On 7 June, nearly 2.5 million Armenians will vote to elect the 9^th convocation of the National Assembly. The unicameral legislature has 101 members, elected for five-year terms across 13 electoral districts under a proportional representation system based on party lists. Seats are distributed proportionally among political forces that pass the electoral threshold: 4 per cent for parties, 8 per cent for alliances of up to three parties, and 10 per cent for alliances of more than three parties.

If a party wins the most votes but secures less than 54 per cent of seats, it receives additional seats to ensure a 54 per cent majority. Conversely, if a party wins more than two-thirds of seats, extra seats are allocated to opposition parties to limit the winning party’s share to a maximum of two-thirds. Four seats are reserved for representatives of national minorities. If no government is formed within six days of the publication of preliminary results, a second round must be held on the 28^th day between the two parties that received the most votes.

This election will be the first regular national election since 2017 and follows two snap elections triggered by the constitutional crises in 2018 and 2021. It is also the first election after Azerbaijan’s military takeover of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh in late 2023, after which the ethnic Armenian population fled to Armenia.

The incumbent prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, is expected to lead the governing Civil Contract party into the election for his third consecutive term. Pashinyan rose to power following Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution, when mass anti-corruption and anti-establishment protests forced the resignation of long-serving leader Serzh Sargsyan and brought Pashinyan to office on a reformist, democratic mandate. While Civil Contract’s failure to secure a majority in the March 2025 municipal elections in Gyumri raised fears over the party’s declining popularity, the party still dominates the polling, with the latest survey conducted by Breavis placing its support at 65 per cent. The opposition remains highly fragmented, with most parties polling between 2 and 12 per cent and largely comprising blocs seeking to revive ties with Russia.

Leading the opposition polling is Samvel Karapetyan of the Strong Armenia party on 12 per cent, a pro-Russian opposition bloc that emerged in late 2025. However, Karapetyan’s additional Russian and Cypriot citizenships mean that his legal eligibility to run in the election is disputed. The traditional opposition is led by former president Robert Kocharyan, who is associated with the Armenia Alliance, the main opposition bloc in parliament, and is polling at around 6 per cent. Kocharyan is broadly mistrusted by the public due to his association with the pre-Velvet Revolution political establishment. Polling between 2 and 4 per cent are Prosperous Armenia led by Gagik Tsarukyan, Mother Armenia led by Andranik Tevanyan, and the Democracy, Law, Discipline (DOK) Party led by Vardan Ghukasyan.

ASSESSMENT

The election is being framed as a referendum on relations with Azerbaijan and Russia. In August 2025, Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a joint declaration on the agreed text of a peace agreement, committing each side to progressing towards a formal signing and ratification. While the signing of the peace agreement depends on the adoption of a new constitution, which will require a referendum following the election, support for Pashinyan is largely centred around this issue. Pashinyan’s ousting would likely result in the end of the current peace deal with Azerbaijan.

The peace agreement would end a conflict that has been ongoing since 1988, when Armenian forces gained control of Nagorno-Karabakh during the collapse of the Soviet Union. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a rapid military operation in the territory, forcing the capitulation of Armenian forces and the fleeing of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians to Armenia. For this reason, the peace agreement is deeply divisive in Armenia, with public opinion split: 44 per cent in support and 41 per cent opposed. Supporters of the peace agreement argue that Armenia should stop tying its security to claims to Nagorno-Karabakh and open up economic opportunities with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Those who oppose perceive the government’s attempt to engage in a peace deal with Azerbaijan as legitimising Azerbaijan’s victory, which is largely considered a national humiliation for Armenians, and as an abandonment of Karabakh Armenians.

The Armenian Apostolic Church has engaged in heavy criticism of Pashinyan over his handling of Azerbaijan. Senior clergy and church-linked figures have been associated with anti-government protest activity, and in June 2025, Armenian authorities claimed they had foiled a coup plot involving Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan. This has provided a rationale for a crackdown on the church, with authorities arresting several clerics in the lead-up to the election. Approximately 95 per cent of Armenia’s population identifies with the Armenian Apostolic Church, and the church’s influence will almost certainly shape how the public votes, particularly among conservative, nationalist, and rural constituencies.

A Pashinyan re-election would likely move the formerly Moscow-aligned Armenia closer to the EU, which would pose a strategic threat to Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus. Armenia has historically been one of Russia’s key security and economic footholds in the region. However, Armenia suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a Russian-led regional security bloc, in February 2024, following the Nagorno-Karabakh war, with Armenia accusing the CSTO of failing to defend its territorial integrity. In March 2025, Armenia’s parliament adopted a law to launch the process of joining the EU. A shift toward the EU would not only erode Russia’s direct influence in Armenia but would also establish a regional precedent that could be adopted by Georgia, which would significantly erode Russian influence in the Caucasus.

Russia has engaged in a disinformation campaign to attempt to sway the election in favour of a pro-Russian candidate. This campaign has attempted to appeal to Armenian nationalists opposed to the peace deal with Azerbaijan, engaging in a smear campaign to portray Pashinyan as an anti-Armenian Western puppet. Additional campaigns have accused Pashinyan and other officials of involvement in “child sex trafficking”. They have also alleged that Pashinyan owns a multi-million-euro property in France and real estate in the UAE, and that he has imported radioactive waste from France for burial in Armenia.

Further reports have claimed that plans are underway to transport tens of thousands of Russian-Armenians to influence the vote. Russian authorities have also imposed restrictions on Armenian imports, including vegetables and wine, exploiting Russia’s position as Armenia’s largest market for agricultural produce, while threatening to suspend their agreement on preferential supplies of gas and petroleum products. Part of Russia’s influence operations has been to portray the EU as interfering in the Armenian election, laying the groundwork for claims of election manipulation should Pashinyan win. While 71 per cent of participants in a 5-11 May 2026 International Republican Institute (IRI) survey believe the elections will be free and fair, this approach could almost certainly trigger protests from nationalist groups in the aftermath of the publication of the election results.

The 7 June election is broadly perceived as a contest over Armenia’s geopolitical orientation, making it a highly divisive vote. For many voters, the election amounts to a referendum on Pashinyan’s pro-Western agenda and pursuit of peace with Azerbaijan, versus more nationalist, Russia-aligned alternatives. This has almost certainly deepened political polarisation. Although recent polling broadly favours Pashinyan and indicates Civil Contract are highly likely to sweep the election, earlier surveys indicated a narrower gap between Civil Contract and pro-Russian opposition parties.

A narrow victory for Civil Contract would highly likely give opposition parties, church-linked critics, and nationalist actors greater scope to claim that the election had been distorted by external influence, media imbalance, vote buying, intimidation, or counting irregularities. Russian messaging portraying Pashinyan as a Western proxy would highly likely reinforce this narrative and provide the opposition with a unifying theme around which to mobilise. In this scenario, protests would likely occur in Yerevan, concentrating around the Central Electoral Commission, Republic Square, parliament, government buildings, and major road junctions. Heavy-handed policing, arrests of opposition figures, or forceful attempts to clear protest sites would almost certainly increase the risk of clashes.

If the latest polling is accurate and Civil Contract wins by a wide margin, protests would be far less likely to gain significant traction, with opposition parties and aligned groups likely to struggle to convince non-aligned voters that the result had been swung by external influence or manipulation. Pashinyan would likely present a decisive victory as a strong mandate for his peace agenda, including normalisation with Azerbaijan, deeper EU integration, and reduced dependence on Russia. A decisive Civil Contract victory would also strengthen Pashinyan’s political mandate to pursue constitutional reform, which he has framed as necessary to facilitate a full peace agreement with Azerbaijan.

On 1 June, general elections are set to take place in Ethiopia, the seventh held under the post-1995 constitutional order. Voters will elect 547 members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR), the lower house of Ethiopia’s parliament, for five-year terms. Members are elected in single-member constituencies through a first-past-the-post system. Voters do not directly elect the prime minister. Instead, the House of Peoples’ Representatives selects the prime minister, meaning the party or coalition that secures a parliamentary majority is expected to form the government. Council elections, electing 2,916 regional councillors, will also be held across 12 regions, as well as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, with those councils subsequently electing representatives to the House of Federation, Ethiopia’s upper house.

Incumbent Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will lead the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) into the election, following its dominant victory in 2021, which resulted in the party securing 457 of the 547 seats in parliament. The National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), a right-wing Amhara ethnic nationalist party led by Belete Molla, is the most visible opposition party, but it currently holds only five parliamentary seats. Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA), a liberal party led by Berhanu Nega, holds just four seats. Two Oromo nationalist parties, the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), led by Merera Gudina and Dawud Ibsa Ayana, respectively, boycotted the 2021 election. The OFC is fielding candidates in the 2026 election to preserve its legal registration, while the OLF has signalled readiness to contest the election.

Amid widespread instability due to ongoing civil wars in Amhara and Oromia, as well as heightened tensions in Tigray, election officials are implementing a three-tier security classification system nationwide. Red areas will be designated unfit for voting, yellow areas require mitigation, monitoring, or additional security measures, and green areas are stable enough for normal electoral operations. In previous elections, seats were left vacant in constituencies where voting could not take place, with polls postponed or cancelled in some areas because of insecurity, logistical constraints, or political disputes.

ASSESSMENT

While Prime Minister Ahmed has declared this is the “best” election to date, with 47 registered parties and nearly 11,000 candidates, several challenges remain. The legitimacy of the upcoming election has already been called into question, with tensions in multiple major regions, including Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray, where limited participation is likely to result in claims of election manipulation. This is exacerbated by the fact that most parties participating in the election broadly align with the PP, allowing the government to present the election as competitive without risking any real competition. Opposition parties are expected to remain largely sidelined, as they were in 2021, when the PP won 96.8 per cent of parliamentary seats. It is highly likely that PP will again secure an overwhelming victory. 

Furthermore, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) faces significant legitimacy challenges. In 2021, NEBE struggled to register internally displaced persons, a problem that is highly likely to continue in 2026, given Ethiopia’s continued displacement crisis and the absence of a recent census. Although the African Union (AU) assessed the 2021 election as broadly “peaceful” and “orderly”, the International Republican Institute/National Democratic Institute (IRI/NDI) observer mission concluded that the process “fell short of key standards concerning human and civil liberties, electoral campaigning, adequate security for all parties, and overall peace and security.” 

These shortcomings are likely to negatively influence perceptions of NEBE’s neutrality and capacity in the upcoming election. This is particularly since many areas are excluded from voting, and displacement and administrative gaps are likely to result in inaccurate voter rolls, under-registration, and contested results. As a result, even if NEBE can administer polling in secure areas, the election is likely to face renewed questions over inclusivity, competitiveness and national legitimacy.

Amhara

The designation of some areas in Amhara as “red”, which means unfit to vote, almost certainly threatens to exacerbate regional tensions. While Amhara and Oromia are two of Ethiopia’s most populous regions, the ongoing internal armed conflicts in both regions render accurate polling near impossible. In Amhara, conflict has been ongoing since the federal government’s 2023 decision to dismantle regional special forces. At least 12,000 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced. The fragmented Fano armed movement controls over 80 per cent of rural territory, with the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) largely restricted to major towns and highways. In March 2026, Fano issued a warning that any entity assisting the electoral process will be considered “enemies of the Amhara people equal to the government”. Voting will almost certainly be restricted to urban areas under government control, and many citizens are unlikely to vote due to the risk of polling stations or voters being targeted by Fano. 

Oromia

The situation is similar in Oromia, where the OLA has fought government forces since 2018/2019, with at least 5,000 people killed. The insurgency has seen civilian killings, mass kidnappings, and numerous transport strikes with enforced road closures. On 23 March, OLF-OLA issued a statement dismissing the election as a “performance staged for foreign consumption” and claiming that over 70 per cent of the country is inaccessible for voting.

The OFC and, despite its criticism of the election, OLF’s potential participation almost certainly gives the 2026 election more formal pluralism than a complete boycott would, with the government able to present the presence of Oromo nationalist parties as evidence of inclusion. However, OFC leader Gudina has argued that opposition parties cannot safely move, campaign, list candidates, organise observers, or mobilise supporters outside Addis Ababa. As with Amhara, the restrictions on polling in Oromia are highly likely to deepen the grievances of excluded populations. Even so, OFC and OLF participation highly likely lowers the risk of major electoral violence in Oromia, with armed groups unlikely to target polling infrastructure.

Tigray

During the general elections, the post-war Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) was expected to give way to a regular elected regional council. In May 2025, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was deregistered by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), meaning Tigray’s dominant political force is effectively unable to contest the 2026 elections. Additionally, the House of Federation has ruled that elections for the HPR will be held in five contested constituencies, but without corresponding elections for Tigray regional council seats under Tigray’s administration. This means that the vote has been perceived as politically illegitimate, with the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) stating that “territorial integrity is non-negotiable”.

Tensions have escalated over the past year, with clashes between the Tigray Defence Force (TDF) and the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) in early 2026. On 8 April 2026, the government unilaterally extended the mandate of the TIA, raising doubts over whether Tigray would transition from the interim administration to an elected regional council and regular constitutional governance through the 1 June electoral process. On 5 May, in response to the mandate extension, the TPLF replaced the government-backed leader, Tadesse Werede, with Debretsion Gebremichael, who had been Tigray’s leader during the 2020-2022 conflict. This was part of a reinstatement of the Tigray Government Assembly (parliament), which has displaced the TIA as the governing framework and revived the pre-war regional government structure. Tadesse warned that such a move would annul the 2022 Pretoria agreement, which ended the civil war which killed over 100,000 and displaced nearly three million.

The restoration of the pre-war parliament almost certainly increases the risk of a renewed confrontation in Tigray, particularly if either side attempts to militarily enforce its claimed authority. The 2020 conflict began after the TPLF rejected the government’s decision to postpone national elections and held its own regional election in Tigray, which the government declared illegal. The government’s handling of the elections in Tigray has been highly likely perceived as an attempt to retain control over the region and prevent its transition to self-governance. By declaring an end to the interim administration, the TPLF are almost certainly threatening the legal-political basis of the post-Pretoria Agreement transition. The election will highly likely reflect the ongoing fracture between the government and Tigray’s leadership and could serve as a flashpoint for either side to attempt to exert its control over the region, which almost certainly risks reigniting the conflict.

Because of the restricted participation in the conflict regions, limited civil unrest is highly likely. Demonstrations have taken place in Addis Ababa over tensions in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray in recent years. The regions’ partial exclusion from the upcoming elections, combined with the escalating dispute over Tigray, almost certainly raises the risk of demonstrations during the election. Addis Ababa hosts an estimated 500,000 to one million Tigrayans, with the federal government perceived to be sidelining Tigrayan self-determination in favour of continuing the TIA led by the government-backed Tadesse.

However, any unauthorised pro-opposition rallies are highly likely to see a severe crackdown, while authorities will likely allow some smaller, less overtly anti-government demonstrations to take place under heavy monitoring. For example, in February 2025, Tigrayans living in Addis Ababa held a peaceful anti-war rally, but were forced to submit slogans to the Addis Ababa Administration for approval. Other planned pro-Tigray rallies in November 2024 were banned by the government, with the organisers placed under arrest. Should demonstrations proceed without permission, security forces are likely to respond forcefully, using tear gas and mass arrests to deter further demonstrations, imposing internet outages to disrupt mobilisation, and potentially using live ammunition if protests escalate and threaten key government sites or security forces.

On 31 May, up to 41 million Colombians will be eligible to vote in the country’s presidential elections, which will decide the successor to incumbent President Gustavo Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking immediate re-election. If no candidate secures 50 per cent of the vote on 31 May, a run-off between the two candidates that secured the most votes will be held on 21 June.

With Petro ineligible, polls have identified three candidates who have a realistic chance of winning. Senator Iván Cepeda Castro, the candidate of the Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact, PH), currently leads the polls. PH is a left-wing alliance formed in 2025 by Petro, consisting of four parties: Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union), Polo Democrático Alternativo (Alternative Democratic Pole), the Partido Comunista Colombiano (Colombian Communist Party), and Humane Colombia (Humane Colombia). Cepeda has built a strong and diverse base and has intensified efforts to reach out to indigenous rights groups in regions such as Cauca.

Cepeda is widely expected to reach the second round. Consequently, two right-wing candidates are likely competing for the second runoff spot. Abelardo de la Espriella, of the Movimiento de Salvación Nacional (National Salvation Movement, MSN), has emerged as a populist right-wing figure with a platform and rhetoric similar to Latin American leaders like El Salvador’s Bukele or Argentina’s Milei, rooted in calls to dismantle the “establishment”, slash regulation, and crack down on organised crime. Senator Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático (Democratic Centre, CD) is a more centrist right-wing candidate, often categorised under the term “Uribismo”, after the policies of former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who also endorses more hardline security policies.

The presidential elections will take place only months after the latest parliamentary contest, in March. This vote was marked by very low turnout (just over 50 per cent) and returned a fragmented chamber. The parties of the three leading candidates all achieved positive results: PH increased its seat share by five, with both CD and MSN increasing their numbers.

The campaign has been dominated by security concerns amid a major increase in militant violence across Colombia. In the past year, there have been several high-profile assassinations of political candidates, most notably the June 2025 killing of Miguel Uribe Turbay, one of the early competitors to become CD’s presidential candidate, and multiple cases of intimidation. In April 2026, Valencia claimed that an armed group had planned an assassination attempt targeting her, while President Petro alleged the existence of a plot to assassinate Cepeda.

In April and May, there have been several cases of journalists and party activists being killed, with the murders being linked to organised crime and armed groups. On 16 May, gunmen assassinated two members of de la Esprella’s campaign staff in Cubarral, Meta Department, while a member of Valencia’s electoral staff had his armoured vehicle fired upon, also in Cubarral. On 22 May, gunmen opened fire on a PH office in Flandes, Tolima Department.

ASSESSMENT

The election is widely seen as a referendum on President Petro’s flagship Paz Total or “Total Peace” policy. Petro, a former guerrilla of the leftist M-19 group, has prioritised dialogue and negotiated settlements with Colombia’s armed groups over coercion or expanded security operations under the policy. Cepeda, who was one of the principal architects of Total Peace and has served as one of Petro’s main negotiators, advocates for the continuation of the policy, despite growing scepticism. Conversely, both leading right-wing candidates have promised to abandon Total Peace and adopt more aggressive measures to combat organised crime and militancy, likely partially inspired by El Salvador’s Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) approach, which has spread throughout Latin America over the last three years.

Total Peace was implemented in 2022 and has achieved some limited successes. The policy has resulted in the creation of formal negotiation channels with several armed groups, temporary ceasefires, and the demobilisation of some smaller factions. However, it has almost certainly failed to deliver a sustained reduction in violence, curb illicit economies or dismantle the primary armed groups, with groups like the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN), the FARC dissident group Estado Mayor Central (Central General Staff, EMC), and the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan, AGC) still highly active across multiple regions of the country. Critics have argued that armed groups, many of which have evolved from political movements into profit-driven criminal networks, have simply exploited Total Peace and its associated ceasefires to regroup, consolidate territorial control, expand recruitment and increase extortion and other illicit revenue streams.

According to NGO Ideas para la Paz, armed groups now have approximately 27,000 fighters (up from an estimated 15,000 in 2022). Armed groups are firmly embedded within local populations, have increasingly been able to operate freely in their respective areas of influence, and have expanded territories under their control, resulting in violent competition over strategically valuable areas for narcotics production, smuggling or other illicit enterprises, such as illegal mining. Currently, the only major group the government is in negotiations with is the AGC, a violent drug cartel that has doubled its territory under Petro and increased its ranks by almost 150 per cent.

Armed groups have also emulated global trends by increasingly adopting advanced weapon systems to carry out attacks, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which they have used to drop explosives on police and military positions, often posing a direct threat to civilians. In 2025, the Ministry of Defence recorded 333 drone attacks, up from 61 the year prior.

Total Peace came under increased scrutiny in 2025, in response to an escalation of the Colombian internal conflict. Several armed groups conducted high-profile “offensives” across the country or increased attacks, primarily to expand territorial control and expand illicit economies, but also likely to challenge state authority and strengthen their bargaining position ahead of the presidential election. This has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians and likely the worst humanitarian situation in over a decade, with Colombia also currently hosting as many as 3.5 million Venezuelan refugees. Attacks on security forces and critical transport routes have increased, as has disruption to business operations in conflict-affected departments such as Catatumbo, Cauca, Valle del Cauca and parts of Antioquia. By some estimates, as many as ten million people now live under the influence of armed groups.

In January 2025, the ELN launched an offensive against FARC-dissident groups in the Catatumbo region, a key border area with Venezuela, which led to more than 100 deaths and the displacement of 50,000 people. In December, the ELN launched another series of attacks, which also affected the city of Cali, Colombia’s third-largest city and a major economic and transport hub, in the Valle del Cauca department.  

The EMC also escalated attacks in 2025 and has continued to do so in 2026. EMC’s first escalation cycle was in early 2025; however, the most significant shift was observed in June 2025, when the militant group launched a wave of coordinated attacks across the Cauca and Valle del Cauca departments, demonstrating a more organised capacity and intent to disrupt security forces, transport routes and urban centres.

Most militant attacks have concentrated on state security forces; there has been a major increase in civilian casualties. Reporting from the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) indicates that there were 965 people injured or killed by explosives, most being civilians. The report also documented 282 cases of violence against health workers related to ​the armed conflict, and 308 new disappearances. While an increased civilian casualty toll is likely partly attributable to the indiscriminate nature of explosive devices, several high-profile attacks indicate that civilians have likely been deliberately targeted or that armed groups are increasingly willing to accept civilian casualties to achieve their objectives.

The most notable of these incidents was the 25 April 2026 detonation of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), near the town of Cajibio, in the department of Cauca in southwest Colombia. The explosion, which occurred approximately one month ahead of the election, killed at least 21 people and injured dozens, and resulted in major transport disruption on one of Colombia’s most important transit corridors. Reports indicate that the bomb was detonated after assailants stopped traffic by blocking the road with a bus and another vehicle, actions that likely indicate the intent to maximise civilian casualties. The attack, which was the most brutal against civilians in decades, coincided with a series of coordinated attacks in the Valle del Cauca and Cauca departments, that was immediately attributed to the EMC.  

Militant offensives and an escalation in attacks have significantly undermined Total Peace and increasingly forced the Petro administration to adopt a more coercive approach, characterised by increased military deployments, enhanced security measures, increased operations aimed at killing or capturing militant senior leadership, and closer security cooperation with international partners, particularly the US, despite the Washington’s sustained criticism of Petro and its own controversial operations against narcotics smuggling just outside of Colombian territorial waters.

Petro’s gradual shift has almost certainly influenced the actions of militant groups. Under increased pressure and facing the threat of expanded military operations and foreign involvement, attacks like the April VBIED and other high-profile attacks are likely aimed at undermining state control and influencing the future course of action of not just the current government, but also other presidential candidates. The strategic message being sent is that government operations attempting to contain the influence of armed groups or disrupt their operations will be met with significant and costly armed resistance.

With internal security assessments almost certainly determining there is a credible risk of increased militancy up to and during the election, the Colombian government has implemented heightened security measures. Measures include the planned closure of all borders with Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Venezuela between 30 May and 1 June. More than 248,000 uniformed personnel, roughly equally provided by the police and military, will be stationed at polling stations as part of “Project Democracy”. States more exposed to armed conflict, such as Cauca, will have a higher volume of personnel deployed.

The EMC and the ELN have announced unilateral “ceasefires” between 20 May and 10 June to coincide with the vote. However, these ceasefires are unlikely to be reliable indicators of reduced election-related risks and may be attempts to distance themselves from political violence. Moreover, ceasefires are unlikely to extend to intimidation, movement restrictions or “armed strikes”, vote tampering, or other non-violent measures designed to influence turnout and local voting behaviour. During the March 2026 Colombian parliamentary elections, local election observers reported potential irregularities at more than 1,000 polling stations.  Colombian armed groups are also very decentralised, and there is a realistic possibility that ceasefire declarations made by senior leadership will not be uniformly adhered to by local commanders of factions.

Most importantly, the self-declared ceasefires do not cover the potential second round on 21 June. Polling indicates that no candidate is likely to achieve more than 50 per cent of the vote, with the second round likely to feature Cepeda against one of the right-wing candidates that has promised a much tougher stance on armed groups. As it is likely that most of the supporters of the losing right-wing candidate will shift to the remaining right-wing contender, the second round is likely to be perceived as a direct contest between an attempt to restore Total Peace and a marked shift towards expanded security operations. This would likely increase the incentive for armed groups to influence the election and could increase the risk of high-profile attacks aimed at deterring the incoming administration from abandoning the negotiation process.

The 2026 presidential election will almost certainly be highly consequential for the future trajectory of Colombia’s internal armed conflict. A Cepeda government will likely remain committed to Total Peace and reopen dialogue with armed groups, assessing that a change in president could be interpreted as an opportunity to stabilise negotiations and reverse the recent path of President Petro. However, while such a course of action has the potential to reduce violence in Colombia, it is likely to play into the hands of the armed groups, which will likely continue to exploit the policy to consolidate territorial control, expand illicit economies, delay demobilisation and potentially increase their leverage in future negotiations.

A victory by a right-wing candidate would likely result in the rapid abandonment of Total Peace. Both de la Espriella and Valencia would likely expand security operations and deploy increased resources to Colombia’s most affected areas. Both would also likely explore options to expand security cooperation with the US, mirroring developments seen elsewhere in Latin America. This could potentially involve Colombia joining the “Shield of the Americas”, increased intelligence-sharing, and even a possible pathway for US kinetic operations on Colombian territory, a development that has recently been observed in Ecuador.

However, recent developments in Colombia likely illustrate limitations to a more hardline approach. Offensives and reprisal attacks likely indicate that armed groups have yet to be deterred by expanded government operations, and incidents like the April Pan-American Highway attack or attacks within major population centres likely indicate a continued willingness to escalate despite the threat of state retaliation. Moreover, Colombia’s armed groups are well-embedded within the civilian population, highly decentralised and are adept at exploiting Colombia’s mountainous, jungle and borderlands to evade security operations. The imposition of security strategies observed elsewhere in Latin America is likely to be of limited effectiveness, given the resources required to combat multiple armed groups operating in challenging terrain on several fronts, with expanded security operations likely to provoke retaliatory attacks aimed at undermining the state’s efforts to curb militancy and disrupt illicit economies.

On 12 April, presidential elections are set to take place in Benin. The president is elected through a two-round system to a five-year term. If no candidate wins a majority in the first round, the two leading candidates will face each other in a runoff held within 15 days of the initial vote. Presidents are limited to two five-year terms. Each presidential candidate must run with a vice-presidential running mate, who also has a five-year term and must complete the president’s term if the president is impeached or is otherwise unable to govern.

The elections follow parliamentary elections on 11 January, whereby two parties aligned with incumbent President Patrice Talon, Bloc Républicain (BR) and the Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UPR), won all 109 seats in the National Assembly. The main opposition party, Les Démocrates, finished third with a meaningful national vote share. However, Benin’s electoral code requires a party to clear a 20 per cent threshold in each electoral district to qualify for seat allocation, preventing Les Démocrates from winning any seats.

Only two candidates have been approved by the Constitutional Court to contest the presidential elections. President Talon has reached his constitutional term limits, nearing the end of his second term in power, and is barred from running again. Finance Minister Romuald Wadagni is running as the overwhelming favourite. Representing the ruling coalition of the BR and the UPR, he represents a continuity of Talon’s leadership. Opposing him is Paul Hounkpè, former mayor of Bopa and leader of the Forces cauris pour un Bénin émergent (FCBE) party. Hounkpè ran as a vice-presidential candidate during the 2021 presidential elections.

The main threat to Wadagni, Renaud Agbodjo, presidential nominee of Les Démocrates, was barred from contesting the election by the Constitutional Court. The ban was implemented on a technicality that he did not obtain a sufficient number of endorsements from members of parliament and that the party failed to pay the registration fee. Agbodjo, also a lawyer, is widely recognised, having defended numerous high-profile opposition politicians from alleged politically motivated charges.

Wadagni is running on a platform of continuity, while promising new policies, such as creating new development hubs across the country and expanding access to healthcare. His campaign also emphasises his achievements as Finance Minister, such as tripling the national budget and bringing Benin’s GDP growth to the highest in over 20 years. Under Talon’s presidency, real per capita incomes increased by 27 per cent over the past 10 years, and infant mortality rates have declined by 25 per cent. Hounkpè, on the other hand, lacks a strong unified opposition coalition behind him and is operating in a system that favours incumbency and constrains opposition mobilisation.

ASSESSMENT

While positive economic developments have marked Talon’s presidency, so has an increasing crackdown on the opposition, increasing concerns that he would not relinquish power. Talon’s government has imposed numerous obstructions on opposition parties since 2019, including excessive party registration fees, a “certificate of conformity” that serves as a legal filter, the use of a special terrorism court to try political opponents, and requirements that presidential candidates gain the endorsement of members of parliament. This, combined with the effective barring of meaningful opposition, almost certainly heightens the risk of opposition figures accusing the government of running a fraudulent election.

