Continued attacks against commercial shipping, including off Jubail and Khor Fakkan, likely indicate that Iran is sustaining and continuing to geographically expand its maritime campaign beyond the SoH into the wider Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The GCC’s collective rejection of Iranian navigation restrictions likely indicates that the Gulf states remain unwilling to legitimise Iranian control of the strait. The IRGC’s threat against undersea telecommunications cables in the SoH likely indicates a further broadening of the potential target set should full-scale conflict resume.

The reported suspension of US strikes against Iranian launchers ahead of the midterms, alongside the estimated earliest arrival of the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR) from mid-November if it continues to participate in exercises off Japan, likely supports the assessment that a resumption of large-scale US combat operations against Iran is more likely after the 3 November elections. However, Hegseth’s unannounced visit to Israel, Trump’s continued threats, and the Pentagon’s reported preparations for renewed major combat operations indicate that strikes ahead of the elections cannot be ruled out. While the Roosevelt CSG’s arrival would provide additional combat power and the capacity to sustain a prolonged campaign, forces already deployed in the region are likely sufficient to conduct major operations against Iran with limited advance warning. Any renewed US strikes would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against US military facilities and critical infrastructure in regional states, with Iranian threats against energy infrastructure in regional states and against US-linked technology facilities likely indicating an intent to further broaden its target set.

The Houthis are increasingly layering drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles into single strike packages, saturating air defence sensors and complicating target tracking and prioritisation, while also targeting areas of Saudi Arabia with limited air defence coverage. This is highly likely to increase the effectiveness of attacks against Saudi Arabia, particularly if air defence stocks are significantly depleted, and is likely to increase the risk posed by falling debris in populated areas where interceptions occur at shorter ranges and lower altitudes. Further Houthi attacks against Saudi airports, energy infrastructure and military bases are highly likely.

The postponement of the Future Investment Initiative, the cancellation of a significant proportion of scheduled flights and the indefinite remote working ordered at Riyadh’s Kingdom Centre highlight the growing impact of the Houthi campaign on business operations in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom Centre closure was likely predicated on the increased risk posed by attacks against Riyadh rather than a specific threat, and there is a realistic possibility that other high-profile commercial buildings will introduce similar measures. King Khalid International Airport remains largely closed, excluding a limited number of flights given special permission, with no confirmed reopening date. Even once reopened, normal operations are unlikely to resume in the short term, with many international airlines maintaining suspensions and further closures likely following renewed attacks.

The widening of external support for Saudi Arabia, with Egypt pledging military support, the GCC reaffirming its collective defence commitments, and the deployment of agreed forces under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, highly likely reflects Riyadh’s efforts to bolster its air defences and border security as Houthi attacks continue. However, external support remains largely defensive, and there is no indication that external partners are prepared to commit ground forces to offensive operations in Yemen.

The reported resumption of Emirati financial support for anti-Houthi forces would mark a significant shift. The UAE was previously one of the most critical members of the anti-Houthi coalition, deploying ground forces in 2015 that led the recapture of Aden, and subsequently building, funding and training multiple armed groups, including the Giants Brigades, the Security Belt and Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance Forces, which spearheaded the 2018 offensive towards Hodeidah. Although the UAE withdrew most of its ground forces in 2019, it retained significant influence through these partners, particularly the Southern Transitional Council (STC). However, Emirati influence in Yemen was largely curtailed following the failed STC offensive and its subsequent capitulation to Saudi-backed forces in January 2026.

Riyadh’s apparent willingness to allow renewed Emirati involvement, under a reported arrangement exchanging Emirati payments to the Southern Giants Brigades for Saudi air support for UAE-backed forces, likely reflects the severity of the pressure imposed by the Houthi campaign and the stalled counteroffensive, with Riyadh likely calculating that Emirati funding and influence over key ground forces are necessary to restore momentum on the Red Sea coast and around the Bab al-Mandab. However, renewed Emirati influence is likely to be limited and closely managed by Riyadh, and risks reviving Saudi-Emirati competition over southern Yemen in the medium term.

Renewed Emirati involvement is likely to increase the risk of Houthi retaliation against the UAE, particularly if it evolves into direct military intervention. In January 2022, the Houthis conducted missile and drone attacks against Abu Dhabi following advances by the UAE-backed Giants Brigades in Shabwa, demonstrating both the capability and the intent to target the UAE in response to Emirati support for anti-Houthi forces. The 19 October attack against the al-Alam camp in Shabwa, previously operated by UAE-aligned forces, likely also signals Houthi intent to impose costs on forces set to benefit from renewed Emirati funding. Houthi attacks against the UAE would almost certainly compound existing disruption to regional aviation, with Emirati airports increasingly used as alternatives to Saudi airports.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The escalation of attacks against shipping in the SoH, including the first confirmed vessel sinkings since March, likely indicates that Iran has reconstituted some of its maritime strike capabilities or adapted its tactics to compensate for previously degraded capabilities, enabling Tehran to sustain disruption to commercial shipping and regional energy exports. This has almost certainly strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, and with diplomatic efforts continuing to stall, the likelihood of high-intensity US strikes aimed at degrading Iran’s offensive capabilities and restoring freedom of navigation in the SoH is highly likely rapidly increasing.

The USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) reportedly arrived at Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan on 16 October, where it will resupply before participating in the US-Japan Keen Sword exercise between 19 and 29 October, after which it is expected to deploy to the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR). The CSG is therefore unlikely to arrive in the region before mid-November, after the 3 November US midterm elections, unless it does not participate in the joint exercises with Japan. The USS George Washington and USS George H.W. Bush CSGs remain in the region, with the Bush having returned to the Arabian Sea following a brief port visit to Thailand. The Roosevelt’s arrival could temporarily increase the US presence to three CSGs, depending on whether an existing CSG withdraws.

The scheduling of the Roosevelt CSG’s deployment, which would align the temporary concentration of three CSGs with the period immediately following the midterms, likely supports the assessment that a resumption of full-scale US combat operations against Iran is more likely after the elections. However, there is a realistic possibility of US strikes ahead of the elections. The Pentagon has reportedly instructed CENTCOM to finalise preparations for renewed major combat operations against Iran, while the two CSGs currently in the region, supported by land-based aircraft, provide Washington with sufficient offensive capabilities to conduct limited strikes, particularly against Iranian maritime strike capabilities threatening shipping in the SoH. Long-range bombers could also deploy at short notice to target sites deeper within Iran. Alternatively, Washington could initiate strikes against the Houthis, aiming to degrade one of Iran’s most important regional allies while calculating that such strikes would be less likely to provoke direct Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

There are also emerging indications that Israel is preparing for potential renewed escalation, with the Israeli Air Force maintaining heightened readiness and the Military Intelligence Directorate reportedly developing an expanded target list within Iran. While the reported discussions between Trump and Netanyahu could reflect pre-election posturing, they could also indicate that Israel is actively preparing for potential renewed military escalation with Iran.

Iran has threatened to escalate beyond previously established targeting patterns in the event of renewed US strikes. This has included threats to escalate attacks on US military assets, potentially using cluster munitions as in the early-September attack against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, as well as strikes against regional energy infrastructure, explicitly naming Saudi oil facilities which the Houthis are currently attacking.

Tehran has also threatened to target US-linked digital infrastructure, including data centres, artificial intelligence facilities and undersea communications cables, particularly in the UAE. Additionally, Iranian officials have threatened the possibility of launching ground incursions into neighbouring countries, with Kuwait the most likely and most vulnerable country to an Iranian ground offensive.

With Saudi Arabia already engaged in an escalating conflict with the Houthis, and the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement strengthening its military cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will seek to limit strikes against Saudi Arabia to reduce the risk of provoking a wider regional conflict, instead concentrating retaliation against Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Jordan. With Saudi airports already compromised by Houthi strikes and regional airports increasingly used as alternatives, this would almost certainly compound disruption to regional aviation and restrict options for commercial travel and evacuation from the region.

The Saudi-led coalition strikes against Houthi oil facilities on 13 October, and the Houthi retaliation against Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran within hours, demonstrate a rapid tit-for-tat escalation dynamic and a further geographic expansion of Houthi targeting to Saudi Arabia’s Gulf coast. The strike on Aramco’s headquarters, adjacent to King Abdulaziz Air Base, likely indicates that even high-value targets (HVTs) are not reliably protected by air defences. Further Saudi strikes on Sanaa will highly likely be met with further Houthi attacks against Riyadh, Aramco facilities and airports across Saudi Arabia, with King Khalid International Airport likely to remain a priority target.

Saudi Arabia’s accusation that Iran is encouraging the Houthi escalation likely indicates that Riyadh does not regard Tehran as a credible intermediary, with Oman highly likely remaining the preferred channel. Al-Bukhaiti’s stated preference for a comprehensive settlement over a temporary ceasefire likely indicates that the Houthis seek to leverage their attacks to secure broader concessions, including an end to the blockade. However, the Yemeni IRG’s public rejection of negotiations and the continued escalation of Saudi strikes indicate that neither side is willing to make significant concessions, and a near-term de-escalation remains unlikely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

On 27 October, Israel will hold an election to appoint the 120 members of the Knesset, with the seats being allocated by national closed-list proportional representation. It will be the first Knesset election since the 7 October 2023 attacks, which were followed by the war in Gaza and significantly altered the security landscape in the Middle East. The vote occurs at a moment of high political instability for Israel. The country has been engaged in conflict in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, with none of these conflicts fully resolved.  

Domestically, Israel continues to record almost daily protests against the government over several major scandals, in addition to a protest movement led by ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis against the conscription of yeshiva students into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which has continued for more than two years.

Israel’s relations with key allies, including the US, have become strained. Only days after the Knesset vote, the US midterms on 3 November are likely to be marked by the victory of several candidates for Congress who have campaigned on platforms highly critical of Israel. Moreover, the recent emergence of the Mecca Pact, a mutual defence agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan on 7 August, has further threatened Israel’s geopolitical positioning by likely advancing an alternative regional security framework to that promoted by Washington with the US-brokered Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco.

