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SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 17 Mar 2026 – 18 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 18 March.
  • On 18 March, Iran issued an evacuation warning for oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, threatening that they would be targeted in “in the coming hours”. The warning follows gas facilities at Iran’s South Pars field being reportedly struck by Israel a few hours earlier. Specifically, the warning was directed towards: Saudi Arabia’s Samref Refinery and Jubail Petrochemical Complex, the UAE’s Al Hosn Gas Field, and Qatar’s Mesaieed Petrochemical Complex, Mesaieed Holding Company and Ras Laffan Refinery.
  • On 17 March, Kuwaiti authorities reported two people injured by debris over the previous 24 hours, following attacks involving two ballistic missiles and 13 attack drones.
  • Saudi authorities stated that two attack drones were intercepted on approach to the Diplomatic Quarter in Riyadh on 18 March, with a third attack drone also announced as intercepted over Riyadh.
  • Australia’s Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, stated that deployed Australian troops were safe after an Iranian projectile hit an area near Al Minhad Air Base on 18 March, which is around 24km south of Dubai.
  • Travel agents in Oman are reportedly recording a significant surge in interest for getaways for UAE residents during the upcoming Eid Al Fitr holidays. Heavy traffic is expected at key crossings such as the Hatta border crossing.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 18 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 18 March.

On 18 March, Iranian state media reported the issuance of an evacuation warning for oil facilities across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, threatening that they would be targeted “in the coming hours”. The warning follows gas facilities at Iran’s South Pars field being reportedly struck by Israel a few hours earlier on 18 March, with the threatened attacks almost certainly intended to be retaliation. Specifically, the warning was directed towards: Saudi ​Arabia’s Samref Refinery and Jubail Petrochemical Complex, ​the UAE’s Al Hosn Gas Field, and Qatar’s Mesaieed Petrochemical Complex, Mesaieed Holding Company ​and Ras Laffan Refinery.

As of 18 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling a highly limited number of departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains restricted, although arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. The airspace remains closed to overflights. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

Between 17 and 18 March, Saudi authorities reported the interception of around 12 attack drones in unspecified parts of Eastern Province during three waves of attacks, the interception of a ballistic missile near Al Kharj, and the falling of debris near Prince Sultan Air Base (next to Al Kharj) following another missile interception, with no damage reported. Saudi authorities furthermore stated that two attack drones were intercepted on approach to the Diplomatic Quarter in Riyadh on 18 March, with a third attack drone also announced as intercepted over Riyadh.

On 18 March, Iranian state media reported the issuance of an evacuation warning for Saudi Arabia’s Samref Refinery and Jubail Petrochemical Complex, threatening that they would be targeted “in the coming hours”.

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Early 18 March, Kuwaiti authorities stated that air defences intercepted seven attack drones in unspecified areas. On 17 March, Kuwaiti authorities reported two people injured by debris over the previous 24 hours, following attacks involving two ballistic missiles and 13 attack drones. Air defences were subsequently activated against a new attack in an unspecified part of northern Kuwait. Interceptions continued overnight 17-18 March, with Kuwait’s Defence Ministry announcing that air defences were intercepting ballistic missiles and attack drones.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Overnight 17-18 March, air raid sirens sounded multiple times across Bahrain, with the public asked to take shelter. On 18 March, the Supreme Council for Environment (SCE) affirmed that no abnormal radiation levels had been recorded in Bahrain’s airspace or territorial waters.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, the Bahraini airspace is heavily restricted. On 13 March, Bahrain amended its airspace closure, enabling a highly limited number of departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission.

Overnight 17-18 March, there were reports of interceptions over Doha. The Qatari Defence Ministry stated that its armed forces intercepted a ballistic missile attack targeting the country. On 17 March, military officials stated that air defence systems intercepted nine missiles and several attack drones.

On 18 March, Iranian state media reported the issuance of an evacuation warning for Qatar’s Mesaieed Petrochemical Complex, Mesaieed Holding Company, and Ras Laffan Refinery, threatening that they would be targeted “in the coming hours”.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. Arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are allowed after permission has been given.

Emirati authorities stated that air defences responded to missile and attack drone threats overnight 17-18 March, with attacks continuing into the morning of 18 March. The UAE’s Ministry of Defence claimed that explosions heard in the UAE, including in Dubai, were the result of air defence activity. Australia’s Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, stated that deployed Australian troops were safe after an Iranian projectile hit an area near Al Minhad Air Base on 18 March, which is around 24km south of Dubai.

On 18 March, Iranian state media reported the issuance of an evacuation warning for the UAE’s Al Hosn Gas Field, threatening that it would be targeted “in the coming hours”.

At least eight people have been killed and 157 injured in the UAE, as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

Travel agents in Oman are reportedly recording a significant surge in interest for getaways for UAE residents during the upcoming Eid Al Fitr holidays, which will occur on either 19 or 20 March, depending on moon sightings. This has almost certainly been in part conditioned by the ongoing elevated security concerns in the UAE in comparison to Oman. Heavy traffic is expected at key crossings such as the Hatta border crossing.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring UAE and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

At least three people have been killed and 15 injured in Oman, as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has continued strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to carry out further attacks on US and Israeli-linked companies across the region.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates that the volume of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has significantly diminished since 28 February, almost certainly due to expended ballistic missile stockpiles and the destruction of transporter erector launchers (TELs) by US-Israeli strikes. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term.

Sustained Iranian attack drone and missile strikes are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, with at least 45 people being arrested so far, including a British tourist who allegedly filmed missile strikes in Dubai. In Bahrain, at least two individuals have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and has arrested at least 313 people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 16 Mar 2026 – 17 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 17 March.
  • On 17 March, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, stated that Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, and the commander of the paramilitary militia Basij, Gholamreza Soleimani, had been killed in overnight strikes. If confirmed, the killing of two senior leadership figures in Iran is likely to trigger an increased rate of Iranian strikes across the region in retaliation.
  • The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March. 16 March recorded the highest daily number of combined missiles and drones targeting Saudi Arabia, at 72.
  • The UAE’s Ministry of Defence claimed that ten ballistic missiles and 45 attack drones had been intercepted so far on 17 March at 11:35 UTC. At least three explosions were reportedly heard in Dubai; and authorities stated that a Pakistani national was killed by debris in the Bani Yas area of Abu Dhabi.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 17 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 17 March.

On 17 March, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, stated that Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, had been killed in overnight strikes. Israel also claimed to have killed Gholamreza Soleimani,  the commander of the Basij, the internal security paramilitary militia of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). If confirmed, the killing of two senior leadership figures in Iran is likely to trigger an increased rate of Iranian strikes across the region in retaliation.

As of 17 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains restricted, although arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. The airspace remains closed to overflights. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 17 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 15 drones in the country’s Eastern Province. The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March, with 16 March recording the highest daily number of combined missiles and drones, 72, fired at Saudi Arabia. The areas most targeted are Riyadh, Al-Kharj (where the Prince Sultan Air Base is located), and the Eastern Province (where key Saudi oil refineries are located).

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Overnight 16-17 March, explosions were heard over Kuwait as air defences intercepted ballistic missiles and attack drones. Two medical personnel were reportedly injured after shrapnel from a ballistic missile fell on an ambulance centre. Late 16 March, Kuwaiti authorities claimed to have intercepted seven attack drones over the previous 24 hours.

On 17 March, the Kuwaiti Interior Ministry stated that a cell of alleged Hezbollah fighters involving 14 Kuwaiti nationals and two Lebanese nationals had been arrested in the country. The counterterrorism operation resulted in the seizure of weapons, communication devices, drones, maps, narcotics, cash and Hezbollah paraphernalia.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

On 17 March, the Chief of the Terrorism Crimes Prosecution announced that several suspects had been detained following the publishing on social media videos that “glorify, promote, and encourage terrorist acts carried out against Bahrain”.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, the Bahraini airspace is heavily restricted. On 13 March, Bahrain amended its airspace closure, enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission.

Early 17 March, Qatar’s Interior Ministry urged residents to remain indoors shortly before explosions were heard over Doha. The Defence Ministry subsequently announced that air defences had intercepted several ballistic missiles over the country’s airspace. A fire burned in Qatar’s industrial district from debris from an intercepted ballistic missile.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. Arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are allowed after permission has been given. The airspace is still closed for overflights.

The UAE’s Ministry of Defence claimed that ten ballistic missiles and 45 attack drones had been intercepted so far on 17 March at 11:35 UTC. Authorities earlier issued multiple incoming threat alerts, urged residents to stay in safe locations, before later stating the situation was safe. At least three explosions were reportedly heard in Dubai; and authorities stated that a Pakistani national was killed by debris in the Bani Yas area of Abu Dhabi.

At least seven people have been killed and 145 injured in the UAE, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

At least three people have been killed and 15 injured in Oman, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has continued strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to carry out further attacks on US and Israeli-linked companies across the region.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates that the volume of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has significantly diminished since 28 February, almost certainly due to expended ballistic missile stockpiles and the destruction of transporter erector launchers (TELs) by US-Israeli strikes. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term.

Sustained Iranian attack drone and missile strikes are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, with at least 45 people being arrested so far, including a British tourist who allegedly filmed missile strikes in Dubai. In Bahrain, at least two individuals have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and has arrested at least 313 people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 15 Mar 2026 – 16 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 16 March.
  • On 16 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 64 attack drones in Riyadh and Eastern Province. The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March. The areas most targeted are Riyadh, Al-Kharj (where the Prince Sultan Air Base is located), and the Eastern Province (where key Saudi oil refineries are located).
  • Early 16 March, an attack drone struck fuel tanks in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB), prompting a temporary suspension of operations at the airport. DXB resumed operations later on 16 March.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 16 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 16 March.

As of 16 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains restricted, although arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. The airspace remains closed to overflights. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 16 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 64 attack drones in Riyadh and Eastern Province. These reportedly include a wave of at least 34 drones fired within one hour. The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March. The areas most targeted are Riyadh, Al-Kharj (where the Prince Sultan Air Base is located), and the Eastern Province (where key Saudi oil refineries are located).

On 15 March, US media reported allegations that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has privately encouraged the US administration to continue and intensify the attacks on Iran. Some Saudi officials have denied these claims on 16 March, speaking to regional media. There is a realistic possibility that the intensification of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia reflects Tehran’s view of Riyadh’s support for the US/Israeli attacks.

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

On 16 March, the Kuwait National Guard announced that its task force shot down two attack drones in the past 24 hours. On 15 March, Kuwait’s Ministry of Defence stated that three soldiers sustained light injuries caused by shrapnel from intercepted attack drones. According to the ministry, 14 attack drones were detected over the previous 24 hours; eight of them were destroyed.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Overnight 15-16 March, Bahrain’s media reported interceptions over the country’s airspace, following the activation of air raid sirens.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, the Bahraini airspace is heavily restricted. On 13 March, Bahrain amended its airspace closure, enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission.

On 16 March, Qatar’s Defence Ministry stated that its armed forces intercepted a second wave of missiles, following an earlier wave intercepted over Doha. Before the attack, Iran warned residents to evacuate Lusail, Al Waab, and Ain Khaled. On 15 March, Qatar’s Defence Ministry stated that it intercepted several attack drones over the country’s airspace.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. Arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are allowed after permission has been given. The airspace is still closed for overflights.

On 16 March, the UAE’s Ministry of Defence claimed that six ballistic missiles and 21 attack drones were intercepted. Early 16 March, an attack drone struck fuel tanks in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB), prompting a temporary suspension of operations at the airport. DXB resumed operations later on 16 March. Authorities in Abu Dhabi announced that a Palestinian national was killed after “a rocket” fell on a civilian vehicle in the Al Bahya area. Authorities in Fujairah stated that civil defence was responding to a fire in a petrochemical industrial area following a drone attack, with no injuries reported.

At least seven people have been killed and 145 injured in the UAE, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Following a drone attack against Dubai International Airport (DXB) early 16 March, flights running from DXB were temporarily suspended. DXB resumed operations later on 16 March.

