and direct action in connection with pro-Palestine unrest.

Nakba Day protests are also common in the Middle East, due to the commemoration’s lasting political importance.  In 2024, particularly notable demonstrations occurred in Beirut, Tunis, Amman, and Rabat. In Israel, protests were concentrated in Tel Aviv, with the local Tel Aviv University being a focal point for the demonstrations.

The ongoing conflict in Gaza has almost certainly contributed to driving larger Nakba Day protests in countries and regions that have not previously been as impacted by pro-Palestinian protests as Western Europe, the Middle East, and North America. In the Asia-Pacific region, for instance, protests were held in cities like Sydney and Melbourne in Australia, and Osaka and Tokyo, Japan.

During the 2024 Nakba Day protests, episodes of violence between protesters and responding security forces were recorded at some locations. For instance, protests in Brooklyn, New York, resulted in around 40 arrests as violent clashes broke out between police and protesters. In Berlin, protests were halted due to the deployment of fireworks, posing a threat to bystanders. In London, local police arrested several people over violent chants and slogans.

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In retaliation, Pakistani forces conducted cross-border shelling in Kashmir, reportedly killing and injuring several civilians, and have claimed to have downed five Indian military aircraft. Flight operations at Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport (KHI) and Lahore’s Allama Iqbal International Airport (LHE) were temporarily suspended overnight due to heightened risks posed by the ongoing aerial engagements.

Similar restrictions have also been implemented across nine airports in northern and western India, with Air India suspending flights to Jammu and Srinagar in Kashmir, Leh, Chandigarh, Jodhpur, Amritsar, Bhuj, Jamnagar, and Rajkot through 10 May.

Air France has suspended flights over Pakistan. Several other airlines have followed suit, re-routing or cancelling flights to and from Europe.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, has described the strikes as an “unprovoked act of war” and referred to the Indian claims of targeting terrorist camps as “false”. Pakistan has justified the retaliatory military action as justified under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which allows self-defence in response to armed attack.

Amid the tit-for-tat strikes, both Indian and Pakistani strikes allegedly hit hydropower assets. Unconfirmed reports by Pakistani media have accused India of targeting the Noseri Dam near the Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project. Two shells also landed on hydroelectric corporation offices in Indian-administered Kashmir, according to an Indian official.

India’s home ministry ordered mock drills to test preparation for an attack across the country to take place on 7 May, including air raid warning system tests. This constitutes the largest civil defence drill in India since 1971. India’s Air Force is expected to hold drills on the night of 7 May in the west of the country, and Delhi and Bengaluru airports are set to hold disaster management exercises; these are reportedly unlikely to impact passenger operations.

Beijing has declared that it is closely following the situation and has advised its citizens to avoid conflict areas. China’s foreign ministry has urged both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint and refrain from taking escalatory actions.

Canada’s Liberal Party wins federal elections

The Liberals, led by Prime Minister Mark Carney, have managed to win enough seats to form a minority government, following a last-minute surge in popular support that erased months of Conservative Party dominance in the polls. Carney, who replaced Justin Trudeau after the latter announced he would step down in January 2025, has campaigned on promises to reverse some of Trudeau’s most controversial policies and to respond to US economic coercion.

No party wins a majority in Cayman Islands general election

No party won a majority in the 30 April 2025 General Election. The People’s Progressive Movement won seven seats, but did not meet the ten required to form a majority. Two newly formed parties, the Cayman Islands National Party and the Caymanian Community Party each won four seats. A non-binding referendum on three issues was also held regarding whether the Cayman Islands should develop cruise berthing infrastructure, introduce a national lottery, and legalise marijuana. As with the 2021 election, parties will now engage in coalition talks to attempt to form a government.

Clashes in Dominican Republic over anti-migrant protests

Protests occurred in Santo Domingo on 27 April, coinciding with the 60^th anniversary of the start of the Dominican Civil War. Demonstrations during the day were also organised by the Old Dominican Order, a nationalist group, which opposes the alleged “Haitianisation” of the country and has called for mass deportations of Haitian nationals.

While the protests began peacefully, there were reported clashes between protesters and the police, who deployed tear gas. While the current government of President Luis Abinader has adopted a tough stance on migration, the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Haiti has almost certainly driven a rise in support for more radical nationalist and identitarian groups.

Opposition party wins snap election in Trinidad and Tobago

On 29 April, the Union National Congress (UNC), led by former prime minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, declared victory in a snap election. The election was called by the newly appointed Prime Minister Stuart Young, after Keith Rowley stepped down amid rising cost of living and soaring crime rates.

The election follows a 105-day state of emergency imposed after a surge in homicides, with 623 recorded in 2024 out of a population of approximately 1.5 million. The rise in murders is linked to criminal gangs, including the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua, and has placed the country among the most violent countries in the Americas, with a homicide rate of 37 per 100,000 people.

The Bissessar has promised numerous measures to combat the crime wave, including the establishment of new ministries of defence and justice. She has also promised to raise wages for public sector workers amid economic stagnation triggered by declining natural gas production, which comprises approximately 80 per cent of the country’s economy. Bissessar previously declared a state of emergency to combat crime during her first tenure as prime minister; there is a realistic possibility that she will use similar measures during her new tenure.

Violent protests erupt in Guyana after the death of an 11-year-old girl

Guyana has imposed a curfew effective from 29 April following violent protests caused by the death of an 11-year-old girl. The girl was found dead at a coastal resort in Tuschen, leading to accusations that she was sacrificed as part of a religious ritual.

The alleged murder and resulting police investigations led to protests in Tuschen, in the capital Georgetown and other parts of the country, with reports of looting, property damage and clashes with the police. The police resorted to using tear gas and firing ammunition after blockades were erected in the capital and clashes erupted outside of Georgetown Public Hospital. There is a realistic possibility of renewed unrest following the release of autopsy results, which are currently being finalised.