In the background of the election is the escalating insurgency in northern Benin. Benin is one of the most affected coastal West African states by the spillover of terrorism from the neighbouring Sahel region. The primary threat is from the Katiba Hanifa faction of the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which promotes divisive intercommunal messages while engaging in extortion and illicit trafficking. The group was responsible for an attack which killed 54 Beninese soldiers in April 2025 and another attack which killed 15 in March 2026. Overall, an estimated 375 people have been killed over the past year in Benin at the hands of insurgent groups. 

The rising insurgency-related violence led to a military coup attempt on 7 December, when a military faction, calling itself the Military Committee for Refoundation and led by Lieutenant Colonel Tigri Pascal, appeared on Benin’s state television and announced the dissolution of the government and national institutions, the suspension of the constitution, and the closure of land, air, and sea borders. With the help of Nigerian air and ground support, the coup attempt was quickly put down. This was the second such attempt since 1977, with an alleged coup plot also disrupted in January 2024. This almost certainly suggests a division between the government and the military and significantly raises the risk of further military coup attempts should electoral violence break out.

To ease fears of the escalating violence, Wadagni has conducted numerous campaign rallies in northern Benin to represent the government’s control over its territory. Furthermore, he has promised to establish municipal police forces in border towns in the north to defend against insurgent attacks. Analysts have noted that the ongoing insurgencies will likely motivate the government to increasingly crack down on opposition in an attempt to consolidate control over the country. This is highly likely, with the recent 7 December attempted coup likely to be used as a pretext for consolidating control by the ruling party and further cracking down on opposition.

While widespread demonstrations following the presidential election may be avoided due to Benin’s strong economy over the past decade, fuel price increases caused by the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz have already triggered minor protests. There is also a historical precedent of post-election unrest, with clashes taking place in May 2019 after opposition parties were excluded from the election. This resulted in the security forces using live ammunition, rubber bullets, and water cannon to deter further protests, which killed at least two. There is a realistic possibility of similar protests being staged, particularly if the election is perceived as rigged, with the security forces likely to again respond with force, which could exacerbate unrest.

On 12 April, Hungarian citizens will vote in their country’s parliamentary elections to elect the 199 members of the Hungarian parliament, the National Assembly. Parliamentary elections are held every four years, and use a mixed system, where 106 MPs are elected via a first-past-the-post system in single-member constituencies, and the remaining 93 are decided via proportional representation within a single, nationwide constituency. Voters who reside in Hungary cast two votes (one for a national constituency and one for their local, single-member constituency), while voters residing abroad can only vote in the nationwide constituency.

Some features of the system, such as the “surplus booster” (whereby winning candidates in single-member constituencies have their surplus votes – the vote difference between them and the second-place candidates – added to their party’s national tally, impacting proportional seat distribution) heavily favour winning parties. For example, in 2014 and 2018, the winning party, Fidesz, won a parliamentary supermajority despite obtaining less than half of the total votes.

The elections are set to be a contest between two parties: Fidesz, the ruling party of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in power since 2010; and the opposition Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar, a Fidesz defector and current member of the EU Parliament (MEP). While smaller parties exist, they all poll at five per cent or less and are unlikely to fundamentally skew the election results.

Tisza, which was founded in 2020, remained relatively uninfluential until 2024, when Magyar joined the party amidst a child abuse scandal involving former Hungarian President Katalin Novák, and reoriented it into a big-tent, populist party campaigning on an anti-corruption platform. Policy-wise, Tisza has a considerably “friendlier” stance towards the EU compared to Fidesz, even maintaining a degree of openness towards entering the Eurozone. At the same time, it is opposed to sending weapons to Ukraine, and Tisza MEPs have repeatedly voted alongside Fidesz on Ukraine-related issues. In terms of domestic policies, the party campaigns on dismantling what it calls the “mafia state” by rooting out corruption within the government. It also opposes immigration and favours reforms to introduce term limits and direct presidential elections.

Aggregates of current polls suggest that Tisza is ahead of Fidesz by around ten points (49 per cent to 39 per cent of the vote). However, if single polling institutes are considered, results vary considerably. Government- and Fidesz-aligned groups repeatedly indicate advantages of up to ten points for Orbán, and opposition-aligned polls suggest that Tisza is ahead by up to 15 points.

ASSESSMENT

The upcoming Hungarian elections will likely be the most heavily contested in more than a decade. Recent developments have contributed to a significant polarisation of the electorate, with both parties repeatedly levying accusations of corruption and foreign interference, and several political figures indicating a high risk of the results being doctored.

The final days of the electoral campaign have been almost entirely marked by foreign policy issues. On 5 April, Orbán convened an emergency meeting of the National Defence Council following the reported discovery of explosives near a pipeline at the Hungary-Serbia border. Magyar claimed that the move was a last-minute attempt to rally domestic support via a “false flag” operation blamed on Ukraine. On 7 April, US Vice President J.D. Vance visited Hungary to call on citizens to support Fidesz, following other demonstrations of support enacted by the current US administration towards European right-wing parties.

Russian support for Orbán has also been open and marked by recent high-profile diplomatic meetings between Budapest and Moscow. Following the publication of a report by international media in March, which alleged that Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó regularly leaked confidential information on EU meetings to Moscow, Magyar accused Fidesz of treason. On the other hand, the ruling party has repeatedly accused Tisza of being controlled or heavily influenced by Brussels or Kyiv.

The current high levels of polarisation in Hungary and the significant spike in misinformation ahead of the vote are likely conducive to election-related unrest. There is a realistic possibility of localised violence between supporters of different parties in the 9-11 April period, leading up to the elections. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility of unrest emerging after the results are published. Previous warnings of vote tampering, the significant discrepancies between pre-election polls, alleged episodes of state-linked interference (such as the reported attempted pipeline sabotage), and even features of the Hungarian electoral system itself (such as the usual delays in counting votes by diaspora communities, which are crucial electoral constituencies) have likely increased the risk of claims of electoral fraud in the immediate aftermath of the vote.

Several possible scenarios could emerge from the vote. If early election results show a clear victory for either major party, it is likely that this would result in a quick concession by the losing side, reducing the short-term risk of civil unrest. An Orbán victory would almost certainly be received coolly in Brussels, but it is unlikely to result in the same institutional challenges as those that followed the 2024 Romanian presidential elections. A Tisza win would almost certainly be accompanied by a spike in Russian-led disinformation efforts. However, this is unlikely to result in a significant increase in the risk of large-scale civil unrest, as Tisza remains broadly aligned with Fidesz in multiple areas and does not mark a significant ideological shift.

A second scenario with a much closer result, for instance, one where the elections’ outcome is dependent on the diaspora vote, would likely greatly increase the risk of the losing side officially challenging the elections’ integrity, or that of either party claiming an early victory while votes are still being counted (this would highly likely lead to the other side doing the same). In such a scenario, foreign intervention is much more likely and could catalyse domestic unrest, as the perception of explicit foreign backing would likely embolden both sides to take increasingly confrontational stances. This, in turn, could increase the threat of large-scale unrest occurring in the weeks and months after the election, increasing political instability in Hungary and more broadly within the European Union.  

On 5 March, Nepalese citizens will vote to elect all 275 members of the House of Representatives (HR), the lower house of the Federal Parliament of Nepal. The elections were announced on 12 September 2025 by the President of Nepal on the recommendation of the government of Nepal, following widespread anti-government demonstrations, which resulted in the formal dissolution of the HR.

The election will take place under two ballots, one to elect 165 members from single-member constituencies via first-past-the-post, and another to elect the remaining 110 members via party-list proportional representation. A party, or coalition, must receive at least three per cent of the votes to be allocated a seat in the proportional vote. Nearly 19 million people are registered to vote, including 915,000 first-time voters, more than two-thirds of whom belong to Gen Z.

Approximately 3,500 candidates from 68 different parties, plus independents, are set to take part in the election. There have been no widely published and credible national opinion polls projecting party vote share. However, based on the previous election in 2022 and the seats held at the time of dissolution, there are five major contenders, representing the entire political spectrum, from communist parties to right-wing pro-monarchist parties.

ASSESSMENT

Nepal’s parliament was formally dissolved on 12 September following widespread youth-led anti-government protests, which began on 8 September. The Gen Z-led demonstrations were triggered by the government’s decision to restrict 26 social media and online platforms after they failed to register within a seven-day deadline. The protests quickly escalated into a broader anti-corruption movement, with mass demonstrations in Kathmandu and several other cities. The protests resulted in the burning down of Nepal’s parliament building and widespread clashes with police and security forces, who responded with live ammunition. In total, an estimated 76 people were killed, and over 2,000 injuries were recorded. In response to the unrest, the military imposed a curfew, ending the violence. The demonstrations triggered a lifting of the social media ban and the resignation of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli.

Following the dissolution of parliament, the military coordinated with youth representatives, who discussed the appointment of an interim prime minister on a Discord server with over 100,000 members. The members settled on former chief justice Sushila Karki, who became the first female prime minister of Nepal and was given the mandate to lead a transitional government, oversee the restoration of order after unrest, and organise fresh general elections by March 2026. Karki has agreed to step down following the vote.

The election will almost certainly represent a contest between older established parties, such as NC, CPN-UML, and NCP, and newer youth-oriented parties such as RSP. Among Nepal’s established parties, older candidates over 40 dominate nomination lists, which contrasts with Nepal’s electorate, 52 per cent of whom are aged between 18 and 40. The established parties largely retain support from rural voters, older citizens, longstanding party loyalists, public sector workers, and patronage-dependent constituencies. The established parties have attempted to expand their appeal to Nepal’s youth through social media engagement, having historically failed to resonate with young voters, who perceive the parties as mired in entrenched corruption, dynastic politics, unrepresentative of younger voters, and having limited internal democracy.

Despite the attraction of less-established parties and the power of the youth vote, NC and CPN-UML are the likeliest parties to win the most seats. Firstly, they are the only two parties fielding candidates in nearly all 165 constituencies. Secondly, an alliance of NC and CPN-UML won convincingly in the National Assembly election on 25 January 2026, with NC winning nine seats and CPN-UML winning eight, out of the total 18 contested seats. Moreover, the fact that 68 total parties are contesting the election means seat fragmentation is the likeliest outcome, which typically benefits parties with the broadest base.

RSP is positioned as a key challenger, appealing to Nepal’s large youth base, but its vote share in the 2022 election was 10.7 per cent, compared to NC and CPN-UML’s 25.7 and 27 per cent, respectively, meaning it would need more than double its vote share to realistically compete. The monarchist RPP won 5.6 per cent of the vote and is unlikely to be a major challenger; however, recent pro-monarchy protests may indicate that it will increase its vote share.

It is highly unlikely that any single party will secure the 138 seats required for a majority in the 275-member HR, suggesting that a hung parliament is the most probable outcome. Consequently, some form of coalition-building will be required, potentially involving ideologically incongruous parties and controversial nominations. Such coalition-building is unlikely to have broad public appeal, especially given long-standing frustration with elite power-sharing arrangements, opportunistic alliances, and the role of patronage politics.

Sporadic violence is highly likely around the election. On 9 February, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) issued a warning declaring that “[t]here is a risk of protests, political violence and travel disruption ahead of the general election scheduled for 5 March 2026.” Extra security forces have been drafted to ensure order, with around 300,000 officers and temporary election police deployed as campaigning began on 16 February.

In Nepal’s 2022 elections, clashes occurred around polling centres across the country. In one instance, police opened fire during fighting at a polling station, killing one person. Explosions also occurred near polling stations in numerous districts, although no one was injured, suggesting the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were intended for disruption and intimidation purposes. Similar incidents are highly likely in the upcoming elections, given the highly fragmented political landscape in Nepal and the long history of localised electoral violence.

The government has grouped polling centres based on risk level, classifying 3,680 as “highly sensitive”, 4,442 as “sensitive”, and 2,845 as “normal”. No “highly sensitive” polling stations are in Kathmandu and Bhaktapur; many are, instead, in more geographically remote areas, with Madhesh Province having the highest number. Three police officers and ten election police members will be deployed to the “highly sensitive” polling stations; three police officers and six election police will be deployed at “sensitive” polling stations; and two police officers and five election police will be deployed at “normal” polling stations.

One of the major lines of tension is between monarchists and republicans. On 18 February, former king Gyanendra Shah called for the election to be postponed, warning that the ongoing nationwide dissatisfaction could deepen political instability. Nepal experienced clashes between monarchist and republican protesters during large-scale pro-monarchy demonstrations in both 2023 and 2025. In both protests, mass arrests were made, and many people were injured, resulting in the security forces deploying tear gas and water cannon, as well as imposing curfews.

In November, over twenty youth-led monarchist groups submitted a memorandum calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Karki. Monarchist groups also engaged in demonstrations on 13 February, when thousands of monarchists rallied to greet Gyanendra Shah on his return from holiday, ignoring prohibitory orders around the airport. The calls from Gyanendra Shah to postpone the elections, alongside the recent history of violence between monarchists and republicans, almost certainly increase the risk of clashes around polling stations on 5 March.

There is also a realistic possibility of civil unrest following the publishing of election results. Former Prime Minister Oli of the CPN-UML, who was ousted in the youth-led unrest in September 2025, could be elected again due to the party’s historical dominance and broad voter base. If CPN-UML fail to appeal to Nepal’s youth, they will likely perceive Oli’s potential return to office as a reversal of the September uprising. Furthermore, many remain dissatisfied with the lack of accountability for the excessive force used by security forces, the perceived impunity for political elites, and unfulfilled reform expectations, and some groups oppose the election itself, arguing that the interim government has “betrayed” the September revolt.

On 12 February, over 127 million Bangladeshi citizens will be eligible to cast their votes for the first time since the 2024 July Revolution, which toppled the 15-year government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League (AL) party. Voters will elect 300 members of the Jatiya Sangsad, the 350-member national parliament. The remaining 50 parliament seats are reserved for women and are assigned proportionally by the other MPs. Voters will also decide on the July Charter, a constitutional reform framework agreed upon by 30 parties following the uprising.

Dozens of parties have fielded more than 1,900 candidates to contest the 300 seats. However, the electoral campaign has evolved into a two-sided contest. On one side, the big-tent Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is leading the polls. Before the revolution, BNP was the main opposition party in Bangladesh. Since AL was banned in May 2025, BNP has managed to attract large swathes of supporters of the previous government.

Opposing it is a coalition, known as the “Like-minded 11 Parties” or “United Bangladesh”, founded in October 2025. The group is led by the other two major players in Bangladesh’s post-revolution political scene: the long-established Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which has emerged as a leading force on the right after years of marginalisation under Hasina, and the new, student-led National Citizen Party (NCP).

