The deployment of US airborne intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets to Mexico is almost certainly indicative of the Trump administration’s strategic priority to counter the cartels.

The ELN’s imposition of an “armed strike” in Colombia’s Chocó Department will almost certainly disrupt the provision of essential services and increase pressure on the central government.

The upcoming German elections will highly likely result in the Christian Democrats winning the most votes, but will likely be followed by a period of instability due to a fractured parliament.

The beginning of bilateral US-Russia talks that exclude Ukraine, and the public dispute between President Trump and President Zelensky, likely puts the Ukrainian president in a lose-lose situation.

The ceasefire in Lebanon is holding, however, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will challenge the terms of the ceasefire, assessing that other parties are in too weak a position to retaliate.

A suspected failed terror attack in Israel will almost certainly be used to justify expanded IDF operations in the West Bank.

There is a realistic possibility that increased IDF operations in the West Bank are shaping activity for increased settlement, a development that could undermine the ceasefire and fuel unrest.

The detention of two British nationals in Iran under charges of espionage is highly likely an example of hostage diplomacy, reaffirming the threat posed by arbitrary detention in adversarial states.

AFC/M23 rebels are highly likely to continue their advance in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which could trigger further unrest in Kinshasa.

Pakistan’s hosting of its first international cricket tournament since 2009 is almost certainly a coveted target for multiple terrorist groups operating in the country.

In Bangladesh, both the arrests of Awami League supporters and the clashes between student groups are almost certainly driven by ongoing power struggles for political primacy post-Hasina.

There is a realistic possibility that student-led protests in Indonesia could evolve into a wider movement if joined by other sections of society, potentially leading to violent clashes with the police.

Since early February, the US military and intelligence community has significantly increased its surveillance of Mexican cartel activity. This has primarily been achieved by deploying a range of tactical to strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) airborne assets to monitor cartel activity.

The US Navy has deployed P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft to identify vessels of interest, monitor surface activity and intercept communications. Assets from the US Coast Guard have supported US Navy missions.

The US Air Force (USAF) has deployed RC135 Rivet Joint, a dedicated signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft capable of intercepting, geolocating, and classifying electronic emissions. The USAF has also deployed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, primarily for wide-area imagery intelligence collection.

Neither the Pentagon nor the White House have confirmed the deployment of RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. However, US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has stated that 140 military intelligence personnel have been assigned to the border mission. Their role includes full-motion video analysis, counter-network analysis, and Spanish language translation in support of the US Border Patrol Office of Intelligence.

Reports also indicate that US military operations are being supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is reportedly flying unarmed MQ-9 Reaper uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV) ISR missions directly over Mexican airspace.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The use of strategic military assets like Rivet Joint against the cartels is an unprecedented shift which has likely been authorised following President Trump’s 20 January executive order to designate several of the cartels as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs), which came into effect on 19 February.

The designation has likely permitted other forms of more covert intelligence collection, such as directed surveillance, which is hard to identify in the open-source domain. The use of strategic assets combined with the scale and frequency of US ISR missions over Mexico, the US-Mexico border and maritime approaches indicates that this activity is unlikely to be simply strategic messaging towards the cartels.

SIGINT platforms will be able to provide US intelligence with information relating to phone signals, radio transmissions, encrypted devices, satellite signals, radar emissions from vessels, and other electronic communications.

When layered with imagery collection and other forms of intelligence collection, such as human intelligence (HUMINT), this data will allow for a comprehensive understanding of cartel operations. When analysed, US intelligence will likely be able to uncover cartel patterns of life, identify key locations such as fentanyl labs, trace drug trafficking routes, map cartel networks and leadership structures, identify enablers, track financial operations, and gather other critical insights into cartel activity.

How this intelligence will be used remains unknown. The CIA has conducted ISR missions against the cartels in the past, but this has often been done with authorisation from the Mexican authorities. Moreover, it is unlikely that the US will be operating within Mexican airspace without approval from the Mexican government.

Trump has posited the idea of using US special forces to conduct targeted operations against the cartels, a policy that is unlikely to require congressional approval. However, the most likely scenario is that the US is fulfilling a sophisticated intelligence capability that Mexico currently lacks. By delivering surveillance, signals intelligence, and analytical support to Mexican authorities, the US is likely enhancing Mexico’s ability to more effectively target cartels and disrupt their operations as part of a partnered operation.

This has likely placed enormous pressure on Mexico to adapt its strategy towards the cartels or face a reaction from the Trump administration, such as tariffs.

However, such a shift could precipitate a change in the security environment in Mexico which may threaten US interests. The cartels may be forced to alter their tactics, which could involve more sophisticated counter-surveillance measures, more innovative ways to smuggle illicit goods into the US or an escalation in violence.

If the cartels perceive increased US involvement as an existential threat to their operations, they may respond with a range of retaliatory actions to deter further intervention. There is a realistic possibility that this could include increased cartel violence on the border, attacks on Mexican security services and assassinations of high-profile civilian targets such as politicians and journalists.

A more extreme response could involve cartels deliberately targeting US interests in Mexico or beyond. This might include attacks on American businesses, kidnappings of US citizens or deliberate attempts to flood the US with higher volumes of narcotics and potentially more lethal varieties.

On 17 February, members of the National Liberation Army (ELN) declared that a three-day “armed strike” would be enforced in the Chocó Department. The strike began on 18 February at midnight and is set to end on 21 February at midnight.

Under the terms of the strike, no public activities will be allowed to take place, public transportation will cease to operate, no one will be able to travel on public roads, and civilians will be forced to remain indoors for the entire period. The ELN has stated that the strike has been imposed in order to expose collusion between the state, military forces and mercenary groups operating in the region.

This is the ninth armed strike that the ELN have imposed but is considerably larger than the previous strikes.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ELN’s imposition of an armed strike likely serves several purposes. The ability to impose an armed strike largely unchallenged will almost certainly be perceived as a direct challenge to the government, likely weakening public confidence in state security forces.

Public confidence in the government will be further tested if the ELN can expose collusion between the state and other armed groups, such as the Gulf Clan. If the ELN succeeds in these efforts, it will likely increase pressure on the Petro administration to concede to more favourable terms in the ongoing peace negotiations.

If successful, it is highly likely that the ELN will impose similar armed strikes in other parts of Colombia, with the group having a major presence in departments such as Norte de Santander, Arauca, Cauca, and Nariño, where it has long-established control and influence. The armed strikes will likely disrupt the provision of essential services, including food, medicine and health care, especially if they increase in scale and duration. Furthermore, anyone contravening the ELN’s orders is likely to be apprehended or executed, including individuals who are typically afforded protection, such as healthcare professionals and humanitarian workers.

The government claims that the ELN is using the armed strike to limit traffic on the area’s roads and waterways. This strategy will enable the ELN to transit illicit goods such as cocaine and illegally mined materials out of the region, ultimately helping to fund future operations. In response, the Colombian government will likely increase military and police deployments in key areas and along major transport routes in an attempt to restore order, interdict smuggling, and prevent the ELN from expanding its influence. However, given the ELN’s entrenched position in the rural Chocó Department and its preference for asymmetric warfare, it is unlikely that government forces will be successful in dislodging the ELN from its area of operations.

Former Brazilian president charged over coup attempt

Brazilian prosecutors have charged former President Jair Bolsonaro over an alleged coup plot to poison his successor, current President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and to kill a Supreme Court judge. The prosecutor general stated that Bolsonaro and 33 others were complicit in the plot.

Bolsonaro has rejected the accusation, labelling the incumbent government as an authoritarian regime. The former president still commands significant support in Brazil and is attempting to rekindle his political career, despite being banned from holding public office until 2030.

Bolsonaro is unlikely to be arrested before his trial, but his future arrest or any major developments in the case are likely to provoke major unrest, with many of his supporters previously attempting to storm government buildings in the capital, Brasilia, after his defeat in the 2022 presidential election.

Argentine President Javier Milei receives backlash following crypto scandal

On 14 February, Milei posted a link to a website selling the cryptocurrency $Libra, leading to it quickly appreciating in value before suddenly dropping, losing up to USD 4 billion, after early investors sold their coins. The main opposition coalition, led by the Socialist Party, has accused Milei of fraud and has called for the start of impeachment proceedings.

Milei defended his actions stating that he did not advertise the coin, shared it from his personal account, and that investing in crypto is like gambling, so he is not responsible for investors’ losses. Milei’s seeming promotion of the little-known cryptocurrency follows similar actions by other politicians. On the eve of the inauguration, US then-President-elect Donald Trump launched a personal crypto coin and was shortly followed by First Lady Melania Trump.    

Six Guyanese soldiers injured in suspected gang attack across Venezuela’s border

On 18 February, armed men on the Venezuelan side of the Cuyuni River opened fire on soldiers on a resupply mission along the Guyana side, injuring six. While there was an exchange of fire, it is unclear whether any attackers, who were suspected gang members, were hit.

Guyana’s defence force has released a statement claiming that it ‘remains committed to protecting its borders and will take all necessary measures to address any threats to national security’. The incident is expected to raise tensions between the two countries and is the latest in a diplomatic feud over the shared border.

Venezuela has claimed that it has been cheated out of the mineral rich Essequibo region, which makes up two-thirds of Guyana, and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has threatened to forcefully annex the region. Protests are likely in Guyana’s capital Georgetown amid public anger at Venezuela’s actions.

Colonel killed in likely cartel-mandated assassination in Ecuador

Colonel Porfirio Cedeño was shot and killed in the town of Guayaquil. According to local media, “multiple” gunmen ambushed the colonel’s vehicle as he was en route to a military ceremony in Manta. Cedeño was the leader of a special armed forces unit, the Special Operations Group, tasked with carrying out operations against drug traffickers in the country. The shooting, almost certainly mandated by local cartels, is the latest in a series of high-profile assassinations of figures within the Ecuadorean government.

Brazilian forces launch large-scale operation against illegal logging

Brazilian forces seized at least 5,000 truckloads of timber during Operation Maravalha, a series of large-scale raids targeting illegal logging in the states of Para, Amazonas, and Rondonia. In addition to the seizures, authorities closed multiple sawmills.

The Lula government has made some considerable progress in curbing illegal logging in the Amazon rainforest, with levels of illegal deforestation falling since the 2022 elections. Deforestation, including logging and deliberate wildfires, is mostly carried out to turn portions of the rainforest into pastures, making them more profitable.

While the government raid, the largest in five years according to government sources, is a notable win for the Lula government, Brasilia likely continues to face significant difficulties in curbing illegal deforestation, which is both widespread and difficult to monitor.

Dengue cases continue to rise in Brazil

On 19 February, the government of São Paulo declared a state of emergency due to a significant rise in dengue cases, with 124,000 infections and 113 deaths reported since the beginning of the year. While the numbers are lower than last year, the state is nearing the epidemic threshold set by the WHO. Almost one-third of Brazil’s dengue cases have been identified in São Paulo, which has necessitated the allocation of more resources to the area. At least five people have also died in the state of Minas Gerais since the start of 2025, which has also recorded over 13,000 cases. One of the primary drivers of the case increases has been the low uptake in vaccinations, which has prompted the Ministry of Health to expand vaccine eligibility and allow doses close to expiration to be administered to a wider population.

On 23 February, German citizens vote to elect the 630 members of the Bundestag. Currently, the Christian Democratic sister parties CDU/CSU are leading the polls with an estimated 29 per cent of overall public support. The incumbent Social Democrats (SPD) are far behind with 16 per cent support. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is second in the polls, at around 21 per cent.

The electoral campaign in Germany has been extremely tense and has attracted significant international attention. Most notably, the AfD, which was previously endorsed by presidential advisor and the world’s richest man Elon Musk, also recently received a less vocal endorsement by US Vice President JD Vance, who met AfD leader Alice Weidel in Munich. Large-scale anti-AfD rallies have occurred with some regularity in Berlin as well as other large urban centres.

The campaign has also been characterised by several cases of violence. Multiple terror attacks inspired by Islamist ideology have occurred in Germany in recent months, including in Munich, Solingen, and Mannheim. A further mass casualty attack, a vehicle ramming attack on a Christmas market in Magdeburg, was carried out by a Saudi national who espoused anti-Islam and anti-government extremist beliefs. These attacks have made migration one of the key issues of the campaign.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The elections will highly likely see the Christian Democrats emerge as Germany’s main force in parliament. The AfD will highly likely be the second-largest party in the Bundestag, securing their best-ever result.

However, the leader of the CDU/CSU, Friedrich Merz, is likely to uphold the “firewall” against the AfD, despite having previously sought the far-right party’s support to pass legislation. Instead, the CDU/CSU will likely look to the left for support in forming a government. This would likely take the form of a Merkel-era “Grand Coalition” with the SPD.

This development would almost certainly result in short-term uncertainty and potentially long-term instability, with the coalition likely to have fewer seats than previous Grand Coalitions due to the forecasted success of the AfD.

This scenario, with the AfD more powerful than ever but still exiled from government, would almost certainly aggravate and embolden the far right, which may have material impacts on Germany’s risk environment. A stronger and more visible AfD is almost certainly going to result in more civil unrest. Alternatively, If Merz tries to pass further laws with the AfD’s support, more protests like those recently seen in Berlin and other cities are almost certain to occur. Alongside civil unrest, there is a realistic possibility of increased political violence, including attacks on politicians and activists, as well as acts of vandalism and sabotage.

It is notable that the AfD is now both openly endorsed by elements of the US administration and American-based pro-Trump channels, as well as Russian information operations. These efforts raise a credible risk of sabotage and activist violence against US businesses in Germany, driven by perceptions of US backing for the far-right. Last year’s sabotage of the Tesla “Gigafactory” near Berlin likely represents an early case of US politics driving activist sabotage in Germany, likely serving as inspiration for similar future actions.

On 18 February, the US and Russia engaged in bilateral talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The US delegation was headed by the Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who was joined by national security advisor Mike Waltz and Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. The Russian delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, joined by Vladamir Putin’s advisor Yuri Ushakov.

The meeting, mediated by senior Saudi officials including the foreign minister, discussed conditions for a possible Trump-Putin summit and agreed to start negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The talks notably excluded any Ukrainian representatives. President Zelensky had been scheduled to also visit Saudi Arabia but has postponed the visit to 10 March as Kyiv does not want to give legitimacy to the US-Russia talks.

In response to Kyiv’s concerns about being excluded from the talks, US President Donald Trump told reporters that Ukraine should have never started the war and Zelensky’s popularity ratings are as low as four per cent. Zelensky then publicly stated that Trump is “living in a disinformation space” created by Russia. Trump subsequently posted on social media that Zelensky, a “modestly successful comedian”, is a “Dictator without Elections” and “has done a terrible job”. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

Following the initial bilateral US-Russia talks, briefings to the press from both Russian and American delegation members give some early indications of possible core principles and red lines for peace negotiations. Waltz specified that a peace deal would require a permanent end to the war, security guarantees for Ukraine, and will have to include talks on territory. The latter condition almost certainly refers to the ceding of Ukrainian territory to Russia, namely Crimea, the Donbas and highly likely the occupied parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts. This would be an immediately offered concession to Ukraine’s stated strategic objectives of full Russian withdrawal from internationally recognised Ukrainian territory.

Lavrov, on the other hand, stated that any deployment of NATO troops to Ukraine, “even under other flags”, would be unacceptable. This condition was almost certainly set in the context of proposals for NATO-member peacekeeping forces that could serve as a security guarantee for Ukraine, with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stating that he is “ready and willing” to deploy British troops as peacekeepers, with French President Macron making similar pledges in the past.

It is highly likely that peace negotiations, with the aforementioned core principles, already have built-in issues. While the US delegation expresses a desire for security guarantees sufficient to make peace permanent, the Kremlin has so far not expressed any indications of possible concessions that could enable this.

One possible scenario that Moscow would be more amenable to may be the deployment of forces from a non-NATO member such as China, although it is unlikely this would provide a sufficient guarantee against future Russian re-invasion.

Fundamentally, while Ukraine (and European partners) have been excluded from these talks thus far, Kyiv would need to accept any proposals for them to be effective. If determined, however, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration could force Kyiv to accept an imposed peace due to a threat of total defeat without any US support.

Zelensky is likely in a lose-lose situation, with any statements against Trump leading to a severe backlash, but silence enabling the imposition of an unfavourable peace.

The ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah, reached in November 2024, has largely held despite notable challenges and incidents. On 18 February, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) units withdrew from positions along the southern border, with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) units moving in to replace them. However, IDF troops remained stationed on five strategic hills, where they have established observation posts.

On 19 February, an Israeli drone strike in the town of Aita al-Shaab resulted in one fatality, marking the first casualty since the IDF’s withdrawal. Both the UN and the Lebanese government have condemned the continued IDF presence at these locations as a violation of the ceasefire terms. However, Tel Aviv maintains that the deployments are temporarily necessary to ensure border security.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The continuation of the ceasefire agreement, despite Lebanon’s protests and Israeli strikes, is largely due to the positions of the three main parties involved: Israel, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese government.

Israel is likely pursuing two main objectives. Firstly, Israel is attempting to facilitate the return of 60,000 residents to northern Israel, the failure to do so has placed significant pressure on Tel Aviv. Secondly, Israel almost certainly wants to maintain a ground presence in Lebanon to monitor Hezbollah in case it attempts to reestablish a military presence south of the Litani River.

The threat of a sustained and likely destabilising IDF presence in Lebanon is also likely placing pressure on Beirut to adopt a more proactive role in containing the militant group.

Hezbollah, severely degraded after IDF operations and the loss of its Syrian supply lines likely has little choice but to accept Israel’s presence or risk a collapse of the ceasefire and renewed IDF operations. The Lebanese government has demonstrated an increased willingness to contain Hezbollah. However, with political and economic challenges, and a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) ill-equipped to directly challenge Hezbollah, the central government will likely have to accept the IDF’s continued presence within its borders.

Given Israel’s position of strength and the relative weakness of other parties involved, it is likely that it will continue to challenge the terms and push the boundaries of the ceasefire agreement. Israel will likely calculate that it can continue to strike at targets of opportunity within southern Lebanon, assessing that any major retaliation is unlikely.

On the night of 20 February, three bombs detonated on empty buses on the wider Tel Aviv bus network. Two explosions occurred in Bat Yam, a city south of Tel Aviv, while a third was reported in the nearby town of Holon. At least one additional explosive device was discovered on another bus in Holon. No injuries were sustained during the blasts.

Israeli police have stated that the bombs were detonated with a timer and were non-standard explosives. The police also commented that the bombs looked similar to those engineered in the West Bank. Israel’s Shin Bet internal security agency stated that it was taking over the investigation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing and placement of the explosive devices strongly suggest that they were intended to detonate during rush hour traffic, likely aiming to cause mass casualties. Furthermore, bus bombings have been a recurrent tactic used by Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups during past hostilities.

A group on Telegram, claiming to be a branch of the Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, based in the northern West Bank city of Tulkarem stated “We will never forget to avenge our martyrs as long as the occupation remains on our land.” This could suggest that the failed attack was Hamas’ revenge for Israeli operations in Palestine or potentially indicative of an internal split within Hamas, both of which are likely to undermine ceasefire negotiations.

However, the failure of three separate explosive devices to detonate at the correct time, coupled with the fact one device reportedly carried a message declaring “Revenge from Tulkarm”, is likely to generate suspicion and fuel speculation that the attack was a false flag operation. Many will likely believe that Israel engineered the incident to undermine ceasefire negotiations and justify continued Israeli military operations in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Regardless of the attack’s origins, when combined with Hamas’ recent public display of deceased Israeli children, it will almost certainly be used as justification for expanded Israeli operations in the West Bank and will likely be widely supported. Early indications suggest that Israel’s Defence Minister has already instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to intensify operations in the West Bank, especially in the Tulkarem refugee camp.

This escalation is likely to jeopardise ceasefire efforts and provoke further retaliatory attacks from the West Bank into Israel, increasing the risk of a broader cycle of violence. If sustained, there is a realistic possibility that it will draw Iran further into the conflict, with senior figures within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recently renewing threats towards Israel.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has increased the tempo of its operations in the West Bank, conducting multiple raids as part of its operation “Iron Wall” which started on 21 January. Raids intended to target militants and dismantle “terrorist infrastructure” have taken place in major Palestinian refugee camps, including in Jenin, Nur Shams, and Nablus and have also been conducted in smaller settlements near Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem. Some raids were reportedly conducted by Israeli settlers supported by the IDF.

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA’s) Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Information Nabil Abu Rudeineh denounced the international community for remaining silent about Israel’s plans for “racist annexation and territorial expansion,” and called on the US to intervene to stop Israeli aggression, warning that failure to do so would only embolden Israel and lead to an uncontrollable escalation in violence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Israel has likely been emboldened by the initial steps of the new Trump administration. Trump has sanctioned the International Criminal Court for its issuing of an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu; proposed the US control and redevelopment of Gaza; increased military support for Israel; and has threatened to unleash “hell” unless Hamas releases the remaining hostages. Israel is likely exploiting a more favourable White House and the current Gaza ceasefire to expand operations in the West Bank. Tel Aviv will also almost certainly exploit the recent failed terror attack and Hamas’ treatment of deceased Israeli hostages as a pretext for increased operations in the West Bank.

The primary objective of Operation Iron Wall is to dismantle militant networks that are likely receiving increasing support from Iran, which is attempting to establish another front against Israel, an objective that has almost certainly been prioritised since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. However, there is a realistic possibility that the increase in operations and consequent displacement of Palestinians, especially in areas near East Jerusalem, are shaping activity for an expansion of Israeli settlements. The previous Trump administration shifted US policy towards Israeli settlements, no longer viewing them as inconsistent with international law, a policy that is likely to provide Israel with diplomatic cover for continued expansion. For example, on 17 February, Israel issued a tender for the construction of nearly 1,000 additional settler homes in the Efrat settlement near Jerusalem.

The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is likely to jeopardise ceasefire agreements, undermine hostage exchanges and increase both radicalism and militancy throughout Palestine. Militant groups like Hamas are likely to exploit settlement growth as a justification to abandon talks with Israel, making negotiations and any long-term solution much harder to achieve. Increased settlement is also likely to severely undermine the PA’s credibility. The PA is already struggling with declining legitimacy and a weakened security apparatus, which it has often used to suppress Palestinian militancy, developments that will ultimately play into the hands of the militant groups. Despite a lull in fighting in Gaza, intensified Israeli operations and settlement expansion in the West Bank will likely fuel anti-Israeli sentiment and global protests. Perceived US backing for Israel is also likely to drive anti-US protests, especially in the Middle East, potentially increasing security risks for American citizens and interests abroad.

On 18 February, two detained British nationals were charged with espionage by Iranian authorities. According to a judiciary spokesman, the couple had “entered Iran under the guise of tourists” and “collected information in several provinces of the country”. The British couple, Mr and Mrs Foreman, were on a worldwide motorbike trip.

The couple intended to stay in Iran for five days, having crossed into Iran from Armenia on 30 December, having earlier admitted that they were ignoring warnings from the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) not to travel to Iran. In January, the couple were arrested in the city of Kerman. The FCDO has stated that they are providing consular assistance to the couple and are in contact with Iranian authorities.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The case is highly likely an example of ‘hostage diplomacy’, the practice of a state using arbitrary detention for geopolitical purposes and to gain transactional rewards. In recent years, numerous British nationals have been arrested in Iran. In a high-profile example, the British-Iranian dual national Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe was arrested in 2016 by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at Imam Khomeini International Airport (IKA) in Tehran after visiting Iran on holiday. Zaghari-Ratcliffe was detained for six years, only being released once the British government agreed to settle an outstanding GBP 400 million debt that dated back to the 1970s.

Due to the likely increasing phenomenon of hostage diplomacy, there is almost certainly a severe risk of arbitrary detention posed to nationals travelling to countries hostile to the West, such as Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Russia. On 7 February, a US citizen was detained in Russia due to allegedly possessing cannabis-infused marmalade. With the talks being conducted between Russian and US officials in Saudi Arabia regarding Ukraine, the Russian government released the US citizen in what has been perceived as a gesture of goodwill. Such events are indicative of how travellers can be subjected to detention in adversarial states, with their continued imprisonment or release being then subject to globally significant geopolitical developments.

On 14 February, AFC/M23 entered the outskirts of Bukavu after capturing the airport in Kavumu, the second major airport to fall to the AFC/M23. On 16 February, AFC/M23 took full control of the provincial capital. Following minimal resistance in Bukavu, AFC/M23 continued south along the N2 Highway, capturing Kamanyola on 18 February. In North Kivu, AFC/M23 militants reportedly captured the city of Kitsumbiro on 20 February, approximately 27 kilometres from the centre of the Lubero region. Having attempted to push along the N2 Highway to Lubero but facing resistance, the group strategically diverted East to Kipese on 20 February.

