INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Hurricane Isaias is highly likely to cause significant disruption across the northern Gulf Coast over the next 24-48 hours, particularly in southern Alabama, coastal Mississippi and the western Florida Panhandle.

The combination of destructive winds, storm surges and intense rainfall is likely to result in widespread flooding, damage to infrastructure, prolonged power outages and major disruption to road, rail and air transport. Coastal communities near the anticipated landfall location face the greatest immediate threat, particularly in low-lying areas where storm surge could render evacuation routes impassable.

Based on the assessed landfall area, the cities and coastal communities most at risk include Pensacola, Pensacola Beach and Gulf Breeze in Florida, alongside Gulf Shores and Orange Beach in Alabama. Other cities at risk include Mobile, Foley and Fairhope in Alabama; Destin, Fort Walton Beach and Panama City in Florida; and Biloxi and Gulfport in Mississippi.

There is a realistic possibility that Hurricane Isaias will intensify into a Category 4 hurricane before making landfall, which would increase the potential for severe infrastructure damage and extend recovery times. Although Isaias will likely weaken as it moves inland, heavy rainfall and associated flooding could continue to affect parts of the southeastern United States throughout the weekend.

Iranian attacks against commercial shipping have further intensified. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) stated on 6 October that nine tankers had been attacked in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) since 1 October, equivalent to half the total recorded across the SoH and the wider Gulf in September. On 7 October, a tanker was struck by multiple projectiles approximately 51 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal, Qatar, with casualties reported, the first attack against a tanker in the western Gulf in several weeks. Iranian state media also reported major explosions in the SoH on 8 October, potentially involving tankers striking naval mines, although these claims remain unverified.

Following the 2 October Camp David meeting in the US to discuss next steps in the conflict, reports published on 7 October indicated that the Pentagon has instructed US Central Command (CENTCOM) to conclude preparations for a resumption of major combat operations against Iran. US and Israeli officials briefed that strikes, potentially targeting nuclear, infrastructure and energy sites and conducted jointly with Israel, could take place before the 3 November US midterm elections and Israel’s elections a week earlier. An Israeli official briefed that the chances of this happening before the elections were “not high” but could not be ruled out, and would “increase significantly” after the midterms.

On 8 October, reporting indicated that the Pentagon had drawn up plans for an intense, three-day campaign targeting Iran’s missile and drone arsenals, and potentially also energy facilities and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command sites. Trump also stated that the US would not attack Iran “at any time prior to the Midterm Elections”, citing “productive discussions” with Tehran. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) chief of staff, Eyal Zamir, reportedly warned that a renewed joint US-Israeli campaign could postpone Israel’s 27 October elections, according to Israeli media reporting citing US officials.

Saudi Arabia’s General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA) stated that an attack against Abha International Airport on 6 October killed two expatriates (Moroccan and Algerian) and injured 28 people, and that an attack against King Khalid International Airport on 7 October killed a Sudanese resident and injured eight people, including five Saudi nationals. On 8 October, the Houthis claimed a further ballistic missile attack against Riyadh’s international airport and reiterated warnings to international airlines against operating in Saudi airspace. On 8 October, a Saudia airliner was heavily damaged by fire while parked at Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport during a Houthi-claimed missile attack, with two Houthi attacks resulting in the deaths of three Saudi citizens, and debris from an intercepted missile damaged a kindergarten and a medical clinic in Riyadh. Flights at the airport resumed early 9 October.

In Yemen, fighting around Dhubab continued on 6 October, and reporting on 7 October indicated that the internationally recognised government (IRG) counteroffensive had stalled. The Saudi-led coalition announced strikes against 82 Houthi targets on 7 October, and government forces claimed more than 2,100 targeting operations and gains in southern Marib between 6 and 8 October. Reports on 7 October also indicated that Riyadh and Damascus have discussed a potential deployment of 10,000-20,000 Syrian troops to Yemen, but Syrian authorities subsequently denied the reports.