Reflective of the lower number of attacks conducted against Oman in comparison to other Gulf States, Oman’s ministry of transport, communication and information technology (MTCIT) is building “regional food depots to establish a secure supply chain to its Gulf neighbours via land borders”. This is to bypass maritime transit through the Strait of Hormuz, which has become high risk to transit due to Iranian attacks.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

At least three people have been killed and 15 injured in Oman, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has continued strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to carry out further attacks on US and Israeli-linked companies across the region.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates that the volume of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has significantly diminished since 28 February, almost certainly due to expended ballistic missile stockpiles and the destruction of transporter erector launchers (TELs) by US-Israeli strikes. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term.

Sustained Iranian attack drone and missile strikes are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, with at least 45 people being arrested so far, including a British tourist who allegedly filmed missile strikes in Dubai. In Bahrain, at least two individuals have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and has arrested at least 313 people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 14 Mar 2026 – 15 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 15 March.
  • Iranian officials have reiterated threats to target US and Israeli private companies across the region, characterising these attacks as “retaliatory” for potential future US-Israeli strikes on Iran’s oil infrastructure.
  • On 15 March, Iran reportedly fired six missiles and 34 drones against targets located in Saudi Arabia. Since 12 March, the volume of Iranian strikes targeting Saudi Arabia has increased.
  • Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 15 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 15 March.

Iranian officials have reiterated threats to target US and Israeli private companies across the region, characterising these attacks as “retaliatory” for potential future US-Israeli strikes on Iran’s oil infrastructure.

As of 15 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains restricted, although arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. The airspace remains closed to overflights. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 15 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 34 attack drones and six missiles over Al-Kharj, Riyadh, and the Eastern Province. Following the Saudi announcement of the interception of a wave of ten drones, channels associated with the IRGC claimed that “this attack [had] no connection to the Islamic Republic of Iran.” However, these claims were not substantiated by any evidence.

Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia have increased in intensity since 12 March, with the areas most targeted being Riyadh, Al-Kharj, where the Prince Sultan Air Base is located, and the Eastern Province, where key Saudi oil refineries are located.

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

As of 15 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Early 15 March, Kuwaiti state media stated that air defences intercepted five attack drones over the previous 24 hours. Overnight 14-15 March, Kuwait International Airport’s (KWI / OKKK) radar system was reportedly impacted by multiple attack drones. Earlier attack drone strikes injured three soldiers and caused structural damage near Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base. On 14 March, Kuwait’s cybersecurity agency stated that it is monitoring for possible attacks and will announce “transparently” if vulnerabilities or attacks are detected.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

As of 15 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Overnight 14-15 March, air raid sirens were activated, and air defences reportedly intercepted Iranian “projectiles” targeting a “facility” in southern Bahrain. Unverified videos show a large fire burning at the Isa Air Base used by US troops in southern Bahrain following an alleged Iranian strike.

Late 14 March, Bahrain reported six new arrests of people for sharing videos of Iranian attacks. Five people were also reportedly arrested on suspicion of passing sensitive information to the Iranian military.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

As of 15 March, the Bahraini airspace is heavily restricted. On 13 March, Bahrain amended its airspace closure, enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission.

On 14 March, the Ministry of Defence stated that Qatar was targeted with four ballistic missiles and several drones, all of which were successfully intercepted.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

As of 15 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. Arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. The airspace is still closed for overflights.

On 15 March, UAE officials stated that they had intercepted six missiles and four drones launched by Iranian forces towards the UAE. The UAE also assesses that, since the start of the conflict, Iran fired at least 298 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles, and 1606 attack drones towards UAE territory, resulting in six deaths.

On 15 March, international media reported that oil loading operations had resumed at Fujairah port, following a fire caused by an attack drone impact on 14 March.

Iranian media linked to the IRGC has advised residents of the UAE to evacuate ports, labelling them “legitimate targets”, following US strikes in Kharg Island. In a follow-up statement, the same media outlet warned residents to “immediately move away” from Jebel Ali, Khalifa, and Fujairah port areas due to likely impending attacks.

At least 20 people, including a British tourist, have been charged under cybercrime laws for allegedly filming Iranian strikes over Dubai, according to the UK Foreign Office. On 14 March, Abu Dhabi police stated that they had arrested 45 people of various nationalities for filming and posting on social media.

At least six people have been killed and 141 injured in the UAE, as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

As of 15 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

At least three people have been killed and 15 injured in Oman, as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 15 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has continued strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to carry out further attacks on US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. Iranian officials have characterised these attacks as “retaliatory” and warned that they would follow possible future US and Israeli attacks on Iranian oil infrastructure.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates that the volume of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has significantly diminished since 28 February, almost certainly due to expended ballistic missile stockpiles and the destruction of transporter erector launchers (TELs) by US-Israeli strikes. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Despite diminishing stockpiles of projectiles, Iranian forces almost certainly remain available to launch high-volume strikes against Gulf States.

Sustained Iranian attack drone and missile strikes are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems. Russian intelligence sharing with Iran will likely enable Iran to better identify vulnerabilities in regional air defence networks and refine targeting for future strikes.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, with at least 45 people being arrested so far, including a British tourist who allegedly filmed missile strikes in Dubai. The sharp increase in the number of arrests indicates a likely crackdown on social media activity.

In Bahrain, at least two individuals have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and has arrested at least 313 people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 13 Mar 2026 – 14 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 14 March.
  • The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region.
  • On 14 March, Iranian media linked to the IRGC has advised residents of the UAE to evacuate ports, labelling them “legitimate targets”, following US strikes in Kharg Island. In a follow-up statement, the same media outlet warned residents to “immediately move away” from Jebel Ali, Khalifa, and Fujairah port areas due to likely impending attacks.
  • Overnight 13-14 March, Iranian officials claimed to have struck two Citibank locations in Manama and Dubai with attack drones.
  • Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 14 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 14 March.

On 11 March, a spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters (KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces) declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia, and Oracle.

On 12 March, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media stated that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.

On the night of 13-14 March, US forces carried out large-scale airstrikes on military targets on Iran’s Kharg Island. On 14 March, IRGC-affiliated channels issued a threat to the UAE stating that it would target US “hideouts” in its territory, and warned UAE residents to stay away from ports, docks and US military installations. Moreover, IRGC-affiliated channels reiterated previous threats to strike private companies and civilian assets associated with the US.

As of 14 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only heavily limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 14 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 15 drones and one ballistic missile overnight 13-14 March. Officials specified that some interceptions occurred near Al-Jowf and the Empty Quarter. The volume of Iranian strikes targeting Saudi Arabia has almost certainly increased since 12 March. On 13 March, international media reported that five US planes were damaged by Iranian strikes at Prince Sultan Airbase in Al-Kharj. The reports did not specify the day when the incident occurred and added that the attack caused no casualties.

On 12 March, IRGC-linked media asserted that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 14 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Overnight 13-14 March, Kuwait’s military stated that they intercepted and destroyed an attack drone in an unspecified location. On 13 March, the Ministry of Defence stated that only one ballistic missile was detected over the previous 24 hours outside of the threat area, causing no damage. The Kuwait Ministry of Interior stated it had detected several individuals using drones for aerial photography in violation of previously announced regulations and that legal measures would be taken against them.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 14 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

On 14 March, the General Command of the Bahrain Defence Force stated that air defences had intercepted and destroyed 124 ballistic missiles and 203 drones targeting the Kingdom of Bahrain since the onset of the hostilities. The General Command also stated that the use of ballistic missiles and drones to target civilian areas and private property constitutes a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and the United Nations Charter. The same day, Iranian media reported having damaged US “targets” in Bahrain in overnight strikes, including Isa Air Base. Iranian officials claimed to have struck a Citibank location in Manama with attack drones overnight, 13-14 March.

Overnight 13-14 March, anti-government groups staged a demonstration in Manama, Sitra, Abu Saiba, Musalla, Samahij, and other locations for “al Quds day”. No notable disruptions or damage to US assets have been reported in connection with the protests.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 14 March, the Bahraini airspace is heavily restricted, having previously been closed. On 13 March, Bahrain amended its airspace closure, enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission.

Overnight 13-14 March, the Qatari military twice intercepted ballistic missile attacks, shortly after public safety alerts were issued. Some of the interceptions were reported over Doha. Qatari authorities reportedly evacuated the Msheireb and Education City area of Doha late 13 March, shortly before the missile interceptions.

On 13 March, the Ministry of Interior released a statement maintaining the nationwide remote-work directive until further notice. The statement also declared that Qatar has food and water reserves to cover its needs for 18 months and four months, respectively, in addition to medicine stockpiles to last nine months, and medical supplies sufficient for 12 months. The statement added that Qatari authorities continued to monitor air and water pollution levels following a strike on a fuel depot in its industrial zone.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 14 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that it will operate heavily limited repatriation flights from Doha Airport (DOH).

On 14 March, the Defence Ministry stated that, so far, nine missiles and 33 attack drones had targeted the UAE on 14 March. Overnight 13-14 March, debris from an intercepted attack drone struck a building in downtown Dubai, but caused no injuries or fire. Iranian officials also claimed to have struck a Citibank location in Dubai. On 14 March, it was reported that some oil loading operations at the Port of Fujairah have been suspended following an attack drone strike. A fire was also reported in Fujairah after intercepted attack drone fragments fell at an unspecified location; no injuries were reported.

Iranian media linked to the IRGC has advised residents of the UAE to evacuate ports, labelling them “legitimate targets”, following US strikes in Kharg Island. In a follow-up statement, the same media outlet warned residents to “immediately move away” from Jebel Ali, Khalifa, and Fujairah port areas due to likely impending attacks.

At least 20 people, including a British tourist, have been charged under cybercrime laws for allegedly filming Iranian strikes over Dubai, according to the UK Foreign Office. On 14 March, Abu Dhabi police stated that they had arrested 45 people of various nationalities for filming and posting on social media.

At least six people have been killed and 131 injured in the UAE, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

At least three people have been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 14 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has continued strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities.

The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked companies issued by the KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March. Previously, on 1 March, Iranian attack drones caused damage to three Amazon Web Services (AWS) facilities in the UAE and Bahrain. Overnight 13-14 March, Iranian officials claimed to have struck two Citibank locations in Manama and Dubai with attack drones.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates that the volume of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has significantly diminished since 28 February, almost certainly due to expended ballistic missile stockpiles and the destruction of transporter erector launchers (TELs) by US-Israeli strikes. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Despite diminishing stockpiles of projectiles, Iranian forces almost certainly remain available to launch high-volume strikes against Gulf States. Since 12 March, Iranian forces have intensified the volume of drone and missile strikes targeting Saudi Arabia.

Sustained Iranian attack drone and missile strikes are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems. Russian intelligence sharing with Iran will likely enable Iran to better identify vulnerabilities in regional air defence networks and refine targeting for future strikes.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, with at least 45 people being arrested so far, including a British tourist who allegedly filmed missile strikes in Dubai. The sharp increase in the number of arrests indicates a likely crackdown on social media activity.

In Bahrain, at least two individuals have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and has arrested at least 313 people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 12 Mar 2026 – 13 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 13 March.
  • The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March.
  • On 12 March, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media stated that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.
  • On 13 March, Dubai officials reported minor damage to a building in the Dubai International Financial Centre caused by debris from a successful interception.
  • On 13 March, the Omani authorities reported the downing of two drones in the Suhar Governorate. One of the drones fell in the Al-Awahi Industrial Area, resulting in the death of two expatriates and several injuries.
  • Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 13 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 13 March.

On 11 March, a spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters (KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces) declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia, and Oracle.

On 12 March, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media stated that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.

As of 13 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only heavily limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 13 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that a drone approaching the international diplomatic area in the west of Riyadh was shot down by air defences. Additional drones were intercepted in Al-Kharj and the Eastern Provinces. Saudi Arabian defence officials reported that at least 50 Iranian drones were shot down over the country overnight on 12-13 March during multiple waves of attacks.