Uganda’s military has confirmed that its forces entered Bunia in the Ituri region of North Kivu after consulting with FARDC leadership. Their purpose in the town is reportedly to “avert evolving genocide” amid alleged killings by armed groups along ethnic lines. This is likely linked to the ongoing intercommunal conflict between the Lendu farming community and Hema pastoralists. The DRC government has reportedly requested military support from Chad to assist against AFC/M23.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Following the capture of Kamanyola in South Kivu, AFC/M23 now controls all three border crossing points between the DRC and Rwanda. It is highly likely that group will continue to push south towards the city of Uvira, enabling them control of the border crossing between the DRC and Burundi. Burundi, whose government is hostile to Rwanda and AFC/M23, will almost certainly see this as a security threat, risking an escalation of the conflict.

Following AFC/M23’s capture of Kitsombiro in North Kivu, they will highly likely push on to the mineral-rich Butembo, approximately 70 kilometres north. There is a realistic possibility that the capture of more major regional cities will result in further unrest in Kinshasa, which has, so far, remained relatively quiet since 29 January.

AFC/M23 increasingly threaten to encroach into regions where Ugandan forces are operating. Beni, 55 kilometres north of Butembo, has been the site of intense counterinsurgency efforts by Ugandan forces against the ADF Islamist rebel group in recent years. Uganda’s deepening involvement is almost certainly linked to the widening security gap along the Congolese border due to the diversion of FARDC resources to combat AFC/M23 militants.

Because of the importance of its military presence in Eastern DRC, Kampala would likely be reluctant to antagonise Kinshasa. An AFC/M23 advance on Beni would highly likely test Uganda’s tentative backing of the rebel group, which has so far been fragmented with senior military figures voicing support while government figures have been muted. There is a realistic possibility that if AFC/M23 do not directly threaten Ugandan troops or their ongoing counterinsurgency against the ADF, Uganda will assume a mediating role.

Fears of M23’s advancement have led to repeated reports of approaches towards Kinshasa. On 17 February, rumours claimed that M23 rebels had established a presence in the Kindu region and that the FARDC abandoned the airport. On 19 February, rumours proliferated that AFC/M23 members had been arrested in Kinshasa, something that was denied by FARDC. On the same day, a FARDC commander released a statement denying rumours that AFC/M23 rebels have a presence in Kisangani or the Tshopo province, significantly west of their current area of operations. Given the prevalence of inaccurate claims of AFC/M23 presence west of Kivu, the disinformation is likely deliberate but could influence public opinion, placing pressure on the government or triggering unrest.

Lebanese government scraps recognition of Hezbollah from yearly ministerial statement

The document, the first to be issued by the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, usually formally recognises the role of “armed resistance” to Israel as a legitimate part of the Lebanese political framework. Its omission is likely an important symbolic show of the government’s willingness to take advantage of Hezbollah’s post-conflict (and post-Assad) weakness to diminish the Shia militia’s political and military clout.

Beirut continues to face significant pressures domestically and from abroad; it is not only looking to improve ties with the Gulf states and the new administration of Syria but also aims to secure a new agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Hezbollah nevertheless remains a powerful force and is unlikely that Beirut will tackle it head-on. Instead, there is a realistic possibility that the government is pivoting towards a long-term strategy, meant to “starve” Hezbollah in both material and political terms.

The funeral of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, killed by Israeli strikes in September 2024, is set to be held on 23 February, and will likely be used by the group as a show of force and political legitimacy.

Ethiopia and Somalia hold first round of technical talks in Turkey

On 18 February, Ethiopian and Somalian diplomats held the first round of talks aimed at resolving a dispute over Ethiopia’s access to Somaliland’s port. Somaliland agreed to lease access to its port to the landlocked Ethiopia after Addis Ababa agreed to become the first country to formally recognise its independence on 1 January 2024. Mogadishu, viewing the breakaway Somaliland as illegitimate, has viewed Addis Ababa’s deal with the regional government as infringing on Somalia’s sovereignty and integrity, threatening a regional conflict. The talks aim to reach a potential agreement upholding Somalia’s territorial integrity while granting Ethiopia access to its port. The second round of talks is set to take place in March.

Four charged in Sweden over Islamic State links

The four individuals had been arrested in Tyresö last March, during a raid at a local Islamic cultural association. According to prosecutors, the four, two of whom are brothers, were radicalised during visits to Somalia, where the Islamic State (IS) has a growing branch (the Islamic State Somalia Province, or ISS). Moreover, prosecutors note how the cultural association had become a vehicle of radicalisation, with local preachers espousing pro-IS rhetoric. The suspects’ sentences reflect a 2023 law on terrorism, which more heavily sanctions individuals convicted of participating with a terrorist organisation. The case further highlights the threat posed by transnational IS ideology and how smaller IS branches are leveraging connections to foreign diasporas to recruit and plot external operations.

Attempted “Incel” lone wolf attack in Annecy, France

On 16 February, a 17-year-old tried to carry out a knife attack in the central square of the French town of the Haute-Savoie department. The attacker, who was shot and wounded by responding police before he could injure anyone, reportedly tried to livestream his attack on TikTok and stated that he intended to target women. The attack is almost certainly tied to “Incel” (or “involuntary celibate”) ideology, a set of beliefs characterised by extreme sexism and misogyny, which has in the past driven multiple lone wolf attacks. In France, another possible Incel attack was thwarted in May in Bordeaux, where an individual was arrested for planning an attack during the relay of the Olympic flame.

Deadly shooting at Brussels Metro highlights growing organised crime threat

On 15 February, a 19-year-old was shot and killed in a shooting at Clemenceau metro station in the Anderlecht district of Brussels. The attack is the latest in a series of violent incidents linked to drug-related territorial conflicts, which have escalated in recent weeks and resulted in two deaths. The brazen nature of these attacks likely indicates that organised crime groups feel emboldened, with the heavily trafficked metro system being exploited for the attacks and as an escape route. Belgian officials have called for stricter measures, with an emergency meeting scheduled with federal police.

IS-inspired knife attack in Villach, Austria, kills one

The attack occurred on 15 February in the main town square of Villach. The attacker was a 23-year-old Syrian national, who targeted random pedestrians, injuring five and killing a 14-year-old. According to security sources, the attacker became self-radicalised online within only three months, espousing IS ideology. IS channels have claimed responsibility for the attack, despite no known direct communication between the attacker and the group.

The case likely further proves the point made by MI5 head Ken McCallum, that lone wolf attackers are becoming radicalised increasingly quickly, making it harder for authorities to prevent attacks. There is a realistic possibility of further copycat attacks following the stabbing, as well as “retaliatory” violence against Muslim communities in Austria. Indeed, an early example of a copycat attack was likely thwarted by Austrian authorities on 19 February, as they arrested a 14-year-old who was planning to carry out a knife attack at the Vienna train station on behalf of IS.

Another large-scale Moroccan raid on IS cells highlights growing threat from the Sahel

On 19 February, reports emerged of multiple raids by Moroccan special forces, in at least eight cities, aimed at dismantling IS-affiliated networks. Authorities secured explosive materials, bladed weapons, and firearms. Local media also claimed that security forces found improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted at sites just outside Rabat. The raids, which follow multiple counterterrorism operations in recent weeks, have been linked to the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which is increasingly attempting to expand its areas of influence. Moroccan authorities have expressed growing concerns over the ISSP’s attempts to establish operational cells within the country, particularly as instability in the wider Sahel region provides a fertile ground for jihadist recruitment and cross-border operations. Moreover, the sophistication of the recent plots suggests coordinated planning and guidance, rather than isolated groups.

Wagner/Africa Corps forces massacre Tuareg civilians in Mali

On 17 February, reports from pro-Azawad channels indicated that a convoy of Russian mercenary and Malian government forces, departing from Gao towards the Algerian border, massacred at least 20 civilians in the Tilemsi region. According to reports, the convoy opened fire on two civilian vehicles, killing the occupants. The case further highlights the contradictory and brutal, and so far, ineffective, counterinsurgency tactics used by the Wagner-supported Malian forces in the predominantly Tuareg northern regions of the country. It is highly likely that the case will further drive local opposition to the junta government.

Sahelian militants attack army post in northern Benin

A militant attack on an army post in northern Benin on 17 February killed six soldiers and 17 militants. This follows a deadly attack in January that claimed the lives of dozens of soldiers in the northern Alibori department, a region bordering Niger and Burkina Faso, which are struggling to contain Islamist insurgencies. The attack likely underscores the growing threat of armed extremist groups expanding from the Sahel into coastal West Africa, with Benin and neighbouring Togo increasingly targeted. Violent extremist organisations like the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and are likely attempting to destabilise the northern region of these countries, fuel an insurgency, expand recruitment, and force national governments to divert resources internally rather than conduct operations in the Sahel.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) escalate attacks after Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) advances

The SAF is currently dislodging the RSF from its positions in the capital Khartoum, forcing the paramilitary group to retreat west towards Darfur where it controls much of the region. However, the SAF is targeting the route out of the capital with drones and fighter jets, which is resulting in high rates of collateral damage.

In response to the SAF’s progress, the RSF has increased its attacks on the civilian population. The RSF reportedly killed 200 unarmed civilians in a cluster of villages in El Geteina in the White Nile State.

Attacks have also intensified in Darfur, with the RSF attacking the Zamzam camp, Sudan’s largest refugee camp, apparently turning it into a “killing field”. Attacks on civilians have likely become a deliberate RSF tactic and are expected to escalate as the group retreats west to Darfur. This strategy appears aimed at undermining the Sudanese government by instilling fear, destabilising communities, and disrupting governance structures in regions where the RSF maintains influence.

Turkey conducts nationwide operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

Turkish police have detained almost 300 individuals accused of having ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group designated by Turkey and many of its allies as a terrorist organisation. The arrests have included journalists, politicians, academics, and members of other pro-Kurdish groups. The arrests, which occurred over five days in 51 provinces, coincide with a wider effort to curb Kurdish influence. This has involved the removal of pro-Kurdish mayors and major military action against allegedly related Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria.

The arrests have received criticism from human rights groups, journalists, and Kurdish groups, who characterise them as authoritarian and likely to undermine peace talks. There is a realistic possibility that the arrests will provoke protests in major Kurdish settlements and could incite attacks on Turkish security services.

Magnitude 6.0 earthquake in Ethiopia causes light shaking in Addis Ababa

Late on 14 February, a strong magnitude 6.0 earthquake at a shallow depth of 10 kilometres struck 6 kilometres northeast of Metahāra. Approximately 120 kilometres east of Addis Ababa, the earthquake caused light shaking in the capital. Despite the earthquake’s strength and shallow depth, however, the tremblor highly likely only caused minimal impact due to limited population exposure near the epicentre.

Since late September 2024, Ethiopia has experienced a series of earthquakes that have raised concerns about volcanic eruptions being triggered. In early January, authorities announced the evacuation of 80,000 people in the Afar, Oromia, and Amhara regions due to the increased risk. Additionally, a task force was set up to assess the risk of seismic activity to Addis Ababa and bolster disaster preparedness.

While Addis Ababa has not historically suffered from significant earthquake damage, the ongoing earthquake “swarm” likely increases the risk of such an event.

Over 40 killed in mine collapse in western Mali

On 15 February, over 40 people, most of whom were women, were killed after an artisanal gold mine collapsed near the town of Kenieba in western Mali. The individuals had reportedly climbed down into open-pit areas left by industrial miners to look for scraps of gold when the earth collapsed around them. This is Mali’s second major mining accident in three weeks, following a flooded tunnel collapse in late January that killed at least 10 miners.

Unregulated artisanal mining of abandoned mines has increased as a result of foreign mining companies leaving Mali due to security concerns, political instability, and the junta targeting foreign companies in revenue disputes. Accidents are likely to increase as international gold prices continue to increase while domestic economic conditions deteriorate, further driving the demand for gold extraction in dangerous and unregulated mines.

Major flooding across Botswana

Botswana is experiencing severe flooding across multiple regions, including the capital, Gaborone, and the Ghanzi District. The flooding has caused widespread disruptions, leading to the closure of all public schools until 24 February. President Duma Boko confirmed that heavy flooding continues in Gaborone and surrounding areas, with at least one reported death. In the Ghanzi District, local media report that hundreds of residents have been displaced. Additionally, the airport in Ghanzi has been closed due to the extreme weather conditions.

Widespread flooding in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal

Heavy rainfall has resulted in major flooding and landslides in several parts of South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province. As of 21 February, at least three fatalities have been confirmed due to the adverse weather conditions. Flooding and landslides have disrupted businesses, forced the closure of schools and caused major traffic disruptions, particularly along the M4 highway in Durban. Further rainfall is predicted, with the South African Weather Service (SAWS) issuing two weather warnings for KwaZulu-Natal, predicting rainfall between 40mm and 100mm.

Pakistan will host the ICC Champions Trophy 2025 from 19 February to 9 March, with the tournament taking place across four venues. The National Stadium in Karachi, the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore and the Rawalpindi Cricket Stadium in Rawalpindi will host games played within Pakistan. Any matches involving India will be played at the Dubai International Cricket Stadium, with India refusing to play in Pakistan due to security concerns.

This will be the first major international cricket tournament held in Pakistan since the 2009 terror attack on the Sri Lanka national cricket team in Lahore, Pakistan. During the attack, 12 gunmen armed with AK-47s, RPGs, and hand grenades attacked the team while they were en route to the stadium. Six members of the Sri Lankan team were injured, and six Pakistani policemen and two civilians lost their lives. The attack was believed to be conducted by the violent Islamist extremist group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which has links to al-Qaeda and other militant groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hosting a successful international cricket tournament in Pakistan would be a huge victory for the government for several reasons. It would not only signal a return to normalcy after years of security concerns but would also bolster Pakistan’s global image, economy, and internal stability. This will almost certainly make it a coveted target for terrorist groups seeking to undermine the government and gain international publicity, especially if they can successfully attack international cricket teams or sites frequented by foreign nationals.

Pakistan is currently contending with border skirmishes with the Afghan Taliban, sectarian violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and a resurgence in militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the restive Balochistan region. The authorities have stressed that the violence is nearly entirely limited to the remote border regions, far away from the stadiums. However, militant groups have demonstrated their ability to strike way beyond their primary areas of operations. As recently as October 2024, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed two Chinese nationals and one Pakistani in an attack near Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, demonstrating the BLA’s ability to attack areas that typically have a heightened security presence.

While security has been increased to protect the tournament, with so many groups likely seeking to conduct an attack, combined with the overstretching of Pakistan’s security services, the hosting of a major international event will invariably be a significant challenge. Moreover, if internal security is diverted to protect the tournament, this may present an opportunity for militant groups to escalate attacks in the border regions or other areas with less security oversight.

Operation Devil Hunt, a series of raids by police and security forces across the country, resulted in 532 reported arrests in only 24 hours. Most of the arrested were members or supporters of the Awami League (AL). The operation was reportedly triggered by clashes in Gazipur on 7 February, the city being considered a stronghold of the party of ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Hasina has recently attacked the interim government of Muhammad Yunus from her exile in India, accusing it of releasing “terrorists” and refusing to punish perpetrators of the violence that accompanied the July-August 2024 protests.

On 19 February, more than 150 students were injured in clashes in Khulna. The violence erupted while student supporters of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) were carrying out recruitment efforts and were confronted by supporters of the Students Against Discrimination group, one of the key formations that led the anti-Hasina protests in August 2024.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Political forces and vigilante groups supporting the new government have continued to carry out attacks on AL members or perceived supporters, as well as on local religious minorities. The AL sought to stage large-scale protests in early February, the first since losing power, but these plans have likely been crushed via a joint government and mob intervention. The latest arrests are likely part of the interim government’s efforts to displace AL from local institutions and positions of influence.

The clashes in Khulna likely showcase the tense, violent, and unstable state of the Bangladeshi political system at the present moment. BNP channels have blamed the clashes on members of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), while other student groups retaliated by staging anti-BNP demonstrations in Dhaka. Parties that were previously members of the opposition, like BNP or JI, likely continue to compete to fill the vacuum left by the overthrow of AL, including the control of local police, academic institutions, and bureaucracy. With the Yunus government unable (and likely unwilling) to intervene due to its dependence on the opposition’s political support, this competition is highly likely to continue taking the form of mob violence and targeting of political opponents. The arming of student groups – the groups that clashed in Khulna were armed with machetes and other bladed weapons – is likely to make universities particularly at risk for severe violence.

Student-led protests have erupted in multiple cities across Indonesia in response to President Prabowo Subianto’s budget cuts and policies. The protests, which have been given the moniker “Dark Indonesia”, have been organised over fears that the budget cuts will weaken social support systems in favour of supporting the president’s policies such as a new school lunch programme. Protests were organised on 17 and 18 February by the All-Indonesian Students’ Union (BEM SI) and were observed in Jakarta, Medan, Yogyakarta, Denpasar, and several other cities across multiple Indonesian islands. The Civil Society Coalition has called for civilians to demonstrate on 21 February following Friday prayers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

These are the first major protests to occur under President Subianto and have so far remained relatively peaceful, with only a handful of arrests and injuries reported. However, the attendance and geographical spread of the protests likely indicate a wider dissatisfaction with the incumbent government’s austerity-laden economic policies. The movement has also called for the removal of the military’s role in civil posts, with many Indonesians likely fearing that the president’s former role as Minister of Defence and military career has disproportionately benefitted the military over ordinary Indonesians.

Students have promised to continue to protest the budget cuts but the real litmus test for the government will be on 21 February. If large sections of society join the demonstrations, it could indicate broader public discontent beyond the student movement. Given President Subianto’s strong approval ratings, the government is unlikely to make significant concessions unless protests escalate in size or intensity. However, if the protests continue to gain momentum, there is a high likelihood of clashes with the police. Under such circumstances, the Indonesian police will likely use tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons to disperse protests, especially if violent or causing major disruptions.

Afghanistan pulls out of the International Criminal Court (ICC)

On 20 February, Taliban channels issued a declaration that the 2003 decision by their predecessor governments to join the ICC was illegal and that Afghanistan would subsequently be outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction. Kabul notably quoted the fact that ‘many of the world’s major powers are not signatories’, likely referencing the US and Russia, which, although being signatories to the Rome Statute, have not ratified it. In January, the ICC stated it was seeking arrest warrants for senior Taliban leaders, including Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada over persecution of ‘Afghan girls and women’, citing the extremely strict rulings and bans on social participation that the Taliban government has issued. The move is likely to further damage Afghanistan’s government’s chances of re-establishing ties with Western powers and improve its international legitimacy.

Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte asks for impeachment to be thrown out

On 18 February, Duterte’s lawyers asked the Supreme Court to revoke her impeachment ruling and block a Senate trial. Duterte was impeached on 5 February after being accused of plotting to assassinate the president, engaging in corruption, and misusing confidential funds. Lawyers argued that the impeachment was sent to the Senate too quickly to be studied and ‘was procedurally defective, constitutionally infirm, and jurisdictionally void.’ Duterte will highly likely be convicted in the Senate trial, which would bar her from holding public office.

Beijing pens new agreement with the Cook Islands

The Pacific nation, the Cook Islands has released details regarding its new strategic partnership deal with China. Under the terms of the deal, Beijing will contribute more funding towards infrastructure and educational projects and will cooperate with seabed mineral mining. The deal has provoked a diplomatic dispute with New Zealand, Cook Island’s primary benefactor and military ally. Unlike other deals Beijing has signed in the region, the agreement does not include security cooperation. However, the growing Chinese influence in the South Pacific is raising mounting concerns, as it points to an expansion of China’s economic presence and potential future military footprint in the region, which could destabilise the area and lead to increased militarisation.

Attack on aid convoy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan

On 17 February, at least 20 gunmen attacked a convoy of aid trucks carrying food supplies to Parachinar in the Kurram district, killing a truck driver and security escort and injuring seven. The attackers also ambushed a paramilitary reinforcement unit, setting three border force vehicles on fire and killing four soldiers. In total, six people were killed and 15 people were injured. The Pakistani military deployed helicopter gunships to target mountain hideouts in the region after the attack. The military reported the militants to be from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Evacuation orders have been issued for residents in four villages of Lower Kurram due to the recent violence. Approximately 250 people have been killed in the region since July 2024, according to local officials. Numerous truces have failed to quell the violence.

Tajik court sentences 30 individuals in poisoning plot linked to Islamic State

A court in Tajikistan has sentenced over 30 individuals to prison for attempting to poison attendees of a Nowruz festival in 2023. Authorities have linked the plot to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the primarily Afghanistan-based offshoot of the Islamic State. In 2024, there were three ISKP-linked attacks in Tajikistan and the security services thwarted at least two other attacks. These trends likely allude to an expansion of ISKP’s operations, with the group increasing its influence in Central Asia and Russia. ISKP is likely attempting to position itself as more of a transregional organisation, a development that will enable it to spread its propaganda, increase recruitment, and conduct attacks beyond its traditional area of operations.  

Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS) outbreak in Maharashtra, India

The GBS outbreak in Maharashtra, India, has resulted in 11 deaths, the first one on 26 January. The rare neurological disorder causes the body’s immune system to attack the peripheral nervous system, causing muscle weakness, paralysis, or death. The state has confirmed four cases and is investigating seven suspected cases. The outbreak has spread to Mumbai, with the first death reported there involving a 53-year-old patient. Overall, the region has detected 197 cases, with Pune being significantly affected. In response, authorities have shut down 30 private water supply plants in Pune and advised the public to consume clean and boiled water and avoid stale or partially cooked food. Investigations into the cause of the outbreak are ongoing, with water contamination being a potential factor.

Cyclone Zelia causes flooding in Western Australia

Cyclone Zelia has caused severe flooding in remote areas of Pilbara, Western Australia, particularly affecting cattle farms. The cyclone, which made landfall near Port Hedland on 14 February, initially brought destructive winds and heavy rains, leading to emergency warnings and evacuations in the region. Ports in Dampier and Varanaus Island have since reopened after the cyclone passed through Pilbara. Authorities have been actively managing the situation, with evacuations conducted in areas like Warralong. The De Grey River catchment has experienced rising water levels, prompting warnings of potential isolation for residents.

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Further unrest is likely in Panama after major union clashes with security forces in Panama City over a government bill.

Chilean authorities indicate that some of the current wildfires were likely intentionally ignited. A trend of wildfires being weaponised for political or criminal goals will likely grow across South America in 2025.

A car-ramming attack in Munich, has almost certainly increased fears of political violence and terrorism ahead of the German election, with anti-migration rhetoric high and the far-right polling strongly.

Trump’s push for immediate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine will likely be exploited by the Kremlin to divide Ukraine’s allies. It is unlikely that an imposed peace on Kyiv could deter future Russian aggression.

Israeli and Hamas officials have likely agreed on a path for future hostage releases, but tensions in Gaza remain high. US President Trump’s “Gaza plan” comments are likely to further destabilise the already precarious truce.

The suspension of NGO operations in the Sahel are highly likely part of a wider attempt to curtail foreign oversight and will almost certainly exacerbate an already dire humanitarian situation.

SAF advances in Khartoum will likely set the conditions for offensives in western Sudan. However, further advances will highly likely result in high civilian casualties and compound the humanitarian crisis.

The offensive by Puntland forces in the Cal Miskaad mountain range, if successful, is highly likely to be a major blow to the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). The intensity of the clashes will likely intensify in the short term.

The ISKP bombing at a bank in Kunduz, northern Afghanistan, highly likely demonstrates the group’s ability to strike at will on Afghan territory and likely underscores growing security issues at the Afghan-Tajik border.

On 12 February, protests broke out among members of the Single National Union of Construction and Similar Workers (SUNTRACS) in Panama City. The demonstrations began as the National Assembly deliberated Law 163 which would reform the Social Security Fund (CSS), raising the retirement age and reducing pension amounts.

The protests also served to honour the memory of Al Iromi Smith Renteria, who was killed by the police on 12 February 2008, denounce Donald Trump’s statements regarding the Panama Canal, and protest the pro-US attitude of President Jose Raul Mulino’s government.

Protests escalated into clashes with Crowd Control units after they attempted to reopen the roads. The protesters threw projectiles at officers, injuring 16. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters and arrested at least 480 demonstrators, injuring at least 100.

Closures occurred across Panama City, including on Balboa Avenue, Via Tocumen, Howard, Via Espana, Transistmica, Ricado J. Alfaro, Centenario, Cincuentenario, and Brisas del Golf.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the wake of the protests, President Mulino declared that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic will audit SUNTRACS’s funds from different government entities.

Mulino called for a stop to collaboration with SUNTRACS, calling it a ‘terrorist union organisation.’ He also claimed that the government would ‘not allow pseudo-union anarchy in this country.’ Reforming the CSS has constituted a long-term ambition for Mulino to ensure its financial sustainability and he will likely not back down in the face of union unrest.

SUNTRACS is one of the largest trade unions in Panama, with approximately 40,000 members. The union is known for its militant class war unionism and leads Coordinadora de Unidad Sindical (CONUSI), the most radical major union federation in the country.

The union has coordinated several major protests in recent years, including a general strike in March 2024. Recently, SUNTRACS protested against the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s arrival in Panama in the wake of President Trump’s comments regarding the Panama Canal.

Other organisations including Coordinadora de Unidad Sindical (CONUSI) and the National Front for the Defense of Economic and Social Rights (FRENADESO) have denounced the government reforms.

SUNTRACs have demanded the release of the detained workers, claiming that ‘we will defend our comrades to the last consequences.’ Given SUNTRACS’s militancy, recent history of significant unrest, and likely unfulfilled demands, further demonstrations and clashes with security forces are likely.

On 8 February, the President of Chile Gabriel Boric declared a state of emergency in the regions of Ñuble and Maule and imposed a 22:00-06:00 curfew in 12 communes of Araucanía due to the threat of wildfires. Large-scale efforts to combat the wildfires are ongoing, with 22 wildfires still active and 55 under control. Wildfires have impacted several regions, including Araucanía, O’Higgins, Bio Bio, Ñuble, and Maule. The fires have led to at least one death (in Maule), three injuries, and 28 destroyed homes.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In February 2024, Chile’s wildfire season caused widespread devastation with an estimated 137 deaths, 1,100 injuries, 14,000 destroyed structures, and USD 4.39 billion in damages. The 2024-2025 Chilean wildfire season has not been nearly as severe due to comprehensive efforts made by authorities to control the fires. Authorities have suggested that a large part of the fires affecting La Araucanía are intentional, with President Boric stating they have well-founded reasons to believe so, with 14 people already arrested. The intentional starting of fires could be related to territorial grievances within indigenous Mapuche areas.

Intentionally ignited fires, exacerbated by dry conditions and high temperatures, is highly likely an increasing threat across South America. Widespread fires which caused large-scale destruction and disruption in Brazil in 2024 were, in many cases, highly likely intentionally started by criminal networks to clear land for illegal logging and agricultural purposes. In some instances, particularly Brazilian wildfires were suspected to have been intentionally started in defiance of local government crackdowns. This weaponisation of large-scale fires for political and criminal purposes is a trend that is likely to grow in 2025. 

Nicaragua continues to crack down on Catholics

On 9 February, the Nicaraguan foreign ministry released comments describing the Vatican as “depraved” and “paedophilic”, following a televised interview with Bishop Rolando Alvez, currently living in exile after being imprisoned for more than a year.

The regime of Daniel Ortega has targeted Catholic priests with arrests and deportations in the country since the local church supported large-scale student protests in 2018. Other Christian groups, including Evangelicals, have also been persecuted. The comments will likely be followed by further measures targeting local Catholic churches and communities.

The Vatican likely has few avenues to respond to the Nicaraguan regime’s policies and to incite change. Pressuring Washington to act may be one. However, while US Foreign Secretary Marco Rubio has recently criticised Nicaragua as an “enemy of humanity” alongside Venezuela and Cuba and has also threatened to block its participation in the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, Washington’s concern is mostly directed at the issue of migration.

Moreover, relations between the Trump administration and the Vatican are cold, after Pope Francis criticised Trump’s deportation plan and Washington appointed Brian Burch, an outspoken critic of Francis and Catholic charities aiding Latin American migrants, as its ambassador to the Holy See.

Ecuador presidential election heads to runoff

Ecuador held the first round of its presidential elections on 9 February, with incumbent President Daniel Noboa seeking re-election. However, the election resulted in a near tie with neither candidate securing an outright majority.

A second run will take place on 13 February, with Noboa hoping that his adoption of militarised security policies will help him secure the presidency. During the first round, Noboa ordered an increased security presence at all Ecuadorian ports of entry and temporarily closed the country’s land borders to prevent attempts to destabilise the election from armed groups.

There is a realistic possibility that similar measures will be introduced in the second round.

Stabbing at anti-Trump protest in Los Angeles leaves one wounded

A mass brawl reportedly broke out at a rally to protest President Trump’s mass deportation plan in downtown Los Angeles. The protest, on 7 February, followed six consecutive days of unrest.

According to witnesses, the attacker was not part of the demonstration but was instead “yelling incendiary things” at the protesters. Law enforcement has not yet confirmed the motive behind the attack, but given the political nature of the protest and the assailant’s reported behaviour, there is a realistic possibility that the stabbing was politically motivated.

Further attacks at similar rallies remain possible as tensions over the deportation plan continue to rise.

Colombian Defence Minister resigns in response to escalating violence

Colombia’s Defence Minister, Iván Velásquez, has resigned amid escalating violence, marking another high-profile departure from President Gustavo Petro’s cabinet as his government struggles to contain the spread of guerilla and narco-related violence.

Community leaders in the eastern Catatumbo region, where the National Liberation Army (ELN) first initiated its offensive, have been murdered and over 50,000 remain displaced.

Fighting has recently intensified in the western region of Chocó, where the ELN and Clan del Golfo are fighting over drug routes on the Pacific Coast and into Panama. The expansion of fighting is likely to continue and will likely overstretch the underfunded Colombian military which has suffered major budget cuts under the Petro administration, resulting in the grounding of critical aerial platforms like helicopter gunships, which have been vital in combating armed groups in the harsh terrain of the Colombian jungle.

Winter storms hit US Midwest, Great Lakes, Northeast and southeast Canada

Large parts of the US and Canada have been hit by a series of disruptive winter storms that have led to the issuing of winter weather alerts and hazardous conditions.

Winter Storm Harlow first brought significant ice accumulation to parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, causing downed trees and power lines. Harlow was followed by Winter Storm Iliana, which is currently bringing snowfall to the Great Lakes, the Northeast and parts of Canada, with hail affecting the Appalachians.

The heaviest recorded snowfall was 28 cm (11 inches) in Lowden, Iowa, while parts of Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa have seen 8-15 cm (3-6 inches). Milwaukee has recorded over 18 cm (7 inches). Southern Ontario and Quebec are also experiencing snowfall and icy conditions.

Winter Storm Jett will follow Iliana, bringing more snow to the Plains, Midwest, Northeast, and Canada, as well as heavy rain and potentially severe thunderstorms in the South. Multiple winter weather alerts have been issued warning of hazardous travel conditions.

Magnitude 7.6 earthquake in the Caribbean Sea briefly triggers tsunami warnings

On 8 February, the most powerful earthquake recorded globally since 2023 occurred approximately 202 kilometres southwest of the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean Sea, with a magnitude of 7.6 at a depth of 10km.

The earthquake briefly triggered numerous tsunami alerts or advisories for the Cayman Islands, Cuba, Honduras, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands, all of which were later rescinded. Despite the earthquake’s magnitude, the impact was ultimately minimal with little to no tsunami threat and only light shaking felt in the Cayman Islands.

Regional experts warn that the threat of a significant tsunami impacting the Cayman Islands is low but not zero. In some highly unlikely but possible modelled scenarios, it is deemed possible that Grand Cayman could suffer a tsunami wave impact up to approximately three metres following a high-magnitude earthquake emanating from nearby fault lines. While not comparable to the 30-metre tsunami that devastated parts of Japan in 2011, such a tsunami could still cause significant damage due to Grand Cayman’s low elevation.

Most of the Cayman Islands’ risk modelling and earthquake impact forecasting is funded by USAID. While modelling work in the Cayman Islands continues as of the time of writing, it is likely that the Trump administration’s efforts to defund USAID and make substantial cuts to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), if successful, will have a considerable impact on not only the efforts of earthquake modelling in the Cayman Islands but worldwide.

On 13 February 2025, a car ramming incident in Munich, Germany left at least 28 people injured, including children. The suspect, a 24-year-old Afghan asylum seeker, drove a white Mini Cooper into a crowd of demonstrators near the city’s central railway station during a trade union protest. German counter-terrorism police have assumed responsibility for the investigation and the authorities suspect the incident was a targeted attack. The suspect was apprehended at the scene, with police firing a shot at the vehicle during the arrest. The investigation into the motives is ongoing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There are indications of an extremist connection with some sources suggesting that the suspect posted jihadist material on social media before the attack. The attack also occurred ahead of the  Munich security conference, hours before the US vice president and the Ukrainian president were set to arrive in the city, which has likely raised the profile of the attack. The suspect had his asylum application rejected, but his deportation was suspended, which was likely a significant factor contributing to radicalisation and a motivation for the attack.

The attack has almost certainly contributed to heightened fears of political violence and terrorism in Germany, with the federal elections approaching on 23 February. Tensions over immigration and asylum policies are high, with many Germans fearing the growth of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. This has recently intensified after the centre-right Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) collaboration with the AfD.

On 31 January CDU leader, Friedrich Merz, sought support from the AfD to pass a bill known as the Influx Limitation Act, aimed at tightening asylum rules in Germany by implementing such measures as permanent border controls and turning back asylum seekers. This has been perceived as a breach of the “firewall” or “cordon sanitaire” strategy aimed at alienating the far-right, with widespread fears such a shift in strategy has legitimised the far-right.

This has sparked major protests across Germany with over 160,000 people demonstrating in Berlin on 2 February and more than 200,000 in Munich on 8 February. However, the growing popularity of the far-right has forced mainstream parties to promise to introduce stricter immigration and asylum policies, with increased deportations often being promised.

As the election approaches, the risk of political violence and terrorism will likely increase across Germany. Anti-far-right protests, counter-protests from far-right groups, and clashes with police are likely to continue, mirroring the violent confrontations seen during previous election cycles. The threat of terrorism, both far-right and extremist Islamist in nature, is likely to increase anti-migrant sentiment, calls for deportations and cancelled asylum statuses, with the Munich attack almost certainly exacerbating pre-existing tensions which will invariably be exploited by the far-right.

On 12 February, US President Donald Trump announced that talks to end the war in Ukraine would begin “immediately”, after a “lengthy” phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The announcement followed US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth telling European allies at a defence summit in Brussels that a return to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders was “unrealistic” and ruling out NATO membership for Ukraine.

Beijing has also reportedly proposed to hold a summit between Putin and Trump to end the war in Ukraine. Trump has stated that he expects to meet Putin in Saudi Arabia, although no date has yet been set.

European leaders and NATO officials have so far reacted with concern, broadly commenting that Europe must be a full participant in any talks, rejecting an imposed peace on Ukraine, and stressing that any peace agreement must be long-lasting with provisions to ensure that the conflict could not easily recommence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Moscow’s strategic objectives in Ukraine are the ceding of Ukrainian territory (including the Donbas, Crimea and the land bridge which connects Crimea to mainland Russia) and permanent Ukrainian neutrality. At the start of the full-scale 2022 invasion, Russian war goals highly likely also included even more maximalist demands including the “denazification” (likely meaning the overthrow of the Kyiv government and the imposition of a rump puppet state in the east) and demilitarisation of Ukraine.

Kyiv’s strategic objectives include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all internationally recognised Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, as well as NATO membership or equivalent security guarantees to deter further Russian aggression.

The Trump administration’s objectives, while less clear, highly likely involve the ending of the Ukraine war as soon as possible (even with significant Ukrainian concessions and only weak security guarantees that are likely inadequate to deter further Russian aggression), the cessation or a significant reduction of US-expenditure on Ukraine, and access to USD 500 billion worth of Ukraine’s rare earth mineral deposits. The latter desire is almost certainly reflective of Trump’s broader agenda of transactional diplomacy.

While Trump stated that Ukraine has “essentially agreed” to hand over the mineral rights, Zelensky has reportedly not yet signed an agreement presented by the US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in Kyiv on 12 February.

It is likely that the Kremlin will actively seek to portray Russia as pursuing peace, while simultaneously escalating military operations in Ukraine to press for its more maximalist demands. Peace talks could serve as a strategic tool for Moscow to sow further division within Ukraine and amongst Ukraine’s allies to reduce military aid to Kyiv.

Nonetheless, with US military aid being a fundamental centre of gravity for Ukraine’s defensive efforts, Trump could force Kyiv to accept terms far short of its strategic objectives. The ceding of the territory south of the Dnipro River between the Donbas and Crimea, in addition to only limited security guarantees, would likely be the most difficult potential peace treaty conditions for Kyiv to accept.

With only limited security guarantees, there would be a substantial threat of Russia recommencing the war to achieve the Kremlin’s even more maximalist objectives after consolidating its position and reconstituting its forces.

Fears regarding the stability of the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas have increased following delays in the planned release of Israeli hostages by the Palestinian militants. Israeli officials threatened the restart of hostilities on 10 February, and again on 14 February, putting in place a deadline for the release of further hostages by 15 February. The Hamas delegation in Cairo has stated its willingness to abide by the deadline and has scheduled three hostages to be released on 15 Saturday, but tensions in the Gaza Strip remain high, with occasional Israeli airstrikes reported.

On 12 February, at least one person was killed in an airstrike in Rafah that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated was targeting a weapons-smuggling effort. Hamas had justified the postponement of hostage release due to claimed Israeli violations of the ceasefire.

In Washington, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly reiterated his plan for the Gaza Strip, centred on the resettlements of residents to Jordan and Egypt and a US-led effort to rebuild and “control” the area. The White House’s plan has been widely rejected by regional and global powers. Jordanian King Abdullah rebuked the plan during a summit with Trump in Washington on 11 February, while Egypt’s President al-Sisi postponed a planned visit to the US in protest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recent developments likely pose a considerable threat to the viability of the ceasefire. Hamas is highly likely currently facing a dilemma: its leaders likely consider it realistic that Israel will resume hostilities if they relinquish their main source of leverage, the remaining hostages. If they choose to do so, however, they likely assess that Israel is highly likely to use it as a casus belli (cause for war) to again intervene in Gaza.

In this situation, Hamas must almost certainly rely on credible guarantors of the pact to deter further Israeli intervention. Washington is the only power that can achieve this. However, Trump’s recent comments have almost certainly reduced its reliability for this role and therefore make it likelier that Hamas will choose to renege on the agreement.

In addition to threatening the stability of Gaza, recent developments have also threatened the stability of Jordan and Egypt themselves. While ostensibly allied to Washington, both Amman and Cairo have largely pro-Palestinian populations that oppose any plans for the resettlement of Palestinians. Both states are moreover targets for destabilisation operations by regional competitors and transnational extremist groups.

In the (so far, unlikely) case that Trump’s plan was to be implemented, Egypt would find itself bordering a US-controlled territory. This would almost certainly result in a significant increase in anti-US sentiment and likely boost Islamist factions and groups in Egypt. In the Sinai Peninsula, there is a realistic possibility that greater US involvement in neighbouring Gaza would embolden groups like the local branch of the Islamic State (IS-Sinai) to resume their low-intensity insurgency, which al-Sisi declared had ended in 2023.

On 9 February, the junta government in Niger announced the closure of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s operations in the country. The junta has justified the action in response to reports that the ICRC was allegedly not adhering to regulations stipulated by the government. The move follows statements made by the Nigerien authorities in November, which expressed concerns about the European Union’s unilateral distribution of humanitarian aid to NGOs, which included the ICRC. According to the junta, the distribution of aid was ‘in disregard of the principles of transparency and good collaboration.’

On 10 February, Burkina Faso’s junta followed suit, imposing a blanket ban on all NGO activity operating without government permission. The directive follows concerns over security risks regarding unregulated NGO activity.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The decision to ban the Red Cross in Niger and NGOs in Burkina Faso comes at a time when the countries are struggling with dire humanitarian situations caused by conflict with jihadist and separatist groups, as well as increasing international isolation. In Niger, the ICRC has provided medical care, food and other forms of support for decades and is assessed to have directly supported almost 150,000 people between January to June 2024.

In Burkina Faso, NGOs have also played a significant role in addressing humanitarian issues. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) helped over 130,000 individuals in 2023 with education, food security, shelter, protection, and water programs; Caritas Burkina Faso assisted 1.5 million individuals in 2018 with agriculture, emergency assistance, microfinance, food security, and access to social services programs.

These decisions to cease ICRC and NGO operations are likely a move to curb foreign influence and independent voices in both countries. The move comes amid reports that NGOs have been utilised by France to exert influence in the Sahel region. While this is disputed, the perceived historic involvement of Western countries in the Sahel makes it likely to be believed and may increase anti-Western sentiment in the region.

The move is almost certainly part of a wider trend, with the Sahel junta governments limiting the influence of foreign mining companies, militaries, and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This trend has likely grown for several reasons. The juntas likely perceive the operations of foreign organisations, as contributing to the legitimacy of criticisms from hostile groups, including violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and rival factions. More importantly, foreign entities provide oversight of government actions, often documenting and reporting on human rights violations, mismanagement, and the impact of conflict on civilians.

By expelling these groups, the juntas likely hope to diminish external scrutiny of their actions and incompetence. However, the expulsion of NGOs will almost certainly exacerbate humanitarian crises, increase internal scrutiny, and ultimately play into the hands of the VEOs. Extremist groups are likely to exploit the worsening conditions to expand their influence, recruit disaffected individuals, and position themselves as alternative providers of aid and security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has achieved rapid advances in the capital Khartoum, capturing key strongholds previously held by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The SAF is reportedly on the verge of controlling all of northern Khartoum, however, the RSF still maintains control of vital ground such as the Soba Bridge on the River Nile.

The UAE, an alleged backer of the RSF, has called for a Ramadan ceasefire to be observed from 28 February to 30 March. However, Sudan’s Sovereign Council President has rejected talks with the RSF unless they lay down their arms, while army officials have dismissed ceasefire proposals unless the RSF retreats. Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aligned with the SAF, has proposed a roadmap to end the civil war, including the formation of a civilian-led government and free elections. The proposal has been submitted to the African Union (AU), the United Nations, and the Arab League for support.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recapturing of Khartoum would serve as a major military and political victory for the SAF. However, the SAF’s advance has been enabled by a heavy use of airstrikes and artillery resulting in high rates of collateral damage. With the SAF advancing, the RSF are likely to withdraw from the east bank of the River Nile and consolidate their forces in the west of the city, with the UAE proposal for a ceasefire providing more time to regroup.

The RSF’s regrouping coupled with their control of vital ground will likely slow the rate of the SAF’s advance and lead to higher rates of civilian casualties and displacement, with the SAF likely to conserve manpower through leveraging long-range fires.

Advances in Khartoum suggest that the SAF has seized the initiative which has likely been enabled by Russian support. On 13 February, Sudan and Russia finalised a long-standing agreement for a Russian naval base at Port Sudan. The base is almost certainly a strategic priority for Russia. Access to Port Sudan will enable Moscow to facilitate operations in Africa and achieve a permanent naval presence on the Red Sea, a critical sea line of communication with two strategic choke points that could be blocked in a time of war.

The capture of Khartoum and increased Russian support will almost certainly set the conditions for an SAF offensive aimed at defeating the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. During such an offensive, the RSF is likely to commit to a fighting withdrawal. This will likely involve indiscriminate attacks on civilians, especially as the SAF has ruled out negotiations, a precedent already set by the RSF.

SAF reprisal attacks on the civilian population are also likely. Reports indicate that activists, human rights defenders, and humanitarian workers are being accused of collaborating with the RSF. Lists have reportedly been circulated, identifying politicians, activists, medical professionals, public prosecutors, and members of protest groups as “partners of the RSF.”

The current civil war in Sudan has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with over 30 million people in need of aid. The establishment of a government in the capital would likely be beneficial for facilitating humanitarian aid into Sudan and its distribution across the country. However, future SAF offensives in western Sudan are likely to exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the short term by disrupting the delivery of aid, damaging vital infrastructure and increasing displacement.

Furthermore, the Trump administration’s 90-day freeze on foreign aid, which may be extended, has already severely impacted Sudan’s humanitarian efforts, leading to the Closure of 742 community kitchens serving over 816,000 people, with USAID providing 75 per cent of the funding. Civilian-led Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), which operate on a volunteer basis, have had to halt operations, leaving millions without access to essential food and medical supplies.

Large-scale clashes which resulted in approximately 100 deaths were recorded on 11 February as Puntland forces advanced deeper into the Cal Miskaad mountain range, where ISS’s main strongholds are located. ISS forces reportedly attacked Puntland forces’ positions using at least 15 person-borne IEDs (PBIEDs) and one vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) on 11 February alone. At least 30 suicide bombings have been reported since the beginning of 2025.

The UAE and US have offered limited support to Puntland units, conducting airstrikes around Dhasaq on 10 February. Puntland sources continue to note the large presence of foreign fighters in ISS units, especially among the perpetrators of suicide bombings. Accounts of ISS’s total manpower vary considerably, from minimum estimates of 400 to maximums of over 1,000 fighters.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The intensification of ISS’s suicide bombings makes the latest campaign reminiscent of larger-scale battles in Mosul and Marawi. In both cases, Islamic State (IS) forces opted to resort to more PBIEDs and VBIEDs to defend vital areas. The recent trends in Cal Miskaad likely reflect the mountain range’s importance for ISS. The large presence of foreigners among ISS units almost certainly showcases the Somali branch’s adoption of tactics used by larger IS branches as well as its close ties to the “core” of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The recent advances by Puntland forces have been successful, with considerable casualties recorded on ISS’s side. Nevertheless, the attrition faced by the attacking force is likely to increase in the short term as Puntland forces continue to advance towards more fortified positions. There is a realistic possibility of a stalemate, with ISS retaining some control in the area and looking for opportunities to reform.

If ISS were to lose Cal Miskaad, the group would highly likely suffer a significant setback, which may have impacts on IS’s global network of branches. ISS, while smaller than other “provinces”, is a key hub for IS’ international flows of funds and fighters, particularly in Africa and the Arab Peninsula.

Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) walks away from coalition talks, deepening crisis

The FPÖ, led by Herbert Kickl, was tasked with forming a government after the centre-right People’s Party (ÖVP) failed to do so. Both major right-wing parties, therefore, have now been unsuccessful in their attempts to form a workable coalition.

President Alexander Van der Bellen now has the option of either calling for new elections or tasking the ÖVP with trying to form a government with the left. In both scenarios, the FPÖ is likely to benefit. Since the 2024 general election, where it finished first with 29 per cent of the votes, the FPÖ has increased its polling to around 35 per cent, meaning that another vote would likely see it increase its numbers in parliament.

On the other hand, the ÖVP has lost considerable public support and is now polling behind the Social Democrats (SPÖ), so, even if it were to form a cordon sanitaire with the left to keep the Freedom Party out of government, it would do so from an extremely weak position and would be exposed to FPÖ’s attacks.

Romania’s president resigns due to significant pressure from opposition

Klaus Iohannis announced his resignation on 11 February amid an impending parliamentary impeachment vote. Senate President Ilie Bolojan has replaced Iohannis and will act as the interim head of state.

Romania is currently undergoing a period of extreme political uncertainty after the second round of the presidential elections in December 2024 was cancelled by the constitutional court over alleged Russian involvement. The first round had unexpectedly been won by Calin Georgescu, a pro-Russia, anti-EU outsider with little political experience.

The unprecedented decision has almost certainly boosted Romania’s anti-establishment parties, particularly the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), which threw its weight behind Georgescu prior to the vote, and SOS Romania, whose leader Diana Sosoaca was barred from running at the elections.

AUR and other populist formations are highly likely to continue pushing for early presidential elections, possibly sooner than the government’s proposed dates in May.

First major blackout in Nigeria in 2025

On 12 February, Nigeria suffered its first major power outage of 2025, after recording 12 consecutive grid collapses in 2024. The Ikeja Electricity Distribution Company reported that the system outage affected all its customers, especially in Lagos, Abuja and Osun due to a line tripping on this axis, which disrupted many businesses and essential services.

The government has implemented several measures to improve the grid, including the privatisation of the power sector and increasing investment in infrastructure. However, inadequate maintenance, corruption, antiquated infrastructure, vandalism and extremist attacks on the grid have hampered major improvements.

Nigerians have expressed their discontent on social media, with historic blackouts fuelling civil unrest and resulting in higher rates of crimes, especially in urban areas when blackouts disrupt lighting and security systems.

Russia claims Ukraine is preparing for false flag attack against vessel in the Baltic Sea

Russia has claimed that Ukraine, with Western support, is preparing a provocation in the Baltic Sea by using Russian-made sea mines to destroy a foreign vessel. The aim, according to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), is to blame Moscow for the explosion, creating a pretext for NATO to intervene and potentially block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which would almost certainly heighten tensions.

This accusation likely serves several strategic purposes.- to sow distrust between NATO and Ukraine, to justify Russia’s own military actions in the Baltic, and to frame Ukraine as an unpredictable actor willing to escalate the conflict. Russia is also likely seeking to undermine peace efforts by portraying Ukraine’s leadership as desperate and willing to provoke further violence rather than seek a resolution.

Russia thwarts Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attack in Pskov

On 13 February, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) stated its agents had discovered and neutralised an ISKP cell planning a large-scale attack on the local train station. Pskov is a medium-sized city located near the Russian border with Estonia and far from ISKP’s Caucasus recruitment hotspots like Dagestan or Chechnya.

The discovery of an ISKP cell in Pskov is likely reflective of the group’s increasing focus on Russia as a desirable target. ISKP leaders almost certainly assess that the war in Ukraine has made Russia vulnerable to attack. Further ISKP operations in Russia remain highly likely and these will likely include both lone-wolf attacks, but also group-level, more sophisticated actions.

Stabbing in Dublin, Ireland, injures three

Multiple stabbing attacks occurred at several locations in north Dublin on 8 February. Authorities arrested one man, a Brazilian citizen, for allegedly carrying out the attack. As of the time of writing, no motive for the attack has been revealed. Due to the suspect’s migrant background, there is a realistic possibility that retaliatory violence and protests will occur in the short term in Dublin and other Irish cities. Mass riots have occurred in the capital following similar incidents involving migrants, or Irish citizens descended from migrants, most notably in November 2023 following a stabbing incident.

Grenade attack in Grenoble, France, injures 12

The incident occurred on the evening of 12 February at a bar near the Olympic Village quarter. Authorities have excluded a terrorism-related motive for the attack and have instead tentatively linked it to a “settling of scores”. Grenoble is near Marseilles, close to the Italian border, and is a hub for organised crime linked to drug trafficking, especially cocaine, in France. Violence associated with drug trafficking has increased significantly since the summer of 2024, following police operations and inter-group fighting that have created opportunities for violent competition between local groups.

Fitness influencer arrested in Spain for spreading Islamic State (IS) propaganda

The individual reportedly used his social media presence to spread IS content, often mixed with otherwise harmless workout and fitness material, to more than 100,000 followers across different social media platforms. The case likely illustrates a trend already seen in other cases of radicalisation and extremism of extremists’ efforts to “hijack” online communities and to weaponise them as tools to encourage violence and terrorist activity.

Major anti-Mafia operation in Palermo, Sicily

Italian authorities arrested 183 people during a large-scale raid on 10-11 February, which reportedly involved over 1,200 Carabinieri (Italy’s gendarmerie). Most of the arrested are accused of collaborating with Cosa Nostra, the Italian mafia in Sicily.

According to Italian media, the raid led to the discovery of Cosa Nostra operatives’ use of increasingly sophisticated logistics and communications, including encrypted messaging channels and sophisticated equipment. Those arrested include both older leaders and a large number of younger members of local mafia groups, almost certainly showcasing how organised crime in Sicily continues to recruit from younger and more disadvantaged demographics.

Compared to other “mafias” in Italy, such as the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta and the Campania-based Camorra, Cosa Nostra has been on the back foot for years due to multiple large-scale anti-crime operations and has shifted to “less visible” sectors like online gambling. The latest raid is likely to further weaken the organisation.

Small Yemeni-flagged fishing boats seized off the coast of Eyl, Somalia

On 9 February, a suspected pirate attack occurred against a Yemeni-flagged dhow off the coast of Eyl in northern Puntland. While the incident is still under investigation, a separate report indicates that suspects may have hijacked three small boats.

Hijacking small boats including skiffs and dhows is a tactic utilised by well-armed pirate groups to travel deeper into the Indian Ocean and target larger vessels. Most piracy in Somalia stems from Puntland, where economic opportunities are scarce, and Somali security forces are combatting the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab.

The large-scale clashes between Puntland forces and ISS in recent weeks have highly likely provided a vacuum for armed piracy groups to resume operations. The increase in counter-insurgency operations will highly likely enable local fishermen to carry out further attacks and hijackings on vessels.

Ebola cases continue to rise in Uganda

As of 14 February, the number of confirmed Ebola cases has risen to nine, with one confirmed death, since Uganda declared an outbreak of the disease in late January. Seven cases are being treated in Kampala and one in Mbale.

265 people who have been identified as having contact with the confirmed cases have been quarantined. Given that Ebola symptoms can take up to 21 days to appear, more confirmed cases will likely be announced in the coming weeks.

This latest outbreak is driven by the Sudan strain of Ebola, which has no approved vaccine. While there are currently approximately 2,400 vaccines in Uganda, they are for the Zaire strain behind outbreaks in the DRC. Furthermore, communication deficiencies from authorities and resistance from businesses have made tackling the outbreak more challenging.

On 11 February, an ISKP militant detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) in front of a bank in Kunduz, where a large crowd of civilians and the Taliban were gathered waiting for their salary distribution. The blast killed the attacker, with reports varying on the number of other fatalities, ranging from five to over 25. In March 2024, ISKP carried out a suicide bombing with the same methodology in Kandahar.

On 12 February, reports emerged that ISKP attempted another suicide bombing, this time in Kabul, but that the attack was thwarted by local security.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is the second notable ISKP operation in the north of Afghanistan in recent weeks, the other being the (disputed) assassination of a Chinese citizen in Takhar, a region that borders Kunduz Province to the east. ISKP’s primary area of operations has traditionally been within Kabul and the eastern provinces like Kunar and Nangarhar. The attack therefore highly likely demonstrates ISKP’s improving reach, and how the group increasingly sees the north as a key area where to expand its presence.

Tajikistan, while not having had any recent large-scale terror attacks, has a growing domestic extremism problem. Factors including a lagging economy, combined with an extremely authoritarian government that has sought to neutralise and control religious institutions, have almost certainly created an environment that is extremely receptive to pro-IS radical propaganda. The border area with Tajikistan, which is poorly policed, remains a key entry point for foreign fighters seeking to join ISKP in Afghanistan.

With the Taliban preoccupied with cross-border tensions, as well as domestic rebel groups, ISKP is likely exploiting a weaker Taliban in peripheral regions.

In political terms, the choice of target likely also matters. ISKP propaganda accuses the Taliban government of being propped up by Western funds, which makes banks symbols of both Taliban rule and Western intervention.

The attack in Kabul is likely to undermine the Taliban’s ongoing assertion that they have defeated ISKP. There is a realistic possibility of further ISKP operations in the north in the medium term. More broadly, ISKP is highly likely to continue taking advantage of an overstretched Taliban, carrying out opportunistic attacks on civilians and Taliban forces to undermine Kabul’s tenuous hold on power.

UN suggests former Bangladeshi government complicit in crimes against humanity

A report by UN human rights investigators has accused the former Awami League government under ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of being complicit in crimes against humanity. The report indicates that the government’s brutal response to the student-led protests in 2024, which killed an assessed 1400 people, involved “an official policy to attack and violently repress anti-government protesters”.

The report also suggests that senior members of the government, including Hasina, were aware of and involved in serious offences. The report is likely to validate many of the narratives pushed by opposition groups, who have long accused the former government of authoritarianism, repression, and human rights abuses.

There is a realistic possibility that this will result in unrest and political violence targeting Awami League supporters, government-affiliated institutions, and religious minorities such as Hindus, who have historically been associated with the party.

South Korean president to face insurrection charges

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol will face his first preliminary hearing on 20 February on insurrection charges, while impeachment proceedings against him continue. His impeachment followed a failed attempt to declare martial law in December 2024, with the legislature removing him for constitutional violations. In January, he was arrested on separate criminal charges of insurrection.

The Constitutional Court is overseeing the impeachment process, while the Seoul Central District Court is handling the criminal trial. Impeachment proceedings are progressing rapidly, with some legal experts anticipating a verdict by mid-March.

However, Yoon’s legal team may seek to pause the impeachment by invoking a constitutional act due to the parallel criminal trial. The trial against Yoon will likely provoke several protests, with thousands of demonstrators continuing to rally across South Korea, both in support of and against the president.

First US Navy ship transits Taiwan Strait under Trump administration

On 10 February, the USS Ralph Johnson, a guided-missile destroyer, and the USNS Bowditch, a survey ship, conducted a north-to-south transit through the Taiwan Strait. The transit marks the first US Navy passing of the Taiwan Strait since President Trump assumed office in January and likely served as a strategic message to Beijing, stressing the US’ right to exercise the freedom of navigation and its sustained support for Taipei.

China’s Eastern Theatre Command stated that it had monitored the passage and criticised the US action for sending “the wrong signals” and increasing “security risks in the region.

Almost 200 cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) detected in western India

As of 12 February, at least 197 cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) have been detected in the Indian state of Maharashtra, with the outbreak concentrated within the Pune region. The death toll is currently assessed at eight, with the first death in Mumbai recorded on 12 February.

GBS is a rare neurological disorder which affects the nervous system, leading to muscle weakness, numbness, and, in severe cases, paralysis. The disease can affect all people but typically follows a viral or bacterial infection. The death rate is generally low (3-7 per cent), however, in severe cases, complications such as respiratory failure, infections, or blood clots can be fatal. Authorities in the region have advised the public to drink boiled water and avoid the consumption of stale or undercooked food.

Island-wide power outage in Sri Lanka

On 9 February 2025, Sri Lanka experienced a nationwide power outage after a monkey came into contact with power lines at a substation in Panadura. The blackout caused widespread disruptions, including railway gate and warning system malfunctions, and the government issued an advisory urging water conservation.

Power was restored to most of the country within hours, however, the authorities had to introduce load-shedding on 10 and 11 February. However, the incident has almost certainly triggered major concerns over the vulnerability of Sri Lanka’s power grid to external disruptions and highlights a major lack of investment in the nation’s infrastructure.

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Mexico’s deployment of 10,000 troops to its northern border is almost certainly a reaction to the US tariff threat. There is a realistic possibility that Mexico’s actions will escalate tensions with the well-armed cartels.

There is a realistic possibility that Argentina’s designation of a radical Mapuche group as a terrorist organisation could escalate tensions resulting in more attacks on state and corporate interests.

The deadliest shooting in Swedish history, which occurred in the town of Orebro, is likely a case of lone-wolf terrorism inspired by far-right ideology. Further attacks remain possible as more information is released.

Russian intelligence’s alleged sponsoring of a sabotage campaign targeting private vehicles in Germany is likely part of a broader attempt to polarise society and influence the upcoming elections.

A new Russo-Belarusian security pact will almost certainly be ratified by Russia’s parliament, and will likely significantly increase the threat of Belarus joining the war against Ukraine.

Turkey’s proposed involvement in counter-ISIS operations in Syria is likely a pretext to expand its operations against the SDF and Kurdish people in anticipation of a US withdrawal. 

Iran’s rapid advancement of its nuclear weapons programme is almost certainly a response to the degradation of its conventional deterrents and a development that could decrease regional stability.

Record-breaking levels of snowfall in northern Japan will almost certainly continue to impact daily life and result in severe transport disruptions.

The ambushing of Pakistani troops by Baloch separatists is likely indicative of overstretched security services and a rapidly deteriorating security situation.

This is the paragraph. Paste as uOn 3 February, the White House announced that it would pause the imposition of planned 25 per cent tariffs on Mexican goods after reaching a deal on the US-Mexico border. The deal calls for the deployment of at least 10,000 Mexican soldiers to the border, in efforts to stop cross-border flows of migrants, as well as smuggling of narcotics and firearms.

The deal occurs at a time of growing violence at the border. On 3 February, multiple gun battles occurred in the Mexican border city of Nuevo Laredo following the arrest of a local cartel leader, which resulted in the US consulate and airport briefly pausing operations. In the past weeks, there have been multiple cases of US border patrol officers exchanging fire with suspected cartel members near the border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The deployment of 10,000 troops is almost certainly a reaction to Trump’s economic coercion, and will highly likely have some impact on Mexico’s overall approach to combating organised crime in the country.

President Claudia Sheinbaum was elected on a platform similar to that of her predecessor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), which called for a “hugs not bullets” strategy for the cartel problem. This approach emphasised improving economic opportunity and reducing social issues in at-risk regions, rather than directly attacking the cartels. AMLO had remained a staunch supporter of this policy despite Washington’s appeals to change course.

Sheinbaum has, instead, gradually signalled a willingness to take a tougher line, also because of a significant reported increase in the number of murders and kidnappings during the president’s first months in power.

However, even if the deployment of 10,000 troops has an important political value, and has successfully paused the threat of US sanctions, it will not necessarily alter the situation at the border. The protracted threat of US economic sanctions will almost certainly force Mexico City to take measures to ensure an increase in narcotics and weapons seizures. This may result in an increase in clashes with local cartel units.

If the threat of government measures becomes unacceptable for the cartels, it could result in escalating violence targeting civil sector workers and politicians. Mexican cartels can in some cases match the firepower of state security forces, and recent trends highlight a growing militarisation of their units. For instance, cartels are increasingly producing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and deploying them via drones, using tactics that match those by armed militias and rebel groups in conflicts such as those in Myanmar and Syria. In states like Michoacan and Jalisco, cartels like the Jalisco Nueva Generation (CJNG) have systematically deployed drone-dropped IEDs to attack police forces and buildings.

ThOn 4 February, Argentine National Security Minister Patricia Bullrich stated that she would designate an indigenous Mapuche group a “terrorist organisation” in response to the group allegedly starting numerous intentional fires in the Patagonia region.

The announcement follows a local media report in which the leader of the Mapuche Ancestral Resistance (RAM), Facundo Jones Huala, declared that sabotage is a legitimate form of struggle for the Mapuche people and claimed responsibility for several arson attacks in the Chubut region, at a time when Argentina is struggling with a series of wildfires, many of which are suspected to be deliberate. Huala also reportedly denied the existence of the Argentine state and called for an armed struggle against the Milei government.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Mapuche are an Indigenous people of South America, primarily living in Chile and Argentina, particularly in the regions of Araucanía, Los Ríos, and parts of Patagonia. Mapuche groups have raised long-standing demands for the return of their ancestral lands from the state or private companies. These demands typically take the form of political activism.

However, in the last two decades, elements of the Mapuche movement have become far more militant. In Chile, the Mapuche have been waging a renewed war against the government since the 1990s after Chile’s return to democracy.  The Mapuche conflict in Chile has entailed arson attacks, sabotage and violent clashes with the Chilean police and military.

In response, Santiago has deployed military forces and special police units to suppress Mapuche groups and has used counterterrorism laws from the Pinochet era to detain key Mapuche figures.

In Argentina, there is a realistic possibility that the declaration of RAM as a terrorist organisation could energise the Mapuche movement and exacerbate tensions with the indigenous community. RAM only emerged in the early 2000s and is likely still in its infancy.

The use of counterterrorism laws, potential human rights violations, freezing of assets, expanded surveillance and a potential increased military presence in Patagonia could easily work in favour of RAM, enabling it to recruit more from an increasingly alienated Mapuche community. If mismanaged, the Mapuche movement in Argentina may adopt a more militant character, as observed in neighbouring Chile.

This could include arson attacks, sabotage against critical infrastructure, and destruction of forestry plantations, agricultural estates and even native forests, which the Mapuche have been known to target as a symbolic act against state and corporate interests.

Trump sanctions International Criminal Court (ICC)

On 6 February, President Trump signed an executive order to authorise economic and travel sanctions targeting ICC staff and family members, if they are determined to be involved in investigations or prosecutions targeting US citizens or allies, namely Israel. The move has been condemned by the organisation, of which the US is not a member.

The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, alongside a leader of Hamas, in November 2024. Trump condemned the simultaneous issuing of these arrest warrants as immoral and baseless, suggesting that the Israeli PM should not be held in the same regard as the leader of the militant group. The ICC has stated that the sanctions are likely to undermine its work.

The decision follows the renewal of US aid packages for Israel and Trump’s controversial comments over US control of Gaza. The convergence of these developments is likely to galvanise pro-Palestinian demonstrations across the globe, viewing it as an endorsement of the Netanyahu administration’s handling of the Gaza conflict, who may seek to organise protests outside US embassies, Trump-owned businesses or other locations associated with US interests could also be targeted.

Greenland tries to “Trump-proof” itself

The government of Greenland has passed a series of measures designed to reduce the likelihood of foreign influence on its internal affairs while simultaneously calling for cross-parliamentary unity. On 5 February, Prime Minister Mute Egede called for snap elections, which would be held on 11 March, likely in the hope of giving his independentist party a stronger mandate to negotiate with Copenhagen and Washington. Coinciding with the call for new elections, the Greenlandic parliament passed laws to ban anonymous foreign contributions to electoral campaigns, as well as legislation to restrict the purchase of land to Greenlandic and Danish citizens and long-term residents only.  

Argentines protest President Javier Milei’s Davos speech

Thousands of protesters gathered in central Buenos Aires on 2 February in response to the president’s remarks. During his speech at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, Milei rallied against “wokeism” and described a global struggle between free market capitalist and socialist forces, also praising US President Donald Trump and his billionaire ally Elon Musk.

Milei has repeatedly used international summits and events as opportunities to build positive relations with key right-wing leaders, particularly those in Washington and in European countries led by the right, such as Italy. It is likely that Milei adapted the speech’s rhetoric, which is directly borrowed from the American right’s domestic political messaging, to accompany Trump’s own speech at Davos, the first since he returned to the White House. A self-proclaimed “anarcho-capitalist”, Milei has often espoused conservative social rhetoric, despite it being ideologically contradictory to libertarian principles. On 5 February, the Milei administration announced that it, like the US, would also withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO), a further development that is likely to energise unrest in Argentina.

US aid freeze threatens UN-backed mission in Haiti

The Trump administration has notified the United Nations that it is freezing some of the funding allocated to the Kenyan-led international task force in Haiti. The US has been the largest contributor to the UN-backed mission, which was launched in 2024 and was already struggling with funding. The aid freeze will present a major threat to the success of the mission and could shape the conditions for the gangs to assume almost full control of the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, where they already control an assessed 85 per cent. Criminal gangs are likely to be emboldened by this development and will likely respond with increased attacks on Haitian and international forces. In recent days, the Viv Ansanm gang coalition has been going door-to-door in one of the capital’s more prosperous neighbourhoods, attempting to target the country’s elite while indiscriminately killing civilians.

ELN warns Colombian government that it will not surrender

After launching an offensive against rival non-state groups in Colombia, which resulted in the deployment of government troops to the regions affected, the National Liberation Army (ELN) has vowed that it will never accept submission or surrender. The statement follows weeks of increased violence in the conflict-ridden parts of Norte de Santander and a gesture from President Petro which involved him pointing at an ELN base displayed on classified satellite-derived imagery. The gesture, which was accompanied by verbal threats, almost certainly indicates a major shift in the Petro administration’s policy of “total peace” and the championing of dialogue. The renewed conflict is likely to trigger a wave of attacks across Colombia, The ELN has a major presence in multiple departments of Colombia, especially in the border region, and is likely to stage attacks against the government, rival guerilla groups, organised crime groups and even the civilian population.

Ecuador to close borders and militarise ports of entry during election

President Daniel Noboa of Ecuador has ordered the closure of all borders between 8-10 February during the country’s presidential election. Noboa also ordered the immediate militarisation of all ports of entry in Ecuador and an increased military presence on the border. The orders have purportedly been issued in response to intelligence indicating that “narco-terrorists” are preparing to destabilise the country during the election, with regional cartels likely seeking to undermine Noboa after his administration introduced measures like those introduced by President Bukele of El Salvador, including mass detentions, states of emergency and increased security patrols.

Flooding in Recife, Brazil, threatens at-risk communities and informal settlements

Heavy rain, which started on 3 February, has resulted in local authorities issuing a maximum alert level on 4 February. According to the Pernambuco Water and Climate Agency (APAC), more than 110 mm of rain fell on parts of Recife in 12 hours. At least one person has been killed due to the severe weather event. Local schools closed and widespread traffic disruptions were recorded due to the floods. The risk of flooding in Recife is particularly high in informal settlements, or favelas. There are an estimated 295 favelas in Recife, where 360,000 people live, or approximately 24 per cent of the population. These are often located on hillsides, with poor drainage infrastructure, meaning that floods can result in buildings collapsing and severe mudslides affecting thousands of residents. The cramped layout of the settlements also makes evacuation and search and rescue operations extremely difficult.

On 4 February, a gunman opened fire inside an adult education centre in the Swedish town of Orebro, located approximately 200 kilometres from Stockholm, killing 11 people. The perpetrator, who was found dead at the scene, was a 35-year-old Swedish national with no criminal history who had reportedly previously been a student at the school. The shooting is the deadliest in Sweden’s history and has sparked a debate over Sweden’s gun laws.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Swedish authorities have not released a possible motive for the attack but have not ruled out the possibility of an ideological motive. There are multiple elements, however, that the shooting in Orebro shares with recent cases of lone actor terrorism.

First, the shooting occurred at a school that primarily caters to migrants. Second, it follows the high-visibility case of an Iraqi, Sweden-based anti-Islam activist, who was recently killed on the eve of his trial. Third, the perpetrator reportedly changed into a “military uniform” prior to carrying out the shooting, according to witnesses. It is notable, here, that multiple perpetrators of far-right terrorist actions, including the Christchurch and Buffalo shooter, as well as the more recent perpetrator of the Eskisehir mosque stabbing attack, wore makeshift “uniforms”. Fourth, elements of the shooter’s profile resemble those of other “lone wolves”, including a history of social isolation. Finally, testimonies (and possible audio) exist of the shooter reportedly shouting anti-migrant slogans during the attack, although, as of the time of writing, these remain unverified by Swedish authorities.

These elements, taken together, make it likely that the shooting was a case of far-right and identitarian extremist violence, similar to other notable cases of lone wolf terror attacks. There is a realistic possibility of copycat attacks, as well as retaliatory violence, as more information regarding the shooting is released.

On 5 February, Der Spiegel released a report claiming that Russian intelligence hired German residents to carry out a deliberate sabotage operation targeting private vehicles in December. According to the report, more than 270 cars were found to have been damaged in Berlin, Brandenburg, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg by having sealant foam sprayed in their exhausts. The vehicles were also tagged with stickers promoting the German Green Party. German authorities reportedly arrested three German residents from Serbia and Bosnia, who confessed to having been recruited by Russian intelligence via the messenger app “Viber”, with the promise of EUR 100 for each sabotaged car.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The operation is almost certainly a clear example of Russian intelligence’s use of “disposable” local agents for unsophisticated acts meant to sow confusion and disruption in target societies. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has established a de facto “gig economy” for sabotage across Europe. Russian sympathisers or people hostile to the state in which they live are identified online, often through social media analysis. Russian intelligence can then recruit them through a decentralised online network, utilising applications such as Viber. Disenfranchised individuals, often those with far-right tendencies, are then recruited to conduct acts like sabotage and arson at the behest of the Kremlin in exchange for remuneration via secure online payments of cryptocurrencies. These acts are then often conducted in a manner that seeks to attribute blame to another group. This strategy has provided Moscow with a low-cost and highly deniable method of disrupting or undermining target countries, without risking its intelligence operatives and demanding only minimal organisation.

Russia’s objective in orchestrating this sabotage campaign is likely to destabilise the German political landscape by sowing confusion and influencing the upcoming 23 February elections. The Greens are currently polling at 13 per cent, and their vote share may become fundamental in shaping a possible government coalition in an increasingly fractured German electorate. The aim was likely to tarnish the image of environmentalists and Green supporters by emulating acts that the more extreme elements of these groups have done before, such as sabotage of a Tesla gigafactory and vandalism of electric cars. If successfully attributed to the green movement, this could gain traction with the German far-right and continue to polarise the country. The destabilising effect of this one operation is likely to be limited. However, the aggregate effect of multiple Russian influence operations in both the physical and virtual world that have yet to be exposed in the open-source domain, is likely far more significant and likely to increase as the federal elections approach.