The political environment in Israel is polarised and fragmented. Most available polls for the 27 October election indicate that no bloc will be able to secure a majority (61) of seats in the 120-member Knesset.

The bloc supporting the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which comprises Netanyahu’s party Likud, the far-right Otzma Yehudit, and the alliance between the Religious Zionism Party and the libertarian Zehut (RZP-Zehut), with the additional conditional support of the ultra-Orthodox parties United Torah Judaism (UTJ, largely Ashkenazi) and Shas (largely Sephardi/Mizrahi), is projected to win around 51-55 seats as of mid-October, after polls showed it gaining more support since September.

The opposition bloc, comprising the liberal Yashar party, the Together (B’Yachad) alliance, the social democratic Democrats Party, and the right-wing Yisrael Beitenu, has an estimated 50-54 seats.

The two Arab parties, Ra’am and the Joint List, are together projected to win 12-13 seats, and several smaller parties hover around the electoral threshold of 3.25 per cent of votes required to enter parliament, including the non-aligned alliance between the New Economic Party and the Reservists party, and the newly formed nationalist People of Israel (Amcha Yisrael) party, which is allied with Netanyahu. As clearing the threshold grants parties at least four seats, smaller parties succeeding in entering parliament could significantly alter the dynamics of possible alliances.

The blocs themselves are somewhat fragmented. While the pro-government and opposition camps are sharply differentiated by their support for or opposition to Netanyahu, they also disagree internally on key issues. Within the pro-government bloc, the ultra-Orthodox draft issue puts parties like UTJ and Shas, which broadly favour exempting yeshiva students from serving in the IDF and have stated that they will oppose future governments that will not grant the exemptions, against parts of Likud and the small Amcha Yisrael party, which has pledged to join future governments only if a law mandating ultra-Orthodox service is passed before that government is formed. The coalition is also divided over the ongoing crisis between the government and the Supreme Court, centred on legislation regarding the regulation of commercial television, with Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi calling on the government to disregard the court’s rulings, a position that worries centrist government supporters.

Inside the opposition, the differences are likely even more marked. On policy towards the Palestinians, parties like B’Yachad and Yisrael Beitenu are generally as hawkish as, if not more hawkish than, the current government, advocating for an expansion of the settlements alongside a hardline military posture in the West Bank and Gaza, whereas the Democrats are open to a two-state solution. While the Democrats and, to a lesser extent, Yashar have advocated for pragmatic engagement with the Arab parties, which could give the opposition a numerical majority in the Knesset, the rest of the coalition opposes such cooperation. In economic policy terms, the parties cover a vast range of positions, from the social democracy promoted by the Democrats to the economic liberalism of B’Yachad and Yisrael Beitenu.

Following the publication of official results, expected approximately eight days after the vote, President Isaac Herzog is scheduled to consult the parties and, within seven days, subsequently assign the mandate to the Member of Knesset (MK) judged most likely to form a government. That MK has 28 days, extendable by up to 14 days.  Should this fail, a second nominee is given 28 days, or the president can instead trigger the next stage. In this final phase, a 21-day window opens, during which 61 MKs can jointly nominate a candidate, who then has 14 days to form a government. If all stages fail, the Knesset dissolves automatically, and new elections follow, approximately 90 days later. The outgoing government would remain in office as a caretaker administration throughout.

The sharp disagreements both within the government and opposition coalitions indicate that the election will highly likely result in a protracted coalition formation process, likely to exceed the first 28+14 day cycle. This would entail Netanyahu remaining in power as a caretaker Prime Minister throughout the remainder of 2026 on procedural timelines alone, with the coalition-formation process likely to extend into early 2027. This scenario would highly likely contribute to protracted instability and civil unrest, with activist groups and protest movements seeking to influence the parties as they debate a possible policy agenda for the next government. The main drivers of unrest are likely to be the ultra-Orthodox draft issue, anti-government protests linked to the crisis between the executive and the judiciary, and, in the West Bank, settler violence.

In terms of government likelihood, polls have shifted in favour of the Netanyahu bloc since September, with most surveys now placing it level with or slightly ahead of the opposition. However, even in the case of a victory for the pro-Netanyahu bloc, government formation is likely to be complicated by the ultra-Orthodox draft issue. Amcha Yisrael’s precondition that a conscription law be passed before a government is formed is directly incompatible with the demand of Shas and UTJ for a permanent exemption. A Netanyahu-led coalition would therefore likely depend on one of the two sides conceding, or on ad hoc support from outside the bloc.

The most probable scenario following an opposition victory thus remains a broad coalition led by the Yashar party, with party leader Gadi Eisenkot being the most likely prime minister from the opposition bloc. This coalition would likely fall short of a majority, based on available polling, and would have to seek ad hoc support from the Arab parties, the Reservists, or members of the Netanyahu bloc. In all cases, negotiation processes are likely to become drivers of civil unrest, and could result in the next government remaining highly unstable throughout the early stages of its mandate.

ASSESSMENT

Since late 2023, Israel has engaged in several simultaneous conflicts. The upcoming vote will almost certainly influence their forward trajectories, although some theatres will likely be more exposed to change than others. The West Bank is the area where a change of government is most likely to translate into different policies, while Gaza is the least likely to be affected.

The West Bank is the area where an opposition government is most likely to implement different policies from the current Netanyahu-led executive. Opposition leaders have decried the incumbent coalition’s hardline approach to the West Bank as damaging to Israeli security at home and abroad. While not advocating for a retrenchment of the settlements, opposition leaders have pledged to address the rising issue of settler violence in the West Bank. Naftali Bennett, former prime minister and leader of the B’Yachad alliance, called settler groups “violent gangs”, while Yair Lapid, the other senior B’Yachad figure and also a former prime minister, referred to settler violence as a form of “Jewish terrorism”.

Many opposition leaders have claimed a direct link between settler violence and a deterioration in Israel’s reputation in Europe and the US. An opposition government will likely seek to reduce settler violence in the short term through increased IDF deployments in at-risk areas, while not committing to reducing the number or extension of the settlements themselves.

Gaza is likely to be least impacted by the upcoming election. The situation in Gaza has recently remained relatively static, despite the lack of progress in the implementation of the US-brokered Gaza Peace Plan. Hamas has been severely degraded and is likely now unable to significantly threaten southern Israel. The IDF, which had expanded its control to approximately 70 per cent of the Gaza Strip by July, according to some reports, pulled back towards the original Yellow Line (around 53 per cent) in August, although other reports argue that the IDF still maintains control of 65-70 per cent.

The IDF has also maintained a policy of decapitation strikes on remaining Hamas leaders to prevent the group from coordinating and regrouping. Three Hamas brigade commanders have been killed since mid-September, while the IDF has sustained comparatively few casualties relative to earlier stages of the conflict. The opposition, which broadly agrees on the necessity to disarm Hamas as a prelude to the implementation of a lasting solution, is unlikely to order any major withdrawals from Gaza or make any significant policy changes, unless it succeeds in making more progress on other fronts. Eisenkot’s statement, on 15 October, that he will remove Hamas from ruling the Gaza Strip “within 18 months of [Eisenkot] taking office as a prime minister”, likely indicates that an opposition government would push the task of resolving the conflict in the Gaza Strip into 2027 and possibly even 2028.

Following Gaza, Lebanon is the front that is least likely to be affected by any potential change in government. Leaders of the opposition coalition share the Netanyahu government’s objective of preventing Hezbollah from re-infiltrating parts of southern Lebanon or reconstituting its capabilities, developments that would allow it to threaten northern Israel. Moreover, they are also sceptical of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) ability to implement the “pilot zones” programme and take over area control responsibilities from the IDF. The expiry of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mandate on 31 December 2026, followed by the mission’s withdrawal in 2027, could nevertheless present a challenge to a hypothetical new government, potentially creating a security vacuum that could be exploited by Hezbollah. Given the volatile security environment in Lebanon, significant changes on the ground could force a new government to reconsider its military posture and operational objectives, potentially resulting in a departure from the current government’s approach despite the broad alignment in their strategic objectives.

In Syria, a new Israeli government would inherit a very unstable position. After the fall of Assad, the Netanyahu government successfully degraded Syria’s conventional military strength and occupied strategically valuable positions in the country’s south, including Mount Hermon. As the new transitional government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa solidified its control over the country and bolstered relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Israel’s position in the south has likely become a growing source of friction with both Damascus and regional powers.

Any Israeli government will likely continue to oppose growing Turkish-Syrian cooperation. Israel is not only concerned about growing Turkish influence in Syria, but also the restoration of Syria’s military capabilities. The deployment of Turkish aircraft, air defence systems and surveillance radars could significantly restrict Israeli freedom of action over Syrian airspace, undermining its ability to target Iranian weapons transfers to Hezbollah and conduct operations against Iran. Consequently, any new government would likely continue efforts to prevent Syria’s military reconstitution and deter an expanded Turkish military presence.

However, some Israeli leaders likely believe that a post-Assad Syria could be leveraged to weaken Iran and Hezbollah’s footprint on the Mediterranean, and an opposition-led Israeli government may seek to reach an agreement with Syria, possibly by leveraging territorial concessions. In an interview published on 6 October 2026, Eisenkot stated that there is an “opportunity” for a new agreement with al-Sharaa’s Syria, noting that Israel could also seek to obtain “the complete expulsion of the Turks and Russians from the area”.

An Israeli government amenable to negotiations with Damascus could also tie territorial concessions to other demands, such as securing Israeli Air Force freedom of operations over Syrian airspace, or increased Syrian efforts to dismantle Hezbollah cross-border smuggling efforts. Eisenkot has also directly tied the necessity of improving relations with Syria to Washington’s own policy towards Damascus, which has significantly warmed since the fall of Assad.

An opposition-led government is unlikely to fundamentally alter Israel’s position on Iran. Opposition leaders publicly share Netanyahu’s view that Iran obtaining nuclear weapons poses an existential risk to Israel, and will continue to leave the option of using military force to prevent Tehran from developing a nuclear weapons capability.

