The attack against the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia, which has now been confirmed to have originated from Iraqi territory, was likely to have been directed or authorised by Iran’s IRGC. The 1,200km pipeline carries an estimated four to five per cent of global crude oil supply and has been Saudi Arabia’s principal means of bypassing the SoH, with Saudi exports through its Red Sea terminus having more than doubled since the outbreak of the conflict, according to the International Energy Agency.

The explicit denial by IRI, the umbrella group for Iran-backed militias in Iraq, is likely intended to preserve deniability for both Tehran and its Iraqi partners rather than indicating non-involvement. The attack likely does not serve any Iraqi factional interest, and the launch site in Maysan province lies in an area of long-standing Iran-aligned militia presence adjacent to the Iranian border.

The attack almost certainly reflects Tehran’s broader incentive to degrade regional export capacity that circumvents the SoH. While Iran’s ability to interdict transit through the strait has been degraded by US escorting and mine clearance, bypass routes have also become a key constraint on Iranian leverage. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline has been used extensively to bypass the SoH. Attacks on the pipeline could also serve as a warning from Tehran to Riyadh that increased Saudi intervention in Yemen will incur higher costs, while forcing Saudi Arabia to disperse air defences to cover threats from the north at a time when the Houthi missile and UAV threat from the south is escalating.

As the US blockade remains in place and economic pressure on Tehran increases, the IRGC is likely to become increasingly incentivised to conduct deniable attacks against infrastructure used to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE’s Fujairah and Khor Fakkan export infrastructure could therefore constitute potential future targets.

The indefinite postponement of the 14 September Salalah meeting likely removes the most viable near-term mechanism for de-escalation in the SoH. The reported submission of Saudi amendments, alongside Bahrain’s refusal to attend, likely indicates that the GCC states are not unified in their approach to negotiating with Tehran on transit arrangements. Moreover, it is likely that Saudi withdrawal from the planned meeting was in part directly related to the East-West pipeline attack. Key Gulf states are also likely unwilling to legitimise long term Iranian regulation of the strait through fees or permits, and a negotiated reopening of the SoH remains unlikely in the near term.

Reciprocal attacks against shipping in the SoH, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea are highly likely to continue triggering further strike exchanges, with neither side likely to de-escalate in the maritime domain without surrendering a key source of leverage. The sustained US “tanker for tanker” policy and Iranian expansion of its targeting zone for vessels have each almost certainly reinforced this cycle. Kinetic exchanges in the maritime domain have repeatedly led to Iranian strikes against targets in regional states, most recently prioritising US military facilities in Jordan.

The conflict in Yemen has continued to escalate with no current observable diplomatic off-ramps. Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia are highly likely to continue, with Houthi statements previously explicitly threatening to broaden attacks in response to further Saudi action. The activation of early warning systems in Taif on 14 September and Yanbu, Jeddah, Taif, Mecca City and AlUla on 15 September potentially indicate a broadening of the Houthi target set, with early warning alerts now being activated outside of southern Saudi Arabia. The highest priority targets for the Houthis likely remain energy infrastructure, military facilities and international airports.  Further alerts across western Saudi Arabia are highly likely over the coming days, in addition to southern Saudi Arabia. Short-notice airspace restrictions and flight disruption at Jeddah and other international airports are a realistic possibility.

Saudi airstrikes have not yet targeted Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah or senior Houthi leadership in Yemen, in a likely calibrated attempt to avoid a major escalation. The conducting of such strikes is likely a key indicator and warning of further escalated Houthi attacks against targets in locations such as Riyadh or Jeddah.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

Iran’s previously announced expansion of the declared threat area for shipping was highly likely intended to restore leverage by widening the area in which Iran can credibly threaten shipping. This sets the conditions for an escalation in Iranian attacks against vessels at anchorage and those conducting ship-to-ship transfers outside of the SoH. The strikes overnight 8-9 September almost certainly demonstrate the execution of this, with Iranian anti-shipping attacks extending to vessels transiting and at anchor well outside the SoH, including off Dubai and in Iraqi waters. Attempted attacks against commercial vessels in the wider Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea, including in the approaches to Gulf state ports, loading terminals, and at port anchorages, are highly likely to increase, which in turn will likely threaten broader escalation.

Washington almost certainly retains a strong incentive to both maintain its blockade and prevent Iran from restoring its leverage over regional export routes, with the US likely to periodically conduct attacks against Iranian capabilities around the SoH when it is assessed they have been reconstituted. Moreover, the previously announced “tanker for tanker” policy has not only been sustained but intensified with the US attacks against Iranian tankers, and is highly likely to further increase the threat to commercial shipping by providing Iran with an additional incentive and justification to retaliate against tankers and US Navy vessels. Additionally, as demonstrated overnight 8-9 September, US strikes against Iranian tankers almost certainly serve as a potential trigger for Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

Both the Iranian targeting of US Navy vessels and use of cluster munitions in Jordan almost certainly represent a notable shift, highly likely increasing the risk of miscalculation and indicating Iranian intent to escalate. A successful Iranian strike against a major US Navy vessel, or any Iranian attack resulting in US casualties, would likely trigger a substantially larger US response, potentially including strikes against Iranian ports, export infrastructure, or leadership targets, which in turn would likely trigger retaliatory attacks against regional states. Iranian retaliation has continued to be directed against US military and maritime targets, but the geographic expansion of vessel targeting and the use of cluster munition warheads highly likely indicate that Tehran is becoming less constrained in how it calibrates its response. This likely reflects the initial application of the escalatory principles outlined in Iran’s new offensive doctrine on 26 August.

As economic pressure on the regime increases and Iran’s ability to threaten shipping continues to be degraded, IRGC hardliners who exercise considerable control in Tehran will highly likely continue to advocate for further escalation to break the deadlock. Further escalation pathways for Iran include the expansion of its targeting to include the Gulf energy and export infrastructure, which circumvent the SoH, such as Fujairah and Khor Fakkan in the UAE, in order to impose greater costs and restore leverage.

Riyadh is likely to sustain operations against the Houthis in Yemen, and the Houthis have almost certainly calculated that cross-border attacks against Saudi economic and energy infrastructure represent their principal means of imposing costs on Riyadh and of deterring further Saudi intervention. They are therefore highly likely to continue these attacks absent a negotiated ceasefire. Further Houthi attacks against airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran are likely in the short term, with deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other major targets also likely in the event of sustained Saudi involvement or further escalation.

Riyadh’s intervention has so far likely been deliberately calibrated to avoid a return to the full-scale conflict with the Houthis conducted prior to 2022, with air strikes conducted primarily in front-line areas such as Taiz and Marib in support of  Saudi-backed IRG ground forces rather than against Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah, or Houthi leadership. However, the reported Houthi seizure of Mocha, Dhubab, and Perim Island almost certainly constitutes the most significant territorial change in Yemen since 2022 and, crucially, gives the Houthis significant capability to interdict traffic through the BaM directly, increasing the threat to Red Sea export routes.

The Houthi statement that navigation remains safe for all shipping other than Saudi vessels is likely intended to avoid provoking intervention from the US while concentrating pressure on Riyadh. An expansion of Saudi air strikes in Houthi-controlled Yemen, both geographically and in terms of target set, remains a key indicator and warning of further escalation characterised by Houthi attacks launched against targets beyond southern Saudi Arabia.  

If the potential incident along the East-West pipeline is confirmed as a Houthi attack, Saudi retaliation is likely. The pipeline is Saudi Arabia’s principal alternative export route while the SoH remains disrupted, and a successful strike against it would almost certainly be assessed by Riyadh as a strategic-level escalation warranting a response beyond current front-line air operations. This would in turn likely trigger intensified Houthi attacks against Saudi territory, energy infrastructure, and shipping.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly derived from its ability to disrupt transit through the SoH, and this leverage has highly likely been substantially eroded. Rezaei’s comment that the US is successfully guiding vessels through the SoH is the first official acknowledgement by Iran that the US is successfully circumventing Iran’s intended SoH closure. Alongside the announced expansion of the restricted zone, this highly likely indicates that Tehran assesses that its existing campaign against shipping in the SoH is no longer providing the intended degree of leverage. The expansion of the declared threat area is likely intended to restore leverage by widening the area in which Iran can credibly threaten shipping, likely setting the conditions for escalated Iranian anti-shipping attacks against vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers outside of the SoH. Attempted attacks against commercial vessels in the wider Persian Gulf, including in the approaches to Gulf state ports and loading terminals, and in the Gulf of Oman, are likely to increase, which in turn will likely threaten broader escalation.

Washington almost certainly retains a strong incentive to prevent Iran from restoring its leverage in the SoH. Further US strikes against Iranian maritime and shipping assets are likely following Iranian attacks against US Navy vessels or commercial shipping. The previously announced “tanker for tanker” policy has been sustained with further US attacks against Iranian tankers, and is highly likely to further increase the threat to commercial shipping by providing Iran with an additional incentive to retaliate directly against tankers and US Navy vessels. US strikes against Iranian tankers also likely serve as a potential trigger for Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

The Iranian targeting of US Navy vessels almost certainly represents a notable escalation, and highly likely increases the risk of miscalculation. A successful Iranian strike against a major US naval vessel, or any Iranian attack resulting in US casualties, would likely trigger a substantially larger US response, potentially including strikes against Iranian ports, export infrastructure, or leadership targets, which in turn would likely trigger retaliatory attacks against analogous targets in regional states.

Iranian retaliation has recently continued to be directed against US military and maritime targets rather than the broader target profile threatened under the disproportionate retaliation principle outlined in Iran’s new offensive doctrine on 26 August. This likely indicates that Tehran is continuing to calibrate its response to avoid provoking a broader and more sustained US response or a rupture with regional states. However, Ghalibaf’s statement that the era of proportionate responses is over, alongside the announced expanded restricted zone in the SoH, likely further sets the conditions for a broader targeting profile and Iran-initiated escalation. As economic pressure increases and Iran’s ability to threaten shipping is degraded, IRGC hardliners in Tehran will highly likely increasingly advocate for the initiation of further escalation to break the deadlock, potentially including an expansion of its targeting to include Gulf energy and export infrastructure, in order to impose greater costs, restore leverage, and bolster deterrence.

The Saudi-backed IRG counteroffensive in Yemen likely indicates that IRG forces have retained sufficient combat power to not only contest but counterattack against the Houthi advance, although reported territorial gains remain unverified. The tempo of air operations against the Houthis conducted between 4 and 8 September, across Taiz, Hodeidah, al-Jawf, Marib, and al-Bayda, highly likely exceeds the IRG’s capabilities, and many, if not all, of the air strikes were likely conducted by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). It is also almost certain that Saudi Arabia is providing other support, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), to IRG forces. The developments almost certainly confirm that the Yemeni civil war has fully resumed, and that the de facto ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis that had held since 2022 has collapsed.

The Houthi attack against southern Saudi Arabia overnight 7-8 September is almost certainly the most significant Houthi attack against the kingdom since the Houthis announced a maritime embargo in July, and the risk of further escalation is high. Riyadh is likely to not only sustain but intensify operations against the Houthis, and the Houthis have almost certainly calculated that cross-border attacks against Saudi economic and energy infrastructure represent their principal means of imposing costs on Riyadh and of deterring further Saudi intervention, and are therefore highly likely to continue these attacks in response.

Further Houthi attacks against airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran are therefore likely in the short term, with minimal warning time. Deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other major targets in Saudi Arabia are also likely in the event of sustained Saudi involvement, as are further attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea. Travellers and expatriates in southern Saudi Arabia should anticipate short-notice air raid siren activation, shelter-in-place instructions, temporary suspensions of operations at energy and industrial facilities, and the continued periodic closure of Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

The 30 August and 1 September strike exchanges between the US and Iran,  which were highly likely triggered by Iranian attempts to restore degraded leverage over the SoH, constitute the most significant kinetic escalation since late July. The 1 September US strikes likely represent the execution of an earlier reported CENTCOM plan, with reporting citing three US officials indicating that CENTCOM had developed a plan for limited, periodic strikes intended to prevent Iran from reconstituting the capabilities required to disrupt shipping in the SoH. The exchange highly likely does not represent a return to the large-scale operations conducted earlier in the conflict, with Washington’s primary intended instrument against Iran likely remaining economic pressure.

Despite this, the resulting deadlock likely imposes greater costs on Tehran than on Washington. Iran is therefore likely to become increasingly incentivised to initiate its own escalation to break it, which is likely to increase the risk that calibrated exchanges could develop into a major escalation or more sustained conflict.

Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly derived from its ability to disrupt transit through the SoH, and this leverage has likely been substantially eroded with the clearing of sea mines, the establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast and the rerouting of some Gulf exports away from the SoH entirely. A planned minelaying operation using rockets on 30 August almost certainly highlights that Tehran retains a strong incentive to restore its leverage over the SoH, despite the high risks of direct military confrontation with the US. Further Iranian attempts to mine the Strait or to intensify attacks on commercial shipping transiting the SoH are highly likely in the coming weeks, with these actions likely risking further kinetic exchanges.

Washington concurrently almost certainly retains a strong incentive to prevent Iran from restoring this leverage. Further US strikes comparable to the 1 September strikes are likely if it is assessed that Iran is reconstituting its ability to disrupt shipping. Moreover, Washington’s newly announced “tanker for tanker” policy, if sustained, is likely to further increase the threat to commercial shipping by providing Iran with an additional incentive to retaliate directly against tankers. US strikes against Iranian tankers also likely serve as a potential trigger for Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

Competing efforts to establish control over the SoH are highly likely to periodically lead to further kinetic exchanges, with Iran’s current course of action prioritising attacks on US military bases. However, these attacks almost certainly increase the risk of miscalculation or escalation. An Iranian strike resulting in US casualties would likely trigger a substantially larger US response, and reported Iranian civilian casualties, including the alleged strike on a wedding party, likely increase domestic pressure on Tehran to pursue a more forceful response.

Iran’s recent retaliation has continued to be directed against US military targets rather than the broader target profile threatened with the disproportionate retaliation principle, outlined in Iran’s new offensive doctrine on 26 August. This likely indicates that Tehran is continuing to calibrate its response to avoid provoking a broader and more sustained US response or a rupture with regional states. However, as economic pressure on Iran gradually increases and its ability to threaten shipping in the SoH is degraded, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will expand its targeting to include Gulf energy and export infrastructure in line with its new offensive doctrine, in order to impose greater costs, restore leverage, and bolster deterrence.

The 3 September offensive in Yemen launched by the Houthis constitutes the first such ground offensive and the most intense fighting since 2022, likely marking a major escalation. The immediate objective is likely the severing of the road linking Taiz city to Mocha, degrading the sustainability of Saudi-backed IRG positions on the western coast. This likely forms part of a broader Houthi objective to expand territorial control around the Bab al-Mandab, consolidating leverage over the strait. Should the offensive threaten a significant territorial reversal, it is likely that Riyadh will assess air intervention as necessary to prevent IRG collapse on the western coast. Direct Saudi intervention with air strikes will highly likely trigger a substantial increase in Houthi cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, particularly against airports, military bases, and energy infrastructure in Jazan, Asir and Najran. A major escalation with sustained Saudi involvement would also likely result in deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah and other major targets in Saudi Arabia.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

Recent mutual exchanges between the US and Iran constitute the most significant kinetic escalation since late July. However, US strikes were limited and likely aimed at denying Iran the ability to mine the SoH, while Iranian retaliation remained focused on US military assets, indicating that both sides were seeking to contain the escalation.

The 30 August Iranian retaliation strikes likely do not constitute an application of the new Iranian offensive doctrine set out on 26 August. While the speed of the retaliation is consistent with the rapid response principle, the target set is more consistent with Iran’s previous targeting patterns than with the stated principle of disproportionate retaliation. This likely indicates that Tehran calibrated its response to avoid provoking a major US campaign or escalation with regional states.

Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly derived from its ability to disrupt transit through the SoH, and this leverage has likely been substantially eroded. CENTCOM’s announcement on 27 August that internationally recognised transit routes had been cleared of Iranian sea mines, alongside the establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast and the rerouting of some Gulf exports away from the SoH entirely, has likely restored a notable proportion of regional export capacity. The claimed planned minelaying operation using rockets on 30 August almost certainly indicates that Tehran retains a strong incentive to restore its leverage over the SoH, despite the high risks of direct military confrontation with the US. Further Iranian attempts to mine the strait or to intensify attacks on commercial shipping transiting the SoH are highly likely in the coming weeks, with these actions likely risking further kinetic exchanges.

If President Trump approves the reported CENTCOM plan for limited and periodic strikes against reconstituted Iranian minelaying, radar, air defence, and anti-ship missile capabilities around the SoH, this would almost certainly lead to Iranian retaliation against US installations in regional states following any US strikes. Moreover, such escalation cycles would almost certainly increase the risk of miscalculation, potentially broadening the conflict beyond limited and calibrated exchanges. There is a realistic possibility that in an effort to impose greater costs, restore leverage and implement its newly stated offensive doctrine to bolster deterrence, Iranian forces may expand the targeting profile for retaliation strikes to include Gulf state energy infrastructure, ports and airports.

The targeting of the UAE by Iran likely marks a notable shift. Iran has likely refrained from targeting the UAE in recent months for economic reasons. However, the Emirati claims of suspending trade and financial transactions with Iran, alongside the US secondary sanctions campaign, almost certainly threaten this key incentive for that restraint. Despite this, early reporting indicates the attack against the UAE was highly limited and likely performative. Therefore, the attempted attack was likely intended as a warning to the UAE against enforcing US measures or implementing its announced financial embargo.

Warning time for further Iranian attacks against regional states would almost certainly be minimal, as demonstrated on 30 August, when Iranian strikes followed the US strikes within hours. Travellers and expatriates in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE should anticipate short-notice air raid warnings, shelter-in-place instructions, and temporary airport or airspace closures, and should avoid proximity to military installations, which remain a key Iranian target priority.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

The combination of US Treasury messaging on economic coercion as a substitute for kinetic force, Rubio’s reported private assurances to allies, and the reported planning of returning diplomatic staff to regional posts indicate that the US is unlikely to initiate major offensive operations against Iran in the short term.

However, the risk that Iran now initiates offensive escalation has highly likely risen. Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly been derived from its ability to interdict transit through the SoH. This leverage has likely been recently degraded; the establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast, the widespread adoption of night-time dark transits, and the rerouting of Gulf exports away from the SoH entirely have likely restored a notable proportion of regional export capacity. Moreover, reported transit and export volumes are likely higher than publicly tracked figures indicate, due to the use of dark transits and ship-to-ship transfers used to obfuscate export activity.

The combination of degraded maritime leverage and intensified economic pressure through Operation Economic Outcast and the US blockade likely increases Tehran’s incentive to escalate militarily, both to demonstrate that the SoH cannot be transited without its consent and to restore its negotiating position before its remaining leverage is further degraded. Iranian escalation aimed at reasserting control over the SoH, restoring Iranian leverage and imposing costs on the US and its allies is likely in the coming weeks. Iran’s most likely course of action is to increase attacks against commercial vessels using the southern transit corridor and may also involve further limited mining operations. However, these actions will likely increase the risk of direct military confrontation with the US, which has yet to conduct any meaningful force reductions in the region.

Attacks against Gulf state energy infrastructure, ports and airports, as well as US military installations, would represent a more significant escalation. The risk of this is highly likely to increase if Gulf states and other major trading partners comply with US sanctions and if Tehran fails to effectively circumnavigate the sanctions. Iran’s new SNSC head, Rezaei, has already made direct threats against regional energy infrastructure. Rezaei’s specific reference to export routes bypassing the SoH likely indicates that Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea infrastructure at Yanbu, alongside pipeline, port, and loading infrastructure in the UAE, particularly at Fujairah, is being framed by Tehran as legitimate targets if it assesses that the Gulf states are supporting the US economic campaign.