On 5 February, a security pact between Russia and Belarus was presented to the Russian parliament (the Duma) for ratification. The pact, that was signed between Minsk and Moscow on 6 December 2024, has three key stipulations: The inclusion of Belarus under Russia’s protective ‘nuclear umbrella’ (meaning Russia will hypothetically use nuclear weapons to protect Belarus against external aggression), allowing the deployment of Russian military bases on Belarusian territory, and according to an independent Belarusian media outlet, the potential recruitment of Belarusian citizens to fight against Ukraine so as to defend “Russia’s territorial integrity”. Additionally, on 3 February, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence announced the start of ‘combat readiness checks’. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (SBGS) stated that while underway, the combat readiness checks do “not pose any threat to Ukraine” as no movement of equipment, personnel or strike formations along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border has been detected.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The treaty has been given priority status by the Duma, and will almost certainly be ratified. Having won every presidential election since 1994, the president of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko won yet again another election on 26 January in a political system that is almost certainly highly undemocratic (Belarus has a low performance across all of the Global State of Democracy Initiative’s categories). Russia and Belarus have de jure been in a Union State since 1999, although de facto maintain independence from one another – the new security pact’s initial signing coincided with the 25^th anniversary of the Treaty on the Creation of the Union State.

While Belarusian armed forces have not as of yet taken part in the war against Ukraine, the Kremlin used Belarus as a staging post for an offensive against Kyiv in the initial stages of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While this offensive was successfully repelled, it is almost certain that the Ukrainian military establishment has significant concerns about the threat posed by any further offensive from Belarus, enabled by the involvement of Belarusian armed forces. Such an offensive would likely severely overstretch Ukrainian forces, whose main efforts are currently the defence of the eastern front and holding the Kursk salient in internationally recognised Russia. Russia struggles with manpower shortages of its own, with North Korean troops being withdrawn from the front lines in the Kursk salient due to considerable casualty rates, so the potential addition of Belarusian troops is almost certainly highly desirable for the Kremlin. On 5 February, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned in a news conference with the UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy that Russia will deploy further forces on Belarusian territory later this year and that the Kremlin will “pull Belarus into the war”. Lukashenko’s position in Belarus is highly likely more fragile than Putin’s in Russia, and while Lukashenko has endeavoured to limit Belarus’ involvement in the war thus far, the inclusion of Belarus into Russia’s nuclear protection zone would likely significantly increase the chances of their direct involvement, especially if Russia has made guarantees to protect the Lukashenko regime domestically.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has stated that Turkey will join forces with Syria, Iraq and Jordan to combat the remnants of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He also suggested that Turkish operations would allow the US to sever its ties with Kurdish militants in Syria, a relationship that Ankara strongly opposes. Fidan also stated that the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), which form the spearhead of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), had only been guarding ISIS detainees in SDF-run prisons and have contributed little else to counter the resurgent threat of ISIS. Ankara has also reiterated its view that the SDF should be absorbed into the new conventional Syrian military.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Turkey has long opposed the SDF, which it views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant group considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey and its allies. Turkey is also currently engaged in an offensive against the SDF in northern Syria, backed by its proxy force the Syrian National Army (SNA). Ankara is likely concerned that the SDF’s influence in Syria could bolster or embolden separatist movements within Turkey, threatening its national security. There is a realistic possibility that Turkey is using anti-ISIS operations as a pretext to increase its force posture in Syria, with its true objective being the suppression of Kurdish forces and the consolidation of control over key areas in northern Syria close to Turkey. In parallel, Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are currently discussing a potential defence pact that could result in Syrian forces being trained by Turkey and the establishment of Turkish airbases in central Syria. If agreed, Turkey will benefit from Iran’s loss of influence in Syria, be in a much stronger position to project strength into the Middle East and will be in a stronger position to counter Kurdish forces in Syria.

Using anti-ISIS operations as a pretext would likely appeal to the Trump administration. Trump has suggested that the US may entirely withdraw from Syria, where CENTCOM currently has approximately 2,000 troops to counter ISIS. Turkish involvement in a regional counter-ISIS coalition would likely be endorsed by Trump and help him facilitate a US withdrawal. However, ISIS has already demonstrated the early signs of a resurgence, with increased and more brazen attacks. If Turkey’s true goal is to suppress Kurdish forces under the cover of anti-ISIS operations while the US withdraws from both Iraq and Syria, it could inadvertently create an opportunity for ISIS to regroup. Ultimately, increased Turkish military presence in Syria could pressure the SDF into disbanding as a military organisation and integrating into the new Syrian forces, a shift that would weaken Kurdish forces in Syria, align with Turkey’s objectives, and simultaneously avoid alienating the SDF’s Western backers..

Reports indicate that Iran is expediting its development of a nuclear weapon, which could potentially enable it to acquire the capability in a matter of months. A secret team of engineers and scientists purportedly linked to the Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (SPND), has been involved in the process, an organisation that was pivotal in Iranian nuclear weapons research before 2003. This approach could shorten the time required to convert weapons-grade uranium (enriched to 90 per cent) into a nuclear weapon. The report states that Iran currently holds uranium enriched to approximately 60 per cent, considered near weapons-grade.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As a result of the conflict in the Middle East, Iran has been left considerably weakened and lacks an effective deterrent. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has effectively defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip, significantly degraded Hezbollah in Lebanon and demonstrated its capability to strike Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The IDF also demonstrated its capability to strike deep within Iran, whilst also degrading much of Iran’s strategic air defence and ability to produce ballistic missiles. Furthermore, Tehran has lost a key ally in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime. This development has also fractured part of Iran’s Shia Crescent, disrupting ground lines of communication to Hezbollah, which was its main deterrent against Israel. With its conventional deterrence severely diminished, Tehran has likely calculated that its only viable option is to pursue a nuclear deterrent, which may lead to the Supreme Leader revoking his fatwa on nuclear weapons. Such a development is likely to raise the chances of escalation between Iran and not just Israel, but also the Gulf States, potentially triggering an arms race in the Middle East.

However, US officials have stated that Iran’s new approach to developing a nuclear bomb would only enable it to build an older-style nuclear weapon, commenting that such a warhead would not fit on a ballistic missile and be far less reliable than a modern nuclear weapon.  This limits Iran’s ability to deploy such a weapon, with aerial delivery the most likely method. However, Israel and the Gulf States possess superior air and air defence capabilities, which are likely sufficient to intercept Iranian aircraft before they reach their intended targets. The main advantage of the new process is that it would significantly reduce the time that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would have to detect Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear bomb, which could provide Iran with a window to strike before the development of the capability is widely known.

The Trump administration has expressed that it will reinstate “maximum pressure” on Iran, specifically threatening Iranian oil exports. Trump has also expressed a willingness to engage in negotiations, but his primary objective is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Renewed sanctions will almost certainly exacerbate Iran’s already fragile economy, which is characterised by deep-rooted structural issues including mismanagement, corruption, nepotism, limited diversification, inflation, and high unemployment. Iran may be seeking to develop nuclear weapons for strategic leverage, viewing them as a means to enhance its deterrence and strengthen its position in any future negotiations. However, such a strategy may backfire if it provokes an aggressive response from an unpredictable White House, leading to further economic degradation. Such a scenario would likely intensify the pressure on the Iranian regime, potentially triggering greater anti-regime social unrest within the country. Alternatively or additionally, the ‘moderate’ president Masoud Pezeshkian was elected on a mandate to tackle the economic crisis by reducing sanctions. If Pezeshkian fails to do this, there is a realistic possibility of a radical backlash against his more moderate foreign policy posture, empowering the more hawkish anti-West military and theocratic establishment.

Far-right activists protest in London

At least six people were arrested on 1 February, during large-scale protests in central London by supporters of far-right figure Tommy Robinson. Robinson is currently serving an 18-month jail sentence for breaching a 2021 High Court injunction. Isolated clashes were reported as protesters entered the designated area for counter-protesters. The protests follow broader signals of a growing popularity of the far-right in UK politics, with early February polls projecting Nigel Farage’s Reform Party as the most popular party in the UK, having overtaken both the Conservatives and the ruling Labour Party. Farage and Reform have disavowed Robinson and his supporters to win Conservative Party voters; however, both sides have adopted similar political discourses and have received common endorsements. Most notably, Elon Musk endorsed and has reposted Reform with some regularity since mid-2024, only to then call on Farage to step down as party leader following the latter’s disavowal of Robinson. In turn, Musk then demanded Robinson’s release.

Protests against Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) and Alternative for Germany (AfD)

An estimated 50,000 people gathered in Vienna after the FPO was formally tasked with trying to form a government with the conservative People’s Party (OVP). While the FPO and OVP have previously been government partners, the FPO’s victory at the past elections makes it almost certain that if a deal were to be reached the far-right party would occupy a senior position in the coalition. The possible FPO-OVP deal follows the collapse of previous OVP-led talks with other “cordon sanitaire” parties, and has been under negotiation since early January. The latest wave of protests has likely been influenced by developments over the border in Germany, where tens of thousands of protesters continue to oppose the rising Alternative for Germany (AfD). On 3 February, an estimated 160,000 people rallied in Berlin in protest of a migration reform advanced by the Christian Democrats (CSU/CDU) with the AfD’s votes. While the bill failed to pass, further protests are likely to occur before the elections scheduled for 23 February.

Kosovo to hold parliamentary elections on 9 February

Kosovo’s parliamentary elections on 9 February will see 27 political groups competing for 120 available seats, with 20 reserved for minority representatives, including Serbs, Bosniaks, Turkish and Roma communities. However, tensions remain high between the central government and the Serb-majority communities in northern Kosovo, after Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s attempts to dismantle Serb-run parallel institutions. A victory for Kurti and his Self-Determination Movement party is likely to increase tensions with both Kosovo’s Serb communities and with neighbouring Serbia, potentially leading to unrest in the north of the country.

Uganda’s president to continue to prosecute civilians in military tribunals despite court ruling

On 1 February, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni declared that the government would continue to prosecute civilians in military tribunals. The declaration comes after a court ruling banned the practice on 31 January, declaring it unconstitutional, and ordering ongoing cases to be continued in civil courts. Museveni claims to be reluctant to abandon military tribunals given their use in pacifying Uganda’s restive northeastern Karamoja region. Uganda’s military courts have tried hundreds of civilians including opposition politicians and government critics. Kizza Besigye, the opposition leader, is facing the death penalty after being abducted in Kenya in November 2024 and tried in a military tribunal in Kampala. Museveni’s reluctance to shift power over to civil courts is almost certainly to retain a hold on power and prevent formal opposition blocs from forming. There is a realistic possibility that Museveni’s refusal to adhere to the court ruling will be used as a catalyst for unrest targeting perceived government corruption.

Azerbaijani forces carry out anti-Islamic State (IS) operation in Qusar

The raid’s target is the same northeastern district where an IS cell was discovered “by accident” in the late summer of 2024. At least eight IS fighters were reportedly killed. The operation is part of growing efforts by Baku to disrupt the Islamic State Caucasus Province (ISCP) from establishing a foothold in the country. IS’ operations in Azerbaijan are likely part of IS’ broader drive to improve its position in the Caucasus, especially in Dagestan, which Qusar borders. Azerbaijani reports identified the fighters as “Forest Brothers”. This term indicates members of the Dagestan-based Derbent Jamaat group, and may highlight a growing interplay between pre-existent Islamist groups in the area and IS (although, it may be a political move by Baku to avoid recognising the existence of IS on its territory). It is highly likely that the operation in Qusar will be followed by further counterterrorism efforts in the north. Given the strain of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russian forces are increasingly vulnerable to threats from IS. There is a realistic possibility that Moscow will pursue joint counterterrorism operations with Baku to combat the transregional terror group.

The US conducts airstrikes conducted on Islamic State Somalia (ISS)

The airstrikes took place in the Puntland region of Somalia, where security forces have been battling a jihadist insurgency since 2015. Sanctioned by President Donald Trump, the strikes targeted cave systems used by ISS militants and reportedly killed multiple jihadists, including senior leadership. After the strike, Trump took to Truth Social, stating ‘The message to ISIS and all others who would attack Americans is that ‘WE WILL FIND YOU, AND WE WILL KILL YOU!’ Occurring shortly after Trump’s inauguration, this is almost certainly a statement of intent for the administration after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appealed to Trump to not pull advisors from Somalia. While Trump has generally opposed direct US military involvement in conflicts, he has typically relied on airstrikes as a tool for counterterrorism, increasing their number significantly during his first administration. He will almost certainly utilise similar tactics during this administration as he seeks to withdraw US personnel from Syria.

Somali Puntland forces strike IS positions

Counterterrorism forces of the Somali breakaway region of Puntland have launched an operation targeting strongholds of the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) in the al-Miskaad mountain range. Puntland sources reported the killing of at least 57 ISS members in the operation, which likely constitutes a major escalation in the conflict against ISS. Coinciding with the operation, US airstrikes and joint US-UAE aerial surveillance operations were reported, likely indicating Washington’s growing concern for Somalia as a staging ground for IS operations. ISS has long been considered a “small” branch of IS. However, ISS has disproportionately grown in importance as a key transit hub for IS operations in the Middle East and South Asia from Africa, under the leadership of Abdul Qadir Mumin, who also likely acts as a leader in IS’ global operational planning. Puntland sources reported that “all” those killed in the recent raids were foreigners. While possibly exaggerated, it is highly likely that ISS’s growth has benefitted from inbound flows of fighters from the Arabian Peninsula, particularly from Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Intense fighting continues in the eastern DRC despite a unilateral ceasefire

On 3 February, a unilateral ceasefire effective from 4 February was announced by the AFC/M23 militant group which seized the city of Goma in North Kivu in late January. The ceasefire has almost certainly failed to end the heavy fighting in the eastern DRC. The government has denounced the ceasefire as “false communication”, and AFC/M23 advances have almost certainly continued along the main road toward the South Kivu capital of Bukavu, despite the ceasefire’s claim that they had “no intention of taking control of Bukavu”. AFC/M23 forces are reportedly now just 50km north of Bukavu. Fighting on 5 February was reportedly intense around Nyabibwe, and the DRC assembly president Vital Kamerhe stated that AFC/M23 forces reached the town of Ihusi after taking Nyabibwe. It is almost certain that significant developments in the conflict, such as the fall of Bukavu, will trigger violent unrest targeting foreign interests in Kinshasa and other major population centres.

Al-Shabaab gunmen abduct five officials in northeast Kenya

On 3 February, five chiefs were kidnapped by al-Shabaab gunmen in Mandera County, near the border with Somalia. The officials were reportedly travelling from Wargadud to Elwak town as they were abducted. The attack was likely carried out by Jaysh Ayman, al-Shabaab’s Kenyan wing responsible for several significant attacks in Kenya in recent years. This is the latest in a series of attacks by the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab in northeastern regions of Kenya, which aims to destabilise the region and undermine local governance. The persistent threat is also partially in retaliation to Kenya’s military presence in Somalia as part of the African Union’s peacekeeping missions, the latest being the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which ended on 31 December 2024, replaced by African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Despite the persistent activity in Kenya’s border regions, Kenya is highly unlikely to withdraw from AUSSOM, with the mission recently being endorsed by Kenyan President William Ruso, which will likely inspire further al-Shabaab activity in Kenya.

Locals evacuated after a wave of earthquakes hits Greek island Santorini

A series of earthquakes have impacted the Greek Aegean region, particularly impacting the islands of Santorini and Amorgos. The seismic activity, which began with over 200 earthquakes in late January, has led to significant disruptions, including the evacuation of at least 11,000 people from Santorini. The recent earthquakes, some reaching magnitudes as high as 4.9, have prompted authorities to close schools and restrict access to certain areas due to the risk of landslides. The situation remains dynamic as officials work to manage the impact of the ongoing seismic activity. Emergency services continue to urge the public to stay alert and heed safety warnings as the region navigates through this challenging period.

Niger bans Red Cross from operating on its territory

Orders to cease activities were issued to the Red Cross and other NGOs providing humanitarian aid to the Sahel country on 4 February. Nigerien authorities did not provide a reason for the decision, but it is highly likely that it is a further move against what the government perceives as “foreign influence”. The expulsion of Red Cross staff is highly likely to have a negative impact on the civilian population. In Niger, the Red Cross has played a fundamental role in guiding responses following severe environmental events, such as the September 2024 floods in Agadez, Diffa, Tahoua and Tillabery, which affected up to one million people.

Since 4 February, record-breaking snowfall has occurred in northern Japan. The snow has severely impacted everyday life and resulted in major transport disruptions. Japan’s second-largest island, Hokkaido, has been hit hardest by what the authorities are describing as “the strongest cold wave of the season,” forcing the authorities to issue snowstorm warnings for parts of the island. However, the situation is not limited to Hokkaido. Parts of northern Honshu have also received extreme levels of snowfall. The town of Shirakawa in Gifu prefecture received 129cm (47 inches) of snowfall in less than 48 hours, with multiple other locations reporting similarly high levels.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Unstable atmospheric conditions in the area will likely cause significant snowfall in the coming days, leading to further disruptions. Major airports in Hokkaido, including Obihiro Airport and Kushiro Airport, have been forced to close their runways due to heavy snow accumulation, causing delays and cancellations. With more snowfall anticipated, additional airports in both Hokkaido and Honshu may be forced to suspend flights, further disrupting domestic and international travel. Furthermore, the knock-on effect of cancellations is affecting airport operations in parts of Japan less affected by snowfall. On 6 February, it was reported that All Nippon Airways was forced to cancel two per cent and delayed 22 per cent of flights out oof Tokyo International Airport (Haneda).

Other forms of transport have been severely disrupted and will likely remain so for the coming days. Thousands of snow ploughs have been deployed across the impacted areas but are unlikely to keep up with demand. As initial layers of snow freeze and become buried under fresh snowfall, hazardous travel conditions are likely to develop. Concealed ice on roads will increase the risk of road traffic accidents and delay bus and coach services. Rail travel will also likely be severely impacted, with ice accumulation on the tracks reducing traction, leading to delays and potential derailments. Ice accumulation on power lines coupled with strong winds may also cause lines to snap leading to power outages, which are likely to be exacerbated by an increased electricity demand for heating.   

On 31 January, insurgents of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed 18 unarmed soldiers belonging to the Frontier Corps paramilitaries after ambushing their vehicle near the town of Kalat, near the Afghanistan border. Approximately 70-80 BLA militants ambushed the soldiers when they were attempting to dismantle a roadblock which had reportedly been erected by the BLA. Pakistani security forces responded quickly to the incident, killing 23 BLA militants in a series of subsequent operations in the region that were described as some of the heaviest fighting in Balochistan in recent years. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s office in Islamabad condemned the violence and the Pakistani Army stated that “sanitisation operations” will continue until the perpetrators are brought to justice.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The number of militants involved in the attack suggests it was a planned assault, and the ambush of security forces attempting to remove roadblocks could be a developing tactic, technique, or procedure employed by the BLA, designed to maximise casualties of exposed and vulnerable targets. Acts of extreme violence, such as ambushes, are likely to become an increasingly common tactic for the BLA, given their effectiveness in generating compelling propaganda, attracting new recruits and undermining the perception of security in Balochistan. There is a realistic possibility that the BLA knew that the paramilitary soldiers were unarmed, which may indicate that the BLA has penetrated the Pakistani armed forces to some degree, enabling it to obtain vital intelligence. In response to the ambush, the Pakistani armed forces will almost certainly expand their operations against the BLA and other Baloch separatist groups.

However, with widespread social unrest, sectarian violence and militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and periodic clashes with the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani military is likely already overstretched. This may explain the deployment of lesser-trained and less experienced paramilitary forces to Balochistan. Moreover, an expansion of Pakistani military operations in the area will almost certainly inspire a wave of reprisal attacks in Balochistan, which may migrate into other parts of Pakistan. Pakistan’s prime minister is currently conducting a state visit to China and it is almost certain that issues like the revitalisation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project will be high on the agenda. China has pledged support to Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts and has conducted military drills within the country. If the security situation continues to deteriorate, Beijing will likely pressure Islamabad to approve the deployment of Chinese security forces to protect Chinese works and assets linked to the Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI).

Taliban deputy foreign minister flees Afghanistan after speech in favour of women’s education

Mohammed Abbas Stanikzai reportedly relocated to the UAE for “health” reasons. However, his departure followed an order by Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada to arrest him. The deputy foreign minister had recently given a speech in which he decried the Taliban government’s ban on women’s education, and reportedly privately criticised Akhundzada. The episode represents a rare but likely notable public spat between Taliban officials. It is highly likely that Akhundzada, whose hold on power faces significant domestic and foreign threats, will continue to respond harshly to perceived internal political threats. International pressure on the Taliban is likely to increase in the short and medium term. Notably, the interruption of USAID projects in the country, which amounted to more than USD 740 million in 2024 (and USD 3.7 billion since 2022) is highly likely to have severe humanitarian impacts and may result in widespread discontent directed towards the Taliban regime.

Modi’s Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) on track to win assembly elections in Delhi, India

The elections were held on 5 February, and the final results are scheduled to be released on 8 February. Early results show the BJP comfortably ahead of the incumbent Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). If these were to be certified, it would be the first BJP victory in the capital in 27 years. Moreover, they would represent a significant reversal of the 2020 results, where AAP won 62 seats out of 70. For Modi, the victory likely represents an important political result, as it gives the BJP further momentum following last year’s general elections which were won by the Hindu nationalist party but not as decisively as its leaders would have hoped. The AAP is a reformist and anti-establishment party, that came to power in Delhi in 2015 on a wave of anti-corruption sentiment.

Bangladeshi protesters attack Awami League assets

Civil unrest was recorded in Dhaka and other cities on 5-6 February, following ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s calls to her supporters, the Awami League (AL) party, to oppose the interim government. Protesters torched Hasina’s father’s former house in Dhaka and continued to attack suspected AL supporters. AL recently called for a two-week-long period of protests against the interim government, the first major protest appeal since the party was removed from power in August 2024. The vandalism by anti-Hasina activists was almost certainly a case of “bulldozer justice” (the protest had been called a “bulldozer procession” by some local activists), a form of mob violence that especially targets opponents’ physical assets, and often poses a threat to uninvolved bystanders.

Islamic State (IS) supporters start prison riot in Tajikistan

At least five inmates were killed and three guards injured in a riot on 3 February at the prison of Vahdat, Tajikistan. The riot was reportedly launched by a group of IS-affiliated inmates. The case continues to highlight how Tajikistan is a growing recruitment ground for IS. Not only is Tajikistan located close to some of the countries where IS already operates (Afghanistan), has carried out attacks (Russia), or aims to expand (China), but the highly repressive government, which has significantly curtailed freedom of worship, has likely been a key driver for radicalisation. Multiple notable recent attacks, including the Crocus Hall attack, were perpetrated by Tajik IS militants.

Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) commander assassinated in Kabul, Afghanistan

A stabbing attack occurred in Kabul on 2 February, which resulted in the death of “Kohi”, nom de guerre of the commander of the BLA’s Majeed Brigade. Sometimes described as a “suicide” brigade, the Majeed unit is responsible for carrying out suicide attacks in Pakistan and is assessed as one of the more elite units within the BLA. The attack was likely a targeted killing of an important BLA unit linked to significant militant activity in Pakistan. Whilst no group has claimed responsibility for the killing, the BLA will likely assess that Pakistan was in some way behind the killing, which is likely to provoke BLA reprisal attacks in Pakistan.

Further IED attack on Thai security forces

On the morning of 7 February, four Thai police officers were injured when an improved explosive device (IED) detonated near a police booth in the Nong Chik district in the restless Patani province. There are currently no indications as to who planted the IED and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers were examining the area. However, there have been a series of often underreported IED attacks on the Thai police in the far south of the country, with Islamist separatist groups like the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) most commonly suspected. The frequency of the attacks may indicate a gradual resurgence of the South Thailand insurgency, likely fueled by internal divisions within the insurgency and systemic failures of peace efforts.

Widespread disruption after cold front brings heavy snow across South Korea

A cold front in South Korea has caused widespread disruption and is expected to last until at least 9 February, with icy temperatures recorded nationwide. Heavy snowfall has resulted in major transport disruptions, flight cancellations and multiple road accidents, including a 30-car pileup on the Sunchon-Wanju Expressway. The Korea Meteorological Administration has warned of continued snowfall in mountainous and inland regions, predicting up to 8 centimetres of additional snow in these areas and temperatures falling to as low as minus 17 degrees Celsius.

Flooding causes widespread disruptions in Queensland, Australia

Northern Queensland, Australia, is experiencing severe flooding due to a low-pressure system that has brought heavy torrential rains. Emergency warnings have been issued for fast-moving floods in Georgetown, with dangerous conditions prompting urgent advisories. At least two fatalities have been reported due to flood-related incidents since the onset of the severe weather. Authorities have also issued flood advice for the Burdekin region and urged residents in Hinchinbrook to conserve water as the flooding has disrupted power and water supplies. In Townsville, residents who had previously evacuated from areas such as Rosslea, Hermit, and Railway Estate have been allowed to return home. However, the region continues to face challenges, with water supply disruptions in Charters Tower and widespread internet and phone outages in Far North Queensland. A highway bridge between Ingham and Townsville collapsed, severing a critical access point for some towns.

