INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Cutting the internet has been used in Uganda in recent years during elections or periods of heightened tension. The internet was almost certainly pre-emptively cut to prevent the spread of footage of security forces using excessive force, the spread of anti-government sentiment, and the organising of mass rallies on social media. Internet restrictions will highly likely remain in place over the coming days.

Major youth protests have erupted in recent years in neighbouring Tanzania and Kenya, as well as numerous other African countries, including Morocco, Madagascar, and Angola. In Uganda in November 2020, in the lead-up to the January 2021 general election, security forces arrested Wine, citing violations of COVID-19 protocols. Widespread protests erupted across Uganda, particularly in Kampala and other urban areas. Security forces cracked down on demonstrations, deploying tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, and detaining approximately 3,000 people over the election period.

Following reports of security force violence, electoral fraud, and the placing of Wine under house arrest, anti-government sentiment is almost certainly heightened, significantly raising the risk of widespread civil unrest. Following the publication of the electoral results on 17 January and the almost certain announcement of Museveni’s victory, Wine is highly likely to double down on claims of electoral fraud. Amid the tense political environment, this is likely to trigger demonstrations from many Wine supporters, which would almost highly likely escalate if security forces were to formally place Wine under arrest.

If civil unrest breaks out, demonstrations are likely to occur in Kampala and other major cities. In Kampala itself, protests will likely be particularly intense around the Central Business District and near government buildings. Large anti-government protests would highly likely result in travel disruptions, with security forces likely to use roadblocks to prevent protesters from accessing government buildings and diplomatic zones.

Civil unrest would almost certainly raise the risk of a potential coup. Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is expected to take over the presidency should the 81-year-old president fail to complete his term in office. Kainerugaba, who has threatened to behead wine and called for him to be hanged, is a four-star general and top military commander, in charge of Uganda’s most powerful institution. Critics of Museveni have previously called on Kainerugaba to conduct a military coup to seize power from his father. Kainerugaba’s control of the military almost certainly heightens the risk of a military coup should major nationwide civil unrest break out.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The reported targeting of military facilities and airports inside Venezuela represents a significant escalation in US–Venezuela tensions, which have steadily deteriorated since August 2025. The substantial buildup of US naval and air assets in the wider Caribbean has largely been interpreted as pressure aimed at undermining the Maduro government. This posture has coincided with multiple US strikes against suspected narcotics trafficking networks, resulting in over 100 fatalities, as well as the seizure of illicit oil tankers suspected of transporting Venezuelan oil in circumvention of sanctions.

The reported strikes on airports and military installations likely suggest an effort to degrade Venezuela’s ability to conduct retaliatory military operations, by limiting air and logistical capabilities. Sustained damage to multiple airfields and port facilities would achieve a clear tactical advantage for any potential follow-on operations and further constrain the operational freedom of Venezuela’s armed forces.

Reports of President Maduro’s capture are yet to be confirmed; however, if true, the United States has likely achieved one of its primary objectives, which may decrease the risk of further US strikes on Venezuela in the immediate term.

In response to foreign military activity within Venezuelan soil, authorities are likely to implement heightened travel restrictions, curfews, and border closures in the coming days to manage potential unrest and support military operations. Increased security patrols, checkpoints, and the deployment of the armed forces to key infrastructure are likely. The authorities may also restrict the right to assembly or limit access to the internet and telecommunications, limiting situational awareness within Venezuela. Foreign nationals, particularly US and other Western citizens, will likely face an elevated risk of detention due to perceptions or allegations of involvement in the recent military activity.

If US strikes are sustained, they are expected to cause significant disruptions to air travel in the Southern Caribbean Basin. The proximity of Trinidad and Tobago and the ABC Islands, Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao, to mainland Venezuela is expected to make travel to and from these areas highly difficult. The closure of Venezuelan airspace is also likely to extend flight times on routes connecting the United States and Canada with areas of South America.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Bondi Beach mass shooting is the deadliest terrorist attack in Australian history and the deadliest mass shooting since the 1996 Port Arthur massacre.

Attribution for the attack has so far seen potentially conflicting reports. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reportedly “took interest” in one of the perpetrators, Naveed Akram, six years ago for ties to a Sydney-based Islamic State (IS) terrorist cell. This followed the July 2019 arrest of Isaac El Matari, the self-proclaimed head of IS in Australia, who wished to establish an “insurgency” in Australia.

Local media reports that investigators from the Australian Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) believe that the two perpetrators had pledged allegiance to IS, with two IS flags reportedly found in their vehicle at Bondi Beach. A senior JCTT official has briefed that Naveed Akram was “closely connected” to El Matari.

These findings, if confirmed, would strongly suggest at least a historical connection to an Australian IS cell. However, Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has stated that intelligence authorities have informed him that there was “no evidence of collusion” and “no evidence that these people were part of a cell”. Investigations by Australian authorities remain ongoing.

In apparent contrast to the attribution to IS, whether that be via coordination with a wider network or through inspiration as lone actors, Israeli intelligence sources have briefed that the attack may have been carried out with the support of Iran or Iran-backed actors such as Hezbollah.

In August 2025, Iran’s ambassador to Australia, Ahmad Sadeghi, was expelled due to “credible evidence” that antisemitic attacks, including an arson attack against a café in Sydney in October 2024 and a synagogue in Melbourne in December 2024, were orchestrated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The Bondi Beach terrorist attack highlights the continuing elevated risk of terrorism in Western countries, particularly against Jewish targets. Other attacks in 2025 include the October 2025 ramming and stabbing attack targeting Jewish worshipers at a synagogue in Manchester, UK, during Yom Kippur, and the May 2025 shooting near the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., USA.

In addition to the elevated risk of antisemitic terrorism against targets associated with Judaism, such as synagogues, Jewish schools, and events such as Hanukkah gatherings (14 December – 22 December 2025), the winter holiday season almost certainly entails an increased risk of terrorist attacks against ‘soft targets’. Symbolic and high-visibility events, such as Christmas markets, draw large crowds and are difficult to comprehensively protect against terrorist actors.

In the aftermath of the Bondi Beach attack, it is almost certain that security presence at Hanukkah events and synagogues will be elevated, as already reported in cities such as Berlin, London, and New York.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The dispute originates from a 1904 colonial-era agreement between France and Siam using the watershed principle to define the border, but a later French map placed the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia. The ICJ ultimately ruled in Cambodia’s favour. Tensions over the disputed region have occasionally escalated, most notably in 2008 and 2011 following armed skirmishes between Cambodian and Thai troops.

Tensions again reignited on 24 July 2025, with violence erupting along multiple border sectors. The two sides exchanged artillery, rocket fire, heavy weaponry, and airstrikes. Overall, the conflict displaced over 300,000 civilians across Thailand and Cambodia. Many villages, schools, and civilian buildings were damaged. On 28 July, both sides agreed to a ceasefire following Malaysia-mediated peace talks with added pressure from the US and China.

The US-brokered Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord was signed by both sides in October. Under the agreement, both sides committed to refrain from the threat or use of force, and to settle disputes peacefully under international law, withdraw heavy weapons from border zones, establish a monitoring mechanism, and demine and clear unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Further clashes are highly likely over the coming days. While the conflict has largely been confined to the border areas, the accusations of civilian targeting on each side, as well as accusations of the use of “toxic gas”, almost certainly heighten the risk of towns and cities further from the border being targeted. Furthermore, accusations of civilian targeting may result in tit-for-tat measures, such as the deliberate targeting of hospitals.

US President Donald Trump has declared that he will “make a phone call” to stop the clashes. It is highly likely that he will threaten further tariffs, which would almost certainly impact the economies of both countries and could act as a diplomatic off-ramp to engage in negotiations. There is a realistic possibility that protests will take place in Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Martial law may be imposed if tensions continue to escalate.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The elections are likely to cause protests in Honduras in the short term. This is due to the extreme polarisation of the Honduran political system. In the lead-up to the vote, several main parties have levied accusations of fraud and warned of foreign interference. The Attorney General has alleged that the opposition will attempt to manipulate the results, releasing, in late October, an audio recording that seems to suggest an agreement between National Party officials and senior military figures to claim victory before the official vote count is complete. Military leaders have also demanded to run a “parallel” vote count, which has almost certainly increased fears of institutional interference.