Moreover, the four principles outlined by the Iranian Artesh spokesperson, Akraminia, codify the lowering of Iran’s threshold for the first use of force and widen the scope of ‘legitimate’ targets. The pre-emptive action principle in particular almost certainly indicates an increased risk of Iran initiating an exchange. Akraminia cited the 28 July strike on Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan, despite a lack of US offensive action, as evidence for the doctrinal shift. The stated trigger, an adversary assembling personnel and equipment, is broad enough that routine force rotations, air defence deployments, or naval movements could be interpreted by Iran as indicators and warnings of an imminent attack and used to justify a pre-emptive strike, highly likely increasing the risk of miscalculation.

Iran had previously pursued a strategy of analogous targeting, whereby it would respond to attacks by striking broadly comparable targets across the region. However, the disproportionate retaliation principle likely represents a shift from this approach. The new doctrine likely indicates that Iran is willing to rapidly escalate and broaden the criteria for both the scale and type of targets it considers legitimate in the event of renewed escalation. The geographic targeting expansion makes explicit threats to adversary interests across the region, including energy hubs, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and undersea internet cables. However, this remains poorly defined and could extend to other targets.

Pakistani and Omani diplomatic activity in Tehran on 24 and 25 August highly likely reflects continued attempts by regional powers to prevent the collapse of the diplomatic track. However, with no direct US-Iran channel in place, Iranian preconditions highly likely unchanged, and Washington committed to escalating economic pressure to compel compliance, a near-term breakthrough is unlikely. The Iran-Oman track on the management of the SoH remains the most likely source of progress, although Iranian officials have consistently stated that an agreement with Oman would not open the SoH until the US meets Iran’s conditions in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

On 26 August, severe flash flooding struck Rasuwa District on the Nepal–Tibet border. Preliminary assessments indicate that the floods followed an ice-and-rock avalanche, which temporarily blocked an upstream river, forming a “lake”. The temporary dam subsequently failed, resulting in the release of a high volume of water into the Bhote Koshi and Trishuli rivers. A magnitude 4.4 earthquake was recorded at around 08:37 local time, which could have triggered the avalanche, although this has not been confirmed at the time of writing.

Authorities have reported at least 22 deaths, while hundreds of people remain unaccounted for. This includes 384 tourists reported out of contact, most of them foreign nationals, as well as 41 security personnel and several government employees. Disrupted communications and road access mean that casualty and missing-person figures are almost certain to rise as contact is restored with isolated communities.

The flooding caused severe damage in Rasuwa, including around Timure and Syabrubesi, and affected parts of Nuwakot and Dhading. The flooding caused severe infrastructural damage, affecting roads, bridges, health facilities and hydropower infrastructure. Damage along the Betrawati–Rasuwagadhi road has also disrupted access to the Chinese border and complicated rescue and relief operations.

Authorities issued warnings for communities along the Bhote Koshi, Trishuli and Narayani river systems regarding the risk of further flooding and landslides.

On the Chinese side of the border in Tibet, landslides and flooding affected the Gyirong area, with authorities reporting “major casualties”. Border infrastructure, roads and communications have also been disrupted, affecting cross-border movement.

On 30 August, Bissau-Guineans will vote in a referendum to approve a constitutional amendment, which was already unilaterally approved by the military-appointed National Transitional Council (NTC). The proposed constitution would preserve the formal description of Guinea-Bissau as a semi-presidential system but substantially strengthen the presidency. Voting will take place by universal, direct suffrage, with voters selecting “Yes” or “No” to the question: “[d]o you agree with the entry into force of the new Constitution of the Republic approved by the National Transitional Council?”

Under the proposed amendments, the president would serve as the head of state, direct the executive, and chair the Council of Ministers. The prime minister would remain the head of government but would become subordinate to the president. Accordingly, the president would appoint and dismiss the prime minister after consulting parliamentary parties, while retaining the power to dissolve the legislature. The National People’s Assembly, Guinea-Bissau’s parliament, would retain its legislative oversight functions, including confidence motions and approval of the government programme. It would also be renamed the National Assembly, with its membership reduced from 102 to 65 members. Additionally, parties which fail to secure at least four per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections could be dissolved. Critics have argued that the proposed changes would significantly weaken parliament’s ability to check the president, concentrating greater power in the presidency.

The vote forms part of the transition process established following the 26 November 2025 military coup. After the referendum, elections to restore civilian rule are scheduled for 6 December 2026. Transitional President General Horta N’Tam formally called the referendum through Presidential Decree No. 19/2026, after the Supreme Court assented to the process. According to a junta statement in December, neither N’Tam nor the current Prime Minister Ilídio Vieira Té will be allowed to run for president.

ASSESSMENT

Guinea-Bissau has grappled with chronic instability since becoming independent from Portugal in 1973, marked by repeated coups and ongoing political power struggles. The country has experienced at least ten successful or attempted coups, making it one of the most coup-prone countries in Africa. The most recent coup occurred in November 2025, when Guinea-Bissau’s military seized power days after the presidential election and amid competing claims of victory, but before the release of results that were widely expected to be unfavourable to President Umaro Sissoco Embaló.

The constitutional referendum is highly likely to pass. Guinea-Bissau’s shift towards a more presidential system is being framed as a means to reduce institutional conflict and political paralysis. Executive authority is currently ambiguously divided between the president and prime minister. Under Article 96 of the constitution, the prime minister-led government is the highest executive and administrative body. Conversely, Article 103 stipulates that the government is politically accountable to the president and the National People’s Assembly. This unclear division has repeatedly triggered disputes over control of the government, and only one president since 1994 has completed their term in office. As a result, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has recommended that the government draft and adopt a new constitution through referendum.

The constitutional reform will highly likely benefit the military-led transitional authority. While the government’s stated motivation is to end the repeated political deadlocks, the proposed constitutional amendments would substantially strengthen the executive ahead of the planned general elections. Alongside conferring popular legitimacy on a constitution drafted and approved under military rule, the changes would largely centralise authority in the presidency, giving one individual substantial control over the state. Additionally, it would enable the transitional authorities to decide the institutional structure under which the next government will operate, meaning that opposition parties’ powers could be significantly curtailed.

Although the transitional president and prime minister are barred from contesting the December election, the junta appears to be facilitating the return of deposed president Embaló. The Inclusive Patriotic Alliance-Cabas Garandi (API-CG), the Inclusive Alliance Platform-Terra Ranka (PAI–Terra Ranka), and human rights groups have accused the transitional authorities of clearing a path for Embaló while repressing rival political figures, including opposition leader Domingos Simões Pereira, who was detained following the 2025 coup and later placed under house arrest in January 2026. They have also criticised the exclusion of civil-society groups from the constitutional drafting process and called for the referendum to be postponed. By securing approval for the new constitution before potentially restoring Embaló to power, the junta is likely seeking to preserve substantial influence over the country through a proxy administration.

There is a realistic possibility of protests and localised violence due to the constitutional referendum. Following the November 2025 coup, hundreds of people demonstrated in Bissau to demand Pereira’s release, while several civil-society groups called for a general strike and a campaign of civil disobedience to restore “electoral truth”. Further protests took place in April 2026 after the killing of a civil-society activist, with demonstrators accusing the security forces of carrying out a politically motivated assassination. Although neither episode developed into widespread unrest, both involved clashes with the police, who used tear gas to disperse demonstrators. During the post-coup protests, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also accused the security forces of deploying lethal force, including live ammunition, against protesters.

There is also a realistic possibility that civil unrest could become widespread. Opposition and civil-society groups’ portrayal of the constitutional referendum as an attempt to legitimise military rule increases the likelihood that they will call for large-scale protests against what they regard as a sham transition process. Security forces’ previous use of live ammunition also raises the risk that initially localised demonstrations could develop into a broader movement if footage or reports of a severe crackdown circulate widely on social media. Demonstrations would likely be concentrated in Bissau, where almost one-quarter of the population lives. Focal points for demonstrations would likely include the presidential palace, the National People’s Assembly, and the National Electoral Commission.

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown. Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. The conflict will likely remain at a lower intensity in the short term, with neither side currently assessing that renewed large-scale operations are in its interests. However, as long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could break out with minimal indicators or warnings.

Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly been derived from its ability to interdict transit through the SoH, and that leverage has likely been recently degraded. The establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast, the widespread adoption of night-time dark transits, and the rerouting of substantial Gulf export volumes away from the SoH entirely have likely restored a notable although still significantly reduced proportion of regional export capacity. Reported transit and export volumes are likely higher than publicly tracked figures indicate, due to the use of dark transits and ship-to-ship transfers. Concurrently, the launch of Operation Economic Outcast on 24 August almost certainly removes any near-term prospect of sanctions relief for Tehran.

The combination of degraded maritime leverage and intensified economic pressure likely increases the incentive for Tehran to escalate militarily, both to demonstrate that the SoH cannot be transited without its consent and to restore its negotiating position before its remaining leverage is further diminished. Iranian offensive escalation over the coming weeks is therefore a realistic possibility. It is highly likely that Iranian forces will intensify attacks against vessels using the southern corridor, and there is a realistic possibility of attempts to place further mines on the approaches.

Attacks against Gulf state energy infrastructure, ports and airports, as well as US military installations, would represent a more significant escalation. The risk of this is likely to increase as Tehran comes under greater economic pressure, particularly given direct threats against regional energy infrastructure by Iran’s new SNSC head, Rezaei. Rezaei’s specific reference to export routes bypassing the SoH likely indicates that Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea infrastructure at Yanbu, alongside pipeline, port, and loading infrastructure in the UAE (particularly at Fujairah), are being framed by Tehran as legitimate targets if it assesses that the Gulf states are supporting the US economic campaign.

Pakistani and Omani diplomatic activity in Tehran on 24 and 25 August likely reflects continued attempts by regional powers to prevent the collapse of the diplomatic track. However, with no direct US-Iran channel in place, Iranian preconditions highly likely unchanged, and Washington committed to escalating economic pressure, a near-term breakthrough is unlikely. The Iran-Oman track on the management of the SoH remains the most likely source of progress, although Iranian officials have consistently stated that an arrangement with Oman would not by itself reopen the strait.

The Houthi-claimed strike against a Saudi tanker west of Yanbu on 24 August is consistent with the pattern of attacks against Saudi-linked shipping conducted since the Houthi maritime blockade was declared on 20 July, although notably north in the Red Sea. Further attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, and limited attacks against energy infrastructure and airports in southern Saudi Arabia, are highly likely in the short term. Further short-notice air raid siren activation, shelter-in-place instructions, and closures of Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports should be anticipated at minimal notice.

Continued intensified conflict between Saudi-backed IRG forces and the Houthis continues to represent the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce, and the risk that either side initiates a ground offensive remains elevated. A ground offensive by either party would highly likely result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and attack drone strikes against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis highly likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran, and deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of the kingdom also highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown. Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. The conflict will likely remain at a lower intensity in the short term, with neither side currently assessing that renewed large-scale operations are in its interests. However, as long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could break out with minimal indicators or warnings.

The US announcement of an intensified economic campaign, combined with Bessent’s statement that maximum economic pressure would likely preclude a restart in large-scale kinetic operations, likely indicates that the Trump administration is pivoting towards economic coercion as its primary instrument against Iran in the short term.

The principal escalation risk from the announced economic campaign is that the removal of any near-term prospect of sanctions relief likely reduces Tehran’s incentive to preserve the MoU framework, and likely increases the risk that Iran escalates militarily in order to impose costs and compel a return to its understanding of the MoU. Iranian officials stated on 17 August that Tehran had shifted to an offensive posture and threatened retaliatory action within weeks if the US failed to implement the MoU in full. Tehran is likely incentivised to exploit the widely reported US munitions shortage before the US has the opportunity to regroup and regenerate capability. This may result in intermittent Iranian attacks designed to force the US into further ammunition expenditure.

Furthermore, if the disclosed numbers transiting the US-controlled southern corridor in the SoH are accurate, this likely reduces the immediate economic pressure on the US to conclude a deal on the SoH, and increases Tehran’s incentive to further escalate attacks against vessels and/or escalate kinetically in other areas.

The ballistic missile warning issued in the UAE is the first such alert in months, with a false alarm in June and an alert in July for an attack that did not enter Emirati territory. The last confirmed Iranian attack against Emirati territory was in May. Iran has likely refrained from targeting the UAE more recently in the conflict for economic reasons, with the UAE having reportedly released billions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets, after having targeted the UAE with the most projectiles of any country in the region.

Prior to the current war, the UAE was Iran’s second largest trading partner after China. The implementation of a comprehensive trade and commerce embargo would almost certainly impose economic costs on Iran and likely indicate a hardening of the UAE’s posture. However, it remains unclear whether the Emirati MFA statement marks a tangible change in policy, or simply restates earlier publicly adopted policy in anticipation of further US sanctions on Iran. As of 21 August, Iranian flights continue to arrive in the UAE. However, if economic ties are significantly curtailed, Iran may have fewer incentives to exercise restraint towards the UAE, likely increasing the risk of renewed Iranian targeting during future escalation cycles.

The IRGC’s threat to deploy more destructive weaponry in a renewed conflict likely refers to an increased scale and complexity of missile and drone attacks, including larger salvos, manoeuvrable warheads and potentially cluster munitions with an extended kill radius. However, the IRGC has not stated what constitutes a renewed conflict or specified the threshold at which these capabilities would be employed. Should the conflict sustain its current intensity, it is unlikely that cluster munitions would be used directly against the Gulf states and Jordan due to the threat of escalation. However, in the event of a further major escalation, their use cannot be ruled out, with unconfirmed reports indicating that Iran previously used a cluster munition warhead against Bahrain on 14 July. Iranian cluster warheads release dozens of submunitions at high altitude, dispersing them over a radius of several kilometres. The use of cluster munitions almost certainly increases the risk of civilian casualties, in addition to leaving large quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Claimed limited Houthi attacks against an Aramco facility and Najran airport in Saudi Arabia on 20 August almost certainly reflect continuing Houthi prioritisation of attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure and airports, with further such limited attacks highly likely in the short term. Moreover, continued intensified conflict between Saudi-backed IRG forces and the Houthis continues to represent the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce, and the risk that either side initiates a ground offensive is likely increasing.

Claims that the Houthis have deployed approximately 2,000 fighters and rocket launchers to Yemen’s western coast in preparation for an advance south of Hodeidah, if confirmed, would likely indicate the intent to seize terrain overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The successful seizure of this key terrain would almost certainly improve the Houthis’ ability to disrupt maritime traffic and further threaten Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export route.

Commentary from Yemeni political figures indicates that Saudi Arabia is likely marshalling IRG forces to prepare for a range of contingencies without having taken a final decision to initiate a ground campaign, and that any Saudi-backed push would most likely focus on Hodeidah, through which the Houthis import Iranian arms. An operation against Hodeidah would almost certainly result in major Houthi retaliation against Saudi Arabia.

The launching of a Saudi-backed ground offensive against the Houthis or a Houthi ground offensive against the internationally recognised government (IRG) would highly likely trigger a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and attack drone strikes against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis would highly likely target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran, and deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of the kingdom would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown. Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could break out with minimal indicators or warnings.

However, the conflict will likely remain at a lower intensity in the short term, with neither side currently assessing that renewed large-scale operations are in its interests. The US is highly likely constrained by munitions shortages and is prioritising economic pressure through the blockade, while Tehran is almost certainly exploiting the pause to regenerate capability and retains the closure of the SoH as its principal source of leverage. The expiry of the 60-day truce period on 17 August without a resumption of major hostilities likely supports this assessment, and suggests that a de facto pause is likely to persist in the short term despite the absence of any publicly declared extension. The rotation of the USS Abraham Lincoln out of theatre without a corresponding increase in overall carrier presence is likely a further indicator that the US is not currently preparing for a major escalation.

US freedom of action against Iran has highly likely been constrained by the considerable depletion of US offensive and defensive munitions during the war. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a reprieve on SoH transit through an Iran-Oman deal will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran. The scale of recent US procurement supports this assessment, with the US Army awarding Lockheed Martin a contract worth up to USD 58.6 billion in late July for significantly increased Patriot interceptor production, and the US Navy awarding Raytheon USD 22.9 billion to increase Tomahawk production seventeen-fold over seven years. However, these contracts are unlikely to translate into meaningful capability in the near term, meaning Washington’s incentive to avoid a prolonged return to high-intensity operations will likely persist for months rather than weeks.

US CENTCOM has previously conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels in the SoH. These were followed by Iranian retaliation strikes launched against targets in regional states, particularly US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, while attacks against vessels transiting the SoH near Oman outside of Iran’s enforced routes have continued, US strikes have not recently followed these attacks. This likely reflects a current prioritisation in the Trump administration to avoid a full return to conflict and instead attempt to maintain pressure against Iran and achieve an opening of the SoH through the blockade and ongoing Iran-Oman talks. However, vessel attacks such as that conducted on 18 August, which has resulted in a crew casualty, remain a key potential trigger for renewed US-Iran strike exchanges.

Iran’s declared shift from a defensive to an offensive posture is likely intended primarily to compel the US back into the MoU framework. The absence of a specified deadline date likely indicates that Tehran intends to preserve flexibility and to avoid a fixed commitment that would oblige it to act. However, the stated posture shift likely increases the risk that in the coming weeks Tehran will attempt to break the deadlock through escalation calibrated to raise costs to the US. Iranian options reported by US media include the sabotage of internet cables in the Persian Gulf, the fomenting of civil unrest in regional states with large Shia populations like Kuwait and Bahrain, and “potentially even ground operations in Kuwait”.

Iranian escalation conducted through Iraqi militia proxies and the Houthis is also likely to form a component of any escalation, as it imposes costs on regional states while providing Tehran with deniability. A reported drone attack against the office of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region prime minister on 17 August, which Iraqi counterterrorism authorities stated was launched from the border area with Iran, is likely indicative of a continued Iranian willingness to conduct deniable attacks during the de facto pause in the wider conflict.

Further claimed Houthi attacks against Aramco facilities in Jazan and Najran almost certainly reflect continuing Houthi prioritisation of attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, with further such attacks highly likely in the coming week. This assessment is reinforced by warnings from Houthi media on 11 August that attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure would be expanded if Saudi Arabia continues to “stall” diplomatic efforts, with such attacks highly likely to be the primary form of leverage the Houthis can impose against Saudi Arabia. Further short-notice air raid siren activation, shelter-in-place instructions, and closures of Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports should be anticipated in southern Saudi Arabia at minimal notice.

Continued intensified conflict between Saudi-backed Yemeni internationally recognised government (IRG) forces and the Houthis, characterised by further exchanges of shelling, missile, and drone strikes between 14 and 18 August, almost certainly a continuation of the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce. Continued Houthi use of ballistic missiles and UAVs against Marib city and the port of Mocha likely indicates a continued intent to degrade Saudi-backed IRG command, logistics, and maritime resupply in preparation for potential full-scale fighting, while also likely seeking to deter a potential Saudi-backed ground offensive.

The most likely trigger for a major escalation remains a Saudi-backed IRG ground offensive against Houthi-controlled Yemen, although a Houthi pre-emptive offensive to seize Marib before IRG forces can be reconstituted is also a realistic possibility. Both of these scenarios would highly likely result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

The competing US and Iranian maritime blockades continue as of 14 August, with President Trump’s previous statements on “low-keying it” with Iran referring to continued economic pressure against the regime as opposed to major combat operations. The Trump administration currently highly likely regards the US blockade as its primary means of exerting leverage over Tehran to compel compliance. Likewise, Tehran almost certainly sees disruption to transit through the SoH as its primary form of leverage.

US CENTCOM has previously conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels in the SoH. These are typically followed by Iranian retaliation strikes launched against targets in regional states, particularly US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, while Iranian attacks against vessels transiting the SoH near Oman outside of Iran’s enforced routes have continued, US strikes have not recently followed these attacks. This likely reflects a current prioritisation in the Trump administration to avoid a full return to conflict and instead attempt to achieve an opening of the SoH through the ongoing Iran-Oman talks.

US freedom of action against Iran has highly likely been constrained by the considerable depletion of US offensive and defensive munitions during the war. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a 60-day or more reprieve on SoH transit will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran.

Continued divergence in Iran’s negotiating position from different figures is likely attributable to factional competition in Tehran. The absence of a fully coherent regime in Tehran almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with or purposely undermine any agreement made by Iran’s civilian government and negotiating teams, as observed after the signing of the MoU.

Iranian forces have almost certainly exploited any US cessation of strikes to improve their offensive and defensive positions. This has likely involved the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, the importation of new equipment, and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should regular active fighting resume.

Fundamentally, the conflict has likely now entered a lower-intensity phase in which neither party currently assesses that renewed large-scale operations are in their interests. The US is highly likely constrained by munitions shortages and is ostensibly prioritising economic pressure through the blockade, while Tehran is almost certainly exploiting the pause to regenerate capability and retains the closure of the SoH as its principal source of leverage. Consequently, a formal lapse of the 60-day truce period on 17 August is unlikely in itself to trigger an immediate resumption of large-scale strikes, and a de facto pause would likely persist without any publicly declared extension. However, the situation almost certainly remains fragile with multiple triggers for rapid escalation, particularly the ongoing maritime blockades.

The claimed 13 August Houthi attack against an Aramco refinery in Jazan almost certainly reflects continuing Houthi prioritisation of attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, with further such attacks likely in the coming week. This assessment is further reinforced by warnings from Houthi media on 11 August that attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure would be expanded if Saudi Arabia continues to “stall” diplomatic efforts, with such attacks highly likely to be the primary form of leverage the Houthis can impose against Saudi Arabia.

The escalation in fighting between Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) forces and the Houthis, with further exchanges of shelling and strikes observed between 13 and 14 August, is almost certainly the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce. The concentration of fighting in Marib, al-Jawf, and Taiz corresponds closely to the axes along which Houthi forces were advancing before the truce. The Houthi use of ballistic missiles and UAVs against Marib city and the port of Mocha likely indicates an intent to degrade Saudi-backed IRG command, logistics, and maritime resupply in preparation for potential full-scale renewed fighting, in addition to a likely intention to deter a potential Saudi-backed ground offensive.

The most likely trigger for a major escalation remains a Saudi-backed IRG ground offensive against Houthi-controlled Yemen, although a Houthi pre-emptive offensive to seize Marib before IRG forces can be reconstituted is also a realistic possibility. Both of these scenarios would highly likely result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

Greater control over the SoH has almost certainly been a long-term objective for Tehran. Control would not only give the regime a potential source of funds by extracting fees, but bolsters its deterrence, with Iran’s closures of the SoH having almost certainly been its most important source of leverage in the conflict. Tehran’s insistence that an arrangement with Oman will not by itself reopen the SoH almost certainly reflects an intent to retain that leverage until wider concessions are secured.

Continued divergence in Iran’s negotiating position from different figures is likely attributable in part to factional competition in Tehran. The replacement of Zolghadr with Rezaei on 9 August likely reflects an attempt to consolidate control over decision-making and highly likely strengthens Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-aligned influence over any agreement reached. The absence of a fully coherent position in Tehran almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with or purposely undermine any agreement made by Iran’s civilian government and negotiating teams, as observed after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

The competing blockades from both the US and Iran remain in place as of 11 August. Previously, US CENTCOM has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels in the SoH, with Iranian retaliation strikes then being launched against targets in regional states, particularly US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, while Iranian attacks against vessels transiting the SoH near Oman outside of Iran’s enforced routes have continued, US strikes have not recently followed these attacks. This likely reflects the Trump administration’s current prioritisation of securing an opening of the SoH through the ongoing Iran-Oman talks.

Military constraints deriving from the depletion of a considerable percentage of both US offensive and defensive munitions in the war thus far have highly likely limited US freedom of action against Iran. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term as a means to end the conflict, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a 60-day or more reprieve on SoH transit will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran.

Iranian forces have almost certainly exploited any US cessation of strikes to improve its offensive and defensive positions, as supported by an Iranian military spokesperson who openly stated on 2 August that Iran “fully exploited” the MoU to improve its capabilities. This has likely involved the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, the importation of new equipment, and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should regular active fighting resume. Moreover, it is likely that a restart of US CENTCOM operations against Iran characterised by the targeting of Iranian infrastructure would trigger retaliation strikes targeting regional energy infrastructure, ports and international airports.

The claimed postponement of Iraqi militia retaliation on 7 August was likely a product of Iraqi domestic political pressure rather than a decision by Tehran to de-escalate, most likely reflecting the interest of Shia Coordination Framework parties in avoiding further US-Saudi strikes and in protecting the PMF’s position ahead of the government’s 30 September deadline for placing all weapons under state control. The IRI has stated explicitly that the decision is a deferral, and Iraqi militias almost certainly retain both the capability and the intent to strike Saudi and US targets. Any resumption would highly likely occur with minimal indicators and warnings.

Attacks originating from Iraqi territory would most likely target energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province and Riyadh, replicating the drone attacks that Riyadh attributed to Iraqi militias in late July, and there is a realistic possibility that these would be deliberately coordinated with Houthi attacks from the south. Simultaneous attacks from both northern and southern axes would likely force Saudi Arabia to disperse aircraft, radar, and air defence systems across multiple directions, potentially overstretching air defences and exposing gaps in coverage.

Continued Houthi attacks against Saudi-linked vessels, southern Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-backed Yemeni IRG forces almost certainly demonstrate the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which will highly likely remain as long as the Houthi “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia is enforced. The 9 August strike against the Jazan refinery indicates that the Houthis are highly likely to continue targeting Saudi energy infrastructure.

A Saudi ground offensive into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen would almost certainly result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

At 07:34 local time (12:34 UTC) on 10 August, a magnitude 7.4 earthquake was detected 5 kilometres east of San José del Palmar, Chocó Department, Colombia, at a depth of 107 kilometres, according to the United States Geological Survey (USGS). The earthquake was felt as far as Venezuela and Ecuador.