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The new Trump administration’s crackdown on migration and other controversial policies is almost certain to result in protests across the United States.

In Colombia, Venezuela’s alleged support of the ELN offensive is likely to sustain the guerilla group’s operations and lead to a deterioration in the security environment.

Alternative For Germany (AfD) support for Christian Democratic Union (CDU) proposals in the Bundestag is almost certain to trigger unrest in Germany in the run-up to elections.

The resignation of the Serbian PM and mayor of Novi Sad are unlikely to curb current demonstrations, with protestors driven by broader concerns over corruption and government accountability.

Russia’s current main effort in Ukraine is almost certainly Pokrovsk, the capture of which will set the conditions for advances north and west and provide Moscow with more bargaining power.

A thwarted terror attack in Morocco likely indicates the growing ability of Islamic State affiliates to project influence across the continent.

Further unrest in Democratic Republic of the Congo capital Kinshasa in highly likely as M23 militia capture Goma and attempt to expand into South Kivu.

The discovery of large quantities of explosives near Sydney, Australia is almost certainly linked to growing cases of extremism, self-radicalisation, and antisemitic hate in the country.

Pakistan’s new amendment to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) bill will almost certainly be exploited to curb dissent and suppress the opposition.

President Donald Trump has vowed to take an extremely restrictive line on migration. On day one of his presidency, Trump signed multiple executive orders targeting the US-Mexico border, including declaring a “national emergency” and ceasing some of the previous administration’s policies meant to allow migrants opportunities to more easily claim asylum in the US.

Trump also signed orders expanding the powers of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain undocumented migrants. On 29 January, Trump achieved the first legislative victory of his administration, with the approval of a law that allows ICE agents to detain migrants charged with an offence regardless of their immigration status.

In response to the administration’s policies, multiple protests have already occurred in large US urban areas, especially in southern states. Protests are likewise scheduled to occur on 1 and 2 February in multiple locations in Texas, including Arlington, Dallas and Houston, as well as in others states including Arizona, Oklahoma, California, Kansas, and New York.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests scheduled for the weekend of 1-2 February are likely to represent the first major wave of unrest in the US since the inauguration. These protests are likely to be peaceful overall, although there is a realistic possibility of gatherings resulting in episodes of violence and vandalism, especially if co-opted by other protest movements such as the pro-Palestine movement.

The high visibility of Trump and some of his political allies, as well as some of the controversial policies enacted by the administration, are highly likely to be major drivers of unrest in the medium-to-long term.

In the United States, threats of “mass deportations” are likely to be met with considerable activism, including possible protests targeting transportation hubs such as airports. Other contentious policies not directly aimed at the southern border are likewise highly likely to draw unrest.

For instance, Trump signed an executive order on 29 January pledging to combat antisemitism, including by deporting foreign nationals deemed to have endorsed proscribed terrorist organisations. Pro-Palestinian groups in the United States have stated that the order is an attempt to silence their criticism of Israel’s policies in Gaza and the West Bank. If this order is implemented, there is a realistic possibility of it resulting in increased civil unrest, especially at large and politically active university campuses.

Diplomatic tensions between Bogota and Caracas have deteriorated in response to Colombian accusations that the Maduro regime sponsored the recent National Liberation Army (ELN) in northeast Colombia.

The ELN launched an offensive in mid-January in the Catatumbo region against rival guerilla factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and organised crime groups to secure control of lucrative narcotic production and smuggling routes. The offensive has involved attacks of rival factions and civilians, has killed an assessed 100 people, displaced around 50,000 and has overwhelmed local morgues and healthcare facilities.

The Colombian government has suggested that Maduro, who was recently re-inaugurated for his third term, either green-lit the operation or played an active role in planning it to establish indirect control of the cocaine-producing region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ELN has operated within Venezuela for decades, originally in exchange for cocaine profits. However, the recent accusations imply that the Maduro regime is now using the ELN as a proxy force to establish control of the region.

Venezuela has also deployed around 2,000 troops to the border, ostensibly to aid displaced Colombians but critics have suggested the troops are supporting the ELN and securing drug trafficking routes. If true, Venezuelan support could help sustain ELN operations with funds and arms, increasing the likelihood of a protracted conflict.

President Petro has already declared a state of emergency for the Catatumbo region and multiple other municipalities, and has deployed government forces to combat the ELN- moves that have almost certainly jeopardised his previous plans for “total peace” through dialogue and negotiations.

The Petro administration has also offered a USD 700,000 reward for information on ELN leaders, signalling a shift towards a more aggressive security policy. However, given the ELN’s entrenched presence in the jungle and potential Venezuelan backing, military efforts are unlikely to dismantle the group’s operations. Conversely, the government’s strategy could trigger a wave of reprisal attacks across Colombia.

The government is engaged with the ELN in other parts of the country and there have been a series of improvised explosive device (IED) detonations throughout Colombia. Although attributing these attacks directly to the ELN is challenging, many have taken place in areas where the group has a well-established presence. If a ceasefire remains elusive, Colombia is likely to achieve its worst year for violence since the 2016 ceasefire agreement, with January 2025 already being marked as the worst month for violence since Petro assumed office.

Escalating violence is likely to result in the displacement of thousands more people, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, a rise in assaults on aid workers and healthcare professionals, a worsening humanitarian crisis, and the overstretching of local services. The ELN and other armed groups may also increase the kidnapping of foreign workers and tourists to raise funds, a tactic employed extensively in the past.

US pauses foreign aid programs for 90 days

The US State Department issued a “stop-work” order for all existing foreign assistance programs and paused new aid, following directives of one of President Donald Trump’s day-one executive orders. Waivers were issued for military financing to Israel and Egypt.

The pausing of aid is likely part of the new White House’s foreign policy that is characterised by transactional diplomacy, with the withdrawal of aid, or the imposition of sanctions, used to renegotiate international partnerships or to coerce compliance.

The aid freeze will likely have short-term implications in countries that rely on US shipments of medicine, food, or other humanitarian aid. This may allow China and other international competitors to bolster their relations with key partners in strategic regions.

Protests break out in Culiacan, Mexico, after children killed in attempted carjacking

Large-scale civil unrest erupted in the capital of Sinaloa state on 23 January and has continued, following the killing of two children and their father during an attempted carjacking. The recent incident has likely become a catalyst for local resentment against increasing cartel crime, and for authorities’ lack of success in fighting it.

Protesters in Sinaloa have particularly targeted Governor Rocha Moya, who has pledged not to resign. Increasing cartel violence, which is especially severe in states like Sinaloa, continues to be a major issue for the Mexican government.

With the US increasing diplomatic pressure, including via threats of coercive military and economic measures, on Mexico to deal with the cartels, there is a realistic possibility of President Claudia Sheinbaum choosing to move towards a harsher policing approach than her predecessor Lopez Obrador’s “hugs not bullets” policy.

Wave of copycat threats at US schools following Antioch Shooting

The shooting occurred on 22 January and resulted in one death. The perpetrator had published material online prior to the shooting praising various mass killers and espousing far right and white supremacist ideology and attempted to livestream the attack.

According to local media, at least eight other students, some as young as 12, have been arrested since the 22 January shooting for threatening to carry out copycat attacks. The shooting likely represents a notable incident as it highlights perpetrators’ symbiotic relationship with social media as well as the use of paradoxical and self-contradictory violent ideology; the attacker, a black student, repeatedly used white supremacist and Neo-Nazi imagery.

Kenyan police launches operation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Clashes between the international UN-mandated police force and gang members broke out on 27 January in the peripheral area of Kenscoff, located outside of Port-au-Prince at the foothills of the Chaine de la Selle mountain range. The operation was reportedly launched in response to an offensive from gangs originally from Carrefour, a town approximately 10 kilometres south of Port-au-Prince.

Local media reported that at least 20 gang members were killed. The attack in Kenscoff is notable as the area occupies a strategic position controlling the southern approach to Port-au-Prince, and as a link between the West and Southeast departments. Moreover, local media reported that the route via Kenscoff has become more important as it is an alternative to the gang-controlled National Road 2.

Two separate wildfires broke out near La Jolla, northwest of San Diego, on 23-24 January. The fires were fuelled by strong winds. While the La Jolla fires were contained relatively quickly, other blazes erupted in the following days, with one (the “Border 2” fire), adjacent to the US-Mexico border, burning more than 500 acres.

The White House and the state government of California continued to clash over responsibility for the fires’ severe damage. President Trump signed an executive order on 24 January to direct federal agencies to “override” California water management rules in order to combat wildfires. Critics of the executive order, including environmentalist groups, have accused the administration of trying to secure greater control over water resources in north California to benefit the agricultural industry in the area.

Winter storm causes widespread disruption in Hawaii, US

The winter storm that began impacting Hawaii on 29 January has caused significant disruptions across the state. The National Weather Service (NWS) has issued flash flood warnings for several islands, including Maui, Molokai, and Oahu, affecting over one million residents. The flash flood warning for Maui has been extended until 00:30 local time.

Severe thunderstorms and strong winds have resulted in widespread power outages, with over 54,000 Hawaiian Electric customers without power on Oahu, Hawaii Island, and in Maui County. Restoration efforts are ongoing, but Hawaiian Electric has urged customers to prepare for the possibility of extended outages.

In response to the severe weather conditions, several schools in Maui County will be closed on Friday ahead of the predicted peak of the storm. Meanwhile, on Kauai Island, the Kauai Island Utility Cooperative has reported that customers in Wainiha and Haena will remain without power until at least Friday morning due to limited access to transmission towers caused by the weather.

Residents are advised to remain vigilant and adhere to safety advisories as the storm continues to impact the region.

The German parliament is set to vote on 31 January on a new and highly contentious immigration law known as the “influx limitation law”. The law has been advanced by the centre-right and conservative Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) bloc.

The law could pass through the Bundestag if supported by the controversial far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. The bill follows a recent controversial motion that passed recently which was advanced by the CDU/CSU bloc and passed with the support of the AfD. This motion was non-binding and proposed establishing permanent border controls and immediately detaining individuals who are required to leave Germany.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The passing of the CDU/CSU motion with AfD support marks a major shift in the political landscape in Germany. It marked the first time that a motion in Germany’s Bundestag was passed with the backing of the AfD. This represents a break from the longstanding strategy of establishing a “firewall” against AfD collaboration and has resulted in significant criticism of current CDU leader Friedrich Merz, especially from the left-wing Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens.

Should the CDU/CSU law pass with AfD support, it will almost certainly provoke fears that the AfD is gradually being normalised within German politics, a trend that will almost certainly trigger large-scale demonstrations across Germany before the country’s general elections on 23 February.

The CDU strategy has likely been to move further right to counter the AfD, with current polls indicating that the far-right party is set to achieve a record 20-21 per cent of the national vote. However, this strategy has potentially backfired, as it has alienated many Germans, including within the CDU’s traditional base, already leading to protests across Germany.

The CDU’s drift to the right and greater participation of the AfD, is also likely to increase the threat of political violence and terrorism. The far-right are likely to feel emboldened by these trends and may interpret it as a legitimisation of their views. Furthermore, the increased measures and rhetoric aimed at migrants are likely to increase the risk of terrorism in Germany, with a series of recent attacks linked to the cancellation of asylum statuses or threats of deportation.

On 28 January, Serbian Prime Minister Milos Vucevic resigned after months of student and civic protests that have gradually increased in size after originally being triggered by the November 2024 collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, which killed 15 people. Alongside Vucevic, the Mayor of Novi Sad, Milan Djuric, also resigned, citing the desire to prevent further unrest and division within society.

At the protest’s height, an estimated 55,000 protestors amassed in the capital Belgrade, with students establishing a blockade on the Autokomanda junction, a major intersection that links several key roads and motorways in the capital.

Human rights groups have warned of the government’s use of repression, indiscriminate force and mass arrests in response to the protests.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests, initially sparked by the Novi Sad incident, almost certainly expanded into a broader movement condemning widespread corruption in Serbia. This movement gained support from students, universities, civil society groups, and various other segments of the population. Some estimates suggest that over 60 per cent of Serbians have endorsed the protests, which has likely increased in reaction to the government’s use of force.

The resignations of the prime minister and the mayor of Novi Sad were likely designed to curb the protest movement and were probably ordered by President Aleksandar Vucic; however, it is unlikely that the protests will subside in the near future. President Vucic has maintained an iron grip on power since assuming office in 2017 and has been accused of decreasing civil liberties and freedom of the press, and of fostering an illiberal regime.

The grassroots protest movement likely holds him partially accountable and views the current resignations as insufficient, with many demanding a complete change of government. President Vucic could call early elections to arrest the development of further protests. However, these will likely be boycotted by the opposition, a move that would undermine the legitimacy of his government.

In the short term, President Vucic will likely appoint a new prime minister, a move that is unlikely to quell the protests or address the broader dissatisfaction with his leadership.

Russian ground forces in Donetsk Oblast are setting the conditions for an encirclement and the ultimate capture of the strategic city of Pokrovsk. Russian strategy has shifted away from costly frontal assaults to a gradual encirclement of Pokrovsk from the west, after bypassing Ukrainian defences.

On 30 January alone, Ukrainian forces claim to have repelled over 70 attacks in the Pokrovsk direction, with Ukrainian commanders complaining about insufficient manpower to defend the front lines, despite conducting a series of counterattacks.

Russian forces have also initiated smaller-scale attacks across multiple frontline sectors, including near Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar and in Zaporizhia Oblast.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Current battlefield observations suggest that Russia’s current main effort is to seize Pokrovsk prior to any proposed negotiations. Pokrovsk is a major logistics node, the capture of which would almost certainly set the conditions for future Russian advances north towards Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, two of Ukraine’s major strongholds remaining in the Donbas.

Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are major industrial cities that both hold military and logistical significance. Both cities serve as critical logistics centres for Ukrainian forces defending the Donbas, both cities form part of Ukraine’s defensive lines, and Kramatorsk currently serves as the administrative centre of the Donetsk Oblast.

The fall of these cities would be a major blow to Ukrainian morale, would hugely disrupt Ukrainian defensive operations and would enable Russia to consolidate control over the Donbas.  The capture of Pokrovsk would also enable future Russian advances west into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where Ukraine has rushed to improve its defences.

Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is not one of the oblasts currently claimed by Russia. However, future Russian advances on this axis could ultimately help lead to Russia advancing towards the River Dnieper, a natural defensive barrier. This could help sever Ukraine in two and is likely one of the initial strategic objectives of the Kremlin.

The collective threat to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk, combined with the lack of assurances from the Trump administration, is almost certain to intensify pressure on the Zelensky administration to pursue negotiations, particularly as Ukraine continues to face manpower shortages and dwindling Western military aid.

Any further Russian territorial gains would significantly strengthen Moscow’s bargaining position, allowing it to dictate terms in future negotiations and potentially press for broader territorial concessions from Kyiv. Ukraine will likely be forced to divert considerable resources to the defence of Pokrovsk. However, as already demonstrated, Russian forces are likely to increase pressure across the line of contact, launching intensified attacks on multiple sectors. This strategy is aimed at overstretching Ukrainian forces, exploiting their manpower shortages, and preventing them from effectively consolidating their defensive positions.

On 26 January, Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (BCIJ) announced the arrests of four individuals in Had Soualem, a town in the Casablanca-Settat region, who had reportedly been planning to carry out an attack in Casablanca. According to authorities, the four had pledged allegiance to IS and had carried out advanced preparations for a coordinated attack at multiple locations, including scouting possible sites and obtaining material that could be used to make explosives. Moreover, authorities claim that the group was planning to travel to the Sahel to receive further training.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Moroccan security has carried out multiple operations targeting Islamist extremist cells in the country in recent years. In August 2024, 50 suspected extremists were arrested in a joint operation across multiple cities.

The recent arrests are notable as the suspects seem to not have only been inspired by IS but have purportedly received online training from the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP)- a group they could have joined post the attack. The growing use of Morocco as a gateway to IS affiliates further south is likely further evidenced by the recent arrest of a US citizen, who had intended to travel to Morocco via France before heading south to join ISSP.

Morocco likely remains a desirable target for IS terrorists. The country has strong relations with neighbouring European states and is an important destination for Mediterranean tourism and business. Moreover, it has considerably improved its relations with Israel in recent years and has gradually liberalised, resulting in a considerable disenfranchised and conservative population receptive to radicalisation.

Finally, Morocco is strategically located on the northwest African coast with access to both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and acts as the key transit point in the western Mediterranean migration route to Spain and onwards to other parts of Europe. ISSP’s alleged involvement in the failed attack likely indicates a strategy of projecting IS’ influence outside of its current main area of operations in West Africa and the Sahel.

Transregional attacks are likely to increase IS propaganda campaigns, helping it attract recruits and funds in areas both under its influence and areas where it has little influence via online channels. IS’ long-term objective may also be to force countries like Morocco to focus counterterrorist operations internally, a strategy that could help it consolidate power and influence in the heavily destabilised Sahelian and West African states.

Following days of fighting after the Rwanda-backed M23 militia’s advance into Goma on 27 January, relative calm returned to the city on 29 January. Hundreds have been killed and over 400,000 displaced in North Kivu since the beginning of 2025, according to the United Nations (UN). The UN has evacuated its non-essential and civilian staff from Goma to Kampala, Uganda. M23 militants began advancing from the town of Minova, captured on 21 January, towards South Kivu on 29 January. On 30 January, violent clashes occurred in Kalangala in South Kivu.

On 28 and 29 January, violent protests broke out in Kinshasa. Protesters engaged in looting and targeted several embassies including those belonging to the United States, France, Belgium, Rwanda, Kenya, and Japan. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters, and unconfirmed reports indicate that live ammunition was used. In response to violent protests breaking out in Kinshasa, the Congolese government has banned protests from 29 January. The US Department of State has updated their Travel Advisory Level from three to four, issuing a “do not travel” warning. Similarly, Belgium’s government has advised its citizens against travelling to the DRC.

While the border with Rwanda is officially open, unannounced border closures are likely. The Australian government has warned citizens of possible cross-border fire and advised against travel to the Rubavu district of Rwanda close to the border. Rwanda has claimed that at least nine citizens were killed in the cross-border fire.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that M23 are attempting to push on to Kavumu, where Bukavu’s airport is located, in the coming days. More broadly, they are almost certainly aiming to capture Bukavu itself, South Kivu’s provincial capital. The quick advance is almost certainly aiming to take advantage of the current weakness of Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), who have so far failed to prevent M23 advances in previous months.

On 30 January, M23 rebel leaders livestreamed a press statement stating that the group plans to remain in Goma and expand its offensive. South Kivu’s governor, Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki, has banned all forms of navigation on Lake Kivu on 29 January. This is almost certainly an attempt to protect Bukavu’s northeastern flank from an amphibious M23 approach.

The M23’s capture of Goma and further expansion threatens major regional escalation. Burundian forces have reportedly been sent to South Kivu to help the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) defend Bukavu. Burundi and Rwanda generally have hostile relations, with each government accusing each other of supporting their respective opponents. There is a high risk of Rwanda-backed M23 clashing with Burundian troops, which would almost certainly increase tensions and raise the risk of regional conflict.

Rwanda’s foreign minister has stated that the country backs a possible ceasefire agreement between M23 and the DRC government, while reaffirming that Rwandan forces were not directly involved in the capture of Goma. UN peacekeeping chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix has asserted that there is “no question” of Rwandan troops assisting M23 in Goma. President Paul Kagame has denied allegations of supporting the Tutsi-led M23 but has consistently accused the DRC of collaborating with Hutu rebels, which he views as a threat to Rwanda.

Although Rwanda denies direct involvement, it is widely believed to provide military support to the group in an attempt to create a buffer zone and extract precious minerals from the DRC. The M23 militia’s continued territorial expansion, therefore, raises significant concerns over the escalation of tensions into a regional conflict, whereby the DRC perceives Rwanda as an aggressor violating its territorial integrity.

French government again at risk of collapse

The government of François Bayrou was appointed in December 2024 after the previous Prime Minister Michel Barnier was ousted following attempts to pass a controversial budget. While Barnier tried to obtain the support of France’s right, Bayrou has courted the Socialist Party (PS). To do so, Bayrou has stated that he is open to renegotiating some particularly inflammatory parts of the budget, such as President Macron’s unpopular pension reform.

On 28 January, PS threatened to withdraw support from Bayrou and possibly support a no-confidence motion following some comments by the PM against migration. While the PS’ threats almost certainly reflect a reaction to the possible political impact of Bayrou’s comments, socialist leaders are also likely seeking to intensify pressure on the government in order to obtain more concessions. The PS’ political strategy highly likely aims to solidly establish the party as a force against Macron’s “austerity” policies, while simultaneously preventing a further haemorrhage of votes towards the more radical and populist La France Insoumise (LFI).

US billionaire Elon Musk speaks at Alternative for Germany (AfD) event

Musk has repeatedly endorsed the AfD, which is on track to obtain its best-ever electoral result at the 23 February elections according to current polls. Connecting remotely to the event hosted in Halle on 25 January, Musk further endorsed the party’s platform and claimed that it is “the best hope” for the country. In response, mass counterprotests were organised in Berlin and Cologne, with 100,000 and 20,000 attending respectively. Musk’s direct engagement in European politics in support of far-right parties may increase risks for US businesses and assets, including diplomatic missions, in Europe. Musk’s Tesla “Megafactory” near Berlin has notably been repeatedly targeted by activists, with a case of sabotage in March 2024 resulting in at least EUR 1 billion in damages.

More than 100,000 protests Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia

At least 60,000 people gathered in Bratislava on 24 January to protest against the Prime Minister’s perceived friendliness to Moscow. Last week, Fico had stated that the planned protests were part of an attempt by foreign forces and domestic fifth columns to stage a coup. In December, the Prime Minister travelled to Moscow to meet Putin, and more recently members of his party advanced the idea of leaving the EU. It is highly likely that the opposition will again attempt to push forward a no-confidence vote, as the pressure from civil society on the government continues to increase.

Lukashenko claims victory in Belarus elections

The authoritarian leader of the East European country claimed to have won a decisive victory, with more than 80 per cent of the vote, granting him a seventh term in office and prolonging his three decades of rule. The election result was not unexpected as Lukashenko’s regime has imprisoned or forced into exile virtually all opposition leaders. A notable development followed the elections as the Hungarian government blocked an EU joint statement condemning the vote as not “free and fair”. The symbolic move was almost certainly linked to the government of Hungary’s broader campaign to change the EU’s foreign policy towards Ukraine, or at least to obstruct support for Ukraine.

Italy arrests, then releases, Libyan police head under arrest warrant by the Hague

Osama Elmasry Njeem, the head of the Libyan judicial police who is accused by the International Criminal Court of multiple crimes including war crimes and crimes against humanity, was arrested earlier in January in Turin. On 21 January, Njeem was freed and repatriated on an Italian government plane. Italian authorities claimed that Njeem had been released due to a “procedural” error.

The episode was widely condemned by the opposition and civil society actors, who have accused Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of securing Njeem’s release and repatriation in order to maintain good relations with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), a key player in Meloni’s plans to control migrant flows in the Mediterranean.

On 28 January, Italian prosecutors stated they are investigating Meloni, alongside two government ministers, over the episode. There is a realistic possibility of protests in Rome, Turin, and possibly Milan and Bologna, during the weekend.

Protests at key oil ports in Libya

Protesters occupied the ports of Es Sider and Ras Lanuf, which represent key hubs for the export of oil from the Oil Crescent region of the country. The protesters demanded the relocation of oil companies’ headquarters to the area, citing the lack of economic development in the oil-producing region. The protests are relevant as they occur at a time when Libya’s National Oil Corporation is seeking to increase its output in line with other OPEC members.  

Sahel juntas formally leave ECOWAS

The government of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali announced their formal exit from the regional bloc on 29 January. The announcement comes after a year of ECOWAS’ attempts to convince the three states to remain within the bloc.

The three junta states will now highly likely seek to pursue further integration within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the alternative bloc they have formed in opposition to ECOWAS. The development is likely to accelerate the disintegration of ties between the landlocked junta states and the coastal members of ECOWAS. It may further worsen regional instability, as the three juntas, despite Russian help, remain unable to contain growing Islamist insurgencies in their territories.

Sporadic protests in Mozambique but widespread unrest diminishes

Sporadic protests have broken out along the N4 Maputo-South Africa motorway following Trans-Africa Concession’s (TRAC) attempt to resume toll collection. The most recent blockade by protesters occurred on 29 January, whereby protesters blocked the road shortly after 07:00 local time (05:00 UTC) and continued until approximately 17:30 local time (15:30 UTC), when protesters voluntarily demobilised.

President Daniel swore in a new General Commander of the Mozambican Police (PRM), Joaquim Sive on 27 January. The appointment comes after Chapo dismissed Bernadino Rafael on 23 January. Chapo announced that Sive’s task is to “regain the people’s trust in the police”. Following likely top-down orders to refrain from the use of force, there is a realistic possibility that security forces will attempt to refrain from using tear gas and live ammunition in further cases of unrest.

Activist facing trial for Quran burning in Sweden killed

Salwan Momika had become a popular figure on social media as one of the most prominent faces of the 2023 Swedish Quran burning. He was scheduled to be sentenced alongside another man on 30 January for inciting violence. Momika was reportedly shot and killed on the night of 29 January in the town of Sodertalje, near Stockholm, while he was streaming on TikTok. Five people were arrested in connection with the shooting.

The global high visibility of the victim (Momika had more than 200,000 followers on X.com and videos featuring him have millions of views), plus the highly likely religious motive for the shooting, make the possibility of copycat violence highly likely. For the same reason, there is also a threat of “retaliatory” actions against Muslim communities in Sweden and other Western states.

Turkish forces arrest 100 in anti-Islamic State (IS) raid

The arrests, which occurred last week, were announced by Turkish officials on 29 January. More than 24 provinces were targeted in the operation, including Ankara and Istanbul. Overall, more than 900 suspected IS supporters were arrested in 2024.

Turkey remains a hotspot for IS recruitment and activity, due to its close proximity to the main areas of operations of IS in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its closeness to Europe and Russia, two key targets for IS operations. Turkey is moreover a high-value target due to its counterterrorism efforts in the region. There is a realistic possibility of IS reprisal attacks in response to the raids.

Syrian government intercepts arms shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah

On 25 January, Syrian border forces intercepted a shipment of arms intended for Hezbollah in Serghaya, Rif Dimashq. The interception followed the previous interdiction of a shipment of drones to Hezbollah which was stopped at the port of Tartus. It is highly likely that the shipments had been organised by Iranian-backed elements as part of Tehran’s efforts to rearm Hezbollah following the latest conflict with Israel. The new Syrian government has significantly boosted its diplomatic engagements with international partners and is likely interested in removing Western and Israeli concerns about Hezbollah’s efforts to replenish its arsenals.

The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) launches offensive against Boko Haram in Nigeria

On 27 January, pro-IS channels reported that ISWAP had attacked Boko Haram (JAS) fighters near the small village of Kachalla Kelluri, situated in Borno state at the border with Niger. IS sources claimed that at least 50 Boko Haram fighters were killed in the offensive.

In 2021, ISWAP forces killed Boko Haram leader Abubakar Sheaku in an offensive in Sambisa Forest, Borno State. Since then, the group has made considerable inroads in taking over territory previously occupied by Boko Haram, especially in the Lake Chad basin. Since 2023, Boko Haram has managed to recover some of its losses and has engaged in clashes with ISWAP. In April 2024, more than 100 dead were reported following clashes in the so-called “Tumbums” islands of Lake Chad.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) intensify attack on al-Fashir, Sudan

At least 70 people were killed after RSF forces attacked the last functioning hospital in al-Fashir. The city is the last stronghold of the government in Darfur and has been under an RSF siege since May 2024. With the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continuing to make considerable gains in the country’s east following the beginning of their offensive in Khartoum, it is highly likely that RSF officials are aiming to clear al-Fashir and redirect forces towards the capital. Taking al-Fashir would also represent a significant political victory that is highly likely considered valuable by the RSF after the recent setbacks near Khartoum.

INTERPOL and AFRIPOL arrest 37 in anti-Islamist operation in East Africa

On 27 January, it was reported that coordinated November-December counter-terrorism operations across Africa led to the apprehension of 37 suspected terrorists and the seizure of illicit material, including both small and heavy arms. Arrests were made in eight countries, including Somalia, the DRC, Tanzania, and Kenya- where 17 individuals were detained.

The detentions include suspected Islamic State (IS) and al-Shabaab members, as well as other local terrorist groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The operations likely allude to greater international cooperation in Africa and the increased use of modern surveillance, particularly at ports of entry. However, the wave of arrests likely indicates the growing significance of Africa for transregional violent extremist organisations (VEOs) such as the Islamic State. IS has developed a network of affiliates across Africa, overseen by its General Directorate of Provinces, which is seeking to exploit porous borders, and overstretched governments to increase its influence.

Storm Eowyn damages energy infrastructure, causes prolonged outages in UK

At least 3,000 properties continued to suffer outages days after the storm made landfall, and more than 45,000 people were affected by outages in Northern Ireland throughout the period between 24 and 28 January. In total, power outages caused by the storm are estimated to have affected more than one million people. At least two deaths have been recorded, and more than five people were injured. The Met Office described the weather event as the “strongest storm in ten years”. Forecasts indicate that, despite Storm Eowyn’s dissipation on 27 January, strong winds are likely to continue throughout the 31 January – 2 February weekend.

UNRWA ban comes into effect in Israel and the West Bank

The Israeli government had passed a law banning the activities of the United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA), but the legislation only came into effect on 30 January, after a legal challenge to pause it was struck down by Israel’s Supreme Court. The Israeli government has accused UNRWA operators of collaborating with Hamas. UNRWA plays a fundamental role in the West Bank and Gaza, where it operates dozens of clinics. As of the time of writing, the United Nations has said that UNRWA clinics remain operational.

On 29 January, President Asif Ali Zadari gave his assent to a controversial amendment to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), a day after the amendment’s passage in the Senate. The bill had earlier been passed by the National Assembly on 23 January, causing condemnation from international human rights organisations and the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ).

The new legislation criminalises ‘fake news’, expands regulatory control over content and expands the powers of the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority through the establishment of a new Social Media Regulation and Protection Authority. According to the law, spreading “false and fake information” will now be punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The new laws are highly likely intended to be used by authorities to suppress dissent and target opposition supporters who use social media platforms to criticise the government. PECA was initially passed in 2016, and initial fears from activists and human rights organisations that the bill would be used to quash dissent have materialised in recent years during periods of unrest.

The major opposition party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) have led a large-scale anti-government protest movement since the 2022 ousting of the Imran Khan government, which dramatically escalated in 2023 following Khan’s arrest and subsequent imprisonment.

The PFUJ, Pakistan’s largest trade union for journalists, has announced plans for nationwide protests set to culminate in a ‘grand sit in’ in front of Parliament House in Islamabad on 14 February. Parliament House’s location in Islamabad’s ‘Red Zone’, gives authorities extensive powers to prohibit protests and public gatherings in the area – it is highly likely that any significant protests will be met by violent crowd dispersal methods from security forces and result in violent clashes.

An investigation has been launched by authorities following the 19 January discovery of a “caravan” containing enough explosive material to create a bomb with a blast radius of more than 40 metres, in the Sydney suburb of Dural. Alongside the explosives, police found a list of targets linked with the local Jewish community. Two people have been detained in connection with the discovery. One of them had reportedly already been charged for other antisemitic attacks. More than 100 counter-terrorism police have been assigned to the investigation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The discovery follows a significant increase in antisemitic and Islamophobic attacks in Australia. In December, an arson attack occurred at the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne, causing extensive damage and injuring one worshipper. It is almost certain that the rise in sectarian violence targeting Jews and Muslims has been driven by the conflict in Gaza and matches similar trends identified in other Western countries.

Australian authorities have described the latest incident as an “escalation” of the terrorism threat in the country, as it is the first time that large quantities of explosives are found alongside attack plans. The explosive retrieved by authorities reportedly consists of a compound that is commonly used for mining. Access to it requires a licence and proper security clearance, indicating that the perpetrators either acquired it “legally” through their work or stole it from a facility related to the mining sector.

Stampede at Hindu festival in Uttar Pradesh, India, kills more than 30

The Maha Kumbh (“Festival of the Sacred Pitcher) is a Hindu pilgrimage whose location and date are decided via astronomical calculations and represents the largest single religious gathering in the world. In 2025, approximately 100 million people were expected to visit the festival location in Prayagraj over the course of 45 days starting on 13 January. A stampede on 29 January was reported after pilgrims tried to take a holy bath in the Triveni Sangam River, resulting in at least 30 deaths and more than 200 injuries. The massive influx of pilgrims to areas that have insufficient infrastructure poses a severe risk of similar events. There is a realistic possibility that protests will follow the recent incident.

Bangladesh’s Awami League calls for mass protests against Yunus governmen

The party of ousted long-time Bangladeshi ruler Sheikh Hasina called for mass demonstrations to take place between 1 and 18 February against the interim government of Muhammad Yunus. The protests will include a day-long Hartal (general strike) on 18 February. The protests are the most ambitious anti-government effort by the Awami League (AL) since Hasina was forced to flee the country following large-scale demonstrations in August 2024. Since the change in government, there have been multiple cases of political violence targeting AL members and sympathisers. These attacks have been mostly led by extra-parliamentary groups, and the Yunus government has de fact distanced itself from them. There is a realistic possibility of a sharp increase in sectarian political violence during the scheduled protest period.

Myanmar National Unity Government (NUG) leader claim 2025 is “tipping point” in the war

The NUG oversees the anti-junta People’s Defence Force (PDF) coalition. Acting President Duwa Lashi La claimed, in an interview with Al Jazeera, that anti-junta forces are looking to achieve a “Syria-like” resolution to the conflict in 2025. The president also called for international involvement in the conflict and for the cutting of financial lines to the junta. The NUG is likely seeking to maintain a balanced position with regional powers, including Beijing, the junta’s key backer. With junta forces continuing to lose ground and facing significant defections, the NUG’s moderate public diplomacy approach will almost certainly continue in order to push regional powers to increasingly consider a post-junta Myanmar to be aligned with their key interests.

Philippines suspends survey in South China Sea following tensions with China

On 25 January, a scientific survey was suspended after perceived harassment from vessels belonging to China’s Coast Guard and Navy. As two Philippine fisheries vessels approached Sandy Cay to collect sand samples, Chinese vessels reportedly conducted “aggressive manoeuvres” in their vicinity.  In response to accusations by the Philippine Coast Guard, Beijing has claimed that Philippine vessels attempted to illegally land on the Tiexian Reef to collect sand samples. The cancellation comes after numerous instances of brinkmanship in the past weeks over contested waters in the South China Sea. Amid escalating tensions, Manila and Beijing met on 16 January and reportedly agreed to cooperate and resolve the territorial dispute.

Deadly floods and landslides in Malaysian Borneo.

At least five people have been killed and almost 8,000 evacuated from the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo as a result of heavy rainfall and flooding that has occurred since 28 January. The Malaysian Meteorological Department has issued a danger-level continuous rain warning for Sarawak and Sabah, effective until at least 31 January due to continued heavy rainfall. Major roads have been blocked due to floods and landslides, with further damage to infrastructure anticipated due to saturated ground. The rural interior regions of Sabah have been greatly affected, with the remoteness of these areas restricting access to resources, healthcare and other services.

Tropical Low 13U off the coast of Queensland, Australia.

Tropical Low 13U is currently impacting the northern coast of Queensland, Australia. The system has brought torrential rains, leading to widespread flooding in Townsville. Local media reports indicate that the heavy rainfall has caused substantial disruptions in the area. Disaster authorities have issued warnings for the region, predicting up to 19 inches of rain between Cairns and Townsville over the weekend. Residents are advised to stay informed and take necessary precautions as the situation develops.

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Almost immediately after his inauguration on 20 January, President Donald Trump signed an executive order which designated drug cartels FTOs. After months of rhetoric aimed primarily at Mexican cartels, the executive order targeted multiple cartels throughout the Western Hemisphere, such as the Venezuelan-based Tren de Aragua and the primarily El Salvadorean based Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).

The order declared these organisations a threat to American safety, national security, and the stability of the Western Hemisphere. The order will also tasked Cabinet secretaries with recommending additional criminal organisations for FTO designation within the next 14 days. The order could permit the seizure of cartel assets, sanctions against US citizens dealing with these groups, and the denial of entry to the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Many critics have questioned the efficacy of the executive order, suggesting that it will have few practical effects. Many of the tools and procedures granted under anti-terrorism laws are already in effect as part of broader counter-narcotics operations. Moreover, designating cartels as terrorist organisations does not provide legal authority for large-scale US military intervention in Mexico, something Trump has proposed on multiple occasions. This would require the approval from Congress and would violate Mexican sovereignty, unless the Mexican government consented to the deployment of US troops on its territory.

However, Trump has threatened to deploy US special forces to Mexico in raids against the cartels. This strategy would be possible under the president’s executive powers and would not require congressional approval.

However, the unilateral deployment of US special forces without Mexico’s consent would violate international norms, jeopardise diplomatic relations with Mexico and other Latin American nations, and would undermine trade with Mexico, the US’ largest trading partner. Furthermore, military operations against the well-armed and heavily funded cartels would be high-risk and likely lead to retaliatory attacks on US civilians, personnel and interests in both Mexico and the US. This is a scenario the incoming administration would likely seek to avoid.

The designation of cartels and organised crime groups as FTOs is more likely posturing from the new administration. This tactic is likely aimed at exerting maximum pressure on the Mexican government to do more to curb the power of the cartels and reduce the flow of narcotics into the US. The move will almost certainly appeal to domestic political audiences, given its prioritising of national security and border control, but is likely more significant in its symbolism rather than its practicality.

On 21 January, shortly before 08:00 local time, three vehicles were fired upon by armed gang members near Toussaint Louverture International Airport (PAP) in Port-au-Prince. Two of the vehicles were armoured and fitted with diplomatic plates; one was not armoured.

The vehicles were reportedly transporting India’s consul and staff as they were travelling to their offices in Sarthe. Five people were injured in total, with a sixth person killed. The two drivers and Jenny Handal Bitar, the daughter of the consul, were reportedly among those injured. This event comes the day after a US embassy van was fired upon.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Given a similar incident has occurred twice in one week, gangs were almost certainly deliberately targeting foreign vehicles and diplomatic missions. Some reports indicate that this was likely a retaliatory action in response to recent police and Multinational Security Support (MSS) operations. The attack came one day before Colombian President Gustavo Petro was scheduled to visit; the first time any Colombian president has visited Haiti in over 20 years. By attacking foreign entities, Haitian gangs are likely aiming to send a message of deterrence against foreign involvement in the country.

The ongoing Kenya-led MSS operations, greenlit in October 2023 by the UN Security Council, have faced significant limitations in the form of a lack of funding, equipment, and personnel; it contains a force of just 800, 1,700 short of the intended target of 2,500. António Guterres, the Secretary General of the UN, has warned that if further money, equipment, and personnel are not provided, Haiti’s security institutions could collapse, and gangs could ‘overrun the entire metropolitan area’.

The struggle to control the gangs in Haiti will highly likely be exacerbated by President Trump’s decision to suspend foreign assistance programs for 90 days. Haiti is incredibly reliant on US aid for financial support for its police force as well as humanitarian and health programs. With the US constituting Haiti’s biggest donor, a cut in funding could reduce police capacity even further. Gangs will highly likely take advantage of this and capitalise on the 90-day review period.

The Colombian government of President Gustavo Petro has vowed to wage war against leftwing guerillas in response to a surge in violence that has killed over 100 people and displaced nearly 40,000. The government has also declared a “state of internal emergency” and a “state of economic emergency”, which will grant the executive branch of government to pass certain legislation without congressional approval for up to three months.

The increase in violence has largely been attributed to the National Liberation Army (ELN), which has launched an offensive against rival groups, including Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, to establish control over strategic territories and drug trafficking routes. Fighting has been reported in at least three Colombian departments, with the majority of the fighting occurring in the northeastern Catatumbo region close to the Venezuelan border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As part of the emergency measures enacted by the government,thousands of troops will be deployed to the affected regions. This strategy marks a major shift in the Petro administration’s approach, which has been prioritising dialogue and ceasefire negotiations in its pursuit of “total peace”.

However, it is highly likely that many of the armed factions within Colombia have simply exploited this approach to regroup and rearm, fearing that peace would ultimately threaten their profits from the ultra-lucrative cocaine trade. The government, which has already suspended peace talks with the ELN, will likely prioritise the targeting of the leftist group.

However, the ELN is highly active across multiple regions of Colombia, including the northeast, southwest, midwest, and central areas. There is a realistic possibility that the government’s military intervention could trigger a wave of reprisal attacks across these regions, potentially exacerbating Colombia’s security environment.

These reprisals could include targeted attacks on military units and installations, government facilities, and infrastructure, such as oil pipelines and transport networks. This would further destabilise rural and urban areas, which is likely to result in more civilian casualties and higher rates of displacement.

US President immigration policy plans highly likely to drive civil unrest in urban centres

Donald Trump’s electoral campaign was characterised by promises of strict immigration reforms and an aggressive policy of mass-deportation. On day one of his presidency, Trump signed a series of executive orders that curtailed previous legal routes to enter the US for undocumented migrants at the southern border, declared a border emergency, and expanded federal authorities’ powers to enact deportations.

For example, as per the new executive decisions, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) units will be granted the ability to carry out enforcement actions at schools and churches, after the end of two directives limiting their powers of arrest in “sensitive” locations.

While no large-scale actions have been carried out as of the time of writing, protests have been planned and carried out in largely Democrat-leaning centres like Chicago, Boston, and Los Angeles since inauguration day. While these protests have so far been limited in scale, it is highly likely that immigration-related political developments will drive larger crowds in the coming weeks.

Kenya deploys more police officers to Haiti

Kenya has deployed an additional 217 police officers to Haiti to arrest the spread of gang violence and help stabilise the country. This takes the total number of Kenyan police officers in Haiti to over 600, with plans to increase the number to 1,000, under a UN-backed mission. However, the effectiveness of the international force remains unproven, with gangs still in control of the vast majority of the capital and large swathes of the country. It is now assessed that over 700,000 have been displaced and an estimated 5,600 people were killed in the Caribbean nation in 2024 alone.

Nicaragua launches volunteer police force

More than 4000 officers have been inducted since the group was formed in accordance with changes to Nicaragua’s constitution. A “Volunteer Police” had already existed in 2018, when it was widely deployed by the government to crush domestic opposition with near impunity. It is highly likely that the reinforced organisation, now more clearly institutionalised, will act as a de facto paramilitary supporting the regime of Daniel Ortega.

US withdraws from World Health Organisation (WHO), Paris Climate Agreement

Both decisions had been widely expected to occur on day one of the second Trump administration. The WHO withdrawal is likely to significantly affect the organisation’s operations, as the US provides approximately 18 per cent of its overall funding. In particular, US contributions have been key to the WHO’s programmes to combat HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, as well as tuberculosis.

It is highly likely that the EU and China will take measures to bolster their position within health- and environment-related international agreements and organisations. While the US withdrawal from the WHO is likely to not fundamentally challenge the overarching support the organisation’s mission has abroad, there is a realistic possibility that the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement will bolster the political traction of international opponents of the framework, possibly leading to policy developments abroad.

Wildfires continue across Southern California in the US

Southern California continues to grapple with the effects of Santa Ana winds, which have triggered a series of wildfires and power outages across the region. The Hughes Fire is currently burning approximately 72 kilometres north of Los Angeles and has grown to over 10,000 acres, causing tens of thousands to evacuate; the fire has been 14 per cent contained.

The Laguna Fire near Camarillo has been brought under control, with firefighters reporting 70 per cent containment and no structural damage. Evacuation orders around the Cal State Channel Islands campus have been downgraded to warnings as the fire’s forward progress has been halted.

Meanwhile, the Gibbel Fire south of Hemet has also seen its forward progress stopped, with crews remaining on site to ensure the area is fully secured. In San Diego County, the Gilman Fire in La Jolla has been contained, allowing for the lifting of all evacuation orders, though road closures persist.

The Border Fire, now renamed Border 2 Fire, has expanded to 228 acres with no containment reported yet, as it burns in the Otay Wilderness Area near the Mexico border.

On 20 January, the Russian Project 22010 oceanographic research ship “YANTAR” (IMO: 7524419) entered the English Channel and was observed operating in UK waters. This marks the second time in months that the YANTAR has been observed in UK waters.

In November 2024, the vessel was suspected of loitering over undersea critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the Irish Sea. The Royal Navy was tasked with tracking and monitoring the YANTAR on both occasions. In November, an Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) was authorised to surface near the YANTAR as a deterrent, signalling that the vessel was under covert surveillance by the UK.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Officially, the YANTAR is a Russian oceanographic research vessel that is primarily used for deep-sea research and underwater rescue missions. However, the vessel is operated by the highly secretive Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), a branch of the Russian Ministry of Defence tasked with underwater warfare and intelligence gathering.

The YANTAR is one of the most capable vessels within GUGI, equipped with advanced sonar systems and capable of deploying a range of underwater assets, including remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), and deep-submergence vehicles (DSVs) that can interrogate depths up to 6,000m. This allows Russia to map some of the deepest undersea critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the oceans, the sabotage of which would be immensely challenging and time-consuming to repair.

However, considering the YANTAR’s strategic importance and the extent to which it is monitored by NATO intelligence assets, it is unlikely that the vessel was conducting nefarious activity. With the Trump administration anticipated to curtail aid to Ukraine, it is likely that European nations will be required to take on a greater responsibility.

The Kremlin, which is already suspected of conducting a reckless sabotage campaign across Europe which has included the severing of undersea cables, is likely sending a strategic message to Ukraine’s European allies. By deploying such assets in proximity to undersea CNI, Russia is communicating that it has both the capability and intent to escalate its sabotage campaign, with undersea sabotage providing a low-cost and highly deniable means of exerting pressure on Ukraine’s allies.

Furthermore, the extent of civilian vessels answering to Russian intelligence makes it almost impossible to accurately monitor Russian activity in the maritime domain and the heavy monitoring of vessels like the YANTAR likely provides opportunities for other vessels to exploit.

Following his inauguration on 20 January, US President Donald Trump made statements and issued executive orders that gave the first indications of how the new Trump administration will handle the war in Ukraine.

Firstly, Trump made statements via social media that Putin is to blame for continuing the war, that Zelenskyy had told Trump “he wants to make a deal” and that Putin is “destroying Russia” by not ending the war. Trump threatened that unless Russia stopped the “ridiculous war”, the US would impose “high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions”.

Secondly, Trump issued an executive order titled “Reevaluating And Realigning United States Foreign Aid” that suspends all US foreign aid for 90 days, which caused concern regarding how US assistance to Ukraine would be impacted.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The executive order is unlikely to significantly impact Ukraine’s war effort. The Biden administration made concerted efforts to “Trump-proof” Ukraine aid, due to Trump’s previous threats to end assistance to Ukraine, with pledged future commitments that cannot be easily suspended with presidential executive authority and NATO taking over the US in coordinating military aid to Ukraine.

The G7-led Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans initiative, the EU’s Ukraine Facility financial assistance program,  the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative  (USAI) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs are all entirely unaffected by the executive order. However, there will nonetheless be a limited impact on Ukraine with foreign development initiatives regarding the restoration of destroyed critical national infrastructure (CNI) and demining being suspended.

It is highly likely that the main intended purpose of the executive order suspending USAID assistance programs relates to the Trump movement’s sociopolitical outlook – the stated “purpose” in the text of the executive order criticises how the “foreign aid industry and bureaucracy” has in many cases been “antithetical to American values” and has promoted ideas “that are directly inverse to harmonious and stable relations”. This is almost certainly in reference to USAID programs that have promoted LGBTQ+ issues, which have received significant criticism from Trump supporters.

What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which Trump will leverage his executive authority to impede the delivery of military assistance to Ukraine. Trump’s statements on social media likely indicate a focus on further economic sanctions as measures to coerce the Kremlin to engage in peace negotiations, as opposed to boosting military aid.

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have intensified attacks on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) around the Tishreen Dam area, a strategic location along the Euphrates River. Attacks have included the use of heavy artillery and rocket strikes; Turkish conventional forces have also conducted drone and airstrikes targeting SDF positions in areas such as Tal Tamr, Hasakah, and Kobani. The SNA has concentrated forces along critical lines of control, including at Ain Issa, Tal Tamr, and Kobani.

The SDF is also contending with attacks by Arab tribal forces in the Deir ez-Zur, which has forced the SDF to deploy reinforcements from the al-Hasakah area to Deir ez-Zur.

Prior to speaking at Davos, Syria’s new Foreign Minister, Assad al-Shaibani, highlighted the potential benefits of a “special relationship” with Turkey. Al-Shaibani suggested that such a relationship would provide the new Syrian government with access to Turkish technology, regional influence, and European relations. Al-Shaibani also stated that there is no longer any justification for the existence of the SDF, with talks to absorb the SDF into government forces ongoing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Turkish artillery, air, and drone strikes are likely shaping activity designed to degrade the SDF and disrupt its supply lines in preparation for a major offensive against SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. The concentration of SNA forces on three axes likely indicates a multi-pronged offensive against the SDF. Such an offensive combined with attacks by Arab tribal forces in Deir ez-Zur will almost certainly overstretch SDF forces, leaving them vulnerable across multiple fronts and likely unable to maintain control over the key territories they hold.

The pro-Turkey comments made by Syria’s foreign minister are likely strategically aimed at pressuring the SDF into aligning with the Syrian government and renouncing further claims for autonomy. In particular, al-Shaibani remarks that the SDF no longer has any justification for its existence underscores the new government’s view that the SDF is an illegitimate force since the collapse of the Assad regime and territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Without external assistance, the SDF is now likely left with two options: be absorbed into the new government’s forces or face military defeat at the hands of Turkey, the SNA, and Arab tribal militias.

However, in the event of a protracted conflict involving the SDF or if the SDF is forced into submission, there is a realistic possibility that this could embolden ISIS, other extremist groups, or former regime loyalists to exploit the resulting instability and potential security vacuums.

On 22 January, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units launched a large-scale operation, named “Iron Wall”, in Jenin. The operation is the first major military development following the signing of the ceasefire in Gaza, and the beginning of the second Trump administration in the US. Donald Trump, on day one of his presidency, removed sanctions on settler groups in the West Bank via executive order. On 19 January, settler groups attacked Palestinian residents in the villages of Jinasfut and Funduq, east of Qalqilya. Coinciding with the new IDF operations in Jenin, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other militant groups announced the creation of a “joint operations room” to coordinate activities in the West Bank.

In Gaza, the ceasefire deal approved on 17 January is so far holding, with the first hostage exchanges having been successfully carried out. Reports indicate that Hamas units are overseeing the return of displaced Palestinians to the north of the Gaza Strip.

In Israel, political pressure on the Netanyahu administration increased. On 21 January, the IDF’s Chief of Staff and the head of Southern Command resigned over the failures to prevent the 7 October 2023 attack. Opposition parties, led by Yair Lapid, likewise called on Netanyahu to resign. The leaders of the far-right parties within the government coalition, Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, continued to call for resuming hostilities following the completion of the first stage of the ceasefire.

Solace Global Assessment: 

With the situation in Gaza having been at least temporarily cooled by the ceasefire, both Tel Aviv and the Palestinian militias are highly likely looking at the West Bank as an increasingly important area of operations.

For Hamas, which retains the strategic goal of expanding its political clout in the West Bank, the setbacks suffered by Iran in the region, the recent Palestinian Authority (PA) raid in Jenin, and the seeming willingness of the new US administration to allow Israeli forces and settlers a greater scope of operations in the area represent growing vulnerabilities. Efforts to coordinate more thoroughly with PIJ and other armed groups are therefore likely reflective of Hamas’ attempts to bolster its short-term resilience while allowing for more effective operations in contested areas like Tulkarm or Jenin.

For the IDF, the 42 days afforded by the ceasefire likely represent an opportunity to further weaken Hamas and PIJ in key West Bank strongholds, while simultaneously allowing the PA to “fill the political gap” left by their retreat.

In Gaza, Hamas will likely use the ceasefire to accelerate attacks on rival militias and local clans that threaten its authority in the area. Reports indicate that Hamas fighters have conducted raids against criminal gangs that were attempting to secure humanitarian aid, hence portraying themselves as a force for stability. Hamas will likewise almost certainly continue recruitment efforts to replenish its manpower.

The flow of internally displaced Palestinian civilians from the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone will also offer an opportunity to re-infiltrate the north of the Gaza Strip. Despite these opportunities, the loss of much of its pre-war infrastructure – including tunnels and arsenals – will hinder Hamas’ rearmament efforts. With Israeli troops still in control of the Philadelphi Corridor, the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt that served as a transit point for smuggled weapons, this is unlikely to change in the short term.

The volatility of Israel’s political situation makes it difficult to assess to what extent Ben-Gvir and Smotrich’s calls to resume the conflict after the first phase of the ceasefire are likely to be observed. If it were to resume hostilities, the Netanyahu government would almost certainly face redoubled international and domestic pressures.

There is also a likelihood that, in such a scenario, Tel Aviv would run into Washington’s opposition. Trump is likely to continue his first term’s foreign policy of improving relations with Gulf states, which however has as a premise the limitation of possible points of contention with key powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Therefore, the White House is likely to continue efforts to stabilise the situation in Gaza and to avoid the restart of a conflict that has minimal potential to advance American strategic interests in the Middle East.

On 19 January, the Houthi-linked Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) released a statement that the Houthis will cease attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, except for “vessels wholly owned by Israeli individuals or entities and/or sailing under the Israeli flag.”  This followed the commencement of the ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and Hamas.

The statement promised that following the “full implementation of all phases of the [ceasefire] agreement”, the last remaining “sanctions” against Israeli vessels would be lifted. The statement also stipulated, however, that attacks against vessels affiliated with the US and the UK would recommence “in the event of any aggression” from “the aggressor state(s)”.

Additionally, on 22 January, the Houthis released the crew members of the MV GALAXY LEADER (IMO: 9237307), with the vessel’s hijacking in November 2023 having marked the start of the Houthi anti-commercial shipping campaign.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Starting in November 2023, the Houthis attacked over 134 vessels in 12 months with uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), and ballistic and cruise missiles.

With 12 per cent of all global shipping previously having passed through the Bab al-Mandeb, a critical chokepoint for maritime trade routes between Europe and Asia, the Houthi campaign against merchant vessels had a global impact. The Red Sea trade corridor saw a 60 per cent decrease in use, due to the increase in insurance premiums and the danger posed to sailors.

The alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope involves markedly increased transit times and fuel costs, leading to container freight rates increasing by as much as 284 per cent.

The extent to which Houthi activity will genuinely alter following the Gaza Ceasefire will likely become clear in the next few weeks, although it is notable that the Houthis have not launched a successful attack against a vessel since November 2024. It is likely that the efforts of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a US-led naval coalition aimed at intercepting Houthi threats and Operation Poseidon Archer, a US-UK joint mission to strike Houthi capabilities within Yemen, have both helped to degrade Houthi strike capabilities. There is a realistic possibility that recent Houthi statements have been made to obfuscate their current limitations and critical shortages in weaponry.

On 18 January, ballot papers from the October elections were incinerated on the outskirts of Maputo. The administrative court rejected the civil society appeal to stop the process.

On 20 January, the swearing-in ceremony for members of provincial assemblies and governors took place and was attended by opposition parties.

On 23 January, protests broke out along the Maputo-South Africa motorway after Trans-Africa Concession (TRAC) attempted to resume toll collection. Protesters smashed through the gates and refused to pay, threatening to set the toll gate alight. Security forces intervened to remove heavy vehicles blocking access and used live ammunition to quell unrest.

According to local NGOs, approximately 314 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The toll gate rioting comes in response to TRAC attempting to reinstate tolls after approximately two months of not collecting them. Mondlane declared that tolls should no longer be paid in December, something he reiterated on 17 January.

The fact that opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane’s demands still resonate with Mozambique’s population despite Frelimo’s perceived victory suggests that he continues to hold sway over the public. However, despite clashes occurring between protesters and security forces, protests have largely decreased since Chapo’s inauguration, indicating that they may continue to diminish in both scale and frequency.

Furthermore, the opposition parties’ attendance at the swearing-in ceremonies indicates that they are ready to move on from protesting the election results; something that may be reflective of the broader population.

Mondlane has announced that he is not interested in joining the new government, though is ready to help find solutions. He has emphasised that he has no problem cooperating with the government if they respond to the questions he considers ‘essential for the people’. He has called for a new round of relatively small-scale protests every Friday at 13:00 local time during the first 100 days of Chapo’s presidency to pressure the government into acquiescing to his demands.

While Mondlane has outlined that he would consider the next steps if the government does not respond to his demands, there is a realistic possibility that demonstrations’ momentum will be relatively diminished in three months. Furthermore, the time enables the government time to present itself as a change from the previous administration, something that Chapo was keen to emphasise in his inauguration speech.

UK government launches probe on Southport stabbings

The government of Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that a public inquiry will be carried out on the July attack, which killed three children and wounded ten others. On 20 January, the perpetrator of the attacks pleaded guilty to the murders, as well as additional attempted murder charges and charges related to the possession of an al-Qaeda training manual.

The attack’s aftermath resulted in severe protests and episodes of targeted sectarian violence, also fuelled by misinformation spread by online-based domestic and foreign far-right channels, in multiple cities across the United Kingdom. There is a realistic possibility of further civil unrest as the inquiry progresses.

Slovakia’s Prime Minister Fico survives no-confidence motion

The vote was raised by opposition parties who accused Prime Minister Robert Fico of shifting Slovakia towards Moscow’s orbit, and of threatening to take the country out of the EU and NATO. The vote, which would have likely failed as Fico holds a parliamentary majority, did not take place as the opposition MPs walked out.

On 20 January, Fico met with Erdogan in Ankara, where the two leaders advanced the idea of redirecting Russian gas supplies to Slovakia via the TurkStream pipeline, a move that considerably worried Brussels. Demonstrations are scheduled to take place in Bratislava on 24 January, and the government stated that it would take precautionary measures over “intelligence” over an alleged plan to carry out a coup against Fico.

Spanish football fans attacked by rival fans in Rome, Italy

Approximately 70 Real Sociedad were attacked by opposing Lazio fans in central Rome on 22 January, the day before a scheduled Europa League match. At least nine Spanish fans were injured with reports indicating that at least two were stabbed and “seriously” wounded.

Football-related violence is a common occurrence in Italy. Teams like Lazio are often supported by organised “ultras” (hooligan) groups that often have ties to far right and neofascist political groups or even organised crime. OSINT analysis highlighted how the attack was highly likely carried out because of political reasons, with pro-Lazio channels describing Real Sociedad fans as “leftists”. 

Three bombings in one night in Sweden

At least two people were injured by a blast in Stockholm on the night of 17-18 January. Explosions are mostly used by organised criminal groups in Sweden and, while often targeting other groups or conducted for intimidatory purposes, often result in bystanders being injured.

Local media reports that 25 bombings occurred in December 2024, and 11 in the first half of January 2025. A growing organised crime presence in Sweden is likely to result in further attacks, especially in the peripheries of large cities. Moreover, as highlighted by counterterrorism researchers with regards to cases in France, there is a growing overlap between criminal gangs and extremist groups, with the latter seeking to obtain access to the former’s arsenals of weapons and improvised explosives.

Knife attack in Aschaffenburg, Germany kills two

Two people, including a two-year-old child, were killed in a stabbing attack in a park Aschaffenburg, Bavaria. According to local media, a man, later identified as an Afghan national who was slated for deportation, attacked a group of children from a daycare centre who were visiting the park.

Germany’s main opposition leader and likely next Chancellor, Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democrats (CDU), has called for a radical shift in Germany’s migration policy ahead of the February general election and criticised the current government for its handling of immigration and deportation processes. Political tensions are expected to intensify as the general election approaches, with migration almost certainly to be a central and controversial issue in campaign discussions.

Two Iranian supreme court justices killed in Tehran

The justices, who had occupied influential positions in Iran’s judiciary since the revolution and had reportedly adjudicated cases involving anti-regime protesters, were killed by a gunman who managed to enter the court on 18 January. A third judge and a bodyguard were also injured in the attack. The shooting follows numerous assassinations of prominent Iranian or allied figures on Iranian soil over the past year. There is a realistic possibility that the regime will use the killings as a pretext for retaliatory violence against regime opponents.

Lebanese military to receive US, EU aid to enforce ceasefire

Washington announced that it would provide USD 117 million, while Brussels pledged USD 62 million to bolster both the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF). The resources will be used to aid the Lebanese military efforts to enforce the demilitarised zone south of the Litani river that was established by the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire. More broadly, with Hezbollah at a historical low point in terms of capability, reinforcing the Lebanese military is highly likely seen by both the US and EU as a way to put significant pressure on the Shia militia.

Mali-based Africa Corps receive armoured vehicles from Moscow

On 17 January, reports from Mali identified a large number of Russian armoured vehicles, including tanks and armoured personnel carriers, being delivered to the local paramilitary forces under the control of the Russian Military of Defence. The delivery, which was initially incorrectly claimed by the Malian junta to be for its forces, is significant for multiple reasons.

First, it underscores Russia’s growing commitment to bolster its presence in Africa after its strategic defeat in Syria. Second, it likely further demonstrates how Moscow considers Bamako to be its key partner in the Sahel, and likely the most stable junta in the region. Finally, the shipment of heavy equipment to the Africa Corps demonstrates Moscow’s continued commitment to shifting its model for its footprint in the Sahel away from the more independent Wagner Group towards the “aligned” Africa Corps.  

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continue making progress in Khartoum

The renewed offensive in the capital, where progress had stalled after initial SAF gains in late 2024, comes after the armed forces took control of the strategic town of Wad Madani to the south of the capital and cleared some operationally valuable towns to the capital’s north. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have reportedly been withdrawing units and equipment east of the Nile, likely to set up better defensive positions. The SAF’s primary objective is likely breaking the RSF’s siege of the Signal Corps base, located in the cities southwest. 

Nigerian army kills dozens of Islamist fighters in Borno state

At least 76 fighters from Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) were killed, and a further 72 arrested, in recent operations by Nigerian forces in the northeastern Borno state. The military’s operations are almost certainly retaliatory following an uptick in Islamist groups’ activity in early 2025. On 13 January, ISWAP militants reportedly killed at least 40 farmers in Dumba. Days prior, a failed ambush on a military patrol resulted in 34 Islamists and six soldiers being killed.

Military deployed to northeast DRC to combat Islamic State-aligned group

Troops belonging to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been deployed to the northeast of the country following an attack on the village of Makoko on 15 January. The attack was conducted by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist group aligned with the Islamic State. The initial death toll has been revised to 30 and several volunteers were attacked in the area when attempting to retrieve bodies. ADF attacks in both the DRC and neighbouring Uganda markedly increased in recent years, likely taking advantage of the government’s prioritisation of the southeast, where the rebel M23 group is leading an offensive and has successfully seized major towns and key terrain.

M23 Movement seizes town on main supply route to Goma in DRC’s North Kivu region

On 21 January, Rwanda-backed M23 rebels seized the town of Minova in North Kivu, a key supply hub for the provincial capital Goma. According to local media, clashes occurred on 22 January in Bugulube across Lake Kivu and on 23 January around Sake. The fighting reportedly triggered an exodus of civilians from Nzulo, less than 16 kilometres from Goma.

This comes amidst steady territorial gains from the rebel group after fighting accelerated in October 2024. Recent gains over the past two weeks have reportedly led to over 178,000 displacements, according to the UN. M23 rebels will likely attempt to capitalise on their recent territorial gains and attempt to retake North Kivu’s provincial capital Goma. There is a realistic possibility that further government losses will ignite civil unrest in the capital Kinshasa, which are often anti-Western in their sentiment and violently suppressed by the police.

Fire at a ski resort in Turkey kills at least 78

On 21 January, a fire broke out at approximately 03:30 local time in the restaurant of the Grand Kartal Hotel in Kartalkaya in the Koroglu mountains in northwest Turkey. The high death toll is partially due to the inadequate fire safety measures at the hotel, despite the hotel’s popularity. While some survivors reportedly did not hear an alarm, the hotel’s fire extinguishing systems have been labelled as inadequate.

While the Turkish Culture and Tourism Minister Mehmet Nuri Ersoy stated that the hotel had a fire competence certificate, local mayor Tanju Ozcan stated that the fire department had not issued a positive report since 2007. Police have detained eleven people including the hotel owner as part of an investigation into the fire. Given the high death toll and perceived incompetence of the fire department, who were reportedly responsible for issuing the fire competence certificate, unrest targeting a tightening of legislation and safety standards at such resorts is likely.

Marburg outbreak confirmed in northwest Tanzania

Despite initial attempts to deny the suspected outbreak of the Marburg virus in the northwest Kagera Region, the Tanzanian government confirmed the outbreak on 20 January. The outbreak was confirmed after identifying at least one case in the 25 suspected cases.

The Marburg virus, a highly infectious and often fatal disease, is similar to Ebola and is transmitted to humans from fruit bats and monkeys; it has a very high fatality rate if not treated. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) is deploying a multidisciplinary team and committing USD 2 million to support Tanzania in containing the Marburg virus outbreak, focusing on surveillance, diagnostics, case management, and community engagement.

On 18 January, Myanmar’s junta government and the ethnically Chinese Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) signed a China-brokered ceasefire which came into immediate effect. The ceasefire came after months of pressure from Beijing, and was finally agreed in the seventh round of peace talks in Kunming, China. The MNDAA have reportedly agreed to pull its forces out of several key positions including Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State which was captured in August 2024. The ceasefire terms dictate that full withdrawal must be completed by June.

However, the group has reportedly maintained many of its gains since the offensive beginning October 2023, also known as Operation 1027. Fighting has resumed elsewhere; on 20 January, Myanmar’s military junta bombed the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)-controlled Nawnghkio town in Shan state and carried out two bombing runs in the People’s Defense Forces-controlled Khampat Town in Tamu Township, Sagaing Region on 21 January.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The MNDAA is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA), which consists of two other groups, the TNLA and the Arakan Army (AA). The Alliance has been engaged in an ongoing offensive against the military junta since October 2023. During the offensive, the groups captured a significant amount of territory consisting of several towns and border crossings with China in Shan State.

So far, there are no indications that the other two members of the TBA are party to the ceasefire. After securing the ceasefire between the MNDAA and the military junta, Beijing will likely turn its attention to the other two members. The TNLA indicated in November that they are ready to engage in peace talks and the AA followed suit in December, providing a potential pathway for another China-mediated ceasefire.

While the ceasefire presents an opportunity for both sides to de-escalate tensions and engage in further peace talks, its staying power remains to be seen. A China-brokered January 2024 ceasefire between the military junta and the TBA lasted approximately five months, breaking down in June amid continued air and artillery strikes on insurgent-controlled areas and mutual mistrust. Furthermore, while the other two members of the alliance have indicated a willingness to talk, they are not yet party to a ceasefire agreement.

As part of its strategy to pressure the MNDAA into a ceasefire, Beijing closed China’s borders with northern Shan State in June 2024, cutting supplies to citizens residing in MNDAA-controlled territory. In the aftermath of the ceasefire, The Chin Shwe Haw border crossing between China and northern Shan State has been opened, allowing a resumption of trade. This is crucial for China’s economic interests, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Sino-Myanmar pipelines. A reduction in tensions in Myanmar is also key to securing the China-Myanmar border and safeguard regional security since instability in border regions could trigger influxes of refugees.

Thailand legalises same-sex marriage

Thailand has become the first country in Southeast Asia and the third in Asia (following Taiwan and Nepal) to legalise same-sex marriage. The new law grants equal legal rights to same-sex couples, including financial, medical, and adoption rights, and will likely contribute to a cultural shift in Thailand which could reverberate in other parts of Southeast Asia. However, opinion polls indicate that public support was overwhelmingly in favour of the new legislation, parts of Thailand remain deeply conservative and a backlash from more traditional segments of society is possible.

Impeached South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol facing insurrection charges

President Yoon, who was impeached following his attempt to declare martial law, is currently facing charges of insurrection and abuse of power. His impeachment hearing at the Constitutional Court in Seoul has seen significant police presence and sparked protests from both supporters and opponents. He has defended his actions again, stating his declaration of martial law was meant to inform the public of the dangers of an opposition-controlled National Assembly.

Police have also sought arrest warrants for two officials from the presidential security service accused of obstructing investigations related to Yoon’s arrest. The situation has been marked by unrest, with multiple arrests made during protests in support of Yoon. The former president has been detained and moved to solitary confinement. His impeachment hearing continues to draw large crowds and requires substantial police deployment to maintain order. Further unrest is likely as the legal process unfolds.

Chinese national killed in northeastern Afghanistan

The targeted attack occurred on the night of 21-22 January in the Takhar province, near the border with Tajikistan. A Chinese national and a Taliban official were killed in the attack, which also wounded other Chinese and Afghan nationals. The attack was claimed by a group called the National Mobilisation Front (NMF), as well as by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). The NMF is an anti-Taliban, anti-ISKP group, which claims to be mostly formed of pre-Taliban Afghan military members.

The NMF justified the attack by stating that the target was a Chinese envoy working with the Taliban intelligence department. While attacks on Chinese nationals have grown in neighbouring Pakistan, they are rare in Afghanistan. The simultaneous claim of the attack by two groups that are ideologically and militarily opposed to each other underscores the high value of Chinese assets and citizens as targets for multiple militant forces. It is likely that attacks on Chinese targets have a strong symbolic value compounded by high visibility for these groups, which thus use them for propaganda and recruitment purposes.

Pakistani intelligence chief visits Bangladesh to improve intelligence sharing

For the first time in decades, the head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has visited Bangladesh, where he was received by Lieutenant General Muhammad Faizur Rahman of the Bangladesh Army. The visit is partially aimed at establishing an intelligence-sharing network between the two countries but has raised concerns due to Rahman’s suspected ties to Islamists and Pakistan.

There are fears that this renewed engagement could lead to subversive activities targeting India, especially through cross-border operations with India suspecting that ISI has long worked with extremist groups that maintain a presence in both India and Bangladesh. The visit follows a series of interactions between Bangladesh and Pakistan, suggesting a thaw in their previously hostile relationship.

Quad member states meet to discuss future policies for Indo-Pacific

On 21 January, the Quad member states of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan convened in Washington to focus on major security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region. Salient talking points were the strengthening of free trade and a shared commitment to upholding democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

The was the first Quad meeting since the return of President Trump and occurred only a day after Trump’s inauguration, likely indicating a renewed focus on strengthening the alliance and prioritising regional security concerns, particularly in response to China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and its unilateral actions in support of its extensive territorial claims.

Childcare centre targeted in anti-Semitic attack in Sydney, Australia

On 21 January, a childcare centre in Sydney was set on fire in what authorities are deeming the latest incident in a growing trend of anti-Semitic attacks in Australia. The centre, which is located adjacent to a Jewish school and synagogue in the east of the city, was also sprayed with anti-Semitic graffiti. Australia has witnessed a major spike in both anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attacks since the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, with at least six reported incidents in Sydney over the past two months.

Landslide kills at least 19 in Indonesia

The landslide occurred on 21 January in the city of Pekalongan in Central Java following heavy rains that started on the day prior. The rainy season in Java runs from November to March and often triggers flooding on the island. Hilly areas such as those affected by the recent landslides are at a higher risk of flash floods and landslides, and the lack of flood-resistant infrastructure can often complicate search and rescue efforts, as well as making floods’ impact worse.

Further rain is expected in the coming days which could exacerbate flooding and trigger further landslides. Several people still remain missing and casualty figures may rise in the coming days.

Taiwanese undersea cables cut

Two undersea cables connecting Taiwan and the Matsu Islands were reported to have been completely severed on 22 January. Taiwanese authorities claimed that the damage was due to environmental factors and degradation, and that no “suspicious vessels” were reported to have transited near the cable.

Repairs are expected to be completed by late February and a backup system, which uses asynchronous satellites, was activated meaning that the recent damages will highly likely not result in significant disruptions. The incident, which is the fourth cable disruption reported in 2025, is still likely to worry Pacific powers, as it cannot be separated from the growing trend of deliberate, state-sponsored sabotage of undersea infrastructure.

Magnitude 6.4 earthquake in central Taiwan

On 20 January, a magnitude 6.4 earthquake struck Chiayi County in central Taiwan. The earthquake caused significant damage and disruptions and resulted in at least 26 injuries, with the majority occurring in Tainan, and others reported in Yunlin and Chiayi.

The earthquake also led to widespread power outages, with up to 7,000 customers affected in Kaohsiung and 12,000 households in Tainan’s Baihe District experiencing temporary power loss. Structural damage was observed in various areas, including the collapse of multiple residential buildings in Tainan’s Nanxi District, where several people were initially trapped. Approximately 30 households in Tainan’s Yujing District were evacuated due to damage in a multi-story residential building.

Taiwanese authorities have warned of potential aftershocks, with magnitudes possibly reaching 5.0 near the earthquake’s epicentre.

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