On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 10 March.

As of 10 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

Saudi Arabia’s Defence Ministry stated that it intercepted a ballistic missile headed for the Eastern Province late 9 March and destroyed multiple attack drones near Al Kharj and the Shaybah oil field. On 10 March, authorities said another attack drone was destroyed east of Al Kharj; two more were intercepted in the Eastern Province, and nine attack drones heading toward Shaybah were intercepted over Eastern Province. Saudi authorities also said a drone fell in a residential area in Al-Zulfi governorate on 10 March, causing some damage but with no injuries confirmed as of yet. The frequency of Iranian attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia is highly likely increasing, in comparison to the earlier phases of the conflict when Saudi Arabia was targeted significantly less than other countries in the Arabian Peninsula.

There have been at least two deaths and 12 injuries from Iranian strikes in Saudi Arabia as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March 2026.

As of 10 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports. Air France on 9 March extended its suspension of flights to and from Riyadh through 13 March.

On 10 March, Kuwait’s air defence systems intercepted incoming ballistic missiles and attack drones. Air raid sirens also sounded overnight 9-10 March, with air defences intercepting two ballistic missiles and six attack drones, which were reportedly aimed at the country’s northern and southern areas. Air defences had previously intercepted 14 ballistic missiles and four attack drones earlier on 9 March. Additionally, on 9 March, Jordan’s Prime Minister Jafar Hassan and Kuwait’s Prime Minister Ahmad Abdullah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah held a phone call, during which they reportedly exchanged views on the regional conflict, reiterated a firm rejection of the Iranian attacks, and stressed that stronger diplomatic engagement is needed to calm tensions.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Early 10 March, explosions were heard over Bahrain as air raid sirens sounded. According to the Ministry of Interior, the fire that broke out at the Bapco oil refinery in Al-Mu’amirah, south of Manama has been brought under control, with limited material damage and no loss of life. Overnight 9-10 March, one person was killed and eight injured in an Iranian attack drone strike on a residential building in Manama. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed that a fire was burning at Bahrain’s Isa Air Base which hosts US troops, following the overnight attacks.

At least one person has been killed, and 40 have been injured in Bahrain, as of  09:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

On 10 March, multiple explosions were heard in Qatar, with the Ministry of Defence announcing that Qatar had been subjected to a “missile attack”. Qatar’s Interior Ministry issued an emergency alert calling on citizens to stay indoors and away from windows due to the high security threat level.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that they will operate limited flights from Doha Airport (DOH), with services to 15 destinations confirmed for 11 March. Aircraft depart with their transponders switched off as a safety precaution and may not appear on flight tracking platforms.

Emirati authorities stated that its air defences responded to a missile threat on 10 March, with the Defence Ministry saying sounds heard across the UAE were caused by the interception of missiles and drones. Civil aviation authorities have announced a complete ban on all drones and light sports aircraft, including suspended permits for drones, gliders, paragliders and sports aircraft. A drone strike on 10 March at the UAE’s state-run ADNOC’s Ruwais refinery resulted in a fire, leading to the closure of the facility. Iranian strikes against oil and gas infrastructure have likely escalated in retaliation for Israeli strikes against Iranian oil infrastructure.

At least six people have been killed and 122 injured as of 12:00 UTC on 10 March.

As of 10 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. On 9 March, the airline Air France extended the suspension of flights running from Dubai until 13 March to the ongoing security situation.

Oman played a crucial role as a mediator in the negotiations between the US and Iran prior to the current conflict. Almost certainly reflective of this mediating role, Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi stated on 9 March that “[b]oth regional and US interests will truly be served by a ceasefire now and a return to diplomacy as soon as possible”. Moreover, Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq congratulated Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, on his appointment on 9 March.

At least one person has been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 9 March.

As of 9 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 8 March, Saudi officials stated that two people died and twelve were injured after an unspecified “military projectile” fell in a residential location in Al-Kharj governorate. This is the first confirmed attack resulting in casualties in Saudi Arabia. Earlier, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had stated that they targeted radar installations in Al-Kharj. The Prince Sultan Air Base is located approximately 20km southeast of Al-Kharj and is regularly used by US forces.