Choco province Governor Nubia Carolina Córdoba-Curi has declared that injuries have been reported and there is severe damage to buildings. Videos and local media reports also indicate major damage in several cities. Buildings were reported to have collapsed or partially collapsed in Cali, Pereira and Manizales. Footage also reportedly showed significant structural damage in Pereira, damage to a cathedral in Manizales, and structural damage in Medellín’s San Diego suburb.

Residents evacuated buildings in northern Bogotá, over 200 kilometres east of the epicentre, while buildings were also evacuated in Barranquilla. However, the mayor of Bogotá, Carlos Fernando Galán, reported that no structural damage was reported aside from some cracks in buildings. There have been no confirmed casualty figures or a comprehensive official damage assessment.

Despite a relative reduction in US strikes against Iran and concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

Greater control over the SoH has almost certainly been a long-term objective for Tehran. Control would not only give the regime a potential source of funds by extracting fees, but bolsters its deterrence, with Iran’s closures of the SoH having almost certainly been its most important source of leverage in the conflict. If accurate, the Iran-Oman proposal being reported as close to agreement would essentially give Tehran the ability to leverage passage through the SoH to advance its objectives for at least a 60-day period. This has been strongly opposed throughout the conflict by the US and several regional states, with this dispute having likely been the key trigger for the collapse of the MoU.

Reporting regarding the potential SoH agreement has been contradictory, with no text having been published and conflicting information being briefed. In part, the divergence in briefings is likely attributable to Iranian factional competition. On 4 August, a senior hardliner politician in Iran stated that lawmakers were gathering documents for the impeachment of Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, and a senior cleric with family connections to the Supreme Leader said on 3 August that President Masoud Pezeshkian has been warned his next resignation request would be accepted. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with or purposely undermine any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government and negotiating teams.

The competing renewed blockades from both the US and Iran remain in place as of 7 August. Previously, US CENTCOM has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels. If further such strikes are conducted, these would highly likely be followed by Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in regional states, most likely US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain given recent target prioritisation by Iranian forces.

Military constraints deriving from the depletion of a considerable percentage of both US offensive and defensive munitions in the war thus far have highly likely limited US freedom of action against Iran. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term as a means to end the conflict, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a 60-day or more reprieve on SoH transit will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran.

As demonstrated since the end of the 13 consecutive nights of US strikes against Iran on 24 July, with numerous subsequent attacks originating from Iraq being conducted against regional targets, the IRGC is likely to continue leveraging regional proxies to inflict sustained pressure on the Gulf states while remaining below the calculated threshold for significant escalation directly against Iran.

Iranian forces have almost certainly exploited any US cessation of strikes to improve its offensive and defensive positions, as supported by an Iranian military spokesperson who openly stated on 2 August that Iran “fully exploited” the MoU to improve its capabilities. This will likely involve the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, the importation of new equipment, and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should regular active fighting resume. Moreover, it is likely that a restart of US CENTCOM operations against Iran characterised by the targeting of Iranian infrastructure would trigger retaliation strikes targeting regional energy infrastructure, ports and international airports.

Continued Houthi attacks against Saudi-linked vessels, southern Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni IRG forces almost certainly demonstrate the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which will highly likely remain as long as the Houthi “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia is enforced. Saudi-Houthi tensions have almost certainly rapidly further deteriorated, with the Houthi targeting of Yemeni IRG forces in particular likely linked to earlier reporting regarding joint Saudi Arabia-IRG preparations for a potential ground offensive against the Houthis.

A Saudi ground offensive into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen would almost certainly result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Moreover, as reflected in the warning given by a senior Saudi official, an escalation in attacks against Saudi Arabia may be characterised by simultaneous attacks from both Houthi-controlled Yemen and Iraq, and may occur regardless of whether a ground offensive is launched against the Houthis. A renewed northern attack axis would likely force Saudi Arabia to disperse aircraft, radar, and air defence systems across multiple directions, potentially overstretching air defences and exposing gaps in coverage.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Despite a relative reduction in US strikes against Iran and concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

Greater control over the SoH has almost certainly been a long-term objective for Tehran. Control would not only give the regime a potential source of funds by extracting fees, but bolsters its deterrence, with Iran’s closures of the SoH having almost certainly been its most important source of leverage in the conflict. If accurate, the Iran-Oman proposal being reported as close to agreement would essentially give Tehran the ability to leverage passage through the SoH to advance its objectives in perpetuity. This has been strongly opposed throughout the conflict by the US and several regional states, with this dispute having likely been the key trigger for the collapse of the MoU. However, indications from reports on 4 August suggest that the Trump administration may now be willing to grant this concession.

The competing renewed blockades from both the US and Iran remain in place as of 4 August, with Iranian forces continuing to conduct attacks against vessels attempting to transit the SoH outside of Iran’s enforced routes on 2-3 August. Previously, US CENTCOM has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels. If further such strikes are conducted, these would highly likely be followed by Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in regional states, most likely US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain given recent target prioritisation by Iranian forces. However, Washington is likely incentivised to refrain from such strikes if the Trump administration is confirmed as having backed the Iran-Oman SoH management deal.

Military constraints deriving from the depletion of a considerable percentage of both US offensive and defensive munitions in the war thus far have likely limited US freedom of action against Iran, but regional pressure also reportedly played a critical role in convincing President Trump to allegedly cancel a planned “massive attack” against Iran. Notably, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly personally urged President Trump on 1 August to de-escalate. However, according to senior Gulf officials briefing US media, some Gulf states such as the UAE have lobbied President Trump in recent days to instead take more decisive action against Iran.

There is almost certainly significant concern among regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, that US strikes against Iranian infrastructure will trigger considerable Iranian retaliation against regional oil and gas infrastructure, as repeatedly threatened by the IRGC and Iranian officials. Growing air defence shortages will also likely degrade the ability of regional countries to sustain continued Iranian attacks, and would likely improve the penetration rates of further attacks from Iran, its proxies in Iraq, and the Houthis.

As demonstrated since the end of the 13 consecutive nights of US strikes against Iran on 24 July, with numerous subsequent attacks originating from Iraq being conducted against regional targets, the IRGC is likely to continue leveraging regional proxies to inflict sustained pressure on the Gulf states while remaining below the calculated threshold for significant escalation directly against Iran.

Moreover, the Houthi attack against Najran Airport almost certainly demonstrates the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which will highly likely remain as long as the Houthi “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia is enforced. Saudi Arabian retaliation for the Najran Airport strike would highly likely trigger further Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, with Houthi attacks most likely to target international airports, military bases, and energy infrastructure, particularly in Jazan, Asir, and Najran.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: