Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence and Travel Advice

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 1 September 2026 – 4 September 2026

Executive Summary

• On 1 September, US Central Command (CENTCOM) struck approximately 100 targets in Iran, as well as two Iranian tankers under a new “tanker for tanker” policy intended to deter Iranian attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH).
• Iran retaliated with ballistic missile and drone attacks against US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq, with further attacks against Kuwait on 3 September. A drone struck a residential complex in Kuwait, and claims of Iranian attacks against bases in the UAE remain unconfirmed.
• A US official stated that the strikes had degraded Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping in the SoH and had “bought at least a month” of reduced threat levels. Reporting indicates that they form part of a CENTCOM plan for limited, periodic strikes to prevent Iran from reconstituting these capabilities.
• Iran’s principal leverage, its ability to disrupt transit through the SoH, has likely been substantially eroded. Further Iranian attempts to mine the strait or to intensify attacks on commercial shipping are highly likely in the coming weeks, which could lead to further strike exchanges.
• The exchange highly likely does not represent a return to the large-scale operations conducted earlier in the conflict, but the current deadlock likely imposes greater costs on Tehran. Iran is therefore likely to become increasingly incentivised to initiate its own escalation to break it.
• On 3 September, the Houthis launched a ground offensive against Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces in Taiz governorate, the most intense fighting in Yemen since 2022. Saudi air intervention is likely should the offensive threaten a significant territorial reversal, which would highly likely trigger increased Houthi attacks against southern Saudi Arabia.
• As of 4 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia have recently been periodically closed due to the Houthi threat.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 28 August 2026 – 1 September 2026

Executive Summary

• On 30 August, US Central Command (CENTCOM) claimed to have struck two Iranian rocket launchers on Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) after Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces were observed preparing to launch rockets carrying sea mines into the SoH.
• The IRGC retaliated hours later with ballistic missile and drone attacks against King Hussein Air Base near Mafraq and Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Azraq, Jordan. Jordanian air defences reported intercepting eight missiles, with no casualties or damage reported. On 31 August, Iranian forces claimed a drone attack against Al Minhad Air Base in the UAE, but Emirati authorities stated that the UAE engaged a drone over its territorial waters and denied that the base had been struck.
• US President Donald Trump stated on 31 August that there would be a response and that the US was “going to hit them hard”. Reporting the same day indicated that CENTCOM has developed a plan for limited, periodic strikes to prevent Iran from reconstituting its capabilities around the SoH.
• Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict, its ability to interdict transit through the SoH, has likely been notably eroded. Tehran almost certainly retains a strong incentive to restore its previously superior leverage over the SoH, despite the high risks of direct military confrontation with the US. Further Iranian attempts to mine the strait or to intensify attacks on commercial shipping are likely in the coming weeks, with these actions likely risking further strike exchanges.
• Reporting indicates that the targeting of the UAE was highly limited and likely performative, and it is likely that the attempted attack was intended as a warning to the UAE against implementing its announced financial embargo.
• As of 1 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, the airspace over Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia has recently been periodically closed due to the Houthi threat.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 25 August 2026 – 28 August 2026

Executive Summary

• Reporting on 25 August indicated that the US Secretary of State has told allies the US does not expect to conduct renewed strikes against Iran “for the time being”, and that the US is preparing to return diplomatic staff to regional embassies. The US is unlikely to initiate major offensive operations against Iran in the short term.
• On 26 August, an Iranian army spokesperson set out four principles of a revised military doctrine, framed as a shift to an offensive posture: rapid response, disproportionate retaliation, pre-emptive action against US assets, and geographic target expansion. The doctrine almost certainly lowers Iran’s threshold for the first use of force and highly likely increases the risk of miscalculation.
• Iran’s principal leverage, its ability to interdict transit through the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), has likely been degraded. Combined with economic pressure through Operation Economic Outcast and the US blockade, this likely increases Tehran’s incentive to escalate militarily. The risk that Iran now initiates offensive escalation in the coming weeks has highly likely risen.
• Oman’s Foreign Minister visited Tehran on 25 August to continue talks on management of the SoH. While Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister stated that an agreement was made, a senior Iranian source briefed international media that the deal had not been finalised. Iranian officials have consistently stated that an agreement with Oman would not open the SoH until the US meets Iran’s conditions in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
• As of 28 August, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 21 August 2026 – 25 August 2026

Executive Summary

• On 24 August, the US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, announced “Operation Economic Outcast”, which significantly expands the categories of activity subject to US secondary sanctions.
• Bessent has stated that the economic campaign can reduce the need for “American force” against Iran, and US officials cited by US media indicated that the expanded economic campaign is expected to remain the primary instrument against Iran until at least after the US midterm elections.
• On 22 August, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Mohsen Rezaei, stated that any country participating in the imposition of economic restrictions on Iran would be regarded as an enemy, warning of “seismic” retaliation and that “not even a drop of oil” would leave the Gulf region, including via export routes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz (SoH).
• The likely progressive degradation of Iran’s ability to interdict transit through the SoH, achieved through US-escorted night-time convoys along the Omani coast and the rerouting of Gulf export volumes away from the SoH, combined with intensified economic pressure, likely increases Iranian incentives to escalate militarily in order to restore leverage.
• On 24 August, a tanker operated by Saudi Arabia’s national shipping company was struck west of Yanbu in the Red Sea in an attack claimed by the Houthis. The conflict in Yemen has continued at an increased intensity, with the risk that either the Houthis or Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) forces initiate a ground offensive remaining elevated. Either scenario would highly likely trigger a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and attack drone strikes against Saudi Arabia.
• As of 25 August, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 18 August 2026 – 21 August 2026

Executive Summary

• On 19 August, US President Donald Trump announced an intensified economic campaign against Iran, with the US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, stating on 20 August that the imposition of maximum economic pressure would likely mean that there would not be a large-scale resumption of combat operations.
• The economic campaign likely increases the risk that Iran escalates militarily in order to impose costs and compel a return to its perception of the Memorandum of Understanding. Tehran is likely incentivised to exploit the widely reported US munitions shortage before the US has the opportunity to regroup and regenerate capability.
• On 20 August, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that Iran would employ more precise and more destructive weaponry in the event of a renewed war.
• On 18 August, the UAE issued a public alert warning of ballistic missiles heading towards the country, before stating that the missiles had targeted maritime navigation rather than Emirati territory. The UAE subsequently announced that all economic activity with Iran had been halted until further notice. If enforced, this would likely erode a key economic incentive for recent Iranian restraint towards the UAE.
• The conflict in Yemen has continued to intensify, with the Yemeni government warning that the Houthis are preparing an offensive to seize coastal territory adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The launching of a Saudi-backed ground offensive against the Houthis or a Houthi ground offensive against the internationally recognised government (IRG) would highly likely trigger a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and attack drone strikes against Saudi Arabia.
• As of 21 August, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 14 August 2026 – 18 August 2026

Executive Summary

• The 60-day negotiating period established by the 17 June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) expired on 17 August without a publicly declared extension or resumption of conflict.
• On 17 August, a senior Iranian official told international media that Tehran had shifted its posture from defence to offence, and that Iran would escalate tensions in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and the wider region, conducting a “timely and precise” attack to break the US naval blockade, if the US failed to implement the MoU in full “in a matter of weeks”.
• This stated posture shift is likely intended primarily to compel the US back into the MoU framework. The absence of a specified deadline date likely indicates that Tehran intends to preserve flexibility and avoid a fixed commitment. However, this likely increases the risk that Tehran will attempt to break the deadlock in the coming weeks with escalation calibrated to raise costs to the US.
• Further claimed Houthi attacks against Aramco facilities in Jazan and Najran almost certainly reflect continuing Houthi prioritisation of attacks against energy infrastructure in southern Saudi Arabia, with further such attacks highly likely in the coming week.
• The conflict in Yemen has continued to intensify. The launching of a Saudi-backed ground offensive against the Houthis or a Houthi ground offensive against the internationally recognised government (IRG) would highly likely trigger a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and attack drone strikes against Saudi Arabia.
• As of 18 August, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 11 August 2026 – 14 August 2026

Executive Summary

• On 12 August, citing Pakistani government sources, Turkish state-run media reported that the US and Iran had agreed to extend the 60-day ceasefire agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) ahead of its expiry on 17 August. However, after this report was published, a senior Iranian source said that no talks on extending the ceasefire have taken place.
• The conflict has likely now entered a lower-intensity phase in which neither party currently assesses that renewed large-scale operations are in their interests. The US is highly likely militarily constrained by munitions shortages and is prioritising economic pressure through the blockade, while Iran is almost certainly exploiting the pause to regenerate capability and retains the closure of the SoH as its principal source of leverage.
• A formal lapse of the 60-day truce period on 17 August is unlikely in itself to trigger an immediate resumption of large-scale strikes, and a de facto pause would likely persist without any publicly declared extension. However, the situation almost certainly remains fragile with multiple triggers for rapid escalation, particularly the ongoing maritime blockades.
• On 13 August, Houthi-affiliated Yemeni media reported that the Houthis successfully targeted an Aramco refinery in the Jazan region with two drones. Saudi authorities or Aramco have not confirmed the attack as of 14 August.
• An intensification in conflict between Yemen’s Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) forces and the Houthis is almost certainly the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce. The launching of a Saudi-backed ground offensive against the Houthis or a Houthi ground offensive against the IRG would highly likely trigger a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and attack drone strikes against Saudi Arabia.
• As of 14 August, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 7 August 2026 – 11 August 2026