In some aspects, the opposition has even advocated for more hawkish policies against Iran than the Netanyahu coalition. In September, Eisenkot reportedly proposed that the US create “kill zones” around areas where Iran’s remaining 60 per cent enriched uranium stockpile is believed to be located, backed by a public commitment to strike any attempt to move the nuclear material until a lasting agreement is reached. Furthermore, Eisenkot stated that he would intensify operations, including covert Mossad actions, against Iran’s missile infrastructure. An opposition-led government would likely continue to prioritise cooperation with the US against Iran, seeing joint action as presenting a more credible deterrent to Iranian military activity.

The above scenarios assume that a new government would assume power under conditions of stability. However, tensions with Iran remain high, a long-term de-escalation framework remains elusive and high-intensity fighting could resume with limited warning. Depending on the date of an escalation or whether it directly involves Israel, renewed hostilities could disrupt the election itself or complicate subsequent coalition negotiations and government formation. A resumption of major operations before the Knesset election involving Israel has the potential to postpone the election entirely.

Since the beginning of October, the likelihood of full-scale conflict resuming has increased. On 7 October, reports emerged that the Pentagon had instructed US Central Command (CENTCOM) to conclude preparations for a resumption of major combat operations against Iran. US and Israeli officials briefed that strikes, potentially targeting nuclear, infrastructure and energy sites and conducted jointly with Israel, could also take place before the 3 November US midterm elections and possibly even the Knesset election. On the following day, reporting indicated that the Pentagon had drawn up plans for an intense, three-day campaign targeting Iran’s missile and drone arsenals, and potentially also energy facilities and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command sites.

On 8 October, US President Donald Trump publicly stated that the US would not attack Iran before the midterm elections. However, Trump has previously leveraged deception and strategic ambiguity around potential military action, almost certainly reducing the reliability of this pledge, and the statement does not preclude escalation initiated by Israel, Iran or Iranian proxies.

CENTCOM’s preparations for renewed full-scale operations are highly likely to be genuine. The deployment of an additional carrier strike group (CSG), additional amphibious forces and thousands of personnel likely indicates that US military pressure on Iran will be sustained and potentially escalate. The weeks following the 3 November US midterm elections, which will coincide with coalition negotiations in Israel, remain the most likely window for renewed major military operations, given the potential political costs of escalation before the vote. However, even a short, intensive three-day campaign of the type reportedly under consideration would be unlikely to remain contained. Iranian retaliation would likely be substantial, with a greater emphasis on targeting regional energy infrastructure than in previous exchanges, particularly if Iranian oil, gas or other energy facilities were targeted.

If the conflict with Iran were to escalate before 27 October, this would almost certainly significantly impact the elections. IDF chief Eyal Zamir reportedly warned that a renewed joint US-Israeli campaign could postpone the elections, according to Israeli media reporting citing US officials. This would follow the precedent of 1973, when the Knesset elections were postponed from October to December due to the Yom Kippur War. Such a move would be unlikely to immediately spark protests in Israel, as the threat of Iranian strikes would deter large gatherings, but would likely be highly politically destabilising in the medium term.

Constitutionally, the Netanyahu government would need a two-thirds supermajority of 80 members of the Knesset to approve a postponement, which would require opposition support. If this fails to materialise and a hypothetical conflict remains ongoing, Israel could seek to hold wartime elections as it did for the local vote in February 2024, which was also held after two postponements. This could significantly disrupt campaigning and voting, particularly in areas exposed to missile attacks, while the mobilisation of reservists, displacement of civilians and restrictions on public gatherings could suppress voter turnout and raise questions over the legitimacy of the results.

However, the significantly higher threat from Iran compared to that from Hamas and Hezbollah in 2024 would almost certainly reduce the feasibility of holding such elections.  If the government fails to secure the required supermajority to postpone the vote, but the security environment makes holding elections unfeasible, Israel could face an unprecedented constitutional crisis, with significant implications for political stability and an increased risk of civil unrest.

If full-scale war restarts after the Knesset vote, it would likely significantly complicate or delay the government formation process, with a Netanyahu caretaker government likely being given wartime authority. In this scenario, there is a higher likelihood of Israeli President Isaac Herzog advocating for the creation of a broad national unity government, as after the 7 October attacks. Given Eisenkot’s rejection of a rotation government and his statement that Netanyahu is unfit to hold any leadership position, such pressure would likely deepen divisions within the opposition.

The Knesset election and the subsequent government formation process are likely to sustain an elevated risk of disruption for travellers and personnel in Israel throughout the remainder of 2026 and likely into early 2027.

In the short term, the main election-related threat to travellers is the disruption caused by protests either for or against the Netanyahu administration, driven by issues such as the draft of ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis. Protests are likely to result in road blockades, disrupting operations in cities like Tel Aviv, and could be marked by violent clashes with security forces. Protests may also disrupt access to Ben Gurion International Airport.

The election results are likely to significantly impact the security landscape in Israel and the wider region. A victory for the opposition could impact Israeli policy towards the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon. These developments, or the continuation of previous policies in case of a victory for the Netanyahu government, would almost certainly affect the risks posed by armed conflict, terrorism, and civil unrest in Israel.

The scheduled elections will coincide with a period of growing tensions in the Middle East, which could rapidly trigger a full-scale restart of the Iran war. If renewed full-scale conflict with Iran forces the postponement of elections or significantly delays government formation, political instability and associated security risks are likely to persist well into 2027.

The UKMTO reporting six vessels struck on 11 October alone almost certainly reflects a further intensification of Iranian attacks against shipping. Continued maritime confrontation almost certainly sustains the risk of a wider escalation, with any further US strikes against reconstituted Iranian capabilities around the SoH highly likely to trigger Iranian retaliation against regional states hosting US military facilities. Rezaei’s warning regarding undersea cables, data centres and AI facilities likely indicates an intent to broaden Iran’s target set to include US-linked commercial and technology infrastructure in the Gulf, particularly in the UAE, which was directly threatened, should large-scale hostilities resume.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) is highly likely preparing for the option of renewed large-scale operations against Iran, potentially conducted jointly with Israel. The USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group (CSG) is expected to arrive in theatre from late October, and will almost certainly be prepared to commence combat operations shortly after arrival. CENTCOM conducted strikes against Iran within days of the USS George Washington CSG arriving into theatre. The US may also maintain a temporary three-carrier posture in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR), providing it with more strike capacity and operational flexibility to conduct high-intensity operations against Iran and potentially sustain simultaneous military operations against the Houthis in Yemen.

Renewed large-scale operations would almost certainly be less politically costly for the Trump administration following the 3 November midterms. However, strikes ahead of the elections would likely send a strategic message to Tehran that Washington is willing to prioritise its military and foreign policy objectives over domestic political considerations and would likely help achieve greater operational surprise.

Trump’s statement that the US may join Saudi strikes against the Houthis marks a notable shift in Washington’s position, following repeated US refusals of Saudi requests for direct military support. Washington may calculate that direct involvement will enable it to restore goodwill with Riyadh, while also indirectly weakening Iran by degrading the capabilities of one of its principal regional partners. Washington also likely calculates that operations against the Houthis will trigger a more limited Iranian response than direct strikes against Iran.

Direct US involvement would highly likely trigger Houthi attacks against US interests in the region. These would likely include US military facilities and diplomatic missions in Saudi Arabia and the wider region, and potentially US-linked commercial interests, alongside a likely resumption of Houthi attacks against US naval vessels and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

The Houthi attack against King Fahd International Airport in Dammam and claimed attacks against Aramco facilities in the Eastern Province mark a further geographic expansion of Houthi targeting. Houthi attacks. The Houthi declaration that all Saudi airports except those serving Mecca and Medina are legitimate targets indicates that further airport attacks across all of Saudi Arabia are highly likely. The FCDO has revised its advice against all but essential travel to all Saudi airports except Medina.

The 10 October attack was almost certainly the most lethal Houthi attack against Saudi Arabia during the current conflict and the most deadly attack in the Kingdom in over a decade, with the strike on a passenger terminal causing mass casualties among travellers and airport staff. Repeated successful strikes against King Khalid International Airport on consecutive days highly likely indicate that Saudi air defences in the area have been unable to reliably intercept Houthi ballistic missiles, consistent with reported interceptor shortages and the possible concentration of air defence batteries to protect other high-value targets (HVTs) such as energy infrastructure and palaces.

The casualty rate was likely exacerbated by the reported absence of public early warning alerts. Due to public early warning alerts and air raid sirens in Saudi Arabia having been inconsistently activated in recent weeks, travellers should not rely on receiving advance warning of an attack, particularly at airports. Although public alerts reportedly resumed on 12 October, their future reliability remains uncertain. Alerts may be deliberately suspended to limit disruption and maintain a sense of normality.

The coalition’s vow to respond decisively likely indicates that Riyadh will intensify strikes in Yemen, potentially including against Sanaa International Airport and other HVTs in Sanaa, which would highly likely trigger further escalatory Houthi attacks. The Houthis directly threatened on 13 October that strikes on Sanaa will be met with a “harsh and painful response” against Riyadh.

Yemeni IRG acknowledgement that the Bab al-Mandeb and Mayyun Island have not been recaptured highly likely confirms that the counteroffensive in Yemen has stalled. Advances will almost certainly require significant Saudi air support, which will almost certainly sustain Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi-Omani and Saudi-Iranian ministerial contacts are the first observable signs of diplomatic engagement on the Saudi-Houthi conflict since the escalation. The Houthi claim that Saudi Arabia accepted Iranian mediation and proposed one-month and two-week truces remains unconfirmed and is highly likely partly intended to portray Riyadh as weakened. If accurate, it would indicate that the attacks against Saudi airports and energy infrastructure are imposing considerable costs on Riyadh.