Trump administration to designate Haitian gangs as FTOs

On 29 April, the Trump administration informed the US Congress of its intent to designate the Haitian gangs, Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif, as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs). The move will follow the designation of several Latin American cartels as FTOs.

The designation could enable the US to freeze any financial assets held within US jurisdiction linked to the groups and could penalise anyone providing material support to the gangs. The move could also enable the Trump administration to deport anyone connected to the gangs from the US back to Haiti. In a far less likely development, the designation could also help provide legal justification for US counterterrorism or intelligence collection in Haiti.

Red alert issued for Costa Rican volcano

On 24 April, a red alert was issued due to an increasing and significant series of eruptions taking place at the Poas Volcano, situated approximately 30km north of the capital, San José. The authorities have closed the Poas National Park as a result of the volcanic activity and have warned against approaching nearby riverbeds due to the presence of volcanic material. Should the volcano continue to release ash, there is a realistic possibility of disruption to air traffic at Juan Santamaría International Airport.

Powerful earthquake strikes off the coast of Esmeraldas, Ecuador

The earthquake, which struck around midday on 25 April, was magnitude 6.3 with a depth of 35 kilometres. Moderate shaking was felt in Esmeraldas, which led to multiple buildings being significantly damaged, with shaking being reportedly felt as far as Guayaquil. Although the earthquake happened at sea, it resulted in no tsunami threat.

Across Ecuador, at least 179 residences were damaged, with 22 people injured and 716 people being “affected”, the majority in Esmeraldas and Muisne. There were no disruptions recorded at Quito Airport.

Due to Ecuador’s proximity to the Pacific Ring of Fire and multiple fault lines, the country is highly seismically active. Previous powerful earthquakes, such as the 2016 7.8 magnitude quake near Muisne which killed at least 676 people, have caused a significant impact.

On 28 April 2025, a significant power outage affected mainland Spain, Portugal, Andorra, and parts of southwestern France, disrupting daily life for an estimated 55-60 million people. The blackout commenced at 12:33 CEST and persisted for up to ten hours in various regions. The cause of the blackout remains unknown, with investigations underway. Initial reports indicate a sudden and substantial drop in energy demand, which resulted in the destabilisation of the grid.

In Spain, the blackout halted all train and metro services, stranding an estimated 35,000 passengers, and disrupted operations at Madrid’s Barajas Airport. Internet and telecoms dropped to less than 20 per cent of normal capacity, while nuclear plants shut down automatically and relied on generators for cooling. Madrid enforced its emergency plan, closing shops and deploying police for traffic control. Economic losses were estimated at EUR 1.6 billion, and at least seven deaths were reported, with some linked to generator misuse.

In Portugal, essential services and payment systems failed, hospitals relied on generators, and public transport, including metro and rail, was suspended. Lisbon Airport was temporarily closed, while Porto and Faro airports operated on backup power. In France, the effects were limited to brief outages in parts of the southwest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Investigations as to why the power outages occurred are ongoing and will likely take weeks to establish a widely accepted explanation. Several explanations have been advanced, although several experts are indicating that it may have been a convergence of factors and not a single cause.

As investigations progress, there is a huge risk of disinformation being proliferated, with largely discounted explanations, such as a state-sponsored cyber-attack, gaining a lot of traction in the information space. One popular theory alleges that Spain’s rapid integration of renewable energy is at fault. The theory is likely to fuel further controversy over net-zero energy policies and will almost certainly be leveraged by right-leaning groups to exert pressure on the current Sanchez administration in Spain.

Regardless of what caused the blackout, the incident highlighted multiple vulnerabilities. One of the primary vulnerabilities is Portugal’s overreliance on Spain for electricity imports, which left the country exposed to grid failures.

The disruption demonstrated how energy interdependence, which is typically beneficial under normal conditions, can rapidly become a liability when a neighbouring system experiences instability. The blackout clearly highlighted the fragility of digital and communications infrastructure across the affected areas. Both telecommunication and internet services fell to a fraction of their normal capacity, severely disrupting business and daily life.

The blackout also demonstrated major shortcomings in public sector preparedness, with inconsistent or poor contingency planning evident at multiple hospitals, airports and across the wider transport network.

While a deliberate cyberattack or act of sabotage has so far largely been dismissed as the cause, the scale and speed of the disruption underscore the systemic vulnerabilities within Europe’s interconnected energy networks. In the future, these weaknesses could be deliberately exploited by malicious state or non-state actors seeking to cause widespread disruption and economic loss if the underlying structural causes of the outage are not identified and addressed.

On 27 April, a group of anti-tourism protesters surrounded a tourist bus in the centre of Barcelona and sprayed its occupants with water guns. The symbolic event, which mirrors similar protests in 2023 and 2024, was carried out to launch the new manifesto of an international protest group, the Southern European Network Against Touristisation (SET).

Initially launched in 2018 in Spain, SET has gained significant traction since 2021 and has expanded to Italy, Spain, and Portugal, with local chapters in 17 cities. SET has pledged to continue to carry out direct action in the summer and has called for a general demonstration on 15 June.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While anti-tourist groups have existed in Europe since the early 2000s, often operating alongside or as part of smaller far-left and anarchist movements, a pan-European anti-tourism movement has considerably grown since the COVID-19 Pandemic. SET is only one of many similar groups, which include regional movements like Less Tourism, More Life (in the Balearic Islands), Banc the Temps (Mallorca), Arran (Catalonia), No Grandi Navi (Venice), Nice a Nous (Nice). However, the manifesto published following the Barcelona protest likely indicates an effort to coordinate direct action as part of an international movement.

Protests by SET and other anti-tourism groups are almost certain to occur in high-visibility areas, usually next to well-known tourist sites. A notable number of protests are likely to include direct action protest tactics. While most protests are likely to be peaceful, there remains a realistic possibility of isolated cases of harassment and vandalism targeting tourists or tourist facilities.

A smaller number of protests, likely including SET’s 15 June demonstration, will entail larger gatherings, meant to disrupt tourism-related activities in city centres. An example of this is the May 2024 march through the centre of Palma de Mallorca, which was attended by around 10,000 people.

In terms of dates, it is highly likely that protests will begin to intensify in frequency in the first weeks of May and will peak in late June and July, coinciding with the end of the academic year in most European countries.

Some elements within the broader movement have reportedly refused to rule out targeting airports and other transportation hubs, a move that could result in major transport disruptions if done at scale. These actions could consist of blockades of roads leading to and from transport hubs, or, particularly in the case of airports, attempts to enter the perimeter, thus forcing a shutdown of airport operations.

On 2 May, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), officially classified the country’s far-right party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), as a “proven right-wing extremist organisation.”  The move marks the most serious action to date designed to contain Germany’s growing far-right movement and was justified on the grounds that the BfV has definitive evidence that the AfD actively works against Germany’s democratic system.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The designation marks the first time in modern German history whereby a party with nationwide representation in parliament has been officially labelled as extremist, although some state-level branches of the AfD, such as those in the eastern states of Saxony and Thuringia, have already received the designation. It is highly unlikely that the designation will result in the banning of the AfD. However, it will serve as a precursor for increased state surveillance of the AfD and will almost certainly isolate the party on the national stage, with other parties now far less likely to cooperate with the AfD within the Bundestag.

For AfD supporters, who secured almost 21 per cent of the vote in the 2025 federal election, the move will almost certainly be perceived as politically motivated and an attempt to suppress dissenting voices. The immediate effect of the designation is likely to be the galvanising of AfD’s base. This could result in the organising of protests across Germany, particularly in the east, which may lead to violent clashes between AfD supporters with both the police and counter-protestors.

In the long term, the designation is likely to lead to deeper divisions and could ultimately drive right-wing extremism underground if supporters feel it is no longer possible to achieve their objectives through established democratic structures. This trend is likely to translate into an increase in right-wing politically motivated violence, with right-wing extremist crimes totalling over 30,000 in 2024, according to the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). Moreover, the reallocation of intelligence and counter-terrorism resources to monitor elements of the AfD could result in an overstretching of these resources, ultimately leading to reduced oversight of other forms of extremism within Germany.

After a 26 April meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Vatican, Trump wrote on social media that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be ‘just tapping me along’ and threatened Russia with ‘Banking or Secondary Sanctions’. This was followed by a Kremlin announcement on 28 April of a unilateral three-day ceasefire between 8 and 10 May during WWII Victory Day commemorations.

Furthermore, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on 29 April that the Victory Day ceasefire proposal ‘is the start of direct negotiations, without preconditions. Kyiv has responded by again calling for Washington’s previous proposal for a full, permanent ceasefire, or at least a 30-day ceasefire, as a prelude to comprehensive negotiations for a peace agreement.

Additional statements from the past week, however, from Lavrov, former President Dmitry Medvedev, and senior Kremlin officials, have all variably reiterated maximalist war goals as a condition for peace, which included the ‘destruction’ of the current Ukrainian government and the full annexation of desired oblasts, including currently unoccupied areas.

On 30 April, Ukraine and the US signed what has been termed the ‘minerals deal’, with the agreement having been delayed with talks needing to restart after the fractious February encounter between Zelensky, Trump, and Vice President JD Vance, in the White House.

The newly negotiated agreement is watered down in Ukraine’s favour compared to the previously proposed draft text, with the establishment of a joint fund with the US and Ukraine each contributing 50 per cent of financing and revenues split 50/50.

Following the minerals deal, the US State Department certified a proposed license to export USD 50 million worth of military aid to Ukraine, the first such permission since Trump paused Ukrainian military aid after taking office.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The minerals deal is the result of a concerted effort by Kyiv to find ways to incentivise the Trump administration to maintain US support for Ukraine, having been held off during the Joe Biden administration in anticipation of Trump’s second presidency.

The increasing frustration of Trump and US officials over the intransigence of Moscow during talks has led to the development of two highly distinct possible scenarios: a) Washington changes its approach to be more coercive against Russia, with the use of more stringent sanctions (as threatened by Trump), or possibly even the ramping of military support to Kyiv; or b) The Trump administration “washes its hands” of Ukraine, accusing both Moscow and Kyiv as being uncooperative and leaving the support of Ukraine to European allies.

The minerals deal has likely considerably reduced the likelihood of the second scenario in the short to medium term, although the final terms of the deal omit previously demanded stipulations on paying back the US for aid given thus far.

It is highly likely that the Kremlin will use the three-day ceasefire to accuse Kyiv of violations, as it did during the energy infrastructure moratorium. The Easter truce, whilst leading to a pause in long-range strikes against Ukrainian urban centres, was marred by extensive accusations of violations.

However, Moscow is highly likely motivated to keep Washington engaged in talks insofar as the Kremlin can leverage them for concessions to further its objectives, and likely fears forcing Trump into taking a more hardline approach. Although denied by the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Putin’s claims on 26 April that Russian forces have retaken all of Kursk, if true, will likely result in a reorientation of Russian forces concentrated in the area to conduct new operations – including the developing northeastern Ukraine spring offensive towards Sumy.

It is likely that Moscow will continue to offer “olive branches” such as the Easter truce or the possibility of direct talks to set conditions for Washington to make concessions and apply pressure to Kyiv, whilst continuing to pursue results on the battlefield to achieve maximum leverage over Ukraine.

Romanians will vote to elect their next president on 4 May, with a second round on 18 May if no candidate receives an absolute majority. The elections are the second to happen in less than a year, as the previous vote in November 2024 was annulled by the Constitutional Court over alleged Russian interference, and the winning candidate, Călin Georgescu, was barred from running. Currently, the polls indicate that George Simion, leader of the populist Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), is the leading candidate. AUR has backed Georgescu’s unsuccessful challenge of the court ruling, and has pledged to give him a government role following a possible victory.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Georgescu’s supporters will likely stage demonstrations against the vote in the last days of the campaign, and on 4 May itself. These demonstrations are likely to be concentrated in Bucharest and are unlikely to result in large-scale traffic disruptions. Nevertheless, a realistic possibility remains of clashes between protesters and police.

In the short term, the elections are likely to be a source of political instability in Romania. With Georgescu’s ban, the vote will highly likely function as a “referendum” on the judiciary and on other Romanian state institutions.

Finally, there is a remote possibility of political violence. Following the annulment of the November 2024 vote, several extremist groups and activists have called for a “revolution” against the Romanian state and have encouraged supporters to attack state officials. If political violence were to occur, the most likely targets would be security personnel, state officials, or electoral stations and staff on or near 4 May. While unlikely to be directly targeted, travellers would be at risk of being collaterally impacted.

On 28 April, Burkina Faso Prime Minister Jean Emmanuel Ouédraogo announced on a nationwide broadcast that the junta government is planning on increasing state ownership of foreign-operated industrial mines as part of efforts to retain a greater share of mining revenues. The initiative will be led by the recently formed state-owned company, Société de Participation Minière du Burkina (SOPAMIB).

SOPAMIB has already been used to achieve control of two industrial gold mines, which were previously owned by the London-listed firm, Endeavour Mining. The move also follows the revision of Burkina Faso’s mining code, which will prioritise national ownership, local suppliers, labour and expertise, but has generated fears of weakened investor protections, concerns of arbitrary state intervention due to a lack of legal clarity, the potential for retroactive contract changes, and pressure tactics.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Burkina Faso’s recent changes towards the mining sector are similar to those observed in Mali and Niger, two other resource-rich but highly unstable and fragile states suffering from endemic poverty, political instability and extremist violence. The junta is likely trying to capitalise on current gold prices, which have increased substantially since the imposition of US tariffs and the associated economic uncertainty.

While this may increase government revenue in the short term, there is a high likelihood that this shift will result in decreased foreign investment, greater economic instability, further isolation and overreliance on extractive industries. In the long term, it is likely that these trends will undermine attempts to stabilise the country, deter investment and reduce job creation, trends that will ultimately be to the advantage of extremists like the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and other violent extremist organisations (VEOs), which collectively are assessed to already control approximately 50 per cent of the country.  

Burkina Faso’s efforts to consolidate control over the mining industry will likely involve coercive measures similar to those reported in Mali and Niger. This has involved the detention of foreign nationals working for foreign mining companies that have failed to adhere to the imposition of retroactive taxes or changes in mining codes.

In Mali, personnel belonging to Barrick Gold were detained in order to extract leverage from the company after the company allegedly failed to meet its tax obligations, with the junta also threatening to place the mine under provisional administration unless tax payments were made.  There have also been reports of gold stocks being seized, mining permits being suspended, and the seizing of mines, all tactics that the Burkina Faso junta is likely to employ as it asserts control over the mining industry.

A spate of attacks in northeastern Nigeria has resulted in warnings of a jihadist revival in the area. On 24 April, at least 14 farmers were killed in Borno State’s Gwoza district near the border with Cameroon, an attack that has been linked to Boko Haram.

On 26 April, Boko Haram ambushed and killed 10 members of the Civilian Joint Task Force in Adamawa State. Suspected twin Boko Haram attacks on 27 April in Adamawa and Borno resulted in 22 deaths, including hunters and Civilian Joint Task Force members.

On 28 April, Boko Haram attacked a Christian community in Borno, killing seven people and burning homes and churches. Then on 29 April, a roadside improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated on a bridge between Rann and Gamboru Ngala in Borno State, killing 26 civilians. The attack has been claimed by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

The surge in violence since January has already led to a warning from the Borno State Governor, Babagana Zulum, who claimed that insurgents were making gains with minimal resistance from the Nigerian military. On 29 April, the Nigerian government appointed Major General Abdulsalam Abubakar as the new commander of counterinsurgency operations in the northeast but refused to officially link the appointment to the surge in violence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In recent years, the Nigerian military has successfully managed to contain and even push back Boko Haram, with internal fights with ISWAP leading to a further weakening of the broader jihadist movement. However, both internal and external developments have likely shaped the conditions for a jihadist revival in the region.

The wider destabilisation and increase in extremism in the Sahel have severely impacted Nigeria. Groups like Boko Haram have been able to exploit the porous border with Niger to establish safe havens in the ungoverned spaces of the Sahelian state. However, more recently, there has been an emergence of new jihadist threats in the northwest of Nigeria linked to Niger, a development that when combined with a host of other internal threats such as banditry and successionist movements, has likely resulted in the overstretching of Nigeria’s military.

This development has been greatly compounded by the increased use of IEDs and uncrewed aerial vehicles by both groups, particularly ISWAP. This could indicate a shift towards more asymmetric tactics, employing high-impact attacks that are difficult to anticipate while conserving manpower by avoiding direct confrontation with security forces.

UAVs are also being increasingly used in an intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) capacity by both groups, a trend that will enable the VEOs to better plan, coordinate and execute attacks against government forces, which are often poorly trained and ill-equipped. ISWAP’s increased use of technology may reflect developing links between it and the broader Islamic State (IS) network. IS has facilitated the transfer of funds, technical expertise and training across its affiliates, resulting in a significant enhancement of their capabilities.

If harnessed effectively by ISWAP and emulated by Boko Haram, it is highly likely that the increased use of these technologies will lead to a migration of violence from rural areas to urban areas, resulting in higher rates of civilian casualties.

Following an ideological split in 2016, Boko Haram’s and ISWAP’s relationship has been characterised by internecine fighting and attempts to expand into each other’s areas of influence. However, there have been previous attempts to establish a truce, likely driven by mutual concerns over external pressure.

The recent surge in violence, which has seen coordinated attacks across their typical area of operations, could be anecdotal evidence of a fragile truce in play. If this is the case, then the temporary cooperation and even coordination between Boko Haram and ISWAP could significantly increase the threat to security forces and civilians and could even lead to a transfer of expertise from IS-affiliate to Boko Haram, potentially resulting in more sophisticated tactics and attacks.

Anti-migrant protests and counterprotests on Easter Rising Day in Ireland

At least three people were arrested during protests on 27 April in Dublin. The protests were attended by around 5,000 people and were led by anti-migrant campaigners and activists. The relatively large attendance was highly likely driven by the high social media virality attained by the campaign due to the support of several online influencers and celebrities. Local civil society groups, as well as party members, staged counterprotests. Despite some hostile interactions between the two sides, no clashes were recorded.

Germany’s new cabinet announced

Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government will reflect the changed power dynamics between the Christian Democratic Union parties (CDU/CSU), and the Social Democrats (SPD), with the former getting ten ministries and the latter seven. The Christian Democratic appointees are in line with Merz’s campaign pledges to increase state security and growth, and to crack down on immigration. The SPD’s main victory is its retention of the Defence Ministry, which will likely allow it to dictate a continuation of Berlin’s support for Kyiv, and a greater say on the direction of Germany’s rearmament plans. The new government is, nevertheless, still likely to face considerable domestic pressure.

Conclave to begin in the Vatican City on 7 May

The voting process to elect the new pope will likely coincide with large influxes of pilgrims and tourists to Rome and other Italian cities. There is a risk of terrorism due to the high visibility of the event and its importance for Catholics. Likewise, civil unrest remains possible, particularly smaller, symbolic actions, as groups capitalise on the visibility of the conclave to mainstream their position. Travellers to Rome are likely to encounter traffic and service disruptions. While a conclave can last indefinitely, the process is likely to take less than a week. Nevertheless, disruptions are likely to continue in the short term following the papal election.

Hungarian opposition lawmakers temporarily barred from parliament

On 28 April, Hungary’s parliament voted to temporarily banish and cut the salaries of six opposition Momentum MPs after they lit flares and played the Soviet national anthem in protest of the 18 March ban on LGBTQ+ Pride marches. The House Speaker Laszlo Kover has also filed a criminal complaint against three of the MPs over the use of flares.

This constitutes the first instance of members of parliament being banned from the chamber since Hungary became a democracy in 1990. Ruling party Fidesz’s decision to ban Pride marches is highly controversial, and the EU is currently investigating whether the party’s plan to deploy facial recognition technology is illegal. Numerous protests have occurred in the wake of the government’s decision to ban Pride events, and more are likely following the news regarding the banning of MPs.

Mali’s junta plans to dissolve all political parties

The national dialogue committees promoted by the junta after taking power in 2021 have issued “recommendations” for junta leader Assimi Goita to become the country’s president and begin a five-year term, and for dissolving all existing parties. The proposals were justified by their proponents as meant to align Mali to the political structure of the other members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

The move, which is likely to be mostly or fully adopted by the junta, will almost certainly further centralise power in the junta’s hands and disenfranchise civil society organisations. The ban on parties and the de facto prohibition of the creation of new ones is likely to be weaponised by the government to target domestic political dissent.

Opposition leader appears in court, and more opposition officials arrested in Tanzania

On 28 April, Tanzanian opposition leader Tundu Lissu appeared in court to face sedition charges following his recent arrest. Armed police barred access to the courthouse to journalists and members of the Chadema Party, resulting in accusations of an attack on press freedom and a violation of constitutional rights. Police also conducted illegal raids in the homes of Lissu and Deputy Chairperson John Heche, and other key officials from Chadema were arrested in separate incidents. These incidents have drawn international condemnation and fears that Tanzania is drifting towards more authoritarianism under President Samia Suluhu Hassan ahead of the November general election.

Lone wolf “Incel” attacker injures two in Leeds, UK

On 26 April, a man reportedly injured two women using a crossbow in Headingley, Leeds. The attacker, who was found to also be in possession of a firearm, was arrested by responding police.

Online posts reportedly originating from the perpetrator’s Facebook profile indicate that he espoused a violent ideology marked by extreme hatred of women, linked to “incel” (“involuntary celibate”) online subcultures. This link with incel ideology is likely further underscored by the attacker’s choice of target. The Headingley area is especially frequented by students of nearby Leeds University, and, by selecting it, the attacker likely sought to harm students.

Past incel lone wolves, like the 2014 Isla Vista attacker, the 2015 Umpqua Community College shooter, the 2017 Aztec, New Mexico and 2018 Parkland, Florida school shooters, all deliberately targeted students.

Online calls for violence targeting UK Hindu and Muslim communities

The rise in tensions between India and Pakistan following the recent terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir has almost certainly driven a sharp increase in the spread of misinformation and hateful content targeting Hindus and Muslims, particularly those from diaspora communities, in the UK.

Notably, a considerable amount of the content espouses far-right and identitarian ideologies, in addition to religious extremism. The development almost certainly showcases the growing threat of sectarian violence within diaspora communities. There is a realistic possibility of political violence, including mob violence, occurring in large UK cities following further increases in India-Pakistan tensions.

Islamophobic stabbing attack kills one in France

On 25 April, a man carried out a stabbing attack at a mosque in Ales, France, killing one worshipper. The alleged perpetrator, who was detained by Italian police after trying to flee the country, is a French-Bosnian citizen who reportedly shouted anti-Islamic slogans and filmed himself during the attack, subsequently sharing the video online.

Civil society organisations have staged rallies in solidarity with the victims and the French Muslim communities and have called for a national day of direct action on 11 May. The attack in Ales shares multiple details with similar lone wolf attacks, including the use of bladed weapons, the selection of a high-visibility target, and the recording and sharing of the attack on social media.

Three people gunned down in Uppsala, Sweden

On 29 April, three people under the age of 20 were shot dead at a hair salon in the Swedish city of Uppsala, approximately 40km north of Stockholm. The police responded by establishing a large cordon of the area, suspending all rail traffic in the immediate area and conducting a manhunt, which ultimately led to the arrest of a 16-year-old suspect.

The motive for the shooting remains unconfirmed; however, authorities believe it is connected to the ongoing gang-related violence that has affected Sweden in recent years, violence that, according to some assessments, has made the country the worst in the EU for gun crime. The incident also highlights the trend of increasing youth involvement in violent crimes.

Israel conducts airstrikes near Syrian presidential palace following sectarian clashes against Druze

On the morning of 2 May, Israel conducted airstrikes within 500 metres of Syria’s presidential palace in Damascus. Syrian sources indicate that the interim-President Ahmad al-Sharaa and top officials had left the palace just an hour prior. The strikes follow sectarian violence in Jaramana and other predominantly Druze areas of southern Syria between 28-30 April, after the circulation online of an audio clip alleged to be a Druze leader insulting the Islamic Prophet Muhammad, which has been denied by the accused Druze sheikh.

Sunni gunmen entered Druze towns and clashed with Druze militias, with the General Security Forces attempting to curb the violence. At least 102 people have reportedly been killed thus far in the clashes. The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that the Israeli strikes are intended to be a warning to Damascus, to deter the deployment of Syrian forces south of Damascus or threats against the Druze community.

It is almost certain that the Sharaa government does not exercise control over the fighters who are attacking the Druze. In comparison to the March massacres of Alawites, government-aligned security forces have highly likely been far more effective in attempts to prevent sectarian clashes against the Druze, successfully cordoning off Druze settlements despite suffering casualties. The Israeli strikes, however, will likely further inflame hostilities emanating from Sunni militants against the Druze, and there is a realistic possibility that these hostilities will be increasingly directed against the Sharaa government if it is perceived as being weak against Israel.

Iraqi security arrests one ISIS suspect in connection with New Orleans truck attack

A spokesperson of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council said that Iraqi forces had arrested the individual responsible for “inspiring” the New Year’s Eve attack that killed 14 people. This represents an important development for analysing the attack. While it immediately became evident that the perpetrator had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), the new arrest likely demonstrates a greater level of vertical direction and a sustained commitment from the VEO to conduct external attacks outside of the Levant.

US strikes hit migrant centre in Yemen, as UK joins the new aerial campaign against Houthis

The US-led aerial campaign against the Houthi movement in Yemen has continued, with the UK having now also participated in aerial strikes. On 28 April, a migrant detention centre was reportedly hit by US strikes, with the Houthi-run health ministry and media claiming 68 fatalities and 47 injuries. Whilst Houthi-provided statistics are unreliable, footage from the bombing’s aftermath has been geolocated and verified.

On 29 April, the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) conducted strikes using precision-guided bombs against a cluster of buildings identified as being used to manufacture drones, 24km south of Sanaa. The migrant trail from East Africa to Saudi Arabia results in considerable numbers of Ethiopians, Sudanese, Somalis crossing the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to Yemen, and available information indicates that a majority of the casualties from the 28 April attack were Ethiopian.

During US President Donald Trump’s first presidency, the Pentagon relaxed the rules of engagement for airstrikes in 2017, which almost certainly contributed towards a 330 per cent increase in civilian casualties from US airstrikes in 2019 compared to 2016. It is highly likely that Trump has similarly relaxed rules of engagement during his second presidency.

The UK’s participation in the new anti-Houthi aerial campaign is likely partly conditioned by an attempt to appease the Trump administration, with senior advisors and the Vice President having expressed frustration at the lack of European action against the Houthis. With reports indicating that a potential US-UK trade deal is being given ‘second-order priority’, Westminster is likely further incentivised to appease Washington’s desires for increased military involvement against the Houthis.

Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) increases kidnapping operations

On 26 April, ISSP operatives attacked a Nigerien military convoy in the Sakoira area. The ambush resulted in the deaths of 12 Nigerien soldiers, and the kidnapping of five Indian nationals. In 2025 alone, ISSP has kidnapped at least 14 foreign nationals. Of these, only four Moroccan truck drivers who had been kidnapped near the Niger-Burkina Faso border have been released (although some sources dispute this), while a Spanish national kidnapped in southern Algeria was rescued by Azawad forces.

The sharp increase in the number of kidnappings makes them highly likely part of a concerted effort by ISSP’s leadership, marking a shift in the group’s strategy. Moreover, unlike the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which, during its zenith in 2014-2017, sought to kidnap foreigners as a propaganda tool and later executed them, ISSP has not released media regarding the hostages, possibly indicating that it is seeking to negotiate ransom payments for their release.

Reports indicate JNIM attempting to establish presence in eastern Senegal

A report by the Timbuktu Institute has indicated a significant escalation in jihadist activity by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the tri-border region of Kayes, which includes parts of Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. The report suggests that attacks between 2021 and 2024 have increased sevenfold in the area and that JNIM are attempting to infiltrate eastern Senegal.

JNIM is likely capitalising on weak state governance and the prioritisation of regime survival in Mali to increase its influence in the area, which it will exploit to increase attacks in Senegal. The strategy likely reflects similar attempts to establish safe havens and buffer zones in other countries that border the Sahelian states, such as Benin and Togo, a move that would allow JNIM to expand its economic activity and recruitment in Senegal to exert greater pressure on the Malian government.

Renewed assaults on El Fasher in Sudan’s Darfur region

On 29 April, at least 41 people were killed in shelling of El Fasher in a renewed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) offensive. El Fasher is the regional capital of North Darfur and constitutes the final town held by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF reported that they killed 600 militants and 25 military vehicles, a number likely inflated.

The RSF is intensifying the siege of the city after being pushed out of Khartoum by the SAF, and its capture is almost certainly a high priority for the paramilitary. By capturing El Fasher, the RSF will complete a crucial step in consolidating its control of Darfur, where it has recently formed a parallel government.

Humanitarian groups in the region have been forced to halt food distributions in the city, and at least 540 people have been killed in the region in the past three weeks. The renewed offensive will almost certainly impact humanitarian operations in Darfur, since El Fasher constitutes a hub for humanitarian operations in all five Darfur states.

Opposition MP killed in “targeted and premeditated” shooting in Nairobi, Kenya

On 30 April, Charles Ong’ondo Were, a member of parliament representing Kasipul constituency in the west of Kenya for the Orange Democratic Movement, was shot and killed in the capital, Nairobi. Were was shot when his vehicle was stationary at traffic lights by a shooter riding as a pillion passenger on the back of a motorcycle. The police have described the killing as “targeted and premeditated”.

The assassination of politicians is relatively rare in Kenya but Were had previously voiced concerns for his safety. Should the public perceive the incumbent administration as being in any way implicated, there is a realistic possibility of civil unrest in Kenya. Public dissatisfaction with President Ruto is already high, resulting from the 2024 attempt to pass a controversial tax bill and the government’s handling of the subsequent protests, which led to multiple civilian fatalities and mass arrests.

Major explosion at Iranian port leads to mass casualties and significant economic disruption

A large explosion on 26 April at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Iran killed at least 70 people and injured over 1,000. The port handles 85 per cent of Iran’s shipping, including a considerable proportion of oil exports. 1,500 hectares of the port are estimated to have been affected, and authorities state that it will take one to two weeks to return to normal operations.

The explosion will highly likely exacerbate Iran’s ongoing economic crisis, with losses of approximately USD 25 million per day since 26 April. The Iranian interior minister, Eskander Momeni, blamed noncompliance with safety precautions and negligence for the blast, with customs authorities claiming the trigger was imported cargo catching fire.

Western media, however, has implicated a sodium perchlorate shipment, which is used to produce solid fuels used in ballistic missiles, which has been denied by Iran’s defence ministry. The port reportedly received hundreds of tons of the chemical precursor in February and March, almost certainly delivered from China. Some experts point towards ammonium nitrate, which is a widely used fertiliser and industrial explosive, as a likely culprit, as it was for the 2020 Beirut port explosion. Detonating ammonium nitrate is difficult, however, without other chemicals catalysing it, such as the fireworks which triggered the detonation in Beirut.

While it would be unusual for the sodium perchlorate to be stored at the port for so long after delivery, an unnamed source linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) briefed that the chemical was responsible for the explosion. Whatever the cause, there is a realistic possibility of civil unrest due to the number of fatalities, exacerbation of Iran’s economic woes, and the perceived or actual cover-up being conducted by authorities.

Wildfires in Israel threaten Jerusalem

As of 2 May, wildfires that threatened Jerusalem have been largely contained. The Israeli government declared a national emergency after Israel’s largest ever wildfires broke out on 1 May along the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway. High winds have exacerbated the fire, spreading it to burn at least 5,000 acres.

Approximately 163 ground crews and 12 aircraft are attempting to contain the fires, with military planes dropping retardant to stop them from spreading. On 2 May, authorities declared the re-opening of the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway.

The fires are suspected to have been deliberately started, and conflicting reports have emerged regarding the number of arson suspects detained; Prime Minister Netanyahu mentioned 18 arrests, while police have confirmed only three. Due to the effectiveness of the fires and the associated disruption, there is a realistic possibility that this tactic will be emulated in the future.

Following the 22 April militant attack that killed 26 civilians in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, tensions have escalated between India and Pakistan. On 30 April, India responded in kind to Pakistan’s airspace closure to Indian airlines, closing its airspace for all Pakistani aircraft until 23 May.

On the same day, Modi held a meeting with senior state and defence officials, declaring that the Indian armed forces have the freedom to decide the ‘timing, targets, and mode’ of their response to the militant attack. Pakistan’s information minister has warned of ‘credible intelligence’ that there may be an imminent attack from India and has warned that it will respond appropriately.

Troops have exchanged small-arms fire across the border, but no casualties have been reported. The US and UN have called for de-escalation, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio urging Islamabad to condemn the terror attack and cooperate in its investigation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

A full-scale conflict between the two nations remains unlikely despite the escalating tensions and aggressive rhetoric. For India, a war would highly likely drag the country into a prolonged conflict that would significantly affect its economy.

Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that China would join the conflict as a Pakistani ally, and New Delhi would almost certainly like to avoid a multi-front war, which would stretch its armed forces, which have been underfunded in recent years, allowing Pakistan to catch up militarily.

Although the United States has developed closer ties with India, especially during the Trump administration, a conflict between India and Pakistan would likely impact the global economy, giving the US a strong interest in promoting de-escalation.

Pakistan almost certainly cannot afford to enter a war. Pakistan Armed Forces are currently engaged in a multi-front internal conflict against militant groups, primarily in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. While its military is more battle-tested than India’s, a war would almost certainly overstretch its armed forces, would risk destabilising the military-dominated government and would provide opportunities for militants to exploit.

Furthermore, Pakistan was removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list in 2023 after legislative and institutional reforms to address perceived anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing deficiencies. India has indicated plans to advocate for Pakistan’s re-entry in the aftermath of the militant attack, and a war would significantly increase the likelihood of this happening. If re-added, Pakistan would almost certainly face reduced investment and foreign aid, as well as risk being blacklisted.

Limited airstrikes and limited border clashes are likely amid significant public pressure for visible action. In the aftermath of the 2019 suicide bombing in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir by a Pakistan-based militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), India launched airstrikes across the line of control in Balakot targeting an alleged JeM training camp. Similar actions are highly likely in the coming days and will likely target militant camps away from populated areas to avoid a miscalculation or significant escalation.

Pakistan will likely respond with limited and sub-threshold military action designed not to provoke an escalation. Cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure are also likely, due to the minimal threat of loss of life.

Amid heightened sectarian tensions, there will highly likely be increased attacks between Hindus and Muslims in India and Pakistan, with probable clashes during protests. There is a realistic possibility of sectarian tensions also manifesting within diaspora communities, such as within the UK, US and Canada.

Disinformation campaigns framing the attack as a symptom of an inter-religious conflict are likely and will almost certainly exacerbate tensions. There is a realistic possibility of lone-actor attacks, further inflaming sectarian tensions.

Security forces of both countries will almost certainly be at a heightened state of alert during the current tensions, which likely reduces the threshold at which they will respond forcefully to perceived unrest, making clashes between protesters and security forces likely.

Bangladesh seizes Hasina family assets

This follows a ruling by the Anti-Corruption Commission, which targets multiple real estate assets, land, and more than 120 bank accounts. The interim government has capitalised on its efforts to dismantle the remnants of the government led by Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League (AL) party, following their removal from power in August 2024, to increase its support and maintain its unstable hold on power.

The volume and value of the assets that have been targeted almost certainly showcase the extent and penetration of the system of clientelism promoted by AL and Hasina as part of their efforts to maintain political supremacy. While authorities have highlighted the importance of due process, assets linked with AL members have been repeatedly targeted in acts of mob vandalism. There is a high likelihood of this trend continuing, despite government efforts to curtail it.

Pakistani security forces kill 54 militants at Afghan border

Security forces reportedly engaged dozens of militants as they were trying to cross the border on the night of 26-27 April in the North Waziristan area. The Pakistani military called the militants “Khwarij”, a term that usually refers to the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and is an iteration of “Kharijites”, a name derived from early Islamic history often used as a derogatory term to describe violent, extremist and revolutionary Islamist groups.

The incident’s casualty count is unusually high and likely highlights ongoing TTP efforts to reinforce their position on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. TTP, moreover, may be seeking to capitalise on Pakistan’s ongoing instability and its tensions with India, which have a realistic possibility of overstretching or unbalancing Islamabad’s security forces. De facto, Pakistani officials have hinted at this logic: following the attack, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi stated that the TTP were prompted to carry out their incursion by “foreign masters” (obviously referring to Kabul) who “[asked] them to enter Pakistan as soon as possible”.

Car-ramming attack at Chinese elementary school

A man reportedly drove a vehicle into a crowd of students and parents outside an elementary school in Jinhua, Zhejiang province. Due to limited information being released about the incident by Chinese media, the exact number of injuries is unclear, although videos taken by bystanders seem to show at least five injuries.

There is a realistic possibility that this attack falls within the “revenge against society” attacks (sometimes referred to with terms like “Zhang Xianzhong” or “Xianzhongxue” on Chinese social media, after the leader of a 17th-century peasant rebellion). These attacks have attracted significant media attention since at least 2021, and around 20 alleged cases occurred in 2024 alone. They are characterised by the lack of a clear ideological motive, the targeting of low-visibility and high-density locations (often schools), and the use of improvised weapons, like vehicles or knives. Moreover, unlike lone wolf attackers in Western countries, perpetrators are not preoccupied with sharing their actions on social media.

Twin attacks in Thailand’s Yala province

Two coordinated insurgent attacks in Thailand’s Yala province between 28–29 April killed three security personnel and injured another, highlighting the persistent threat posed by Muslim separatist groups in the Deep South, despite ongoing peace talks and increased security measures following a spate of attacks in recent months.

If attacks continue at this rate, there is a realistic possibility that the government rejects peace talks and pursues more aggressive military tactics. This would constitute a similar approach seen under former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, which involved the imposition of curfews, arbitrary arrests, an increase in raids and the use of military tribunals for suspected militants.

Wildfires in South Korea cause significant disruptions in Daegu

Wildfires that began on 28 April in Daegu led to the evacuation of over 5,000 residents and the issuance of a Level 3 wildfire response, the highest tier, from the Korea Forest Service. Several disruptions resulted from the fires, including the closure of local schools and key infrastructure such as Gyeongbu expressway. By the evening of 28 April, the fire was reportedly 50 per cent contained and by the afternoon of 29 April, the fire was reportedly fully extinguished. On 30 April, however, the fire rekindled, prompting further evacuation advisories for nearby residents, particularly around the Guam neighbourhood.

In addition to the considerable impact in neighbourhoods close to the fires, the wildfires caused a deterioration in air quality across Daegu. The Daegu wildfires follow the March wildfires that originated in Ulseong, which were the worst in South Korean history and killed at least 28 people. According to a report published by an independent body of scientists and researchers, the Ulseong fires were highly unusual in terms of scale and speed, with climate change being a significant factor. Climate change is expected to increase both the frequency and severity of wildfires globally.

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