As of 9 October, the US Department of State maintains Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman at “Level 3: Reconsider Travel”.

As of 9 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed, and operations were disrupted at King Khalid International Airport due to the Houthi strikes.

Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia intensified between 6 and 9 October, with international airports increasingly targeted. An attack against Abha International Airport on 6 October killed two foreign residents and injured 28 people, according to Saudi Arabia’s GACA. On 7 October, an attack against King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh killed a Sudanese resident and injured eight people, including five Saudi nationals.

On 8 October, the Houthis claimed a further wave of strikes against King Khalid International Airport, Najran Airport and Khamis Mushait air base, and reiterated warnings to international airlines against operating in Saudi airspace. A Saudia airliner was heavily damaged by fire while parked at King Khalid International Airport during the attack, with the airport suspending operations for several hours, and three Saudi citizens were killed. Debris from an intercepted missile also damaged a kindergarten and a medical clinic in Riyadh, according to Saudi Civil Defence. Hundreds of flights were cancelled or delayed, and Lufthansa and several Indian carriers suspended Riyadh flights.

On 8 October, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) expanded its advice against all but essential travel to Riyadh, Asir, Najran and Jazan provinces, as well as Taif, while Norway, the Netherlands and India also strengthened their respective travel advisories. The US Mission stated that US government employees now require special authorisation to use King Khalid International Airport.

As of 9 October, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed, and operations at King Khalid International Airport were disrupted by Houthi strikes before resuming early 9 October.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 6 and 9 October.

As of 9 October, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 6 and 9 October.

As of 9 October, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 6 and 9 October.

As of 9 October, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 6 and 9 October.

As of 9 October, the UAE’s airspace is open.

Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 6 and 9 October.

As of 9 October, Oman’s airspace is open.

The funeral of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the early stages of the conflict, began on 4 July and is set to conclude on 9 July, with ceremonies hosted in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad. Qatar’s foreign ministry had earlier said that US-Iran negotiations will be paused during the funeral and will resume after 9 July. International media reported that as many as 12 million people have attended the processions, with some mourners recorded chanting “death to the compromiser” in reference to President Masoud Pezeshkian for engaging in negotiations with the US.

Overnight 6-7 July, the UK Maritime Trade Operations stated that a tanker had been hit by an “unknown projectile” close to the coast of Oman. The tanker was later identified as the Marshall Islands-flagged Qatari LNG tanker AL REKAYYAT (IMO: 9397339). Further reports indicate that another vessel, the Saudi Arabia-flagged crude oil tanker WEDYAN (IMO:9524970), was also struck overnight. US officials have briefed that Iran’s military fired at least two missiles at commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), and that both vessels suffered significant damage but no casualties.

As of 7 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Jordan between 3 and 7 July.

At least 29 people have been injured in Jordan, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Jordan’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 3 and 7 July.

On 3 July, the Houthis’ military spokesman, Yahya Saree, announced that Houthi forces had confronted Saudi Arabian “warplanes” that allegedly attempted to prevent an Iranian civilian aircraft from landing at Sanaa International Airport in Houthi-controlled Yemen. The Houthi spokesman threatened that any allegedly repeated airspace violations would be retaliated against with strikes on Saudi Arabian airports and other “vital interests on land and sea”.

On 4 July, the spokesman of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG), Major-General Turki al-Maliki, pledged a response of “unprecedented determination and force” to any attempts to target Saudi Arabia or violate Yemeni sovereignty, dismissed the Houthi threats, and noted that the group’s posture had exposed civilian infrastructure in Houthi-controlled Yemen to potential targeting.

On 4-5 July, clashes between the Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces were reported south of Hodeidah, likely marking the most serious fighting between the two sides since 2024. On 5 July, a bulk carrier transiting the Red Sea reported being attacked by unknown armed assailants on a skiff, around 13 nm off the Yemen coast near Al-Durayhimi, a Houthi-controlled area. If confirmed as the Houthis, this would mark a further escalation, with the Houthis having suspended attacks against merchant vessels in recent months.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 3 and 7 July.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 3 and 7 July.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 3 and 7 July.