The publicly claimed Houthi rejection of the unverified proposals would almost certainly indicate that the group assesses it is able to fulfil its primary stated objective of reopening Houthi-controlled airspace while concurrently holding its recent territorial gains. However, conflicting claims that Riyadh is unwilling to accept a ceasefire until the territory lost to the Houthi offensive has been reclaimed likely indicate that neither side is willing to make significant concessions, and a near-term de-escalation remains unlikely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Hurricane Isaias, the first hurricane of the 2026 Atlantic Season, is expected to make landfall on 9 October or early 10 October near the Florida-Alabama border on the Gulf of Mexico. Isaias initially developed as a trough along the Mexican Gulf Coast on 5 October, strengthening into a tropical depression on 6 October and into a tropical storm on the following day.

On 9 October, Hurricane Isaias rapidly intensified into a Category 3 major hurricane, with maximum sustained winds reaching 120 mph 193 km/h). According to the National Hurricane Center NHC, the hurricane is located approximately 240 miles 386 kilometres) south of Pensacola, Florida, and is moving northeast towards the northern Gulf Coast.

US authorities have issued hurricane warnings across sections of the northern Gulf Coast, with forecasters warning of destructive winds, storm surges of up to 2.7 metres (nine feet), and rainfall accumulations potentially exceeding 380 mm 15 inches) in some areas.

Authorities have ordered evacuations across vulnerable coastal communities. Alabama Governor Kay Ivey ordered tourists and visitors to evacuate southern Baldwin County and Dauphin Island, while mandatory evacuation orders have been issued for non-residents in parts of Baldwin County and for Venice, Louisiana. Emergency declarations have been issued in parts of Alabama and Florida, with emergency shelters opened in Mississippi.

Authorities have also closed several state parks and government offices, while Gulf Shores International Airport was scheduled to suspend operations from midday on 9 October. Amtrak has suspended services between New Orleans and Mobile until 11 October and between New Orleans and Atlanta until 12 October. Offshore energy operations have also been significantly disrupted, with more than 60 per cent of Gulf oil production reportedly suspended, equivalent to approximately 1.3 million barrels per day.

While the hurricane’s impacts will be most pronounced on the coast, authorities have noted that it will likely bring wet weather further north, reaching the Tennessee Valley and the Carolinas.

Intensified attacks in the maritime domain almost certainly increase the risk of confrontation and subsequent Iranian retaliation against regional states. The uptick in Iranian attacks against vessels since late September likely increases the probability of a further round of US strikes against reconstituted Iranian capabilities around the SoH, previously referred to by US officials as “mowing the lawn”. Such attacks would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against regional states hosting US military facilities. Iranian retaliation is likely to be larger in scale than in previous exchanges, following the reported use of cluster munition warheads against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in September and public Iranian threats that future retaliation against US strikes will be more severe.

Trump’s statement that the US will not attack Iran before the midterms is likely to be of limited value in assessing the risk of renewed strikes. Trump has previously leveraged deception and strategic ambiguity around potential military action. Strikes ahead of the midterms could help achieve an element of surprise and demonstrate to Tehran that Trump is prepared to prioritise its Iran objectives over domestic political considerations.  CENTCOM’s preparations for renewed full-scale operations are highly likely to be genuine, with the deployment of an additional carrier strike group (CSG), additional amphibious forces and thousands of personnel indicating that US military pressure on Iran will be sustained.

A resumption of full-scale US combat operations remains more likely after the 3 November US midterms, due to the political costs of such a campaign. However, more limited operations could be ordered ahead of the elections, with recent comments made by Israeli officials lending greater credibility to the possibility of an earlier escalation.

A short, intensive three-day campaign of the type reportedly under consideration would be unlikely to remain contained. Iranian retaliation would likely be substantial and would likely involve a greater focus on regional energy infrastructure than in previous exchanges, particularly if Iranian oil, gas or other energy facilities were targeted.

Targeting Iran’s reconstituted missile and drone stockpiles, manufacturing facilities, associated support infrastructure, and nuclear facilities, much of which is held in hardened underground sites, would also likely require strategic bomber support. With B-1 bombers withdrawn from RAF Fairford, any renewed deployment of strategic bombers to RAF Fairford, Diego Garcia, or other forward operating locations would likely represent a notable indicator and warning of preparations for major operations against Iran. However, strikes limited to exposed missile launchers, air defence systems, command-and-control facilities and other above-ground military infrastructure would not necessarily require strategic bomber support and could be conducted by assets already in theatre.

The deployment of the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group (CSG) and Makin Island amphibious ready group (ARG), which are expected to reach the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR) from late October, will bolster US capability in the region, particularly if the Roosevelt CSG deploys in addition to, rather than in place of, an existing CSG.

A three-carrier posture would almost certainly increase US capacity to sustain its blockade, conduct high-intensity strikes against Iran and potentially also support offensive operations against the Houthis. The arrival of these forces from late October, and whether the USS George Washington withdraws from theatre, will likely be key indicators and warnings of the timing and scale of any renewed campaign. There is a realistic possibility that a temporary overlap of three CSGs could be used to support the short, high-intensity three-day strike campaign reportedly under consideration ahead of the US midterms, placing late October to early November as the most likely period for any such operation to be initiated, based on the assessed arrival of the Roosevelt CSG.

Houthi attacks against Saudi international airports are now causing civilian fatalities, including in Riyadh, marking a notable increase in the risk posed to travellers, aviation personnel and other passengers across the kingdom. Reiterated Houthi threats against international airlines highly likely indicate that further attacks against King Khalid International Airport and airports in southern Saudi Arabia will occur in the coming days. Further airline suspensions and short-notice disruption to civil aviation across Saudi Arabia are highly likely, with Abha, Jazan, Najran and Riyadh airports at the highest risk.

The Saudi-backed IRG counteroffensive in Yemen has so far failed to deliver verified major territorial gains, excluding a push along the coast up to Dhubab and potentially the Jabal Kahbub mountain area. Initial IRG claims regarding the recapture of Mocha were highly likely inaccurate. The offensive has reportedly stalled with heavy fighting ongoing on the southwestern Dhubab axis, while the Houthis continue efforts to isolate Taiz through a pincer movement.

IRG ground forces appear to have made limited territorial progress relative to the scale of their reported operations, likely reflecting their continued dependence on Saudi air support and difficulties in capturing and consolidating control over Houthi-held territory. Saudi air support will almost certainly remain critical to sustaining IRG offensive and defensive operations.

A stalled counteroffensive is likely to prolong high-intensity conflict rather than compel Houthi concessions, while incentivising Riyadh to deepen its involvement and activate further external support. This is likely to sustain the Houthi cross-border strike campaign against Saudi territory, with the Houthis highly likely to continue escalating attacks against Riyadh and high-value targets deeper into the kingdom, as previous escalation thresholds have almost certainly already been met.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Continued reciprocal attacks in the maritime domain, including the 2 October strike against a Kuwait-flagged tanker, almost certainly sustain the risk of confrontation and subsequent Iranian retaliation against regional states. The uptick in Iranian attacks against vessels since late September likely increases the probability of a further round of US strikes against reconstituted Iranian capabilities around the SoH, previously referred to by US officials as “mowing the lawn”, which would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against US military facilities in regional states. Such retaliation is likely to remain limited in scope, but larger in scale than in previous exchanges, following the reported use of cluster munition warheads against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in September and the public warnings of a stronger response to US military operations.

The unannounced Camp David meeting, the last comparable instance of which preceded Israel’s war against Iran in June 2025, likely indicates that Washington is strongly weighing options for renewed military action against Iran and potential involvement in Yemen. However, a return to major sustained US combat operations remains most likely after the 3 November midterm elections, excluding more limited operations to degrade reconstituted Iranian capabilities that threaten transit through the SoH.

The withdrawal of US strategic bombers from RAF Fairford, publicly reported as reflecting force protection concerns, may also reflect a lack of intent by the Trump administration to imminently resume large-scale operations against Iran. The potential redeployment of strategic bombers to RAF Fairford or other key staging grounds for operations against Iran would likely serve as a key indicator and warning for a renewed and more sustained US air campaign.

Tehran’s hardened position and reported preparation of a broader retaliatory campaign involving allied groups likely indicate that any resumption of large-scale US strikes would be met with a multi-axis response, including from Iraqi militias and the Houthis. Such a response would highly likely include attacks against Gulf states hosting US forces and regional energy infrastructure. Pezeshkian’s public dismissal of negotiations likely indicates a further hardening of Tehran’s position, with Pezeshkian having broadly pursued a more open attitude to negotiations within the Iranian regime.

Operation Dawn of Yemen and the Yemeni internationally recognised government (IRG) counteroffensive almost certainly mark the most significant Saudi-backed military effort against the Houthis since 2022. The scale of the campaign highly likely indicates that Riyadh has calculated that a decisive escalation is less costly in the medium to long term than sustaining calibrated strikes while the Houthis hold the BaM coastline and continue limited attacks against Saudi territory, and that it is prepared to absorb significantly intensified Houthi strikes across the kingdom as a cost. Claimed gains around Dhubab and Mocha would, if confirmed, mark significant progress towards retaking the BaM coastline, although the seizure of Mocha remains unconfirmed. Any confirmed IRG successes, particularly around the BaM or towards Sanaa, would highly likely further increase the intensity of Houthi strikes against Saudi Arabia, as the Houthis seek to impose costs on Riyadh and deter further advances.

The claimed Houthi attack against Aramco’s refinery south of Riyadh on 3 October was almost certainly the most significant Houthi attack against the Riyadh region during the current conflict, and was followed on 5 October by a claimed attack against King Khalid International Airport. Both followed Saudi-backed strikes on Sanaa, which were previously a key indicator and warning of Houthi attacks against Riyadh. However, the broader escalation of the conflict in Yemen and intensification of strikes on Sanaa likely indicates that further Houthi attacks on Riyadh and other major targets deeper into Saudi Arabia are likely, as previous escalation thresholds have already been met.

The reissuing of Houthi threats against Saudi airspace, and the targeting of multiple airports and energy targets, highly likely indicate an intent to impose costs on Saudi civil aviation and energy infrastructure across the kingdom. Further escalatory Houthi attacks against Riyadh, Jeddah and other major targets, and short-notice disruption to civil aviation across Saudi Arabia are highly likely.