Executive Summary

• Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.
• On 8 August, Iran set out multiple maximalist demands for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). Iranian officials have stated explicitly that an Iran-Oman agreement will not by itself reopen the SoH. US President Donald Trump rejected these conditions, stating on 9 August that the US was “only semi-negotiating” with Iran and on 10 August demanding compensation from Iran.
• Iran-backed Iraqi militias claimed to have postponed retaliatory strikes against US and Saudi targets, and no attacks originating from Iraq have been reported between 7 and 11 August. The postponement is explicitly temporary, and Iraqi militias almost certainly retain both the capability and the intent to strike Saudi and US targets.
• Continued Houthi attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, Red Sea shipping, and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces almost certainly demonstrate the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. The 9 August strike against the Jazan refinery indicates that the Houthis are highly likely to continue targeting Saudi energy infrastructure.
• A simultaneous attack against Saudi Arabia from both Houthi-controlled Yemen and Iraq would likely force Saudi Arabia to disperse aircraft, radar, and air defence systems across multiple directions, potentially overstretching air defences and exposing gaps in coverage.
• As of 11 August, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 4 August 2026 – 7 August 2026

Executive Summary

• Despite a relative reduction in US strikes against Iran and concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.
• Iran-Oman negotiations on managing the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) are reportedly close to a deal, with Iran’s foreign ministry stating that a joint announcement is being finalised “if certain third parties do not obstruct this process”.
• On 6 August, reporting was published regarding earlier warnings issued by Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi to Gulf states. The warning reportedly explicitly threatened that “energy facilities, oil fields, refineries, electricity grids, water infrastructure, transport networks and other strategic assets” in regional states would be targeted if US strikes against Iran restarted, particularly if characterised by the targeting of Iranian infrastructure.
• Houthi attacks against Saudi-linked vessels, southern Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces almost certainly demonstrate the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis.
• A senior Saudi official briefed international media on 6 August that intelligence indicates that the Houthis and Iran-supervised Iraqi militias could soon launch coordinated attacks against Saudi civilian targets including energy infrastructure, ports, and airports. A simultaneous attack from multiple axes would likely force Saudi Arabia to disperse aircraft, radar, and air defence systems across multiple directions, potentially overstretching air defences and exposing gaps in coverage.
• As of 7 August, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 31 July 2026 – 4 August 2026

Executive Summary

• On 1 August, US President Donald Trump announced on social media that he had cancelled what he characterised as a highly significant planned attack against Iran. There is almost certainly significant concern among regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, that US strikes against Iranian infrastructure will trigger considerable Iranian retaliation against regional oil and gas infrastructure, as repeatedly threatened.
• President Trump later claimed that US-Iran talks would resume on 3 August, but Iran’s Foreign Ministry denied this, stating that Iran’s only talks were being conducted with Oman over management of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH).
• The Iran-Oman talks are reportedly close to agreeing a proposal which would give Iran considerable control over the SoH long-term, which has been strongly opposed by the US and regional allies through the conflict. However, indications from reports on 4 August suggest that the Trump administration may now be willing to grant this concession.
• Kinetic activity in the period 31 July to 4 August has consisted of: at least three attempted attacks against vessels in the SoH transiting near Oman; two limited attempted attack drone strikes in Kuwait; and the Houthis in Yemen claiming to have hit a “sensitive site” with a drone strike at Najran Airport in Saudi Arabia.
• Previously, the US has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels. If further such strikes are conducted, these would highly likely be followed by Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in regional states, most likely US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
• As of 4 August, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 28 July 2026 – 31 July 2026

Executive Summary

• On the evening of 29 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces carried out a series of strikes on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets in Iran. Strikes were reported in multiple southern Iranian cities, including Bushehr and Bandar Abbas, as well as Qeshm and Kish islands. Strikes continued into 30 July. No further US strikes on Iran were reported overnight 30-31 July.
• Iranian forces carried out strikes targeting US military assets in Jordan and Kuwait, with a strike in Kuwait reportedly resulting in one civilian death. IRGC channels also claimed to have carried out strikes in Bahrain, without specifying a date.
• Also on 30 July, international media quoted Yemeni sources’ assessment that Saudi forces are withdrawing from positions in eastern Yemen in preparations for a land offensive and/or maritime operations targeting the Houthis, following the group’s threats to blockade the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and their attacks on Saudi oil and gas infrastructure.
• The reciprocal US and Iranian blockades remain in place in the Strait of Hormuz, while the Houthis have pledged to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. On 30 July, a Saudi-led defensive alliance to maintain open regional maritime routes, called the Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance, was launched.
• As long as the competing blockades are maintained, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain.
• The IRGC is likely to exploit the use of regional proxies, particularly Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq, to continue low-level attacks against regional states.
• As of 31 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 24 July 2026 – 28 July 2026

Executive Summary

• US President Donald Trump reportedly directed the US military not to conduct new strikes in Iran on 24 July. Iranian officials stated to international media on 26 July that Iran would maintain a posture of “retaliation” and continue to refrain from attacks provided the US sustained its own pause on attacks.
• On 27 July, President Trump told US media that if claimed ongoing “very deep talks” with Iran do not work out, the US will return to “very strong military action”, and that he is unwilling to give diplomacy “much time”, saying that “either it goes fast or not at all.”
• The US and Iranian maritime posture officially remains unchanged, with CENTCOM stating on 25 July that the US blockade on Iran remains in effect, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC-N) announcing continued attempts to enforce its control of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH).
• Despite the pause in US strikes against Iran and concurrent pause in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown with minimal indicators and warnings.
• As long as the competing blockades are maintained, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain.
• The IRGC is likely to exploit the use of regional proxies, particularly Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq, to continue low-level attacks against regional states. Moreover, further Houthi strikes against Saudi Arabia will highly likely follow any further Saudi strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen conducted in retaliation for Houthi attacks against Saudi-flagged vessels.
• As of 28 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 21 July 2026 – 24 July 2026

Executive Summary

• Between 21 and 24 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several more rounds of strikes against Iran up to its thirteenth consecutive night overnight 23-24 July. Iranian forces on each occasion launched retaliation strikes against claimed US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Air raid sirens were additionally briefly activated in Dammam, Saudi Arabia on 22 July, although it remains unconfirmed whether Saudi Arabia was directly targeted.
• On 22 July, US President Donald Trump threatened that each time Iran attacks a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, the US will destroy an Iranian bridge or power plant. Senior Iranian politicians, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-affiliated media each threatened retaliation strikes against energy infrastructure targets across the region.
• The previously announced Houthi maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia has now materialised into kinetic activity, with Houthi attacks against two Saudi Arabia-flagged oil tankers on 22 July. Houthi attacks on Saudi-linked vessels likely raise the risk of Saudi strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen, which would in turn likely prompt further Houthi attacks against Saudi territory.
• On 23 July, President Trump stated in an interview that he is considering an attack larger “than ever before” against Iran. US officials briefed that no decision has yet been made or orders given on the launching of an expanded operation against Iran.
• On 23 July, the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) upgraded the travel advisory rating for both Kuwait and Bahrain to advise against all but essential travel.
• As of 24 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, numerous flight cancellations have followed the resumption of attacks.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 17 July 2026 – 21 July 2026

Executive Summary

• Between 17-21 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted daily waves of strikes against Iran. In retaliation, Iran has conducted attacks against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
• Iranian forces have continued to conduct attacks against power and desalination plants in Kuwait, claimed to have targeted an Amazon data centre in Bahrain, and launched an attack against Aqaba in southern Jordan, in close proximity to Eilat, Israel.
• At least two US military personnel were killed as a result of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ballistic missile and attack drone strikes against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Azraq, Jordan, and one US service member was reported as being killed in northern Iraq. The first such deaths since March, these almost certainly mark an escalation which placed greater pressure on the Trump administration to continue escalating despite ongoing efforts by regional mediators to propose a ten-day ceasefire.
• An attack against Saudi Arabia, the first since April, appears to have been highly limited and likely primarily symbolic. The attack coincides with the escalation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis, and may be an attempt by Tehran to ward off further Saudi action against the Houthis.
• On 20 July, the Houthis announced a maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia, effective immediately. Messages were subsequently broadcast over marine VHF radio warning vessels not to dock at Saudi ports, or they will be treated as targets. The Houthi declaration has not yet materialised into kinetic activity against Saudi-linked vessels as of 21 July. Any such Houthi attacks would likely lead to Saudi strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen, which in turn would likely lead to the launching of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia.
• As of 21 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Numerous flight cancellations have followed the resumption of attacks.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 14 July 2026 – 17 July 2026