In response to the attack against the Qatari LNG tanker in the SoH overnight 6-7 July, Qatar’s foreign ministry stated that Tehran bore full legal responsibility for the attack. Qatar has been acting as a mediator, alongside Pakistan, between the US and Iran, with no Iranian attacks recorded against Qatar since the implementation of a ceasefire on 8 April.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 3 and 7 July.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, the UAE’s airspace is open.

Excluding attacks in Omani waters in the Strait of Hormuz, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 3 and 7 July.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Oman’s airspace is open.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The attacks on both 2 and 7 July share multiple characteristics. Both attacks occurred in central Damascus, both attacks were in close proximity to a government ministry, and both attacks relied on planted explosive devices rather than firearms. Moreover, available footage of the second explosion (reportedly the more powerful blast) at the site does not suggest it was particularly large. The improvised explosive device (IED) detonated at the 2 July café bombing was a “crude [IED] weighing approximately one kilogram equipped with metal shrapnel”, according to the Ministry of Interior. These characteristics indicate that the attacks are likely connected, coordinated, and conducted by the same threat actor.

The attacks also follow another attack against a government ministry on 19 May, when a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) was detonated outside a Defence Ministry building in the Bab Sharqi district of Damascus, killing one soldier and injuring at least 21 people. Just before the explosion, soldiers had identified and defused a separate vehicle rigged with explosives in the same part of the city.

Overall, the attacks highlight that despite a gradually improving security environment in Damascus for foreign travellers since the fall of the Assad regime, the risk of terrorism remains high and regime forces are unable to fully secure central Damascus.

Potential perpetrators of the attack include Salafi jihadist terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, or Assad-regime remnant forces.

ISIS remains the most active terrorist group in Syria. Despite the Islamic State (IS) globally having shifted in strength towards sub-Saharan Africa, the group’s weekly newsletter al-Naba maintains a key focus on Syria and regularly calls for attacks against the Syrian transitional government (STG), which it classifies as “apostate”. Earlier this year in February, the ISIS spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari released a statement announcing a new phase of operations targeting the STG.

Moreover, ISIS channels have previously been observed as calling on supporters to kill foreigners travelling to Syria, with foreign travel to Syria having considerably increased since the fall of the Assad regime. This would align directly with the 7 July attack being conducted close to the Four Seasons Hotel, which hosts foreign diplomats, business travellers, and UN staff, and the attack occurring shortly after President Macron had left the area. Macron’s visit to Syria is notably the first visit by a Western leader to Syria under the STG, and an attack during his visit is likely calculated to undermine President al-Sharaa and Western involvement in Syria.

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah was formed in 2025 as a splinter of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the al-Sharaa-led Islamist rebel group which spearheaded the offensive that brought down the Assad regime in late 2024, by radicals who are disillusioned with the more moderate approach pursued by the government. The group shares much of its ideology with IS, and uses a similar communications style, although links between the two groups are unconfirmed. On 22 June 2025, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah militants carried out a suicide bombing in the Mar Elisa Greek Orthodox Church in Douailah, Damascus, during mass. The attack killed 30 people and injured more than 50, and remains the most deadly terrorist attack to have been conducted in Damascus since the fall of the Assad regime.

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Since the HTS-led takeover of Syria, the new al-Sharaa-led STG has cracked down on foreign jihadist fighters who were in the ranks of HTS, particularly Central Asian and North Caucasian militant factions. On 5 May, for example, Syrian security forces arrested over 24 Uzbek militants in Idlib, following an armed standoff between Uzbek fighters and security forces after a raid. In issue 547 of al-Naba published in May, ISIS called on former foreign fighters to join its ranks.