Previous elections have also resulted in widespread protests. In 2017, the vote led to almost a month of violent street clashes, curfews, mass arrests and almost 40 deaths after the opposition claimed there was widespread election fraud. In 2009, following the military ousting of President Manuel Zelaya, large-scale mobilisations paralysed parts of Tegucigalpa and other cities for weeks.​

Protests are likely to begin shortly after the vote count is completed and the results are announced. However, if any of the participating parties claim an “early” victory, this would highly likely increase the risk of large-scale unrest in the immediate term. Protests following the elections are likely to take place near government buildings and party offices. Large-scale unrest often coincides with road blockades on key highways, leading to severe traffic disruptions.

Honduras currently implements a “state of emergency”. It was issued in 2022 and is based on the “Mano Dura” anti-crime approach adopted by El Salvador. The state of emergency grants police significant powers to stop, search, and detain civilians. While aimed at combating organised crime, the state of emergency almost certainly increases the threat of a violent police response to all forms of unrest.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Guinea-Bissau has grappled with chronic instability since achieving independence from Portugal in 1973, marked by repeated coups and ongoing political power struggles. The country has experienced at least 10 successful or attempted coups, making it one of the most coup-prone countries in Africa.

Political instability has increased following the postponement of the elections, with the opposition regarding Embaló as an illegitimate president, claiming that his mandate expired on 27 February 2025. The two main opposition parties had been largely excluded from the elections, including the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which led Guinea-Bissau’s fight for independence.

The arrest of Embaló is highly likely indicative of a falling out between the presidency and the military, which is likely due to Embaló’s attempts to centralise authority and reshape the country’s security services while marginalising his political opponents. This apparent coup attempt marks the second in recent months, coming not long after another alleged coup attempt took place on 31 October, resulting in the arrests of several senior army officers. It is highly likely that the military, which holds considerable political power in Guinea-Bissau, used Dias’ claim to victory as a pretext to conduct the arrest.

Former Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira has accused Embaló of simulating a coup so he could initiate a crackdown on the opposition. Dias’ claim of victory in the presidential election has highly likely provided Embaló with a pretext to portray him as attempting to forcefully take power. If simulated, Embaló will highly likely exploit the situation to arrest Dias and other opposition members.

Continued political instability is highly likely in the coming weeks. In the immediate days, the military will highly likely occupy key sites, including government buildings, media outlets, airports and border crossings, and critical infrastructure. It is highly likely that they will close the country’s borders and airspace, impose a curfew, and/or impose internet blocks while they attempt to re-establish order. Increased military checkpoints are highly likely on major routes and in the vicinity of government buildings and airports.

There will almost certainly be a heavy security presence in Bissau and other major cities in Guinea-Bissau over the coming days. The arrest of the Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces indicates that military factionalism is highly likely. Security forces will likely conduct further arrests of high-ranking individuals in the government and opposing factions within the military. There is a realistic possibility that military factions opposed to the army chief of staff will engage in armed resistance. A failed coup attempt in 1998, led by a dissident general, triggered a year-long civil war.

The apparent coup will almost certainly be perceived as exacerbating Guinea-Bissau’s political instability, and there is a realistic possibility that civil unrest breaks out in the coming weeks. After an alleged coup attempt in 2023 and the subsequent dissolution of parliament by Embaló, small-scale protests took place near the parliament building, with several people burning tyres. Guinea-Bissau’s security forces typically respond forcefully to protests, and the expected heavy security presence across the capital in the coming days will likely dissuade many from demonstrating. However, given the high tensions in the country following the dual victory claims, there is a realistic possibility that many will engage in rival protests.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Violent civil unrest has increased significantly across Bangladesh in the aftermath of the July Revolution. Cases of large-scale mob violence, often led by local student political groups, have repeatedly coincided with important anniversaries of domestic and international events. Violence between opposing political parties, or even opposing factions within parties, is the most frequently reported. However, post-revolution violence has also disproportionately targeted local religious and ethnic minorities.

The ongoing unrest is highly likely to continue until the verdict is announced on 17 November and will highly likely continue in the immediate aftermath. The unrest will highly likely take the form of clashes between AL and other parties’ supporters – particularly those of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) – and between AL supporters and police. Opportunistic attacks on minority places of worship and other institutions remain likely during the unrest, as demonstrated by the recent firebombings on Catholic sites.