The agreement to rapidly deploy forces and capabilities under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement likely reflects Riyadh’s effort to bolster its air defence and border security ahead of an anticipated intensification of Houthi attacks. Pakistan’s reported arms deliveries to Aden and deployment of military advisers in support of Yemeni forces indicate that Islamabad’s involvement already extends beyond the defence of Saudi territory, although the size and remit of any new deployment remain unclear and Pakistan has not yet committed troops to combat operations in Yemen.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

UKMTO reporting of five tankers struck by unidentified projectiles in the SoH between 28 September and 1 October likely indicates an uptick in Iranian attacks against vessels using the US-escorted southern corridor, compared with the preceding week, during which comparatively few attacks were publicly reported. This likely reflects a gradual reconstitution of Iranian anti-shipping capabilities and maritime surveillance around the SoH since the large-scale US strikes of 1 September, which a US official stated had bought “at least a month” of reduced threat to shipping.

There is a realistic possibility that CENTCOM will conduct a further round of strikes against Iranian maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-shipping and mine warfare capabilities around the SoH in the coming weeks. On 1 September, CENTCOM conducted a large one-day wave of strikes against analogous targets, in what was described as “mowing the lawn” of Iranian reconstituted capabilities in the SoH. The USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is set to arrive in theatre around mid-October. CENTCOM’s previous large-scale strike package came shortly after a new carrier had entered the theatre.

US strikes would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against US military facilities in regional states. Iranian attacks may also extend to other strategic targets, including infrastructure used to circumvent the SoH, such as export terminals, pipelines and storage facilities. The most recent wave of Iranian retaliation strikes against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan on 8-9 September reportedly involved the use of cluster munition warheads, marking a notable escalation. Iranian retaliation following any further US strikes is likely to be more intense than has typically been observed in previous limited exchanges.

The deployment of additional Patriot batteries to protect Saudi and Qatari energy facilities (potentially Yanbu and Ras Laffan, respectively) is likely an additional indicator that Washington is preparing for the resumption of combat operations against Iran. Additional air defence in Saudi Arabia could also be used to defend against Houthi missiles and UAVs. However, the deployment to Qatar is almost certainly more indicative of concern over direct Iranian retaliation, with the Houthis having no established history of conducting attacks against Qatari territory.

The Houthi attack on the Medina electricity station, following the claimed attempted attack near Mecca earlier in September, almost certainly increases the political sensitivity of the Houthi campaign, with Saudi authorities framing both as attempts to target the Two Holy Mosques. Alongside attacks towards Riyadh, Tabuk and Yanbu, it highly likely demonstrates Houthi capability and intent to strike targets across western and central Saudi Arabia. Further short-notice disruption to civil aviation across a wider area of Saudi airspace is likely.

The reported strikes against high-value targets in the Houthi-controlled capital of Sanaa on 1 October mark a significant expansion of the air campaign. Strikes on Sanaa have been a key indicator and warning of escalated Houthi attacks against Riyadh, Jeddah and other targets beyond southern Saudi Arabia. While the Yemeni IRG military claimed the strikes, they were highly likely to have been conducted or enabled by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF).

The Houthis will highly likely attempt retaliatory attacks against Riyadh and other strategic targets in the coming days. Previous Houthi attacks targeting Riyadh in the current phase of conflict have been limited, likely in an effort to demonstrate capability and intent without triggering a major escalation. However, following the strikes on Sanaa, it is likely the Houthis will escalate attacks against Riyadh and other strategic locations in Saudi Arabia.

Reports of Houthis massing fighters near the border with Saudi Arabia, if confirmed, would indicate potential preparation for cross-border ground operations. During the previous phase of the Yemeni Civil War between 2015 and 2022, the Houthis conducted multiple cross-border ground incursions into Jazan and Najran provinces, primarily targeting Saudi military positions, border posts and patrols. However, Najran city was also repeatedly targeted by Houthi artillery, mortar and rocket attacks, resulting in civilian casualties.

Pakistan’s public commitment to defend Saudi Arabia by “whatever means” is its clearest signal yet of potential direct involvement in the conflict. Pakistan has already deployed 8,000 troops, two UAV squadrons, 16 fighter jets and air defence to Saudi Arabia. While no further deployments have been made, the existing force posture provides Islamabad with the capacity to transition from defensive support to offensive operations with minimal advance warning. Further attacks on the holy cities or a Houthi ground incursion may cross the threshold for a more direct Pakistani military response.  

The Yemeni IRG’s general mobilisation and the sustained intensity of fighting around Taiz and Lahj, alongside the expansion of the air campaign, highly likely indicate that the conflict in Yemen is entering a more intensive phase. With no observable diplomatic off-ramp, the conflict and its impact on Saudi Arabia are likely to intensify further in the coming weeks.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

On 4 October, more than 150 million Brazilian nationals will be eligible to vote in the country’s general election. The elections are to nominate the president, vice-president, all 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 54 out of 81 Federal Senate members, and the governors, vice-governors, and parliamentarians of all federative units. As the president and governors need an absolute majority to win, a potential run-off vote will be held on 25 October.

At the federal level, the elections are a highly polarised contest between incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, of the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT), and challenger Flávio Bolsonaro, of the right-wing Liberal Party (PL). Flávio Bolsonaro is the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, who held office between 2019 and 2023. The transition between the presidencies of Jair Bolsonaro and Lula was marked by the former’s allegation of a rigged vote, with his supporters storming the Supreme Court of Brazil, National Congress, and Planalto Presidential Palace on 8 January 2023 in an unsuccessful attempt to instigate a coup and reinstate him as president. Bolsonaro was subsequently convicted of several offences including “attempted violent abolition of the democratic rule of law”, “attempted coup d’etat”, and “armed criminal conspiracy”, and was sentenced to 27 years.

Lula currently holds a narrow lead over Flávio Bolsonaro, with a popular support difference of around four to six percentage points. However, neither candidate has the votes to win a majority in the first round, indicating that a runoff is likely. In the event of a runoff, available polling suggests that most voters supporting other candidates would favour Bolsonaro over Lula, narrowing the margin considerably. However, runoff projections continue to place Lula ahead by approximately two percentage points.

While the presidential contest is a clear two-man race, the parliamentary vote is more complex. Seats in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies are allocated proportionally within individual states, contributing to significant fragmentation across multiple parties nationwide. Available projections suggest that the PL and the PT-led federation are likely to remain among the largest forces in Congress, alongside the centre-right Progressive Union Federation (PP/União). This points to a fragmented legislature in which centre and centre-right parties are likely to retain significant influence, with neither Bolsonaro- nor Lula-aligned blocs expected to secure a clear majority.

The final weeks before the vote have been marked by growing disinformation and challenges to electoral integrity and to candidates’ security. Authorities have identified and publicly denounced several online misinformation campaigns reporting widespread rigging to doctor the election results. Authorities have also noted a growing threat from foreign interference. In late August, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) reportedly raised the risk of US influence or interference in the 2026 election to a ‘criticality level’ and assessed that pressure on Brazil was intensifying. Moreover, there is a threat of intimidation or violence against voters and candidates from organised criminal groups. The Federal Police has established a nationwide protection operation for candidates involving more than 450 personnel, armoured vehicles, counter-drone equipment and intelligence teams. Federal troops have also been authorised to reinforce election security in 11 states, including 129 municipalities in Amazonas and Pará alone.

ASSESSMENT

Similar to many recent campaigns in LATAM, much of the Brazilian electoral campaign has been focused on issues of security. Several large, multinational organised criminal groups operate in Brazil, the largest being Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV). These groups have increasingly expanded into the country’s north from their southern strongholds, seeking to establish new drug trafficking routes or to exercise greater control over illegal mining, logging and other illicit operations in the Amazon. They have also established alliances with smaller groups, strengthening them in the process and thus creating more opportunities for violent competition. The expansion of narcotics trafficking routes, including to Europe and West Africa, has provoked a surge in violence between criminal groups in states like Bahia, which is currently one of the least-secure areas of Brazil.

The current government of Brazil has sought to counter the growth of criminal groups by deepening coordination between various levels of government, from the local and city levels to the federal government. Researchers have noted that the significant independence that each state government has in setting its own counter-cartel strategy has resulted in uneven coverage and a lack of a coherent approach to combating organised crime nationwide. In 2025, the government proposed a constitutional amendment to strengthen the Unified Public Security System, originally created in 2018, by increasing coordination and standardising aspects of policing and public-security policy across Brazil. However, constitutional limits on Brasília’s ability to directly deploy federal forces against organised crime have constrained the federal government’s operational role. This has likely encouraged the Lula administration to place greater emphasis on disrupting the illegal economies that sustain criminal groups, including through measures such as the 2026 Anti-Faction Law.

The lack of coordination between states has also contributed to periodic, highly violent anti-cartel operations at the local level. These have resulted in significant casualties but have generally failed to materially weaken the underlying structures or operational resilience of the criminal groups. The most notable example is the October 2025 “Operation Containment”, a raid in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro targeting the leadership of CV. The raid escalated into a battle throughout the settlements, resulting in more than 120 deaths, making it the deadliest police operation in Brazil’s history. The operation failed to inflict meaningful damage on CV (local police leaders stated that its impact had been “minimal”), and resulted in significant protests and criticism against the government in Rio de Janeiro.

While foreign policy has been a relatively secondary topic in the electoral campaign, the upcoming election is highly likely to be consequential for the geopolitical orientation of South America. During the Lula presidency, Brazil has become a notable global promoter of a “multipolar” diplomacy for the LATAM region, based on engagement with China and Russia via the BRICS bloc, and resistance to an expanded US role in Latin America. Lula has also promoted greater “de-dollarisation”, including expanded use of the Brazilian real and Chinese renminbi in bilateral trade and financial transactions, reducing reliance on the US dollar.

However, since 2023, the electoral victories of several right-wing candidates in LATAM, who have generally espoused pro-US foreign policies, have made Brazil’s position progressively more distinct in the region. The capture of President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela in January 2026 and the more recent election of right-wing President Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia have also deprived the Lula administration of two key allies, leaving it increasingly isolated.