As of 9 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

On 9 March, Iran’s IRGC stated that its navy targeted Al-Adiri helicopter airbase with attack drones and cruise missiles. The IRGC claims to have destroyed the base’s fuel and gas tanks, US helicopter ramps, and logistics and support facilities. Overnight 8-9 March, the Kuwait Defence Ministry stated that air defences were activated in response to the missile and drone threat.

The Kuwait Electricity Ministry stated that a small fire in one fuel tank was extinguished after breaking out at Subiya Power and Water Distillation Plant; drone fragments were discovered at the fire’s origin. Another fire was recorded at Shuwaikh Power and Water Distillation Station on 9 March. The two facilities are located on opposite sides of Kuwait Bay. The plants are critical in supplying both electricity and desalinated water to Kuwait’s population and industry. The Kuwaiti military stated that three ballistic missiles were shot down in total on 8 March.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Air raid sirens sounded in Bahrain on 9 March, with the public urged to seek shelter. A fire was reported at the Bapco oil refinery in Al-Mu’amirah, south of Manama, after Iranian strikes. No casualties were reported; however, Bapco Energies declared force majeure on the group’s operations.

Overnight 8-9 March, at least 32 people were injured (four in critical condition) in the Sitra area south of Manama, following an alleged drone strike on a residential area. All those injured were Bahraini citizens. Contrary to initial reports, unverified footage shared on social media potentially indicates an interceptor missile mistakenly striking the area. The exact cause of the injuries remains unconfirmed.

At least one person has been killed, and 40 have been injured in Bahrain, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

On 9 March, Qatar’s military stated that it intercepted 17 ballistic missiles and six attack drones in the latest Iranian attack. Qatar’s Ministry of Defence also stated that its air defences intercepted a “missile attack” overnight, without specifying the number of missiles. Local media reported that explosions, likely from missile interceptions, were heard in Doha.

On 9 March, the Qatari Ministry of Interior stated that the General Directorate of Criminal Investigations had arrested over 300 individuals of various nationalities in connection with the filming, dissemination, and publication of misleading information. The arrests are highly likely associated with the filming of Iranian missile and drone attacks.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that they will operate limited flights from Doha Airport (DOH), with services to airports including Seoul (ICN), London Heathrow (LHR), Delhi (DEL), Madrid (MAD), Islamabad (ISB), and Beijing (PKX) scheduled on 9 and 10 March. Aircraft depart with their transponders switched off as a safety precaution and may not appear on flight tracking platforms.

On 9 March, the UAE Ministry of Defence stated that two soldiers had died after a helicopter suffered a technical malfunction and crashed at an undisclosed location.

On 9 March, UAE officials stated that they had detected 15 ballistic missiles and 18 drones. UAE air defences intercepted 15 missiles, with three falling into the sea, and 17 drones, the last falling in the country’s territory. At least two people were injured in Abu Dhabi in two separate incidents caused by falling debris following successful interceptions. Authorities also reported that falling debris caused a fire in Fujairah near oil sector infrastructure.

At least four people have been killed and 112 injured as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is increasingly being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

At least one person has been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

Our team will be on hand throughout the event to share how Solace supports organisations with travel risk management, secure journey planning, and operational oversight in complex environments.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Iran’s shift to the targeting of critical infrastructure and other civilian profile targets is likely reflective of an attempt to increase economic disruption across the Gulf, pressure regional governments that host US military bases and support operations, and demonstrate Iran’s capacity to impose widespread costs across the region despite being under sustained pressure from US and Israeli joint strikes. Iran may have also calculated that attacks of this magnitude may undermine the long-term presence of the US military in the Middle East by increasing the political and security costs for host nations and raising domestic pressure within Gulf states to distance themselves from US military operations.