On 12 March, IRGC-linked media asserted that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Reporting from 12 March indicates that foreign nationals have found it difficult to leave the country due to a Kuwaiti law requiring foreign nationals to obtain exit permits from their employers. Many teachers have reportedly been denied permission to leave. The Kuwaiti immigration authority is reportedly urging employers to supply exit permits. Reports also emerged on 12 March that the Canadian section at Ali Al-Salem Air Base, which has repeatedly been targeted by Iranian strikes, was damaged by a ballistic missile strike on 1 March.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

On 12-13 March, air raid sirens were activated multiple times in Bahrain. On 13 March, IRGC-channels stated that they had targeted US bases in Manama. On 12 March, the General Command of the Bahrain Defence Force stated that air defences had intercepted and destroyed 114 ballistic missiles and 190 drones targeting the Kingdom of Bahrain since the onset of the hostilities. The General Command also stated that the use of ballistic missiles and drones to target civilian areas and private property constitutes a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and the United Nations Charter.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

The Defence Ministry announced that Qatar was targeted by two ballistic missiles, one cruise missile, and several attack drones by Iran on 12 March. All were successfully intercepted.

On 12 March, IRGC-linked media asserted that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.  Also on 12 March, French oil company TotalEnergies stated that it would suspend oil production in Qatar in response to the heightened threat environment.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that it will operate heavily limited repatriation flights from Doha Airport (DOH).

On 13 March, Hamad International Airport (HIA) warned passengers about fraudulent accounts impersonating the airport and stressed that it will never request passport details via phone, email, SMS, or social media, urging travellers to rely only on official communication channels.

On 13 March, Dubai officials reported minor damage to a building in the Dubai International Financial Centre caused by debris from a successful interception. The incident follows a warning issued on 11 March from IRGC media channels that it will deliberately target financial institutions in the Middle East. According to the UAE’s Defence Ministry, its air defence intercepted seven ballistic missiles and 27 drones since early 13 January.

On 12 March, IRGC-linked media asserted that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum. On 12 March, French oil company TotalEnergies stated that it would suspend oil production in the UAE in response to the heightened threat environment.

At least six people have been killed and 131 injured in the UAE, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

On 13 March, the Omani authorities reported the downing of two drones in the Suhar Governorate. One of the drones fell in the Al-Awahi Industrial Area, resulting in the death of two expatriates and several injuries. The second drone fell in an open area and did not result in any casualties.

At least three people have been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 13 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has continued strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities.  

The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked companies issued by the KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March. Previously, on 1 March, Iranian attack drones caused damage to three Amazon Web Services (AWS) facilities in the UAE and Bahrain.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates that the volume of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has significantly diminished since 28 February, almost certainly due to expended ballistic missile stockpiles and the destruction of transporter erector launchers (TELs) by US-Israeli strikes. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term.

Sustained Iranian attack drone and missile strikes are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems. Russian intelligence sharing with Iran will likely enable Iran to better identify vulnerabilities in regional air defence networks and refine targeting for future strikes.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, with at least 21 people being arrested so far, including a British tourist who allegedly filmed missile strikes in Dubai. In Bahrain, at least two individuals have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and has arrested at least 313 people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

blue background

Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 11 Mar 2026 – 12 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 12 March.
  • The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March.
  • As of 12 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
  • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • In Dubai, UAE, 11-12 March attack drones impacts were recorded in the Al Bada’a area and onto the façade of a building on Sheikh Zayed Road, causing no injuries. An attack drone also hit the Address Creek Harbour hotel, sparking a fire that was brought under control and causing no injuries.
  • On 11 March, Iranian drone strikes hit fuel tanks in Salalah, Oman, setting off a large blaze. Omani authorities said there were no injuries.
  • In Kuwait on 12 March, an attack drone strike injured at least two people after impacting a residential building in Mangaf, southern Kuwait.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 12 March.

On 11 March, a spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters (KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces) declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia, and Oracle.

As of 12 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only heavily limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

Overnight 11-12 March, Saudi Arabia reported interceptions of three ballistic missiles targeting Prince Sultan Air Base near Al-Kharj. Saudi air defences subsequently intercepted 18 attack drones over the country’s eastern region. Another drone was subsequently intercepted as it headed for the Shaybah oil field in the Empty Quarter; three more were intercepted in the eastern region; another was intercepted heading towards the Diplomatic Quarter in Riyadh; and two more were intercepted heading towards the Shaybah oil field. Iranian media have reported that the country targeted the US embassy in Riyadh.

There have been at least two deaths and 12 injuries in Saudi Arabia as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

As of 12 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Overnight 11-12 March, Kuwait activated air defences against another wave of Iranian attacks, later stating air defences intercepted an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and attack drones. According to Iranian state media, IRGC strikes targeted Ali al-Salem Air Base. Interceptions continued on the morning of 12 March, with one attack drone strike injuring at least two people after impacting a residential building in Mangaf, southern Kuwait. The building was subsequently evacuated, and the fire was extinguished. Drone debris damaged six overhead power transmission lines, causing a temporary power outage in parts of the country. Kuwait’s civil defence agency says it has prepared public shelters with essential supplies and services for long-term use if necessary.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

As of 12 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Air raid alerts were activated overnight 11-12 March, with explosions subsequently heard. Several Iranian attack drones were reportedly intercepted over the country’s airspace. Iranian strikes reportedly targeted fuel tanks in Muharraq Governorate, starting a large fire. According to Bahrain’s Interior Ministry, the strikes led to the closure of Rayya Road next to Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI), with authorities urging residents in Al Hidd, Arad, Galali and Samaheej in the Muharraq region to remain in their homes and to close windows and ventilation openings. The fire has subsequently been brought under control. Bahraini authorities have reportedly brought in security forces from Jordan to quell pro-Iranian protests; the first time since the Arab Spring that Bahrain has called in foreign forces to deal with unrest.

Bahrain reports arrests of six more people for allegedly posting videos showing the aftermath of Iranian strikes. Another four nationals were arrested after they allegedly sent information to Iran.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

As of 12 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

On 12 March, Qatar’s government issued a shelter-in-place order, before its armed forces intercepted a ballistic missile attack. On 11 March, following the threats issued by Iran against US and Israeli-linked banks and other economic centres, HSBC stated that it would close its Qatar branches until further notice.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

As of 12 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that it will operate heavily limited repatriation flights from Doha Airport (DOH).

The UAE came under particularly heavy attack overnight 11-12 March, with authorities stating that explosions heard were caused by interceptions. In Dubai, attack drone impacts were recorded in the Al Bada’a area and onto the façade of a building on Sheikh Zayed Road, causing no injuries. An attack drone also hit the Address Creek Harbour hotel, sparking a fire that was brought under control and causing no injuries.

Following the threats issued by Iran against US and Israeli-linked banks and other economic centres, Citibank has said it would close its UAE branches and financial centres through 14 March as a precaution. Moreover, major firms including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered have reportedly evacuated or shut their Dubai offices.

At least six people have been killed and 131 injured in the UAE, as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

On 12 March, the Australian government announced an order for the departure of non-essential Australian officials posted to the UAE due to the deteriorating security situation.   

As of 12 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

On 11 March, Iranian drone strikes hit fuel tanks in Salalah, setting off a large blaze. Omani authorities said there were no injuries, but firefighting teams, the military and private companies were still working to contain the fire hours later. Authorities have advised people near the site to wear masks and close windows, but have said that the air quality across the rest of Salalah remains within safe limits. The transportation minister said operations at Salalah seaport were expected to return to normal within two or three days. Oman has reportedly evacuated all vessels from the Mina Al Fahal oil export terminal in Muscat as a precaution.

At least one person has been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 12 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has further escalated strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities.  The Gulf States are highly dependent on desalination for drinking water, domestic use, and industrial purposes. Sustained attacks on desalination facilities are likely to have significant impacts on national water security.

The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked companies issued by the KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March. Previously, on 1 March, Iranian attack drones caused damage to three Amazon Web Services (AWS) facilities in the UAE and Bahrain.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates that the volume of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has significantly diminished since 28 February, almost certainly due to expended ballistic missile stockpiles and the destruction of transporter erector launchers (TELs) by US-Israeli strikes. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term.

Sustained Iranian attack drone and missile strikes are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems. Russian intelligence sharing with Iran will likely enable Iran to better identify vulnerabilities in regional air defence networks and refine targeting for future strikes.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, with at least 21 people being arrested so far, including a British tourist who allegedly filmed missile strikes in Dubai. In Bahrain, at least two individuals have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and have arrested at least 313 people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 10 Mar 2026 – 11 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 11 March.
  • On 11 March, a spokesman for KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces, declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia and Oracle. Moreover, the KACHQ stated that Iran will now move from a claimed policy of “reciprocal hits” after attacks to continuous strikes on its adversaries.
  • As of 11 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
  • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • Qatar Airways announced a limited flight schedule to and from Doha, Qatar, on 13 and 14 March, dependent on the airspace reopening.
  • In Dubai, UAE, four people were injured on the morning of 11 March, after “two drones fell in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB)”. The Dubai Media Office added that air traffic is operating as normal.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 11 March.

On 11 March, a spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters (KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces) declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia and Oracle. Moreover, the KACHQ stated that Iran will now move from a claimed policy of “reciprocal hits” after attacks to continuous strikes on its adversaries.

As of 11 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only heavily limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

Overnight 10-11 March, Saudi Arabia’s military stated that it shot down two Iranian attack drones targeting an oil field near Shaybah in the country’s Eastern Province, and a further five east of Al Kharj. Six ballistic missiles targeting Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj were also reportedly shot down. According to Iranian state media, the overnight attack drone and ballistic missile barrage targeted US bases in multiple countries, including Saudi Arabia.

There have been at least two deaths and 12 injuries from Iranian strikes in Saudi Arabia as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March 2026.

As of 11 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Overnight 10-11 March, air defence systems intercepted eight attack drones, according to the Kuwaiti National Guard. According to the Iranian military, the most recent wave of attacks targeted the US base at Camp Arfijan with two ballistic missiles. Kuwait stated that it shot down four out of five Iranian attack drones on 10 March, with one striking “outside the threat area”.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March.

As of 11 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

On 11 March, explosions were heard following an air raid warning, with authorities urging citizens to seek shelter. According to Iranian state media, the recent wave of attacks targeted a “secret house affiliated with the U.S. base in the Saar area west of the capital Manama.” Air raid sirens also activated overnight 10-11 March. Bahrain’s Civil Aviation Affairs (CAA) said that several Gulf Air aircraft, operating without passengers, alongside cargo aircraft from a number of operators, have been repositioned away from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) to Saudi Arabia to “enhance operational readiness”. This is highly likely to protect the aircraft from strikes targeting the airport.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March.

As of 11 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

On 11 March, Qatar issued an emergency alert, with the Defence Ministry stating that it intercepted a missile attack. Another attack was repelled in the morning, with explosions heard over Doha. Overnight on 10-11 March, another ballistic missile attack was intercepted. Qatar Airways announced a limited flight schedule to and from Doha on 13 and 14 March, dependent on the airspace reopening.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March.

As of 11 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that it will operate heavily limited repatriation flights from Doha Airport (DOH).

The UAE faced repeated threats from missiles and attack drones between 10 and 11 March, with authorities stating on several occasions that air defences were activated, explosions heard were from interceptions, and urging residents to shelter-in-place. In Dubai, four people were injured on the morning of 11 March, after “two drones fell in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB)”. The Dubai Media Office added that air traffic is operating as normal.

At least six people have been killed and 122 injured in the UAE, as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March.

As of 11 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

Early 11 March, the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) centre reported that a cargo vessel was hit by an unknown projectile in the Straits of Hormuz, 11NM north of Oman, resulting in a fire onboard. The crew evacuated the vessel, and injured crew members are receiving treatment in Oman. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint which Iran is able to threaten to cause a global impact on trade. Furthermore, local Omani media reported on 11 March that an attack drone was intercepted and another crashed into the sea north of Duqm. No casualties were reported.

At least one person has been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 11 March, the airspace remains open in Oman. Oman Air has confirmed the suspension of all flights to nine destinations until 15 March: Copenhagen, Dubai, Doha, Dammam, Amman, Bahrain, Kuwait City, Baghdad and Khasab.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has further escalated strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities.

Recent US and Israeli strikes targeting oil facilities and banks in Iran are likely to result in a continued increased rate of Iranian attacks targeting energy infrastructure and other economically significant targets across the Gulf. The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked companies issued by the KACHQ on 11 March highly likely to increase the risk profile for targeting of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. Previously, on 1 March, Iranian attack drones caused damage to three Amazon Web Services (AWS) facilities in the UAE and Bahrain.

Moreover, the Gulf States are highly dependent on desalination for drinking water, domestic use, and industrial purposes. Sustained attacks on desalination facilities are likely to have significant impacts on national water security.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates that the volume of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has significantly diminished since 28 February, almost certainly due to expended ballistic missile stockpiles and the destruction of transporter erector launchers (TELs) by US-Israeli strikes. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term.

Sustained Iranian drone attacks are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems. Russian intelligence sharing with Iran will likely enable Iran to better identify vulnerabilities in regional air defence networks and refine targeting for future strikes.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, and in Bahrain, at least two individuals have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and have arrested at least 313 people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 09 Mar 2026 – 10 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 10 March.
  • As of 10 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
  • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • Overnight 9-10 March, one person was killed, and eight were injured in an Iranian attack drone strike on a residential building in Manama, Bahrain.
  • The frequency of Iranian attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia is highly likely increasing, in comparison to the earlier phases of the conflict when Saudi Arabia was targeted significantly less than other countries in the Arabian Peninsula.
  • A drone strike on 10 March at the UAE’s state-run ADNOC’s Ruwais refinery resulted in a fire, leading to the closure of the facility. Iranian strikes against oil and gas infrastructure have likely escalated in retaliation for Israeli strikes against Iranian oil infrastructure.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 10 March.

As of 10 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

Saudi Arabia’s Defence Ministry stated that it intercepted a ballistic missile headed for the Eastern Province late 9 March and destroyed multiple attack drones near Al Kharj and the Shaybah oil field. On 10 March, authorities said another attack drone was destroyed east of Al Kharj; two more were intercepted in the Eastern Province, and nine attack drones heading toward Shaybah were intercepted over Eastern Province. Saudi authorities also said a drone fell in a residential area in Al-Zulfi governorate on 10 March, causing some damage but with no injuries confirmed as of yet. The frequency of Iranian attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia is highly likely increasing, in comparison to the earlier phases of the conflict when Saudi Arabia was targeted significantly less than other countries in the Arabian Peninsula.

There have been at least two deaths and 12 injuries from Iranian strikes in Saudi Arabia as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March 2026.

As of 10 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports. Air France on 9 March extended its suspension of flights to and from Riyadh through 13 March.

On 10 March, Kuwait’s air defence systems intercepted incoming ballistic missiles and attack drones. Air raid sirens also sounded overnight 9-10 March, with air defences intercepting two ballistic missiles and six attack drones, which were reportedly aimed at the country’s northern and southern areas. Air defences had previously intercepted 14 ballistic missiles and four attack drones earlier on 9 March. Additionally, on 9 March, Jordan’s Prime Minister Jafar Hassan and Kuwait’s Prime Minister Ahmad Abdullah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah held a phone call, during which they reportedly exchanged views on the regional conflict, reiterated a firm rejection of the Iranian attacks, and stressed that stronger diplomatic engagement is needed to calm tensions.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Early 10 March, explosions were heard over Bahrain as air raid sirens sounded. According to the Ministry of Interior, the fire that broke out at the Bapco oil refinery in Al-Mu’amirah, south of Manama has been brought under control, with limited material damage and no loss of life. Overnight 9-10 March, one person was killed and eight injured in an Iranian attack drone strike on a residential building in Manama. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed that a fire was burning at Bahrain’s Isa Air Base which hosts US troops, following the overnight attacks.

At least one person has been killed, and 40 have been injured in Bahrain, as of  09:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

On 10 March, multiple explosions were heard in Qatar, with the Ministry of Defence announcing that Qatar had been subjected to a “missile attack”. Qatar’s Interior Ministry issued an emergency alert calling on citizens to stay indoors and away from windows due to the high security threat level.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that they will operate limited flights from Doha Airport (DOH), with services to 15 destinations confirmed for 11 March. Aircraft depart with their transponders switched off as a safety precaution and may not appear on flight tracking platforms.

Emirati authorities stated that its air defences responded to a missile threat on 10 March, with the Defence Ministry saying sounds heard across the UAE were caused by the interception of missiles and drones. Civil aviation authorities have announced a complete ban on all drones and light sports aircraft, including suspended permits for drones, gliders, paragliders and sports aircraft. A drone strike on 10 March at the UAE’s state-run ADNOC’s Ruwais refinery resulted in a fire, leading to the closure of the facility. Iranian strikes against oil and gas infrastructure have likely escalated in retaliation for Israeli strikes against Iranian oil infrastructure.

At least six people have been killed and 122 injured as of 12:00 UTC on 10 March.

As of 10 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. On 9 March, the airline Air France extended the suspension of flights running from Dubai until 13 March to the ongoing security situation.

Oman played a crucial role as a mediator in the negotiations between the US and Iran prior to the current conflict. Almost certainly reflective of this mediating role, Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi stated on 9 March that “[b]oth regional and US interests will truly be served by a ceasefire now and a return to diplomacy as soon as possible”. Moreover, Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq congratulated Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, on his appointment on 9 March.

At least one person has been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has further escalated strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities. Recent US and Israeli strikes targeting oil facilities in Iran are likely to result in Iranian retaliatory attacks targeting energy infrastructure and other economically significant targets across the Gulf.

The Gulf States are highly dependent on desalination for drinking water, domestic use, and industrial purposes. In Kuwait, 90 per cent of drinking water is obtained from desalination plants, compared with 86 per cent in Oman, 70 per cent in Saudi Arabia, and 42 per cent in the UAE. Sustained attacks on desalination facilities are likely to have significant impacts on national water security.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates the volume of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has diminished since 28 February. It is almost certain that the US-Israeli strike campaign, combined with heavy ballistic missile usage, has diminished Iran’s ballistic missile stockpiles. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term.

Sustained Iranian drone attacks are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems. Russian intelligence sharing with Iran will likely enable Iran to better identify vulnerabilities in regional air defence networks and refine targeting of future strikes.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, and in Bahrain, at least two individuals have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and have arrested at least 313 people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 08 Mar 2026 – 09 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran.
  • As of 9 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
  • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • Overnight 8-9 March, at least 32 people were injured in the Sitra area south of Manama, following an alleged drone strike on a residential area. All those injured were Bahraini citizens. Contrary to initial reports, videos shared on social media show an interceptor missile mistakenly striking the area. The exact cause of the injuries remains unconfirmed.
  • On 8 March, Saudi officials reported that two people were killed and several more injured by a strike on a residential area in Al-Kharj. These are the first reported casualties recorded in Saudi Arabia since the start of the conflict.
  • On 9 March, Iranian officials selected Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Ali Khamenei, as the regime’s new Supreme Leader. The appointment constitutes a victory for the hardline political and religious factions of the Islamic Republic, and for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). US officials have threatened to target Khamenei.​

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 9 March.

As of 9 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 8 March, Saudi officials stated that two people died and twelve were injured after an unspecified “military projectile” fell in a residential location in Al-Kharj governorate. This is the first confirmed attack resulting in casualties in Saudi Arabia. Earlier, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had stated that they targeted radar installations in Al-Kharj. The Prince Sultan Air Base is located approximately 20km southeast of Al-Kharj and is regularly used by US forces.

As of 9 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

On 9 March, Iran’s IRGC stated that its navy targeted Al-Adiri helicopter airbase with attack drones and cruise missiles. The IRGC claims to have destroyed the base’s fuel and gas tanks, US helicopter ramps, and logistics and support facilities. Overnight 8-9 March, the Kuwait Defence Ministry stated that air defences were activated in response to the missile and drone threat.

The Kuwait Electricity Ministry stated that a small fire in one fuel tank was extinguished after breaking out at Subiya Power and Water Distillation Plant; drone fragments were discovered at the fire’s origin. Another fire was recorded at Shuwaikh Power and Water Distillation Station on 9 March. The two facilities are located on opposite sides of Kuwait Bay. The plants are critical in supplying both electricity and desalinated water to Kuwait’s population and industry. The Kuwaiti military stated that three ballistic missiles were shot down in total on 8 March.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Air raid sirens sounded in Bahrain on 9 March, with the public urged to seek shelter. A fire was reported at the Bapco oil refinery in Al-Mu’amirah, south of Manama, after Iranian strikes. No casualties were reported; however, Bapco Energies declared force majeure on the group’s operations.

Overnight 8-9 March, at least 32 people were injured (four in critical condition) in the Sitra area south of Manama, following an alleged drone strike on a residential area. All those injured were Bahraini citizens. Contrary to initial reports, unverified footage shared on social media potentially indicates an interceptor missile mistakenly striking the area. The exact cause of the injuries remains unconfirmed.

At least one person has been killed, and 40 have been injured in Bahrain, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

On 9 March, Qatar’s military stated that it intercepted 17 ballistic missiles and six attack drones in the latest Iranian attack. Qatar’s Ministry of Defence also stated that its air defences intercepted a “missile attack” overnight, without specifying the number of missiles. Local media reported that explosions, likely from missile interceptions, were heard in Doha.

On 9 March, the Qatari Ministry of Interior stated that the General Directorate of Criminal Investigations had arrested over 300 individuals of various nationalities in connection with the filming, dissemination, and publication of misleading information. The arrests are highly likely associated with the filming of Iranian missile and drone attacks.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that they will operate limited flights from Doha Airport (DOH), with services to airports including Seoul (ICN), London Heathrow (LHR), Delhi (DEL), Madrid (MAD), Islamabad (ISB), and Beijing (PKX) scheduled on 9 and 10 March. Aircraft depart with their transponders switched off as a safety precaution and may not appear on flight tracking platforms.

On 9 March, the UAE Ministry of Defence stated that two soldiers had died after a helicopter suffered a technical malfunction and crashed at an undisclosed location.

On 9 March, UAE officials stated that they had detected 15 ballistic missiles and 18 drones. UAE air defences intercepted 15 missiles, with three falling into the sea, and 17 drones, the last falling in the country’s territory. At least two people were injured in Abu Dhabi in two separate incidents caused by falling debris following successful interceptions. Authorities also reported that falling debris caused a fire in Fujairah near oil sector infrastructure.

At least four people have been killed and 112 injured as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is increasingly being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

At least one person has been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.


On 9 March, Iran’s Assembly of Experts elected Mojtaba Khamenei as the country’s new Supreme Leader. Mojtaba is the son of his predecessor, Ali Khamenei, who was killed during the opening strikes of the conflict. Mojtaba Khamenei is widely seen as a hardliner, with deep ideological and political ties to the IRGC. US President Donald Trump stated that the new Supreme Leader “[is] going to have to get approval from [the US]” or “he’s not going to last long.” Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment is likely an indication that the Iranian leadership intends to maintain a hardline and aggressive posture rather than pursue immediate de-escalation.

Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has further escalated strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities. Recent US and Israeli strikes targeting oil facilities in Iran are likely to result in Iranian retaliatory attacks targeting energy infrastructure and other economically significant targets across the Gulf.

The Gulf States are highly dependent on desalination for drinking water, domestic use, and industrial purposes. In Kuwait, 90 per cent of drinking water is obtained from desalination plants, compared with 86 per cent in Oman, 70 per cent in Saudi Arabia, and 42 per cent in the UAE. Sustained attacks on desalination facilities are likely to have significant impacts on national water security.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates the volume of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has diminished since 28 February. It is almost certain that the US-Israeli strike campaign, combined with heavy ballistic missile usage, has diminished Iran’s ballistic missile stockpiles. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term.

Sustained Iranian drone attacks are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems. Russian intelligence sharing with Iran will likely enable Iran to better identify vulnerabilities in regional air defence networks and refine targeting of future strikes.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, and in Bahrain, two individuals were arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

Solace Global at ASIS Europe 2026

Stand G3 | Antwerp | 23-25 March 2026

Our team will be on hand throughout the event to share how Solace supports organisations with travel risk management, secure journey planning, and operational oversight in complex environments.


Event details

When

23-25 March 2025

Where

Antwerp, Belgium


AT THE STAND

Throughout the event, our team will be hosting a series of expert briefings at the stand, sharing practical insights drawn from real-world operational experience.

Topics will include why more CEOs and boards are prioritising security, how organisations can select the right communications for different operating environments, and what recent events in the Middle East have revealed about crisis readiness inside the operations room.

Board-level exposure has shifted. Visibility is higher, scrutiny is sharper, and leadership travel is under greater observation than ever before.

What now constitutes the minimum standard for executive protection – and how is that benchmark evolving? For security leaders responsible for safeguarding senior decision-makers, understanding where the industry is moving is becoming part of the role itself.

Tuesday 24th March – 10.20am

Wednesday 25th March – 10.50am


Communications resilience is shaped long before deployment. It sits in the architecture – layered systems, alternative pathways, power continuity and governance oversight designed to withstand disruption, interference and cross-border complexity.

For security and operations leaders, the real question is not simply what equipment to issue, but who owns resilience, how it is configured, and whether it is simple enough to work under pressure without specialist intervention.

Tuesday 24th March – 12.30pm

Wednesday 25th March – 1.10pm


The recent Middle East evacuations were not shaped by the first strike, but by months of sustained intelligence monitoring, scenario mapping and clearly defined mobilisation thresholds. When conflict escalated, teams were already aligned, CONOPS were established and movement options had been assessed.

Crisis readiness is not reactive; it is built through sustained preparation, structured oversight and the ability to act immediately when the window opens.

Tuesday 24th March – 3.10pm

Wednesday 25th March – 1.30pm


Connect with us at ASIS Europe 2026

Share your details below and we’ll get in touch to book a timeslot during the event.

    Global Intelligence Summary

    Gulf Security Under Pressure From Iranian Attacks

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    Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

    SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 12:00 UTC 05 MARCH 2026

    Since 28 February, Iran has conducted multiple waves of ballistic missile and one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV) strikes targeting the Gulf States. Strikes were conducted almost immediately in response to US and Israeli operations in Iran, which resulted in the death of Ayatollah Khamenei. The primary targets for Iranian strikes have been US regional bases, including Ali Al Salem Air Base, Camp Arifjan, and Camp Buehring in Kuwait; Naval Support Activity Bahrain, which hosts the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet; Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar; Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, in additional to strikes on facilities used by US forces outside of the Gulf, including Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan.

    US diplomatic missions have also been targeted multiple times, including the US Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and the US Consulate in Dubai, UAE, both of which were targeted by OWA-UAVs. However, Iran’s targeting patterns have been markedly more aggressive than in previous regional crises, with strikes increasingly directed toward civilian-profile infrastructure and dual-use facilities. Targets have included international airports, hotels, energy installations, ports, and commercial shipping.

    In Kuwait, at least four people have been killed and 35 injured, with several incidents involving debris from successful interceptions, including in the capital region. In Bahrain, one person has been killed and four injured. Iranian missile and UAV activity has targeted Bahrain International Airport, which sustained material damage from a UAV strike. A hotel accommodating US personnel was also targeted in Manama. In Qatar, 16 people have been injured, primarily due to falling debris from intercepted missiles and UAVs in populated areas. Qatar has also suspended gas liquefaction in response to strikes on its production facilities. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), at least three people have been killed and 68 injured. Civilian impacts have included residential areas near Zayed International Airport in Abu Dhabi, injuries to staff at Dubai International Airport, and damage to buildings in Palm Jumeirah.

    In Oman, one person has been killed and five injured in incidents involving civilian maritime and port infrastructure. On land, there has been one recorded injury to a port worker. Duqm port, a dual-purpose facility that has historically been used as a logistics node for US naval operations, has been targeted several times. In Saudi Arabia, the country’s largest oil refinery at Ras Tanura has been hit at least twice by Iranian UAVs, forcing its closure.

    While the intensity of Iranian strikes has significantly decreased since the start of the conflict, sustained strikes have continued to result in widespread disruption. As of 5 March, airspace closure remains in place over Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, while the UAE has only partially reopened its airspace to limited civilian flights. Numerous carriers have suspended flights to the region, and multiple government embassies have issued security alerts, either warning their citizens to depart where possible or to continue sheltering in place due to the heightened risk environment. Expenditure rates for regional air defence systems have been very high, leading to multiple reports indicating that the Gulf States may soon run out of interceptor munitions.

    Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

    To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

    INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

    Iran’s shift to the targeting of critical infrastructure and other civilian profile targets is likely reflective of an attempt to increase economic disruption across the Gulf, pressure regional governments that host US military bases and support operations, and demonstrate Iran’s capacity to impose widespread costs across the region despite being under sustained pressure from US and Israeli joint strikes. Iran may have also calculated that attacks of this magnitude may undermine the long-term presence of the US military in the Middle East by increasing the political and security costs for host nations and raising domestic pressure within Gulf states to distance themselves from US military operations.

    Iran is also likely attempting to pressure Washington and Tel Aviv by provoking international condemnation and economic pressures on a global scale. Attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, followed by the suspension of operations at these sites, combined with a de facto Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, will almost certainly trigger economic shocks and volatility in global energy markets, as well as disruptions to maritime trade and energy supply chains. This strategy is likely to increase international pressure and could help to isolate Washington.

    Before the US and Israeli offensive operations in Iran, the US conducted hundreds of cargo flights to the region to enhance its force posture and defensive capabilities. This involved the rapid deployment and reallocation of air defence systems and munitions to the Gulf. Large-scale and layered Iranian ballistic missile and UAV attacks have largely been contained by regional air defence systems, although casualties and damage have resulted from interceptions. Moreover, joint strikes and high rates of expenditure have rapidly degraded Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, resulting in marked decreases in the volume of missiles it is firing in just a matter of days.

    However, Iran was assessed to have 2000-2500 ballistic missiles before the start of the war, and as many as 100,000 long-range attack UAVs. Iran will likely be able to sustain long-range attacks across the Gulf for weeks, even if its ballistic missile capabilities are completely destroyed or exhausted. Previous Iranian attacks have likely probed for weaknesses and vulnerabilities in regional air defence systems, which could be exploited in future attacks. Moreover, the expenditure rates of regional air defence munitions have been extremely high and in many cases, very cost-ineffective, with expensive interceptor missiles used to counter low-cost UAVs and relatively-low cost missile systems.

    Iran’s initial tactics may have been to force the Gulf States into rapidly expending large volumes of air defence interceptors to degrade regional air defence capacity. If the Gulf States run critically low on interceptors, Iran will likely exploit this by targeting the affected countries with increased attacks, especially with low-cost UAVs, as its ballistic missile capabilities are either spent or held in reserve. This would likely place Iran in a position to maintain small-scale attacks against the Gulf, with increased penetration rates and sustained economic disruption.

    Kuwait, which lies just dozens of kilometres from mainland Iran and borders southern Iraq, is likely the most vulnerable to Iranian attacks, and hosts several US bases. Projectiles can be launched from Iran within close range of Kuwait, providing limited reaction and interception time. Furthermore, Iranian-backed Shia militia groups are highly active in southern Iraq and maintain a large arsenal of rocket, drone, and missile capabilities. However, other Gulf States, especially the UAE, are likely to present more strategically attractive targets for Iran due to their concentration of high-value economic infrastructure and scale of US investment. This has likely been reflected by the number of missiles and UAVs that have been launched against the UAE, which remains the most targeted country in the Gulf. Dubai is located approximately 150 kilometres from Iran, where UAVs can be launched and approach targets, using slow and low-altitude flight profiles, which will likely complicate detection, positive identification and interception and provide air defences with limited time to react.


    CONTINUE READING

    Current US and Israeli military operations mark a significant escalation from Operation Midnight Hammer, which involved preliminary strikes on Iranian conventional military capabilities to enable a US bombing run on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the scale of the US’s current force posture and forward positioning of military assets is the largest buildup in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

    Iran’s current strategy is likely aimed not only at striking Israel and US military forces but also at generating widespread economic disruption, undermining US regional security guarantees and restoring deterrence by positioning itself as a resilient power capable of inflicting widespread damage and costs despite suffering major losses.


    Global Intelligence Summary

    Escalation Risks Persist After US–Israel Strikes on Iran

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    US–Israel Strikes on Iran Raise Regional Security and Energy Risks

    SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 12:00 UTC 05 MARCH 2026

    On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel launched a coordinated military campaign against Iran, designated Operation Epic Fury by the US and Operation Roaring Lion by Israel. Combined US and Israeli strikes have targeted Iranian senior leadership, resulting in the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the opening stages of the operation. At least 40 additional senior Iranian officials have been killed, including the Iranian defence minister, the secretary of Iran’s Defence Council, the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, and the commander-in-chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The combined military operation has also targeted Iranian nuclear facilities, missile production sites, naval forces, and conventional military capabilities that pose a direct threat to combined air power, regional forces and the civilian population across the Middle East. As of 5 March, the US has claimed to have conducted over 2,000 strikes in Iran, and Israel has carried out over 1,500, with combined strikes assessed to have resulted in over 1,000 deaths in Iran, although the death toll is likely to be much higher.

    US President Donald Trump has projected that the operation against Iran will likely last as long as four to five weeks, but indicated that the US military posture in the region is sufficient to sustain operations for much longer. President Trump has also encouraged Iranian citizens to challenge the legitimacy of the current regime and take advantage of the current situation to help implement regime change in Iran.

    Iranian retaliation has involved sustained ballistic missile and one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV) salvos targeting Israel, US military installations in the region, US diplomatic missions in the region, US economic interests, and regional critical infrastructure, including airports, ports and energy facilities across the Middle East, with strikes recorded in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan and Iraq, as well as airspace violation or attempted strikes in Cyprus and Turkey.

    On 5 March, three Iranian UAVs also targeted the passenger terminal of the airport in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan International Airport. Hotels and other civilian targets have also been affected by debris or nearby strikes, particularly in the UAE. Some reports indicate that hotels have also been directly targeted in the Gulf States for accommodating US forces that had evacuated US military facilities in the region. Six US service personnel have been killed in the conflict so far, after an Iranian strike targeted a makeshift US command centre that had been established at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait.

    Iran’s IRGC has also stated that it has achieved “complete control” of the Strait of Hormuz and has harassed commercial shipping, deployed fast attack craft and threatened to deploy sea mines in one of the world’s most critical energy transit chokepoints, through which a significant proportion of global oil and liquefied natural gas exports pass.

    Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

    To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

    INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

    Current US and Israeli military operations mark a significant escalation from Operation Midnight Hammer, which involved preliminary strikes on Iranian conventional military capabilities to enable a US bombing run on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the scale of the US’s current force posture and forward positioning of military assets is the largest buildup in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

    US and Israeli strikes follow three rounds of talks between the US and Iran aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear programme and preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, as well as imposing limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Despite diplomatic engagement, Washington likely assessed that Tehran’s commitment to talks and a potential new nuclear deal lacked credibility. Iran failed to commit to any substantive concessions, maintained its own red lines, and was likely using the negotiation process to delay, test US resolve and potentially to buy time to prepare for conflict. As further negotiations had been scheduled in Vienna for 2 March, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian senior leadership assessed the risk of imminent military action was temporarily reduced, relaxed operational security and provided the US and Israel with a rare window of opportunity to target senior regime figures.

    Iran had likely expected limited strikes aimed at coercing substantive nuclear concessions as part of a broader pressure strategy tied to the ongoing negotiations, rather than an immediate transition from aggressive military posturing to large-scale and sustained strikes. However, Iranian officials had previously warned that even “limited strikes” would be met with a significant response. The scale, duration and depth of US-Israeli combined strikes and the immediate decapitation of Iranian senior leadership likely exceeded Tehran’s expectations, resulting in a significant escalation in Iran’s retaliatory strategy.

    Iran’s current strategy is likely aimed not only at striking Israel and US military forces but also at generating widespread economic disruption, undermining US regional security guarantees and restoring deterrence by positioning itself as a resilient power capable of inflicting widespread damage and costs despite suffering major losses, evidenced by its attacks on Arab nations and attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s objective is likely to drag the US into a prolonged and costly war that drains US resources, provokes domestic and international condemnation, disrupts global energy supply and strains US relations with regional partners. Tehran has also likely calculated that if the US only commits to a military campaign defined by the use of stand-off capabilities like air and naval power, it remains unlikely that the current operations will be able to dislodge the regime. For this objective to be achieved, the US will likely need to deploy ground forces unless the regime is toppled by internal unrest. However, a ground invasion will likely require congressional approval and would likely be detrimental to the Trump administration, which has condemned previous administrations for protracted and costly wars.