Focal points for protests will likely include universities, main public squares in large cities, and the vicinity of party headquarters. Protests in Bangladesh often coincide with road blockades, with protesters erecting improvised barricades and often attacking transiting vehicles. There is a realistic possibility of unrest near airports, which could cause flight delays or cancellations.

Bangladeshi police will likely respond to all unrest with violent crowd control methods. These include tear gas, baton charges, water cannons, and, in some cases, live ammunition. There is a realistic possibility that police actions will escalate unrest.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The attack comes a day after a vehicle explosion killed at least eight people near the Red Fort landmark in Delhi, India, although there is so far no evidence linking the two events.

Suicide bombings in Islamabad have been less common in recent years relative to other Pakistani urban centres. The city is Pakistan’s most securitised urban space, containing security checkpoints and fortified zones to prevent such attacks.

There is no official confirmation of the perpetrator’s affiliation. Pakistani media has accused “Fitna al-Khawarij”, a term often applied to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which primarily operates in regions next to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The group has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Pakistan’s major cities, including a 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, a 2017 suicide bombing in Lahore, and a 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Karachi. The group has previously targeted Islamabad, attempting a suicide bombing in Islamabad’s government district in December 2022. In August 2025, Pakistan’s intelligence agency announced that it foiled a planned TTP suicide car bombing. Early assessment suggests that the TTP are the most likely perpetrators of the Islamabad District Judicial Court bombing, although there are multiple other terrorist threat actors present in Pakistan.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has also claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the country. PBIEDs are often used by the group; however, most of ISKP’s attacks have taken place in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the group has not previously targeted Islamabad. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is also active in Balochistan, with typical targets including Pakistani security forces, infrastructure projects, and government installations in the Balochistan region.

The attack comes amid heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamabad has frequently accused the Afghan Taliban-led government of allowing TTP militants safe havens across the border, from which attacks are launched into Pakistan. Recent tensions escalated into airstrikes conducted by Pakistan on TTP targets in Kabul on 15 October, following TTP raids on Pakistani military posts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that killed 11 on 11 October.

If confirmed to be TTP, already high tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan will highly likely further increase. There is a realistic possibility that Pakistan will conduct further cross-border strikes into Afghanistan targeting TTP hideouts. Additionally, Islamabad may suspend ongoing diplomatic engagement, fully close partially open border crossings, and/or impose further travel restrictions on Afghan nationals.

Islamabad has also frequently blamed New Delhi for supporting the TTP as a proxy to destabilise Pakistan, and Pakistani media have accused the perpetrators of the attack of being “India-backed”. There is a realistic possibility that protests will occur close to the High Commission of India in Islamabad, although demonstrations are generally restricted inside the diplomatic zone and are likely to be met with a heavy security presence.

A heightened security presence across major cities in Pakistan is highly likely, with increased security checkpoints and road closures. Heightened security will highly likely lead to increased travel disruptions in the short term. Intensified security operations in the border regions, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and/or Balochistan, are highly likely.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Red Fort, also known as the Lal Qila, is a Mughal-era fort located in the old city and is a popular tourist destination with heavy foot traffic. The location of the blast in the area and near a traffic hub likely suggests that, if the explosion is terrorism-related, its perpetrators sought to maximise civilian casualties while also obtaining maximum visibility for their actions.

While a possible terrorist link has not been confirmed by authorities as of the time of reporting, the incident occurred only hours after two separate terror plots were reportedly thwarted by Indian authorities. On the night of 9-10 November, Indian police reported the arrest of seven individuals in Faridabad, part of the Delhi National Capital Region, who were reportedly found in possession of approximately 360 kilograms of explosive material and a “large cache of arms and ammunition”. Authorities reported that the suspects were linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a separatist-Islamist group based in Kashmir.

On 9 November, three individuals were arrested in Gujarat and found in possession of several firearms and approximately 4 kilograms of ricin precursors. Indian authorities have suggested that they had had links with an Afghanistan-based operative of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). In late October, Indian authorities had already arrested two suspected ISKP-linked operatives for planning attacks in New Delhi on Diwali.

If the Red Fort blast is confirmed as terrorism, there is a realistic possibility that the attack is linked to the reported foiled plots, with the perpetrators seeking to quickly conduct an attack due to the increased threat of discovery. Moreover, confirmation of an act of terrorism, particularly if linked to JeM, would highly likely increase tensions between India and Pakistan.

Transport disruptions are highly likely following the blast, with potential closures to the metro and likely road closures in the area. Furthermore, there is highly likely to be a heightened security presence in Delhi and other major cities, with increased checkpoints.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

While the organisers of the march to Novi Sad have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to peaceful protest, the possibility of political violence on 31 October and 1 November cannot be ruled out. The past twelve months of anti-government protests have significantly deepened divisions in Serbia’s political landscape, and there have been repeated cases of targeted attacks against anti-government protesters during past demonstrations. Moreover, the anniversary falls only days after a shooting occurred outside the Serbian parliament, in an area where supporters of the president had erected an improvised “encampment”. The shooting injured one, and Vučić described it as a “terrorist attack”.

Should the protests turn violent, Serbian police are likely to use heavy-handed crowd control measures such as pepper spray, tear gas, stun grenades and water cannons. These tactics have previously intensified unrest, with their use during past demonstrations often provoking larger turnouts, escalating clashes, and fuelling public anger over perceived police brutality.

While the main rallying point for the demonstrators will be the vicinity of the Novi Sad train station, the protests are likely to create disruptions throughout the city’s centre. In past demonstrations, protesters blocked the city’s main bridges over the Danube, as well as the main roadways leading to and from the city. Even in the absence of violent unrest, the protests are likely to result in traffic disruptions in and around Novi Sad.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Tanzania’s ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has held power since the country’s independence in 1961, initially through its predecessor party, Tanzania Mainland (TANU). Since the 2015 election, which resulted in CCM achieving its smallest vote share of 58 per cent, the government has become increasingly authoritarian. Under incumbent president Samia Suluhu Hassan, the government has cracked down on opposition, civil society, and journalists.

The main opposition party, The Party for Democracy and Progress (CHADEMA), was barred from running in April 2025, with its leader, Tundu Lissu, arrested and charged with treason in response to pro-democracy protests. Luhaga Mpina, the presidential candidate for Alliance for Change and Transparency – Wazalendo (ACT-Wazalendo), was also disqualified from entering the race due to alleged procedural issues within the party’s nomination process.

The general election is widely perceived as cementing the continuation of CCM’s rule, with the party standing effectively unchallenged. Post-2015 elections have been characterised by observers as containing systematic fraud, intimidation, and obstruction. Electoral results have heavily favoured the government, with CCM securing 98.7 per cent of the vote share in the 2020 parliamentary elections and 99.3 per cent in the November 2024 local government elections. The ongoing general elections will highly likely result in the government achieving similarly high numbers to recent elections.

Tanzania has historically responded harshly to civil unrest. Following the 2020 elections, protests against government corruption erupted in Zanzibar. Security forces responded forcefully, with reports of soldiers, police, and a militia linked to the CCM beating civilians and using live ammunition against demonstrators, killing nine. Thousands also demonstrated in January 2024 to demand constitutional changes to reform the electoral commission and reduce presidential powers.

Authorities will highly likely enforce the curfew severely in an attempt to prevent the protests from gaining traction. If the protests continue, the authorities will highly likely respond with crackdowns including mass arrests, tear gas, water cannon, and potentially live ammunition. Internet shutdowns are almost certainly being imposed to prevent the spread of anti-government sentiment, particularly among the youth, with large-scale ‘Gen Z’ protests leading to the ousting of governments in Nepal and Madagascar in recent months.

There is a realistic possibility that major protests will spread beyond Dar es Salaam and become widespread across Tanzania’s urban centres, including Dodoma and Zanzibar, where military personnel have reportedly been deployed. If civil unrest escalates, airport disruptions are likely, with airlines potentially cancelling flights and roadblocks preventing access to major airports.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Protests are highly likely to intensify across major cities and Bakary strongholds, such as Douala, Yaoundé, and Dschang, and could spread nationwide. A significant portion of the population almost certainly believes the vote count was manipulated and is highly likely to mobilise in support of Bakary. The violent confrontations that occurred on 15, 21, and 26 October indicate that demonstrations could rapidly turn violent. The perception that security forces have been stationed outside Bakary’s residence is likely to reinforce public anger and the potential for escalation.

Biya’s government has become increasingly repressive in recent years. Starting in 2016, harsh measures have been imposed on the Anglophone communities in the Northwestern and Southwestern regions, which comprise approximately 15 to 20 per cent of the population. At least 3,000 people have been killed and nearly 700,000 people displaced in the violence. The government has also cracked down on civil society, arresting and intimidating journalists and opposition figures, preventing criticism of the government, and denying permission for gatherings.

Cameroon’s population has struggled with unemployment and a rising cost of living. Cameroon’s young population remains politically disenfranchised, with many viewing the government as deeply corrupt under President Paul Biya, who has ruled since 1982. Bakary declaring victory will highly likely be perceived as a potential catalyst for widespread civil unrest, which could unseat the current government, almost certainly inspired by recent demonstrations in Nepal and Madagascar.

The 2018 election resulted in protests across the country led by opposition figure Maurice Kamto, which the government responded to with a heavy crackdown and excessive force against demonstrators. Security forces have demonstrated similar patterns in response to recent demonstrations, and anti-government demonstrations will almost certainly be met with severe crackdowns, with security forces highly likely to use live ammunition, crowd-dispersal measures such as tear gas and water cannon, internet blackouts, and mass arrests.

If civil unrest escalates, airport disruptions are likely, with airlines potentially cancelling flights and roadblocks preventing access to major airports. Curfews could also be imposed, further disrupting transportation.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Hurricane Melissa is the 13th named storm of 2025’s Atlantic hurricane season (June to November), with the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration having previously predicted an above-normal season with between 13 to 18 named storms and three to five major hurricanes.

Hurricane Melissa is the third Category 5 Atlantic hurricane of the season. However, unlike the other Category 5 hurricanes, Erin and Humberto, which reached such intensities further east over the Atlantic, Melissa is forecast to directly make landfall in Jamaica and then Cuba and will likely have a far more severe level of impact. Moreover, the hurricane is currently moving at only eight kilometres per hour, considered very slow, which, if sustained, will likely exacerbate the impact of the storm.

A country’s disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, remains the most critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. Jamaica is assessed by GDACS as having Medium vulnerability. While mandatory evacuation orders have been issued for at-risk areas, officials have indicated that uptake has not been high enough and are reportedly considering enforcement of the orders. Hurricane Beryl in the summer of 2024 led to at least four deaths in Jamaica and USD 204 million in damages. Melissa will almost certainly have a higher level of impact, with the potential to be the worst hurricane to have ever hit Jamaica.

In Cuba, Melissa is forecast to make landfall at either Category 3 or 4 strength late 28 October or early 29 October local time, with the city of Santiago de Cuba highly likely to be heavily impacted. Cuba has already over the past year been heavily impacted by a series of nationwide power blackouts, leading to rare instances of civil unrest, with these issues with the nation’s energy infrastructure almost certain to be exacerbated by Hurricane Melissa. After Cuba, Melissa is anticipated to impact both the eastern Bahamas and the Turks & Caicos Islands on late 29 October, likely at a reduced strength of Category 2 or 3. The hurricane is not anticipated to have a major impact on the eastern seaboard of the United States.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Despite President Jerí announcing that the death of the protester would be “objectively investigated” and that they would face the “full force of the law”, the killing of Ruiz has almost certainly deepened anti-government sentiment and inflamed protests. This has been further exacerbated by President Jerí’s refusal to step down amid escalating pressure from Peru’s parliament.

The state of emergency will likely be imposed to quell civil unrest over the weekend. Previous bouts of civil unrest in the country, such as the December 2022 to March 2023 demonstrations against the removal of Former President Pedro Castillo from office, have led to the government imposing similar states of emergency.

Under the expanded powers, the government will highly likely deploy military forces, impose curfews, and conduct mass arrests. The state of emergency imposed in 2022 failed to deal with the civil unrest, instead resulting in alleged human rights abuses, such as the use of live ammunition against protesters and forced disappearances; protests continued for months, inflamed by the perceived excessive force used by security forces.

It is likely that a state of emergency resulting in harsher measures by security forces will exacerbate protests. Demonstrations are highly likely over the weekend and into next week.