Assad-regime remnants also likely have incentives to have conducted the attacks, and previous unverified sources have suggested the initial investigations of the 2 July café have pointed away from ISIS; however, investigations remain in the early stages. In March 2025, major clashes broke out between STG forces and Assadist insurgents from Syria’s Alawite minority in Latakia and Tartus governorates. The 2 July café bombing, which killed six lawyers, occurred next to the Ministry of Justice, with trials ongoing for former regime figures such as Bashar al-Assad’s cousin, Atef Najib, and Syria’s former grand mufti, Ahmed Hassoun. Surviving Assad-regime networks could be attempting to disrupt the trials and discredit the STG, with the “primitive” nature of the IED on 2 July potentially pointing towards a smaller and less organised actor.

Other potential perpetrators include Druze and Kurdish militants, and Hezbollah. However, initial indications suggest that these actors are less likely to have conducted the attacks.

Druze militant violence has so far been localised in the south of Syria, with no established practice of conducting similar terrorist bombings. While some Kurdish hardliners in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintained opposition to integration into the STG following their effective defeat by STG forces in early 2026, such a campaign of bombings in Damascus would almost certainly undermine their legitimacy for little operational gain.

Finally, while US pressure has been applied against the STG to intervene in Lebanon against Hezbollah in recent days, Syria’s Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, has stated that Damascus has no intention of intervening in the country militarily. A regional expert briefing the media stated after the 2 July attack that there were no indications from Hezbollah’s supporters that pointed to Damascus as a target in recent days.

Security forces are highly likely to maintain a higher threat posture than usual in Damascus in the coming weeks, which will likely materialise with greater numbers of checkpoints and vehicle checks. Authorities may additionally conduct raids against suspected cells, which could lead to localised firefights in the vicinity of the raids. If the attack/s are attributed to Assad-regime remnants, there is a realistic possibility of a crackdown being launched in Latakia and Tartus governorates.

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INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The current protest movement in Bolivia has almost certainly evolved into a large-scale challenge to President Paz’s government, as reflected by the increased participation of civil society actors, unions and other sections of Bolivian society. In addition, the drivers of unrest have almost certainly expanded in scope. Initial protests were a direct reaction to fuel subsidy cuts, but have increasingly been driven by broader socioeconomic grievances, including inflation, fuel shortages, wage and pension demands, opposition to the government’s wider reform agenda, and calls for the president to resign.

Paz was elected in November 2025. However, millions of Bolivians view the incumbent government as illegitimate. Paz’s centre-right Christian Democratic Party (PDC) succeeded due to the fragmentation of the long-dominant MAS, which resulted in the left-wing vote being split between several candidates. This means that Paz’s control of the executive is not reflective of an actual political mandate, with most of Bolivia’s electorate likely still aligned with MAS.

This political vulnerability almost certainly constitutes a major structural weakness, which makes the Paz government unable to address the root causes of the unrest and provide a policymaking alternative that could restore order in the short term while preserving government integrity. The ongoing international fuel crisis caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has almost certainly worsened the fallout from the fuel subsidy removal and further constrained the government’s room for manoeuvre.

In the immediate term, it is likely that violent unrest will continue in La Paz and in the rural parts of Bolivia, such as Chapare and Cochabamba, where Morales has a strong base of support. Due to the use of explosives by protesters and the violent response by officers, it is likely that the protests will result in further fatalities.

The highly dispersed system of roadblocks used by protesters is likely aimed at maximising disruption while overstretching police clearance operations. However, if sustained, the government will likely be forced to deploy additional police and military personnel to clear key routes and protect critical supply corridors, increasing the risk of violence between protestors and security forces, which in turn could exacerbate unrest.

Sustained nationwide roadblocks will likely cause protracted travel and service disruptions in La Paz and other large urban centres. Local media have already reported shortages of medicine and medical equipment, which will likely decrease access to quality healthcare. The government has already deployed the Bolivian Air Force to transport food to La Paz from other parts of the country.

Extended fuel shortages are likely to cause power outages, with secondary impacts, such as an increase in property crime, also being possible. For travellers, blockades are likely to reduce options to leave Bolivia, with several roadblocks established on the approaches to airports and international borders.

There is a realistic possibility that the Paz government will increasingly deploy coercive measures to contain the protests, with the likelihood of this increasing if the blockade of La Paz continues. Such efforts would be primarily dedicated to securing La Paz, but would almost certainly provoke a violent reaction, with attacks on security forces and police becoming likelier. In rural areas, these could take the form of ambushes on police units responding to blockades. Previous examples of this include an attack which occurred in June 2025 in the mining town of Llallahua in the Potosí region, where three officers were killed in an ambush.

As of 0810 UTC 28 February, there are reports of Iranian kinetic retaliation being initiated, with Iranian missile launches detected by the IDF. An Iranian official told international media that Iran is preparing for retaliation and that the response is set to be “crushing”.  

In Israel, authorities have enacted a “special and permanent state of emergency” and closed the country’s airspace, with Home Front Command / the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issuing guidance including advising citizens to stay near protected shelters and minimise travel, and announcing the closure of schools, workplaces, and public gatherings. Sirens sounded across Israel at approximately 08:15 Israel local time (06:15 UTC), warning of a possible impending missile attack. The Israeli government has suspended civilian flights to and from the country in the wake of the attack on Iran.

Diplomatic missions have issued advisories for countries across the Middle East. The US has issued shelter-in-place advisories in Israel, Qatar, and Bahrain. 

The air and maritime disruption is immediate and almost certain to expand. Authorities are confirmed to have closed the entirety of the airspace in Israel, Iran and Iraq. Flight tracking websites confirm that this has already resulted in major region-wide flight diversions, cancellations, and delays.  

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The strikes almost certainly significantly elevate the risk profile of the entire Middle East. Given the early indications of the significant scale of the attack, major Iranian retaliation is highly likely. 

In the immediate term, further airspace closures are highly likely, which will almost certainly further impact air travel and, in some cases, reduce options for evacuation via commercial airlines. Further revisions to government travel advisories are highly likely, and any evacuation of non-essential embassy personnel would likely reduce consular capacity and complicate support to nationals remaining in-country. 

The region-wide risk of terrorist attacks, kidnappings, and civil unrest, including the staging of protests targeting US and Israeli businesses and diplomatic missions, has now likely increased.  

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Tanzania’s ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has held power since the country’s independence in 1961, initially through its predecessor party, Tanzania Mainland (TANU). Since the 2015 election, which resulted in CCM achieving its smallest vote share of 58 per cent, the government has become increasingly authoritarian. Under incumbent president Samia Suluhu Hassan, the government has cracked down on opposition, civil society, and journalists.

The main opposition party, The Party for Democracy and Progress (CHADEMA), was barred from running in April 2025, with its leader, Tundu Lissu, arrested and charged with treason in response to pro-democracy protests. Luhaga Mpina, the presidential candidate for Alliance for Change and Transparency – Wazalendo (ACT-Wazalendo), was also disqualified from entering the race due to alleged procedural issues within the party’s nomination process.

The general election is widely perceived as cementing the continuation of CCM’s rule, with the party standing effectively unchallenged. Post-2015 elections have been characterised by observers as containing systematic fraud, intimidation, and obstruction. Electoral results have heavily favoured the government, with CCM securing 98.7 per cent of the vote share in the 2020 parliamentary elections and 99.3 per cent in the November 2024 local government elections. The ongoing general elections will highly likely result in the government achieving similarly high numbers to recent elections.

Tanzania has historically responded harshly to civil unrest. Following the 2020 elections, protests against government corruption erupted in Zanzibar. Security forces responded forcefully, with reports of soldiers, police, and a militia linked to the CCM beating civilians and using live ammunition against demonstrators, killing nine. Thousands also demonstrated in January 2024 to demand constitutional changes to reform the electoral commission and reduce presidential powers.

Authorities will highly likely enforce the curfew severely in an attempt to prevent the protests from gaining traction. If the protests continue, the authorities will highly likely respond with crackdowns including mass arrests, tear gas, water cannon, and potentially live ammunition. Internet shutdowns are almost certainly being imposed to prevent the spread of anti-government sentiment, particularly among the youth, with large-scale ‘Gen Z’ protests leading to the ousting of governments in Nepal and Madagascar in recent months.

There is a realistic possibility that major protests will spread beyond Dar es Salaam and become widespread across Tanzania’s urban centres, including Dodoma and Zanzibar, where military personnel have reportedly been deployed. If civil unrest escalates, airport disruptions are likely, with airlines potentially cancelling flights and roadblocks preventing access to major airports.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Protests are highly likely to intensify across major cities and Bakary strongholds, such as Douala, Yaoundé, and Dschang, and could spread nationwide. A significant portion of the population almost certainly believes the vote count was manipulated and is highly likely to mobilise in support of Bakary. The violent confrontations that occurred on 15, 21, and 26 October indicate that demonstrations could rapidly turn violent. The perception that security forces have been stationed outside Bakary’s residence is likely to reinforce public anger and the potential for escalation.

Biya’s government has become increasingly repressive in recent years. Starting in 2016, harsh measures have been imposed on the Anglophone communities in the Northwestern and Southwestern regions, which comprise approximately 15 to 20 per cent of the population. At least 3,000 people have been killed and nearly 700,000 people displaced in the violence. The government has also cracked down on civil society, arresting and intimidating journalists and opposition figures, preventing criticism of the government, and denying permission for gatherings.

Cameroon’s population has struggled with unemployment and a rising cost of living. Cameroon’s young population remains politically disenfranchised, with many viewing the government as deeply corrupt under President Paul Biya, who has ruled since 1982. Bakary declaring victory will highly likely be perceived as a potential catalyst for widespread civil unrest, which could unseat the current government, almost certainly inspired by recent demonstrations in Nepal and Madagascar.

The 2018 election resulted in protests across the country led by opposition figure Maurice Kamto, which the government responded to with a heavy crackdown and excessive force against demonstrators. Security forces have demonstrated similar patterns in response to recent demonstrations, and anti-government demonstrations will almost certainly be met with severe crackdowns, with security forces highly likely to use live ammunition, crowd-dispersal measures such as tear gas and water cannon, internet blackouts, and mass arrests.

If civil unrest escalates, airport disruptions are likely, with airlines potentially cancelling flights and roadblocks preventing access to major airports. Curfews could also be imposed, further disrupting transportation.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Hurricane Melissa is the 13th named storm of 2025’s Atlantic hurricane season (June to November), with the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration having previously predicted an above-normal season with between 13 to 18 named storms and three to five major hurricanes.

Hurricane Melissa is the third Category 5 Atlantic hurricane of the season. However, unlike the other Category 5 hurricanes, Erin and Humberto, which reached such intensities further east over the Atlantic, Melissa is forecast to directly make landfall in Jamaica and then Cuba and will likely have a far more severe level of impact. Moreover, the hurricane is currently moving at only eight kilometres per hour, considered very slow, which, if sustained, will likely exacerbate the impact of the storm.

A country’s disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, remains the most critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. Jamaica is assessed by GDACS as having Medium vulnerability. While mandatory evacuation orders have been issued for at-risk areas, officials have indicated that uptake has not been high enough and are reportedly considering enforcement of the orders. Hurricane Beryl in the summer of 2024 led to at least four deaths in Jamaica and USD 204 million in damages. Melissa will almost certainly have a higher level of impact, with the potential to be the worst hurricane to have ever hit Jamaica.

In Cuba, Melissa is forecast to make landfall at either Category 3 or 4 strength late 28 October or early 29 October local time, with the city of Santiago de Cuba highly likely to be heavily impacted. Cuba has already over the past year been heavily impacted by a series of nationwide power blackouts, leading to rare instances of civil unrest, with these issues with the nation’s energy infrastructure almost certain to be exacerbated by Hurricane Melissa. After Cuba, Melissa is anticipated to impact both the eastern Bahamas and the Turks & Caicos Islands on late 29 October, likely at a reduced strength of Category 2 or 3. The hurricane is not anticipated to have a major impact on the eastern seaboard of the United States.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

Sporadic protests have been ongoing in Kenya since 9 June, after blogger Albert Ojwang died in police custody the previous day after being arrested for the alleged defamation of the Deputy Inspector General of Police.  As protests escalated, the Kenyan National Police also released a statement confirming that a woman miscarried whilst in police custody at Rwanyambo police station in Nyandarua County. On 12 June, the government announced a new finance bill, the trigger for the 2024 protests, although the 2025 iteration was far more conservative.

Protests will likely continue to escalate. On 17 June, the most violent day of unrest before today, a large group of unidentified individuals on motorcycles arrived in the Central Business District in Nairobi armed with makeshift weapons, including whips and clubs, and Kenyan police forces shot a bystander who had been selling face masks with an anti-riot shotgun at point-blank range in the head. There is a realistic possibility that the allegedly pro-government individuals could once again target protesters, which would almost certainly inflame tensions.

These protests constitute the most significant demonstrations since the June-August 2024 protests triggered by the government finance bill. The 2024 protests saw a harsh response from security forces, who were accused of abducting, torturing, and killing civilians believed to be leaders of anti-government protests. At least 60 protesters were killed in total.

The continued perceived harsh repression of demonstrations by security forces, as well as the harming of civilians in custody, has significantly exacerbated tensions, and further footage of security forces using excessive force will almost certainly contribute to demonstrations spreading further.

Today’s date, 25 June, marks the first anniversary of the 2024 storming of parliament. Protesters will likely target the parliament again due to its symbolic value, although there is a heavy security presence around the building, and it has been barricaded with razor wire to prevent protesters from entering.

Despite the introduction of a new finance bill being the trigger for the 2024 protests, it is likely the least contributing factor in this wave of demonstrations. The 2024 finance bill aimed to raise 346 billion Kenyan shillings to pay off the country’s high debt by massively increasing taxes on consumers, such as value-added tax (VAT). Amidst a rising cost of living and inflation, this would have added significant economic pressure on ordinary Kenyans, triggering widespread youth-led protests.

The current wave of unrest, on the other hand, is largely directed towards police brutality, with protesters demanding justice and the resignation of a senior officer they blame for the death of Ojwang, likely suggesting that sustained police brutality and a lack of accountability will continue to sustain violent unrest.

The presence of prominent opposition figures will almost certainly add pressure on President William Ruto, who has seen multiple bouts of unrest since attaining power in 2022. There is a realistic possibility that protests will continue to escalate until Ruto steps down.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Delivered by Head of Intelligence Mark Overington and Chief Customer Officer Robert Aldous, the session highlighted:

INTELLIGENCE TEAM’S GUIDANCE

•Closely monitor local news reports, government alerts, and the Solace Secure platform and trusted local media for updates. There is a high likelihood of disinformation being published regarding the nature of the plane crash.

•Follow Air India’s X page found here for the latest information regarding the incident.

•Expect significant transport disruptions near the airport and crash site. Where possible, use alternative routes.

•Confirm all flights with your airline if scheduled to depart from or arrive at Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport.

•If stranded or delayed, contact your airline’s 24/7 helpline to arrange alternative flights.

•If staying near the airport or crash site, expect transit delays due to crash-related roadblocks. Consider moving hotels to somewhere away from the airport.

•Expect reduced capacity for emergency services in the Ahmedabad area over the coming hours.