Brazil is now increasingly surrounded by members of the US-backed “Shield of the Americas”, an anti-cartel initiative centred on closer security and political cooperation with Washington. Against this backdrop, Lula has adopted a more overtly anti-US campaign position, advocating greater strategic autonomy and reduced dependence on Washington. Most recently, in his opening address at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City in September, Lula stated that “Brazil does not fit in anyone’s backyard” and warned of the US’s “hegemonic temptations” and “neocolonial incursions”. 

Flávio Bolsonaro has styled himself after other right-wing LATAM leaders, like Argentine President Javier Milei or Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, and ran a campaign based on an anti-crime stance and on greater cooperation with the US. Bolsonaro has pledged to classify the country’s cartels as terrorist organisations, matching the US’s classification of them as “foreign terrorist organisations” (FTOs), and to join the “Shield of the Americas”. He also vowed to enter a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US and suggested greater cooperation over rare earths, a strategic priority for Washington. While reiterating his intentions to take a “pragmatic” stance towards China, Bolsonaro has signalled that he will reverse course from his rival’s policy of tightening relations with Beijing.

There is a realistic possibility that the final days of the electoral campaign, and the voting day itself, will be marked by civil unrest, with the threat likely to be higher in the aftermath of the vote. In 2022, protests erupted almost immediately after Lula was declared the winner of the runoff vote. Pro-Bolsonaro supporters erected more than 300 barricades across the country using trucks and other heavy vehicles, and staged hundreds of protests. Protesters also attempted to invade the perimeter of Guarulhos International Airport in São Paulo. The unrest culminated in the 8 January attack on the main government buildings in Brasília.

Demonstrations, particularly after a presidential candidate is announced as the winner, could escalate into roadblocks, vehicle convoys, or attempts to obstruct key transport routes, resulting in delays on major roads, restricted access to airports, and disruption to public transport. The risk is likely to be highest in major political centres and large cities, particularly Brasília, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro.

There is a realistic possibility of targeted political violence being carried out by rival supporters. This also has a precedent after the 2022 elections, when an individual tried to carry out a bombing at Brasília International Airport. In another case, a person was arrested in Brasília as he tried to enter a street celebration for Lula’s inauguration while armed with an improvised explosive device (IED) and a knife.

Alongside civil unrest, there is a threat of violence linked to organised criminal groups. Groups like CV and PCC are likely to retain an interest in influencing the election of candidates, particularly those competing for state-level positions, due to Brazil’s devolution of policing power to individual states. Criminal groups may seek to threaten voters, prevent them from visiting stations, or carry out actions aimed at disrupting the voting process. In 2022, local media reported several cases of criminal groups seeking to influence the vote, including by using intimidation tactics such as circulating written warnings telling residents which candidate they should vote for. These incidents appeared localised, rather than part of a nationwide or even state-wide campaign. However, it is likely that similar incidents will take place during the upcoming election as criminal groups seek to protect local political and economic interests.

An election victory for Lula would almost certainly strengthen the government’s political mandate, and reinforce its position as the key power counterbalancing US influence in the region. A second consecutive term for Lula (his fourth overall) would allow Brazil to deepen bilateral ties within the BRICS bloc, particularly with China. Lula’s pledge to prioritise national sovereignty and safeguard Brazil’s natural resources, including critical mineral reserves, would almost certainly further strain relations with the US. Moreover, the administration would likely leverage strained relations between the US and EU to deepen ties with the latter, building on the recently approved EU-Mercosur trade deal.

Lula may agree to some security cooperation with Washington to combat transnational criminal groups, particularly in Brazil’s northwestern borders with Colombia and Venezuela, but is unlikely to agree to allow US counter-narcotics operations on its soil. Discrepancies between the Shield of the Americas framework and Brazil’s independent approach to combating organised crime are likely to continue causing occasional diplomatic friction between Brasília and Washington. In the long term, exclusion from US-led anti-cartel initiatives could displace criminal activity into Brazilian territory as enforcement pressure increases in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and other regional states.

A Bolsonaro victory would likely bring Brazil into closer alignment with the US and strengthen the Shield of the Americas framework. At its launch, the initiative excluded Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, despite these countries hosting some of the region’s most powerful criminal organisations. As in Colombia under De La Espriella, a Bolsonaro administration would likely pursue much closer integration of US intelligence, military and law-enforcement capabilities into Brazilian anti-cartel operations, expanding Washington’s ability to support action against organised criminal groups across the continent.

Bolsonaro would also highly likely implement a hardline policing approach towards organised criminal groups, partnering with ideologically aligned state administrations. This could drive the internal displacement of criminal groups towards states where policing is less aggressive or enforcement capacity is weaker, potentially shifting rather than reducing organised-crime activity. Bolsonaro could, like President Milei in Argentina, reverse the previous trend of growing relations with China and Russia, leading to a reduced role within BRICS in favour of greater cooperation with the US. However, this would likely not result in moves that are deliberately hostile to China, as Brasília cannot afford to alienate its main trading partner. Closer ties with the US would likely focus on areas of key interest to Washington, such as rare earth minerals or the control over irregular migration.

The injury of eight US Marines in the 14 September attack highlights the continued risk of escalation and miscalculation arising from sustained kinetic exchanges in the maritime domain. US fatalities in the attack would likely have triggered US strikes against Iranian territory, which in turn would likely have triggered Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states. The disclosure of the incident was likely deliberately delayed ahead of UNGA to avoid increasing tensions and preserve room for diplomatic engagement. There is currently no publicly available information indicating that Iran knew US service personnel were on the vessel or what the Marines were doing.

Iran’s seven-day proposal closely mirrors the terms of the June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Its rejection by Trump likely indicates that Washington assesses that the blockade and economic pressure against Iran, concurrent with elevated rates of regional hydrocarbon exports in recent weeks, has given the Trump administration greater leverage in compelling compliance from Iran. Contradictory US and Iranian statements on whether talks will resume indicate that indirect contact via Qatar is likely continuing, but a near-term agreement to reopen the SoH remains unlikely. With the status quo likely to persist, reciprocal attacks in the maritime domain are highly likely to continue, sustaining the risk of Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

The US is almost certainly in the stronger negotiating position. Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict, its ability to interdict transit through the SoH, has been substantially degraded by US military operations, mine clearance and the restoration of regional export capacity, while the blockade and sanctions continue to impose mounting economic costs on Tehran. Iran likely has increased incentives to compromise than before the signing of the June MoU. This may be reflected in reporting that Tehran has indicated flexibility on nuclear issues.

However, a breakthrough remains unlikely in the near term. The IRGC is likely to undermine any agreement perceived in Tehran as a capitulation, and mutual distrust will almost certainly continue to be an obstacle. Following the collapse of the June MoU, neither party is likely to trust the other to fulfil its obligations, with Iran seeking sanctions relief and the release of frozen funds upfront, and Washington seeking concrete nuclear steps upfront. The reported gap over the timing of commitments and which party acts first likely reflects this, which is unlikely to be resolved without a phased mechanism acceptable to both sides.

The USS Theodore Roosevelt’s deployment is reportedly intended to relieve the USS George Washington, which would sustain the current two-carrier posture in the region into 2027, consistent with the reported order to maintain US force levels until at least the end of 2026. However, there is a realistic possibility that the Roosevelt CSG will deploy in addition to the existing carrier presence, increasing the total to three CSGs. A three-carrier posture in the CENTCOM AoR would almost certainly increase US offensive and defensive capacity across the region, providing greater operational flexibility to sustain its maritime blockade, revert to high-intensity strikes against Iran and potentially join operations against the Houthis if required. The Roosevelt CSG is expected to arrive in theatre around mid-to-late October, and the Washington CSG is unlikely to withdraw prior to her arrival. Whether the Washington CSG departs on or soon after its arrival will likely be a key indicator of a relief in place or enhanced carrier posture.

The Houthi attack on the Riyadh region on 26 September is the second attempted Houthi attack against Riyadh since 2022, following the 19 September attack. The second attack on the capital region almost certainly indicates that the Houthis are prepared to sustain attacks on high-profile and more politically sensitive targets in Saudi Arabia to deter further Saudi intervention in Yemen. Houthi leadership figure al-Asad’s characterisation of the attack as a “rehearsal” likely indicates that further attacks on Riyadh are planned and could involve larger or more complex strike packages, with two attack drones likely intended to probe Saudi air defences and signal intent.

Houthi claims of Saudi strikes in Saada and Amran governorates on 25 September, if confirmed, would indicate a continued expansion of Saudi air operations beyond front-line areas into the Houthi heartland in northern Yemen. This would mark a continued shift from the more calibrated Saudi posture observed immediately following the Houthi offensive launched on 3 September, and likely triggered the 26 September limited attack against Riyadh.  Further Houthi attacks on Riyadh are likely in response to the expansion of Saudi air operations into the Houthi heartland in northern Yemen, particularly Sanaa.

The Saudi-backed Yemeni IRG leader Al-Alimi’s call for a general mobilisation, combined with the stated objective of restoring state control over Sanaa, likely indicates that the IRG is preparing for a protracted campaign, with the amnesty offer likely intended to fracture Houthi cohesion.

The first chiefs of staff meeting under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement likely reflects Riyadh’s effort to secure additional air defence and military support from Pakistan and Turkey amid reported interceptor shortfalls, although no deployment of Turkish or Pakistani forces has been confirmed. With no observable diplomatic off-ramp, the conflict in Yemen and its impact on Saudi Arabia are likely to intensify further in the coming weeks.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The absence of Iranian missile or UAV attacks against regional targets since 8-9 September is the longest pause in attacks since they resumed on 28 August. This likely reflects deliberate Iranian calibration rather than a shift towards de-escalation. Iran has sustained attacks in the maritime domain and is likely exploiting this lull to regroup and reconstitute its offensive military capabilities. Recent Iranian rhetoric almost certainly indicates that Iran remains on high alert and is prepared for immediate escalation.  