NCP, which was founded after the uprising, initially emerged as a reformist, progressive force. However, it has struggled to translate street support into electoral momentum. Its alliance with JI, which places it within a de facto right-wing Islamist coalition, has led to significant infighting, further weakening the party. In January 2026, 15 NCP party leaders resigned over the coalition deal.

Reflecting the high levels of insecurity, on 5 February the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) updated its Bangladesh travel advisory to recommend “against all but essential travel” to the country.

ASSESSMENT

The two votes are likely to be very differently contested. The referendum will highly likely return a resounding victory for the “Yes” vote, as the July Charter remains backed by all the major parties as well as the incumbent interim government. However, the parliamentary vote will likely be deeply competitive.

The failure of the NCP to organise effectively and to build a significant base of support has made it likely that the elections will be a contest between the BNP and JI. This dynamic is likely to be conducive to growing ideological polarisation and street violence. Throughout January 2026, several episodes of violent clashes between BNP, JI, and other parties’ canvassers have occurred across the country, injuring dozens of people.

A key test for the stability of post-electoral Bangladesh will be whether there is a general acceptance of the outcome of the 12 February vote. Several factors are likely to hinder such a scenario. First, current polls indicate a close contest between BNP and JI. There is a realistic possibility that polls will return a close or uncertain result, which could prolong the vote-counting period and delay the release of final tallies.

Second, several leaders have publicly warned of “plots” to doctor the results. These statements could constitute attempts to lay the foundations for a rejection of the vote as invalid. Finally, local media have reported on a growing spread of online disinformation targeting the election, often leveraging Artificial Intelligence-generated content. The spread of fake or misleading stories online has become a key driver of mob violence in Bangladesh and is likely to intensify during and after the vote.

Deep political polarisation and the spread of online disinformation have a realistic possibility of inciting “vigilante” violence by political activists targeting poll workers or voters during and after voting procedures. In the days immediately following the vote, further cases of mob violence targeting officials, candidates, and elected representatives, as well as inter-party clashes, remain likely. Attacks on foreigners, minorities, or foreign-owned businesses are also possible, particularly if claims of “foreign involvement” in the election were to spread online. For example, previous cases of mob violence have targeted American-owned businesses or businesses perceived to be pro-American or pro-Israeli.

In the medium term, instability and violence are likely to remain pervasive. The likelihood of further insecurity will largely depend on the parties’ acceptance of the election outcome. In a scenario where this occurs, possibly via a commitment by the parties to respect the electoral results, Bangladesh could reach a level of greater political stability. Pre-election commitments, however, would need to be paired with assurances that the new opposition will not be marginalised from the policymaking process. These dynamics would need to involve at least the three major parties, but could be extended to other key political players. This, of course, would not eliminate other pre-existing issues, such as the economic and labour-related challenges faced by Bangladesh, but would likely reduce the short-term threat of political violence.

A more likely scenario involves the elections resulting in protracted political instability. In this scenario, competition for control of the patronage networks left behind by AL’s collapse prevents the parties from reaching a meaningful agreement. Even if the central leadership acquiesces to a deal, local and student chapters, who are more dependent on local patronage networks, are likely to continue violently competing. Smaller groups marginalised under Hasina are expected to exploit the opportunities created by the revolution, but are likely to react negatively to any indication that they will continue to be excluded from any form of political influence.

In any scenario involving long-term political instability, economic instability is likely to deteriorate. Foreign direct investment (FDI) would likely decrease, especially in key industrial sectors, as investors delay commitments or reallocate capital to more stable markets and political environments in the region, such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam or Cambodia. In the fiscal quarter following the July Revolution in 2024, FDI inflows to Bangladesh dropped by 71 per cent, as investors avoided the country due to deadly political unrest, labour agitation and high degrees of political and economic uncertainty.

Failure to achieve any meaningful form of political stability or cohesion in Bangladesh is likely to reinforce the country’s economic and security issues. In turn, prolonged instability is conducive to worsening recurrent cycles of economic disruption, labour unrest, political violence, deteriorating crime rates and sectarian tensions, many of which remain unresolved.

On 8 February, Thai citizens will vote to elect members of the House of Representatives, the lower house of the National Assembly, following its dissolution in December 2025. 500 seats are up for election, with 400 chosen by constituency and the remaining 100 allocated to political parties in proportion to their nationwide vote share. 251 parliamentary votes are required to elect a prime minister, which is typically achieved through post-election coalition negotiations between multiple parties. The election must be certified within 60 days, by 9 April, and the parliament must convene within 15 days of election results being confirmed.

A referendum is also scheduled for the same day to determine whether to replace the current constitution, which was only enacted in 2017. Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled in September 2025 that drafting a new constitution requires three referendums. The first would approve the initiation of the drafting process; the second would focus on the draft’s key principles and approach; the third would constitute final approval of the draft.

57 parties have registered to take part in the election, but three main parties will be the primary contenders: the ruling conservative Bhumjaithai Party (BJT), the progressive reformist People’s Party (PP), and the populist Pheu Thai Party (PTP). Incumbent Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul is representing BJT. PP and PTP are the third incarnations of previous parties dissolved by the Thai courts for legal or technical breaches.

ASSESSMENT

Thailand’s current constitution was adopted in 2017 following a political crisis, which led to the removal of Yingluck Shinawatra in a military coup in 2014. As it was drafted under a military junta, the current constitution was approved in a tightly controlled referendum and is viewed as granting excessive power to the Senate, which has the authority to approve the prime minister and members of numerous independent bodies, including the Thai Constitutional Court. Many Thais view the constitution as imposed rather than chosen and have demanded reforms.

The election is taking place amid a broader political crisis. The border dispute with Cambodia, which led to direct fighting in July and December 2025, triggered the expulsion of former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra (niece of Yingluck and daughter of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, both members of PTP or one of its predecessors) after she expressed deference to the Cambodian former leader Hun Sen and criticised the Thai military in a leaked phone call.

Her successor, Anutin Charnvirakul, who took power in September, has faced heavy criticism over his minority government’s handling of the flooding in southern Thailand in November, which left at least 176 people dead. Adding to this was PP’s pulling of support from the BJP and its looming vote of no confidence over its alleged failure to honour promises to reform the constitution, compelling Anutin to dissolve parliament and call a general election in December.

A coalition government is the expected outcome of the election, with no party likely to win an outright majority. According to recent polling by Suan Dusit, respondents to a 28 January poll backed BJP by 21.14 per cent, PP by 21.11 per cent, and PTP by 17.56 per cent. 23.85 per cent of respondents were “still undecided”, suggesting that there could be a large disparity in electoral results from the polling. In a 6-9 January poll, PP leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut was the top choice for prime minister for 31.99 per cent, with PTP leader Yodchanan Wongsawat second on 17.45 per cent, and the incumbent Anutin third on 15.14 per cent. However, BJP’s polling has likely been inflated by a surge in nationalism linked to the ongoing Thailand-Cambodia border dispute and could diminish in the lead-up to the election, should the current ceasefire continue to hold.

Despite its popularity in the polls, PP faces potential legal action from the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) that could bar dozens of its members from running for attempting to amend Article 112 of the Criminal Code, Thailand’s royal insult (lèse-majesté) law, in 2021. The amendment sought to reduce penalties, narrow who could file complaints, and limit what constitutes an offence. While procedurally lawful within parliament, the proposal was later characterised by opponents as an abuse of office and an act undermining the constitutional order.

In the 2023 election, PP’s progenitor party, Move Forward, which openly campaigned on amending Article 112, won 151 seats in parliament, the most votes of any party, but was blocked from power by lawmakers tied to the royalist military due to its support for the amendment. Its prime ministerial candidate, Pita Limjaroenrat, was subsequently suspended from parliament and later barred from politics after Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled that his candidacy violated electoral law, effectively preventing him from assuming office.

Since then, PP has moderated its position during this electoral campaign, dropping the call to change Article 112 and softening its stance on the military, which it previously wanted to drive out of politics. Even so, PP’s historical backing of the amendment almost certainly exposes the party to political pressure and, in extremis, potential bans from candidacy.

Should PP receive the most votes but be barred from candidacy, widespread protests are highly likely, as was observed in 2023. These would highly likely be led by the Thai youth, who make up a large part of the reformist parties’ support base. Previous bouts of major unrest mixed with institutional paralysis have triggered coups from Thailand’s powerful military on numerous occasions. This is unlikely to occur again in the short-term due to independent mechanisms typically now being preferred tools for managing political crises in Thailand in an effort to increase democratic legitimacy. However, if protests become widespread, violent, and sustained, with a political deadlock over the election winner, this would highly likely increase the risk of a coup.

Large-scale unrest is not the only potential physical risk likely to increase in Thailand during the electoral campaign. Thailand has been experiencing an ongoing separatist insurgency since 2004 in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla. Insurgents have traditionally increased attacks during electoral cycles to undermine the central government and achieve maximum publicity for their cause. In 2023, insurgents set fire to cell phone towers and tyres across Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces. During the election periods in 2011 and 2014, insurgent activity increased around polling and campaigning phases, marked by attacks on infrastructure, local officials, and security forces.

On 11 January 2026, a series of coordinated bomb and arson attacks targeted PTT petrol stations across Thailand’s Deep South, injuring at least four. A member of the largest insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), has since declared that the group is “likely to conduct attacks like arson, shootings and bombings to remind political parties of their demands” around the general election. Further attacks in the run-up to the election are likely, with incidents likely to be contained to the southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla, and designed to generate publicity and exert political pressure, rather than cause mass casualties. However, attacks on Thai Buddhists, state officials, military personnel, police officers, and local Muslims perceived as cooperating with the authorities have increased in recent years, and there is a realistic possibility that more hardline elements of the insurgency will conduct more deadly attacks during the electoral period.

Costa Rica will hold general elections on 1 February to elect the president, the two vice presidents, and the 57 members of the Legislative Assembly. To be elected president, a candidate must secure at least 40 per cent of the vote in the first round. If that does not occur, the two candidates who received the most votes will compete in a run-off election on 5 April. If multiple candidates cross the 40 per cent threshold, the one who receives the most votes is elected president in the first round. Legislative Assembly seats are assigned via proportional representation across the country’s seven electoral districts.

Current polls indicate that Minister of National Planning and Economic Policy Laura Fernández Delgado is a clear favourite to win the first round. Polling from 21 January suggests she is approaching the critical 40 per cent mark, providing her with a realistic possibility of securing an outright first-round victory if current support levels are maintained. Fernández is running for the right-wing populist Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO), which was only founded in 2022. She also has the backing of incumbent President Rodrigo Chaves, who is currently an independent and barred from running for re-election.

Several candidates are competing for a possible second spot in the runoff, although they are all polling below double digits. They include: Álvaro Ramos Chaves, of the centrist National Liberation Party (PLN), Fabricio Alvarado, an Evangelical singer who heads the conservative New Republic Party (PNR), Claudia Dobles Camargo, the former first lady of Costa Rica who is supported by the centre-left National Democratic Agenda (AND) coalition, and Ariel Robles Barrantes, of the democratic socialist Broad Front (FA).

ASSESSMENT

The elections occur at a time of increasing political turmoil in Costa Rica. President Chaves is currently involved in a conflict with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and has survived two attempts to strip his electoral immunity over suspected electoral violations. This instability was highlighted on 19 January, when the head of Costa Rica’s intelligence agency reported that it had received information about a plot to assassinate Chaves ahead of the vote, although the activist who was accused has denied the allegations and suggested they were politically motivated.  

Moreover, the crime rate has increased significantly, which has largely been attributed to the spread of transnational organised criminal groups since the late 2010s. In 2023, the murder rate reached 17.2 per 100,000, around 40 per cent higher than its previous peak in 2017. Increasing crime rates have resulted in growing public scepticism towards the political class. According to polls, large sections of the electorate have become disillusioned with the existing parties, with up to half of voters still undecided regarding their preferred candidate.

Law and order and the fight against corruption are highly likely to be the main issues during the electoral campaign, mirroring patterns observed in other Latin American states. In countries like Chile, Honduras, and Ecuador, leaders have increasingly responded to these concerns with promises to implement Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) policies. Such policies have been characterised by mass detentions, increased police powers, and the curtailing of civil liberties. Mano Dura’s application by the government of El Salvador, which resulted in a sharp decrease in the violent crime rate, has become a model for other Latin American nations seeking to combat organised crime.

Fernández, expanding on Chaves’s positions, has pledged to implement Mano Dura in Costa Rica, vowing to build a “maxi-prison” like El Salvador’s CECOT facility, curtail civil rights in high-crime areas, and extradite Costa Ricans involved in organised crime to other countries, especially the US. These hardline stances, combined with Chaves’s enduring popularity (likely bolstered by the president’s clash with the legal “establishment”, have likely solidified Fernández’s primacy in the polls.

Still, Fernández’s victory, while highly likely due to the significant divisions within the opposition, is not certain. If the vote goes to a runoff, her competitor will almost certainly have an opportunity to unify at least part of this fragmented vote. However, the low levels of disillusionment within the electorate may make a significant swing in support between the two rounds unlikely.

Costa Rica has a long history of stable and peaceful political transitions. However, the country has had occasional waves of large-scale unrest, which have at times turned violent. The latest occurred in 2018, when labour unions staged a three-month strike over a proposed tax reform. The strike was marked by widespread and sometimes violent clashes between authorities and the protesters, as well as multiple incidents of vandalism.

It is unlikely that the upcoming vote itself will trigger large-scale violent unrest in Costa Rica. However, persistent political tensions, particularly the unresolved dispute between the executive and the TSE, could become catalysts for broader instability depending on the policies adopted by the incoming administration in its early months. The potential and controversial implementation of Mano Dura–style security measures is likely to result in significant division. While rising crime rates and the threats associated with transnational organised crime groups will almost certainly be leveraged to justify their implementation, for many, such draconian policies will likely be interpreted as a state overreach in a country that has traditionally championed democratic institutions and civil liberties, and which has historically been less affected by violent crime than many of its Central American neighbours.

On 18 January, Portuguese citizens will vote to elect their new President for a five-year term. The winning candidate needs to obtain a majority of 50 per cent of votes plus one. If that fails to occur, then the two leading candidates will compete in a run-off vote on 8 February. The incumbent President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, in office since 2016, is constitutionally barred from seeking a third consecutive term.

Portugal is a semi-presidential republic, and the president, while mostly holding ceremonial responsibilities, has some tangible political power (unlike, for example, the heads of state of Italy and Germany). For example, the president has the authority to veto laws and appoints not only the prime minister, but also other members of government.

