INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The current protests form part of a broader wave of anti-government sentiment in 2025, which has triggered sporadic civil unrest. Notably, student-led civil unrest targeting government austerity erupted on 17 February under the slogan #IndonesiaGelap (Dark Indonesia). Beginning on 25 August, the most recent demonstrations started following the publication of reports regarding a new monthly housing allowance for politicians, which is worth approximately 20 times Indonesia’s minimum wage. The publication has acted as a catalyst for broader anti-government sentiment centring on low wages, cuts to government funding, job cuts in the textile industry, government corruption, and the growing role of the military in civilian life, which have been sources of growing frustration among much of Indonesia’s population.

The perceived government failures are amid a background of economic uncertainty. Real wages have lagged behind inflation, contributing to shrinking real wages and a rising cost of living. This has been exacerbated by accelerating unemployment, with Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, which constituted 32 per cent of the country’s GDP in 2002, shrinking to just 19 per cent in 2024. In the first half of 2025, approximately 42,000 manufacturing workers were laid off. Furthermore, economic growth has slowed, dropping to 4.8 per cent in Q2 of 2025, the weakest pace in nearly four years and short of President Prabowo Subianto’s target of 8 per cent.

Social media has catalysed unrest, with footage of clashes spreading quickly and prompting further anti-government sentiment. The government has blamed online platforms for disinformation and has summoned representatives from several social media platforms, including Meta and TikTok. According to the deputy communications minister, the government will request that the platforms moderate their content. There is a realistic possibility that, should social media platforms refuse to impose strict content moderation measures, the government will impose social media blocks to prevent further anti-government sentiment from spreading. However, such measures would also likely significantly reduce situational awareness, limiting the ability to track the scale and location of protests in real-time.

Given the escalation in demonstrations, particularly since 28 August, it is highly likely that they will continue over the weekend. While there is a realistic possibility that this could subside in early September, the police’s continued use of force and any potential investigation into police brutality will likely trigger further unrest. There is a realistic possibility that the government will attempt to placate protesters by imposing policies centred on curbing corruption and austerity measures, although minor concessions are unlikely to quell current or prevent further demonstrations.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The earthquake is the joint sixth-largest recorded globally since 1900, and the strongest since Japanʼs 2011 magnitude 9.0 Tohoku earthquake. The Kamchatka Peninsula is situated along the seismically active Pacific Ring of Fire, a horseshoe-shaped tectonic belt which spans most of the coastal Pacific and is responsible for approximately 90 per cent of the worldʼs earthquakes.

The shallow depth of the earthquake is a key cause of the extensive tsunami threat. The effects of tsunamis will almost certainly depend on the disaster resilience of the countries affected. Hawaii and Japan, two locations anticipated to experience the greatest tsunami impact, both have comprehensive disaster preparedness measures which have highly likely mitigated the potential impact.

In Japan, the suspension of high-speed rail, mass evacuations, emergency broadcasting, and automated sea gates have all contributed towards a low risk to life as of the time of writing. In Hawaii, the rapid issuance of evacuation orders and pre-emptive measures to protect critical infrastructure, such as the shutting down of water supply valves, have likewise considerably reduced the risk to life. The effectiveness of the evacuation orders in Hawaii has been notable, particularly in contrast with the emergency communications system failures that exacerbated the impact of the 2023 Maui wildfires.

In multiple areas with issued tsunami warnings, the level of disruption is high, with significant air travel disruption, high levels of traffic congestion, and the sudden suspension of business activity.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

While the price increase was proposed on 1 July, which has triggered weekly protests, the taxi strike almost certainly acted as a catalyst for Angolan citizens to vent their broader frustrations against the government. The ruling party, People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), has been in power since 1975 and has been facing increasing opposition. Angola’s economy is heavily reliant on oil, which accounts for approximately 90 per cent of export revenues. Global price fluctuations in recent years have triggered high inflation, rising food and transport costs in a country where the average monthly wage is just USD 75.

Angola has a large youth population who are experiencing widespread unemployment and are driving the current wave of unrest. Approximately 65 per cent of Angola’s population is under the age of 24, and only 2 per cent of its population is aged over 65. Social media almost certainly constitutes a tool for organising demonstrations and could be blocked by the government in an attempt to quell the unrest.

Civil unrest will highly likely continue on 30 July, which will be the third and final day of the originally planned taxi driver strike. The forceful reaction from security forces almost certainly aims to deter further protests. However, this could have the adverse effect of further inflaming demonstrations, particularly if footage of violence perpetrated by security forces is widely shared on social media.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

After an armed confrontation in the disputed border region of Preah Vihear on 28 May, which resulted in the death of one Cambodian soldier, tensions have escalated between the two countries. In the following weeks, border crossing restrictions have been imposed, trade of produce, fuel, and media has been stopped, resulting in protests, economic disruption, and a political crisis in Thailand resulting in the suspension of Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra.

The dispute originates from a 1904 colonial-era agreement between France and Siam using the watershed principle to define the border, but a later French map placed the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia. The ICJ ultimately ruled in Cambodia’s favour. Tensions over the disputed region have occasionally escalated, most notably in 2008 following armed skirmishes between Cambodian and Thai troops.

In 2011, both sides engaged in a week-long exchange of artillery, mortars, and rocket fire, triggering at least 15 deaths and 85,000 displacements. The clashes prompted the diplomatic intervention of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and led to both sides agreeing to de-escalate with Indonesian observers monitoring the border. Following the clashes, Bangkok and Phnom Penh agreed to settle future disputes with a Joint Boundary Commission; a means which failed to resolve the current dispute on 15 June.

Given the instability in Thailand, there is an elevated risk of a coup, with the Thai military highly likely exploiting the border crisis with Cambodia to win public favour. Thailand has a history of coups, with 22 coup attempts, 13 of which were successful, since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The most recent two coups ousted Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra‘s family members, Thaksin in 2006 and her aunt Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014. The normalisation of coups in Thailand has likely created a ‘coup culture’, whereby often military-led takeovers are viewed by many as an acceptable way to solve a political crisis. The likelihood of coups typically increases during times of mass protest or armed conflict, with the military justifying a coup by claiming they are “restoring order”.

Thailand has a significant military advantage over Cambodia, outmatching Cambodia in airpower, firepower, and mobility. Cambodia has historically relied on symbolic and diplomatic efforts during disputes with Thailand. On 14 July, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet declared that mandatory military conscription would be implemented in 2026 in an attempt to bolster its military capabilities.

Continued clashes are highly likely as both sides conduct retaliatory strikes. The accusations of the deliberate targeting of civilian areas from Thailand significantly escalates the risk of miscalculation from both sides. While ASEAN has, so far, been diplomatically impotent regarding the escalations, given the lack of formal mechanisms for conflict dispute and consensus-based decision-making, diplomatic intervention to de-escalate between the two sides is likely.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Anti-government protests have escalated following the death of blogger Albert Ojwang in police custody on 9 June. Today is the most significant day of unrest since 25 June, the first anniversary of the storming of parliament. Protests will almost certainly escalate throughout the day and into the evening, with demonstrators highly likely to clash with security forces.

​Ahead of today’s protests, Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Interior and National Administration Onesimus Kipchumba Murkomen encouraged security forces to shoot on sight, something that will almost certainly exacerbate the civil unrest.

The 7 July Saba Saba (Seven Seven) Uprising in 1990 saw pro-democracy activists led by opposition figures rally against the rule of President Daniel arap Moi, who had been in power since 1978. The government banned the rally and violently cracked down on demonstrators, with security forces killing at least 20 people, arresting hundreds, and detaining opposition leaders without trial. In December 1991, Moi lifted the ban on opposition parties, enabling multiparty politics. ​

A notable distinction from the Saba Saba Uprising is that, while protests in the 1990s were led by opposition figures, the current demonstrations are a grassroots Gen Z movement led by students without defined leaders or ethnic affiliations.

​The protesters have demanded good governance, greater accountability, and justice for victims of police brutality. The broad demands and lack of clear leadership will highly likely make it more difficult for protesters to pressure President William Ruto, who has weathered previous waves of protests since his election in September 2022, to resign. This, alongside the continued heavy-handedness by security forces, means that protests will likely continue beyond today.

Security checkpoints and protests have blocked major roads across Kenya. Continued travel disruptions around major cities, including Nairobi and Mombasa, are highly likely.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The incident is the first Houthi attack against a merchant vessel since December 2024. Following the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the US and the Houthis on 6 May, some merchant vessel operators had resumed transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. However, the attack against MAGIC SEAS, almost certainly highlights the continuing threat to merchant vessels, and there is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will follow up the success of the attack with further attacks in the near future. 

The brief Gaza ceasefire between Israel and Hamas between January and March led to the Houthi movement announcing an end to attacks against merchant vessels that are not directly affiliated with Israel. However, the Houthis announced a resumption of the anti-merchant shipping campaign after the end of the ceasefire, with the US and Israel then regularly conducting air strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen. The Houthis, however, did not attack any merchant shipping during this period, despite sustained threats.

The US involvement in strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities in Operation Midnight Hammer in June led to a member of the Houthi politburo announcing an end to the ceasefire with the US, and it is likely that the attack against MAGIC SEAS is intended as strategic messaging of a renewal of the Houthi anti-merchant shipping campaign.

MAGIC SEAS was transiting between China and Turkey. However, the shipowner, Allseas Marine, has at least three other vessels that have previously made port calls in Israel. In a statement published after the attack, the Houthis claimed that the vessel “meets the Yemeni criteria for targeting ships”.  It is unclear at the time of the writing whether this is due to the vessel owners having conducted business in Israel – given the ambiguity of Houthi statements and the previously indiscriminate nature of Houthi attacks, all merchant vessels transiting near Yemen should consider themselves a potential target. 

The Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) employed during the attack stand out for both the scale and diversity of attack methods. While the Houthis have previously used skiffs during attacks, the number used during this attack is particularly large. It is highly likely that the ISR capabilities of the Houthis have been significantly degraded following the withdrawal of Iranian assets from the region and US-Israeli strikes. The Houthis likely used the large group of skiffs to enable the targeting of the vessel with other weapon systems such as USVs and missiles. It is almost certain, given the attack methods, that the Houthis intended to sink the vessel.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

Sporadic protests have been ongoing in Kenya since 9 June, after blogger Albert Ojwang died in police custody the previous day after being arrested for the alleged defamation of the Deputy Inspector General of Police.  As protests escalated, the Kenyan National Police also released a statement confirming that a woman miscarried whilst in police custody at Rwanyambo police station in Nyandarua County. On 12 June, the government announced a new finance bill, the trigger for the 2024 protests, although the 2025 iteration was far more conservative.

Protests will likely continue to escalate. On 17 June, the most violent day of unrest before today, a large group of unidentified individuals on motorcycles arrived in the Central Business District in Nairobi armed with makeshift weapons, including whips and clubs, and Kenyan police forces shot a bystander who had been selling face masks with an anti-riot shotgun at point-blank range in the head. There is a realistic possibility that the allegedly pro-government individuals could once again target protesters, which would almost certainly inflame tensions.

These protests constitute the most significant demonstrations since the June-August 2024 protests triggered by the government finance bill. The 2024 protests saw a harsh response from security forces, who were accused of abducting, torturing, and killing civilians believed to be leaders of anti-government protests. At least 60 protesters were killed in total.

The continued perceived harsh repression of demonstrations by security forces, as well as the harming of civilians in custody, has significantly exacerbated tensions, and further footage of security forces using excessive force will almost certainly contribute to demonstrations spreading further.

Today’s date, 25 June, marks the first anniversary of the 2024 storming of parliament. Protesters will likely target the parliament again due to its symbolic value, although there is a heavy security presence around the building, and it has been barricaded with razor wire to prevent protesters from entering.

Despite the introduction of a new finance bill being the trigger for the 2024 protests, it is likely the least contributing factor in this wave of demonstrations. The 2024 finance bill aimed to raise 346 billion Kenyan shillings to pay off the country’s high debt by massively increasing taxes on consumers, such as value-added tax (VAT). Amidst a rising cost of living and inflation, this would have added significant economic pressure on ordinary Kenyans, triggering widespread youth-led protests.

The current wave of unrest, on the other hand, is largely directed towards police brutality, with protesters demanding justice and the resignation of a senior officer they blame for the death of Ojwang, likely suggesting that sustained police brutality and a lack of accountability will continue to sustain violent unrest.

The presence of prominent opposition figures will almost certainly add pressure on President William Ruto, who has seen multiple bouts of unrest since attaining power in 2022. There is a realistic possibility that protests will continue to escalate until Ruto steps down.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Delivered by Head of Intelligence Mark Overington and Chief Customer Officer Robert Aldous, the session highlighted:

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The most immediate threat posed by the escalation is of Iranian retaliation strikes against Israel. Reports indicate that the first wave of Iranian UAVs was completely intercepted by Israel or regional forces. However, the first wave was likely an initial response and will almost certainly be followed by larger waves of layered attacks consisting of UAVs and ballistic missiles conducted by Iranian conventional forces.

Israeli attempts to degrade Iranian air defence likely indicate that further Israeli strikes on Iran are impending, which will almost certainly provoke further Iranian retaliation. Given the strategic importance of Iran’s nuclear program, it is likely that future Iranian attacks will be larger than those observed in April and October 2024.

Iranian proxy forces in the region will highly likely form part of Iran’s retaliation against Israel. The Houthi Movement in Yemen will likely conduct missile and drone attacks targeting southern and central Israel. Iranian proxies in Iraq will likely launch drones at Israel. Despite much of its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon having been dismantled, Hezbollah still maintains a credible arsenal of rockets, missiles, and drones, and is likely to conduct attacks primarily against northern Israel.

Whilst Israeli air defence is comprehensive and highly capable, previous Iranian strikes and proxy attacks have managed to successfully penetrate Israel’s defences. Furthermore, there is a high threat from falling debris caused by successful interceptions across Israel, Jordan and Iraq. The resumption of hostilities will almost certainly result in significant airspace closures, and air travel disruption will continue across the region, complicating evacuation.

So far, the US Trump administration has sought to distance itself from the Israeli operation. However, Iran’s foreign ministry has stated that the US will also be responsible for the “dangerous consequences” of Israel’s “adventurism”, and there are indications from Iranian television broadcasts that Iran will now not participate in the scheduled negotiations with the US on 15 June.

The most likely US targets to be attacked are the US military bases in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, it is likely that the Iraq-based Iranian proxies, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMFs), will engage in rocket attacks against these US bases. Such attacks would highly likely lead to retaliation from the US, threatening to further escalate the conflict.

Should Hezbollah resume direct conflict with Israel, this would almost certainly be met with Israeli airstrikes against Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, particularly in the Dahieh suburbs of southern Beirut, the Beqaa Valley, and south of the Litani River.

As the Royal Jordanian Air Force has already engaged in interceptions of Iranian aerial threats over Jordan’s airspace, this poses an immediate threat of debris in Jordan. Furthermore, Jordanian involvement has previously led to civil unrest in Amman, and this will likely occur again, particularly in the vicinity of the Israeli and US embassies.

It is unlikely but possible that retaliation from Tehran and its proxies will develop to involve strikes against US military bases in the Gulf states, particularly Kuwait and Bahrain, but also the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. Gulf state leaders have made distinct efforts to condemn the Israeli strikes, with Iranian officials having previously threatened attacks against US interests across the region in the event of escalation.

For the Gulf states, the highest impact potential outcome is the development of the conflict into a protracted regional conflict involving the US, characterised by the targeting of energy facilities across the region. Strikes against Gulf oil facilities are a key capability Iran can deploy against US interests in the region and threaten to disrupt the global economy.

INTELLIGENCE TEAM’S GUIDANCE

•Closely monitor local news reports, government alerts, and the Solace Secure platform and trusted local media for updates. There is a high likelihood of disinformation being published regarding the nature of the plane crash.

•Follow Air India’s X page found here for the latest information regarding the incident.

•Expect significant transport disruptions near the airport and crash site. Where possible, use alternative routes.

•Confirm all flights with your airline if scheduled to depart from or arrive at Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport.

•If stranded or delayed, contact your airline’s 24/7 helpline to arrange alternative flights.

•If staying near the airport or crash site, expect transit delays due to crash-related roadblocks. Consider moving hotels to somewhere away from the airport.

•Expect reduced capacity for emergency services in the Ahmedabad area over the coming hours.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The civil unrest has been characterised by the relatively small size of demonstrations, compared to, for example, the Black Lives Matter protests. However, despite the low attendance, the level of disruption has been pronounced, highly likely due to a combination of both the propensity for the attendees to conduct direct action and due to the forceful response by authorities.

It is highly likely that protests will continue in the following days, given the so far established cycle of escalation. ICE raids were the initial primary trigger for the unrest, with the protests in Paramount, for example, being triggered by rumours of an ICE raid at a Home Depot. It is almost certain that further ICE raids will continue to act as a trigger for localised demonstrations in major US cities, with protesters attempting to stop the mass detentions through direct action.

As the protests progressed, however, additional triggers for escalation materialised. First, the arrest and hospitalisation of David Huerta, the President of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), acted as a trigger for protests within the organised labour movement, with union chapters coordinating demonstrations.

Second, the deployment of the National Guard and then the proposed deployment of active-duty US Marines have catalysed so-called “solidarity” protests in other US cities.

A key trigger for further escalation would be the unlikely but possible scenario of the Trump administration invoking the Insurrection Act, which would allow the deployment of the armed forces for law-enforcement activities.

The most likely hotspots for demonstrations (and associated violent clashes with authorities) continue to be federal facilities, particularly ICE offices and federal detention centres, and areas where ICE raids are being conducted (with social media being a key means of enabling this).

There is a high risk of collateral violence to bystanders at these protests, given the levels of violence thus far, and they should be avoided as far as possible. Furthermore, the unrest has resulted in significant transport disruptions, with major freeway closures such as the 101 Freeway being closed in Los Angeles.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Eyewitness accounts and video footage captured in the immediate prelude to the incident indicate that the car ramming likely occurred after an altercation erupted between the suspect, who had entered the newly reopened street, and supporters who had surrounded his vehicle. The information available thus far likely indicates a lack of premeditation or terror-related motive for the attack.

In the aftermath of the attack, there have been several reported cases of disinformation being spread online regarding the perpetrator’s identity and motive for the attack. These are almost certainly meant to provoke retaliatory violence against minority communities in the UK and mirror a phenomenon already observed in the immediate aftermath of the stabbing attack in Southport in July 2024.

As of 27 May, UK authorities have taken several steps to combat the spread of misinformation, and a decrease in the engagement of disinformation narratives on select social networks has been observed. Nevertheless, a remote possibility of “retaliatory” attacks following the incident remains extant.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The airstrikes come amid escalatory tit-for-tat actions between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam attack, which resulted in at least 26 civilian deaths. The attack was allegedly orchestrated by the Resistance Front, a reported offshoot of the Pakistan-linked terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The high civilian toll, almost all of whom were Hindu Indian nationals, has escalated tensions between India and Pakistan, prompting mass deportations and the imposition of airspace restrictions in the days leading up to the 7 May strikes.

There is precedent for India retaliating with airstrikes after perceived Pakistan-backed militant attacks on its territory. In 2016 India launched “surgical strikes” against Pakistan after four militants killed 19 Indian soldiers in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir; in 2019, further strikes were launched in Balakot after 40 Indian paramilitary personnel were killed in a bombing in Pulwama.

Indian strikes on Pakistan have generally been subthreshold, designed to target militant camps to carry out retaliatory measures while not forcing Islamabad into entering into a direct conflict.

While Pakistan has responded with limited artillery shelling along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, it is likely Pakistan will be forced to respond with airstrikes under mounting public pressure. Pakistani retaliatory strikes are highly likely to be carefully calibrated to remain below the escalation threshold and to avoid triggering a major conflict with a rival nuclear power.

During previous hostilities in 2019, Pakistan refrained from directly targeting Indian military sites, instead striking open areas to demonstrate its capability while limiting civilian casualties. To avoid a major escalation or miscalculation, Pakistan will likely limit its strikes to Indian-administered territory in Jammu and Kashmir.

The targeting of dams, particularly in Indian-administered Kashmir, is highly likely due to India’s perceived weaponisation of water flows after unilaterally pulling out of the Indus Water Treaty. This has significantly escalated tensions between the two sides since it threatens Pakistan’s water supply and agricultural sector, with Pakistan having warned that any attempt from India to disrupt the flow of water from its rivers would be considered an act of war.

Over the past week, India has taken steps to enhance the storage capacity at two hydroelectric facilities in Jammu and Kashmir’s Himalayan region, constituting the first concrete action outside the framework of the Indus Water Treaty. In a highly likely perceived threat to Pakistan’s water supply, India began flushing silt at the Baglihar and Salal dams in the Kashmir valley on 3 May. This would ordinarily only be allowed during the monsoon season, as it involves nearly emptying the reservoirs of silt before closing the dams and slowly refilling them, choking water flow downstream.

Pakistan recorded a significant decrease in the waters of the Chenab River, and since 4 May, almost 90 per cent of the usual volume has been prevented from flowing into the Chenab River.

A full-scale conflict between the two nations remains unlikely despite the airstrikes. For India, a war would highly likely drag the country into a prolonged conflict that would significantly affect its economy. This would almost certainly stretch India’s armed forces, which have been underfunded in recent years, allowing Pakistan to catch up militarily.

Although the US has developed closer ties with India, especially during the Trump administration, a conflict between India and Pakistan would likely impact the global economy, giving the US a strong interest in promoting de-escalation.

Pakistan almost certainly cannot afford to enter a war. Pakistan Armed Forces are currently engaged in a multi-front internal conflict against militant groups, primarily in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. While its military is more battle-tested than India’s, a war would almost certainly overstretch its armed forces, would risk destabilising the military-dominated government and would provide opportunities for militants to exploit.

Furthermore, a conflict would hinder the country’s progress in stabilising its economy. Pakistan was removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list in 2023 after legislative and institutional reforms to address perceived anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing deficiencies. India has indicated plans to advocate for Pakistan’s re-entry in the aftermath of the militant attack, and a war would significantly increase the likelihood of this happening.

Furthermore, a conflict would hinder the country’s progress in stabilising its economy. Pakistan was removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list in 2023 after legislative and institutional reforms to address perceived anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing deficiencies. India has indicated plans to advocate for Pakistan’s re-entry in the aftermath of the militant attack, and a war would significantly increase the likelihood of this happening.

If re-added, Pakistan would almost certainly face reduced investment and foreign aid, as well as risk being blacklisted, which would significantly affect is ability to finance its debt repayments.

Given that both nations are nuclear-armed, a full-scale conflict would risk rapid escalation and nuclear war. This acts as a deterrence from escalation for both sides, who will likely favour diplomatic options and limited skirmishes despite the ongoing brinkmanship. Diplomatic pressure will almost certainly be applied by regional powers including China.

Amid heightened sectarian tensions, there will highly likely be increased attacks between Hindus and Muslims in India and Pakistan, with probable clashes during protests. There is a realistic possibility of sectarian tensions also manifesting within diaspora communities, such as within the UK, US, and Canada. Disinformation campaigns framing the attack as a symptom of an inter-religious conflict are likely and will almost certainly exacerbate tensions.

This is especially since the tensions come shortly after Modi passed the Waqf Amendment Act, which changes the way Muslim waqf properties are governed, triggering violent protests by conservative Muslim communities, particularly in West Bengal.

There is a realistic possibility of lone-actor attacks, further inflaming sectarian tensions. Security forces of both countries will almost certainly be at a heightened state of alert during the current tensions, which likely reduces the threshold at which they will respond forcefully to perceived unrest, making clashes between protesters and security forces likely.