US President Donald Trump used his UNGA speech to renew threats to “annihilate” Iran, likely to increase pressure on Tehran to engage in negotiations to reach a settlement. President Trump also implied that Iran is deliberately stalling negotiations until the US midterm elections, expecting them to weaken the White House’s mandate to undertake further military action against Iran.

Iran’s submission of a seven-point peace framework, which reportedly largely matches the June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), likely indicates that Tehran has not shifted from its maximalist demands. While its full text has not been publicly disclosed, the proposal reportedly includes demands for an immediate end to the conflict on all fronts, the preservation of Iran’s civilian nuclear programme, and the unfreezing of Iranian assets before the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. The main difference with the June MoU is that the new text reportedly has a much narrower timeline, with the reopening of the SoH possible within one week of the deal’s initial approval.

Rubio’s statement that the talks did not represent a major breakthrough likely indicates that Washington is unlikely to accept a long-term settlement that defers the nuclear issue. However, there is a realistic possibility that the US will pursue a limited, short-term arrangement to reopen the SoH and stabilise oil prices ahead of the midterm elections, while leaving core issues to subsequent negotiations.

Iran’s ability to restrict the SoH has been one of its primary sources of leverage. However, the US blockade combined with expanded sanctions has significantly damaged the Iranian economy. Iran has struggled to generate revenue from its illicit oil trade, has a shortage of foreign currency reserves, is struggling to access raw materials, and production costs have increased. Moreover, despite sustaining intermittent attacks on shipping in the SoH, Iran’s ability to interdict is increasingly constrained by sustained US military operations and mine-clearing, as demonstrated by recent CENTCOM reports of 60 vessels transiting the SoH on 23 September.

With its primary source of leverage degraded and its economy increasingly struggling to absorb the costs of US military and economic pressure, Tehran likely has a growing incentive to compromise on access through the SoH, while preserving its core demands. Enabling access in exchange for sanctions reprieve and a suspension of the US blockade would almost certainly allow Iran to increase oil exports, improve access to foreign currency and raw materials and reduce pressure on domestic production. Tehran likely assesses that the rapid reopening of the SoH envisioned by the seven-point plan would be desirable for the US administration, as it would likely cause a drop in fuel prices ahead of the upcoming midterms.

However, any negotiations to temporarily reopen the SoH and ease economic pressure are unlikely to address the fundamental issues that were used to justify the conflict. Moreover, any concessions agreed on by Iran’s civilian government are likely to be undermined by both Iranian proxy force actions and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has consolidated power in Tehran and is effectively running the country.

US force posture in the region remains enhanced, with two carrier strike groups still deployed to the CENTCOM AoR. US forces could pivot rapidly to renewed high-intensity offensive operations against Iran with limited advanced warning. Renewed high-intensity US strikes would highly likely trigger a broader Iranian retaliation beyond US military assets, likely including attacks against regional infrastructure, energy facilities, ports, and aviation hubs. Recent Iranian retaliation has largely been concentrated against targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain, but a renewed major US campaign would almost certainly increase the risk of attacks expanding to other Gulf states hosting US forces or supporting US operations. The threat to regional airports has likely increased following Iranian warnings and the prohibition on Iranian flights. Iranian flights to the UAE, Muscat and Baghdad have been suspended, and other nations are likely to follow.

In Yemen, current Houthi operations appear primarily focused on consolidating recent territorial gains on the Red Sea coast and securing the strategic high ground around Jabal Kahbub. Consolidating gains on the Red Sea coast would likely improve the Houthis’ ability to monitor and attack international shipping, provide greater defensive depth against IRG counter-offensives, and improve their bargaining position. Saudi Arabia will almost certainly sustain its air support in order to prevent further Houthi advances and to support IRG counter-offensives aimed at dislodging the Houthis from recently captured coastal positions.

The Houthi forces are almost certain to continue attacks in Saudi Arabia in the short term in response to Saudi air support. Most attacks will likely remain focused on southern Saudi Arabia, particularly Jazan, Abha, Najran and Khamis Mushait. However, sustained Saudi air support is likely to increase the risk of further long-range Houthi attacks on military bases, airports, and energy infrastructure deeper inside the Kingdom, including in Riyadh and Jeddah. The East-West Pipeline and the port of Yanbu have likely become priority targets following the pipeline’s partial restart and before French military support is deployed to protect energy infrastructure.

Saudi strikes on Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah, senior Houthi leadership, or other high-value targets (HVTs) are likely to serve as key indicators of more intense or sustained long-range Houthi attacks outside of southern Saudi Arabia, especially Riyadh.

US forces are set to withdraw from Iraq on 30 September. Baghdad has confirmed that there is no fixed deadline for bringing militia weapons under state control, so Iran-backed armed groups will likely retain significant missile and UAV capabilities after the withdrawal. Iranian-backed groups will likely continue to conduct intermittent attacks against regional states, particularly Saudi energy infrastructure such as the East-West Pipeline.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Early on 23 September, Tigrayan Defence Forces (TDF), the military wing of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), seized Alula Aba Nega International Airport in Mekelle. Ethiopian Airlines subsequently suspended flights to Mekelle, Axum, and Shire.

The airport’s capture follows the formation of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival on 21 September, a coalition aimed at overthrowing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and establishing a transitional administration across Ethiopia. The alliance includes the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM), Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and TPLF, alongside four smaller groups. The coalition includes former enemies: Fano militias fought alongside the government against the TPLF during the 2020-2022 Tigray conflict but have clashed with the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) since 2023.

Relations between the federal government and the TPLF have deteriorated sharply over the past year since a Debretsion Gebremichael-led faction seized TPLF administrative offices in March 2025, which removed the federally appointed Getachew Reda from power. Addis Ababa revoked the TPLF’s legal status as a political party in May 2025, leaving Tigray outside the normal institutional framework. In May 2026, the TPLF reinstated Tigray’s pre-war Regional Council and elected Debretsion as regional president, displacing the Interim Regional Administration. Tigray was then excluded from the 1 June 2026 national elections.

Direct clashes between the ENDF and TDF took place in January and August 2026, the most significant fighting since the end of the 2020-22 conflict. Since February 2026, the ENDF has deployed heavy artillery and troops along Tigray’s borders, and there have been widespread fears of an escalation between government and Tigrayan forces.

In recent weeks, the ENDF has conducted several drone strikes across Tigray, including in Mekelle. One 20 September strike hit a humanitarian aid convoy carrying 41 tonnes of food to displaced people. On 18 September, preceding the formation of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, the ENDF claimed to have captured nearly 300 TDF fighters.

The absence of Iranian ballistic missile or drone attacks against targets in a regional state since 8-9 September is the longest such interval since attacks resumed on 28 August. This likely reflects deliberate Iranian calibration rather than a shift towards de-escalation, with Iran sustaining attacks in the maritime domain. Iranian strikes against US military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain in particular are likely to resume with minimal warning following US strikes against Iranian territory or tankers.

Attacks in the maritime domain are likely to continue triggering further strike exchanges, with neither side likely to de-escalate without surrendering a key source of leverage. The IRGC’s attempt to seize a US Navy USV on 14 September and its claimed disabling of a Togo-flagged tanker on 17 September indicate that Tehran is continuing to contest control of the SoH through both interdiction of commercial shipping and direct attacks against US assets. The IRGC’s claimed downing of two MQ-9 Reaper drones on 16 and 17 September indicates a sustained Iranian effort to degrade US intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations over the SoH. Kinetic exchanges in the maritime domain have repeatedly led to Iranian strikes against targets in regional states, and there are currently no indications that Tehran has abandoned this strategy.

Trump’s statement that he faces a decision over whether to “annihilate” the Iranian regime, alongside the reported order to maintain US force levels in the region until the end of the year, likely indicates that Washington is preserving the option to return to large-scale military operations and sustain pressure on Tehran, rather than signalling an immediate intent to resume major combat operations. The planned 22 September meeting with GCC leaders is likely to be an indicator of the conflict’s next phase. Gulf states almost certainly remain opposed to a return to full-scale conflict given their exposure to Iranian retaliation, and are likely to press for a renewed diplomatic effort.

Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia are highly likely to continue, with the attempted attack against targets in Yanbu and Taif indicating a continued broadening of the Houthi target set beyond southern Saudi Arabia. The highest priority targets for the Houthis likely remain energy infrastructure, military facilities and international airports. The death of one person and the injury of two others from falling debris in the Taif region on 17 September highly likely indicates that the risk to civilians from intercepted munitions and debris is increasing as attacks continue and extend into western Saudi Arabia. Further early warning alerts across western and southern Saudi Arabia are highly likely over the coming days, and short-notice airspace restrictions and flight disruption at Jeddah and other international airports are a realistic possibility.

Saudi airstrikes have not yet targeted Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah or senior Houthi leadership in the current phase of conflict triggered by the Houthi 3 September offensive, in a likely calibrated attempt to avoid a major escalation in Houthi long-range fires. The conducting of such strikes is likely a key indicator and warning of further escalated Houthi attacks against targets in locations such as Riyadh or Jeddah, and the claimed interception near Mecca is likely to expand the political latitude available to Riyadh to escalate against the Houthis.

The US-Houthi Muscat meeting likely prioritised US attempts to decouple American interests from the Saudi-Houthi conflict rather than a push for mediation, and the reported exclusion of Saudi-linked vessels indicates Houthi intent to maintain the blockade while trying to avoid US retaliation. A Houthi attack against a US-linked vessel or interest would likely be a key indicator of future US involvement.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The absence of Iranian ballistic missile or drone attacks against targets in a regional state since 8-9 September is the longest such interval since attacks resumed on 28 August. This likely reflects deliberate Iranian calibration rather than a shift towards de-escalation, with Iran sustaining attacks in the maritime domain. Iranian strikes against US military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain in particular are likely to resume with minimal warning following US strikes against Iranian territory or tankers.

