INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The reported targeting of military facilities and airports inside Venezuela represents a significant escalation in US–Venezuela tensions, which have steadily deteriorated since August 2025. The substantial buildup of US naval and air assets in the wider Caribbean has largely been interpreted as pressure aimed at undermining the Maduro government. This posture has coincided with multiple US strikes against suspected narcotics trafficking networks, resulting in over 100 fatalities, as well as the seizure of illicit oil tankers suspected of transporting Venezuelan oil in circumvention of sanctions.

The reported strikes on airports and military installations likely suggest an effort to degrade Venezuela’s ability to conduct retaliatory military operations, by limiting air and logistical capabilities. Sustained damage to multiple airfields and port facilities would achieve a clear tactical advantage for any potential follow-on operations and further constrain the operational freedom of Venezuela’s armed forces.

Reports of President Maduro’s capture are yet to be confirmed; however, if true, the United States has likely achieved one of its primary objectives, which may decrease the risk of further US strikes on Venezuela in the immediate term.

In response to foreign military activity within Venezuelan soil, authorities are likely to implement heightened travel restrictions, curfews, and border closures in the coming days to manage potential unrest and support military operations. Increased security patrols, checkpoints, and the deployment of the armed forces to key infrastructure are likely. The authorities may also restrict the right to assembly or limit access to the internet and telecommunications, limiting situational awareness within Venezuela. Foreign nationals, particularly US and other Western citizens, will likely face an elevated risk of detention due to perceptions or allegations of involvement in the recent military activity.

If US strikes are sustained, they are expected to cause significant disruptions to air travel in the Southern Caribbean Basin. The proximity of Trinidad and Tobago and the ABC Islands, Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao, to mainland Venezuela is expected to make travel to and from these areas highly difficult. The closure of Venezuelan airspace is also likely to extend flight times on routes connecting the United States and Canada with areas of South America.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Bondi Beach mass shooting is the deadliest terrorist attack in Australian history and the deadliest mass shooting since the 1996 Port Arthur massacre.

Attribution for the attack has so far seen potentially conflicting reports. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reportedly “took interest” in one of the perpetrators, Naveed Akram, six years ago for ties to a Sydney-based Islamic State (IS) terrorist cell. This followed the July 2019 arrest of Isaac El Matari, the self-proclaimed head of IS in Australia, who wished to establish an “insurgency” in Australia.

Local media reports that investigators from the Australian Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) believe that the two perpetrators had pledged allegiance to IS, with two IS flags reportedly found in their vehicle at Bondi Beach. A senior JCTT official has briefed that Naveed Akram was “closely connected” to El Matari.

These findings, if confirmed, would strongly suggest at least a historical connection to an Australian IS cell. However, Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has stated that intelligence authorities have informed him that there was “no evidence of collusion” and “no evidence that these people were part of a cell”. Investigations by Australian authorities remain ongoing.

In apparent contrast to the attribution to IS, whether that be via coordination with a wider network or through inspiration as lone actors, Israeli intelligence sources have briefed that the attack may have been carried out with the support of Iran or Iran-backed actors such as Hezbollah.

In August 2025, Iran’s ambassador to Australia, Ahmad Sadeghi, was expelled due to “credible evidence” that antisemitic attacks, including an arson attack against a café in Sydney in October 2024 and a synagogue in Melbourne in December 2024, were orchestrated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The Bondi Beach terrorist attack highlights the continuing elevated risk of terrorism in Western countries, particularly against Jewish targets. Other attacks in 2025 include the October 2025 ramming and stabbing attack targeting Jewish worshipers at a synagogue in Manchester, UK, during Yom Kippur, and the May 2025 shooting near the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., USA.

In addition to the elevated risk of antisemitic terrorism against targets associated with Judaism, such as synagogues, Jewish schools, and events such as Hanukkah gatherings (14 December – 22 December 2025), the winter holiday season almost certainly entails an increased risk of terrorist attacks against ‘soft targets’. Symbolic and high-visibility events, such as Christmas markets, draw large crowds and are difficult to comprehensively protect against terrorist actors.

In the aftermath of the Bondi Beach attack, it is almost certain that security presence at Hanukkah events and synagogues will be elevated, as already reported in cities such as Berlin, London, and New York.