Executive Summary

• Overnight 14-15 July, CENTCOM conducted a seven-hour wave of strikes against dozens of military targets in Iran. On 15 July, the IRGC conducted retaliatory strikes against targets in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan. The US conducted further waves of strikes on 15-17 July, with further Iranian retaliation salvos being launched at targets in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar.
• US President Trump threatened on 14 July that strikes would be conducted against Iran’s bridges and power plants next week “unless they get to the table and negotiate.” Overnight 16-17 July, the US struck seven bridges and railway, port, and airport infrastructure. Iran has also accused the US of targeting “power infrastructure”, although this remains unconfirmed.
• On 17 July, Kuwait’s Ministry of Electricity, Water and Renewable Energy stated that one of its electricity generation and water desalination plants was targeted by Iran in the latest attack, resulting in fire and damage to the site. Further attacks against civilian infrastructure is highly likely.
• Reports emerged on 14 July that an Iranian missile targeting Bahrain during the overnight 13-14 July attack may have used a cluster munition warhead. While this remains unconfirmed, if repeated, it would almost certainly increase the risk of collateral damage from Iranian strikes.
• Following an attempted Houthi attack against Abha International Airport, Saudi authorities issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) which closed Abha, Jizan and Najran airports until 18:00 local time, 14 July. The NOTAM has been extended to 15:00 UTC, 17 July.
• As of 17 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. However, on 14 July, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB) which recommended that air operators should not operate within the airspace of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and over the waters of the Gulf of Oman within Omani airspace. The notification is valid until 29 July.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 10 July 2026 – 14 July 2026

Executive Summary

• US President Donald Trump again declared on 10 July that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and its ceasefire with Iran were “over”. Subsequently, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attacked further vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and declared that the SoH is closed, and the Trump administration announced the reimposition of the naval blockade against Iran to go into effect on 14 July.
• Between 11 and 14 July, US forces conducted daily strikes against targets in Iran. In retaliation, the IRGC launched attacks against primarily US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. Air defences were also activated in the UAE, although officials later claimed this was for Iranian projectiles outside of “UAE borders”.
• The MoU has almost certainly ended as a functioning de-escalation framework, even if it has not been formally abrogated by either party. The conflict has likely now entered a new, higher-intensity phase characterised by regular US strike packages and subsequent Iranian retaliatory salvos against targets in the Gulf states and Jordan.
• Following strikes against Sanaa International Airport in Houthi-controlled Yemen on 13 July, the Houthis launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and attack drones against southern Saudi Arabia, with Abha International Airport and King Khalid Air Base being targeted.
• As of 14 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. However, on 14 July, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB) which recommended that air operators should not operate within the airspace of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and over the waters of the Gulf of Oman within Omani airspace.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 7 July 2026 – 10 July 2026

Executive Summary

• Following the earlier reported Iranian strikes against vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) overnight 6-7 July, the US conducted strikes against Iran, which were followed by Iran launching attacks against targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan.
• The 7-9 July exchanges almost certainly represent the most severe escalation since the implementation of the MoU, exceeding the 26-28 June cycle in scale, duration and target selection.
• Speaking at the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, on 8 July, US President Trump stated that he believed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran was “over”. However, a US official briefed after a meeting between President Trump and his national security team on 9 July that the US is “still committed to finding a resolution, and technical-level talks continue”.
• Iran almost certainly retains the capabilities to further escalate in response to US attacks. Escalation options publicly outlined on 8 July included Iran closing the Bab al-Mandeb Strait (BaM) and expanding strikes “to other American bases in the region”. Furthermore, a senior Iranian official stated on 10 July that attacks against infrastructure would be met with retaliation.
• A closure of the BaM would almost certainly require Houthi participation, and a recent deterioration in Houthi-Saudi relations almost certainly increases the credibility of this threat. On 7 July, the Houthis issued an ultimatum to Saudi Arabia threatening to close the BaM and the Red Sea to Saudi shipping if the naval and aerial blockades of the Houthis are not lifted.
• As of 10 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 3 July 2026 – 7 July 2026

Executive Summary

• Overnight 6-7 July, at least two vessels were attacked in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). These attacks have taken place just over a week after the US and Iran agreed to halt tit-for-tat strikes that were exchanged 26-28 June, which also followed attacks against vessels in the SoH.
• There is a realistic possibility of a similar cycle of escalation occurring in the coming days, with limited US strikes against Iranian territory highly likely to be followed by limited Iranian strikes targeting US regional bases, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain, given recently established target prioritisation.
• On 3 July, a spokesman for Yemen’s Houthis announced that Saudi Arabian “warplanes” had been confronted by Houthi air defence, and that repeated airspace violations would be retaliated against with strikes on Saudi Arabia’s airports and other “vital interests”. A spokesman for the Saudi Arabia-led coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG) issued threats in response.
• The exchange of threats marks what is likely the most significant escalation in rhetoric between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia in years, and was followed by clashes between Houthi and Yemeni IRG forces. While the risk of a full resumption of the Yemeni civil war and a return to full-scale conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia is unlikely in the immediate term, the risk has risen significantly in the last few days.
• As of 7 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 30 June 2026 – 3 July 2026

Executive Summary

• US and Iranian officials held indirect talks in Doha on 30 June and 1 July. Officials reported that the talks were focused solely on the technical issues of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and the unfreezing of Iranian funds.
• Qatar’s Foreign Ministry stated that the next meetings are scheduled to take place after the funeral processions for Iran’s now deceased former Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is scheduled to be buried on 9 July.
• Iranian channels have continued to claim sovereignty over the SoH, and have threatened to resume strikes on vessels that do not abide by Iranian instructions.
• US media reported on 1 July that US President Donald Trump had considered the possibility of carrying out a new wave of strikes on Iran, but eventually decided against it.
• Israeli and Hezbollah forces have continued to engage in clashes in southern Lebanon. Ongoing conflict in Lebanon is likely to be a key trigger for destabilising the broader ceasefire.
• There remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement. These cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to strikes against regional countries, with targets in Bahrain and Kuwait being more recently prioritised by Iran.
• As of 3 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 26 June 2026 – 30 June 2026

Executive Summary

• Since 26 June, the fragile ceasefire formalised in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the US and Iran on 17 June has come under serious strain, with the US and Iran trading direct fire for the first time since the MoU’s signing.
• On both 26 and 27 June, the US conducted strikes in Iran. These strikes followed Iranian attacks against two vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH).
• In retaliation, Iran launched attack drones and ballistic missiles against targets in Bahrain and Kuwait on 27 and 28 June, with the IRGC claiming to have targeted the Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.
• During the 28 June attacks against Bahrain, a residential building near Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was damaged, with no fatalities reported.
• Despite the first direct kinetic engagement between the US and Iran since the signing of the MoU, the strikes conducted by both Iran and the US were likely calibrated to remain sub-threshold for a return to full-scale conflict.
• Delegations from Iran and the US are in Qatar on 30 June, but it remains unconfirmed whether negotiations will go ahead and in what format.
• There remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement. These cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to strikes against regional countries, with targets in Bahrain and Kuwait being more recently prioritised by Iran.
• As of 30 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 23 June 2026 – 26 June 2026

Executive Summary

• Despite the ceasefire remaining formally in place, Israel and Hezbollah continue to engage in clashes in southern Lebanon.
• Iran reportedly carried out a strike on a vessel trying to exit the Strait of Hormuz. The strike followed the announcement of a UN-led effort to evacuate the personnel of vessels that have remained in the area. Following the strike, the evacuation effort was halted.
• On 25 June, the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) released a joint statement following a ministerial meeting in Bahrain, which reiterated US-GCC partnership commitments. Iran criticised the statement as “interventionist”.
• US Vice-President J.D. Vance stated on 25 June, that the United States and Iran had established a direct channel of communication in Doha to support deconfliction and reduce the chance of the conflict resuming.
• As of 26 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 19 June 2026 – 23 June 2026

Executive Summary

• On 19 June, within an hour of a renewed Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire coming into effect, Israel conducted further strikes in southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah launched drones towards northern Israel.
• On 20 June, Iran’s military headquarters announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, citing continued conflict in Lebanon. US Central Command (CENTCOM) said it had tracked no Iranian movements to close the Strait and that traffic continued to flow, while Iran’s own foreign ministry told Iranian media that shipping was operating normally.
• On 21 June, the first round of Qatar and Pakistan-mediated direct US-Iran talks began at Lake Lucerne, Switzerland. Threats from US President Donald Trump to strike Iran again led to the Iranian delegation reportedly threatening to walk out.
• The second day of the Lucerne Summit went ahead on 22 June, with mediators announcing a 60-day roadmap and several working groups on the key issues. Subsequent statements from both parties contradicted each other on agreements made regarding an invitation for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and the release of some frozen Iranian assets.
• On 22 June, an Israeli statement was issued, which said that Israel Defence Forces (IDF) operations will continue in southern Lebanon. Israeli and Lebanese diplomats are scheduled to hold another round of direct talks on 23 June.
• As of 23 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 16 June 2026 – 19 June 2026