Attacks in the maritime domain are likely to continue triggering further strike exchanges, with neither side likely to de-escalate without surrendering a key source of leverage. The IRGC’s attempt to seize a US Navy USV on 14 September and its claimed disabling of a Togo-flagged tanker on 17 September indicate that Tehran is continuing to contest control of the SoH through both interdiction of commercial shipping and direct attacks against US assets. The IRGC’s claimed downing of two MQ-9 Reaper drones on 16 and 17 September indicates a sustained Iranian effort to degrade US intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations over the SoH. Kinetic exchanges in the maritime domain have repeatedly led to Iranian strikes against targets in regional states, and there are currently no indications that Tehran has abandoned this strategy.

Trump’s statement that he faces a decision over whether to “annihilate” the Iranian regime, alongside the reported order to maintain US force levels in the region until the end of the year, likely indicates that Washington is preserving the option to return to large-scale military operations and sustain pressure on Tehran, rather than signalling an immediate intent to resume major combat operations. The planned 22 September meeting with GCC leaders is likely to be an indicator of the conflict’s next phase. Gulf states almost certainly remain opposed to a return to full-scale conflict given their exposure to Iranian retaliation, and are likely to press for a renewed diplomatic effort.

Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia are highly likely to continue, with the attempted attack against targets in Yanbu and Taif indicating a continued broadening of the Houthi target set beyond southern Saudi Arabia. The highest priority targets for the Houthis likely remain energy infrastructure, military facilities and international airports. The death of one person and the injury of two others from falling debris in the Taif region on 17 September highly likely indicates that the risk to civilians from intercepted munitions and debris is increasing as attacks continue and extend into western Saudi Arabia. Further early warning alerts across western and southern Saudi Arabia are highly likely over the coming days, and short-notice airspace restrictions and flight disruption at Jeddah and other international airports are a realistic possibility.

Saudi airstrikes have not yet targeted Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah or senior Houthi leadership in the current phase of conflict triggered by the Houthi 3 September offensive, in a likely calibrated attempt to avoid a major escalation in Houthi long-range fires. The conducting of such strikes is likely a key indicator and warning of further escalated Houthi attacks against targets in locations such as Riyadh or Jeddah, and the claimed interception near Mecca is likely to expand the political latitude available to Riyadh to escalate against the Houthis.

The US-Houthi Muscat meeting likely prioritised US attempts to decouple American interests from the Saudi-Houthi conflict rather than a push for mediation, and the reported exclusion of Saudi-linked vessels indicates Houthi intent to maintain the blockade while trying to avoid US retaliation. A Houthi attack against a US-linked vessel or interest would likely be a key indicator of future US involvement.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The attack against the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia, which has now been confirmed to have originated from Iraqi territory, was likely to have been directed or authorised by Iran’s IRGC. The 1,200km pipeline carries an estimated four to five per cent of global crude oil supply and has been Saudi Arabia’s principal means of bypassing the SoH, with Saudi exports through its Red Sea terminus having more than doubled since the outbreak of the conflict, according to the International Energy Agency.

The explicit denial by IRI, the umbrella group for Iran-backed militias in Iraq, is likely intended to preserve deniability for both Tehran and its Iraqi partners rather than indicating non-involvement. The attack likely does not serve any Iraqi factional interest, and the launch site in Maysan province lies in an area of long-standing Iran-aligned militia presence adjacent to the Iranian border.

The attack almost certainly reflects Tehran’s broader incentive to degrade regional export capacity that circumvents the SoH. While Iran’s ability to interdict transit through the strait has been degraded by US escorting and mine clearance, bypass routes have also become a key constraint on Iranian leverage. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline has been used extensively to bypass the SoH. Attacks on the pipeline could also serve as a warning from Tehran to Riyadh that increased Saudi intervention in Yemen will incur higher costs, while forcing Saudi Arabia to disperse air defences to cover threats from the north at a time when the Houthi missile and UAV threat from the south is escalating.

As the US blockade remains in place and economic pressure on Tehran increases, the IRGC is likely to become increasingly incentivised to conduct deniable attacks against infrastructure used to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE’s Fujairah and Khor Fakkan export infrastructure could therefore constitute potential future targets.

The indefinite postponement of the 14 September Salalah meeting likely removes the most viable near-term mechanism for de-escalation in the SoH. The reported submission of Saudi amendments, alongside Bahrain’s refusal to attend, likely indicates that the GCC states are not unified in their approach to negotiating with Tehran on transit arrangements. Moreover, it is likely that Saudi withdrawal from the planned meeting was in part directly related to the East-West pipeline attack. Key Gulf states are also likely unwilling to legitimise long term Iranian regulation of the strait through fees or permits, and a negotiated reopening of the SoH remains unlikely in the near term.

Reciprocal attacks against shipping in the SoH, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea are highly likely to continue triggering further strike exchanges, with neither side likely to de-escalate in the maritime domain without surrendering a key source of leverage. The sustained US “tanker for tanker” policy and Iranian expansion of its targeting zone for vessels have each almost certainly reinforced this cycle. Kinetic exchanges in the maritime domain have repeatedly led to Iranian strikes against targets in regional states, most recently prioritising US military facilities in Jordan.

The conflict in Yemen has continued to escalate with no current observable diplomatic off-ramps. Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia are highly likely to continue, with Houthi statements previously explicitly threatening to broaden attacks in response to further Saudi action. The activation of early warning systems in Taif on 14 September and Yanbu, Jeddah, Taif, Mecca City and AlUla on 15 September potentially indicate a broadening of the Houthi target set, with early warning alerts now being activated outside of southern Saudi Arabia. The highest priority targets for the Houthis likely remain energy infrastructure, military facilities and international airports.  Further alerts across western Saudi Arabia are highly likely over the coming days, in addition to southern Saudi Arabia. Short-notice airspace restrictions and flight disruption at Jeddah and other international airports are a realistic possibility.

Saudi airstrikes have not yet targeted Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah or senior Houthi leadership in Yemen, in a likely calibrated attempt to avoid a major escalation. The conducting of such strikes is likely a key indicator and warning of further escalated Houthi attacks against targets in locations such as Riyadh or Jeddah.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

Iran’s previously announced expansion of the declared threat area for shipping was highly likely intended to restore leverage by widening the area in which Iran can credibly threaten shipping. This sets the conditions for an escalation in Iranian attacks against vessels at anchorage and those conducting ship-to-ship transfers outside of the SoH. The strikes overnight 8-9 September almost certainly demonstrate the execution of this, with Iranian anti-shipping attacks extending to vessels transiting and at anchor well outside the SoH, including off Dubai and in Iraqi waters. Attempted attacks against commercial vessels in the wider Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea, including in the approaches to Gulf state ports, loading terminals, and at port anchorages, are highly likely to increase, which in turn will likely threaten broader escalation.

Washington almost certainly retains a strong incentive to both maintain its blockade and prevent Iran from restoring its leverage over regional export routes, with the US likely to periodically conduct attacks against Iranian capabilities around the SoH when it is assessed they have been reconstituted. Moreover, the previously announced “tanker for tanker” policy has not only been sustained but intensified with the US attacks against Iranian tankers, and is highly likely to further increase the threat to commercial shipping by providing Iran with an additional incentive and justification to retaliate against tankers and US Navy vessels. Additionally, as demonstrated overnight 8-9 September, US strikes against Iranian tankers almost certainly serve as a potential trigger for Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

Both the Iranian targeting of US Navy vessels and use of cluster munitions in Jordan almost certainly represent a notable shift, highly likely increasing the risk of miscalculation and indicating Iranian intent to escalate. A successful Iranian strike against a major US Navy vessel, or any Iranian attack resulting in US casualties, would likely trigger a substantially larger US response, potentially including strikes against Iranian ports, export infrastructure, or leadership targets, which in turn would likely trigger retaliatory attacks against regional states. Iranian retaliation has continued to be directed against US military and maritime targets, but the geographic expansion of vessel targeting and the use of cluster munition warheads highly likely indicate that Tehran is becoming less constrained in how it calibrates its response. This likely reflects the initial application of the escalatory principles outlined in Iran’s new offensive doctrine on 26 August.

As economic pressure on the regime increases and Iran’s ability to threaten shipping continues to be degraded, IRGC hardliners who exercise considerable control in Tehran will highly likely continue to advocate for further escalation to break the deadlock. Further escalation pathways for Iran include the expansion of its targeting to include the Gulf energy and export infrastructure, which circumvent the SoH, such as Fujairah and Khor Fakkan in the UAE, in order to impose greater costs and restore leverage.

Riyadh is likely to sustain operations against the Houthis in Yemen, and the Houthis have almost certainly calculated that cross-border attacks against Saudi economic and energy infrastructure represent their principal means of imposing costs on Riyadh and of deterring further Saudi intervention. They are therefore highly likely to continue these attacks absent a negotiated ceasefire. Further Houthi attacks against airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran are likely in the short term, with deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other major targets also likely in the event of sustained Saudi involvement or further escalation.

Riyadh’s intervention has so far likely been deliberately calibrated to avoid a return to the full-scale conflict with the Houthis conducted prior to 2022, with air strikes conducted primarily in front-line areas such as Taiz and Marib in support of  Saudi-backed IRG ground forces rather than against Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah, or Houthi leadership. However, the reported Houthi seizure of Mocha, Dhubab, and Perim Island almost certainly constitutes the most significant territorial change in Yemen since 2022 and, crucially, gives the Houthis significant capability to interdict traffic through the BaM directly, increasing the threat to Red Sea export routes.

The Houthi statement that navigation remains safe for all shipping other than Saudi vessels is likely intended to avoid provoking intervention from the US while concentrating pressure on Riyadh. An expansion of Saudi air strikes in Houthi-controlled Yemen, both geographically and in terms of target set, remains a key indicator and warning of further escalation characterised by Houthi attacks launched against targets beyond southern Saudi Arabia.  

If the potential incident along the East-West pipeline is confirmed as a Houthi attack, Saudi retaliation is likely. The pipeline is Saudi Arabia’s principal alternative export route while the SoH remains disrupted, and a successful strike against it would almost certainly be assessed by Riyadh as a strategic-level escalation warranting a response beyond current front-line air operations. This would in turn likely trigger intensified Houthi attacks against Saudi territory, energy infrastructure, and shipping.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: