In the early hours of 30 August, the Gabonese Election Centre (CGE) announced that President Ali Bongo had won a third term in office, having received 64.27 percent vote share in Saturday’s general election. However, just after 05:00 local time, a group of senior officers from the Gabonese military announced on television channel, Gabon 24, that they had seized power with the full support of the Gabonese security and defence forces.​

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Introducing themselves as members of The Committee of Transition and the Restoration of Institutions, the officials stated that the election results were cancelled, all borders were closed until further notice and state institutions – the government, the senate, the national assembly, the constitutional court and the election body – were dissolved. ​

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Following the announcement, domestic and regional sources reported gunfire could be heard in the capital Libreville. However, as the day progressed, the streets appeared calm, and crowds of  citizens peacefully took to the streets. Videos circulating on social media showed multiple instances of people celebrating and cheering, often in close proximity to the country’s armed forces. So far, there has been no signs of widespread protest or alarm. Several hours after the officers’ announcement, internet access also appeared to be restored for the first time since Saturday’s vote. ​

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The Gabonese government has yet to make an official statement, with President Bongo reportedly under house arrest, surrounded by his family and doctors.​

Ahead of the coup, there was significant concern over potential unrest following Saturday’s presidential, parliamentary and legislative elections that the opposition alleged were plagued by fraud. Questions over the election’s transparency were re-enforced by the lack of international observers, the suspension of foreign media broadcasts, the decision to cut internet service, and the imposing of a nationwide curfew.​

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President Ali Bongo and his father, Omar Bongo, have ruled Gabon since 1967, but frustrations with the political dynasty had been growing for several years ahead of Saturday’s election. The Central African nation is a major oil producer, so much so that it is a member of OPEC, as well as being a major exporter of uranium and magnesium. Indeed, the country is home to over one-quarter of the world’s proven magnesium reserves. However, Bongo has done little to channel its oil and other wealth towards the population of some 2.3 million people, a third of whom live in poverty. ​

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This is also not the first attempt in recent history to overthrow Bongo as in January 2019 he and the Gabonese government were able to foil an attempted military coup after soldiers briefly seized the state radio station and broadcasted a message saying Bongo, who had suffered a stroke months earlier, was no longer fit for office.

The strength of Gabon’s extractive-based economy means that it is Africa’s third most wealthy country by GDP per capita. However, with large swathes of the country still living in poverty, it is highly likely that the state has failed to transfer much of this wealth to ordinary citizens. It is likely that economic disparities have been one of the major triggers for the coup. This is likely supported by the lack of public resistance and the fact that celebrations have been seen on the streets of Libreville and other major population centres across the country.​

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Furthermore, the coup has yet to be characterised by anti-French rhetoric in a similar vein to the recent West and Central African coups in countries like Niger and Mali. However, the coup is almost certainly another problem for Paris in Africa, with multiple French companies operating in the country. Unlike the other coups in Africa, it is doubtful that the Gabonese coup leaders will seek Russian support in favour of maintaining Western relations. Gabon has traditionally had weak ties with Russia and unlike much of Africa, has not been threatened with major insurgencies and security issues. Moreover, Gabon was one of the countries in Africa that voted against Russia at the United Nations in the 2022 resolution on Ukraine.​

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Economically, the coup is almost certainly going to lead to price volatility in global oil and magnesium markets. Gabon has strong economic links with both France, and increasingly with China, and it is a major exporter of commodities to these nations. Reports indicate that some foreign companies like the French mining company, Eramet, have already suspended operations in Gabon in response to the coup. It is therefore highly likely that both France and China will be looking for the political situation to be resolved quickly, and there is a realistic possibility of diplomatic involvement from both Paris and Beijing. ​

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In the immediate future, it is unlikely that any major protests or armed clashes will break out as the Gabonese security forces are seemingly onside, and most indications suggest the public is too. The turning on of the internet was likely a move to win over the public as well as signal a different approach to governance than the Bongo regime. However, this also presents an increased potential for demonstrations and protests, both in favour and against the coup, to occur as information is spread on social media. There is a realistic possibility of sustained demonstrations which will likely lead to disruption in major population hubs. Borders will likely remain closed for upcoming days, but if scenes remain calm, borders are likely to reopen quicker than seen in Niger and Mali.

On the morning of 26 July, multiple domestic and regional sources reported that a potential coup was underway in Niamey, Niger. Early indications suggested that the Presidential Guard had blocked the entrance to the Presidential Palace, and detained President Mohamed Bazoum. Concurrently, government ministries next to the palace were blockaded, with those inside, including the Minister of the Interior, detained.

By early afternoon, the Niger Armed Forces (FAN) and National Guard had both deployed in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace. The FAN and the Presidential office both released statements asserting that the ongoing coup attempt was being driven by “anti-republican” elements and gave the Presidential Guard an “ultimatum” to stand down and release President Bazoum, or face being attacked. Unverified social media reports have subsequently described armoured FAN columns entering Niamey. Further unverified reports later emerged of roadblocks appearing across the city.

The conditions in Niamey remained calm initially, however, as the situation developed businesses were reputedly told to close and residents were ordered to stay at home. Operations at Diori Hamani International Airport currently remain unaffected, with flight tracking data showing that both inbound and outbound flights were operating as normal.

Since 2020, several coups have taken place across the Sahel region, most notably in neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso. The key driver for instability has been the inability of central governments to guarantee internal security from a myriad of insurgencies and terrorist actors. Niger has been increasingly afflicted by the instability affecting the wider region. In the southeast, Niger is battling incursions from Boko Haram and in the west of the country, the government is attempting to contain threats from Islamic State’s Sahel Province.
Due to the external and internal threats posed by these actors, Niger has become a major operating base for Western nations in the region. Indeed, both France and the USA utilise the country as a base for operations in the wider Sahel.
This relationship has grown in significance for Western governments as relations with other states in the region, such as Mali and Burkina Faso, have broken down in the wake of their own respective coups, leading to the expulsion of French forces.

Further strengthening this relationship is the fact that Niger’s President was democratically elected in 2021 and is one of the region’s few remaining democratically elected heads of state. However, in February 2023 protests erupted in the capital, Niamey, with demonstrators expressing their dissatisfaction with a sustained French military presence in the country, with many believing that the foreign presence was either ineffective or had exacerbated security concerns.

At the time of writing, there has been no official statement from Presidential Guard. However, given the recent regional trends, it is highly likely that this attempted coup has transpired due to concerns regarding the deteriorating security of Niger.

This is further evidenced by the fact that the Presidential Guard has also apprehended the Minister of the Interior, who is the person ultimately responsible for policing and internal security in Niger. The recent uptick in attacks near the borders with Burkina Faso and Mali likely provided the catalyst for the current situation.

As the situation develops, it is almost certain that key transport routes and critical locations across Niamey will be seized by rival forces. This will include Niamey’s key river crossings, which connect the main part of the city on the eastern bank of the Niger River to its western parts, the international airport, and state TV and radio offices. At the time of writing, it is believed that President Mohamed Bazoum remains in detention.

The success of the ongoing attempted coup remains to be seen. Initial signs suggest that the FAN and National Guard have remained loyal to President Bazoum and are willing to fight. If this remains the case, it is unlikely that the coup succeeds due to the disparity in military firepower between the two sides. This result would ultimately see the Presidential Guard purged.

However, should the coup succeed, civil unrest, both in favour and against, will highly likely occur. A transitional military council will likely take over the government and immediately revise the stationing of foreign militaries in Niger. The removal of the last remaining Western forces in the region will likely create a security vacuum, that will almost certainly benefit the insurgencies and terrorist groups in Niger and the wider region.

The vulnerability has been exploited by the threat group APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, Sofacy, and STRONTIUM since April 2022.

It was initially reported to Microsoft by the Ukrainian CERT. According to Microsoft, “a Russia-based threat actor” exploited the vulnerability in targeted attacks against several European organizations in government, transportation, energy, and military sectors.

Currently 15 organisations are believed to have been targeted or breached using CVE-2023-23397.

Solace Cyber Head of Incident Response believes with high certainty that this particular vulnerability will be used by other threat actors – equating to a vast quantity of attacks in the coming days to weeks.

As of 16/03/2023 proof of concept code has been developed by security researchers and it is likely to be used in subsequent attacks by other threat actors.

The attack involves the attacker sending an Outlook note or task to the victim, triggering the notification sound file mechanism, which sends an NTLM negotiation request to the attacker-controlled SMB share. The threat actors accomplish this using extended MAPI properties that contain UNC paths. The vulnerability can be exploited with a simple, specially crafted email, even if the victim doesn’t open the item.

However, it’s worth noting that this vulnerability cannot be exploited with Outlook for iOS, Mac, or Outlook for Android. Nevertheless, it affects all Windows versions of Outlook that are currently supported.  

Note: Those at a higher risk include remote workers due to home firewalls that do not block SMB traffic.

This can be done by emailing all end users to advise a manual update of Microsoft Office (click-to-run) or updating via alternative methods. If you require assistance with auto-patching solace cyber can assist.

Preferably this is run in audit mode only so that forensic data can be reviewed. If the script produces results it is recommended that you review the UNC paths in the outlook items to ensure no exploitation has occurred. 

At around 06:45 local time on 11 January 2023, several people were injured after a lone individual attacked commuters at the Gare du Nord train station in Paris, France. Those present during the incident suggested that the attacker was targeting passengers indiscriminately.

Police officers responding to the incident reportedly fired several shots at the attacker, who was arrested at the scene and remains in a critical condition. Unverified reports suggest that the attacker was first interdicted by an off-duty police officer, although this has not been officially confirmed.

The French Interior Minister Gérald Moussa Darmanin has confirmed that six people have been injured in the attack, including one police officer. A security cordon remains in place around the station, with emergency services still on site.

Police and security officials have not commented on a suspected motive for the attack, and a criminal investigation has been launched.

In the immediate aftermath of the incident, rail network TER Hauts-de-France noted that rail traffic had been disrupted both to and from Paris Nord, with some services still delayed. Limited disruption has been reported for the local road network.

Although officials have not commented on the exact motive for the attack, the methodology (bladed weapon) and targeting preferences (busy transport hub during morning commute) indicate that this incident is highly likely to be terror-related.

There have been a considerable number of high-profile terror incidents in France in recent years, with most attacks in the 21st century conducted either by violent Islamist extremists, or by individuals with extreme right-wing or racist ideologies.

The apparently indiscriminate nature of this attack likely suggests that this incident was an act of Islamist terror, since racially- motivated attacks are highly targeted.

The attack at the Gare du Nord comes less than three weeks (23 December) after a racially-motivated shooting attack killed three at a Kurdish cultural centre and nearby café on the Rue d’Enghien, in the 10th arrondissement, less than 2km from the Gare du Nord station. That incident prompted extensive unrest amongst the local Kurdish population and was condemned by the Kurdish Democratic Council of France (CDK-F).

Previous Islamist terror attacks in France have been motivated by perceived or genuine attacks against ethnic minority, immigrant or Islamic communities.