The attacks against commercial vessels transiting the SoH have taken place just over a week after the US and Iran agreed to suspend tit-for-tat strikes that were exchanged 26-28 June. The agreement followed a cycle of military escalation in the SoH, beginning with Iranian attacks on commercial shipping, followed by US Central Command (CENTCOM) strikes against Iranian military infrastructure and subsequent Iranian retaliatory strikes on US military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed to have targeted the Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain in these strikes, which were likely calibrated to remain sub-threshold while signalling capability.

In addition to threatening the broader MoU, cycles of escalation originating in the maritime domain since the implementation of the first ceasefire on 8 April have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against terrestrial targets in the Gulf and Jordan. This pattern was first observed with Iranian attacks on the UAE and more recently against Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. During the 26-28 June escalation, Iranian retaliation was limited to Bahrain and Kuwait,  likely reflecting this emerging pattern of target prioritisation. There is a realistic possibility of a similar cycle of escalation occurring in the coming days, characterised by limited US strikes against Iranian military targets followed by limited Iranian strikes targeting US regional bases, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain, if recently established target prioritisation is sustained.

Currently, Iranian retaliation strikes are less likely to directly target Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Oman, although direct strikes against these countries cannot be ruled out in the event of a significant escalation and/or breakdown in the MoU. Senior Iranian officials and the IRGC have repeatedly threatened that strikes will be conducted against US military assets across the region in response to continued “aggression”.

Iran has avoided directly targeting Saudi Arabia and Qatar since the implementation of a ceasefire 8 April. Saudi Arabia highly likely exerts the greatest level of deterrence against Iran and has maintained regular diplomatic communication with Tehran, while Qatar is currently actively serving as a mediator in the US-Iran talks. However, it is notable that the vessels attacked by Iran in the SoH were Saudi Arabia and Qatar-owned. The vessels were reportedly transiting with AIS turned off and were conducting an outbound transit of the SoH via the Omani route and not Iran’s approved transit corridor. According to Iranian state television, the AL REKAYYAT had also reportedly ignored IRGC warnings. It currently remains unclear if the vessels were targeted due to their ownership links to Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The attacks likely indicate that the IRGC is prioritising Iranian control of the SoH and assesses that limited attacks on shipping will not trigger a major escalation.

The MoU almost certainly remains fragile and is functioning primarily as an extension of the 8 April ceasefire, rather than as a substantive or durable peace agreement. The previous ceasefire was marked by sporadic exchanges of strikes between the US and Iran following continued confrontations in the maritime domain. There remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement.

Iranian adherence to the ceasefire is likely to be undermined by the IRGC, which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The funeral procession for Iran’s former Supreme Leader is ongoing, with the sentiments of anti-negotiation hardliners likely empowered by the proceedings. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government and negotiating team.

The recent exchange of threats between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis likely represents the most significant escalation in rhetoric between the two sides in years, ending a period of relative calm that persisted despite the wider regional conflict involving Iran, the Houthis’ primary sponsor. While the risk of a full resumption of the Yemeni civil war and a return to full-scale conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia is unlikely in the immediate term, the risk has likely increased significantly in the last few days. There is a realistic possibility of further clashes in Yemen and further exchanges of hostile rhetoric between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in the coming days, and miscalculation threatens to undermine the ceasefire in place since 2022.  

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

It is likely that Iran, potentially supported by the Yemen-based Houthis, will attempt to conduct attacks against US naval assets operating in the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, or Red Sea, particularly the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG). The threat environment for maritime transit through these areas is likely to be severe in the event of active hostilities between the US and Iran.  

Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that a US attack would result in retaliatory strikes against US bases and facilities across the region. There is a realistic possibility that Iran will launch ballistic missiles towards US bases in Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, or Qatar. Following the US intervention in the 12-Day War, Iran launched 14 ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, Qatar. Despite resulting in no casualties, the attack caused notable air travel disruption.  

Iranian retaliation strikes against US regional bases would likely lead to significant air travel disruption in the targeted country, a threat of debris from successful interceptions, and the imposition of shelter-in-place orders. Moreover, while strikes in these countries are highly likely to prioritise US military bases, such as Al Dhafra Air Base outside Abu Dhabi, UAE, the targeting of civilian areas cannot be discounted.  

Tehran is likely to leverage the capabilities of its proxy forces to retaliate. The Houthis have threatened to restart their anti-shipping campaign and will likely launch long-range attacks against Israel, particularly Eilat, Tel Aviv, and Ben Gurion International Airport. If the conflict escalates, there is also a realistic possibility of the Houthis launching attacks against US bases in the Arabian Peninsula. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), the loose network of Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq, are likely to launch its own attacks against Israel and US military bases in the region.

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Lebanese Hezbollah did not intervene during the 12-Day War due to their severe degradation and continued Israeli military pressure. However, particularly if the Iranian regime is existentially threatened, there is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah will conduct attacks targeting northern Israel. This would highly likely lead to major IDF operations in Lebanon, including strikes in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and in Beirut targeting Hezbollah senior leadership.

Iranian officials and proxy force leaders have previously warned of retaliation strikes targeting US economic interests in the region, particularly oil and gas infrastructure. This would almost certainly further escalate the conflict and risk drawing in Gulf States against Iran. However, if existentially threatened, there is a realistic possibility of Iran and its proxy forces conducting region-wide attacks against oil and gas infrastructure and other economic targets. Iranian state media has previously threatened to target key economic and technology zones in Dubai, UAE, and the Saudi port of Jubail.

Active conflict in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, and adjacent waters is likely to disrupt international shipping and trade. It is estimated that 20 per cent of global daily oil consumption passes through the Strait of Hormuz. 

There is an elevated global risk of large-scale and potentially violent civil unrest in response to any potential conflict.  Large-scale protests may be staged in major US cities, other Western cities and across the Islamic world. Protests outside of US and Israeli embassies are likely. 

Demonstrations and clashes with security forces broke out on 25 June in multiple cities in Kenya. The protests, which initially began in Nairobi, have now expanded to other cities including Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Nyahururu. According to Citizen TV, protests are also taking place in Eldoret, Kakamega, Narok, Busia, Makueni, Nyeri, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Machakos, Homa Bay, and Kirinyaga. Demonstrations are reportedly taking place in at least 20 of the country’s 47 counties. While precise numbers are unconfirmed, thousands of demonstrators have taken to the streets.

In Nairobi, large crowds have occupied parts of the Thika Road highway, and protesters have blocked streets in the Zimmerman area. Demonstrators are reportedly heading towards the city centre, highly likely aiming to reach the parliament. Security forces have deployed tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowds, particularly in the central business district and outside the city hall. One protester in the capital city was reported to be injured after being struck on the head by a tear gas canister and at least eight people have been shot, according to local news.

Reports from Matuu in Machakos County and Molo in Nakuru County indicate that police have opened fire on protesters, resulting in at least two deaths and several injuries in both locations. Eyewitnesses in Matuu claim that the violence occurred when protesters attempted to enter a police station.

The unrest has led to significant disruptions. Kenya Railways announced the suspension of commuter trains in Nairobi due to the ongoing protests. Additionally, the Kenyan government has taken steps to control the flow of information, with the Communications Authority ordering TV and radio stations to cease live broadcasts of the demonstrations.

Local NTV and KTN stations report that security forces raided their transmission centres and turned off their signals. NetBlocks has reported disruptions to the Telegram messaging service across Kenya, following a government ban on media platforms covering the protests live. Multi-media organisation The Standard Group has declared that it will continue to broadcast despite the attempted ‘news blackout’.

Opposition leaders Kalonzo Musyoka and Eugene Wamalwa have joined demonstrators in Nairobi, laying wreaths outside parliament in honour of those killed during demonstrations last year which killed an assessed 60 people. Former Chief Justice David Maraga is also taking part in the protests. They have called on police to exercise restraint and have condemned police brutality.

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India’s aviation minister has stated that rescue teams have been mobilised. The Chief Minister of Gujarat has stated that officials have been instructed to carry out ‘immediate rescue and relief operations’ and to make arrangements on a ‘war footing’. A green corridor for injured passengers has been arranged to ensure priority at the hospital. The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has been sent from Delhi to investigate the cause of the incident.

While the cause of the crash is unclear, the loss of signal shortly before the crash indicates a critical systems failure is likely. There was high visibility of six kilometres, and there were light surface winds, so a weather-induced accident is unlikely. An investigation into the cause of the incident will almost certainly be quickly carried out by the DGCA and Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), who will attempt to recover the black boxes (flight data and cockpit voice recorders) to determine the nature of the crash.

The last fatal plane crash in India occurred at Kozhikode International Airport (CCJ) in 2020, where the plane skidded off the runway and crashed into the ground. 21 people were killed and over 100 were injured.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will likely declare a day of national mourning over the victims of the crash as casualty figures become clear. If the cause of the crash is deemed to be due to poor maintenance, regulatory failures, or negligence, demonstrations are likely to occur outside the airport or outside government buildings.

There will almost certainly be significant flight disruptions over the coming hours. Flight tracking sources indicate that incoming domestic flights have been diverted back to their airports of origin, and departure flights have been cancelled.

The 2024 Nakba Day protests were the most extensive to occur in connection with the commemoration. Several gatherings that were attended by tens of thousands of attendees were recorded in several cities, with hotspots concentrated in Western Europe and in large North American urban centres. On 18 May 2024, protests in London were attended by an estimated 250,000 people, with smaller gatherings in Manchester, Leeds, Cardiff, and Edinburgh among other cities. Large-scale protests were likewise recorded in Barcelona, Madrid, Milan, Bologna, Berlin, Paris, Marseille, Toulouse and other large European urban centres.

In North America, Nakba Day coincided with several large-scale protests, with major demonstrations occurring in cities including New York City, Toronto, Washington, D.C., Miami, Cleveland, and Portland.

In both Europe and North America, university-based groups have been particularly active in spearheading the unrest, making campuses hotspots of demonstrations. Student groups at, among others, Columbia University in New York, Sorbonne and Sciences Po, in Paris, and Amsterdam University staged large-scale demonstrations and direct action in connection with pro-Palestine unrest.

Nakba Day protests are also common in the Middle East, due to the commemoration’s lasting political importance.  In 2024, particularly notable demonstrations occurred in Beirut, Tunis, Amman, and Rabat. In Israel, protests were concentrated in Tel Aviv, with the local Tel Aviv University being a focal point for the demonstrations.

The ongoing conflict in Gaza has almost certainly contributed to driving larger Nakba Day protests in countries and regions that have not previously been as impacted by pro-Palestinian protests as Western Europe, the Middle East, and North America. In the Asia-Pacific region, for instance, protests were held in cities like Sydney and Melbourne in Australia, and Osaka and Tokyo, Japan.

During the 2024 Nakba Day protests, episodes of violence between protesters and responding security forces were recorded at some locations. For instance, protests in Brooklyn, New York, resulted in around 40 arrests as violent clashes broke out between police and protesters. In Berlin, protests were halted due to the deployment of fireworks, posing a threat to bystanders. In London, local police arrested several people over violent chants and slogans.

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Information correct as of 1200 BST 2nd of October 2024

Update 16th June 2025: We are currently able to evacuate from Israel and Middle East. Learn More →

Nations worldwide are activating contingency plans for evacuating their citizens, with key efforts focused on securing safe transport routes out of Lebanon. Western governments including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, United States, and Portugal, are urging their citizens to leave the country immediately, and preparations are underway for evacuations by sea and air.

Western government actions taken to date:

With a highly dynamic and evolving security landscape, businesses operating in the region are likely to be considering the evacuation of their employees and/or securing their assets. Beirut’s airport remains operational, but safe travel options may become limited due to the rapidly changing situation on the ground.

Case Study: Solace Global Evacuates Personnel from Israel

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Second presidential debate, Trump sentencing delayed, and 6 January 2025 security plans.

Former President Donald Trump and current Vice President Kamala Harris participated in their long-awaited presidential debate on 10 September. The debate was the first between the two candidates, but the second in this electoral season, as current President Joe Biden dropped out of the electoral race following a widely criticised performance in his own debate with Trump in June.

Days prior, Judge Juan Merchan, who presided over the hush money trial of the former president in Manhattan, delayed the sentencing to 26 November, to be after the presidential election. In May, Trump was convicted of 34 felony counts of falsifying business records. The maximum sentence that Trump could receive is two years in prison, though such a sentence is unlikely. On 5 September, Trump also pleaded not guilty to federal charges over alleged attempts to interfere with the 2020 election, in a separate case.

Solace Global Assessment: The postponement of Trump’s sentencing is likely to reduce the risk of civil unrest and violence prior to and immediately after the election. However, there is still a realistic possibility of unrest occurring during the remainder of the electoral season. During the debate, the former president repeated claims that the 2020 election results were fraudulent. Trump’s 2024 running mate, J.D. Vance, also separately echoed these views and criticised the results’ certification process for the 2020 election. Moreover, local media have highlighted a growing number of local officials that have either hinted at, or outright threatened, not to certify the 2024 election results if they perceive that they are affected by “irregularities”. Recent notable cases include new Georgia State Election Board rules that instruct county boards to conduct “reasonable inquiries” before certifying the election results, and a lawsuit in Michigan against a county board member who stated that he would refuse to certify the 2024 electoral results if the election were to be “stolen”.

The likelihood of another incident like the 6 January Capitol attack occurring has been significantly reduced by planned security measures and is therefore highly unlikely. On 11 September, the Department of Homeland Security declared the 2025 results’ certification date a “National Special Security Event”, meaning that considerable security – including federal, state, and local assets – will be deployed to secure the Capitol and other key areas in Washington D.C. Nevertheless, a realistic possibility remains of civil unrest at a local level, especially in states where officials have raised doubts about their willingness to certify the election results.

Judicial reform bill approved by Senate after protesters storm the Senate chamber.

The controversial judicial reform bill was approved by the Mexican Senate in the early hours of 11 September, after protesters had stormed the Senate chamber on 10 September. The judicial reform bill proposes that approximately 7,000 state and federal judges, including the Supreme Court, will be replaced by popular elections that will take place in 2025 and 2027. The bill additionally reduces experience and age requirements for multiple judicial roles. Protesters against the bill broke through the door of the Senate chamber using pipes and chains, with security forces deploying tear gas and fire extinguishers. As a result of the incursion, the Senate took a temporary recess, before reconvening and approving the bill.

Solace Global Assessment: The storming of the Mexican Senate by protesters almost certainly marks a further escalation in the anti-judicial reform unrest that has intensified in the last few weeks. Unions representing many of Mexico’s 55,000 judicial workers started an indefinite nationwide strike on 19 August, and on 3 September were joined by the Supreme Court justices.

Protests were initially notably peaceful, until a demonstration by striking judiciary workers blocked access to the Congress building on 3 September before the Chamber of Deputies approved the bill. The drivers of unrest, therefore, have been the Congress votes in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. With the bill now approved by both houses of Congress, all that remains now is for the bill to be ratified by the state legislatures, which will highly likely occur.

President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum will be sworn in on 1 October, and it is highly likely that judicial reform will be the biggest issue she will face at the start of her administration. On the one hand, there is a realistic possibility that unrest will decrease as the opportunities to stop the bill have been almost exhausted. On the other hand, however, it is more likely that unrest will take a more disruptive and violent character. The bill has spooked investors, with concerns that it may undermine the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) trade pact, and has been met with international condemnation, notably drawing criticism from the US ambassador.

The Peso has weakened by 17% since the landslide victory for the Morena party in the 2 June elections, and a former central bank official has stated that a recession next year is likely.

Venezuelan opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez lands in Madrid.

Gonzalez, who is the most prominent opposition figure in the country alongside Maria Corina Machado, went into hiding following the 28 July election, staying at various diplomatic offices and residences in Caracas. From Madrid, Gonzalez will highly likely use the freedom to speak publicly to gather international support against Maduro. However, it is also highly likely that the Maduro regime will use Gonzalez’s escape as a pretext for increasing accusations of foreign interference and “treason” by opposition forces. This, in turn, may grant the government greater legitimacy to suppress remaining civil society groups and non-aligned figures.

Venezuelan authorities revoke Brazil’s custody of Argentina’s diplomatic offices.

The decision was justified with the accusation that Brazilian officials were using Argentine offices to stage acts of terrorism. The decision will likely result in retaliatory moves in Brazil, and will likely further isolate the Venezuelan government by weakening Brazil’s mediating role. Members of the opposition are currently sheltering in the Argentine ambassador’s residence in Caracas, and the decision by Venezuelan authorities has a remote possibility to be a prelude to a more forceful violation of diplomatic rights in Venezuela.

USA “Terrorgram” leaders charged with allegedly inspiring terrorism.

The transnational collective’s name refers to the social network Telegram. It espoused white supremacist ideology and praised past far-right lone wolf terrorists as “Saints”, in efforts to motivate further attacks. American authorities accuse the two informal “leaders” of the collective of inciting at least three specific terror attacks – an anti-LGBTQ shooting in Slovakia, which killed two, a planned attack in New Jersey, and the recent stabbing outside a Mosque in Turkey. If convicted, the two face up to 220 years in prison.

The development is likely important and may become a key legal precedent in the prosecution of stochastic terrorists. The term “stochastic” identifies a “probabilistic” type of terrorism, where radical messages and calls to violence are indiscriminately spread within a target community (usually online) with the expectation that one or more members will act upon them. Stochastic terrorists are difficult to prosecute as they are not often involved in the planning and organisation of attacks, and maintain some plausible deniability regarding their involvement. There is a remote chance of violent retaliatory actions by Terrorgram supporters in the US.

Canadian counterterrorism arrests Pakistani citizen over 7 October terror plot.

The man was arrested on 7 September over an alleged plan to attack the Jewish community of New York City on the anniversary of the Hamas attack in southern Israel. The individual was almost certainly a self-radicalised lone wolf but nevertheless planned to carry out the attack in the name of IS. 7 October, as well as the 11 October Yom Kippur holiday, are likely to be at a particularly high risk from extremist action targeting both Jewish and Muslim places of worship in Western countries.

El Salvador police chief dead in helicopter crash.

Since 2019, Mauricio Arriaza Chicas was a central figure in implementing the crackdowns on local gangs spearheaded by President Bukele, which led to up to 80,000 arrests and a drastic reduction in murder rates. Chicas was travelling with Manuel Coto, a former credit union head, who was accused of money laundering and was being transported back to El Salvador. Bukele expressed suspicions about the incident’s cause.

South California wildfires destroy homes and cause mass evacuations.

At least three major wildfires erupted in southern California on 8 September. The fires have been especially difficult to contain, highly likely exacerbated by protracted hot and dry conditions in the region, and have expanded particularly quickly due to strong winds. As of 12 September, the fires have destroyed at least 100,000 acres of land, injured 13, and destroyed approximately 40 homes.

All three fires pose a direct threat to the greater Los Angeles urban area, and reports of Californian state firefighting resources being overstretched likely indicate that efforts to contain the blazes will continue throughout the weekend.

Hurricane Francine makes landfall in Louisiana, USA.

Making landfall as a category 2 hurricane, Francine hit southern Louisiana on late 11 September. The storm had maximum record windspeeds of 157 km/h, but quickly weakened into a tropical storm post-landfall. The New Orleans area experienced heavy rainfall, and flash flood emergency warnings were published by authorities. There have been no reported deaths or injuries as of the time of writing, and the storm was downgraded into a tropical depression on 12 September over Mississippi.

Tropical Storm Illeana forms south of Baja California Sur, Mexico

On 12 September, Tropical Storm Illeana formed in the North Pacific, roughly 400 kilometres south of the tip of Baja California Sur, Mexico. Initial forecasts anticipate the storm will bring heavy rainfall, strong winds, and storm surges to the peninsula, as well as to the states of Michoacán, Colima, and Jalisco over the weekend. There is a realistic possibility of localised travel disruptions and damage to physical properties in affected coastal areas.

Bolivia declares a state of emergency due to wildfires.

Over the past three months, wildfires have destroyed an estimated ten million acres of land, especially in the states of Beni and Santa Cruz. The Bolivian government announced that it will seek international support to combat the fires, which have additionally caused disruptions in La Paz and other urban centres.

On 11 September, IDF officials stated that Israeli forces have degraded Hamas forces in Gaza to such a great extent that Hamas is no longer able to operate as an organised military force. However, they also claimed that the complete destruction of Hamas may take approximately another year. The report seems to be based on a captured letter written by Khan Yunis Brigade leader Salameh prior to his killing in July, where the Hamas official claims to only retain a fifth of his personnel, ten per cent of his rocket arsenal, and less than half of his stocks of anti-tank and small calibre munitions.

On the same day, two Israeli strikes on a school building in Nuseirat killed at least 18 people, including six workers of the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency UNRWA. The organisation stated that the strikes resulted in its highest death toll in a single incident throughout the war. The al-Jaouni school had been targeted by Israeli strikes four other times since October 2023.

Solace Global Assessment: The IDF’s assessments of Hamas’ continuing degradation as a viable combat force are likely accurate. The Palestinian militant group has been likely cut off from its main sources of smuggled resources and weapons, Egypt, via the protracted Israeli occupation of the Philadelphi Corridor, and the destruction of much of the tunnels in the area. Satellite imagery from late August showed that Israeli forces had begun paving a road extending six kilometres inland along the corridor, likely an important signal of Tel Aviv’s intention to retain a presence at the Egypt-Gaza border. Hamas, moreover, has likely lost much of its most experienced personnel and morale is highly likely poor.

Nevertheless, Hamas likely retains some capacity to operate small units from densely populated areas previously cleared by Israeli forces, in efforts to inflict protracted attrition on IDF units. Hamas also likely maintains some political leverage via the dozens of hostages still under its control. The new “guidelines” for the treatment of captives issued by the group, which state that its fighters will kill Israeli hostages if IDF troops approach their location, are highly likely aimed at deterring raids by Israeli forces.

Additionally, these measures likely reflect decreasing confidence amongst the Hamas leadership in the organisation’s capability to keep the hostages.

The killing of six UNRWA workers highlights the continuing severe threat to non-combatants in Gaza posed by IDF aerial strikes. Moreover, the strike likely indicates the continued erosion of deconfliction processes in Gaza – whereby humanitarian organisations share their locations, operations and movements with militaries and armed groups.

The administrations of the US and Iraq reached a preliminary deal which would result in the full withdrawal of US and coalition forces from Iraq by the end of 2026. Partial withdrawal will begin in 2025. The deal follows six months of negotiations, and now requires the final approval from Washington and Baghdad. The deal was reached amid increased attacks by Iran-backed, Iraq-based forces on US bases in the country, which this year have killed three US troops and injured dozens more.

Solace Global Assessment: The deal will likely directly benefit Iran and allow Tehran’s proxy forces greater freedom in carrying out operations in Iraq. In return, it may result in a growing volume of Israeli strikes in the country, as Tel Aviv will likely increasingly bear the brunt of containing Iran’s proxy operations.

However, IS still carried out up to 200 attacks in the two countries in the first half of 2024, and likely retains considerable operational capacity. Despite a post-2019 tendency to under-report attacks and territorial control, IS core likely remains the political centre of the global terrorist network. A resurgent IS core may benefit from a decreased Western presence in the area, as well as the growing assets and expertise of other branches, like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), in Afghanistan, and the Islamic State Greater Sahara Province (ISGSP) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), in the Sahel.

Local media reported on 11 September that six humanitarian workers of the NGO ALIMA were kidnapped by an unspecified armed group in the sub-prefecture of Liwa. At least one of the six was shot dead, while three escaped. The remaining two humanitarian workers are unaccounted for as of the time of writing.

Solace Global Assessment: Incidents affecting aid workers in Chad are less common that in other neighbouring Sahel states. According to the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD), there has been one case of kidnapping of aid workers in the country in 2024, with one victim. The kidnapping occurred in Dona Manga, in the country’s south.

The latest case, instead, occurred in the Lake Chad basin area and was therefore likely carried out by one of the Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the area. These include Boko Haram and their rivals the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The kidnapping of aid workers in the area is mostly conducted for ransom, as both local and foreign nationals working for NGOs are perceived as being far wealthier than the general populace.

Due to a lack of state resources to combat local militant groups, targeting NGO workers can be a relatively low-risk effort, especially in regions affected by a security vacuum such as Lake Chad. In general, the risks faced by NGO workers in the Sahel have increased in recent years, while not reaching the severity of the Sudan area. This is likely due to the worsening domestic stability of local authorities, and the growing strength and scope of terrorist groups operating in the region.

Barnier promises new French government “by the end of next week”.

The centre-right politician and newly appointed prime minister is considered by Macron – and, according to some polls, by a slim majority of the French electorate – to be able to compromise with the main parliamentary forces to end the months-long political crisis that followed the European elections.

However, it is unlikely that Barnier’s picks will be able to satisfy the two radical forces in parliament, the far-right National Rally (RN) and the populist, left-wing France Unbowed (LFI). The latter, alongside much of the rest of the New Popular Front (NFP) coalition, has already vowed to support a no confidence vote against the new government.

This means that Barnier will likely be forced to make some important concessions to RN. However, here, RN’s commitment to oppose fiscal reform may prove impossible to accept, as the Barnier-appointed government will only have weeks before the 1 October draft budget deadline. If the Barnier government fails to survive, it is almost certain that the NFP and RN will renew calls for new elections, and there is a likewise high likelihood of severe civil unrest.

Germany begins temporary border controls.

The measure, which is initially scheduled to be in place for six months, follows the terror attack by a radicalised Islamist in Munich, who targeted the Israeli consulate on the anniversary of the 1972 Olympics massacre. It is also likely an attempt by the government coalition to toughen counterterrorism measures after two state-level positive results by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). In late September, state elections will be held in Brandenburg, and the high likelihood of another AfD positive result threatens the stability of the current government.

Abdelmadjid Tebboune predictably re-elected president of Algeria.

Tebboune reportedly won 94 per cent of the vote, after campaigning with the support of the military and the National Liberation Front (NFL). Turnout was low, at a reported 23 per cent, and opposition figures boycotted the election citing the likelihood of fraud. In an unusual move, Tebboune challenged the election results, and particularly the reported turnout rate. There is a realistic possibility of civil unrest following the elections, although this is unlikely to reach the same severity of the 2019 protests.

President Faye dissolves Senegal’s parliament in preparation for upcoming snap-elections

Faye assumed office in April 2024, the first opposition politician to win an election in Senegal’s post-independence history. The decision to hold legislative elections three years earlier than expected is largely attributed to the parliament’s opposition to President Faye’s proposed reforms. The current majority in Senegal’s National Assembly belongs to the United in Hope coalition, founded by former President Macky Sall.

Sall’s controversial presidency saw widespread and often violent protests, particularly by Senegal’s youth, who are largely represented by Faye’s PASTEF party. With the elections approaching, there is a realistic possibility that the tensions witnessed during Sall’s tenure could resurface, potentially instigating renewed civil unrest.

Danish gang-member arrested after antisemitic group attack.

The individual, alongside other accomplices, allegedly carried out an arson attack against a Jewish individual’s residence. The 21-year-old is allegedly a member of a group with links to the street gang Loyal to Familia (LTF), a group based in the Nørrebro district of Copenhagen. In recent years, LTF is one of the main gangs that have tried to expand into Sweden, where there is a greater network of organised crime groups. The case is notable as there is a realistic possibility that it highlights the overlap between organised crime and extremist activity in Denmark, a trend that was already observed in other European cities like Marseille.

Chechen couple sentenced to prison for Antwerp, Belgium, terror plot .

According to authorities, the two had made concrete plans to attack the Jewish quarter as well as an LGBTQ bar. The couple had reportedly self-radicalised, but also contacted Islamic State (IS) members on Telegram and received instructions and guidance on how to carry out the attack. The case likely highlights the considerable overlaps and complex relationship between patterns of self-radicalisation and vertical organisation. Belgium is a desirable target for Islamists as the seat of key EU institutions, and has previously acted as a base for terrorist cells planning attacks in neighbouring countries, especially France.

Russia claims involvement of Finland and Sweden in drone attacks in Murmansk

Ukraine has conducted drone attacks in the Murmansk region since 11 September. According to Russian sources, three Ukrainian drones were shot down on 11 September, with a further two shot down on the following day.

Russian military-affiliated sources have stated that no Ukrainian drones have successfully hit targets in the Murmansk region. Notably, a source linked to the Federal Security (FSB) claimed that the drone attack on 11 September originated from Finland. Furthermore, a prominent Russian military blogger, “Kotenok”, has hinted at a possible Sweden’s involvement in Thursday’s attack due to a Swedish surveillance plane flying near the Murmansk border.

However, no official Russian source has not echoed this latter claim. There is a remote possibility that these accusations could lead to further tension in the region, and greater Russian aggressive moves at its northwestern borders.

Israeli forces strike Masyaf, Syria.

On 9 September, Israeli forces launched a missile strike in the vicinity of Masyaf, targeting facilities reportedly being used by Iranian and Iran-affiliated groups. According to NGO sources, the strike killed at least 25 people, including a number of civilians. There is a realistic possibility of retaliatory strikes on Israeli cities by local Iranian proxy groups or by other members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”.

Terror attack at Allenby Bridge, Jordan-Israel border.

On 8 September, an individual opened fire on Israeli workers at the border crossing with Jordan, killing three. The bridge, also known as King Hussein Bridge, is the only active Israel-Jordan border crossing, and is therefore almost certainly a high-value target for extremist action. The attack was carried out with a pistol and was unsophisticated, which suggests that the attacker was likely not affiliated with any specific terrorist group. Iran and its proxies have increasingly sought to smuggle weapons to organised groups inside Jordan, and the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict has favoured anti-government sentiment inside the kingdom. Similar incidents, which force a security response, likely put a high level of political pressure on authorities’ efforts to retain some stability and popular support.

Dozens of “armed bandits” kidnap travellers in Zamfara, Nigeria.

The kidnapping of an as of the time of writing still unspecified number of travellers occurred on 12 September, just hours after the expiration of a deadline for payment requested by a local bandit leader, known as Bello Turji, and the deployment of increased military assets to the area. The region of Zamfara is extremely underdeveloped, and authorities exercise only partial control over it. It is highly likely that the kidnapping case, is linked to the high level of organised militia activity in the area, and there is a likelihood that it relates to the recent extortion attempt.

Anti-air travel and miscellaneous groups plan “International Day for the Ban on Night Flights”

Dozens of activist groups, almost entirely based in Western Europe, have released a joint statement protesting night flights and calling for a day of sensibilisation on 13 September. While no planned protests were identified, there is a realistic possibility that activists, especially in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands (where the movement is most present) will seek to stage disruptions and protests at or near international airports. These, in turn, may affect travel and business.

Nigeria dam collapse provokes severe floods, displaces thousands

Heavy rains in Borno State, northeast Nigeria, caused the Maiduguri dam to overflow and collapse on 10-11 September. The resulting flooding has affected, according to authorities, up to one million people, with at least 30 reported fatalities at the time of writing. Nigeria’s northeast suffers from poor infrastructure and a lack of authority presence, meaning that rescue efforts are often delayed or impossible.

Moreover, the security situation in Borno is further worsened by the active Boko Haram insurgency. The severity of the floods is likely to result in a sharp number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria’s northeast, and will almost certainly further stretch already insufficient government response assets.

Repeated extreme weather events moreover have a direct negative impact on food security, with young people and at-risk demographics particularly affected, and directly contribute to increases in violent crime. Boko Haram, as well as other violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and bandit groups, have taken advantage of disasters to carry out recruitment efforts among the displaced or dispossessed.

Dengue fever epidemic declared in Central African Republic (CAR).

The CAR’s Minister of Health, Pierre Somsé has declared an epidemic after 13 cases of Dengue fever was declared by the national epidemiological surveillance system in the cities of Bangui and Bimbo. Dengue fever, also known as “tropical flu”, is an infectious, mosquito-borne disease caused by a virus of the same name.

The incident rate of dengue fever in the CAR has significantly increased and is now classified as a ‘re-emerging’ disease. The development reflects the wider trend in rising dengue infections across Africa, with over 270,000 cases and 753 deaths reported across 18 African Union (AU) Member States between 2019 and June 2024.

Ganesh Pandal riots show looming threat of sectarian violence.

On 8 September, a number of individuals reportedly pelted a pandal (a temporary structure erected to celebrate a Hindu god) with stones in Surat, Gujarat. The episode resulted in a riot, and in at least 30 arrests. In the days following the incident, authorities began demolishing irregular settlements in the area, in a move that observers identified as retaliatory targeting of the local Muslim community (although authorities claimed that the demolitions were planned weeks in advance).

Solace Global Assessment: The case almost certainly represents the latest escalation in sectarian, religion-based conflict in India, and there is a realistic possibility that it will lead to an increase in violence in the state.

There is a significant threat of sectarian mob violence in India, with recent cases particularly involving the Hindu and Muslim communities. Local and national officials of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have repeatedly encouraged mob violence – including “bulldozer justice” – against Muslim minorities, and studies have found a correlation between BJP state rule and sectarian anti-Muslim violence.

The BJP is the ruling party in Gujarat, and officials and sympathisers have likely deliberately increased sectarian tensions. During the electoral campaign for the 2024 elections, Gujarat BJP officials accused opponents of unfairly “giving quotas” as “other backward classes” (OBC, a designation that entails some access to reserved government jobs and higher education posts) to Muslims. In March, Muslim students carrying out Ramadan prayers at the University of Gujarat were reportedly attacked by a “Hindu mob”. In September, BJP members were accused of arbitrarily enlisting local secondary school students as party members.

Alongside internal development, sectarian violence in India has also likely been influenced by social media-based disinformation, with radical groups using international developments as instruments to stoke domestic violence. For instance, the recent cases of anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh following the ousting of Sheikh Hasina, have been reposted and likely inflated by Hindu nationalist influencers and pages in India. OSINT analysis shows that the recent Gujarat case has also been broadcast online as a case of concerted anti-Hindu violence, and there is a realistic possibility that increased attention will result in further calls for retaliatory violence.

Typhoon Yagi kills almost 200 people in northern Vietnam.

Typhoon Yagi made landfall in northern Vietnam on 7 September as a Very Strong Typhoon with windspeeds of 149km/h. 199 people have so far been killed, with over 800 injuries and 128 people still missing. The death toll will almost certainly rise. The deaths were primarily caused by flash floods and landslides in the northwestern Lao Cai province, which borders China. One hamlet in Lao Cai, Lang Nu, was entirely swept away by a flash flood, leading to at least 42 deaths and 52 missing. On 9 September, the Phong Chau bridge in Phu Tho province collapsed. Flood waters from the Red River led to Hanoi neighbourhoods on its banks being flooded, with thousands being evacuated. Power and drinking water has been cut since 11 September. 

Solace Global Assessment: Yagi is the strongest typhoon in Asia this year, having earlier made landfall in Hainan, China on 6 September as a Super Typhoon. In Hainan, four people were killed and 95 injured, with an estimated USD 9.26 billion in total damages. While Yagi considerably reduced in strength before hitting northern Vietnam, the impact has been far greater. This is almost certainly due to the increased vulnerability of Vietnam, which results from architectural practices, resiliency and preparedness measures, and state capacity. Even weakened, Yagi was the strongest typhoon to hit Vietnam in three decades. The flooding in Hanoi is likely the worst in two decades, with warehouses and export-oriented hubs in the east of Hanoi closing. While Sapa, a popular tourist destination for trekking, is located in the worst affected province, Lao Cai, the area is a particularly impoverished part of Vietnam. This highly likely further increased the population’s storm vulnerability. The Australian Foreign Ministry has announced the provision of USD 2 million in humanitarian relief funding, and rescue operations are ongoing.

Kyrgyzstan removes Taliban from list of banned organisations.

The move follows a similar recent one by Kazakhstan. The Kyrgyz government likely has a security interest in normalising relations with the Taliban, as it likely assesses the survival of the current Kabul regime to have a positive effect on regional stability. Moreover Bishkek, like nearby Dushanbe, is almost certainly worried about the possibility of a power vacuum in Afghanistan resulting in a growing Islamist activity in the region.

While primarily active in Afghanistan, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has increased recruitment and fundraising activities beyond the country’s borders. Normalisation with neighbouring central Asian states will also likely be a prelude to similar developments in the Taliban’s relations with Russia and other key regional powers.

Anti-war demonstration in Melbourne, Australia, ends in dozens of arrests and injuries.

Approximately 3,000 protesters clashed with police while attempting to disrupt an expo for weapons manufacturers. Protesters reportedly threw Molotov cocktails and acid bottles at police, which responded with tear gas and stun grenades. At least 39 arrests were made on the day, and more than 100 people were injured.

Due to the violence and increased media exposure of the protest, there is a realistic possibility that it will lead to further cases of civil unrest in the city. Events such as the arms expo in Melbourne constitute high-desirability targets for protesters due to their extremely high visibility.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacks Shiites on pilgrimage in Afghanistan.

On the morning of 13 September, reports and footage emerged of an ISKP ambush on unarmed Afghan Hazara Shia pilgrims at the border between the provinces of Daikundi and Ghor. Reports indicate that the pilgrims were returning from Karbala, a key location in Shia history. The deliberate attack on pilgrims is likely meant to continue undermining Taliban claims that ISKP has been neutralised, and that Kabul retains full authority over the country. Moreover, although unconfirmed, reports indicate that, in the Ghor province, local Taliban offices have been comprehensively infiltrated by ISKP, with Taliban resources being redirected to train and equip Islamic State fighters.

Over 50 killed after Myanmar’s military bombs Arakan Army prisoner of war camp

On 8 September, Myanmar’s military bombed a prison camp in Maungdaw, killing at least 50 according to yet unverified reports released by the rebel Arakan Army (AA), which operates in Rakhine State. The AA claimed that junta have increased the volume of their bombing campaigns. Pro-junta forces likely see bombing rebel-held areas – including civilian targets – as a way to erode civilian confidence in rebel forces, and to disrupt local logistics.

With the junta continuing to lose territory to the better-motivated and increasingly larger rebel forces, there is a realistic likelihood of further increases in bombing campaigns.

North Korean state media disclose image of uranium-enrichment facility

The image marks the first public disclosure of a uranium-enrichment site since photos of the Yongbyon nuclear complex were released in 2010. North Korean authorities almost certainly saw releasing the image as a way to deter South Korea, the US, and their allies. However, the image may also assist Seoul and Washington in refining estimates of North Korea’s current nuclear capabilities, following satellite images in recent years that indicate significant expansions at the Yongbyon complex.

Tropical Storm Bebinca moving towards China in Philippine Sea.

Bebinca is currently a Severe Tropical Storm, with windspeeds of 110 km/h. The storm is forecast to strengthen into a Typhoon, or even a Very Strong Typhoon, before making landfall in densely populated eastern China on 15-16 September. Within the cone of uncertainty, which is the predicted possible paths the storm could take, are the Chinese areas of southern Jiangsu Province, Shanghai and Zheijiang Province (with the cities of Ningbo, Hangzhou, Taizhou and Wenzhou all liable to be potentially affected).

The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) predict that the storm could have a high humanitarian impact, which is based on the forecast maximum sustained wind speeds, exposed population and vulnerability.

Bebinca will likely enter the Philippine area of responsibility on 14 September and is expected to bring sporadic heavy rainfall or thunderstorms to Manila and other areas of Luzon.

On 15-16 September, the storm is predicted to go past or through the Japanese islands of Amami and Okinawa, with authorities warning of possible landslides and flooding. The area of China that will likely be most impacted is highly developed, with extensive state capacity as well as rigorous storm preparedness and resiliency measures. Nonetheless, Bebinca will likely cause widespread disruptions and impact.

Two hundred evacuated due to volcanic threat in the Philippines

Kanlaon Volcano is located in the centre of the Negros Island. Authorities issued alerts for the area in June, after initial seismic activity. On 11 September, further activity, including sulphur dioxide emissions and more than 300 minor volcanic quakes, prompted authorities to issue an evacuation order for nearby villages due to the risk of a serious eruption.

Volcanic activity could interfere with travel and economic activity elsewhere on the island. In June, flights to Bacolod-Silay International Airports were briefly interrupted due to the volcano’s activity.

Haiti expands state of emergency to cover entire country.

On 5 September, the Haitian government announced that it was expanding the current state of emergency to cover the entire country. Haiti’s Ouest department, home to the capital Port-au-Prince, was placed under a state of emergency on March 3 under former Prime Minister Ariel Henry due to escalating violence and mass prison escapes.

The emergency was extended to other areas, including Artibonite, Centre, and Nippes, which have also experienced severe violence. The announcement also follows widespread protests after the suspension of services at Haiti’s largest hydroelectric dam which has left huge swathes of the country without power.

Solace Global Assessment: Haiti’s expansion of the state of emergency has likely been timed to coincide with the arrival of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Blinken is set to conduct a diplomatic visit to Haiti on 5-6 September where he will meet with Prime Minister Garry Conille to discuss Haiti’s democratic transition. Conille has only been in power for three months and despite the recent deployment of a UN-backed Kenyan security mission, authorities have failed to make much progress in combating the criminal gangs that now control an estimated 80 per cent of the country.

The expansion of the state of emergency is likely aimed at attracting more foreign aid and assistance, with the US currently being the largest contributor. The Kenyan force, which was deployed in June, only consists of 400 police officers, and their effectiveness has been curtailed by salary payment issues. Moreover, the domestic security services are almost certainly underfunded, and overstretched and have been limited to only a few minor operations, with the gangs often outnumbering and outgunning the police.

Conille’s strategy is likely intended to convince Blinken to both increase US contributions but also to secure additional support from the international community. However, foreign assistance will likely be partially dependent on steps towards democratic transition, a process that currently appears unachievable with the gangs exerting so much influence across the country.

Judicial reform bill passed by lower house, despite escalating unrest.

On 3 September, protests led by striking judiciary workers took place outside the Mexican Supreme Court and Congress against the controversial judicial reform bill. The demonstrations blocked access to the Congress building, leading to lawmakers instead gathering in a gymnasium to start the voting proceedings. The Supreme Court additionally released a statement on 3 September that they would be joining the strike, following an 8-3 vote. Despite the protests, the bill was passed on 4 September by the lower house and will now go to the Senate.

Solace Global Assessment: The bill’s most controversial measures involve the direct election of approximately 7,000 judges, magistrates and Supreme Court justices, along with the removal and lowering of several requirements. Critics warn that the bill will politicise the judiciary, lessen the strength of checks and balances against the ruling Morena party, and enable organised crime to exert greater influence over the Mexican judicial system.

The Morena party is only one seat short of the required supermajority in the Senate, and it is highly likely that the bill will pass. President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum’s swearing-in ceremony will take place on 1 October, and she has indicated that the reform package will be one of the first priorities for her administration.

The indefinite nationwide strike by judiciary workers began on 19 August, and demonstrations have taken place in several cities across Mexico. The decision by the Supreme Court to join the strike is highly likely to lend further legitimacy to the protests, which are unlikely to subside in the coming weeks.

While the unrest has been generally peaceful thus far, the blocking of roads and access to Mexico’s congress is an escalation in the tactics employed by the demonstrators, likely indicative of increasing desperation to stop the bill. It is likely that as the legislation further progresses towards being signed into law, unrest will intensify.

Trucker protests paralyse Colombia’s transport network.

Widespread trucker protests have erupted across Colombia following the government’s decision to increase diesel prices. On 31 August, the government raised the price of diesel by 1,904 Colombian pesos or 45 US cents per gallon. In protest, truckers have cut off many of Colombia’s largest cities by staging roadblocks on the nation’s major highways. On 4 September, Colombia’s ombudsman stated that there were at least 127 demonstrations being held across 13 regions, with 42 of them consisting of total road blockades.

Solace Global Assessment: The almost 21 per cent increase in diesel prices by the government has been claimed as fair and justified on the grounds that the country has long subsidised prices. Prices have been held for four years at just over 9,000 pesos but the government has stated that this was fiscally unsustainable and was costing it over one trillion pesos a month.

However, truckers have argued that the immediate and high price increase is set to push their businesses to bankruptcy. Truckers have also likely been frustrated by the removal of subsidies as it has coincided with a huge increase in government spending elsewhere by Colombia’s leftist President Gustavo Petro.

Trucker protests have led to major supply chain issues, reducing the amount of food arriving at wholesale markets. If sustained, the trucker protests are likely to result in price increases and could spark unrest within major cities like Bogota, Medellin and Cali. Colombia’s largest state-owned oil and gas company, Ecopetrol, has also warned that the protests will affect the production of hydrocarbons and fuel supplies across the country.

This trend has been exacerbated by a spate of attacks on Colombia’s pipeline infrastructure in areas held by the National Liberation Army or ELN, following the end of a fragile ceasefire agreement.

Pro-Palestine protests likely to resume on US campuses.

Classes in multiple US colleges that were the epicentres of pro-Palestine protests, including Columbia University, began during this reporting period. It is highly likely that pro-Palestine groups will resume protests from the 6-8 September weekend, and that these will include attempts to start campus “encampments” and, more likely, disrupt local roadways and public transport.

First US presidential debate scheduled for 10 September.

Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump are set to participate in their first debate at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia on 10 September. Given the recent assassination attempt on Donald Trump and the degree of political division in the US, the debates will almost certainly involve heightened security measures and will likely attract large demonstrations in support of a range of issues, most likely the conflict in the Middle East.

Venezuela issues arrest warrant for opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez.

Gonzalez and co-leader of the opposition Maria Corina Machado are currently believed to be in hiding in Venezuela, while other prominent opposition members have either escaped or sought refuge in diplomatic offices in the country. The arrest order is almost certainly meant to reinforce the government’s legitimacy, and may be a prelude to more violent suppression of remaining opposition groups and individuals associated with Gonzalez. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that authorities are aiming to provoke the expatriation of Gonzalez and Machado, likely aiming to link their positions with foreign adversaries of the Maduro regime, while also reducing their ability to coordinate domestic protests at a later date.

US sailor detained by Venezuelan authorities.

According to Pentagon officials, a US Navy sailor was detained in Caracas on 30 August and is currently being held by the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). The detained US service member was reportedly not on approved leave or official travel, and his purpose in-country is currently unknown. On 2 September, the US Justice Department seized a plane belonging to Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, which will likely impede the sailor’s release. It is a realistic possibility that the detention is a result of Venezuelan hostage diplomacy. It is additionally, however, a realistic possibility that the detention relates to concerns from Venezuelan authorities regarding subversive anti-regime actions from US nationals, heightened since the failed 2020 coup plot Operation Gideon that was led by an ex-US service member.

Loggers killed by indigenous group in Peruvian Amazon.

On September 3, two loggers were killed and two others are missing after a clash with the Mashco Piro, an isolated indigenous community in Peru’s Amazon. The conflict occurred in the Madre de Dios region where loggers have been clearing a trail. Confrontations between loggers and indigenous tribes are like to increase as the logging, both legal and illegal, of the Amazon increases. The Peruvian government is investigating the incident, under pressure from local rights groups who claim that the government is failing to recognise indigenous territory.

Continued row between Brazilian judiciary and Elon Musk.

The judiciary of Brazil ordered the owner of X.com, Elon Musk, to uphold the country’s ban on the social network, which followed the platform’s refusal to comply with court orders regarding the removal of profiles spreading disinformation. Musk initially refused to comply with the latest order and has increasingly accused the Brazilian government of ideologically motivated censorship. Musk’s involvement in Brazilian politics has been praised by supporters of former President Bolsonaro, who have called for protests against the Supreme Court on 7 September.

Haiti’s main hydro-electric plant ceases to operate.

On 3 September, Haiti’s state-owned power company, Electricité d’Haiti (EDH), reported that output from the Peligre hydroelectric plant had ceased due to protests over power distribution, with protestors demanding that energy be redistributed beyond the capital, Port-au-Prince. The plant, which provides most of Haiti’s hydroelectric power, has been offline since 2 September, worsened by damage to two transformers and disrupted access due to gang control. Only 49 per cent of Haitians reportedly now have grid access, with the energy blackout likely to further exacerbate many of the country’s current issues, including crime, displacement and the humanitarian situation.

August worst month in two decades for Brazilian wildfires.

Satellite-derived data from Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (Inpe) has indicated that August was the worst month for wildfires in the country since 2010. The 38,266 fire hotspots identified in the Amazon in August were nearly twice the amount observed in the previous month. Warmer temperatures and drier vegetation have provided conditions conducive to the spread of wildfires, many of which are started deliberately to clear land for cattle pastures. Multiple investigations are currently underway looking into possible criminal involvement in the starting of wildfires. Furthermore, deforestation has decreased the rainforest’s long-term ability to maintain moisture, suggesting that future wildfires will increase in scale and frequency.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) wins first state parliamentary election in Thuringia.

In addition to winning 32.8 per cent of the votes cast in the central German state, the party also received the second most votes in Saxony, 31 per cent. The results represent the first time that a far-right party has won an election in Germany since the Second World War.

Solace Global Assessment: The AfD is unlikely to enter the state’s government, as the remaining parties are likely to adopt a strategy of alliances similar to that used by their French counterparts to prevent Le Pen’s National Rally from obtaining power. Still, the result is notable as it is the first time that the AfD has won a state election and is likely to have a significant impact on German politics.

Compared to other European far-right parties – for instance, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy or Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, which have moderated some of their positions in order to court moderate right votes – the AfD’s continued rise has not coincided with a notable change in its proposed policies. In Thuringia itself, the party is led by Björn Höcke, who was found guilty by German courts for using Nazi rhetoric twice. It is likely that the AfD’s victory will prompt civil unrest in Thuringia, Saxony, and in large urban centres in Germany.

There is a realistic possibility that increasing popular support for the AfD will be seized by far-right and identitarian groups to carry out demonstrations and symbolic disruptive action. Finally, the positive performance (15.8 per cent of the vote in Thuringia and 11.8 per cent in Saxony) of the new Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance party (BSW) is also notable. BSW was founded in January 2024 after breaking away from The Left party, and it represents a left-wing populist, socially conservative and nationalist formation that rejects Berlin’s support for Ukraine and the environmentalist policies of the rest of the left.

On 22 September, elections are scheduled for Brandenburg. Polls predict an AfD win (with more than 24 per cent of the vote) and show a realistic chance for BSW to come third or fourth. Another AfD victory, and continued BSW growth, are likely to seriously damage the current governing coalition’s perceived legitimacy. They may, furthermore, create questions about the viability of the SPD-CDU coalition.

Finally, it is important to note that there has been a rise in lone-wolf Islamist attacks in Germany, and media associated with groups like the Islamic State (IS) have called for further attacks following the Mannheim stabbing in late May. It is possible that the AfD victory, even if not directly resulting in the passing of new policies in the short term, will drive a rise in extremist activity in Germany.

Largest West Bank operation of the war ends, Hamas shares new hostage policy.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) declared, on 6 September, that their almost two-weeks-long raids in Jenin, Tulkarem and Tubas have ended. The large-scale operation, which has resulted in at least 33 deaths and 140 injuries, including the head of Hamas in Jenin, was described by Israeli authorities as a response to a growing number of attacks on Israeli settlers and citizens in the West Bank and Israeli territory. In Gaza, Hamas announced a new policy of killing Israeli captives if IDF forces approach areas where they are being held, following the recovery of six hostages’ bodies who had reportedly been shot by their guards, The policy reportedly dates back to June. The reports on the deaths of the six hostages prompted further protests in Israel calling for the Netanyahu administration to reach a ceasefire deal. Protests in Israel were particularly severe in Tel Aviv, with at least 550,000 demonstrators gathering in the city.

Solace Global Assessment: The question of the control over the Philadelphi corridor likely remains the main obstacle in the way of a ceasefire deal. On 4 September, Israeli officials stated that IDF positions at the border with Egypt would be assessed at the war’s end. For Tel Aviv, maintaining control of the Philadelphi corridor is crucial to depriving Hamas of lethal aid and degrading its capabilities. Hamas leaders are likewise highly likely aware of the general degradation of their fighting strength, and of the skills of the fighters that they are able to recruit from the Palestinian population – whose survivability rate has decreased in recent months.

The new hostage policy – which was notably only announced months after its first apparent implementation, likely reflects Hamas’ growing concern over its ability to hold and transfer hostages whilst under pressure from IDF operations. The tactic may also be indicative of a new strategy aimed at undermining Israeli resolve and applying pressure on the Netanyahu administration.

The executions will almost certainly fuel further unrest in Israel and could put pressure on Tel Aviv to accept ceasefire demands that are more favourable to Hamas. However, the often indiscriminate nature of the Israeli campaign to date would suggest that it is unlikely to cause a major shift in Netanyahu’s demands. Moreover, the hostages are Hamas’ main source of leverage. Executing them en masse would diminish this leverage and reaffirm Netanyahu’s stance that Hamas needs to be completely destroyed as a military and political force.

Rival Libyan legislatures jointly agree to appoint new central bank governor.

On 3 September, Libya’s two rival legislative bodies jointly signed a statement agreeing to appoint a central bank governor within 30 days. Previously, on 18 August, long-term governor Sadiq al-Kabir was unilaterally dismissed by the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), which increased tensions In Libya. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) is responsible for holding Libya’s oil revenues, with Libya’s oil reserves being the largest in Africa. The crisis at the CBL has had a wide-ranging impact on Libya’s economy, hampering the payment of state salaries and ordinary transactions.

Assessment: The agreement is likely to reduce tensions in Libya, which have in recent weeks been at their highest since the 2020 ceasefire between the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA, now the GNU) and the Benghazi-based Libyan National Army (LNA).

The LNA has been highly likely instrumentalising the flow of oil, causing shutdowns and reduced operations at several oil fields including Libya’s largest, the Shahara oil field. Mass LNA troop mobilisations in the west and southwest of the country, particularly in the vicinity of the strategically significant Ghadames Airport, have caused great concern that Libya is on the verge of renewed civil war.

While the agreement to resolve the crisis at the CBL will likely lessen tensions in the short term, and will likely alleviate the threat of economic crisis, it still remains a realistic possibility that renewed conflict could break out in Libya between the rival governments.

Over 100 killed in Islamist attack in northeast Nigeria.

On 1 September, approximately 150 armed militants suspected of belonging to the Islamist group Boko Haram conducted an attack on the village of Mafa, Yobe State in northeast Nigeria. The militants arrived on motorcycles armed with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades and then began to indiscriminately attack locals and set fire to multiple homes and businesses. Original estimates put the death toll at just under 40; however, most revisions have now placed the death toll at over 100.

Solace Global Assessment: The attack took place in northeast Nigeria, where an Islamist insurgency primarily led by Boko Haram has lasted for 15 years and has taken the lives of approximately 40,000 people. It is almost certain that Boko Haram operates within this area with a high degree of freedom and is likely exploiting the increased destabilisation of the wider Sahel region to conduct increased cross-border operations. This attack closely resembles the recent Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) attack in Burkina Faso which killed as many as 500 people. Boko Haram has traditionally employed a range of tactics, including suicide bombings, mass kidnappings and raids or armed assaults.

However, there is a realistic possibility that the success of JNIM’s attack, the overstretching of Nigerian security services and the growing strength of Boko Haram have inspired it to transition towards more hit-and-run raids using motorcycles. These attacks enable Boko Haram to attack isolated villages and then swiftly withdraw before the military can be deployed to the area.

Additionally, by targeting small villages, Boko Haram may force military commanders to spread their resources thinly, making it challenging to allocate sufficient support to defend future potential targets. Of note, unconfirmed reports indicate that militants left the area and rigged the roads leading to it with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), highly likely in an effort to delay the arrival of the armed forces. The scale and sophistication of the attack likely indicate a growth in Boko Haram’s organisational and logistical capacity, which have likely been facilitated by the group’s alliances with regional bandits and ability to exploit safe havens in border areas.

These attacks are likely to continue and will undermine the government’s authority and its ability to provide security, a development that is likely to lead to civil unrest against the government in Nigeria’s north- a trend that has been witnessed throughout the region.

Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier appointed new French Prime Minister.

Barnier is a representative of the Gaullist right adjacent to the Republicans (LR). His appointment ends a two-month-long period of uncertainty that followed the National Assembly elections. The move is likely to be followed by concessions to the right, particularly Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN), which will be crucial to surviving a no-confidence vote. Barnier’s appointment is almost certainly going to be received extremely negatively by the left-wing coalition, the New Popular Front (NFP), which had suggested Lucie Castets as a potential prime minister. The NFP was seemingly moving towards collapse due to tensions between its two main members, the Socialists (PS) and the populist France Unbowed (LFI). However, with Macron turning to the right rather than the PS, the left is likely to call for large-scale anti-Macron demonstrations in the coming weeks. As numerous far-left groups threatened violent action if LFI was kept from governing, there is a high likelihood of sabotage.

Pro-Palestine protests likely to increase in intensity in Western Europe.

It is likely that pro-Palestine protests will increase in intensity in September in European countries that have had major protest movements, especially in large urban centres. This is due to multiple factors: the beginning of the academic year, the overlap with multiple Palestine-related anniversaries (i.e. Black September, Oslo Accords), and the approaching one-year anniversary of the 7 October attack.

Volkswagen (VW) cost-cutting plans are likely to provoke civil unrest in Germany.

Senior representatives of the automotive industry giant, which employs about half of its 600,000 workers in Germany, have announced that they are considering cutting production in Germany to relocate plants to other more competitive markets, where labour costs are lower. The announcement is likely to translate into concrete policies, as VW has recently had a decline in profits and competitiveness, especially in the growing electric vehicle market. There is a high likelihood that further pressures will result in labour union reactions, including strikes and protests, in areas that host VW plants.

Major transport strikes organised across Italy.

A series of public transport and air travel strikes have been organised across Italy and are set to begin on 7 September. Strikes over worker conditions for ground operations workers, air traffic controllers and baggage handlers are set to cause major disruptions at Rome’s Fiumicino and Olbia, Milan Malpensa, Florence Amerigo Vespucci and Pisa Galileo Galilei airports. A nationwide rail strike organised for 9 September will be closely followed by a nationwide public transport workers’ walkout will almost certainly cause major disruption on Italy’s train, bus, tram and underground services.

Kosovo closes institutions that serve Serb minority.

On 31 August, Kosovar authorities closed five institutions in the north that served the ethnic Serb minority, a move that escalated tensions with Serbia. Kosovo’s local administration minister, Elbert Krasniqi, stated that these institutions violated Kosovo’s constitution and laws. US officials expressed worries that the move could destabilise the region, a concern that has likely been amplified by Russia’s recent attempts to sow division in the area, including treating Bosnia’s breakaway Republika Srpska as a recognised state. The head of Mitrovica Citizens’ Association, a Kosovar Serb group, has announced the blockade of all administrative border crossings with Serbia in North Kosovo in response to Kosovo’s actions.

Two US marines attacked by mob in Turkey.

Ten individuals were arrested for attacking two US marines in the centre of Izmir. The perpetrators were reportedly part of a nationalist and left-Kemalist (the ideology based on the ideas of Turkish 20^th century leader Ataturk) group known as the Youth Union of Turkey. The arrests have been challenged by the group, and there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory protests by the Youth Union in Izmir and other cities where it has a strong presence, including Istanbul. The actions may also lead to similar attacks on US personnel within Turkey.

Algerian President Tebboune likely to win re-election on 7 September.

The vote, which has been protested by the opposition for being rescheduled to September rather than the customary date in December, is likely to be affected by low voter turnout and government interference. Tebboune’s highly likely re-election could result in protests in Algiers and other cities, albeit these are unlikely to reach the severity of the 2019 protests.

Senegal likely to look to the West for counterterrorism operations.

The newly elected government of Senegal, which has espoused an overall anti-West rhetoric and has previously made diplomatic gestures in favour of the neighbouring Sahel junta states, asked for more international cooperation to tackle local jihadist groups during a visit by Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez. It is highly likely that the move is a response to the failure of the junta states’ counterterrorism operations, which are becoming increasingly reliant on Russian help which has yet to curtail the rate of extremist attacks. The Islamist groups operating in the Sahel likely aim to reach the comparatively richer coastal West African states, as part of growing ambitions to develop territorial entities.

Islamist lone wolf attack in Munich.

The attack occurred on 5 September, near the Israeli consulate and a Holocaust Museum. The attacker almost certainly carried out the attack to coincide with the 52^nd anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, where members of the Palestinian organisation Black September took hostages and killed 11 Israeli athletes. The Munich attacker was killed by police, and no other casualties were recorded. The attack is notable due to the use of a long-barrel rifle by the perpetrator as, in Europe, most lone-wolf attacks involve bladed weapons. According to police reports, the attacker was a self-radicalised 18-year-old supporter of the Islamic State (IS). In 2023, he had reportedly already been investigated by authorities for terrorism-related offences. The attack continues the trend of notably young lone wolves, likely underscoring the growing effect of online self-radicalisation.

Houthis reportedly attack two oil tankers in the Red Sea, including Saudi flagged vessel.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that the Houthis struck the Panama flagged MV BLUE LAGOON I and the Saudi flagged MV AMJAD on 2 September with two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and one one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV). Neither vessel was seriously damaged. The Houthis and Saudi Arabia, after being engaged in a seven-year conflict between 2015-2022, are participating in ongoing peace negotiations and have generally abided by a cessation of fighting since 2022. Both vessels were sailing in close proximity to each other, and it is likely that the Houthis accidentally struck the MV AMJAD. The AMJAD’s owner, Saudi shipping firm Bahri, “unequivocally affirm[ed] that AMJAD was not targeted”, and the Houthis omitted any mention of the AMJAD in their claim of responsibility. This highly likely indicates that both parties are keen to avoid jeopardising peace negotiations.

Prison break in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) results in more than 100 deaths.

The escape started after a riot broke out in the Makala prison of Kinshasa. Authorities responded violently and the resulting clashes killed at least 129 and injured 59. DRC prisons are highly overcrowded, and the government has recently sought to release some inmates convicted of low-level offences to alleviate the pressure. There is a realistic possibility that the combination of overcrowding and insufficient police resources will provoke further riots and prison break attempts.

Uganda opposition leader Bobi Wine shot by police.

Bobi Wine was initially elected as an independent but joined the opposition National Unity Platform party prior to the 2021 presidential election. In early 2024, he announced that he would again run in 2026, challenging Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda since 1986. The autocratic government of Uganda is characterised by a strong symbiotic relationship between government, the judiciary, and security forces, and there is a high likelihood that the shooting was a deliberate attempt on the opposition leader’s life. Due to Bobi Wine’s domestic and international popularity, it is likely that the case will spark significant unrest.

At least one tourist dead following flash floods in Mallorca, Spain.

The individual died while hiking in the area of the Torrent de Pareis, in the Tramuntana mountain range. Approximately ten other people were also trapped by the floods before being rescued. On 2-3 September, extreme weather, with severe showers and localised flash flooding, affected various coastal areas throughout the Mediterranean, including parts of Greece, central Italy and eastern Spain.

Protest bill approved ahead of planned demonstration by main opposition party.

On 5 September, the Pakistani Senate passed the ‘Peaceful Assembly and Public Order Bill 2024’ law. Pending further approval, the law is set to be implemented before a planned major 8 September demonstration by the main opposition party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in support of the jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan. The proposed legislation will empower Islamabad officials to ban assemblies in designated areas, with participants in unauthorised protests liable to receive prison sentences of up to three years.

Solace Global Assessment: In 2023, large-scale civil unrest frequently occurred in Pakistan after attempts to arrest Khan. Initially, the protests were managed by police with riot control measures such as tear gas and water cannons. Later demonstrations led to military deployment and internet shutdowns. Critics view the bill as a government tactic to suppress opposition and the bill’s passage is likely to heighten tensions.

The 8 September demonstration had already been rescheduled from 22 August following the withdrawal of permission by officials, and it is likely that authorities will attempt to suppress the upcoming rally. It is highly likely that violent clashes will occur in Islamabad during the protest. The bill reflects the government’s unstable position following contentious elections in February 2024 and will likely exacerbate levels of violence in future protests that are not granted official permission.

Garment workers protest for higher pay in industrial areas.

Protests by garment factory workers in early September, mainly in key industrial areas such as Gazipur and Narayanganj, resulted in the closure of 130 garment factories. Their demands include higher wages, maternity leave and other concessions. The protesters vandalised factories and vehicles, as well as blocked roads, which resulted in the deployment of military and police forces. Although some workers continued to work throughout the protests, factories were forced to close in order to protect their employees from the violence. The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) stated that unspecified “outsiders” were responsible for the violence. The protests initially focused on the demands of garment workers, but then reportedly escalated when outsiders joined the demonstrations, gathering outside factories demanding jobs and pressuring workers to join the protests. In response to the protests, the government has increased security in industrial areas, which allowed the factories to reopen on 5 September.

Solace Global Assessment: These protests are the first significant labour action in Bangladesh’s garment sector since the new interim government took office in August. Although there is increased security in the areas where protests took place, tensions are still likely to persist because a negotiated settlement between the garment workers and BGMEA has not yet been reached. The BGMEA has suggested that the unrest may be linked to the current political instability of Bangladesh, with tensions remaining high since the resignation of the prime minister on 9 August following weeks of deadly protests. Although an interim government has been established to restore law and order, it is likely that groups may be exploiting this to gain access and control of the garment market. On top of this, the ongoing mass floods across Bangladesh have meant factories have had to grapple with production stoppages. The political instability and financial strain the BGMEA are facing mean it is unlikely that the BGMEA will meet the demands of the protests, which would highly likely generate further unrest.In October and November 2023, garment workers’ strikes led to violent clashes with police, with at least three deaths and factories being set alight. There is a realistic possibility that equivalent levels of violence could occur again as a result of the ongoing industrial disputes.

Super Typhoon strength storm Yagi makes landfall in Hainan.

Tropical Cyclone Yagi made landfall in Hainan, China, on 6 September. The storm made landfall at Super Typhoon strength, equivalent to a category 5 hurricane, with maximum windspeeds recorded of 241km/h. Yagi had earlier impacted the northern Philippines on 3-4 September as Severe Tropical Storm Enteng, killing 16 people. Luzon was the most impacted. Yagi then moved past Hong Kong and Macau, causing disruptions.

The Chinese Central Meteorological Agency has issued a red typhoon warning for Hainan and Guangdong, the highest warning possible. Over 400,000 people were evacuated on the southern Chinese coastline.

Solace Global Assessment: Yagi is the second-strongest Tropical Cyclone to occur anywhere in the world in 2024. It is the largest storm to hit Hainan since 2014 when Typhoon Rammasun killed at least 88 people and caused over USD 6.25 billion in damages. Hainan is a tropical holiday destination, referred to as “China’s Hawaii”. In anticipation of the Super Typhoon, Hainan was brought to a standstill, with businesses, schools and transport being halted. While the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area was spared notably severe impact, the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai bridge and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange were closed.

The impact in Hainan, where Yagi has made landfall as a Super Typhoon, is highly likely to be worse. Meteorologists have warned that the scale of damage in Hainan could be “catastrophic”. The rigorous preparedness measures by Chinese authorities will, however, significantly aid in mitigating the worst possible outcomes.

Yagi is forecast to weaken from a Super Typhoon to a Very Strong Typhoon once it moves past Hainan, before weakening further to Typhoon strength just before making landfall in northern Vietnam. Four airports have already been closed in northern Vietnam, including Hanoi’s Noi Bai International Airport. Despite Yagi’s greatly increased strength over southern China, it is a realistic possibility that Yagi will cause more fatalities in Vietnam due to Vietnam’s higher level of vulnerability.

Putin visits Mongolia despite ICC arrest warrant.

The state visit likely represents an effort by Putin to highlight that, despite its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Russia is not internationally isolated. The visit is also likely to reflect ongoing Russian efforts to begin transitioning from its reliance on Europe as the main market for its fossil fuels. Russia and Mongolia have continued talks regarding the construction of a pipeline connecting the two countries.

Pope Francis tours Southeast Asia.

Pope Francis has arrived in Indonesia as part of his 12-day tour of Southeast Asia where he will visit Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Indonesia. In Jakarta, the Pope and Grand Imam Nasaruddin Umar of Istiqlal Mosque pledged to combat religious violence and environmental degradation, highlighting interfaith unity through a symbolic event at the mosque.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) carries out suicide bombing in Kabul.

ISKP had previously carried out a suicide bombing in Kandahar, one of the Taliban’s main strongholds. Its attack outside a Kabul government office, which killed at least six, is likely meant to further demonstrate the group’s ability to strike the Taliban’s administrative centres. Taliban authorities have continuously minimised the threat posed by ISKP, which nevertheless continues to be the Islamic State’s most active and likely most capable “province”.

South China Sea confrontations continue at Sabina Shoal.

Manila and Beijing accused each other of deliberately ramming each other’s vessels in an incident on 31 August at the disputed Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea. Aggressive confrontations between Chinese and Filipino vessels have occurred multiple times in recent months at the Second Thomas Shoal, and a deal was reached in late July that was hoped to de-escalate the situation. However, the new incident at the Sabina Shoal, in addition to a reported vessel collision there on 19 August, highly likely indicates that tensions remain high in the South China Sea with a new flashpoint for confrontations at the Sabina Shoal.

Monsoon rains cause deadly flooding in southern India.

Higher than average monsoon rains resulted in the deaths at least 33 people in southern India between 1 and 3 September. Significant flooding occurred as a result of the annual monsoon season since June. Forecasts indicate that the heavy rainfall will continue into late September. While the monsoon season is an annually recurring issue, this year’s monsoon will ultimately highly likely cause a greater level of impact than in previous years, exacerbated by La Nina weather conditions that will likely develop in September. Officials from the India Meteorological Department (IMD) indicate that the withdrawal of the monsoon season will likely be delayed as a result of developing La Nina weather conditions.

Military doctors deployed in South Korean hospitals due to ongoing strikes.

The measure was announced by the health ministry on 2 September to try to alleviate shortages in medical staff. Thousands of junior doctors have been conducting strikes since February 2024, in protest of government plans to drastically increase annual medical school admission caps. While authorities dispute claims by the national association of medical school professions that the medical system is on the verge of collapse, the deployment of military doctors is likely indicative of serious concerns that the staff shortage has drastically impacted the provision of healthcare.