Iran is also likely attempting to pressure Washington and Tel Aviv by provoking international condemnation and economic pressures on a global scale. Attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, followed by the suspension of operations at these sites, combined with a de facto Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, will almost certainly trigger economic shocks and volatility in global energy markets, as well as disruptions to maritime trade and energy supply chains. This strategy is likely to increase international pressure and could help to isolate Washington.

Before the US and Israeli offensive operations in Iran, the US conducted hundreds of cargo flights to the region to enhance its force posture and defensive capabilities. This involved the rapid deployment and reallocation of air defence systems and munitions to the Gulf. Large-scale and layered Iranian ballistic missile and UAV attacks have largely been contained by regional air defence systems, although casualties and damage have resulted from interceptions. Moreover, joint strikes and high rates of expenditure have rapidly degraded Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, resulting in marked decreases in the volume of missiles it is firing in just a matter of days.

However, Iran was assessed to have 2000-2500 ballistic missiles before the start of the war, and as many as 100,000 long-range attack UAVs. Iran will likely be able to sustain long-range attacks across the Gulf for weeks, even if its ballistic missile capabilities are completely destroyed or exhausted. Previous Iranian attacks have likely probed for weaknesses and vulnerabilities in regional air defence systems, which could be exploited in future attacks. Moreover, the expenditure rates of regional air defence munitions have been extremely high and in many cases, very cost-ineffective, with expensive interceptor missiles used to counter low-cost UAVs and relatively-low cost missile systems.

Iran’s initial tactics may have been to force the Gulf States into rapidly expending large volumes of air defence interceptors to degrade regional air defence capacity. If the Gulf States run critically low on interceptors, Iran will likely exploit this by targeting the affected countries with increased attacks, especially with low-cost UAVs, as its ballistic missile capabilities are either spent or held in reserve. This would likely place Iran in a position to maintain small-scale attacks against the Gulf, with increased penetration rates and sustained economic disruption.

Kuwait, which lies just dozens of kilometres from mainland Iran and borders southern Iraq, is likely the most vulnerable to Iranian attacks, and hosts several US bases. Projectiles can be launched from Iran within close range of Kuwait, providing limited reaction and interception time. Furthermore, Iranian-backed Shia militia groups are highly active in southern Iraq and maintain a large arsenal of rocket, drone, and missile capabilities. However, other Gulf States, especially the UAE, are likely to present more strategically attractive targets for Iran due to their concentration of high-value economic infrastructure and scale of US investment. This has likely been reflected by the number of missiles and UAVs that have been launched against the UAE, which remains the most targeted country in the Gulf. Dubai is located approximately 150 kilometres from Iran, where UAVs can be launched and approach targets, using slow and low-altitude flight profiles, which will likely complicate detection, positive identification and interception and provide air defences with limited time to react.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Current US and Israeli military operations mark a significant escalation from Operation Midnight Hammer, which involved preliminary strikes on Iranian conventional military capabilities to enable a US bombing run on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the scale of the US’s current force posture and forward positioning of military assets is the largest buildup in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

US and Israeli strikes follow three rounds of talks between the US and Iran aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear programme and preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, as well as imposing limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Despite diplomatic engagement, Washington likely assessed that Tehran’s commitment to talks and a potential new nuclear deal lacked credibility. Iran failed to commit to any substantive concessions, maintained its own red lines, and was likely using the negotiation process to delay, test US resolve and potentially to buy time to prepare for conflict. As further negotiations had been scheduled in Vienna for 2 March, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian senior leadership assessed the risk of imminent military action was temporarily reduced, relaxed operational security and provided the US and Israel with a rare window of opportunity to target senior regime figures.

Iran had likely expected limited strikes aimed at coercing substantive nuclear concessions as part of a broader pressure strategy tied to the ongoing negotiations, rather than an immediate transition from aggressive military posturing to large-scale and sustained strikes. However, Iranian officials had previously warned that even “limited strikes” would be met with a significant response. The scale, duration and depth of US-Israeli combined strikes and the immediate decapitation of Iranian senior leadership likely exceeded Tehran’s expectations, resulting in a significant escalation in Iran’s retaliatory strategy.

Iran’s current strategy is likely aimed not only at striking Israel and US military forces but also at generating widespread economic disruption, undermining US regional security guarantees and restoring deterrence by positioning itself as a resilient power capable of inflicting widespread damage and costs despite suffering major losses, evidenced by its attacks on Arab nations and attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s objective is likely to drag the US into a prolonged and costly war that drains US resources, provokes domestic and international condemnation, disrupts global energy supply and strains US relations with regional partners. Tehran has also likely calculated that if the US only commits to a military campaign defined by the use of stand-off capabilities like air and naval power, it remains unlikely that the current operations will be able to dislodge the regime. For this objective to be achieved, the US will likely need to deploy ground forces unless the regime is toppled by internal unrest. However, a ground invasion will likely require congressional approval and would likely be detrimental to the Trump administration, which has condemned previous administrations for protracted and costly wars.

Joint US-Israeli strikes have almost certainly been calibrated to degrade Iranian command and control (C2) structures, integrated air defence systems, long-range strike capabilities and Iranian intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In the opening stages of the conflict, strikes will likely prioritise high-value targets (HVTs), including Iranian senior leadership, to disrupt national‑level decision‑making and Iran’s ability to coordinate a sustained and coherent military response.

Conventional military HVTs will include systems such as Iranian radars, combat air power and air defences to achieve complete air superiority as quickly as possible, as well as Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, including transporter erector launchers (TELs), missile stockpiles, production sites, logistic networks and other supportive elements. Iran was estimated to have approximately 2,000-2,500 ballistic missiles remaining in its inventory before the start of the current conflict, and approximately 200 TELs, Iran’s primary delivery system for ballistic missiles, which constitute the greatest threat to Israel, US bases, critical infrastructure and civilian populations in the region.

Initial estimates suggest that joint strikes have rapidly degraded Iran’s TELs and missile stockpiles. However, TELs are highly mobile systems, and it is unlikely that all of Iran’s TELs will be destroyed in the opening stages. With some TELs remaining operational and Iran still likely capable of manufacturing some ballistic missiles under conflict conditions, it is unlikely that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities will be completely neutralised in the immediate term, despite high rates of degradation and interceptions. Smaller, less concentrated and less frequent Iranian ballistic missile attacks are likely to continue in the near term.

In addition to its ballistic missile capabilities, Iran was estimated to possess an arsenal of 80,000 operational one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs). These combined capabilities will likely enable Iran to target Israel, US military installations, economic interests, civilian centres and critical infrastructure, including oil and gas infrastructure, ports, and airports, especially in the Gulf States, that remain in range of even Iran’s shortest range ballistic missile systems, which constitute the largest proportion of Iran’s ballistic arsenal.

Failure to rapidly degrade Iran’s ballistic missile threat will almost certainly place enormous strain on regional air defence systems, with hundreds of expensive Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile interceptors already being expended to counter sustained Iranian ballistic missile salvos and also used to intercept low-cost UAVs. Iran’s ballistic missile salvos have decreased in volume, which is likely reflective of launcher attrition, stockpile conservation and Iranian dispersal tactics. However, even lower-volume salvos, especially when layered with UAVs and designed to exploit air defence vulnerabilities or gaps in coverage, can pose a credible threat, especially to the Gulf States, which are rapidly exhausting interceptor stocks and are located much closer to Iran, providing significantly reduced warning times and compressed engagement windows for air defence systems.

In addition to Iran’s long-range strike capabilities, Tehran may increasingly resort to asymmetric tactics to project strength, reach and resolve if the war is sustained for weeks, particularly if its ballistic missile and long-range strike capabilities are significantly degraded by sustained US and Israeli operations. Such tactics could include proxy attacks by Iran-aligned groups across the region, IRGC-backed terrorism against Israeli and Western diplomatic missions or the international Jewish community, and cyber operations targeting financial systems and critical infrastructure.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Iranian retaliation strikes against US military facilities across the region are a major escalation in comparison to Iranian retaliatory actions during the June 2025 12-Day War. The Iranian ballistic strikes against Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, Qatar, following US intervention in June 2025, were highly likely intended to be subthreshold for further escalation while maintaining deterrence. In contrast, these strikes were likely intended by Tehran to cause maximum damage against US military interests and fulfil the repeatedly stated threat that Iran would do such strikes in retaliation for US-Israeli strikes.