Executive Summary

• On 17 June, US and Iranian officials electronically signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed by both countries. The 14-point document extends the ceasefire and entails several provisions to resume shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
• The immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict has likely decreased with the MoU’s implementation. However, it is likely to be only a ceasefire extension, not yet a substantive and lasting peace agreement.
• The reported agreement is likely vulnerable to continuing conflict in Lebanon, disagreements on the nuclear file in a 60-day negotiating period, and issues regarding the Strait of Hormuz.
• The planned formal signing ceremony between US and Iranian officials in Switzerland on 19 June has been postponed, highly likely due to Israel’s continued attacks in Lebanon.
• A US force withdrawal from the region is reportedly tied to progress on further negotiations. As long as the US force posture is maintained, renewed escalation could rapidly break out with minimal indicators and warnings.
• As of 19 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 12 June 2026 – 16 June 2026

Executive Summary

• On 14 June, an agreed memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Iran and the US was announced. The MoU is reportedly scheduled to be formally signed on 19 June, with the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to follow.
• Almost certainly the biggest diplomatic breakthrough since the implementation of the 8 April ceasefire, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease with the MoU’s implementation. However, it is likely to only be effectively a ceasefire extension and not yet a substantive and lasting peace agreement.
• The announcement of the MoU’s agreement was preceded by further conflict in Lebanon on 14 June, which reportedly almost derailed the deal. Sustained Israeli operations in Lebanon are likely to represent the first major test of the MoU’s implementation. Israeli operations in southern Lebanon have continued as recently as 16 June.
• The reported agreement is likely vulnerable to continuing conflict in Lebanon, disagreements on the nuclear file in a 60-day negotiating period, and issues pertaining to the Strait of Hormuz.
• A US force withdrawal from the region is reportedly tied to progress on further negotiations. As long as the US force posture is maintained, renewed escalation could rapidly break out with minimal indicators and warnings.
• As of 16 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 5 June 2026 – 9 June 2026

Executive Summary

• Israeli operations have continued in southern Lebanon, with an airstrike being conducted against the southern Lebanese city of Tyre on 9 June, resulting in at least eight deaths, which followed the issuance of an Israeli evacuation order for the entire city. There is a realistic possibility of this triggering further Iranian strikes against Israel, which could lead to further exchanges of tit-for-tat strikes and endanger the broader ceasefire.
• Should further Israel-Iran confrontation be triggered by developments in Lebanon, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian retaliation would again extend to the Gulf States. Senior Iranian officials have threatened that the Israeli strikes against Iran, in addition to the ongoing US naval blockade, have made US bases and assets in the region “legitimate targets”.
• Overnight 5-6 June, further Iranian strikes were conducted against Kuwait and Bahrain following confrontation in the maritime domain between the US and Iran. The Kuwaiti military announced the interception of seven ballistic missiles, with interceptions occurring over several residential areas, and authorities stated that debris caused material damage but no injuries. The Bahrain Defence Force announced the interception of three missiles and “several drones”.
• As of 9 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Overnight 5-6 June, Kuwait announced the temporary closure of its airspace, which was reopened on 6 June.

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Intelligence cut off: 13:00 UTC 8 June 2026

Following escalating conflict in Lebanon, Israel and Iran engaged in retaliatory tit-for-tat strikes. Late 7 June, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) stated that it had intercepted a wave of Iranian missiles in northern Israel. Iran reportedly launched at least ten ballistic missiles against Israel, all of which the IDF claimed were intercepted. This was Iran’s first direct attack against Israel since the implementation of the 8 April ceasefire.

The strikes followed a rocket attack on northern Israel launched by Hezbollah in Lebanon on 7 June, which the Israel Defence Forces responded to with strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh).

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 29 May 2026 – 2 June 2026

Executive Summary

• Following reports that a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) had been agreed by US and Iranian negotiators, President Donald Trump reportedly requested several amendments to the MOU regarding the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz.
• On 1 June, Israel’s Prime Minister publicly ordered strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh). IRGC-affiliated media reported that due to the developments in Lebanon, “the Iranian negotiating team is suspending dialogues and exchange of texts through mediators”. President Trump announced a claimed fresh cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and that talks with Iran were “continuing.”
• The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes across the region, likely remains high. Furthermore, the continuing competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz by the US and Iran continue to lead to conflict in the maritime domain, which has repeatedly escalated into broader ‘tit-for-tat’ strikes which have impacted the Gulf States.
• On 30 and 31 May, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that it conducted “self-defense strikes on Iranian radar and command and control sites for drones in Goruk, Iran and Qeshm Island”. These followed “aggressive Iranian actions that included the shootdown of a U.S. MQ-1 drone that was operating over international waters.” The IRGC subsequently announced attempted retaliation strikes against a US air base in Kuwait, with Kuwaiti air defences being activated early 1 June and CENTCOM claiming the interception of two Iranian ballistic missiles.
• As of 2 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 26 May 2026 – 29 May 2026

Executive Summary

• Reports on 28 May have said that the US and Iranian negotiating teams have reached an agreement on a memorandum of understanding (MOU). However, reports also indicate that US President Donald Trump and potentially Iran’s Supreme Leader have yet to give final approval.
• The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes across the region, likely remains high despite the reported progress on a potentially imminent MOU. Moreover, the continuing competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz by the US and Iran continue to lead to conflict in the maritime domain, which has repeatedly escalated into broader ‘tit-for-tat’ strikes which have impacted the Gulf States.
• Should an MOU be agreed, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved.
• On 27 May, further US strikes were conducted against Bandar Abbas in Iran, following Iran’s reportedly launching five one-way attack drones at a US commercial vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
• On 28 May, authorities announced that Kuwaiti air defences were “confronting hostile missile and drone attacks”. The IRGC stated that, following the US attack against Bandar Abbas, “the US air base from which the attack originated was targeted with aerial projectiles”. US CENTCOM stated that Iran launched a ballistic missile towards Kuwait that was successfully intercepted by Kuwaiti forces.
• As of 29 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 22 May 2026 – 26 May 2026

Executive Summary

• Since 22 May, indirect negotiations between the US and Iran have intensified for a potential memorandum of understanding (MOU). Should a framework agreement be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement.
• Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved, and escalation in Lebanon threatens the wider ceasefire.
• In a written statement broadcast on 26 May, Iran’s Supreme Leader stated that “the nations and lands of the region will no longer serve as shields for American bases”. This is almost certainly in reference to the US military presence in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf States.
• On 25 May, the US conducted what Central Command (CENTCOM) described as “self-defence strikes” against “missile launch sites and Iranian boats attempting to emplace mines”, with strikes taking place in the Iranian city of Bandar Abbas next to the Strait of Hormuz. This followed tit-for-tat escalation in the Strait of Hormuz resulting from the competing US and Iranian blockades.
• In addition to endangering the negotiation process, there is a realistic possibility of further Iranian retaliation strikes being soon launched against regional targets, particularly the UAE, in response to the US strikes against Bandar Abbas.
• As of 26 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 19 May 2026 – 22 May 2026

Executive Summary

• On 19 May, it was reported that the US and Iran are working on a “letter of intent”, with a US source claiming that the framework agreement involves a formal end to the war, and the launching of a 30-day negotiation period on the nuclear file and opening the Strait of Hormuz.
• On 21 May, it was reported that two senior Iranian sources have said that Iran’s Supreme Leader gave a directive that Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) should not leave the country. The HEU’s removal is a stated red line for the Trump administration, and White House and other senior Iranian sources denied the reporting.
• Iranian adherence to any interim framework is likely to be undermined by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands.
• The two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines, and a potentially imminent framework agreement would be unlikely to fully resolve these red line issues. If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.
• Escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that sporadic Iranian strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE unless there is a return to full-scale regional conflict.
• On 19 May, the UAE Defence Ministry stated that forces intercepted and destroyed six attack drones in the country’s airspace over the previous 48 hours.
• As of 22 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 15 May 2026 – 19 May 2026

Executive Summary

• On 17 May, Pakistani mediators shared with the US a revised Iranian proposal, which was again rejected as insufficient. US President Donald Trump stated on 18 May that the US had planned to conduct strikes against Iran on 19 May but that this was called off following calls with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.
• The two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines, particularly regarding the nuclear file. If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.
• Escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that sporadic Iranian strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE unless there is a return to full-scale regional conflict.
• On 17 May, the UAE’s Ministry of Defence announced that three attack drones had entered the UAE from the western direction, with one attack drone striking an electrical generator at the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in the Al Dhafra Region. Authorities have stated that “the incident did not affect the safety of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant” and no increase in radiation has been recorded.
• On 17 May, the Saudi Ministry of Defence stated that “three drones were intercepted and destroyed after entering the Kingdom’s airspace coming from Iraqi airspace.” These are the first public claims of hostile projectiles over Saudi Arabia since 12 April, but it is unconfirmed where the drones were targeting, and the incursion may be linked to the attack targeting the UAE.
• As of 19 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Flight restrictions were reactivated in the UAE following renewed Iranian attacks.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 12 May 2026 – 15 May 2026

Executive Summary

• Following the 11 May reports that the UAE had earlier secretly participated in the conflict as an active combatant with kinetic strikes against Iran, reports emerged on 12 May that Saudi Arabia had also launched several strikes against Iran.
• The Saudi strikes likely resulted in an opposite effect to those conducted by the UAE, reducing rather than increasing Iran’s willingness to attack Saudi territory. Riyadh likely ordered limited, calibrated attacks against Iran to restore deterrence, and Tehran likely views an escalation with Saudi Arabia as a higher risk than with the UAE.
• As recently demonstrated, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has highly likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that sporadic Iranian strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE unless there is a return to full-scale regional conflict.
• With the current diplomatic track facing major difficulties, Washington may conclude that a return to conflict is the only means of forcing compliance from Tehran. If this occurs, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.
• Recent leaked assessments by US intelligence services indicate that Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz; regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities; fields 70 per cent of its transporter erector launchers; and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments likely suggest Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes for several more months.
• As of 15 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Flight restrictions were reactivated in the UAE following renewed Iranian attacks.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 8 May 2026 – 12 May 2026

Executive Summary

• On 10 May, Tehran sent through its response to the US-proposed draft agreement, which reportedly included several maximalist demands and minimal to no concessions. US President Donald Trump described the Iranian response as “TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE” and said that the “ceasefire with Iran is on massive life support”.
• On 10 May, Kuwaiti authorities announced the detection of an unspecified number of “hostile drones”, the UAE’s Ministry of Defence announced that Emirati air defence systems successfully engaged two attack drones launched from Iran, and a bulk carrier was reported to have been struck by a drone in Qatar’s territorial waters.
• On 11 May, US media reported that the UAE has secretly participated in the Iran conflict as an active combatant. The emerging reports will likely reinforce Iran’s prioritisation of the UAE as a target over other Gulf States.
• On 12 May, Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior announced that the four individuals arrested early this month for attempting to infiltrate Bubiyan Island, Kuwait, were members of Iran’s IRGC. The attempted infiltration, if confirmed, highlights the ongoing threat of IRGC asymmetric and sabotage operations, particularly against high-value targets such as critical national infrastructure.
• As recently demonstrated, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE in the immediate term due to these factors.
• With the current diplomatic track facing major difficulties, Washington may conclude that a return to conflict is the only means of forcing compliance from Tehran. If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.
• As of 12 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Flight restrictions were reactivated in the UAE following renewed Iranian attacks.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 5 May 2026 – 8 May 2026

Executive Summary

• Iran launched another wave of strikes against the UAE on 5 May. Emirati air defences were activated again on 8 May, with no immediate reports of damage.
• On 5 May, President Trump announced that Project Freedom would be suspended, the US being highly likely constrained by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait suspending the use of their territory and airspace. However, reporting on 7 May indicates that these restrictions have been lifted. Should Project Freedom restart, this would likely lead to further Iranian strikes against the UAE.
• On 7 May, Iranian forces launched missiles and attack drones at three US naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. US forces subsequently conducted strikes against the Iranian city of Bandar Abbas and the island of Qeshm.
• As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE in the short term due to these factors.
• As of 8 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Flight restrictions have been reactivated in the UAE.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 1 May 2026 – 5 May 2026

Executive Summary

• On 4 May, Iranian forces launched 15 missiles and four attack drones at the oil terminal in Fujairah, UAE. This marks the first attacks originating directly from Iran against the Gulf States since the implementation of a ceasefire on 8 April.
• Omani officials also reported that a building housing workers was damaged by an “attack” in the Tibat area of Bukha, which is in close proximity to the Emirati border, with “moderate injuries to two expatriates”.
• The attacks followed the 3 May announcement by US President Donald Trump of the new Project Freedom initiative and escalated conflict in the Strait of Hormuz.
• The Iranian strikes on the UAE almost certainly represent the most significant escalation since the ceasefire’s implementation on 8 April. However, messaging from US President Donald Trump has so far refrained from stating that the ceasefire has been violated or is no longer in effect.
• There is a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring in the maritime domain, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be contained to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain.
• If the US and/or Israel resume strikes against Iran in an effort to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Such attacks would likely involve Iran broadening its targeting, in particular to include oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Emirati port of Fujairah (as it did on 4 April).
• As of 5 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Following the 4 May attacks, flight restrictions have been reactivated in the UAE.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 28 Apr 2026 – 1 May 2026

Executive Summary

• On 29 April, Trump reiterated that US forces will continue to impose a naval blockade on Iran until the Iranian government agrees to a deal that addresses its nuclear programme. Overall, it is unlikely that the US blockade will be capable of compelling Iran to make immediate concessions.
• On 29 April, US officials said that the USS Gerald R Ford carrier is set to depart the Middle East and return to its homeport in Virginia in the coming days. This may be in anticipation of a relief in place with an additional carrier.
• On 30 April, President Trump reportedly received a briefing on potential plans for new military action against Iran. US officials have briefed that the proposals include a “short and powerful” wave of strikes, likely including infrastructure targets.
• If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Attacks would likely involve Iran broadening its targeting to include assets and infrastructure that enable the Gulf States to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz, such as oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Emirati port of Fujairah.
• An Iran-affiliated group reportedly targeted US troops in Bahrain in an information campaign on social media.
• As of 1 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 24 Apr 2026 – 28 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

• On 25 April, Iran’s foreign minister reportedly set forth demands from Tehran in Islamabad that the US naval ‘blockade’ of the Strait of Hormuz be lifted as a precondition for talks, giving a proposal to solve the Strait crisis first with a ceasefire extension, with nuclear negotiations delayed to a later stage.
• US President Donald Trump subsequently announced that a planned trip to Islamabad by US negotiators had been cancelled due to Tehran’s unchanged negotiating position and a lack of commitment to meet, but that this does not mean a resumption of war.
• Continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and the current lack of further US-Iran talks to formally extend the ceasefire have increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict. Such a conflict would highly likely result in renewed Iranian attacks against targets in the Gulf States.
• The current status quo in the Strait of Hormuz is almost certainly untenable for both the US and Iran in the long term, and it is unlikely that either party will be willing to prolong the situation indefinitely.
• On 24 April, Kuwait’s Ministry of Defence stated that two northern border posts were targeted by drones originating from Iraq, resulting in material damage but no casualties.
• As of 28 April, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman’s airspaces are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 21 Apr 2026 – 24 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

• On 21 April, potential US-Iran talks in Pakistan were put on hold after Iran refused to send a delegation to the negotiations. US President Donald Trump subsequently unilaterally extended the ceasefire indefinitely, although US officials briefed on 22 April that the extension is expected to last only three to five days.
• The USS George H.W. Bush carrier strike group (CSG) entered the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AoR) on 23 April, transiting past eastern Africa. Depending on transit speed, the Bush CSG is anticipated to be on station within two to four days.
• On 22 April, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media outlet Fars News Agency published a list of threatened targets in the Gulf States if their “geography and facilities are used” in attacks against Iran. These included specific oil and gas facilities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.
• As of 24 April, Kuwaiti airspace has been opened following an announcement by the authorities. Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar’s airspaces are open, although carriers must adhere to strict procedures. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspaces remain fully open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 17 Apr 2026 – 21 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

• US President Donald Trump stated on 20 April that the deadline for the two-week ceasefire is now Wednesday evening (22 April), Washington time.
• The ceasefire came under significant pressure and has been considered on the verge of collapse following continuing disputes in the Strait of Hormuz.
• As of 21 April, it remains unclear whether further potential talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, between the US and Iran will go ahead. US Vice President JD Vance is expected to travel to Islamabad imminently, with Iranian participation unconfirmed.
• If a ceasefire extension is not agreed upon before its expiration or potential talks result in a total breakdown in negotiations, there is a high likelihood of kinetic activity returning to pre-ceasefire levels. All parties have likely exploited the ceasefire to improve their offensive and defensive positions.
• On 20 April, the UAE’s State Security Agency announced that it dismantled a “terrorist organisation” and arrested its member over an alleged plot which included plans for “coordinated terrorist and sabotage attacks”.
• As of 21 April, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahraini airspace is open, but with a high rate of flight cancellations. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains unused by almost all carriers, but Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 14 Apr 2026 – 17 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

• US officials have briefed that further direct in-person talks are likely before the expiration of the ceasefire. A Pakistani delegation visited Tehran on 16 April, and calls and draft proposal exchanges have reportedly continued remotely between the US and Iran.
• Both Iran and the US almost certainly remain incentivised to continue negotiations in the immediate term, although the ceasefire remains highly fragile and could break down rapidly with minimal advanced warning.
• If a ceasefire extension is not agreed upon in the coming days, there is a high likelihood of kinetic activity returning to pre-ceasefire levels. All parties have likely exploited the ceasefire to improve their offensive and defensive positions.
• On 16 April, US President Donald Trump stated that Israel and Lebanon agreed to a 10-day ceasefire. The status of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire likely plays a key role in either strengthening or weakening the Iran-US ceasefire.
• On 17 April, it was reported that Dubai Police confirmed in official internal documents that “electronic monitoring operations” were used to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group. The individual who sent the video was then reportedly located, lured to a meeting point, and arrested by police.
• As of 17 April, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahraini airspace is open, but with a high rate of flight cancellations. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains unused by almost all carriers, but Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 10 Apr 2026 – 14 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

• Both Iran and the US almost certainly remain incentivised to continue negotiations in the immediate term, although the ceasefire remains highly fragile and could break down rapidly with minimal advanced warning.
• On 11 April, the US began engaging in Pakistan-mediated talks with Iran. However, on 12 April, the talks ended without an agreement.
• Despite the failure of the Islamabad post-ceasefire talks to produce a peace agreement, neither side has declared an end to talks or the ongoing two-week truce.
• Sources indicated on 14 April that a second round of post-ceasefire talks may occur later this week.
• On 12 April, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Iraqi Ambassador following alleged low-scale drone attacks targeting Gulf States that are claimed to have originated from Iraq.
• On 11 April, unconfirmed Bahraini media reports stated that one attack drone was intercepted over the past 24 hours in Bahrain.
• As of 14 April, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahraini airspace is open, but with a high rate of flight cancellations. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains unused by almost all carriers, but Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 8 Apr 2026 – 10 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

• Following the agreement of a 15-day ceasefire on 7 April, US and Iranian officials are scheduled to begin negotiations in Pakistan. Iranian forces have largely paused their attacks on Gulf states, although occasional reports of drone launches have been recorded on 8 and 9 April.
• As of 10 April, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahraini airspace is partially open, with operations gradually resuming. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, while the airspace is closed to almost all commercial flights, but Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 7 Apr 2026 – 8 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

• On the evening of 7 April, US and Iranian officials agreed to a two-week ceasefire, in a deal brokered by Pakistani officials. The agreement was announced shortly before the deadline set by US President Donald Trump. The deal involves an immediate cessation of hostilities between the US, Israel, and Iran.
• Despite the deal, several Iranian attacks on Gulf states have been recorded on 7-8 April. This is likely due to the breakdown of command and control in Iran caused by US and Israeli strikes.
• Late 7 April, vehicular movement was once again suspended along the King Fahd Causeway connecting Saudi Arabia to Bahrain due to a missile threat, before reopening early 8 April.
• As of 8 April, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 2 Apr 2026 – 7 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

• On 2 April, two US strikes targeted the newly built B1 bridge linking Tehran to Karaj. In response, Iranian media published a list of major bridges across the region. The list includes the Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah Sea Bridge in Kuwait, King Fahd Causeway linking Saudi Arabia to Bahrain, the Sheikh Zayed Bridge and Sheikh Khalifa Bridge in the UAE, and the King Hussein Bridge, the Damia Bridge, and the Abdoun Bridge in Jordan. On 7 March, the King Fahd Causeway was closed due to the threat of Iranian attacks.
• On 7 April, the Israeli military warned the people of Iran not to use trains, with their X account stating: “Dear Citizens, for the sake of your security, we kindly request that from this moment until 21:00 Iran time, you refrain from using and travelling by train throughout Iran. Your presence on trains and near railway lines endangers your life.” This almost certainly increases the likelihood that Iran will target rail infrastructure in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.
• On 5 April, US President Donald Trump issued an ultimatum to Iran, calling on authorities to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and agree to a deal on ending the conflict. President Trump later added that the deadline to reach an agreement would be 20:00 EST on 7 April (00:00 UTC on 8 April).
• Following the US ultimatum, Iranian officials threatened to “irreversibly destroy” critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the region, including power plants and water systems, in response to potential US strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure.
• Multiple CNI sites were struck in Kuwait, including Al Ahmadi Port Refinery, a water and desalination plant, and Shuaiba oil complex.
• Bahraini authorities noted that an Iranian drone attack had likely damaged the GPIC petrochemicals plant. Further damage was also reported at a BAPCO Energies storage facility.
• Multiple civilian and CNI sites were targeted in the UAE, including buildings belonging to the US company Oracle in Dubai, Habshan gas plant, an Emirates Global Aluminium plant near Abu Dhabi, Borouge petrochemicals plant, and the Sharjah telecom building. On 3 April, two fires were reported at the Royal Airwing building at Dubai International Airport (DXB / OMDB).
• The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 7 April, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 31 Mar 2026 – 2 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

• On 31 March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that it would attack US companies in the region starting on 1 April in retaliation for attacks on Iran. The IRGC published a list of 19 companies with corporate offices in the region: Microsoft, Apple, Google (Alphabet), Nvidia, Intel, IBM, Amazon, Meta, Tesla, Boeing, Cisco, Dell, HP, Oracle, Palantir, JPMorgan, General Electric, G42, and Spire Solutions.
• The IRGC’s threat was followed by an additional drone strike on an Amazon data centre in Bahrain, air defences being activated over Dubai, and “minor” damage being reported in the Khalifa Economic Zones Abu Dhabi (KEZAD), UAE, due to debris.
• On 1 April, President Trump gave a televised address in which he said that he expects the war to last another two to three weeks, and reiterated serious threats against Iran if it does not open the Strait of Hormuz.
• Air defences were activated in Bahrain on 1-2 April, with the IRGC Navy claiming to have targeted the “Al-Hidd Industrial City, Bahrain” and “Remaining aluminium infrastructure, Bahrain”.
• In the UAE, one Bangladeshi national was killed on 1 April after debris from an intercepted drone reportedly fell in the Al-Rifaa area. Interceptions have been reported over Dubai and Abu Dhabi on 2 April, with Abu Dhabi authorities reporting “minor” damage in the Khalifa Economic Zones Abu Dhabi (KEZAD) following debris from a missile interception. The IRGC Navy claimed that attacks were launched against “Abu Dhabi American Steel Industries”.
• The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 2 April, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 30 Mar 2026 – 31 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• On 30 March, US President Donald Trump threatened strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure and desalination plants if a “deal is not shortly reached” and the Strait of Hormuz is not immediately opened. Moreover, an Iranian Health Ministry official claimed on 31 March that a desalination plant on Iran’s Qeshm Island has been out of service since an alleged attack on 7 March.
• President Trump’s threats and Iran’s claims of Qeshm’s desalination plant being out of order almost certainly raise the risk of future Iranian retaliation strikes targeting CNI and desalination plants in the Gulf States. Following President Trump’s initial ultimatum earlier in March, the IRGC-linked FarsNews Agency published a list of potential targets for retaliation strikes, including power and/or desalination plants in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE.
• Early 31 March, a spokesman for Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence stated that Saudi air defences intercepted and destroyed a total of seven ballistic missiles launched towards Riyadh.
• The US Embassy in Qatar published an alert on 30 March, stating, “[t]he U.S. Embassy in Doha lifted its shelter in place advisory.”
• Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets, and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 31 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 27 Mar 2026 – 30 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the USS Tripoli, which has embarked around 2,200 Marines, arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility on 27 March. A further 2,000 US Army paratroopers have reportedly been ordered to deploy to the region, with the Pentagon also alleged by US media to be considering deploying an additional 10,000 ground troops.
• The Houthis’ entry into the conflict on 28 March, marked by strikes against Israel, raises the risk of a broader threat across the Arabian Peninsula if the group escalates its involvement further. The Houthis are almost certainly the most capable Iran-backed proxy force in the region. During the 2014-2022 civil war in Yemen, the Houthis launched multiple attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including international airports and oil and gas infrastructure.
• On 28 March, civil aviation authorities stated that Kuwait International Airport (KWI / OKKK) was impacted by several attack drones, resulting in “significant” damage to the radar system, but no injuries. Another attack on 29 March targeted a service building at an unspecified power and water desalination plant, killing one Indian national.
• Following strikes in the UAE overnight 28-29 March, officials in Abu Dhabi stated that the fire department was dealing with three fires in the Khalifa Industrial Zone caused by ballistic missile debris. At least five people were injured. Emirates Global Aluminium also reported that multiple employees were injured and that the plant sustained “significant damage”.
• Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets, and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 30 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 25 Mar 2026 – 27 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• On 27 March, US President Donald Trump extended the deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz by 10 days to 6 April. The ultimatum initially led to Iranian threats against desalination and power plants across the region.
• A combined attack drone and cruise missile attack led to material damage at Mubarak al Kabeer Port in Kuwait, with no injuries recorded, and an attack drone strike against Shuwaikh Port also resulted in material damage but no injuries.
• On 26 March, at least two people were killed, and multiple others were injured when debris from a ballistic missile interception fell onto Sweihan Road, Abu Dhabi, UAE. Pakistani, Indian, Emirati and Jordanian citizens were reportedly among the casualties.
• The potential entry of Saudi Arabia into the war against Iran, which remains reportedly under consideration in Riyadh, would highly likely result in an increased rate and scale of retaliation attacks being launched by Iran.
• Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets, and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 27 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatar is allowing limited flights with prior permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 23 Mar 2026 – 25 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• On 23 March, reports emerged that Saudi Arabia is strongly considering entering the war against Iran. With Iranian attacks against the Gulf States having been so significant, Saudi Arabia likely calculates that deterrence against Iran may need to be re-established with offensive operations. The entry of Saudi Arabia, in addition to potentially other Gulf States such as the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar, into the war against Iran, would highly likely result in an increased rate and scale of retaliation attacks being launched by Iran into these countries.
• A rare storm system has moved through the region this week, leading to heavy rainfall and thunderstorms in eastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman.
• On 24 March, Amazon Web Services (AWS) stated that it had been “disrupted” following attack drone activity in Bahrain, although it is unconfirmed whether Amazon’s Bahrain facility was directly hit by an attack drone or if the disruption was due to nearby strikes.
• On 25 March, QatarEnergy declared force majeure on its long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply contracts with South Korea, Italy, Belgium, and China following damage to key production facilities caused by an Iranian ballistic missile strike overnight 18-19 March.
• Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drone and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 25 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatar is allowing limited flights with prior permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 20 Mar 2026 – 23 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• In response to a 48-hour ultimatum delivered by US President Donald Trump to Iran on 21 March to open the Strait of Hormuz, or the US would conduct strikes against Iranian power plants, Tehran issued threats to “irreversibly destroy” critical national infrastructure across the region, including desalination plants. On 23 March, President Trump stated that the ultimatum would be extended for a “FIVE DAY PERIOD” due to claimed productive talks.
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media published a list of power and desalination plants that would be targeted in retaliation strikes, in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.
• The Gulf States are highly dependent on desalination for drinking water, domestic use, and industrial purposes. Sustained attacks on desalination facilities are likely to have significant impacts on national water security in the Gulf States.
• Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drone and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 23 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatar is allowing limited flights with prior permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; and Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 18 Mar 2026 – 20 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reported on 20 March that its spokesman was killed in overnight strikes by the US and Israel. This follows a series of high-profile “assassinations” of senior Iranian military and political figures, which have triggered retaliation attacks from Iran.
• On 20 March, Iran issued a threat to US and Israeli officials and military personnel, stating they will not be safe in “resorts and tourist centres around the world.”
• In retaliation for the Israeli attack against the Iranian South Pars gas field on 18 March, Iranian forces conducted significant strikes targeting oil and gas facilities across the region.
• UAE authorities announced that they had dismantled a terrorist network operating in the country, which had links to Hezbollah and Iran.
• Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 20 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatar is allowing limited flights with prior permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; and Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 17 Mar 2026 – 18 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• On 18 March, Iran issued an evacuation warning for oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, threatening that they would be targeted in “in the coming hours”. The warning follows gas facilities at Iran’s South Pars field being reportedly struck by Israel a few hours earlier. Specifically, the warning was directed towards: Saudi Arabia’s Samref Refinery and Jubail Petrochemical Complex, the UAE’s Al Hosn Gas Field, and Qatar’s Mesaieed Petrochemical Complex, Mesaieed Holding Company and Ras Laffan Refinery.
• On 17 March, Kuwaiti authorities reported two people injured by debris over the previous 24 hours, following attacks involving two ballistic missiles and 13 attack drones.
• Saudi authorities stated that two attack drones were intercepted on approach to the Diplomatic Quarter in Riyadh on 18 March, with a third attack drone also announced as intercepted over Riyadh.
• Australia’s Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, stated that deployed Australian troops were safe after an Iranian projectile hit an area near Al Minhad Air Base on 18 March, which is around 24km south of Dubai.
• Travel agents in Oman are reportedly recording a significant surge in interest for getaways for UAE residents during the upcoming Eid Al Fitr holidays. Heavy traffic is expected at key crossings such as the Hatta border crossing.
• Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 18 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 16 Mar 2026 – 17 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• On 17 March, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, stated that Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, and the commander of the paramilitary militia Basij, Gholamreza Soleimani, had been killed in overnight strikes. If confirmed, the killing of two senior leadership figures in Iran is likely to trigger an increased rate of Iranian strikes across the region in retaliation.
• The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March. 16 March recorded the highest daily number of combined missiles and drones targeting Saudi Arabia, at 72.
• The UAE’s Ministry of Defence claimed that ten ballistic missiles and 45 attack drones had been intercepted so far on 17 March at 11:35 UTC. At least three explosions were reportedly heard in Dubai; and authorities stated that a Pakistani national was killed by debris in the Bani Yas area of Abu Dhabi.
• Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 17 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 15 Mar 2026 – 16 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• On 16 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 64 attack drones in Riyadh and Eastern Province. The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March. The areas most targeted are Riyadh, Al-Kharj (where the Prince Sultan Air Base is located), and the Eastern Province (where key Saudi oil refineries are located).
• Early 16 March, an attack drone struck fuel tanks in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB), prompting a temporary suspension of operations at the airport. DXB resumed operations later on 16 March.
• Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 16 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 14 Mar 2026 – 15 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• Iranian officials have reiterated threats to target US and Israeli private companies across the region, characterising these attacks as “retaliatory” for potential future US-Israeli strikes on Iran’s oil infrastructure.
• On 15 March, Iran reportedly fired six missiles and 34 drones against targets located in Saudi Arabia. Since 12 March, the volume of Iranian strikes targeting Saudi Arabia has increased.
• Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 15 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 13 Mar 2026 – 14 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region.
• On 14 March, Iranian media linked to the IRGC has advised residents of the UAE to evacuate ports, labelling them “legitimate targets”, following US strikes in Kharg Island. In a follow-up statement, the same media outlet warned residents to “immediately move away” from Jebel Ali, Khalifa, and Fujairah port areas due to likely impending attacks.
• Overnight 13-14 March, Iranian officials claimed to have struck two Citibank locations in Manama and Dubai with attack drones.
• Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 14 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 12 Mar 2026 – 13 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March.
• On 12 March, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media stated that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.
• On 13 March, Dubai officials reported minor damage to a building in the Dubai International Financial Centre caused by debris from a successful interception.
• On 13 March, the Omani authorities reported the downing of two drones in the Suhar Governorate. One of the drones fell in the Al-Awahi Industrial Area, resulting in the death of two expatriates and several injuries.
• Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• As of 13 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 11 Mar 2026 – 12 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March.
• As of 12 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
• Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• In Dubai, UAE, 11-12 March attack drones impacts were recorded in the Al Bada’a area and onto the façade of a building on Sheikh Zayed Road, causing no injuries. An attack drone also hit the Address Creek Harbour hotel, sparking a fire that was brought under control and causing no injuries.
• On 11 March, Iranian drone strikes hit fuel tanks in Salalah, Oman, setting off a large blaze. Omani authorities said there were no injuries.
• In Kuwait on 12 March, an attack drone strike injured at least two people after impacting a residential building in Mangaf, southern Kuwait.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 10 Mar 2026 – 11 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• On 11 March, a spokesman for KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces, declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia and Oracle. Moreover, the KACHQ stated that Iran will now move from a claimed policy of “reciprocal hits” after attacks to continuous strikes on its adversaries.
• As of 11 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
• Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• Qatar Airways announced a limited flight schedule to and from Doha, Qatar, on 13 and 14 March, dependent on the airspace reopening.
• In Dubai, UAE, four people were injured on the morning of 11 March, after “two drones fell in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB)”. The Dubai Media Office added that air traffic is operating as normal.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 09 Mar 2026 – 10 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• As of 10 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
• Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• Overnight 9-10 March, one person was killed, and eight were injured in an Iranian attack drone strike on a residential building in Manama, Bahrain.
• The frequency of Iranian attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia is highly likely increasing, in comparison to the earlier phases of the conflict when Saudi Arabia was targeted significantly less than other countries in the Arabian Peninsula.
• A drone strike on 10 March at the UAE’s state-run ADNOC’s Ruwais refinery resulted in a fire, leading to the closure of the facility. Iranian strikes against oil and gas infrastructure have likely escalated in retaliation for Israeli strikes against Iranian oil infrastructure.

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INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 08 Mar 2026 – 09 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

• As of 9 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
• Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
• The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
• Overnight 8-9 March, at least 32 people were injured in the Sitra area south of Manama, following an alleged drone strike on a residential area. All those injured were Bahraini citizens. Contrary to initial reports, videos shared on social media show an interceptor missile mistakenly striking the area. The exact cause of the injuries remains unconfirmed.
• On 8 March, Saudi officials reported that two people were killed and several more injured by a strike on a residential area in Al-Kharj. These are the first reported casualties recorded in Saudi Arabia since the start of the conflict.
• On 9 March, Iranian officials selected Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Ali Khamenei, as the regime’s new Supreme Leader. The appointment constitutes a victory for the hardline political and religious factions of the Islamic Republic, and for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). US officials have threatened to target Khamenei.​

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This week’s Global Intelligence Briefing covers the increased terrorism threat in the United States following the outbreak of war with Iran, nationwide Bolsonaro rallies in Brazil, Ukrainian frontline advances, US-Israeli strikes on Iran and the resulting regional conflict, Israeli operations in Lebanon, Iranian attacks across the Gulf, Pakistan’s open conflict with the Afghan Taliban, and Shia protests across South Asia.

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Iran’s shift to the targeting of critical infrastructure and other civilian profile targets is likely reflective of an attempt to increase economic disruption across the Gulf, pressure regional governments that host US military bases and support operations, and demonstrate Iran’s capacity to impose widespread costs across the region despite being under sustained pressure from US and Israeli joint strikes. Iran may have also calculated that attacks of this magnitude may undermine the long-term presence of the US military in the Middle East by increasing the political and security costs for host nations and raising domestic pressure within Gulf states to distance themselves from US military operations.

Iran is also likely attempting to pressure Washington and Tel Aviv by provoking international condemnation and economic pressures on a global scale. Attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, followed by the suspension of operations at these sites, combined with a de facto Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, will almost certainly trigger economic shocks and volatility in global energy markets, as well as disruptions to maritime trade and energy supply chains. This strategy is likely to increase international pressure and could help to isolate Washington.

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Current US and Israeli military operations mark a significant escalation from Operation Midnight Hammer, which involved preliminary strikes on Iranian conventional military capabilities to enable a US bombing run on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the scale of the US’s current force posture and forward positioning of military assets is the largest buildup in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Iran’s current strategy is likely aimed not only at striking Israel and US military forces but also at generating widespread economic disruption, undermining US regional security guarantees and restoring deterrence by positioning itself as a resilient power capable of inflicting widespread damage and costs despite suffering major losses, evidenced by its attacks on Arab nations and attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz.

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Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 06 MARCH 2026

Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat increasingly used by regional airlines as a hub for relief flights, including services operated by Qatar Airways.

Israel’s airspace continues to be closed to most civilian traffic. Access is currently limited to military operations and civilian flights that have received prior authorisation.

Jordan’s airspace remains open; however, operators are being advised to plan for potential delays and carry additional fuel as a precaution.

• Saudi Arabia: Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf  – Expires 2200 UTC | 5 March
• Iran: Total closure – Expires 0830 UTC | 7 March
• Iraq: Total closure – Expires 0900 UTC | 7 March
• Qatar: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 5 March
• Bahrain: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 5 March
• Kuwait: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 5March
• Syria: Total closure – Expires 2100 UTC | 7 March
• United Arab Emirates: Closure by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones – All expire 1200 UTC | 6 March
• Israel: Total closure – Expires 1000 UTC | 9 March
• Azerbaijan: Southern sector closed – Expires 1939 UTC | 5 March

Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 05 MARCH 2026

Intelligence cut off: 08:47 UTC 04 MARCH 2026

We note that Oman airspace remains open. In addition, Jordan has removed its nighttime ban.

• Saudi Arabia: Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf  – Expires 2200 UTC | 4 March
• Iran: Total closure – Expires 0830 UTC | 7 March
• Iraq: Total closure – Expires 0900 UTC | 7 March
• Qatar: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 4 March
• Bahrain: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 4 March
• Kuwait: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 4 March
• Syria: Total closure – Expires 2100 UTC | 7 March
• United Arab Emirates: Partially closed – Expires 1200 UTC | 4 March
• Israel: Total closure – Expires 1000 UTC | 9 March

Solace Global is currently able to evacuate personnel from Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Israel. If you require assistance, our security team is available 24/7 to discuss secure transportation.

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Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 03 MARCH 2026

Gulf States Ground Evacuation Routes and Border Crossings Map

Israel Ground Evacuation Routes and Border Crossings Map

Please Note:

All ground movements are subject to current immigration and border regulations. Travellers must confirm entry requirements in advance, including visa eligibility, residency status, and passport validity. Border policies and processing times may change with little notice.

Evacuations conducted by Solace Global are assessed case by case, based on the evacuee’s citizenship and the entry requirements of the receiving country. Route selection depends on border accessibility, security conditions, and onward travel options.

Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 03 MARCH 2026

We note that Oman (OOMM) airspace remains open.

• Saudi Arabia (OEJD) — Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf  — Expires 2200 UTC | 3 March
• Iran (OIIX) — Total closure — Expires 0830 UTC | 7 March
• Iraq (ORBB) — Total closure — Expires 0900 UTC | 4 March
• Qatar (OTDF) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 3 March
• Bahrain (OBBB) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 3 March
• Kuwait (OKAC) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 3 March
• Syria (OSTT) — Total closure — Expires 2100 UTC | 3 March
• United Arab Emirates (OMAE) — Partially closed — Expires 1200 UTC | 4 March
• Israel (LLLL) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 6 March
• Jordan (OJAC) — Closed daily from 1500 to 0600 — Expires 0600 UTC | 5 March

Solace Global is currently able to evacuate personnel from Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Israel. If you require assistance, our security team is available 24/7 to discuss secure transportation.

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Intelligence cut off: 16:30 UTC 02 MARCH 2026

• Since 28 February, Iran has conducted ballistic missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran.
• Iran has further escalated strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, including oil and gas infrastructure, in addition to strikes targeting US military facilities.
• Airspaces remain closed across Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, as of 2 March.
• In Kuwait, the Doha West power station, Mina Al Ahmadi Refinery, and US Embassy in Kuwait City were impacted. Most drones were reportedly intercepted near Rumaithiya and ⁠Salwa neighbourhoods.
• In Bahrain, a foreign vessel in Salman Industrial City and a US-flagged tanker in the Port of Bahrain were impacted. Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was targeted on 1 March by an Iranian drone, causing material damage but no casualties.
• In Qatar, air defences intercepted attacks reportedly aimed at civilian infrastructure, including Hamad International Airport (DOH / OTHH). A water tank in Ras Laffan Industrial City was also impacted.
• The UAE has been the second most targeted country behind Israel. Further explosions were reported in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai on 2 March.
• Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term, and while likely continuing to prioritise the targeting of US military installations, they will also likely continue against civilian-profile targets due to the escalation in Iranian targeting patterns.
• The UK FCDO maintains its travel advice to advise against all but essential travel to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.

Intelligence cut off: 11:00 UTC 02 MARCH 2026

• Cyprus: Airspace Open
• Egypt: Airspace open. Israeli passport holders NOT permitted entry.
• Jordan: Partial closure on a daily basis, between UTC 1500 and 0600, until March 5th. Israeli passport holders must use this route, open to all other passport holders.
• Saudi Arabia: Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf
• Bahrain: Total closure
• Israel: Total closure
• Iran: Total closure
• Iraq: Total closure
• Kuwait: Total closure
• Qatar: Total closure
• Syria: Total closure
• United Arab Emirates: The United Arab Emirates (OMAE) airspace is not outright closed, but remains restricted by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones, effectively limiting commercial air traffic.

Intelligence cut off: 12:30 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

• Avoid all non-essential travel to the Middle East.
• Travellers should follow shelter-in-place orders and advisories, particularly in Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.
• Do not conduct travel to the airport until shelter-in-place orders or recommendations are lifted. Once lifted, ensure that booked flights are still running before conducting travel to the airport.
• Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if situated in the Middle East.
• Travellers in Israel should familiarise themselves with the nearest air raid shelter and ensure that they have downloaded applications that provide early warning of incoming threats, such as Home Front Command or Red Alert.
• Avoid all military installations, government buildings, and key infrastructure, which may constitute potential targets.
• Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
• Expect the security situation in the region to remain highly unstable in the immediate future. There is an increased risk of further strikes, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest.
• Prepare an essential “go-bag” containing, at a minimum, travel documents, cash, medications, basic supplies, and communication devices in case of evacuation.
• Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
• Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

Intelligence cut off: 12:30 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

On 28 February, Iran conducted ballistic missile strikes targeting United States military facilities in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in response to joint United States and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The strikes targeted US military installations across the Gulf region, including facilities associated with force posture, command and control, and logistics.

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Intelligence cut off: 08:10 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

At approximately 10:00 Iranian local time on 28 February, the US and Israel conducted strikes against Iran. The strikes followed weeks of escalating regional tensions, large-scale US military build-up across the region and Tehran’s refusal to concede to US demands regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

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