Eleven official candidates are contesting for the presidency. A first-round victory seems highly unlikely, and current polls indicate that only five of the candidates have a realistic possibility of progressing to the second round. André Ventura, the founder of the far-right nationalist party Chega! (CH) leads the polls with approximately 19.5 per cent support. Marques Mendes, the candidate of the governing centre-right Social Democrat Party (PSD), polls at 19 per cent. António José Seguro, of the Socialist Party (PS), has around 17.5 per cent support, as does Henrique Gouveia e Melo, an “outsider candidate” and former Chief of the Naval Staff who is running as an independent and has significant centre-right support. Finally, João Cotrim de Figueiredo, president of the Liberal Initiative (IL), polls at around 16.5 per cent.

ASSESSMENT

The elections are likely to be a crucial test for Chega that could accelerate the party’s political momentum. In May’s parliamentary elections, Chega won 22.8 per cent of the vote, improving on its 2024 result and becoming the main opposition force in parliament. On the other hand, Chega was generally seen as having underperformed at the October 2025 local elections, only winning in three municipalities.

Securing the presidency would almost certainly grant Chega significant leverage over the governing PSD-led coalition. A Chega president could threaten to weaponise presidential veto powers to extract significant legislative concessions and shift the parliament to the right, encouraging PSD to work more often with Chega.

Holding the presidential office for five years is also an important political asset at a time of extreme parliamentary instability in Portugal. The 2025 vote was the third in three years, and the current governing coalition only retains a parliamentary minority. Finally, Chega’s position is further reinforced by Portugal’s lack of a developed cordon sanitaire system; the informal agreement that, in the parliaments of other European countries, such as France and Germany, centrist parties unite to keep the far-right out of power.

Current polls indicate that Ventura is likely to reach the second round. In other European head-to-head electoral contests involving a far-right candidate (such as, for instance, the second round of the 2022 French presidential elections), supporters of rival parties have typically coalesced around the leading alternative candidate to deny a far-right victory. However, several of the presidential candidates are from the right of the political spectrum, and if the choice is between Chega and the Socialist Party, Ventura’s chances will likely markedly increase, with right-leaning voters, not affected by a cordon sanitaire, potentially opting for Chega to block the left. On the other hand, a centre-right candidate may have a greater chance of winning centre-left voters by positioning themselves as a “lesser of two evils” against the far-right.

While presidential elections in Portugal seldom result in protests, a (likely) second round involving Ventura, which raises the possibility of a Chega head of state, would likely become an important cause of public opposition. Chega’s growth in the polls has meant that party rallies have increasingly been met by large counterprotests. Occasionally, as during the April 2025 Revolution Day celebrations in Lisbon, these demonstrations have escalated into clashes between opposing groups.

Furthermore, the likelihood of civil unrest after the first round of the elections is further increased by recent political developments in Portugal. In December, Portugal experienced its largest general strike in a decade, which forced the government to amend a labour reform package that opponents said reduced workers’ rights. Before the protests, the reform, proposed by the PSD coalition, was widely expected to be approved by parliament with Chega’s support. Chega representatives later backtracked and called on the government to amend the legislation as protests gained significant traction. Emboldened by their recent success, labour unions may stage further demonstrations, particularly if the runoff appears to be “tilted to the right”, for example, in a Ventura-Mendes scenario.

While large-scale protests cannot be ruled out, especially in Lisbon, protests after the first round are likely to be mostly peaceful and smaller-scale. On the other hand, direct action by groups opposing Chega is likely. This may include vandalism, particularly targeting party premises and police and government offices, and possibly small-scale political violence, such as clashes involving opposing political activists.

On 15 January, Ugandans will take part in general elections to elect the president and members of parliament. The president will be elected in a two-round system, with candidates requiring at least 50 per cent of the vote to be elected in the first round. The 529 members of the Ugandan Parliament will be elected via a first-past-the-post system. 146 seats are reserved for women, with one seat per district, and 30 seats are indirectly filled via special electoral colleges. 

Uganda’s Electoral Commission has cleared 27 parties to participate. Eight presidential candidates are competing. The 81-year-old Incumbent President Yoweri Museveni was declared the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party’s candidate and is seeking to extend his rule, which has been ongoing since 1986, to a seventh term. Opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi, popularly known as Bobi Wine of the National Unity Platform (NUP) is the primary opposition candidate.  

The lead-up to the elections has been characterised by intimidation, violence, and arrests targeting the opposition. Over 300 opposition supporters have been detained, with rallies being met by the police with tear gas, roadblocks, and arbitrary arrests. On 5 January 2026, Wine shared social media footage of security forces arresting and manhandling a journalist. This was the latest in a series of incidents involving heavy-handed tactics by security forces, typically against Wine supporters at his political rallies. Wine has claimed at least three deaths at his rallies at the hands of security forces, including one instance of a supporter being shot and another being hit by a military truck. In May 2025, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s son, who is likely being groomed as the next in line for the presidency, boasted of torturing Wine’s chief bodyguard. 

ASSESSMENT

Previous Ugandan elections have resulted in significant levels of violence. In November 2020, in the lead-up to the January 2021 general election, security forces arrested Wine, citing violations of COVID-19 protocols. Widespread protests erupted across Uganda, particularly in Kampala and other urban areas. Security forces cracked down on protests, deploying tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, and detaining approximately 3,000 people over the election period. 

In July 2024, young Ugandans engaged in anti-government protests in Kampala, largely inspired by similar youth-led movements in Kenya. Security forces quickly cracked down on demonstrations, detaining at least 100 protesters. Museveni, Africa’s third-longest-running leader, has cracked down on opposition in recent years, arresting and trying numerous opposition figures in military courts. Wine himself has been arrested multiple times since campaigning for the presidency, most recently in October 2023. 

A rising cost of living crisis, primarily driven by rising fuel and food costs, combined with perceptions of government corruption, has fuelled significant frustration among Uganda’s youth. If the election is perceived as unfree and unfair, or if the security forces use excessive or unwarranted force against the opposition, there is a realistic possibility that widespread unrest could break out. Security forces have historically cracked down on protesters with severe force and are highly likely to respond similarly to any unrest during the upcoming election. While the security crackdown acted as a deterrence to protesters in July 2024, Wine could act as a figurehead for post-election protests, potentially helping to sustain demonstrations despite the high likelihood of security force crackdowns. 

Despite the head of the Uganda Communications Commission’s (UCC) reassurance that reports of potential internet blackouts were “mere rumours”, internet blackouts are likely in the lead-up to the election. The government has already banned the sharing of live footage of riots, “unlawful processions”, and other violent incidents ahead of the election. Youth-led protests are generally heavily reliant on real-time updates, viral content, and livestreamed evidence of police brutality to sustain demonstrations. By cutting the internet, the government can disrupt protester coordination, prevent the documentation of abuses by security forces, isolate activists, and limit the spread of anti-government sentiment. During the 2021 election, during which widespread protests took place in Kampala, the internet was cut for four days.  

If civil unrest breaks out, demonstrations are likely around the Central Business District and near government buildings; during the July 2024 anti-corruption protests, groups marched through Kampala towards the parliament building but were blocked by the security forces. Large anti-government protests would highly likely result in travel disruptions, with security forces likely to use roadblocks to prevent protesters from accessing government buildings and diplomatic zones.  

Demonstrations and clashes with security forces broke out on 25 June in multiple cities in Kenya. The protests, which initially began in Nairobi, have now expanded to other cities including Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Nyahururu. According to Citizen TV, protests are also taking place in Eldoret, Kakamega, Narok, Busia, Makueni, Nyeri, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Machakos, Homa Bay, and Kirinyaga. Demonstrations are reportedly taking place in at least 20 of the country’s 47 counties. While precise numbers are unconfirmed, thousands of demonstrators have taken to the streets.

In Nairobi, large crowds have occupied parts of the Thika Road highway, and protesters have blocked streets in the Zimmerman area. Demonstrators are reportedly heading towards the city centre, highly likely aiming to reach the parliament. Security forces have deployed tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowds, particularly in the central business district and outside the city hall. One protester in the capital city was reported to be injured after being struck on the head by a tear gas canister and at least eight people have been shot, according to local news.

Reports from Matuu in Machakos County and Molo in Nakuru County indicate that police have opened fire on protesters, resulting in at least two deaths and several injuries in both locations. Eyewitnesses in Matuu claim that the violence occurred when protesters attempted to enter a police station.

The unrest has led to significant disruptions. Kenya Railways announced the suspension of commuter trains in Nairobi due to the ongoing protests. Additionally, the Kenyan government has taken steps to control the flow of information, with the Communications Authority ordering TV and radio stations to cease live broadcasts of the demonstrations.

Local NTV and KTN stations report that security forces raided their transmission centres and turned off their signals. NetBlocks has reported disruptions to the Telegram messaging service across Kenya, following a government ban on media platforms covering the protests live. Multi-media organisation The Standard Group has declared that it will continue to broadcast despite the attempted ‘news blackout’.

Opposition leaders Kalonzo Musyoka and Eugene Wamalwa have joined demonstrators in Nairobi, laying wreaths outside parliament in honour of those killed during demonstrations last year which killed an assessed 60 people. Former Chief Justice David Maraga is also taking part in the protests. They have called on police to exercise restraint and have condemned police brutality.

Major anti-gang protests in Haiti likely reflect a deteriorating humanitarian situation, which the gangs are likely attempting to exploit to increase the population’s dependence on them.

The Colombian government’s unilateral end to peace talks with the ELN almost certainly indicates an end to “total peace” and marks a significant shift in its policy towards rebel and criminal groups.  

The sentencing of far-right leader Marine Le Pen almost certainly deepens political tensions in France and is likely to increase the risk of political violence and unrest.

It is highly likely that Russia is exploiting poorly defined ceasefire terms and is delaying negotiations to pursue further territorial advances in Ukraine.

There is a realistic possibility that an Israeli strike on a Hezbollah external attack planner in Lebanon indicates a shift in Hezbollah’s strategy to target Israeli and Jewish interests abroad.

The Israeli establishment of a new operational corridor in Gaza is highly likely meant to isolate the remaining Hamas units. There is a realistic possibility of a growing consensus in Tel Aviv regarding annexing parts of Gaza.

It is likely that, due to its vulnerable position, Tehran will pursue a relatively cautious approach after Trump’s threats to bomb Iran. However, military escalation would likely force retaliation, threatening a regional conflict.

There is a realistic possibility that Uganda will support the newly formed Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR) in the DRC’s Ituri province, highly likely exacerbating humanitarian issues in the region.

Worst-case scenarios for an anticipated Nankai Trough megaquake in Japan predict mass casualties and the loss of almost half the country’s total GDP, almost certainly reaffirming the need for disaster planning.

Large-scale Chinese military drills around Taiwan are highly likely rehearsing a blockade of the island and almost certainly demonstrate the coordination of multiple PLA branches to conduct multi-domain operations.

On 2 April, thousands of Haitians protested in the capital, Port-au-Prince, to denounce a surge in gang violence. Protestors demonstrated outside of government buildings and demanded that the government do more to keep them safe.  Gunfire was exchanged between armed protesters and the police outside the offices of the prime minister and the transitional presidential council, resulting in many protestors fleeing the area.

The protests follow an increase in gang activity, which has involved gangs like the Viv Ansanm gang coalition attempting to move into new parts of the capital, where gangs are estimated to control 85 per cent. Recent gang activity has forced more than 60,000 people to flee their homes in one month alone, according to the UN’s International Organization for Migration.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Recent developments indicate that the gangs are attempting to expand their control and move out of their traditional areas of operations.  Increased attacks in the capital likely suggest that the gangs are attempting to secure the remaining 15 per cent of Port-au-Prince and isolate the government to just a few areas of the city.

The 2 April protests followed a gang attack on the central Haitian commune of Mirebalais on 31 March. During the Mirebalais attack, which has been linked to the Viv Ansanm gang coalition, a prison was targeted, and over 500 inmates were released, many of whom were likely immediately recruited by the gangs.

The attack in Mirebalais, approximately 60 kilometres northeast of the capital, may indicate that the gangs are attempting to assert control and expand their territory outside of Port-au-Prince. This strategy would likely provide several benefits for the gangs.

Attacks outside of the capital will almost certainly help to further undermine both the government and the Kenyan-led international task force, which is already reporting increased casualties. Significant attacks outside the capital will likely act as a demonstration of strength for the gangs, bolstering their recruitment efforts.

If sustained, such actions could also pressure the government and international forces to divert resources from the capital, further overstretching their forces to the advantage of the gangs. Most importantly, if the gangs take control and expand their influence in central Haiti, this will likely enable them to assert greater influence in the capital.

The gangs have systematically targeted key elements of Haiti’s infrastructure, including aid distribution points and convoys, hospitals and healthcare facilities, and vital infrastructure such as the international airport, roads, and transport hubs. They have also attacked educational institutions and other critical services. These attacks have likely been conducted to disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid, increase the population’s dependency on the gangs, and undermine the government’s inability to provide essential services.

Control of central Haiti will likely exacerbate these trends. Mirebalias is on the intersection of Route 305 and National Road 3 (Route Nationale 3), the main supply route that connects the capital to Cap-Haïtien. Gang attacks on Toussaint Louverture International Airport (PAP) and on aircraft have effectively rendered the airport non-operational, and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has banned flights to the airport until September 2025. This has led to Cap-Haïtien becoming an increasingly critical hub for both humanitarian aid and international support.

The gangs will likely continue to attack and attempt to assert control in central Haiti to cut off Port-au-Prince from humanitarian aid and international relief. As their territorial expansion increases, the humanitarian situation will almost certainly continue to deteriorate, likely further entrenching gang dominance, increasing internal displacement and migration flows, increasing unrest, and increasing the need for a coordinated international intervention.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro has announced the unilateral termination of peace talks with the left-wing guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), following sustained fighting, which has primarily affected regions like Arauca and Norte de Santander on the Venezuelan border. President Petro also denounced the ELN as an “occupying army of foreign origin.”

Petro’s comments were reinforced by incumbent Colombian Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez, who condemned the ELN, labelling it as a “purely criminal group” responsible for a wide range of human rights abuses, including the mass displacement of 56,000 people, the forced confinement of 23,000, murder and kidnap.

Recent government operations have neutralised hundreds of ELN fighters, and awards amounting to approximately USD 400,000 have been offered that lead to the arrest of ELN leaders. ELN leaders have responded by declaring Petro’s “total peace” policy a failure and betrayal of the Colombian people. The group also justified the killing of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, accusing them of collaboration with the government.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Recent government statements and operations indicate a complete shift in the Petro administration’s strategy towards the ELN and other guerilla and criminal groups, which will highly likely result in a worsening of the conflict near the border with Venezuela and the humanitarian situation.