    Joint US-Israeli strikes have almost certainly been calibrated to degrade Iranian command and control (C2) structures, integrated air defence systems, long-range strike capabilities and Iranian intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In the opening stages of the conflict, strikes will likely prioritise high-value targets (HVTs), including Iranian senior leadership, to disrupt national‑level decision‑making and Iran’s ability to coordinate a sustained and coherent military response.

    Conventional military HVTs will include systems such as Iranian radars, combat air power and air defences to achieve complete air superiority as quickly as possible, as well as Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, including transporter erector launchers (TELs), missile stockpiles, production sites, logistic networks and other supportive elements. Iran was estimated to have approximately 2,000-2,500 ballistic missiles remaining in its inventory before the start of the current conflict, and approximately 200 TELs, Iran’s primary delivery system for ballistic missiles, which constitute the greatest threat to Israel, US bases, critical infrastructure and civilian populations in the region.

    Initial estimates suggest that joint strikes have rapidly degraded Iran’s TELs and missile stockpiles. However, TELs are highly mobile systems, and it is unlikely that all of Iran’s TELs will be destroyed in the opening stages. With some TELs remaining operational and Iran still likely capable of manufacturing some ballistic missiles under conflict conditions, it is unlikely that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities will be completely neutralised in the immediate term, despite high rates of degradation and interceptions. Smaller, less concentrated and less frequent Iranian ballistic missile attacks are likely to continue in the near term.

    In addition to its ballistic missile capabilities, Iran was estimated to possess an arsenal of 80,000 operational one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs). These combined capabilities will likely enable Iran to target Israel, US military installations, economic interests, civilian centres and critical infrastructure, including oil and gas infrastructure, ports, and airports, especially in the Gulf States, that remain in range of even Iran’s shortest range ballistic missile systems, which constitute the largest proportion of Iran’s ballistic arsenal.

    Failure to rapidly degrade Iran’s ballistic missile threat will almost certainly place enormous strain on regional air defence systems, with hundreds of expensive Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile interceptors already being expended to counter sustained Iranian ballistic missile salvos and also used to intercept low-cost UAVs. Iran’s ballistic missile salvos have decreased in volume, which is likely reflective of launcher attrition, stockpile conservation and Iranian dispersal tactics. However, even lower-volume salvos, especially when layered with UAVs and designed to exploit air defence vulnerabilities or gaps in coverage, can pose a credible threat, especially to the Gulf States, which are rapidly exhausting interceptor stocks and are located much closer to Iran, providing significantly reduced warning times and compressed engagement windows for air defence systems.

    In addition to Iran’s long-range strike capabilities, Tehran may increasingly resort to asymmetric tactics to project strength, reach and resolve if the war is sustained for weeks, particularly if its ballistic missile and long-range strike capabilities are significantly degraded by sustained US and Israeli operations. Such tactics could include proxy attacks by Iran-aligned groups across the region, IRGC-backed terrorism against Israeli and Western diplomatic missions or the international Jewish community, and cyber operations targeting financial systems and critical infrastructure.


    CONTINUE READING

    Iran’s shift to the targeting of critical infrastructure and other civilian profile targets is likely reflective of an attempt to increase economic disruption across the Gulf, pressure regional governments that host US military bases and support operations, and demonstrate Iran’s capacity to impose widespread costs across the region despite being under sustained pressure from US and Israeli joint strikes. Iran may have also calculated that attacks of this magnitude may undermine the long-term presence of the US military in the Middle East by increasing the political and security costs for host nations and raising domestic pressure within Gulf states to distance themselves from US military operations.

    Iran is also likely attempting to pressure Washington and Tel Aviv by provoking international condemnation and economic pressures on a global scale. Attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, followed by the suspension of operations at these sites, combined with a de facto Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, will almost certainly trigger economic shocks and volatility in global energy markets, as well as disruptions to maritime trade and energy supply chains. This strategy is likely to increase international pressure and could help to isolate Washington.


    Election Guide

    Nepal Holds High-Risk General Elections After Youth-Led Unrest

    Nepal Election Guide 2026 Solace Global


    Sporadic Violence Expected During Nepal General Elections

    On 5 March, Nepalese citizens will vote to elect all 275 members of the House of Representatives (HR), the lower house of the Federal Parliament of Nepal. The elections were announced on 12 September 2025 by the President of Nepal on the recommendation of the government of Nepal, following widespread anti-government demonstrations, which resulted in the formal dissolution of the HR.

    The election will take place under two ballots, one to elect 165 members from single-member constituencies via first-past-the-post, and another to elect the remaining 110 members via party-list proportional representation. A party, or coalition, must receive at least three per cent of the votes to be allocated a seat in the proportional vote. Nearly 19 million people are registered to vote, including 915,000 first-time voters, more than two-thirds of whom belong to Gen Z.

    Approximately 3,500 candidates from 68 different parties, plus independents, are set to take part in the election. There have been no widely published and credible national opinion polls projecting party vote share. However, based on the previous election in 2022 and the seats held at the time of dissolution, there are five major contenders, representing the entire political spectrum, from communist parties to right-wing pro-monarchist parties.

    1. The Nepali Congress (NC) or “Congress Party” held 88 out of 275 at the time of dissolution. The NC is one of Nepal’s oldest and historically dominant parties, and has the largest party membership. It has traditionally been viewed as a centrist and democratic party, with broad nationwide appeal across urban and rural constituencies. It is putting forward Gagan Thapa as a prime ministerial candidate, a prominent reform-oriented leader.
    2. The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) (CPN-UML) was the second most represented party in the HR at the time of dissolution, with 79 seats. Despite holding fewer seats than NC, its leader, KP Sharma Oli, was in power when the large-scale youth-led protests erupted in September 2025, heading a coalition government formed in partnership with the NC that commanded a parliamentary majority. The party is contesting this election with the same leader on a socialist-leaning platform that combines economic development with social welfare.
    3. The Nepali Communist Party (NCP) has recently emerged as a left-wing alliance combining the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) (CPN (MC)) and eight other leftist groups. The MC held 32 seats, with its allies accounting for only limited additional representation in the HR.  Its prime ministerial candidate is former three-time prime minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, also known as “Prachanda”. The party is positioned further left of the CPN-UML, advocating for expanded state intervention in the economy, improved labour rights, wealth redistribution, and stronger implementation of federalism.
    4. Representing the monarchists is the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), campaigning in support of ex-king Gyanendra Shah, who was deposed in 2008. The RPP also advocates restoring Nepal as a Hindu state, reversing the country’s current secular constitutional framework. The party held only 13 seats at dissolution, but has been able to mobilise supporters and organise large-scale pro-monarchy rallies in recent years.
    5. The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) is a newer, reform-oriented party that held 21 seats at dissolution. RSP represents a challenge to old parties, with a strong youth voter base. Balen Shar, a popular former mayor of Kathmandu, will represent the party as its prime ministerial candidate as part of an alliance between him and the RSP.

    ASSESSMENT

    Sporadic Violence Highly Likely Around Polling Centres in Nepal

    Nepal’s parliament was formally dissolved on 12 September following widespread youth-led anti-government protests, which began on 8 September. The Gen Z-led demonstrations were triggered by the government’s decision to restrict 26 social media and online platforms after they failed to register within a seven-day deadline. The protests quickly escalated into a broader anti-corruption movement, with mass demonstrations in Kathmandu and several other cities. The protests resulted in the burning down of Nepal’s parliament building and widespread clashes with police and security forces, who responded with live ammunition. In total, an estimated 76 people were killed, and over 2,000 injuries were recorded. In response to the unrest, the military imposed a curfew, ending the violence. The demonstrations triggered a lifting of the social media ban and the resignation of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli.

    Following the dissolution of parliament, the military coordinated with youth representatives, who discussed the appointment of an interim prime minister on a Discord server with over 100,000 members. The members settled on former chief justice Sushila Karki, who became the first female prime minister of Nepal and was given the mandate to lead a transitional government, oversee the restoration of order after unrest, and organise fresh general elections by March 2026. Karki has agreed to step down following the vote.

    The election will almost certainly represent a contest between older established parties, such as NC, CPN-UML, and NCP, and newer youth-oriented parties such as RSP. Among Nepal’s established parties, older candidates over 40 dominate nomination lists, which contrasts with Nepal’s electorate, 52 per cent of whom are aged between 18 and 40. The established parties largely retain support from rural voters, older citizens, longstanding party loyalists, public sector workers, and patronage-dependent constituencies. The established parties have attempted to expand their appeal to Nepal’s youth through social media engagement, having historically failed to resonate with young voters, who perceive the parties as mired in entrenched corruption, dynastic politics, unrepresentative of younger voters, and having limited internal democracy.

    Despite the attraction of less-established parties and the power of the youth vote, NC and CPN-UML are the likeliest parties to win the most seats. Firstly, they are the only two parties fielding candidates in nearly all 165 constituencies. Secondly, an alliance of NC and CPN-UML won convincingly in the National Assembly election on 25 January 2026, with NC winning nine seats and CPN-UML winning eight, out of the total 18 contested seats. Moreover, the fact that 68 total parties are contesting the election means seat fragmentation is the likeliest outcome, which typically benefits parties with the broadest base.

    RSP is positioned as a key challenger, appealing to Nepal’s large youth base, but its vote share in the 2022 election was 10.7 per cent, compared to NC and CPN-UML’s 25.7 and 27 per cent, respectively, meaning it would need more than double its vote share to realistically compete. The monarchist RPP won 5.6 per cent of the vote and is unlikely to be a major challenger; however, recent pro-monarchy protests may indicate that it will increase its vote share.

    It is highly unlikely that any single party will secure the 138 seats required for a majority in the 275-member HR, suggesting that a hung parliament is the most probable outcome. Consequently, some form of coalition-building will be required, potentially involving ideologically incongruous parties and controversial nominations. Such coalition-building is unlikely to have broad public appeal, especially given long-standing frustration with elite power-sharing arrangements, opportunistic alliances, and the role of patronage politics.

    Sporadic violence is highly likely around the election. On 9 February, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) issued a warning declaring that “[t]here is a risk of protests, political violence and travel disruption ahead of the general election scheduled for 5 March 2026.” Extra security forces have been drafted to ensure order, with around 300,000 officers and temporary election police deployed as campaigning began on 16 February.

    In Nepal’s 2022 elections, clashes occurred around polling centres across the country. In one instance, police opened fire during fighting at a polling station, killing one person. Explosions also occurred near polling stations in numerous districts, although no one was injured, suggesting the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were intended for disruption and intimidation purposes. Similar incidents are highly likely in the upcoming elections, given the highly fragmented political landscape in Nepal and the long history of localised electoral violence.

    The government has grouped polling centres based on risk level, classifying 3,680 as “highly sensitive”, 4,442 as “sensitive”, and 2,845 as “normal”. No “highly sensitive” polling stations are in Kathmandu and Bhaktapur; many are, instead, in more geographically remote areas, with Madhesh Province having the highest number. Three police officers and ten election police members will be deployed to the “highly sensitive” polling stations; three police officers and six election police will be deployed at “sensitive” polling stations; and two police officers and five election police will be deployed at “normal” polling stations.

    One of the major lines of tension is between monarchists and republicans. On 18 February, former king Gyanendra Shah called for the election to be postponed, warning that the ongoing nationwide dissatisfaction could deepen political instability. Nepal experienced clashes between monarchist and republican protesters during large-scale pro-monarchy demonstrations in both 2023 and 2025. In both protests, mass arrests were made, and many people were injured, resulting in the security forces deploying tear gas and water cannon, as well as imposing curfews.

    In November, over twenty youth-led monarchist groups submitted a memorandum calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Karki. Monarchist groups also engaged in demonstrations on 13 February, when thousands of monarchists rallied to greet Gyanendra Shah on his return from holiday, ignoring prohibitory orders around the airport. The calls from Gyanendra Shah to postpone the elections, alongside the recent history of violence between monarchists and republicans, almost certainly increase the risk of clashes around polling stations on 5 March.

    There is also a realistic possibility of civil unrest following the publishing of election results. Former Prime Minister Oli of the CPN-UML, who was ousted in the youth-led unrest in September 2025, could be elected again due to the party’s historical dominance and broad voter base. If CPN-UML fail to appeal to Nepal’s youth, they will likely perceive Oli’s potential return to office as a reversal of the September uprising. Furthermore, many remain dissatisfied with the lack of accountability for the excessive force used by security forces, the perceived impunity for political elites, and unfulfilled reform expectations, and some groups oppose the election itself, arguing that the interim government has “betrayed” the September revolt.


    Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence and Travel Advice

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    This page provides situational awareness and practical guidance for organisations and individuals with personnel in the Middle East following the recent escalation of conflict involving Israel, the United States, and Iran.

    The security environment remains highly volatile, with ongoing military activity, airspace closures, travel disruptions, and government advisories likely to change at short notice.

    This information is provided for general awareness only and does not constitute operational, legal, or travel advice. Decisions regarding shelter-in-place or evacuation should be made following a tailored risk assessment specific to your personnel, location, and circumstances. You should not rely solely on this guidance without first consulting Solace Global Risk or other qualified professionals, as conditions on the ground may change rapidly and options for movement may be limited or unavailable.

    Solace Global Risk is actively supporting clients in the region, including the coordination of secure movements and evacuations from the Middle East. Speak to our security operations team 24/7 to learn more.

    Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 18 MARCH 2026

    Intelligence

    INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 17 Mar 2026 – 18 Mar 2026

    Executive Summary

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 18 March.
    • On 18 March, Iran issued an evacuation warning for oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, threatening that they would be targeted in “in the coming hours”. The warning follows gas facilities at Iran’s South Pars field being reportedly struck by Israel a few hours earlier. Specifically, the warning was directed towards: Saudi Arabia’s Samref Refinery and Jubail Petrochemical Complex, the UAE’s Al Hosn Gas Field, and Qatar’s Mesaieed Petrochemical Complex, Mesaieed Holding Company and Ras Laffan Refinery.
    • On 17 March, Kuwaiti authorities reported two people injured by debris over the previous 24 hours, following attacks involving two ballistic missiles and 13 attack drones.
    • Saudi authorities stated that two attack drones were intercepted on approach to the Diplomatic Quarter in Riyadh on 18 March, with a third attack drone also announced as intercepted over Riyadh.
    • Australia’s Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, stated that deployed Australian troops were safe after an Iranian projectile hit an area near Al Minhad Air Base on 18 March, which is around 24km south of Dubai.
    • Travel agents in Oman are reportedly recording a significant surge in interest for getaways for UAE residents during the upcoming Eid Al Fitr holidays. Heavy traffic is expected at key crossings such as the Hatta border crossing.
    • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
    • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
    • As of 18 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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    Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 17 MARCH 2026

    Intelligence

    INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 16 Mar 2026 – 17 Mar 2026

    Executive Summary

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 17 March.
    • On 17 March, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, stated that Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, and the commander of the paramilitary militia Basij, Gholamreza Soleimani, had been killed in overnight strikes. If confirmed, the killing of two senior leadership figures in Iran is likely to trigger an increased rate of Iranian strikes across the region in retaliation.
    • The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March. 16 March recorded the highest daily number of combined missiles and drones targeting Saudi Arabia, at 72.
    • The UAE’s Ministry of Defence claimed that ten ballistic missiles and 45 attack drones had been intercepted so far on 17 March at 11:35 UTC. At least three explosions were reportedly heard in Dubai; and authorities stated that a Pakistani national was killed by debris in the Bani Yas area of Abu Dhabi.
    • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
    • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
    • As of 17 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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    Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 16 MARCH 2026

    Intelligence

    INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 15 Mar 2026 – 16 Mar 2026

    Executive Summary

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 16 March.
    • On 16 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 64 attack drones in Riyadh and Eastern Province. The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March. The areas most targeted are Riyadh, Al-Kharj (where the Prince Sultan Air Base is located), and the Eastern Province (where key Saudi oil refineries are located).
    • Early 16 March, an attack drone struck fuel tanks in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB), prompting a temporary suspension of operations at the airport. DXB resumed operations later on 16 March.
    • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
    • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
    • As of 16 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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    Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 15 MARCH 2026

    Intelligence

    INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 14 Mar 2026 – 15 Mar 2026

    Executive Summary

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 15 March.
    • Iranian officials have reiterated threats to target US and Israeli private companies across the region, characterising these attacks as “retaliatory” for potential future US-Israeli strikes on Iran’s oil infrastructure.
    • On 15 March, Iran reportedly fired six missiles and 34 drones against targets located in Saudi Arabia. Since 12 March, the volume of Iranian strikes targeting Saudi Arabia has increased.
    • Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
    • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
    • As of 15 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

    Continue Reading →

     

    Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 14 MARCH 2026

    Intelligence

    INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 13 Mar 2026 – 14 Mar 2026

    Executive Summary

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 14 March.
    • The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region.
    • On 14 March, Iranian media linked to the IRGC has advised residents of the UAE to evacuate ports, labelling them “legitimate targets”, following US strikes in Kharg Island. In a follow-up statement, the same media outlet warned residents to “immediately move away” from Jebel Ali, Khalifa, and Fujairah port areas due to likely impending attacks.
    • Overnight 13-14 March, Iranian officials claimed to have struck two Citibank locations in Manama and Dubai with attack drones.
    • Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
    • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
    • As of 14 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

    Continue Reading →

     

    Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 13 MARCH 2026

    Intelligence

    INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 12 Mar 2026 – 13 Mar 2026

    Executive Summary

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 13 March.
    • The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March.
    • On 12 March, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media stated that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.
    • On 13 March, Dubai officials reported minor damage to a building in the Dubai International Financial Centre caused by debris from a successful interception.
    • On 13 March, the Omani authorities reported the downing of two drones in the Suhar Governorate. One of the drones fell in the Al-Awahi Industrial Area, resulting in the death of two expatriates and several injuries.
    • Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
    • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
    • As of 13 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

    Continue Reading →

     

    Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 12 MARCH 2026

    Intelligence

    INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 11 Mar 2026 – 12 Mar 2026

    Executive Summary

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 12 March.
    • The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March.
    • As of 12 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
    • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
    • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
    • In Dubai, UAE, 11-12 March attack drones impacts were recorded in the Al Bada’a area and onto the façade of a building on Sheikh Zayed Road, causing no injuries. An attack drone also hit the Address Creek Harbour hotel, sparking a fire that was brought under control and causing no injuries.
    • On 11 March, Iranian drone strikes hit fuel tanks in Salalah, Oman, setting off a large blaze. Omani authorities said there were no injuries.
    • In Kuwait on 12 March, an attack drone strike injured at least two people after impacting a residential building in Mangaf, southern Kuwait.

    Continue Reading →

     

    Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 11 MARCH 2026

    Intelligence

    INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 10 Mar 2026 – 11 Mar 2026

    Executive Summary

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 11 March.
    • On 11 March, a spokesman for KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces, declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia and Oracle. Moreover, the KACHQ stated that Iran will now move from a claimed policy of “reciprocal hits” after attacks to continuous strikes on its adversaries.
    • As of 11 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
    • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
    • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
    • Qatar Airways announced a limited flight schedule to and from Doha, Qatar, on 13 and 14 March, dependent on the airspace reopening.
    • In Dubai, UAE, four people were injured on the morning of 11 March, after “two drones fell in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB)”. The Dubai Media Office added that air traffic is operating as normal.

    Continue Reading →

     

    Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 10 MARCH 2026

    Intelligence

    INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 09 Mar 2026 – 10 Mar 2026

    Executive Summary

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 10 March.
    • As of 10 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
    • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
    • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
    • Overnight 9-10 March, one person was killed, and eight were injured in an Iranian attack drone strike on a residential building in Manama, Bahrain.
    • The frequency of Iranian attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia is highly likely increasing, in comparison to the earlier phases of the conflict when Saudi Arabia was targeted significantly less than other countries in the Arabian Peninsula.
    • A drone strike on 10 March at the UAE’s state-run ADNOC’s Ruwais refinery resulted in a fire, leading to the closure of the facility. Iranian strikes against oil and gas infrastructure have likely escalated in retaliation for Israeli strikes against Iranian oil infrastructure.

    Continue Reading →

     

    Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 9 MARCH 2026

    Intelligence

    INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 08 Mar 2026 – 09 Mar 2026

    Executive Summary

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran.
    • As of 9 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
    • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
    • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
    • Overnight 8-9 March, at least 32 people were injured in the Sitra area south of Manama, following an alleged drone strike on a residential area. All those injured were Bahraini citizens. Contrary to initial reports, videos shared on social media show an interceptor missile mistakenly striking the area. The exact cause of the injuries remains unconfirmed.
    • On 8 March, Saudi officials reported that two people were killed and several more injured by a strike on a residential area in Al-Kharj. These are the first reported casualties recorded in Saudi Arabia since the start of the conflict.
    • On 9 March, Iranian officials selected Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Ali Khamenei, as the regime’s new Supreme Leader. The appointment constitutes a victory for the hardline political and religious factions of the Islamic Republic, and for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). US officials have threatened to target Khamenei.​

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    The Global Risk Podcast | Is the US Prepared for a Prolonged War with Iran?

    Intelligence

    This week’s Global Intelligence Briefing covers the increased terrorism threat in the United States following the outbreak of war with Iran, nationwide Bolsonaro rallies in Brazil, Ukrainian frontline advances, US-Israeli strikes on Iran and the resulting regional conflict, Israeli operations in Lebanon, Iranian attacks across the Gulf, Pakistan’s open conflict with the Afghan Taliban, and Shia protests across South Asia.

    Listen now:

     

    Outlook: Gulf Security Under Pressure From Iranian Attacks

    Intelligence

    Iran’s shift to the targeting of critical infrastructure and other civilian profile targets is likely reflective of an attempt to increase economic disruption across the Gulf, pressure regional governments that host US military bases and support operations, and demonstrate Iran’s capacity to impose widespread costs across the region despite being under sustained pressure from US and Israeli joint strikes. Iran may have also calculated that attacks of this magnitude may undermine the long-term presence of the US military in the Middle East by increasing the political and security costs for host nations and raising domestic pressure within Gulf states to distance themselves from US military operations.

    Iran is also likely attempting to pressure Washington and Tel Aviv by provoking international condemnation and economic pressures on a global scale. Attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, followed by the suspension of operations at these sites, combined with a de facto Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, will almost certainly trigger economic shocks and volatility in global energy markets, as well as disruptions to maritime trade and energy supply chains. This strategy is likely to increase international pressure and could help to isolate Washington.

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    Outlook: Escalation Risks Persist After US–Israel Strikes on Iran

    Intelligence

    Current US and Israeli military operations mark a significant escalation from Operation Midnight Hammer, which involved preliminary strikes on Iranian conventional military capabilities to enable a US bombing run on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the scale of the US’s current force posture and forward positioning of military assets is the largest buildup in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

    Iran’s current strategy is likely aimed not only at striking Israel and US military forces but also at generating widespread economic disruption, undermining US regional security guarantees and restoring deterrence by positioning itself as a resilient power capable of inflicting widespread damage and costs despite suffering major losses, evidenced by its attacks on Arab nations and attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz.

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    Latest Update: Airspace & Ground Routes – Israel and Gulf States

    Operations

    Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 06 MARCH 2026

    Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat increasingly used by regional airlines as a hub for relief flights, including services operated by Qatar Airways.

    Israel’s airspace continues to be closed to most civilian traffic. Access is currently limited to military operations and civilian flights that have received prior authorisation.

    Jordan’s airspace remains open; however, operators are being advised to plan for potential delays and carry additional fuel as a precaution.

    • Saudi Arabia: Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf  – Expires 2200 UTC | 5 March
    • Iran: Total closure – Expires 0830 UTC | 7 March
    • Iraq: Total closure – Expires 0900 UTC | 7 March
    • Qatar: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 5 March
    • Bahrain: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 5 March
    • Kuwait: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 5March
    • Syria: Total closure – Expires 2100 UTC | 7 March
    • United Arab Emirates: Closure by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones – All expire 1200 UTC | 6 March
    • Israel: Total closure – Expires 1000 UTC | 9 March
    • Azerbaijan: Southern sector closed – Expires 1939 UTC | 5 March

     

    Latest Update: Airspace & Ground Routes – Israel and Gulf States

    Operations

    Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 05 MARCH 2026

     

    Latest Update: Gulf Airspace Closures Amid Iranian Strikes

    Operations

    Intelligence cut off: 08:47 UTC 04 MARCH 2026

    We note that Oman airspace remains open. In addition, Jordan has removed its nighttime ban.

    • Saudi Arabia: Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf  – Expires 2200 UTC | 4 March
    • Iran: Total closure – Expires 0830 UTC | 7 March
    • Iraq: Total closure – Expires 0900 UTC | 7 March
    • Qatar: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 4 March
    • Bahrain: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 4 March
    • Kuwait: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 4 March
    • Syria: Total closure – Expires 2100 UTC | 7 March
    • United Arab Emirates: Partially closed – Expires 1200 UTC | 4 March
    • Israel: Total closure – Expires 1000 UTC | 9 March

    Solace Global is currently able to evacuate personnel from Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Israel. If you require assistance, our security team is available 24/7 to discuss secure transportation.

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    Latest Update: Ground Routes & Border Crossings

    Operations

    Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 03 MARCH 2026

    Gulf States Ground Evacuation Routes and Border Crossings Map

    Israel Ground Evacuation Routes and Border Crossings Map

    Please Note:

    All ground movements are subject to current immigration and border regulations. Travellers must confirm entry requirements in advance, including visa eligibility, residency status, and passport validity. Border policies and processing times may change with little notice.

    Evacuations conducted by Solace Global are assessed case by case, based on the evacuee’s citizenship and the entry requirements of the receiving country. Route selection depends on border accessibility, security conditions, and onward travel options.

     

    Gulf Airspace Closures Amid Iranian Strikes

    Operations

    Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 03 MARCH 2026

    We note that Oman (OOMM) airspace remains open.

    • Saudi Arabia (OEJD) — Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf  — Expires 2200 UTC | 3 March
    • Iran (OIIX) — Total closure — Expires 0830 UTC | 7 March
    • Iraq (ORBB) — Total closure — Expires 0900 UTC | 4 March
    • Qatar (OTDF) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 3 March
    • Bahrain (OBBB) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 3 March
    • Kuwait (OKAC) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 3 March
    • Syria (OSTT) — Total closure — Expires 2100 UTC | 3 March
    • United Arab Emirates (OMAE) — Partially closed — Expires 1200 UTC | 4 March
    • Israel (LLLL) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 6 March
    • Jordan (OJAC) — Closed daily from 1500 to 0600 — Expires 0600 UTC | 5 March

    Solace Global is currently able to evacuate personnel from Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Israel. If you require assistance, our security team is available 24/7 to discuss secure transportation.

    Contact us →

     

    Gulf Airspace Closures Amid Iranian Strikes

    Operations

    Intelligence cut off: 16:30 UTC 02 MARCH 2026

    • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted ballistic missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran.
    • Iran has further escalated strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, including oil and gas infrastructure, in addition to strikes targeting US military facilities.
    • Airspaces remain closed across Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, as of 2 March.
    • In Kuwait, the Doha West power station, Mina Al Ahmadi Refinery, and US Embassy in Kuwait City were impacted. Most drones were reportedly intercepted near Rumaithiya and ⁠Salwa neighbourhoods.
    • In Bahrain, a foreign vessel in Salman Industrial City and a US-flagged tanker in the Port of Bahrain were impacted. Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was targeted on 1 March by an Iranian drone, causing material damage but no casualties.
    • In Qatar, air defences intercepted attacks reportedly aimed at civilian infrastructure, including Hamad International Airport (DOH / OTHH). A water tank in Ras Laffan Industrial City was also impacted.
    • The UAE has been the second most targeted country behind Israel. Further explosions were reported in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai on 2 March.
    • Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term, and while likely continuing to prioritise the targeting of US military installations, they will also likely continue against civilian-profile targets due to the escalation in Iranian targeting patterns.
    • The UK FCDO maintains its travel advice to advise against all but essential travel to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.

     

    Airspace Closures across the Middle East

    Operations

    Intelligence cut off: 11:00 UTC 02 MARCH 2026

    Latest Updates: Airspce Closures across the Middle East
    • Cyprus: Airspace Open
    • Egypt: Airspace open. Israeli passport holders NOT permitted entry.
    • Jordan: Partial closure on a daily basis, between UTC 1500 and 0600, until March 5th. Israeli passport holders must use this route, open to all other passport holders.
    • Saudi Arabia: Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf
    • Bahrain: Total closure
    • Israel: Total closure
    • Iran: Total closure
    • Iraq: Total closure
    • Kuwait: Total closure
    • Qatar: Total closure
    • Syria: Total closure
    • United Arab Emirates: The United Arab Emirates (OMAE) airspace is not outright closed, but remains restricted by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones, effectively limiting commercial air traffic.

     

    Travel Advice for the Middle East

    Travel Advice

    Intelligence cut off: 12:30 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

    • Avoid all non-essential travel to the Middle East.
    • Travellers should follow shelter-in-place orders and advisories, particularly in Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.
    • Do not conduct travel to the airport until shelter-in-place orders or recommendations are lifted. Once lifted, ensure that booked flights are still running before conducting travel to the airport.
    • Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if situated in the Middle East.
    • Travellers in Israel should familiarise themselves with the nearest air raid shelter and ensure that they have downloaded applications that provide early warning of incoming threats, such as Home Front Command or Red Alert.
    • Avoid all military installations, government buildings, and key infrastructure, which may constitute potential targets.
    • Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
    • Expect the security situation in the region to remain highly unstable in the immediate future. There is an increased risk of further strikes, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest.
    • Prepare an essential “go-bag” containing, at a minimum, travel documents, cash, medications, basic supplies, and communication devices in case of evacuation.
    • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
    • Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

     

    Iran Retaliation Strikes Against US Bases in the Gulf

    Alert+

    Intelligence cut off: 12:30 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

    On 28 February, Iran conducted ballistic missile strikes targeting United States military facilities in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in response to joint United States and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The strikes targeted US military installations across the Gulf region, including facilities associated with force posture, command and control, and logistics.

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    US and Israel Conduct Major Strikes Against Iran

    Alert+

    Intelligence cut off: 08:10 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

    At approximately 10:00 Iranian local time on 28 February, the US and Israel conducted strikes against Iran. The strikes followed weeks of escalating regional tensions, large-scale US military build-up across the region and Tehran’s refusal to concede to US demands regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

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    Our Evacuation Checklist provides a clear, structured framework to support security and incident management teams during relocation or evacuation scenarios. Covering verification, staff accountability, movement planning, communications, and post-evacuation review, it brings together the actions that matter most when decisions need to be measured and well-coordinated.

    Designed for organisations operating across both routine and complex environments, the checklist enables consistent decision-making, accurate staff tracking, and organised execution from initial trigger through to safe arrival. It supports your teams in protecting people, maintaining oversight, and meeting duty of care responsibilities with confidence.

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    Iran Retaliation Strikes Against US Bases in the Gulf

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    Iran Conducts Ballistic Missile Strikes Across the Gulf

    SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 12:30 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

    On 28 February, Iran conducted ballistic missile strikes targeting United States military facilities in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in response to joint United States and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The strikes targeted US military installations across the Gulf region, including facilities associated with force posture, command and control, and logistics.

    In Kuwait, air defence systems have neutralised most incoming missiles. However, “significant damage” has been reported to the runway of an air base hosting Italian air force personnel. Following the attack, Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry declared that it reserves the right to respond in a manner that is “commensurate with the scale and nature of this attack”.

    In Bahrain, the service centre of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet has been “subjected to a missile attack”, according to a statement quoted by the state-run Bahrain News Agency (BNA). The headquarters was reportedly hit, and while extent of the damage is unclear, thick smoke has been reported from the Juffair area of Manama. Bahrain’s Interior Ministry has declared that it has started evacuating people from Juffair.

    In Qatar, which is home to Al Udeid Air Base, the US’s largest military base in the region, explosions have been heard, and air raid sirens have sounded. Qatar’s defence ministry stated that it “successfully countered a number of attacks targeting the country’s territory”, with reports that a US-made Patriot battery had intercepted an Iranian missile. The attacks caused no damage to the air base, according to Qatar’s interior ministry. Its Foreign Ministry has announced that it reserves the right to respond.

    In the UAE, one person had been killed by debris in a residential area of Abu Dhabi following the interception of Iranian missiles.

    Direct strikes have not been confirmed in Jordan or Saudi Arabia. Debris has been reported in the governorates of Amman, Zarqa, Jerash, Madaba and Irbid, damaging several buildings. No casualties have been reported.

    Saudi Arabian media have reported loud bangs and several heavy explosions shortly after the strikes in Qatar and Bahrain. However, direct strikes on Saudi Arabia are unconfirmed.

    Multiple national governments have issued shelter-in-place advisories to their citizens in the affected countries, reflecting the elevated threat environment and the risk of further strikes or indirect impacts.

    Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has stated that “[t]his operation will continue relentlessly until the enemy is decisively defeated”, adding that all US assets in the region constitute a legitimate target. Kataib Hezbollah, an Iraqi paramilitary group, has declared that it will soon begin attacking US bases following strikes which killed two of its fighters in southern Iraq.

    Airspaces are closed across at least eight countries, including Iran, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. Syria also announced it had closed part of its airspace in the south for 12 hours. Numerous airlines have cancelled flights to the region.

    Multiple foreign governments have issued shelter-in-place warnings for Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.


    INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

    The Iranian retaliation strikes against US military facilities across the region are a major escalation in comparison to Iranian retaliatory actions during the June 2025 12-Day War. The Iranian ballistic strikes against Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, Qatar, following US intervention in June 2025, were highly likely intended to be subthreshold for further escalation while maintaining deterrence. In contrast, these strikes were likely intended by Tehran to cause maximum damage against US military interests and fulfil the repeatedly stated threat that Iran would do such strikes in retaliation for US-Israeli strikes.

    Early indications are that the interception rates have been very high, with the US having engaged in a significant buildup of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot anti-ballistic missile air defence systems over the past month. However, early reports indicate that air defences were penetrated by Iranian projectiles at the headquarters of US Navy’s 5th Fleet in Manama, Bahrain. This highlights that even with comprehensive air defence coverage, large-scale Iranian strikes are capable of saturating advanced air defence systems, leading to penetration.

    Moreover, the use of ballistic missiles presents a significant risk of collateral impact, particularly from falling debris outside intended target areas, as highlighted by the death of one civilian in Abu Dhabi from debris. Emergency services are also likely to be operating at increased capacity, which may result in longer response times and reduced availability for non-critical incidents.

    Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term and will highly likely prioritise the targeting of US military installations. However, there is a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, airspace closures, flight diversions, airport disruption, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region. Civilian infrastructure in proximity to military facilities is at risk of incidental targeting.

    Over the coming days, Iran’s capability to conduct mass large-scale ballistic missile launches capable of penetrating advanced air defences could notably reduce. Iran’s ballistic missile Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) are almost certainly high-value targets for joint US-Israel operations, and their use reduces their concealability. However, airspace closures and disruptions are highly likely to be protracted, and shelter-in-place orders are highly likely to remain in place while Iranian retaliation strikes continue.

    If the regime is threatened existentially, Tehran is likely to escalate even further. A currently less likely but most dangerous course of action for Tehran would be to fulfil previously issued threats to launch attacks at US economic interests in the region, particularly oil and gas infrastructure. Furthermore, the Iranian naval forces could attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint for the transportation of oil. Finally, Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Yemen could launch their own attacks against US military bases or economic interests in the Arabian Peninsula. Shia militias in Iraq have the capability to conduct attacks into Kuwait, and the Houthis in Yemen are capable of launching missile and long-range drone attacks across the peninsula, in addition to resuming attacks against merchant vessels.


    Travel and Safety Guidance for the Middle East

    • Avoid all non-essential travel to the Middle East.
    • Travellers should follow shelter-in-place orders and advisories, particularly in Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.
    • Do not conduct travel to the airport until shelter-in-place orders or recommendations are lifted. Once lifted, ensure that booked flights are still running before conducting travel to the airport.
    • Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if situated in the Middle East.
    • Sign up for government/embassy alerts.
    • Avoid all military installations, government buildings, and key infrastructure, which may constitute potential targets.
    • Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
    • Expect the security situation in the region to remain highly unstable in the immediate future. There is an increased risk of further strikes, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest.
    • Prepare an essential “go-bag” containing, at a minimum, travel documents, cash, medications, basic supplies, and communication devices in case of evacuation.
    • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
    • Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.