Early indications are that the interception rates have been very high, with the US having engaged in a significant buildup of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot anti-ballistic missile air defence systems over the past month. However, early reports indicate that air defences were penetrated by Iranian projectiles at the headquarters of US Navy’s 5th Fleet in Manama, Bahrain. This highlights that even with comprehensive air defence coverage, large-scale Iranian strikes are capable of saturating advanced air defence systems, leading to penetration.

Moreover, the use of ballistic missiles presents a significant risk of collateral impact, particularly from falling debris outside intended target areas, as highlighted by the death of one civilian in Abu Dhabi from debris. Emergency services are also likely to be operating at increased capacity, which may result in longer response times and reduced availability for non-critical incidents.

Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term and will highly likely prioritise the targeting of US military installations. However, there is a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, airspace closures, flight diversions, airport disruption, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region. Civilian infrastructure in proximity to military facilities is at risk of incidental targeting.

Over the coming days, Iran’s capability to conduct mass large-scale ballistic missile launches capable of penetrating advanced air defences could notably reduce. Iran’s ballistic missile Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) are almost certainly high-value targets for joint US-Israel operations, and their use reduces their concealability. However, airspace closures and disruptions are highly likely to be protracted, and shelter-in-place orders are highly likely to remain in place while Iranian retaliation strikes continue.

If the regime is threatened existentially, Tehran is likely to escalate even further. A currently less likely but most dangerous course of action for Tehran would be to fulfil previously issued threats to launch attacks at US economic interests in the region, particularly oil and gas infrastructure. Furthermore, the Iranian naval forces could attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint for the transportation of oil. Finally, Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Yemen could launch their own attacks against US military bases or economic interests in the Arabian Peninsula. Shia militias in Iraq have the capability to conduct attacks into Kuwait, and the Houthis in Yemen are capable of launching missile and long-range drone attacks across the peninsula, in addition to resuming attacks against merchant vessels.

As of 0810 UTC 28 February, there are reports of Iranian kinetic retaliation being initiated, with Iranian missile launches detected by the IDF. An Iranian official told international media that Iran is preparing for retaliation and that the response is set to be “crushing”.  

In Israel, authorities have enacted a “special and permanent state of emergency” and closed the country’s airspace, with Home Front Command / the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issuing guidance including advising citizens to stay near protected shelters and minimise travel, and announcing the closure of schools, workplaces, and public gatherings. Sirens sounded across Israel at approximately 08:15 Israel local time (06:15 UTC), warning of a possible impending missile attack. The Israeli government has suspended civilian flights to and from the country in the wake of the attack on Iran.

Diplomatic missions have issued advisories for countries across the Middle East. The US has issued shelter-in-place advisories in Israel, Qatar, and Bahrain. 

The air and maritime disruption is immediate and almost certain to expand. Authorities are confirmed to have closed the entirety of the airspace in Israel, Iran and Iraq. Flight tracking websites confirm that this has already resulted in major region-wide flight diversions, cancellations, and delays.  

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The strikes almost certainly significantly elevate the risk profile of the entire Middle East. Given the early indications of the significant scale of the attack, major Iranian retaliation is highly likely. 

In the immediate term, further airspace closures are highly likely, which will almost certainly further impact air travel and, in some cases, reduce options for evacuation via commercial airlines. Further revisions to government travel advisories are highly likely, and any evacuation of non-essential embassy personnel would likely reduce consular capacity and complicate support to nationals remaining in-country. 

The region-wide risk of terrorist attacks, kidnappings, and civil unrest, including the staging of protests targeting US and Israeli businesses and diplomatic missions, has now likely increased.  

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The recent escalation comes after Pakistani strikes on alleged Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) camps and hideouts located in Nangarhar and Paktika provinces on 22 February. These strikes followed a series of high-profile terror attacks and increased militancy in Pakistan, particularly from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad has long accused the Afghan Taliban of sponsoring or failing to restrain.

The strikes also follow the 6 February mass casualty attack on a Shia Mosque in Islamabad, which was claimed by Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP), which largely derives from Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional branch of IS operating primarily in Afghanistan and parts of western Pakistan.

This escalation marks the first time that Pakistani forces have directly targeted Taliban installations in Kabul. Previous Pakistani strikes in Afghanistan have targeted militant camps and have generally been subthreshold to avoid all out conflict. This almost certainly marks the most significant escalation since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021.

Pakistan’s armed forces significantly outmatch Afghanistan’s, with roughly 660,000 personnel and extensive materiel, including at least 465 combat aircraft, around 6,000 armoured vehicles, and approximately 4,600 artillery systems. Afghanistan, on the other hand, has approximately 172,000 troops and no functioning air force excluding drones.

A prolonged conflict is highly likely undesirable to both sides. Pakistan has multiple ongoing insurgencies, and a conflict would significantly increase the probability of exacerbating the militant threat, with the TTP highly likely to increase its attack volume against security personnel and civilians in Pakistan in the short-to-medium term. Furthermore, sustained clashes risk significantly disrupting Pakistan’s economy, increasing pressure on an already unpopular government.

For Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military advantage means it can almost certainly impose disproportionate physical and political costs on Afghanistan, including targeting Taliban officials and important military sites. Furthermore, a conflict would almost certainly undermine the Taliban’s attempts to improve external relations and reduce its isolation on the international stage, which has been a primary goal of the Kabul-based Taliban faction.

The Taliban potentially being open to talks almost certainly provides an offramp to Pakistan to de-escalate. However, both governments are likely to face significant internal pressure from their civilian populations to not be perceived as backing down, which risk further escalating the conflict. There is a large degree of disinformation from both countries’ media outlets, as well as on social media, which is highly likely to exacerbate nationalist sentiment. Should the governments be perceived as backing down, protests in major population centres are likely.

If clashes continue to escalate, the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments are highly likely to further restrict border crossings and impose airspace restrictions. The risk of terror attacks in major Pakistani urban centres, including Islamabad, has highly likely further increased.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

While episodes of violence have been recorded in the early hours of 24 February in Guadalajara, there are early signs that the security situation in Puerto Vallarta is improving. The security forces are likely prioritising the security of the tourist resorts and their immediate surroundings, including access roads, transport hubs and key infrastructure.

Jalisco governor Pablo Lemus has announced the resumption of in-person teaching at all levels on 25 February. In Puerto Vallarta itself, available reporting indicates that stores have started to reopen on 23-24 February.

Several airlines have announced they would operate flights to and from Puerto Vallarta on 24 or 25 February, including Air Canada and United Airlines. Others, like Southwest Airlines, have assessed that disruptions will continue until 26 February.

Disruptions for cruise services remain extant. Operators such as Carnival Corporation and Norwegian Cruise Line have stated that they have cancelled scheduled port calls in Puerto Vallarta. Likely, cruise services to Puerto Vallarta will gradually resume during the 25-28 February period.

The large armed forces and security contingent deployed to Jalisco has likely decreased the risk of another severe outbreak of violence in tourist locations like Puerto Vallarta in the short term, whereas isolated episodes of violence, such as targeted killings by cartel operatives, cannot be ruled out. The reduction in the immediate threat of widespread violence will likely allow travellers to conduct road movements on key roadways and between central Puerto Vallarta and the airport, provided they take mitigation measures such as using low-profile vehicles with security-trained drivers who are familiar with the local area.

However, the killing of El Mencho has likely significantly destabilised CJNG and could lead to a fragmentation of the cartel and provoke the outbreak of infighting, similarly to what occurred in the Sinaloa Cartel after its leaders were apprehended. This would likely lead to a longer-term deterioration of the security environment in Jalisco and Nayarit states.