However, the effective dismantling of the ELN will likely prove to be a significant challenge. The group maintains a decentralised structure and is well entrenched in the rural and border regions of Colombia. The ELN has traditionally survived the killing or capturing of its leadership by quickly replacing them and operating through a network of decentralised cells.

Petro’s comments that the ELN is an occupying army of foreign origin is almost certainly a reference to how the group has developed ties with Venezuela, with widespread reports that the Maduro administration is directly profiting from the ELN’s illicit activities. These ties will help ELN sustain itself militarily and enable it to establish safe havens outside of Colombia.

Moreover, cross-border operations will complicate Colombian counter-insurgency efforts, limiting its ability to target ELN high-value targets within Venezuela without risking a diplomatic crisis or broader conflict.  These challenges likely indicate that the conflict will last for the foreseeable future following the mutual acceptance of the failure of “total peace”.

It is estimated that the ELN operates in at least 231 municipalities across 19 departments in Colombia and in eight of Venezuela’s 24 states. In Colombia, the ELN’s main strongholds are in the departments of Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Arauca. However, the group also has a strategic presence in the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, and Vichada, where it engages in illicit activities such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion to sustain its operations.

The ELN’s widespread territorial control and illicit networks likely make it highly resilient to military pressure. This also puts the group in an advantageous position to escalate violence across the country, and there is a realistic possibility that sustained government operations against the ELN near the Venezuelan border will result in a migration of violence to other parts of Colombia.

US administration announces “Liberation Day” tariffs

On 2 April, Washington highlighted the Trump administration’s plans to impose sweeping tariffs on its international trade partners. President Trump has held a long-standing belief that a comprehensive tariff regime will bolster the American economy by reducing the impact of “unfair” international trade practices.

The move is likely to drive anti-American sentiment abroad, particularly in the most severely hit states or regions, including the European Union, China, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In Europe, there is a realistic possibility that an increase in the perceived hostility of the US administration will contribute to drive further cases of vandalism of American assets and businesses.

Violent unrest in the Dominican Republic during anti-Haitian protests

On 30 March, an anti-Haitian protest in the Dominican Republic turned violent as the nationalist group Antigua Orden Dominicana (AOD) called for the expulsion of Haitian migrants. Violent unrest resulted in the police using tear gas and water cannons, and several arrests were made.

Protestors claimed that Haitians are responsible for an increase in crime in the country, demanded that mass deportations be conducted, and broke past barricades to enter Haitian communities in Hoyo de Friusa, Bavaro, close to the tourist resort of Punta Cana.

Due to the endemic violence and continued destabilisation in Haiti and its associated migrant flow into the Dominican Republic, future protests and unrest are likely to continue, with the AOD attempting to organise further demonstrations in April.

New Mexico Republican HQ firebombed

On 30 March, the Republican Party state offices were set on fire, and slogans like “ICE=KKK” were spray-painted on the building. The damage to the premises was reportedly contained by responding firefighters, and as the attack occurred overnight, no injuries were reported.

The firebombing is almost certainly in response to the Trump administration’s drive to carry out mass deportation of undocumented migrants in the US. While available data suggests that the actual number of expulsions is similar to that recorded during the Democrat Biden administration, the Trump White House has strongly invested in public messaging on its migration policies, often highlighting and glorifying their most controversial aspects, such as the deportation of alleged gang members to prisons in El Salvador.

The high-visibility of the current administration’s policies is likely to drive further acts of vandalism, and possibly political violence, in the medium term.

Floods result in evacuations in northeast Paraguay

Severe floods have affected the Alto Paraguay region since 1 April, following severe precipitation. The severe weather events have resulted in the evacuation of local towns and major traffic disruptions, and authorities have issued a state of emergency for the area. The Alto Paraguay department is sparsely populated and lacks comprehensive infrastructure, with few key roadways, like the PY16. Consequently, even localised floods can result in smaller towns being effectively cut off from receiving emergency help.

On 1 April, a French court sentenced Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right National Rally (RN) and favourite in early polls for the 2027 presidential race, to four years in prison (two suspended, two on house arrest) over charges of embezzlement of EU funds. The court, which also sentenced other prominent RN officials, also barred Le Pen from running for office for five years, meaning that the sentence prevents her from partaking in the 2027 vote.

The sentence was met by the opposition of prominent international right-wing figures, including in Italy, Hungary, and the US. Jordan Bardella, RN’s party president, and other leaders called for a peaceful mobilisation in support of Le Pen, including a rally at 15:00 local time in Paris on 6 April.

Le Pen has appealed the verdict, and, on 2 April, court officials stated they plan to hold the appeal trial before the 2027 electoral campaign.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The verdict is almost certainly a severe blow to RN. The party’s political appeal has been tied to the Le Pen family for generations, and if Marine Le Pen was unable to run, there is a realistic possibility that it would struggle to gain traction by fielding Bardella or another alternative candidate.

It is highly likely that RN supporters will stage demonstrations following the verdict, particularly on 4-6 April. Counterdemonstrations by anti-RN activists will highly likely take place in response, with a realistic possibility of violent clashes and police intervention.

There is likewise a realistic possibility that the sentencing will embolden radical groups and movements that share some ideological affiliation with RM’s platform to increase recruitment and messaging to RN’s voter base. It may be notable that RN won around 30 per cent of the youth vote at the last elections, matching a shift also seen elsewhere in Europe.

Finally, the judicial closing of a political path for RN to take power is likely to be exploited by extremists to increase calls to violence against public officials and left-wing politicians in France, possibly increasing the risk of lone wolf terrorism.

Officials within the Trump administration have acknowledged that securing a peace deal in Ukraine within the next few months is unlikely. The officials stated that while the original intent was to secure a full ceasefire by April-May, both Ukrainian and Russian resistance to key elements proposed by the Trump administration are delaying efforts, leading to increasing frustration within the White House over President Putin’s refusal to compromise on his maximalist demands.

Washington has discussed renewed measures to coerce Moscow into accepting its proposals, which include secondary tariffs of 25-50 per cent on Russian oil buyers.

President Putin has continued to criticise US peace proposals through his chief negotiator Sergei Ryabkov, demanding several core demands that the Kremlin insists must be met to secure any potential ceasefire agreement.

These include Ukrainian recognition of the annexation of Crimea and the four partially occupied regions in southeastern Ukraine of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson; a Ukrainian pledge to never join NATO or any other Western military alliance; a demilitarisation of Ukraine; the removal of President Volodymyr Zelensky; a suspension of US lethal aid and intelligence; and an easing of European sanctions, which the EU has rejected.

Solace Global Assessment: 

By refusing to accept current ceasefire proposals advanced by the US or renege on its maximalist demands, it is highly likely that the Kremlin is delaying the ceasefire proposal in order to seize further Ukrainian territory, which will ultimately improve its bargaining power in future negotiation talks.

Moreover, Russia is unlikely to accept any meaningful ceasefire agreement while Ukraine retains forces in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. Ukraine’s Kursk offensive was a symbolic and operational success that buoyed Ukrainian morale, forced Russia to divert resources from other sectors of the line of contact and most importantly, placed Ukraine in a more advantageous position for future negotiations.

Recent reporting indicates that Russian ground forces are close to reclaiming the entirety of the Kursk Oblast after seizing the city of Sudzha in mid-March, Ukraine’s main defensive position. However, Moscow is unlikely to pursue ceasefire negotiations once it has fully reclaimed Kursk, as it has seized the momentum on multiple fronts.

Once the Kursk Oblast has been recaptured, Russia will likely stabilise its lines on this axis and laterally redeploy forces to parts of eastern Ukraine, in order to further consolidate territorial gains, improve its leverage, and maximise its chances of securing concessions from both Ukraine and the West.

Moscow is highly likely to accept poorly defined steps towards a ceasefire or limited ceasefires in order to project a willingness to pursue overall peace, a strategy that will continue to delay the conflict and may help to placate the Trump administration, which is under pressure to secure a resolution to the conflict.

By agreeing to vague, poorly defined or incomplete ceasefire proposals, Moscow can claim it is acting in good faith while exploiting the lack of clarity to continue military operations or adapt them to appear as if it is complying.

One example of this strategy currently in place is Russia’s interpretation of the moratorium on attacks on Ukraine’s energy-related critical national infrastructure (CNI). Russia has refrained from attacking these targets with long-range missiles and drones in accordance with the vaguely defined terms of the ceasefire. However, it has increased its targeting of energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery, as it is unclear as to whether this is covered in the yet-to-be formalised ceasefire terms, which may only apply to long-range fires.

One of the objectives of this strategy is likely to provoke Ukraine into retaliatory actions, then exploit the ambiguity of the ceasefire terms to shift blame onto Kyiv for violating the ceasefire. Ultimately, this strategy will help Russia control the narrative, undermine Ukraine’s commitment to ongoing peace negotiations, help extend the conflict whilst Russia maintains the upper hand on the battlefield, and most importantly, help to foster division within the West, one of Russia’s primary strategic objectives.

On 1 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in the Hezbollah stronghold of the Dahieh area in southern Beirut, targeting Hassan Ali Mahmoud Bdeir. Israeli intelligence claims that Bdier was a senior Hezbollah commander who served in the militant group’s Unit 3900, which is responsible for external operations beyond Lebanon’s borders.

Bdeir was also responsible for the coordination between Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran’s Quds Force. According to Israeli sources, Bdier was planning a major attack on Jewish and Israeli targets overseas and had been monitored for months by the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), working in conjunction with Israel’s military intelligence and cyber surveillance units.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Israeli defence sources claim that Bdeir was overseeing the recruitment of suicide operatives, logistic chains for weapons and explosives, the funnelling of funds through covert Iranian channels, and was responsible for target selection against Israeli diplomatic missions, Jewish community centres and other potential civilian targets.

If the foiled attack was credible, it may indicate a shift in Hezbollah’s strategy against Israel. Hezbollash has established a network of operatives across the globe and has previously demonstrated its ability to attack Israeli and Jewish interests outside of the Middle East. For example, in 1994, 85 people were killed after a vehicle-borne improved explosive device (VBIED) detonated outside of the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires, an attack that has been linked to Hezbollah with Iranian backing.

There is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah may be seeking to adopt a strategy of external attacks to increase pressure on Israel and the US while achieving a high degree of plausible deniability. Such a strategy would also enable Hezbollah to target Israeli interests without directly engaging Israeli forces, with any Israeli response in Lebanon likely to provoke international condemnation.

However, the strike follows a series of expanded Israeli strikes in Lebanon, which have not been confined to the southern parts of Lebanon. Hezbollah is in a weakened position after Israel’s ground offensive and strikes on the group, and it has lost its critical supply lines from Iran through Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. However, the group still maintains thousands of fighters and a credible arsenal of missiles and rockets.

While Hezbollah likely has some tolerance for attacks on rank-and-file fighters and military equipment, Israeli strikes on senior leadership and within Beirut could force Hezbollah into resuming hostilities if sustained. Any major kinetic response from Hezbollah will likely result in a definitive end to the increasingly fragile ceasefire agreement and would likely lead to increased Israeli strikes in Lebanon and potentially a renewed ground offensive in southern Lebanon.

Given the current geopolitical climate, there is a realistic possibility that Israel may be seeking to capitalise on Hezbollah’s degradation, a weakened Iran, and the support of an increasingly pro-Israel, anti-Iran Trump administration to further its strategic goals.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have continued offensive operations in the Gaza Strip, with the aim of maximising pressure on Hamas and securing the release of the remaining Israeli hostages still in captivity. On 2-3 April, IDF channels issued evacuation orders for much of the southern city of Rafah, while Israel Katz, the minister of defence, stated that IDF operations are aimed at seizing territory for long-term occupation. This echoed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements on 30 March that Israel is now seeking to implement Trump’s plan for the “voluntary migration” of Gazans from the Gaza Strip.

On 3 April, Netanyahu announced that IDF units have established the Morag Corridor, named after a former Israeli settlement in Gaza, between Rafah and Khan Yunis, calling it a “second Philadelphi”. Over 1,150 Palestinians are estimated to have been killed since hostilities resumed on 18 March.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The establishment of the Morag Corridor almost certainly seeks to isolate Rafah from the rest of Gaza. The southern city was considered to be the key stronghold from Hamas forces and benefited from the proximity of the Gaza-Egypt corridor, through which the armed group received most of its equipment and resources.

IDF operations are likely aimed at “strangling” the remaining Hamas units by sectioning Gaza. It is highly likely that IDF units in the Morag area will immediately seek to identify and destroy the remaining tunnels linking Rafah and Khan Yunis, aiming to sever Hamas’ ground lines of communications and forcing it into more direct and costly confrontations.

The establishment of the new corridor, combined with the evacuation orders for Rafah, highly likely shows that the aid blockade will continue, which will in turn almost certainly worsen the humanitarian situation in southern Gaza.

Katz and Netanyahu’s statements are highly likely the clearest indications of a growing interest in the Israeli annexation of parts of the Gaza Strip. The far-right parties that support Netanyahu’s government have long considered the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 a historic mistake and are likely interested in returning to some of the previous settlements in the area.

A more tangible set of measures to expel Gazans from the area would almost certainly precipitate tensions in the region, bringing both Tel Aviv and Washington at odds with regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who see the removal of Gazans as an unacceptable “red line”.

Moreover, it would almost certainly result in severe civil unrest in Jordan and, especially, Egypt, who would be the likeliest destinations for displaced Gazans.

While likely still the main political force in Gaza, there are notable indications that Hamas has lost much of its administrative capacity and support. In the past month, there have been multiple cases of protests against the war in Gaza, some openly criticising Hamas’ policies in the war.

In addition, on 2 April, members of the Abu Samra clan, based in Deir al-Balah, carried out a public execution of a Hamas member who had allegedly killed one of their relatives. The execution, which was filmed and posted online, is almost certainly an open act of defiance against Hamas, and highly likely reflects a wider belief in Hamas’ relative weakness.

On 30 March, US President Donald Trump stated that if Iran does not agree to a deal on their nuclear program, ‘there will be bombing’, ‘the likes of which they have never seen before’. Trump additionally threatened secondary tariffs on countries that trade with Iran, giving an approximate timeline of ‘a couple of weeks’ for progress in nuclear talks until the tariffs would be imposed.

On 31 March, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded, stating that he did not believe the threats but that the US would ‘certainly receive a heavy blow in return’. A senior Iranian adviser also stated that US or Israeli strikes would ‘force’ Tehran to develop nuclear weapons, and Iranian media and senior military commanders threatened retaliation against US military facilities across the region (including a direct threat against the US base on Diego Garcia Island south of the Maldives) and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Furthermore, on 3 April, the Telegraph reported that a senior Iranian official source briefed that Tehran had ordered a withdrawal of military personnel from Yemen, as part of a reorientation away from a strategy of supporting its network of regional proxies, the “axis of resistance”, to focus instead on direct threats from the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The increase in rhetoric comes amidst a return to Trump’s “maximum pressure” approach to Iran, with Trump’s threats following Tehran formally responding to a 5 March letter Trump sent to Khamenei. In the letter, Trump set a two-month deadline to reach a nuclear deal, although it is unclear whether this countdown begins from the letter’s delivery or when negotiations hypothetically begin. Tehran’s rejection of Trump’s demands for direct negotiations, instead proposing indirect talks mediated by Oman, highly likely conditioned Trump’s direct threats of military force.

Iran has been classified as a “nuclear threshold state”, with estimates suggesting that it could take less than a week for Iran to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium to produce a nuclear weapon. Following the severe degradation of Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the October 2024 aerial strikes by Israel that highly likely heavily degraded Iran’s air defence network, Iranian deterrence in the region has almost certainly been significantly diminished.

Tehran, therefore, is highly likely to have far more incentive to develop a nuclear deterrent. There is likely considerable internal debate within the Iranian establishment, with a clear split between President Masoud Pezeshkian, who was elected on a mandate of reopening nuclear negotiations to enable the removal of sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy, and hardliners who reject the possibility of any concessions to Washington.

Whilst the briefed withdrawal from Houthi-controlled Yemen may indicate a substantial shift in Tehran’s strategy, it is unlikely that they will fully abandon the Houthis, as the Yemeni group remains one of Iran’s most powerful and strategically positioned proxy forces.

Considerable escalation to open conflict between Iran and the US (with almost certain Israeli support), would highly likely increase the threat to US-aligned states across the region, notably Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, with Iranian-backed proxy forces having previously threatened attacks against US energy interests during periods of increased tensions.

It is likely that Tehran, due to Iran’s assessed highly vulnerable position, will pursue a cautious approach and is likely particularly susceptible currently to Trump’s coercive rhetoric. Nonetheless, Khamenei will likely be highly reluctant to overtly concede to US pressure and military escalation by Washington would likely force retaliation by Tehran.

On 31 March, Ituri native Thomas Lubanga announced the creation of the Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR), which aims to topple the government in the Ituri province. Lubanga, currently based in Uganda, claims that the group has political and military wings, with armed forces present in three areas of Ituri.

Lubanga was sentenced to 14 years in prison by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2012 for ‘enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities.’ Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi appointed him after his release in 2020 as part of a task force to restore peace in Ituri. However, after being taken hostage for two months by a rebel group in 2022, he blamed the government, severing ties with Tshisekedi.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The CPR is the second rebel movement led by Lubanga, following the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), a rebel group involved in the Ituri conflict. While the conflict mainly occurred between 1999 and 2003 following the Second Congo War, it has continued at a lower intensity between the agriculturalist Lendu and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups.

The UPC, under the command of Lubanga, primarily supported the Hema ethnic group, and will almost certainly continue to do so under the new banner of CPR. Given that rebels under Lubanga’s command have previously been accused of human rights violations including ethnic massacres, murder, torture, rape, mutilation, and the forcible conscription of child soldiers, it is highly likely that CPR will engage in similar tactics, exacerbating humanitarian issues in the region, which has seen over 50,000 killed and 500,000 displaced. It is likely that aid workers will not be targeted, with Lubanga previously pledging security for humanitarian workers.

The UPC operated with the support of Ugandan forces, who are currently active in the Ituri region under Operation Shujaa, a joint offensive against insurgent forces in the Ituri province. In August 2002, the UPC captured Bunia with the assistance of the Ugandan military and subsequently began to receive support from Rwanda.

Uganda currently has a military presence in Bunia due to counterinsurgency efforts against the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Uganda also has an active interest in exploiting the abundant mineral resources in eastern DRC; in 2019, 95 per cent of its gold exports were highly likely sourced from the DRC.

There is a realistic possibility that Uganda will renew its ties with Lubanga, which would highly likely expand Ugandan access to mineral wealth attained by the rebel group, likely in exchange for military support from the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). Forming an alliance with CPR would also likely expand Ugandan influence in the region, counterbalancing Rwanda’s expanding influence in Kivu through AFC/M23.

The formation of the CPR will highly likely further stretch the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), who are currently attempting to prevent an ongoing offensive by the AFC/M23 militia. This will likely also indirectly increase pressure on Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi, who is currently facing significant opposition regarding his perceived handling of the conflicts in eastern DRC.

Lubanga has an indirect link to the AFC/M23 through Bosco Ntaganda, founding member of M23 and former Chief of Military Operations in the UPC. The UN accused Lubanga last year of mobilising fighters to support AFC/M23. AFC/M23 are currently approaching the Ituri province in an ongoing offensive in North Kivu; currently in Lubero, they almost certainly aim to continue north into Ituri. The formation of CPR will highly likely facilitate this northern expansion.

Workers at London Heathrow Airport (LHR) to strike from 5 to 9 April

The strikes have been announced by Unite the Union and will be conducted by approximately 500 Heathrow workers who assist passengers with limited mobility. The dispute stems from the wage difference between staff performing the same role at London Gatwick Airport (LGR), despite being employed by the same company, Wilson James.

Further strike dates will reportedly be announced if an agreement is not reached. Travel disruptions are likely over the Easter period, potentially disrupting holiday flights. The strike announcement comes amid increasing pressure from airlines over the temporary airport closure due to a power outage caused by a substation fire nearby, which affected approximately 200,000 passengers.

There is a realistic possibility that airline pressure, combined with threats of further strike action, will mean that the workers succeed in attaining a pay increase and call off strike action.

More than 250 migrants displaced for the second time in weeks in Paris

On 1 April, French police removed a migrant encampment in central Paris on the Seine quays. Many of the displaced individuals had reportedly previously occupied the Gaite Lyrique theatre, also in central Paris, which had been raided by authorities on 18 March following months of occupation. There is a realistic possibility of civil unrest by left-wing groups following the second displacement in two weeks.

General strike grounds flights in Belgium

On 31 March, a general strike among both public and private sector workers took place in Belgium in protest of planned government austerity measures. The strikes severely disrupted public services and transport, grounding 244 flights across the country. The national railway operated a minimal service of fewer than half its trains running and several schools and public services have stopped. Eurostar was unaffected.

This is the second such nationwide strike and reflects a growing discontent with the newly formed “Arizona coalition”. In February, tens of thousands of people engaged in a multi-day strike in protest against pension reforms. The government’s measures are set to cut funding for pensions, healthcare, unemployment support, and social services. Given the widespread hostility of the country’s unions towards these measures, further strikes and demonstrations are highly likely.

Germany tries to deport four pro-Palestine activists

Three of the four individuals reportedly hold EU citizenship, and the fourth is American. None have been convicted or charged for a criminal offence, although this is not technically needed for the issuing of a deportation order under German law. The four are, however, accused of  taking part in direct protest action in support of Palestine, including university and roadway blockades. The timing of the case will likely result in its association with similar efforts to deport pro-Palestine activists from the United States. It is highly likely that, if the planned deportations progress, these will result in anti-government protests in Berlin, particularly at local universities.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) dissolves youth wing

The termination of the “Young Alternative”, which had been classified as an extremist group in 2023, is likely meant to reduce the risk of legal challenges to the party, which is now the second strongest force in the German parliament. AfD has, at the latest elections, made some important gains in terms of the youth vote, so the party would be positioned to benefit from having a youth wing to capitalise on its new supporters. Likely, AfD will now launch a new formation to replace the Young Alternative. However, in the interval, there is a realistic possibility that other far-right youth groups who are not aligned with the party, such as the resurgent German chapter of Generation Identity (GI) will seek to recruit AfD supporters into their ranks.

Slovakia proposes draft of “anti-lobbyists” bill targeting NGOs

The law, which is supported by the Fico government, classifies NGOs that “directly or indirectly” influence politicians as “lobbies”, thus imposing more significant restrictions on their operations. As the definition of “influence” is vague, critics of the bill argue that it is effectively an attempt to curtail NGO operations in a manner similar to that seen in Russia or Georgia. Protests have occurred in Bratislava and other large cities in the aftermath of the law’s proposal. These protests are likely to continue next week, when the draft law is set to have its final vote.

Protests in Hungary over Pride ban

Large-scale demonstrations, resulting in widespread traffic disruptions, have erupted in Budapest following the Orban government’s new legislation, which bans Pride parades and authorises police to use facial recognition software to identify participants. The law is scheduled to come into effect in mid-April, in time for Pride month in June. Notably, 2025 is also the 30^th anniversary of the first Pride parade in Budapest. The unrest is likely to continue on 4-6 April, and there is a realistic possibility of its increase in the short term. If the ban remains in place, a further wave of unrest is highly likely to occur in June.

National strike planned in Greece for 9 April

Several public sector unions in Greece have announced that they will participate in a 24-hour general strike beginning on 9 April. The strike is expected to cause widespread disruption, especially within the transport sector. All flights in Greece will be cancelled due to the participation of air traffic controllers in the strike, severely affecting domestic and international travel. Maritime industry unions have also announced their intent to participate, which will halt all shipping in the country, which may impact the country’s supply chains, tourism, and commerce. There is a realistic possibility of strike-related protests in major cities like Athens and Thessaloniki resulting in violent interactions with the police force.

UK sanctions pro-Russian group over Moldovan election interference

On 2 April, the UK government imposed sanctions on the pro-Russian group Evrazia, linked to Russian oligarch Ilan Shor, for attempting to rig Moldova’s October 2024 presidential election and its referendum on joining the European Union. The sanctions, which include asset freezes and travel bans on the group’s leaders, are likely part of a broader UK effort to counter Russian influence, combat corruption and safeguard democratic institutions in Europe, and will likely expand in response to Russian efforts to influence upcoming European elections, such as the Romanian presidential election in May.

Guinea’s junta sets September as a date for constitutional referendum

On 2 April Guinea’s military junta announced 21 September 2025 as the date for a constitutional referendum. This marks a significant step in the transition towards democracy after Mamady Doumbouya took power in a coup in September 2021. The military has so far missed the deadlines it set for a transition to civilian rule, having initially proposed a two-year transition period, which lapsed after 31 December 2024. The junta has engaged in significant political repression since gaining power, allegedly disappearing two prominent opposition figures in July 2024 and a journalist in December. The proposed constitution would introduce a two five-year term presidential limit but may enable Doumbouya to run for office, something forbidden in the transitional charter. It is highly likely that the constitution is engineered to enable Doumbouya to attain power legitimately.

Burkina Faso accelerates media crackdown

On 1 April, the security minister of Burkina Faso released a list of individuals who are wanted for “criminal association” and “terrorism”. Many of the figures listed are the heads or high-ranking members of Islamist terror groups operating in the country. However, alongside them, the junta listed prominent journalists and civil society opposition figures, many of whom are currently in exile. The crackdown on media figures has likely intensified following the reported massacre of civilians by Burkinabe forces in Solenzo on 11 March, and the publication of the lists likely represents an effort to systematise the efforts to silence opposition voices. In addition to this recent development, there is a high likelihood that Burkinabe security forces have been deployed to “disappear” critics still present in the country. For instance, local sources have reported that, on 30 March, security forces arbitrarily arrested the head of a civil society group based in Ouagadougou. No reports about the detainee’s location or state have been released since the arrest.

Approximately 95 arrested in demonstrations against Zimbabwe President Emmerson Mnangagwa

On 31 March, a muted planned protest demanding Mnangagwa’s resignation took place amid heavy security presence. Few people participated in the protests, likely due to fears of potential violent unrest, opting to stay home. The fear led to widespread closures of businesses, offices, and schools in Harare and Bulawayo. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters, and the demonstrators, identified through social media posts, were arrested on charges of “promoting public violence” and “breaching the peace”. The demonstrations were organised by Blessed Geza, a member of the ruling Zanu-PF party and part of a faction calling for Vice-President Constantine Chiwenga to replace Mnangagwa.

Zimbabweans have been calling for Mnangagwa’s resignation since a Zanu-PF announcement in January, which declared that he would be in office until 2030, despite the constitutional limit of two five-year terms, which would limit his rule to 2028. The calls for protests come amid hyperinflation, high unemployment, and widespread corruption, despite Mnangagwa’s early promises of political and economic reforms. While the population is generally wary of destabilising an already fragile country, it is highly likely that calls for Mnangagwa’s resignation will increase over the coming weeks and embolden currently wary opponents, potentially sparking widespread nationwide unrest.

Man sets vehicle on fire in central Amsterdam, Netherlands, in possible failed car bomb attack

On 2 April, a man drove a vehicle to the centre of Dam Square and reportedly attempted to detonate it. This resulted in a fire that injured the driver but caused no casualties. As of the time of writing, the identity and motive of the individual remain unclear. However, there is a realistic possibility that the incident is linked to the recent lone wolf stabbing attack that occurred at the same location.

From the episode’s dynamic, it appears highly likely that the driver sought to achieve maximum visibility for his action, but it is still unclear whether the detonation was a failed terror attack attempt or whether it was carried out as a form of high-visibility suicide. Over the past year, there have been several cases of self-immolation carried out for political messaging. These included a man detonating a Tesla vehicle outside the Las Vegas Trump Hotel in January 2025, in an apparent protest of the incoming Trump administration.

Multiple Teslas torched in Rome

On 31 March, 17 vehicles manufactured by US billionaire Elon Musk’s company were burned at a dealership in the periphery of the Italian capital. The act of vandalism is highly likely the most severe incident targeting Tesla in Italy so far, and is highly likely linked to the string of attacks on the US automakers that have occurred in Europe in the last months. Tesla is a preferred target for anarchist groups, who retain a heavy presence in Italy, due to its high visibility and its association with the Trump administration.

In addition to Tesla, the is a realistic possibility that as US tensions with Europe increase, other high-visibility American companies could be targeted for vandalism. Moreover, the targeting of US assets in Italy could increase following the possible announcement of a visit by US Vice-President JD Vance to Rome for Easter, which appears likely to be announced following repeated contacts between the Italian government and the American embassy in Rome.

Israel intensifies strikes on Syria

On 2 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) escalated its strikes in Syria, targeting air bases and military infrastructure near Damascus and in several other parts of the country, resulting in the near-total destruction of Hama Air Base and the Tiyas (T4) Air Base near Homs.  The strikes also coincided with an IDF ground operation in southwestern Syria, where IDF forces clashed with militants.

The strikes were likely intended to send a strategic message to Syria’s new Islamist-led transitional government that Israel will not accept hostile forces establishing a presence on its borders. Israel also raised concerns over Turkey’s increasing influence in Syria, with Foreign Minister Gideon Saar accusing Ankara of attempting to turn Syria into a “Turkish protectorate.” Turkey has made attempts to secure the T4 Air Base, with reports circulating that it will deploy air defence to secure the base. Israel’s repeated targeting of T4 in recent weeks likely suggests a deliberate effort to degrade its operational capacity before Turkish forces can establish a presence.

Armed attack kills several dozen soldiers in Burkina Faso

On 31 March, “several dozen” soldiers and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) members were killed by suspected jihadists in a military camp in Diapaga, eastern Burkina Faso close to the borders with Niger and Benin. Approximately 30 wounded security personnel were evacuated to a hospital. During the attack, militants set fire to shops and homes. The military retaliated, launching a sweep of the area and killing several militants.

Burkinabe authorities have not released a statement regarding the attack. Burkina Faso’s security forces have been battling insurgencies, primarily by the al-Qaeda linked Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). Based on the respective operating and attack zones, it is likely that the attack was conducted by JNIM, who typically operate along the border regions with Niger and Benin.

Volcanic eruption in Iceland

On 1 April, a volcanic fissure opened north of Grindavik, causing the evacuation of the town and nearby Blue Lagoon. The fissure initially reached 500 metres; by midday, it had grown to 1,200 metres, moving southward toward Grindavik. Despite the dramatic initial activity, Icelandic authorities have recently observed a decrease in volcanic activity. On 2 April, local media reported no significant activity at the fissure site. An Icelandic meteorological official stated that the eruption is ‘more or less over,’ although they cautioned that future magma intrusions could occur. In the meantime, approximately six hundred earthquakes have been recorded in the magma chamber since April 3, but no new volcanic activity has been observed since the fissure opened.

Storm Nuria hits Iberian Peninsula

Storm Nuria continues to affect the Iberian Peninsula with heavy rain and winds, although no orange or red alerts have been issued in Spain as of the time of writing. In the Canary Islands, classes have resumed following the end of the wind alert. Previously, La Palma Airport remained closed, and flights at Tenerife North Airport were cancelled due to the storm. The storm had also caused landslides and road closures in Las Palmas, and injured individuals in Puerto de la Cruz. Additionally, a power outage affected 3,000 people in Fuencaliente, La Palma. The Spanish meteorology office had activated a yellow alert for Cádiz province due to forecasts of wind, rain, and storm surges.

Greek islands declare emergency due to flooding

Both Mykonos and Paros, two of the most visited islands in the Aegean Sea, announced a state of emergency following the storm that hit the Cyclades on 31 March. The weather system caused widespread flooding and severe traffic disruptions across the islands, with two months’ worth of rain falling on Paros in two hours on 31 March. The state of emergency will be in place for one month.

Nigeria warns of rising nationwide Lassa fever cases

According to the Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), at least 118 people have been killed in Nigeria in the first quarter of 2025 due to an outbreak of Lassa fever, with 645 confirmed cases recorded and a current fatality rate of 18.3 per cent. The disease, which is spread primarily by rodents, is most prevalent in rural areas due to poor sanitation, resulting in the contamination of food and living spaces. The outbreak has likely been exacerbated by inadequate healthcare facilities and staffing shortages in rural areas, as well as the overreliance on traditional medication. Symptoms of Lassa fever appear 6 to 21 days after exposure and typically include fever, weakness, headache, muscle pain, sore throat, chest pain, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhoea, with severe cases potentially leading to internal bleeding, facial swelling, low blood pressure, shock, and organ failure.

Japan’s Cabinet Office released a report on 31 March regarding the potential impact of a Nankai Trough “megaquake”, which typically refers to an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 and above, and the subsequent tsunami caused by such an earthquake. The megaquake is estimated to have an 80 per cent chance of occurring within the next 30 years, with the new estimates projecting potentially severe devastation.

In modelled worst-case scenarios, there could be approximately 300,000 fatalities, over 1.2 million evacuees, 2.35 million structures destroyed, and USD 1.81 trillion in economic losses, which is almost half of the country’s total gross domestic product (GDP). The worst-case scenarios involve a magnitude 9.0 and above earthquake occurring late at night in winter.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Nankai Trough, situated south of Japan, contains the prominent Nankai megathrust fault. Megathrust earthquakes, such as the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake (magnitude 9.1), which resulted in the Fukushima nuclear disaster, are the planet’s most powerful earthquakes. The most at-risk areas from a Nankai Trough megaquake are on Japan’s southern Pacific coast, particularly the prefectures of Miyazaki, Kochi, Tokushima, Wakayama, Mie, Aichi, and Shizuoka.

In August 2024, authorities issued a rare megaquake warning due to an assessment that the probability of a Nankai Trough megaquake was several times higher than usual following a magnitude 7.1 earthquake off the coast of Kyushu. Authorities then urged residents on Japan’s Pacific coast to reaffirm their preparedness and take precautions over the following week.

With Japan being so seismically active, the country has world-leading earthquake resiliency. The use of advanced earthquake-resistant technologies, infrastructure resilience, stringent building codes, and thorough disaster response plans all contribute towards making Japan highly resistant to the impact of earthquakes. However, extremely powerful earthquakes such as the 2011 earthquake are still capable of causing widespread damage and large numbers of fatalities.

A Nankai Trough megaquake would likely push Japan’s earthquake resilience to its absolute limits, and the latest projected figures will almost certainly reaffirm the need for companies and employees in at-risk areas to review business continuity plans, risk assessments, and crisis communications protocols and conduct drills.

On 1 and 2 April, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theatre Command conducted two days of large-scale military drills around Taiwan, including live-fire exercises. A PLA spokesperson stated that the drills were held as a ‘severe warning and forceful containment against Taiwan independence’, aimed at ‘testing the troops’ capabilities to carry out integrated operations, seizure of operational control and multi-directional precision strikes. 

Named ‘Strait Thunder-2025A’, the exercises involved personnel from the PLA, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and the China Coast Guard (CCG). Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) stated that on 1 April, 76 PLA aircraft, 15 PLAN vessels and 4 “official ships” were detected operating around Taiwan, with 37 sorties crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). On 2 April, they detected 53 PLA aircraft, 23 PLAN vessels and 8 official ships, with 31 sorties crossing the median line. The PLAN vessels detected included a CNS Shandong aircraft carrier group.

Additionally, the PLA conducted live-fire exercises, which included rocket strikes targeting a static object which resembles the Yongan Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Terminal in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. In propaganda released by the PLA to publicise the exercises, Taiwan’s staunchly pro-independence president, Lai Ching-te, was depicted as a parasite and labelled a separatist.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ by PLA forces are an almost daily occurrence, the Strait Thunder-2025A exercises are particularly large-scale and almost certainly demonstrate the coordination of multiple different branches of China’s military to conduct multi-domain operations. In May and October 2024, the Joint Sword-2024 exercises were similar in scale but did not involve live-fire exercises.

The Strait Thunder exercises were more coordinated than usual and were almost certainly designed to enhance interoperability between different military branches for joint operations. They also likely aimed to integrate operations across multiple domains, including unconventional elements like information warfare, as evidenced by the simultaneous PLA propaganda campaign.

The exercises were highly likely a rehearsal for a blockade of Taiwan, which is assessed to be more likely in the coming years than a full-scale amphibious invasion as a means to compel the unification of Taiwan with mainland China.

The scale, frequency, coordination and use of live fire in Chinese exercises are likely part of a deliberate effort to normalise large-scale military activity in the region. This will almost certainly make it more challenging to identify clear indicators and warnings of a genuine military operation. Such a strategy will likely complicate decision-making and delay response times for Taiwan and its allies, allowing China to achieve strategic surprise.

A full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan, however, would highly likely require an operation that would dwarf WWII’s Normandy landings in scale and complexity, with a highly observable military and logistical build-up. A blockade may nonetheless be accompanied by more limited operations to seize the Taiwan-controlled Kinmen islands that are just three kilometres away from mainland China, which could be achieved with far fewer observable indicators and warnings.

Any significant escalation by Beijing is likely to cause a considerable pan-regional impact, in addition to a global economic crisis, with the head of the Philippines’ military stating on 1 April that the country would ‘inevitably’ be involved.

In US defence circles, the “Davison window” refers to Admiral Phil Davison’s comments to the US Congress that China could be capable of pursuing the seizure of Taiwan by 2027, with US intelligence reportedly believing that China’s leader Xi Jinping has given the PLA a 2027 deadline to reach capability for a full-scale invasion.

Some analysts assess that as the US nears semiconductor sovereignty, likely around 2030, Taiwan will lose strategic importance (due to its monopoly on advanced semiconductor manufacturing) and, therefore, Beijing will be less incentivised to take the risks involved to invade or blockade Taiwan. Alternatively, it is likely that US semiconductor sovereignty would dramatically lower the incentives for Washington to provide defence guarantees for Taiwan and would, therefore, increase the likelihood of Chinese military aggression. PLA exercises around Taiwan are almost certain to continue, with large-scale drills likely to be prompted by international and political developments, as well as important dates such as anniversaries of President Lai’s inauguration on 20 May or Taiwan’s National Day on 10 October.

Indian land management bill likely to cause civil unrest

On 3 April, the Indian parliament passed a bill, presented by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) one day prior, which entails significant changes to the administration of “waqf” lands. The term refers to land which is donated by Muslims for religious and charitable uses by other Muslims. These lands are usually administered by all-Muslim funds or boards.

The law would allow non-Muslims to enter these and would increase the government’s authority to resolve disputes involving waqf lands. Opponents of the law have accused the BJP of encroaching on Muslim minority rights. It is likely that, as it begins to be implemented, the bill will drive significant unrest. Past disputes over land have caused notable cases of sectarian violence, including mob violence involving Muslim and Hindu communities.

Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) sabre-rattling showcases interim government’s fragility

The leaders of the (former) main opposition party in the country have warned that if the interim government fails to hold elections in 2025, this will result in “instability” and “strong resentment with the people”. Muhammed Yunus, who heads the government following the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, has maintained that, due to ongoing instability, the vote could instead be held in early 2026.

The BNP’s remarks likely amount to a thinly veiled threat: following Hasina’s removal, the political vacuum left by her party – the Awami League (AL) – has resulted in violent competition between smaller groups and opposition parties, with mob violence now a regular occurrence. With AL still reeling from its loss of power, BNP is now the strongest political force in Bangladesh and therefore seeks to capitalise on an early vote. There is a realistic possibility of the BNP increasingly adopting a more aggressive messaging in the medium term, driving unrest or political violence.

Thai court issues arrest warrant for US academic

A Thai court has issued an arrest warrant for American academic Paul Chambers, a lecturer at Naresuan University, on charges of insulting the monarchy and violating the Computer Crimes Act. The charges were filed by the Thai military and relate to an article Chambers posted online last year, although the specific details have not been disclosed. The charges fall under Thailand’s stringent “lese majeste” laws, which are often used arbitrarily to repress the opposition or supress dissent. The laws are some of the harshest anti-monarchy laws in the world and can carry prison sentences of up to 15 years. Since the 2020 pro-democracy protests, almost 300 individuals have been charged under the law, reflecting its increasing application against critics.

South Korean Constitutional Court ruling

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol was removed from office on 4 April after the Constitutional Court upheld his impeachment over his December 2024 martial law declaration. The court ruled unanimously that Yoon violated his constitutional powers, with Acting Chief Justice Moon Hyung-bae condemning his actions as a “serious challenge to democracy” that resulted in both domestic and foreign instability.

The trial has been incredibly divisive, leading to protests both in support of and against the former president. Protests in reaction to the verdict are likely; however, they have so far remained localised and non-violent, leading to minimal disruption despite increased security measures. A snap presidential election must now be held within 60 days, likely leading to a period of political uncertainty.

The deepening divide between Yoon’s supporters and opponents, coupled with the urgent need to restore stability, will likely complicate governance in the short term and impact South Korea’s economic and foreign policy decisions, especially as it attempts to adapt to the 25 per cent tariff rates imposed on them by the Trump administration.

Afghan anti-Taliban group releases overview of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) structure.

The National Mobilization Front (NMF) is a small anti-Taliban group that has claimed multiple attacks on Taliban officials and, notably, Chinese citizens in Afghanistan. On 3 April, NMF channels released information allegedly detailing major efforts by ISKP to restructure some key departments and purge the group from alleged “spies” or “moles”.

While it is currently difficult to assess the credibility of the claims made by NMF – which styles itself as a pro-Western and secular force opposed to both the Taliban and ISKP – the hypothesis of an internal reshuffle could provide an explanation for the recent lull in ISKP operations in Afghanistan and abroad.

Myanmar junta declares a ceasefire until 22 April

On 2 April, Myanmar’s ruling military junta declared a temporary ceasefire to enable relief efforts following the 28 March 7.7 magnitude earthquake, which killed at least 3,000. The decision followed unilateral ceasefires from rebel groups, including the People’s Defence Force and the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which are engaged in a civil war with the government.

While the ceasefire may provide an opportunity for further peace-making, it is unlikely to hold until 22 April. Despite the declaration, there were already reports of ceasefire violations on 3 April, with rebels accusing junta forces of conducting airstrikes in Bhamo and continuing attacks on Waingmaw and Indawgyi. Further reports list strikes in multiple villages of Homalin township on the same day and shootings in Shwegyin and Mone townships on 3 and 4 April.

For the ceasefire to contribute to broader peace efforts, it would likely require long-term measures, including safe zones and humanitarian corridors for aid, on top of a complete cessation of hostilities, something the military junta appears unwilling to accept.

7.1 magnitude earthquake off the coast of Tonga

A magnitude 7.1 earthquake was recorded off the east coast of Tonga in the South Pacific on 30 March, triggering a tsunami warning for the region. The US Geological Survey initially reported a preliminary magnitude of 7.3 before downgrading it to 7.1. Tsunami waves between 0.3 to 1 metre above tide level were considered possible on the coasts of Niue and Tonga.

As a precaution, Tonga authorities activated tsunami sirens and advised coastal residents to move inland. However, the tsunami warning was lifted, and there are no immediate reports of injuries or damage in Tonga. There were also no tsunami threats to Japan, Chile, Guam, or Hawaii. No damage was caused by the earthquake. Several aftershocks have taken place and more are highly likely over the coming days and weeks.

Gas pipeline fire in Malaysia

A large fire broke out on 1 April at a gas pipeline in the Kampung Tengah Puchong area, south of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Authorities have reported that 145 people were injured, though all are in stable condition. The fire, which started at a pipeline owned by Petronas, significantly diminished as gas pressure decreased. The possibility of a second explosion is considered very low, as no gas leaks have been detected after the closure of pipeline valves. An investigation involving up to 20 agencies is set to take place to determine the cause of the fire.

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