It is important to note that 24 February is Día de la Bandera, a nationwide commemoration which usually coincides with official events in large urban centres. In Puerto Vallarta, past Día de la Bandera events were held in Plaza Armas or at Agustín Flores Contreras Stadium. There is a remote possibility of cartels seeking to disrupt any celebrations or carry out demonstrative and symbolic operations targeting state officials. Travellers should avoid large public events in Puerto Vallarta or other parts of Jalisco.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

As the head of the CJNG, El Mencho was one of the most wanted people in all of Mexico and the US and had a USD 15,000,000 bounty on his head issued by US authorities. Since its founding in 2009, the CJNG has developed into Mexico’s strongest cartel. In 2024, the fracturing of the Sinaloa Cartel after the capture of several of its key leaders allowed CJNG to expand its presence across multiple states, resulting in a nationwide spike in homicides and other violent crimes.

Past cases of arrests or killings of key cartel leaders have resulted in immediate-term waves of violence. For instance, in October 2019, the arrest of Ovidio “El Ratón” Guzmán López, son of Sinaloa boss “El Chapo”, resulted in the outbreak of severe violence in Culiacán, known locally as “Culiacanazo”. Faced with extreme levels of cartel violence, authorities took the controversial decision to release Guzmán.

CJNG will highly likely continue to respond to the killing of its leader with targeted violence against police, authorities, and security forces across its areas of operations, while also staging violent actions aimed at causing major disruptions and undermining the government. The states that will likely be most affected by the violence include Jalisco, Nayarit, Michoacán, Baja California and Baja California Sur, Colima, Tamaulipas, and Sinaloa; areas where the CJNG is most influential.

There is a realistic possibility that the public acknowledgement of US involvement in the killing of the CJNG’s leader has temporarily increased the risk to US tourists, personnel, and businesses in Mexico. The operation follows months of US pressure, threats of military intervention in Mexico, record extraditions to the US and the sharing of intelligence with Mexico. This has resulted in more visible security coordination between Mexico and the US, and an increase in anti-cartel operations in Mexico.

Increased counter-cartel operations have resulted in direct threats from CJNG to target US Border Patrol personnel along the international border. Furthermore, CJNG-aligned elements have reportedly left “narcomantas” (publicly displayed cartel banners) at tourist resorts, warning that US tourists and government officials could face reprisals in response to alleged US involvement in anti-cartel operations.

In the medium term, the death of El Mencho is likely to intensify infighting within the CJNG, with different factions likely seeking to inherit control over the cartel. This would mirror the case of Sinaloa, whereby following the arrests of “El Chapo” and “El Mayo”, the cartel’s historic leaders, Sinaloa fragmented among various factions, which are currently engaging in an internal war. Possible splinters or rival CJNG factions are likely to prioritise securing access to key revenue-generating areas and smuggling routes.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

There is a high likelihood of political violence on election day, and in the days immediately before and after the vote. There have already been high levels of violence, with clashes between supporters of the two major parties – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami – in the final days of the electoral campaign. Furthermore, several party leaders have warned that their opponents are planning to commit electoral fraud, allegations that have been further “validated” by a spike in online disinformation.

Some party leaders have also asked their supporters to act as de facto vigilantes, going to voting stations to “monitor” that no fraud takes place. Following the mobile phone ban, local media reported that multiple parties have threatened to “besiege” the EC, claiming that the measure is unwarranted and unjust. It is highly likely that both domestic and international actors will increase the volume of fraud claims on election day and during the vote-counting process.

On 12 February, there is a high likelihood of unrest near polling centres, local and national party offices, and government structures, as supporters of opposing parties could engage in confrontations while “monitoring” the vote. The harassment of voters (particularly those from religious and ethnic minorities) and journalists near polling stations cannot be ruled out. There is a realistic possibility that the authorities will impose internet blackouts in response to unrest or violence, limiting situational awareness on the ground.

Foreign nationals or assets are likely to be at an increased risk of violence. Embassies and other diplomatic offices will likely have a heightened risk of being targeted during the voting period and following the vote. This is due to repeated and widespread allegations of foreign attempts to meddle in the elections.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Multiple militant groups operate in Pakistan, but the attack was highly likely conducted by either the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

The TTP has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Pakistan’s major cities, including a 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, a 2017 suicide bombing in Lahore, and a 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Karachi. The TTP has previously targeted Islamabad, attempting a suicide bombing in Islamabad’s government district in December 2022. In August 2025, Pakistan’s intelligence agency announced that it foiled a planned TTP suicide car bombing. In November 2025, the TTP detonated a bomb outside Islamabad’s District Judicial Court complex.

ISKP has also claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the country. Person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) are often used by the group; however, most of ISKP’s attacks in Pakistan have taken place in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the group is not thought to have conducted any attacks in Islamabad in recent years.

Both the TTP and ISKP have conducted attacks against Shia Muslims in Pakistan before. Moreover, both militant groups have absorbed fighters from Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), a now-dissolved militant group with a long history of anti-Shia violence.

The attack comes amid heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamabad has frequently accused the Afghan Taliban-led government of allowing militant safe havens across the border, from which attacks are launched into Pakistan. Recent tensions escalated into airstrikes conducted by Pakistan on TTP targets in Kabul on 15 October 2025, following TTP raids on Pakistani military posts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that killed 11 on 11 October.

There is a realistic possibility that Pakistan will conduct further cross-border strikes into Afghanistan targeting militant hideouts. Additionally, Islamabad may suspend ongoing diplomatic engagement, fully close partially open border crossings, and/or impose further travel restrictions on Afghan nationals.

A heightened security presence across major cities in Pakistan is highly likely, with increased security checkpoints, road closures, and military deployments. Heightened security will likely lead to increased travel disruptions in the short term, particularly around major hospitals. Intensified security operations in the border regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and/or Balochistan are also likely.

Given that the attack targeted Shia Muslims, the terror attack is likely to inflame sectarian tensions. Shias make up approximately 10 to 15 per cent of Pakistan’s population and have been targeted in numerous acts of terrorism in recent years, including the 2019 Quetta market bombing. Shia political and religious leaders are highly likely to call for stronger security measures, and there is a realistic possibility of protests from Shia groups.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Following the October 2025 ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, large-scale pro-Palestine protests have continued to occur regularly in Australia, often coinciding with events involving Israeli figures or companies.

Several of these protests have been characterised by clashes. For instance, in early November 2025, pro-Palestine protesters clashed with police outside the Sydney International Convention Centre, which was hosting an expo attended by weapons manufacturers. In September 2024, protesters and police clashed during a similar expo in Melbourne, with the protests resulting in more than 110 arrests.

It is highly likely that the protests scheduled to occur during Herzog’s visit will attract thousands of attendees, particularly in Sydney. In Sydney, the planned protest route passes through the CBD and will therefore be subject to PARD. Consequently, there is a higher likelihood of police carrying out mass arrests, which would likely lead to clashes.

If significant clashes break out, police may deploy pepper spray, tear gas, stun grenades and rubber bullets. Protests are highly likely to disrupt traffic in Sydney, possibly blockading key roadways like Anzac Bridge, Sydney Harbour Bridge (as during previous pro-Palestine protests), A4, Park Street, King Street, William Street, and Druitt Street.

While the 9 February protests in Sydney are likely to be the largest, it is highly likely that smaller protests will be held throughout Herzog’s visit throughout the country. Moreover, previous pro-Palestine protests in Australia have been attended by counterprotests, and there is a realistic possibility of clashes between opposing protester groups.

Extremist violence targeting protest attendees, possible counter-protesters, or Jewish individuals and places of worship cannot be ruled out. In late January, police detained a 19-year-old Sydney resident for allegedly threatening to assassinate Herzog. Moreover, several calls for violence against Herzog have appeared on social media, including appeals to extremist groups to join the protests.