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Magnitude 7.4 Earthquake Strikes Colombia

Major Earthquake Strikes Colombia’s Chocó Department

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:00 UTC 10 August 2026

At 07:34 local time (12:34 UTC) on 10 August, a magnitude 7.4 earthquake was detected 5 kilometres east of San José del Palmar, Chocó Department, Colombia, at a depth of 107 kilometres, according to the United States Geological Survey (USGS). The earthquake was felt as far as Venezuela and Ecuador.

Choco province Governor Nubia Carolina Córdoba-Curi has declared that injuries have been reported and there is severe damage to buildings. Videos and local media reports also indicate major damage in several cities. Buildings were reported to have collapsed or partially collapsed in Cali, Pereira and Manizales. Footage also reportedly showed significant structural damage in Pereira, damage to a cathedral in Manizales, and structural damage in Medellín’s San Diego suburb.

Residents evacuated buildings in northern Bogotá, over 200 kilometres east of the epicentre, while buildings were also evacuated in Barranquilla. However, the mayor of Bogotá, Carlos Fernando Galán, reported that no structural damage was reported aside from some cracks in buildings. There have been no confirmed casualty figures or a comprehensive official damage assessment.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Aftershocks Could Prolong Disruption Across Colombia

Despite the high magnitude of the earthquake, the most severe destruction is highly likely limited to near the epicentre, due to the depth of the earthquake. A deep or intermediate-depth 7+ magnitude event generally produces less concentrated surface damage than an equivalent shallow earthquake, while transmitting seismic energy over a much larger area.

Colombia experiences numerous major earthquakes because of its position at the convergence of several tectonic systems, with significant historical seismicity recorded across the Andean and Pacific regions. The Servicio Geológico Colombiano (SGC) records an average of approximately 2,500 earthquakes per month, equivalent to around 30,000 per year. However, the overwhelming majority are low-magnitude events that are not felt by the population and are detected only instrumentally. Significant damaging earthquakes are considerably less frequent.

Notable historical earthquakes include the 1999 Armenia earthquake, a magnitude 6.1 event that killed more than 1,000 people, injured thousands, and caused extensive damage across Colombia’s Coffee Axis, and the 1983 Popayán earthquake, a magnitude 5.5 event that killed several hundred people and severely damaged large parts of the city. The 1979 Tumaco earthquake was among Colombia’s most destructive modern seismic events: the magnitude 7.9-8.0 earthquake generated a tsunami, caused widespread building collapse and liquefaction along the Pacific coast, and killed approximately 600 people.

This will almost certainly act as a test for the new President Abelardo de la Espriella, who was inaugurated on 7 August. The government’s handling of emergency response, infrastructure disruption, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction will likely shape initial perceptions of the administration’s competence. This is particularly important given de la Espriella’s narrow and politically contentious election victory, meaning any perceived shortcomings in the response could quickly become a focus for opposition criticism.

Aftershocks are highly likely over the coming days and weeks, although they will highly likely be smaller than the main shock. These could trigger further landslides, damage already weakened buildings and infrastructure, disrupt transport and emergency operations, and prolong public anxiety, particularly in the most heavily affected areas.

Travel and Safety Guidance for Colombia

Closely monitor local news reports and government alerts.
Expect aftershocks. Be prepared to Drop, Cover, Hold On in case of further tremors.
During a tremor, if outside, do not enter buildings and move away from buildings, trees, streetlights and overhead lines.
If inside, pick a safe place (under a sturdy table or desk, or against an interior wall and away from windows and heavy furniture). Do not leave until the shaking stops.
If evacuating a building, always use the stairs. Look out for fires and falling debris.
Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
Heed evacuation orders and travel to government-issued shelters if safe to do so.
Ensure important documents and medications are appropriately stored.
Prepare an emergency ‘go bag’ with essentials such as bottled water, batteries, important documents, and medications.
Confirm booked flights are running prior to checking out of hotels or travelling to the airport.
Prepare for power outages, communication disruptions, and travel delays.
Stay away from damaged buildings and affected areas until authorities deem them safe.

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Powerful Earthquake hits Japan’s Southern Kumamoto Prefecture

Kyushu Earthquake Disrupts Southern Japan

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 10:30 UTC 28 July 2026

On 28 July 2026, at approximately 16:27 Japan Standard Time (07:27 UTC), a powerful, shallow earthquake struck southern Kumamoto Prefecture on the island of Kyushu in south-western Japan. The Japan Meteorological Agency initially assessed the earthquake at magnitude 7.1 and a depth of approximately 10 kilometres, while the United States Geological Survey (USGS) later revised its estimate to magnitude 6.8. Strong shaking was reported across Kumamoto, Nagasaki and other parts of Kyushu. The earthquake also resulted in the issuing of a tsunami advisory for coastal areas around the Ariake and Yatsushiro Seas, where waves of up to one metre were considered possible.

The earthquake caused damage in the Kumamoto area. At least 50 people were injured, and approximately 48,000 households were left without power; mobile-phone users in parts of Kumamoto reported service disruptions. At least one freight train derailed at Yatsushiro station in Kumamoto, and several local roadways have suffered damage, including a flyover in Yatsushiro and parts of the Kyushu Expressway.

Japanese authorities have reported disruptions across the Kyushu region of southern Japan, with all rail services being suspended. Kumamoto Airport halted takeoffs and landings, and all Nippon Airways flights bound for Kumamoto and Nagasaki have been cancelled.

Authorities have issued evacuation orders for residents of Minamishimabara, Nagasaki. A Level 5 Emergency Safety Alert was issued for all residents of Amakusa City, in Kumamoto Prefecture. Japanese officials have stated that no abnormalities had been reported at nuclear power plants.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Tsunami Advisory Issued for Southern Kyushu, Japan

The death toll will likely be limited by Japan’s disaster resilience. Japan enforces strict building codes, seismic retrofitting, early-warning alerts, regular public drills, and responsive emergency services, which reduce the risk of major infrastructure damage. Japan’s Shinkansen trains, for example, have seismic sensors and brake automatically at the first detection of shaking.

However, in 2016 Kumamoto experienced a series of earthquakes that resulted in nearly 300 direct and indirect fatalities and caused extensive damage to homes, roads, bridges and other critical infrastructure. This indicates that even in highly resilient environments, shallow earthquakes and repeated strong aftershocks can still cause significant casualties and prolonged disruption, particularly where buildings have already been weakened and transport networks have been damaged.

Further aftershocks are highly likely over the coming days. Although most will probably be weaker than the initial earthquake, additional tremors of approximately magnitude 5.0 remain possible. Aftershocks could cause further damage to buildings, bridges, and roads already weakened by the initial shock, increase the risk of landslides in mountainous areas, and disrupt search-and-rescue operations.

Rail services are likely to resume gradually following inspections; however, damage to tracks, stations, signalling systems, and rolling stock is likely to result in localised suspensions and delays for several days. Flight disruptions at Kumamoto and Nagasaki airports are likely to continue until runways, terminals and navigation systems have been assessed. Road closures around damaged bridges, flyovers, and landslide-prone areas are likely to disrupt ground transport, increase journey times and disrupt relief efforts.

Power and telecommunications services will likely be gradually restored; however, intermittent outages and mobile-network congestion remain likely, particularly in the most affected parts of Kumamoto Prefecture and in response to aftershocks.

Travel and Safety Guidance for Japan

Monitor alerts from the Japan Meteorological Agency, local prefectural authorities and municipal emergency services, particularly in Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Amakusa, Yatsushiro and Minamishimabara.
Expect further aftershocks and be prepared to Drop, Cover and Hold On. Aftershocks may occur without warning and could damage structures already weakened by the initial earthquake.
Do not enter visibly damaged buildings. Move away from walls, roof tiles, glass façades, overhead power lines and other potentially weakened structures when outside.
If inside during further shaking, shelter beneath sturdy furniture or against an interior wall, away from windows, unsecured furniture and suspended objects. Refrain from using lifts.
Heed all evacuation orders, Level 5 Emergency Safety Alerts and any instructions issued by the local authorities. Travel to designated municipal shelters only when the route is safe and avoid crossing damaged bridges, flyovers, or roads affected by landslides.
Avoid coastal areas around the Ariake and Yatsushiro seas until tsunami advisories have been formally lifted. Do not approach shorelines, ports, river mouths or low-lying coastal roads to observe conditions.
Exercise caution in mountainous and rural parts of Kumamoto and Nagasaki prefectures, where aftershocks and rainfall may trigger landslides, rockfalls, and road closures.
Avoid unnecessary travel on the Kyushu Expressway and around Yatsushiro, Amakusa and southern Kumamoto, where road and bridge damage may cause closures, congestion and extended journey times.
Confirm the operating status of Shinkansen, regional rail and ferry services before travelling. Allow additional time for journeys and maintain alternative transport arrangements where possible.
Confirm flights before departing for Kumamoto or Nagasaki airports. Travellers should remain at their accommodation until the flight and ground-transfer route have been verified as operational.
Prepare for intermittent power cuts and internet disruption. Keep mobile devices and battery packs charged and agree check-in arrangements where communications are unreliable. Enable satellite-based emergency messaging before travelling into areas with limited cellular coverage.
Maintain sufficient bottled water, food, medication, cash and other essential supplies for at least 72 hours, particularly in areas where road access or utility services remain disrupted.
Keep passports, identification, medication and essential documents in a waterproof and readily accessible emergency bag.
Avoid obstructing emergency-response routes and do not travel to affected areas unless necessary. Follow police cordons and instructions from local authorities.
Management should account for all personnel in affected prefectures, confirm their accommodation and onward travel arrangements, and maintain regular welfare checks until transport and essential services have been stabilised.

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France Steps Up Security for Bastille Day and World Cup Semi-final

Elevated Unrest Risk During Bastille Day and France’s World Cup Semi-final

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 14:00 UTC 13 July 2026

The semi-final of the 2026 FIFA World Cup will be played in Arlington, Texas, on 14 July, starting at 15:00 local time (19:00 UTC). The game will be contested by the French and Spanish national teams, and the winner will play in the final on 19 July.

In France, the game will coincide with Bastille Day. The commemoration, observed every year on 14 July, marks the beginning of the French Revolution and is the most important political anniversary in France. Bastille Day frequently results in large-scale protests and rallies.

French authorities have planned large-scale security deployments and other measures to increase security during the Bastille Day events and the semi-final. The Interior Ministry announced that up to 70,000 extra police officers would be deployed throughout the country during the day.

In Paris, at least 7,000 police officers and 2,000 firefighters will be deployed. The Champs-Élysées, which will host a military parade for Bastille Day starting at 15:00 local time, will largely be closed to traffic, with a security perimeter that will only be accessible subject to prior registration. Several metro stations will be closed throughout the day, including Charles de Gaulle – Étoile, George V, Argentine, Tuileries, Concorde, Franklin Roosevelt, Champs-Élysées – Clemenceau, Kléber, and Boissière.

Other cities will also have security measures enhanced to minimise the threat of unrest. In Marseille, Lyon, and Lille, authorities have stated that no dedicated fan zones will be allowed. In Strasbourg, a dedicated fan zone will be established in the Jardin des Deux-Rives, while in Toulouse, the fan zone will be located near the stadium.

Several political demonstrations are scheduled to occur on 14 July alongside the official celebrations for Bastille Day. In Paris, several left-wing groups have planned a demonstration in the Bastille area, starting at 15:00 local time.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Crowd Convergence Raises Unrest Risks Across France

The convergence of France’s World Cup semi-final appearance and Bastille Day is likely to generate large crowds and widespread celebrations. This will likely increase the risk of disorder, violence and vandalism across Paris and other major French cities. Crowds will likely begin forming early for Bastille Day events and remain in public spaces to watch the World Cup semi-final. This is likely to result in high crowd densities throughout the day and well into the evening.

Past notable club- and national-level football games have resulted in large-scale and often violent disorder in major French cities. In 2026, several Champions League games involving Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) were followed by dispersed clashes and vandalism throughout central Paris and suburban areas. On 9-10 July, the World Cup quarterfinal game between France and Morocco also resulted in some isolated clashes; however, the deployment of a large police presence likely limited the scale of the disorder.

Cases of unrest could begin in the late afternoon but are likely to intensify during the night, peaking after the game’s conclusion. If the police intervene to counter disorder, there is a realistic possibility of escalation.

Previous clashes were marked by the widespread use of fireworks to attack police, posing a risk to bystanders, and by indiscriminate attacks on transiting private vehicles, with passengers also occasionally being harassed or attacked.

In Paris, unrest is likeliest to take place on the Champs-Élysées and in the Champ de Mars, with other high-risk areas including Trocadéro and Concorde. While most of the higher-risk areas for unrest are in northwest Paris, incidents in other parts of the city, such as the Marais area, République, Canal St. Martin, and Bastille, cannot be ruled out.

Travel and Safety Guidance for France

Reconsider non-essential travel to South Africa on 30 June.
Avoid the central business districts in major cities around 30 June.
Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and trusted media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.
Avoid all areas of unrest due to incidental risks to bystanders. If caught in the unrest, travellers should move with the crowd until they find the nearest opportunity to escape. If in a vehicle, look to turn down the nearest road. If driving away is not an option, lock the vehicle and escape on foot.
Always follow all instructions and orders from security forces. Where possible, avoid areas of active unrest and remain in secure accommodation.
Prolonged civil unrest can disrupt travel, especially if protesters begin targeting airports. Travellers should have contingency measures in place, including evacuation plans and reliable access to food, water and medication.
Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any loss of electricity.
Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

Request Evacuation Assistance

If you need secure, coordinated support to move personnel out of a high-risk location, our team is ready to help – quickly, calmly, and with care.

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Explosions opposite Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus

Explosions opposite Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus, Syria

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 11:15 UTC 07 Jul 2026

At approximately 0720 UTC, two separate explosions in very close proximity occurred outside the Ministry of Tourism in Damascus. At least 18 people were injured in the blasts, including four police officers, according to Syrian state media. A Ministry of Interior source has said that one of the bombs was placed in a vehicle and another in a dumpster. The first explosion was followed seconds later by a second, more powerful explosion. Security forces have deployed to the scene and have closed the surrounding streets. No group has so far claimed responsibility for the attack.

The Ministry of Tourism is located just opposite the Four Seasons Hotel, where French President Emmanuel Macron was reported to have stayed overnight for a state visit. President Macron was unharmed, but had left the hotel in a motorcade to the presidential palace for a meeting with Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa shortly before the explosions. The office of the French President, the Élysée Palace, has said that President Macron did not hear the explosions from the motorcade.

The attack at the Ministry of Tourism comes days after the 2 July bombing of a café on Al-Nasr Street in the Al-Marjah district of central Damascus, in the immediate vicinity of the Palace of Justice. This bombing resulted in at least ten deaths and 21 injuries, with no group having yet claimed responsibility for this attack.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Damascus IED Attacks Highlight Ongoing Terrorism Risk in Post-Assad Syria

The attacks on both 2 and 7 July share multiple characteristics. Both attacks occurred in central Damascus, both attacks were in close proximity to a government ministry, and both attacks relied on planted explosive devices rather than firearms. Moreover, available footage of the second explosion (reportedly the more powerful blast) at the site does not suggest it was particularly large. The improvised explosive device (IED) detonated at the 2 July café bombing was a “crude [IED] weighing approximately one kilogram equipped with metal shrapnel”, according to the Ministry of Interior. These characteristics indicate that the attacks are likely connected, coordinated, and conducted by the same threat actor.

The attacks also follow another attack against a government ministry on 19 May, when a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) was detonated outside a Defence Ministry building in the Bab Sharqi district of Damascus, killing one soldier and injuring at least 21 people. Just before the explosion, soldiers had identified and defused a separate vehicle rigged with explosives in the same part of the city.

Overall, the attacks highlight that despite a gradually improving security environment in Damascus for foreign travellers since the fall of the Assad regime, the risk of terrorism remains high and regime forces are unable to fully secure central Damascus.

Potential perpetrators of the attack include Salafi jihadist terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, or Assad-regime remnant forces.

ISIS remains the most active terrorist group in Syria. Despite the Islamic State (IS) globally having shifted in strength towards sub-Saharan Africa, the group’s weekly newsletter al-Naba maintains a key focus on Syria and regularly calls for attacks against the Syrian transitional government (STG), which it classifies as “apostate”. Earlier this year in February, the ISIS spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari released a statement announcing a new phase of operations targeting the STG.

Moreover, ISIS channels have previously been observed as calling on supporters to kill foreigners travelling to Syria, with foreign travel to Syria having considerably increased since the fall of the Assad regime. This would align directly with the 7 July attack being conducted close to the Four Seasons Hotel, which hosts foreign diplomats, business travellers, and UN staff, and the attack occurring shortly after President Macron had left the area. Macron’s visit to Syria is notably the first visit by a Western leader to Syria under the STG, and an attack during his visit is likely calculated to undermine President al-Sharaa and Western involvement in Syria.

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah was formed in 2025 as a splinter of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the al-Sharaa-led Islamist rebel group which spearheaded the offensive that brought down the Assad regime in late 2024, by radicals who are disillusioned with the more moderate approach pursued by the government. The group shares much of its ideology with IS, and uses a similar communications style, although links between the two groups are unconfirmed. On 22 June 2025, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah militants carried out a suicide bombing in the Mar Elisa Greek Orthodox Church in Douailah, Damascus, during mass. The attack killed 30 people and injured more than 50, and remains the most deadly terrorist attack to have been conducted in Damascus since the fall of the Assad regime.

Damascus Bombings: Assessing the Most Likely Threat Actors

Since the HTS-led takeover of Syria, the new al-Sharaa-led STG has cracked down on foreign jihadist fighters who were in the ranks of HTS, particularly Central Asian and North Caucasian militant factions. On 5 May, for example, Syrian security forces arrested over 24 Uzbek militants in Idlib, following an armed standoff between Uzbek fighters and security forces after a raid. In issue 547 of al-Naba published in May, ISIS called on former foreign fighters to join its ranks.

Assad-regime remnants also likely have incentives to have conducted the attacks, and previous unverified sources have suggested the initial investigations of the 2 July café have pointed away from ISIS; however, investigations remain in the early stages. In March 2025, major clashes broke out between STG forces and Assadist insurgents from Syria’s Alawite minority in Latakia and Tartus governorates. The 2 July café bombing, which killed six lawyers, occurred next to the Ministry of Justice, with trials ongoing for former regime figures such as Bashar al-Assad’s cousin, Atef Najib, and Syria’s former grand mufti, Ahmed Hassoun. Surviving Assad-regime networks could be attempting to disrupt the trials and discredit the STG, with the “primitive” nature of the IED on 2 July potentially pointing towards a smaller and less organised actor.

Other potential perpetrators include Druze and Kurdish militants, and Hezbollah. However, initial indications suggest that these actors are less likely to have conducted the attacks.

Druze militant violence has so far been localised in the south of Syria, with no established practice of conducting similar terrorist bombings. While some Kurdish hardliners in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintained opposition to integration into the STG following their effective defeat by STG forces in early 2026, such a campaign of bombings in Damascus would almost certainly undermine their legitimacy for little operational gain.

Finally, while US pressure has been applied against the STG to intervene in Lebanon against Hezbollah in recent days, Syria’s Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, has stated that Damascus has no intention of intervening in the country militarily. A regional expert briefing the media stated after the 2 July attack that there were no indications from Hezbollah’s supporters that pointed to Damascus as a target in recent days.

Security forces are highly likely to maintain a higher threat posture than usual in Damascus in the coming weeks, which will likely materialise with greater numbers of checkpoints and vehicle checks. Authorities may additionally conduct raids against suspected cells, which could lead to localised firefights in the vicinity of the raids. If the attack/s are attributed to Assad-regime remnants, there is a realistic possibility of a crackdown being launched in Latakia and Tartus governorates.

Travel and Safety Guidance for Damascus, Syria

Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts. Unverified claims and disinformation will likely be propagated on social media and unvetted sources.
If not in-country, reconsider non-essential travel to Syria.
Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
Avoid all travel to the vicinity of government offices, military facilities, and police stations in Damascus.
Delays and increased traffic are likely to persist in Damascus. Allocate additional time for all road movements.
Heed any evacuation orders and travel to government-issued meeting points if ordered to do so.
Ensure you are carrying the necessary documents.
Prepare an emergency ‘go bag’ with essentials such as bottled water, batteries, important documents, and medications.
Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance.
Ensure mobile devices are fully charged. Electricity provision is inconsistent in parts of Syria, including in Damascus.

Request Evacuation Assistance

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South Africa Faces Nationwide Anti-Migrant Protests

Escalating Anti-Migrant Protests Raise Security Concerns in South Africa

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 13:00 UTC 30 June 2026

Coordinated anti-migrant protests are scheduled to take place on 30 June across all nine of South Africa’s provinces, with rallies scheduled in major cities including Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and Durban, as well as smaller towns. The protests coincide with an unofficial deadline set by anti-migration campaigners for undocumented foreign nationals to leave the country.

The protests have been primarily organised by the anti-migrant March and March movement. They have been supported by a coalition of approximately 27 anti-migrant and civil society groups, including Operation Dudula, United South Africa, and the Progressive Forces of South Africa.

South African authorities and local officials have increased security measures ahead of the planned protests, with police officers deployed across the country and widespread road closures implemented due to fears that the protests could turn violent. Workers have stayed home, and shops have closed in anticipation of the large-scale marches.

In Johannesburg, three marches have been approved: from Beyers Naudé Square to Constitution Hill (08:00-14:00); a Hillbrow leg running from the Kotze/Hospital streets intersection to the Department of Home Affairs on Plein Street (08:00-12:00); and a Midrand leg from the Dale/Modderfontein roads intersection to the Sandton Plant Hire office (09:00-13:00). In Durban, marchers are gathering at King Dinuzulu Park before proceeding along Dr Pixley KaSeme Street, although the endpoint is subject to confirmation, while in Pretoria the march runs from Church Square to Sunnyside police station (10:00-15:00).

Multiple businesses have reportedly been vandalised by protesters along KaBokweni Road in Ngodini. Officials have also reported looting in Delft, Cape Town, while a flash-bang grenade was deployed against demonstrators in Kraaifontein.

Thousands of migrants have awaited processing in temporary camps for several weeks out of fears of being subjected to violence. Nigeria, Ghana, and Mozambique have initiated the repatriation of citizens, while Zimbabwe’s embassy has issued a warning for nationals to avoid protest areas and limit movement.

President Cyril Ramaphosa has repeatedly called on protesters to act peacefully and responsibly, writing, “[t]he right to protest and freedom of expression does not allow people to threaten or intimidate others, or to engage in acts of vandalism or violence.”

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Longstanding Grievances Continue to Fuel Anti-Migrant Mobilisation in South Africa

The preparations followed weeks of violence and disruption tied to anti-immigration unrest. On 28 June, the Ugandan government said one of its nationals was killed in a suspected anti-immigrant attack in KwaZulu-Natal and said 746 Ugandans had voluntarily registered for evacuation ahead of the 30 June protests. On 20 June, one person was killed during anti-immigrant rioting in central Pietermaritzburg, and local media said at least 1,000 Malawian nationals had fled to nearby Durban. By 17 June, local media reported that more than 600 Malawians had been repatriated from South Africa, with humanitarian services set up in Blantyre. According to South African police, at least 25,000 people, most of whom are from other African countries, have been repatriated.

The unrest also included attacks on foreign-owned businesses and properties, leading to cases of displacement. On 18 June, police stated that seven people were arrested near Vrede, Free State, after more than 15 foreign-owned shops were looted. On 15 June, South African media reported that at least 120 foreign nationals were camping outside a Home Affairs office in central Durban after being displaced by recent anti-migration rioting. On 8 June, residents in George reportedly attacked foreign-owned businesses before police dispersed them.

The rise of dedicated anti-migrant groups likely reflects the increasing organisation of anti-migrant movements in South Africa in recent years. Since 2022, Operation Dudula, meaning “to push”, has reportedly harassed migrant traders in Soweto and Johannesburg. The Dudula Movement concurrently emerged, acting as a vigilante organisation targeting foreign nationals believed to be undocumented. March and March, a self-described “grassroots citizen movement addressing growing concerns about undocumented immigration in South Africa”, is a newer movement aiming to mobilise citizens through “peaceful demonstrations and rallies”.

Migrants make up just under four per cent of South Africa’s population, equivalent to approximately 2.4 million people. Most originate from neighbouring countries, including Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Anti-migrant groups claim that there are also between three and five million undocumented migrants, although these figures are contested. A primary driver of anti-migrant sentiment is South Africa’s high unemployment rate, which remains above 30 per cent. Anti-migrant groups have mobilised this to frame migrants as direct competitors for jobs, housing, informal trading space, and state resources, amid rising economic instability triggered by the Strait of Hormuz closure.

This is the latest of a series of waves of unrest targeting foreign nationals and foreign-owned businesses, with major waves in 2008, 2015, and 2019. In 2008, at least 62 foreign nationals were killed, while in 2015, a wave of anti-foreigner violence that began in Durban and spread to Johannesburg left at least seven people dead and saw the widespread looting and burning of foreign-owned shops. In September 2019, renewed rioting concentrated in Johannesburg and Pretoria again targeted foreign-owned businesses and left roughly 12 people dead.

The 30 June protests are highly likely to be accompanied by incidents of vandalism and looting targeting foreign-owned businesses, as well as isolated violence. There is a realistic possibility that the protests will escalate into widespread clashes with security forces into the evening, particularly if they attempt to disperse protesters with measures perceived as excessive, such as tear gas, water cannon, rubber bullets, and mass arrests.

Travel and Safety Guidance for South Africa

Reconsider non-essential travel to South Africa on 30 June.
Avoid the central business districts in major cities around 30 June.
Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and trusted media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.
Avoid all areas of unrest due to incidental risks to bystanders. If caught in the unrest, travellers should move with the crowd until they find the nearest opportunity to escape. If in a vehicle, look to turn down the nearest road. If driving away is not an option, lock the vehicle and escape on foot.
Always follow all instructions and orders from security forces. Where possible, avoid areas of active unrest and remain in secure accommodation.
Prolonged civil unrest can disrupt travel, especially if protesters begin targeting airports. Travellers should have contingency measures in place, including evacuation plans and reliable access to food, water and medication.
Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any loss of electricity.
Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

Request Evacuation Assistance

If you need secure, coordinated support to move personnel out of a high-risk location, our team is ready to help – quickly, calmly, and with care.

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Doublet Magnitude 7.2 and 7.5 Earthquakes Strike Venezuela

Major Earthquakes Cause Widespread Damage in Venezuela

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 9:00 UTC 25 June 2026

At 18:04 local time (22:04 UTC) on 24 June, a magnitude 7.2 earthquake was detected 23 kilometres southeast of Yumare, Venezuela, at a depth of 20.3 kilometres. The first tremor was followed by a magnitude 7.5 earthquake at 18:05 local time, 39 seconds after the initial foreshock, at a depth of 23 kilometres. Shortly after the earthquakes, the National Weather Service (NWS) issued a tsunami advisory for Venezuela, Curaçao, Aruba, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. A separate notice stated that there was no tsunami risk for the US East Coast, Gulf Coast, or eastern Canada. The tsunami threat remained focused on coastal areas closer to the epicentre, particularly parts of the southern Caribbean. The National Weather Service subsequently updated its tsunami advisory for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, stating that tsunami waves of less than one foot were expected.

Damage and disruption were widespread across Venezuela, specifically in Caracas. Local media sources reported dozens of building collapses, road closures, and utility outages reported across the capital region, including in Catia La Mar, Los Teques, La Pastora, Chacao, Altamira, Los Palos Grandes, Lídice, El Paraíso, Ciudad Universitaria, and San Bernardino. Water and power supplies were affected in Caracas and several northern states, while authorities shut off gas services in impacted areas as a precaution.

Social media footage showed shaking in downtown Caracas, damage inside apartments in La Tahona and significant structural damage in Altamira. A building collapse in the Los Palos Grandes area of Caracas reportedly caused at least two deaths. In Las Minas de Baruta, at least three people were killed in two building collapses. Beyond Caracas, significant damage was reported in La Guaira, Catia La Mar, Tucacas, Turmero, Morón, and San Antonio de los Altos. Reports also indicated multiple collapsed homes on fire in La Guaira, cracks in a highway in Morón, and possible damage or leaks at a chemical plant in Morón. Local media have also reported widespread gas outages and telecommunications service disruptions in Venezuela following the earthquake.

Tremors from the earthquakes were also felt in parts of Brazil’s Amazonas and Pará states, although local media have not reported any structural damage or casualties in those regions.

Video footage showed major damage inside Simón Bolívar International Airport in Maiquetía. Reports indicated that all flights at Simón Bolívar International Airport were cancelled. The Caracas Metro was also evacuated.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez said at least 32 people had been killed and around 700 others injured by the earthquakes, and subsequently announced a nationwide state of emergency. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) has made an initial estimate that the death toll could range from 10,000 to 100,000.

Argentina and Colombia indicated readiness to support response efforts, while Ecuador announced plans to send humanitarian aid. El Salvador said it had prepared more than 300 rescuers and 50 tonnes of equipment, supplies, and medicines for deployment. The Dominican Republic said specialised search-and-rescue teams would depart for Venezuela on the morning of 25 June, and US President Donald Trump has pledged to deploy US resources to Venezuela.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Economic and Political Grievances Continue to Shape Unrest Risks in Kenya

Venezuela is highly exposed to seismic activity. The country is near the boundary between the Caribbean and South American tectonic plates, where plate motion is largely accommodated by major strike-slip fault systems across northern Venezuela, including the Boconó fault system. The 24 June earthquake southeast of Yumare occurred at a shallow depth and was associated with strike-slip faulting along this boundary.

Northern Venezuela has a history of significant seismic activity, though large earthquakes near the June 2026 epicentre have been relatively infrequent over the past century. On 21 August 2018, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake struck Venezuela’s northern coast, damaging dozens of buildings and causing multiple injuries across the country. More recently, in September 2025, magnitude 6.2 and 6.3 tremors near Mene Grande caused at least one death, injured more than 110 people, damaged homes and infrastructure, and were felt across several Venezuelan states and parts of Colombia.

Notable historical earthquakes include a 6.4 magnitude earthquake near Morón in 2009, which injured 18 people and damaged buildings, and a 6.0 magnitude event near Valencia in 1989 that caused minor damage. The most destructive modern earthquake in the wider region was the 1967 Caracas earthquake, which caused around 240 deaths, hundreds of injuries, collapsed several high-rise apartment buildings, and led to widespread destruction. Since 1900, at least five magnitude 7 or larger earthquakes have occurred in northern Venezuela or near its coast. However, it is highly likely that the damage, casualties and impact of the 24 June doublet earthquakes will be the worst in Venezuela in a century.

It is likely that aftershocks will be recorded near the epicentre in the short term. On 25 June, USGS assessed that there is a 94 per cent chance of at least one aftershock of magnitude 5 or above within the next week, and a 29 per cent chance of an aftershock of magnitude 6 or above. Even if lower-magnitude compared to the 24 June earthquake, aftershocks can still result in significant damage, causing critical failures in structures damaged during the initial shocks.

The death toll from the 24 June earthquakes will almost certainly considerably exceed the early estimates provided by the Venezuelan government. The impact of the tremors is highly likely to be compounded by the country’s poor disaster preparedness and emergency response infrastructure. Possible failures in government responses to the earthquakes could rapidly become catalysts for civil unrest in Venezuela, particularly as the country’s leadership has likely been destabilised by the US intervention that captured former President Maduro in January 2026. Previously a staunch geopolitical adversary of the US, Venezuela is now increasingly close to Washington as a result of the US intervention.

The economic impact will highly likely be severe and will fall on a state with minimal fiscal and institutional capacity to absorb it. Venezuela’s economy was already critically degraded prior to the earthquake, and the earthquake has had a severe impact on major economic hubs like the Caracas capital region. Acute humanitarian crisis, pre-existing economic crisis, destroyed utilities, and a transitional government which has contested legitimacy are all factors which could quickly materialise into an anti-government movement and violent civil unrest in the coming months.

Travel and Safety Guidance for Venezuela

Closely monitor local news reports and government alerts.
Expect aftershocks. Be prepared to Drop, Cover, Hold On in case of further tremors.
During a tremor, if outside, do not enter buildings and move away from buildings, trees, streetlights and overhead lines.
If inside, pick a safe place (under a sturdy table or desk, or against an interior wall and away from windows and heavy furniture). Do not leave until the shaking stops.
If evacuating a building, always use the stairs. Look out for fires and falling debris.
Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
Heed evacuation orders and travel to government-issued shelters if safe to do so.
Avoid coastal areas covered by tsunami warnings.
Ensure important documents and medications are appropriately stored.
Prepare an emergency ‘go bag’ with essentials such as bottled water, batteries, important documents, and medications.
Confirm booked flights are running prior to checking out of hotels or travelling to the airport.
Prepare for power outages, communication disruptions, and travel delays.
Stay away from damaged buildings and affected areas until authorities deem them safe.
Management should maintain communication with individuals affected until the event is concluded.

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Kenya Braces for Nationwide Protests on 25 June

Large-Scale Protests Planned Across Kenya

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:00 UTC 24 June 2026

Nationwide demonstrations are planned for 25 June, marking the second anniversary of the 25 June 2024 anti-Finance Bill protests and commemorating those who were killed during the unrest in 2024 and 2025.

Victims’ families have called on Kenyans to march to parliament in Nairobi at 10:00 local time (07:00 UTC) to demand justice and lay flowers where their relatives were killed. Activists have urged participants outside Nairobi to hold peaceful vigils near police stations with flowers and flags, and to document events on mobile phones, livestreams, and hidden cameras to capture any incidents.

Opposition figures, including former Vice-President Kalonzo Musyoka, have called for a large turnout. A group including Siaya Governor James Orengo, activist Boniface Mwangi, and families of protest victims marched to parliament on 18 June and formally notified the police of a nationwide march. Organisers have stated that the demonstrations will remain peaceful and constitutional. Orengo added on social media that “June 25th remains a public holiday of remembrance and resistance.”

The government has ruled out a public holiday, with Government Spokesperson Isaac Mwaura insisting that 25 June remains a normal working day. President William Ruto additionally warned against attempts to “shut down the country”. Police maintain they have not received formal notification authorising demonstrations in Nairobi and have warned that they will respond “firmly” to any attempts to disrupt public order.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Economic and Political Grievances Continue to Shape Unrest Risks in Kenya

Widespread youth-led protests have taken place in Kenya in both 2024 and 2025. In June and July 2024, a series of mass protests erupted in response to proposed tax increases in the government’s Finance Bill 2024. The unrest started in Nairobi, quickly spreading to other parts of the country. On 25 June, thousands of protesters stormed the parliamentary complex, setting fire to the Kenyan Parliament Building. Overall, at least 50 people were killed, and several hundred were injured as protesters clashed with security forces, who used live ammunition and conducted mass arrests.

Widespread protests were also staged in June and early July 2025, after a blogger was killed in police custody, with protesters demanding an end to police brutality. Security forces again responded with force, including live ammunition, tear gas, water cannon, and mass arrests. At least 65 people were killed, and over 550 people were injured. No significant concessions were made following the protests, and police brutality almost certainly remains a core grievance in Kenya.

The planned demonstrations are set to take place amid increased pressure on living costs, as well as frustrations over government plans to allow a US Ebola quarantine facility on its territory. Kenya’s fuel imports are heavily tied to Gulf suppliers, and the price of fuel has spiked due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Although President Ruto has moved to cushion consumers by cutting fuel VAT, using stabilisation funds, and pushing through a diesel price reduction, fuel prices remain elevated and continue to feed wider cost-of-living pressures. This almost certainly increases the risk that the planned protests could escalate into broader anti-government unrest.

Kenyan police forces have a precedent of responding forcefully to demonstrations, deploying live ammunition in both 2024 and 2025 unrest and being accused of abducting, torturing, and killing civilians believed to be leaders of anti-government protests. The apparent lack of authorisation for the demonstrations almost certainly raises the risk of crackdowns being imposed. If security forces are perceived as using disproportionate force against protesters, this will highly likely exacerbate demonstrations. This risk almost certainly elevates with calls for protesters to capture footage, with videos of perceived brutality by security forces highly likely to spread quickly through social media, increase anti-government sentiment and provoke larger demonstrations.

Nairobi’s parliament is located within the Central Business District (CBD), and most protesters will highly likely be gathered there. If protests spread, other hotspots in Nairobi include Kangemi, Ngong, Kamukunji, Thika Road, and Kitengela. During the 2025 protests, security forces blocked off major roads into Nairobi, including Waiyaki Way, Mombasa Road, Thika Road, Ngong Road, Valley Road, Juja Road, and Lang’ata Road. Other cities that may see large-scale gatherings and potential clashes include Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru.

In the lead-up to and during the potential protests, there is a realistic possibility that the government will impose internet outages to prevent the spread of calls for anti-government protests. There will highly likely be a heightened security presence in Nairobi and other major cities on 25 June.

Travel and Safety Guidance for Kenya

Reconsider non-essential travel to Kenya, particularly Nairobi, Mombasa, and other major cities on 25 June.
Avoid the central business district in Nairobi around 25 June, particularly around Kenyatta Avenue, Haile Selassie Avenue, City Hall, and any other wide roads conducive to the staging of protests, as well as all major government buildings such as the Kenyan Parliament or the Governor’s Office.
Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and trusted media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.
Avoid all areas of unrest due to incidental risks to bystanders. If caught in the unrest, travellers should move with the crowd until they find the nearest opportunity to escape. If in a vehicle, look to turn down the nearest road. If driving away is not an option, lock the vehicle and escape on foot.
Always follow all instructions and orders from security forces. Where possible, avoid areas of active unrest and remain in secure accommodation.
Prolonged civil unrest can disrupt travel, especially if protesters begin targeting airports. Travellers should have contingency measures in place, including evacuation plans and reliable access to food, water and medication.
Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any loss of electricity.
Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

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Large-Scale Teachers’ Union Protests in Mexico as World Cup Begins

Teachers’ Strike Raises Operational Risks During World Cup

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 13:00 UTC 11 June 2026

Mexico’s largest teachers’ union, the National Coordinator of Education Workers (Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, CNTE), has continued to coordinate large-scale and disruptive protests across Mexico as the 2026 FIFA World Cup opens. The protests form part of an ongoing nationwide strike that began in May and has involved thousands of teachers and education workers across multiple states. The CNTE is demanding the repeal of pension reforms, higher wages, improved working conditions and direct negotiations with the federal government.

The World Cup, which is being co-hosted with the United States and Canada, is being contested by 48 teams across 104 matches in 16 cities, and opens on 11 June. Mexico is scheduled to play the inaugural match against South Africa at the Estadio Azteca in Mexico City. Mexico’s three host cities are Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey.

Mexico City has remained the epicentre of the protest movement. Demonstrators have maintained a large encampment in the capital’s central district and have repeatedly disrupted transport networks through marches and by establishing roadblocks. On 5 June, teachers blocked several major roads across the capital, causing significant transport disruption. On 9 June, police prevented a teachers’ march from reaching a stadium scheduled to host FIFA World Cup events, and protesters have toppled World Cup symbols in the capital, including statues of football players. Protesters have also effectively blocked access to the central plaza (Zócalo) designated to host the capital’s main fan celebrations. On 10 June, protesters warned that they would block access to Mexico City’s Benito Juárez International Airport (AICM).

Smaller-scale protests have also been observed in the states of Guerrero, Michoacán, Morelos, Zacatecas and Baja California, where teachers have occupied government buildings, blocked roads and organised strikes. In several locations, protesters have reportedly used fireworks and other improvised projectiles during confrontations with authorities.

In response, Mexican authorities have mounted one of the country’s largest peacetime security operations. More than 100,000 soldiers, marines, National Guard and police personnel are reported to be deployed across the three host cities and major tourist destinations for the duration of the tournament, supported by anti-drone teams, surveillance-camera networks and specialised crowd-management units operating at stadiums, fan zones, airports and national-team camps in coordination with FIFA. The deployment also reflects broader security concerns: Guadalajara experienced a severe but brief outbreak of cartel-related violence earlier in the year, and host-city authorities have increased visible patrols to reassure visitors and residents.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Disruption Risks in Mexico Likely to Persist Throughout the Tournament

Large-scale, disruptive and coordinated protests have almost certainly been staged by the CNTE to maximise pressure on the central government ahead of and during the 2026 FIFA World Cup, and have likely been designed to provide minimal time for President Sheinbaum to concede to their demands. The deliberate targeting of World Cup symbols, such as player statues, and the establishment of an encampment near the capital’s fan zone have almost certainly been intended to signal the CNTE’s intent to disrupt the tournament and to increase the political and reputational cost of failing to resolve the dispute before the tournament begins.

With the World Cup beginning on 11 June, and Mexico hosting the opening match at the Estadio Azteca, it is increasingly unlikely that the government will concede to CNTE demands in the near term. The CNTE is likely to continue using the tournament as leverage by targeting high-visibility locations and key transport routes, which is likely to result in major disruption on the international stage and sustain pressure on the federal government throughout the early stages of the tournament.

The CNTE has successfully organised large-scale and coordinated protests across Mexico on multiple occasions. Moreover, several smaller protest movements, such as farmers’ and transport unions, have threatened to disrupt the tournament. The likelihood of protests continuing throughout the tournament is high, with protesters likely to target fan zones, World Cup venues, transport hubs, airports, border crossings, government buildings and major roads in order to cause significant disruption and achieve maximum visibility.

The government has already deployed security forces to prevent protesters from reaching World Cup venues and to clear or contain demonstrations, and is likely to deploy additional forces during the tournament. As a result, there is a high risk of violent clashes, arrests and the use of dispersal tactics at or near protest sites. If the protests continue to escalate, there is a realistic possibility that security resources will become overstretched, limiting the authorities’ ability to manage unrest while simultaneously protecting tournament sites and transport routes. This risk is likely further compounded in host cities such as Guadalajara, where security forces are also committed to countering organised crime threats. Any concurrent criminal or security incident could further reduce the resources available to manage protest activity.

Travel and Safety Guidance for Mexico

Travellers should avoid areas prone to protest or where demonstrations have been organised, particularly around World Cup venues, fan zones and fan festivals, government buildings and central Mexico City.
Travellers should closely monitor local news reports, government alerts, official FIFA and venue advisories, trusted local media, and, if available, a security provider’s intelligence feed for updates relevant to the demonstrations and to match-day arrangements.
Additional time should be allocated to all transfers to and from stadiums, fan zones and airports, and pre-plan alternative routes due to the high likelihood of roadblocks and marches.
Anticipate disruption at Mexico City’s Benito Juárez International Airport (AICM), particularly if protests affect access roads. Where feasible, consider Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA) or Toluca as contingency options and allow additional time for check-in, transfers and security screening.
Where possible, vetted or private transport should be used and public transport avoided near demonstrations and city centres.
If in the vicinity of a protest, it is advised to leave the area if it is safe to do so, and always abide by the directions of police and security authorities.
If caught in a crowd and unable to leave, take precautions to minimise the risk of crowd crush: stay upright, move away from all hard barriers, move with and not against the crowd, and hold your arms at chest level in a boxer-like stance to relieve pressure.
Ensure that you always carry personal identification documents or copies.
Ensure all travellers know key contact numbers, including local emergency services, their embassy or consulate, accommodation security, venue security and any contracted assistance provider.
Organisations should review staff attendance plans for World Cup events, brief travellers on high-risk areas for protests, consider flexible or remote working arrangements during large-scale protests, and confirm emergency communications, check-in and rendezvous protocols before travel.

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Gulf Security Under Pressure Following Israel-Iran Strikes

Israel-Iran Strikes Renew Threats to Gulf Stability

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 13:00 UTC 8 June 2026

Following escalating conflict in Lebanon, Israel and Iran engaged in retaliatory tit-for-tat strikes. Late 7 June, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) stated that it had intercepted a wave of Iranian missiles in northern Israel. Iran reportedly launched at least ten ballistic missiles against Israel, all of which the IDF claimed were intercepted. This was Iran’s first direct attack against Israel since the implementation of the 8 April ceasefire.

The strikes followed a rocket attack on northern Israel launched by Hezbollah in Lebanon on 7 June, which the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) responded to with strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh).

A statement from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that Iranian “missile and drone units launched a co-ordinated and intensive attack targeting the heart of the northern cities”. The statement added that “this operation is not a passing event, but rather the beginning of a full week of continuous strikes” and that “waves of missiles and drones will continue to be launched around the clock for the next seven days until the enemy is deterred and ceases its crimes. … Any targeting of Iranian territory will be met with a devastating and overwhelming response beyond all expectation.”

Early 8 June, Israel launched retaliatory strikes on western and central Iran, with Iranian state TV reporting explosions in multiple cities, including Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and near Karaj. The IDF claimed that it launched strikes against “several targets” at an Iranian petrochemical facility in Mahshahr.

Missiles were subsequently fired from Yemen, alongside another Iranian salvo, with the Houthis claiming that they conducted a joint strike with Iran. The group also reiterated their total ban on Israeli vessels transiting the Red Sea. The IRGC stated that it targeted two Israeli air bases in Nevatim and Tel Nof.

The Al-Kharj governorate in Saudi Arabia issued an early warning in the early hours of 8 June “in anticipation of a possible danger”. Al-Kharj hosts the US Prince Sultan Air Base, which was regularly attacked until the 8 April ceasefire. Iranian officials have denied an attempted attack on Saudi Arabia, and an attack against Al-Kharj remains unconfirmed.

US President Donald Trump has reportedly made significant efforts to “restrain” the Israeli response against Iran to allow more time for diplomacy. At approximately 11:30 UTC, the IRGC issued a statement that “the cessation of armed forces operations is hereby announced”, but that if attacks continue, “including in southern Lebanon”, Iran will respond “more severe and forceful than before”. It is not immediately clear whether Israel has also agreed to a pause, and Israeli media have reported that no final decision has been made, as of 13:00 UTC, 8 June.

After this statement, Lebanese media reported further Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon. Three rockets were reportedly launched by Hezbollah at IDF troops in southern Lebanon in response. Two of the rockets were intercepted, while a third struck close to the target. No casualties were reported.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Drivers of Further Middle East Escalation Remain Unresolved

Tehran had previously warned that strikes in Beirut “could derail the diplomatic track” and prompt retaliation, with Iranian officials consistently insisting that the ceasefire includes Lebanon. Continued conflict in Lebanon, which remains highly likely, will almost certainly continue to complicate the wider US-Iran negotiations and could again trigger further cycles of Israel-Iran strikes, which endanger the broader ceasefire.

Hezbollah have historically served as a key component of Iranian deterrence in the region, and its preservation is highly likely a strategic priority for Tehran. However, the regime’s focus on Lebanon and claimed suspension of negotiations also followed President Trump’s request for several amendments to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) being negotiated by the US and Iran.

It is highly likely that the Iranian regime, which is increasingly under the control of hardline IRGC commanders such as Major General Ahmad Vahidi, calculates that it is willing to accept the risk of a return to full-scale conflict or a continuation of the current status quo rather than be perceived as conceding to US demands. By increasingly linking the status of the ceasefire to Lebanon, the regime likely also seeks to divert attention from and gain leverage over the two principal points of contention in negotiations: control of the Strait of Hormuz and the nuclear file.

As of 13:00 UTC, 8 June, it remains unconfirmed whether the current escalation cycle between Israel and Iran has fully ceased. If Israel conducts further strikes against either Iran or Beirut in the coming hours, this would almost certainly be met with further Iranian retaliation.

If further tit-for-tat strikes are sustained, or an Israel-Iran confrontation is again prompted by developments in Lebanon, there is a realistic possibility of Iranian retaliation strikes expanding to include attacks on the Gulf States. Iran’s chief negotiator and parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, threatened that the Israeli strikes against Iran, in addition to the ongoing US naval blockade, have made US bases and assets in the region “legitimate targets”. Moreover, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet Fars, citing a senior Iranian official, reported that if Iranian energy infrastructure is attacked again, Iran will carry out attacks against US oil and gas facilities in the region.

The involvement of the Yemen-based Houthis was almost certainly limited and primarily performative. However, their involvement highly likely serves Tehran as a key deterrence due to the Houthi capability to impact maritime traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The most critical leverage Iran has highly likely been able to impose against the US is the continued impact on the global economy and energy markets due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which remains severely disrupted. In the event of a full-scale escalation, it is likely that Iran would seek to additionally close the Bab al-Mandeb, as repeatedly threatened.

Travel and Safety Guidance for the Middle East

Avoid all non-essential travel to the Middle East.
Travellers should follow shelter-in-place orders and advisories, particularly in Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.
Do not conduct travel to the airport until shelter-in-place orders or recommendations are lifted. Once lifted, ensure that booked flights are still running before conducting travel to the airport.
Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if situated in the Middle East.
Sign up for government/embassy alerts.
Avoid all military installations, government buildings, and key infrastructure, which may constitute potential targets.
Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
Expect the security situation in the region to remain unstable in the immediate future. There is an increased risk of further strikes, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest.
Prepare an essential “go-bag” containing, at a minimum, travel documents, cash, medications, basic supplies, and communication devices in case of evacuation.
Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

Request Evacuation Assistance

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Major Earthquake Causes Widespread Disruption in the Philippines

Tsunami Alert after 7.8-Magnitude Quake Hits the Philippines

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 10:00 UTC 8 June 2026

At 06:37 local time on 08 June (22:37 UTC on 07 June), a magnitude 7.8 earthquake was detected 24 kilometres west-southwest of Burias, Philippines, at a depth of 35 kilometres. The earthquake has killed at least 19 people and injured over 200, in addition to causing widespread infrastructure damage and flight disruptions. The primary earthquake was followed by over 130 aftershocks ranging from 1.3 to 6.7 in magnitude.

Damage and disruption were widespread across southern Mindanao. At least 20 structures were reported damaged in Soccsksargen. Video and photos showed a collapsed school in Jose Abad Santos, damaged buildings in Malapatan, severe damage at the Port of Mabila on the Balut Islands near the epicentre, and landslides into Lake Holon in South Cotabato. Power outages were widely reported in South Cotabato, Sarangani, and General Santos, and at least 17 flights were cancelled at General Santos International Airport (GES / RPMR) because of earthquake damage.

Shortly after the earthquake, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre issued a tsunami alert for the Philippines and across a large part of southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and Australia. A tsunami measuring a few centimetres was later seen in Okinawa, while a 20-centimetre wave was measured in Ogasawara Islands. Tsunami waves were also detected along the coasts of Indonesia, Palau, and the Philippines, ranging from a few centimetres to 1.4 metres. In a later update, the threat was declared largely over.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has stated that evacuation centres are ready and operational. Government agencies have continued to assess damage and clear routes for rescue operations.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Philippines Earthquake Triggers Significant Operational Challenges

The Philippines is almost certainly among the most vulnerable countries in the world to natural disasters. The archipelago is hit by approximately 20 typhoons and tropical storms a year, and its location in the Pacific ‘Ring of Fire’ means it is highly seismically active. In 2023, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake killed at least three people and injured 79, and in 2022, a magnitude 7 earthquake killed at least five people and injured 60. However, the 30 September 2025 Cebu earthquake, which killed at least 79 and injured 1,271, stands out as one of the deadliest earthquakes in the Philippines in years.

The Philippines has poor disaster resilience. A country’s disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, is a critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. Due to the confluence of the Philippines’ extreme exposure to natural hazards and its poor disaster resilience, the country is frequently cited as the most disaster-prone country in the world.

In late 2025, mass nationwide protests occurred in the Philippines due to public grievances regarding corruption in disaster resilience projects, particularly flood defences. While the movement had largely declined by early December, it is likely that the devastation of the earthquake may reinforce public perceptions that disaster-resilience funds and infrastructure governance are weak. There is a realistic possibility that this will trigger a resurgence in the protest movement in the coming weeks.

Travel and Safety Guidance for the Philippines

Closely monitor local news reports and government alerts.
Expect aftershocks. Be prepared to Drop, Cover, Hold On in case of further tremors.
During a tremor, if outside, do not enter buildings and move away from buildings, trees, streetlights and overhead lines.
If inside, pick a safe place (under a sturdy table or desk, or against an interior wall and away from windows and heavy furniture). Do not leave until the shaking stops.
If evacuating a building, always use the stairs. Look out for fires and falling debris.
Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
Heed evacuation orders and travel to government-issued shelters if safe to do so.
Avoid coastal areas covered by tsunami warnings.
Ensure important documents and medications are appropriately stored.
Prepare an emergency ‘go bag’ with essentials such as bottled water, batteries, important documents, and medications.
Confirm booked flights are running prior to checking out of hotels or travelling to the airport.
Prepare for power outages, communication disruptions, and travel delays.
Stay away from damaged buildings and affected areas until authorities deem them safe.

Request Evacuation Assistance

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Elevated Unrest Risk in Paris Ahead of Champions League Final

Paris Braces for Unrest Ahead of Champions League Final

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut-off: 13:30 UTC 29 May 2026

The final game of the UEFA Champions League will be played in Budapest, Hungary, on 30 May, starting at 18:00 local time (16:00 UTC). The final will be contested by Paris Saint-Germain (PSG), the current title-holder, having won the tournament in 2025, and Arsenal. Previous high-profile PSG games in the Champions League have resulted in large-scale, violent civil unrest and disorder in Paris and other parts of France.

In preparation for the final game, the Paris Police Prefecture has implemented a series of traffic management measures, including localised road closures. These will be in place from 17:00 local time on 30 May to 05:00 on 31 May. Restrictions include a blanket traffic ban within a perimeter that includes Place Charles de Gaulle (where the Arc de Triomphe is located) and the Champs-Élysées, with traffic on nearby roads being restricted. Authorities have also imposed restrictions on taking exits from the Périphérique (the ring road) leading to the 16th and 17th Arrondissements.

Public transport will also be restricted: the Charles de Gaulle – Étoile station will remain closed (17:00-05:00), while the Metro Line 6 will bypass Kléber, Charles de Gaulle – Étoile, and Trocadéro starting from 19:30 local time. Other Metro lines that will face closures include Lines 1, 2, 8, 9, 12, 13, as well as RER Line A. Buses are expected not to stop near the security perimeter.

A large official fan zone will be in the Parc des Princes stadium. Authorities have also designated the Champ de Mars (the area near the Eiffel Tower) for post-match celebrations, instead of the previously used Champs-Élysées area.

Approximately 8,000 extra police officers will be deployed in Paris on the day of the match. This represents a notable increase compared to the 5,400 deployed for the previous final game in 2025.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Transport and Mobility Disruptions Expected across Paris

It is highly likely that the final game will result in large-scale, violent unrest in Paris, regardless of the match result. In 2025, following PSG’s victory against Inter Milan in the Champions League final, riots broke out across Paris and other major French cities. The riots resulted in widespread cases of vandalism, more than 500 arrests, hundreds of injuries, an estimated 264 vehicles set on fire, and severe transport and service disruptions. Two deaths were also recorded, one in Paris and one in Dax, in the southwest of France.

Violent unrest also occurred on 7 May 2026, following PSG’s victory in the 2026 Champions League semi-final over Bayern Munich. At least 127 people were arrested, mostly in Paris, and 30 people were injured, with one being severely hurt by a firework.

Previous clashes were marked by the widespread use of fireworks to attack police, posing a significant risk to bystanders. Previous protests were also marked by indiscriminate attacks on transiting private vehicles, with passengers also occasionally being harassed or attacked.

Violent unrest is likeliest to take place outside the Parc des Princes stadium, on the Champs-Élysées and in the Champ de Mars, with other at-risk areas including Trocadéro and Concorde. While most of the likely high-risk areas for unrest are located in northwest Paris, incidents in other parts of the city, such as the Marais area, République, Canal St. Martin, and Bastille, cannot be ruled out.

Unrest is likely to begin in the early afternoon and will progressively intensify after the match starts. During previous games, unrest reached its peak intensity at night. If police intervene to violently disperse the unrest, this will likely result in violence and vandalism occurring in smaller roadways and residential areas.

Travel and Safety Guidance for Paris

Reconsider non-essential travel to central and western Paris on the afternoon and evening of 30 May.
Avoid the stadium and any large gatherings. Always maintain situational awareness.
If office premises are located near possible unrest hotspots, park company vehicles indoors or relocate them outside of the at-risk area. Choose a parking location that has in-person, 24/7 security.
Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and trusted media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.
Avoid all areas of unrest due to incidental risks to bystanders. If caught in the unrest, travellers should move with the crowd until they find the nearest opportunity to escape. If in a vehicle, look to turn down the nearest road. If driving away is not an option, lock the vehicle and escape on foot.
Always follow all instructions and orders from security forces. Where possible, avoid areas of active unrest and remain in secure accommodation.

Request Evacuation Assistance

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Large-scale unrest escalates in La Paz and several regions of Bolivia

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 13:30 UTC 21 May 2026

Large-scale protests have been ongoing in Bolivia since early May, with unrest intensifying in recent days. Protests were organised by the largest federation of labour unions in Bolivia, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), which called for an “open-ended” strike beginning 5 May. The labour unions have been joined by Indigenous organisations, teachers, miners, transport workers, healthcare staff, and agricultural groups.

On 15 May, the UK FCDO issued a notice advising “against all travel” to the department of La Paz, including the administrative capital, La Paz, and the city of El Alto, due to an escalation in violent unrest.

On 18-19 May, large-scale demonstrations were recorded in La Paz, leading to widespread vandalism, attacks on government buildings, and day-long clashes between protesters and police. The protests coincided with the arrival in the capital of supporters of former president Movement for Socialism (MAS) party leader, Evo Morales, following a six-day march from Oruro in the Andes; some were reportedly carrying dynamite sticks and other weapons.

Morales has endorsed the protest and alleged, on 15 May, that the US ordered the right-wing government of President Rodrigo Paz to stage a “military operation” to capture or kill him. Furthermore, Morales announced on 20 May a “90-day ultimatum” to President Paz, calling on him to resign and organise new elections or face a coordinated escalation of the unrest.

Protesters have imposed a de facto blockade on La Paz, blocking key roadways leading to the administrative capital and causing localised shortages in fuel, some basic goods, and medical supplies. In addition to the protests in La Paz, unrest and roadblocks have been recorded in several regions, including Beni, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Tarija, Potosí, and Oruro, with up to 60–65 roadblocks recorded nationwide. Multiple roadblocks have been established in Cochabamba, an area with a large Indigenous population and a Morales stronghold.

“Indefinite” protests began on 19 May in Chuquisaca. In Chapare, protesters occupied an airport, which led to a shutdown in operations. On 20 May, the main highway between El Alto airport and La Paz was temporarily blocked. Four people have been killed in the protests as of 21 May, with dozens of injuries and more than 100 arrests.

The protests have had an impact beyond Bolivia’s borders. On 17 May, Colombian President Gustavo Petro shared a video that labelled President Paz as a “puppet of the US”, which prompted Bolivian authorities to expel the Colombian ambassador. Washington, which has strongly supported President Paz, claimed that the protests are a “coup d’état”.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Bolivia Unrest Highlights Structural Weaknesses in Paz Government

The current protest movement in Bolivia has almost certainly evolved into a large-scale challenge to President Paz’s government, as reflected by the increased participation of civil society actors, unions and other sections of Bolivian society. In addition, the drivers of unrest have almost certainly expanded in scope. Initial protests were a direct reaction to fuel subsidy cuts, but have increasingly been driven by broader socioeconomic grievances, including inflation, fuel shortages, wage and pension demands, opposition to the government’s wider reform agenda, and calls for the president to resign.

Paz was elected in November 2025. However, millions of Bolivians view the incumbent government as illegitimate. Paz’s centre-right Christian Democratic Party (PDC) succeeded due to the fragmentation of the long-dominant MAS, which resulted in the left-wing vote being split between several candidates. This means that Paz’s control of the executive is not reflective of an actual political mandate, with most of Bolivia’s electorate likely still aligned with MAS.

This political vulnerability almost certainly constitutes a major structural weakness, which makes the Paz government unable to address the root causes of the unrest and provide a policymaking alternative that could restore order in the short term while preserving government integrity. The ongoing international fuel crisis caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has almost certainly worsened the fallout from the fuel subsidy removal and further constrained the government’s room for manoeuvre.

In the immediate term, it is likely that violent unrest will continue in La Paz and in the rural parts of Bolivia, such as Chapare and Cochabamba, where Morales has a strong base of support. Due to the use of explosives by protesters and the violent response by officers, it is likely that the protests will result in further fatalities.

The highly dispersed system of roadblocks used by protesters is likely aimed at maximising disruption while overstretching police clearance operations. However, if sustained, the government will likely be forced to deploy additional police and military personnel to clear key routes and protect critical supply corridors, increasing the risk of violence between protestors and security forces, which in turn could exacerbate unrest.

Sustained nationwide roadblocks will likely cause protracted travel and service disruptions in La Paz and other large urban centres. Local media have already reported shortages of medicine and medical equipment, which will likely decrease access to quality healthcare. The government has already deployed the Bolivian Air Force to transport food to La Paz from other parts of the country.

Extended fuel shortages are likely to cause power outages, with secondary impacts, such as an increase in property crime, also being possible. For travellers, blockades are likely to reduce options to leave Bolivia, with several roadblocks established on the approaches to airports and international borders.

There is a realistic possibility that the Paz government will increasingly deploy coercive measures to contain the protests, with the likelihood of this increasing if the blockade of La Paz continues. Such efforts would be primarily dedicated to securing La Paz, but would almost certainly provoke a violent reaction, with attacks on security forces and police becoming likelier. In rural areas, these could take the form of ambushes on police units responding to blockades. Previous examples of this include an attack which occurred in June 2025 in the mining town of Llallahua in the Potosí region, where three officers were killed in an ambush.

Travel and Safety Guidance for La Paz, Bolivia

Avoid areas prone to protest or where demonstrations have been organised, especially government buildings, universities, and major urban centres.
Closely monitor local news reports, government alerts, trusted local media, and, if available, a security provider’s intelligence/alerting feed, for updates relevant to the demonstrations.
Avoid all travel to and from La Paz, unless strictly necessary.
Allocate additional time for travel to or near areas where protests are scheduled, due to the possibility of increased traffic or travel disruptions.
Where possible, use alternative routes to steer clear of city centres and avoid public transport.
If in the vicinity of a protest, try to leave if it is safe to do so. Always abide by authority and police directions.
If you are in a crowd and unable to leave, take precautions to minimise the risk of crowd crush. These include staying upright, moving away from all hard barriers, going with and not against the crowd, and holding your arms at chest level in a boxer-like stance to relieve pressure.
Ensure that you always carry personal identification documents or copies.
Ensure knowledge of important contact numbers. These should include at least the local emergency number(s) and contacts for your local embassy or consulate.
If protests are scheduled to occur near business premises or travel destinations, consider alternative working arrangements, such as remote work, to minimise the threat to employees and business travellers.

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Nakba Day 2026:
Global Protest Outlook

Nakba Day 2026 Protest Outlook Amid Elevated Global Unrest Risks

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 13 MAY 2026

The 78th anniversary of the Nakba falls on 15 May, 2026. The Arabic term “Nakba” (“catastrophe”) refers to the mass-displacement of Palestinians following the 1947-49 conflict. The Nakba is central to the formation of Palestinian identity and continues to shape political perspectives and activism in support of Palestine across the world.

Nakba protests have increased in size and volume since the outbreak of the war in Gaza in late 2023. In cities including London, New York, Paris, Berlin, and Barcelona, protests are frequently attended by hundreds of thousands of people, with the 2025 London event reportedly drawing 500,000 participants. Nakba Day protests have mostly occurred in city centres, often in the vicinity of US and Israeli diplomatic facilities.

In both Europe and North America, university-based groups have been actively spearheading the protests, making campuses epicentres of demonstrations. During past anniversaries, student groups in several American and European cities staged large-scale demonstrations and more disruptive forms of activism, including occupations, sit-ins, and blockades.

Nakba Day protests are also common in the Middle East, due to the commemoration’s lasting political importance. Nakba Day protests often occur in Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon.

The increased visibility of the pro-Palestine movement has driven an increase in the volume of Nakba Day protests outside of North America, Europe, and the Middle East. In past years, large-scale protests were recorded in several South and Central American countries and in Japan.

On previous commemorations, there have been several pro-Israel counterprotests. Tensions between protesters and counterprotesters, or between protesters and security forces, have been observed on multiple occasions. These have included episodes of violence and harassment.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Large-Scale Nakba Day Protests Expected Globally

In 2026, Nakba Day will almost certainly coincide with large-scale protests in major urban centres across North America, Western Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and parts of the Asia-Pacific. Protest activity in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be lower by comparison, although large-scale demonstrations remain likely in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Kenya, and South Africa.

The ongoing but contested ceasefire in Gaza is unlikely to result in a reduction in the volume of protests or their attendance compared to 2025. Instead, the 2026 protests have a realistic possibility of exceeding the scope of last year’s. Developments that will likely drive large-scale Nakba Day protests in 2026 include the ongoing Iran conflict, the continuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, expanded operations in the West Bank, and the resumption of high-intensity conflict in Lebanon.

Other events not directly related to Gaza or the broader Middle East are also likely to influence protests. In Mexico, the US, and Canada, protests may focus on the upcoming World Cup, with several activist groups having been formed to oppose the event. In the United Kingdom, the anniversary will fall a week after the deeply contested local elections, and shortly after the end of a trial for several members of “Palestine Action”, a proscribed pro-Palestine direct action group. In Argentina, recent scandals have destabilised the government of President Milei. In the US, the anniversary falls during the opening stages of the electoral campaign for the November midterm elections.

While many protests will take place on 15 May, several large-scale demonstrations have been organised over the 16-17 May weekend. Areas where protests have already been organised (or are highly likely to be announced) include London, Sydney, Paris, Los Angeles, New York, Washington D.C., Johannesburg, Brussels, Amsterdam, and Barcelona.

The case of London is particularly notable, as a far-right march has also been scheduled to occur in the city’s centre on Nakba Day, where pro-Palestine protests are simultaneously planned. The last “Unite the Kingdom” rally, in September 2025, was attended by more than 100,000 people. The presence of hundreds of thousands of protesters with radically different political positions has a realistic possibility of resulting in severe disruptions in central London, including violent clashes.

Planned Nakba Day rallies are mostly scheduled to begin in the late morning, although disruptions may begin earlier and continue throughout the day. In addition to planned demonstrations, smaller gatherings are likely to occur, possibly as groups splinter from the main crowd. Common protest methods on Nakba Day include slow marches through city centres, the symbolic “occupation” of government offices or, more frequently, academic buildings on university campuses. Particularly in large cities, protests will almost certainly be heavily policed, and authorities will implement road closures and other mitigation measures ahead of Nakba Day.

Protests are particularly likely to occur in high-visibility areas of city centres, particularly in the vicinity of government offices, Israeli and US embassies, and other diplomatic offices such as consulates. In addition to these, past pro-Palestine protests have targeted businesses that have links with Israel or have been accused of directly or indirectly aiding the Israeli war effort, such as insurance companies. Universities are highly likely to be particularly at-risk hotspots for civil unrest.

Pro-Palestine activist groups are highly likely to stage direct action on or near Nakba Day. This form of unrest may include targeted actions meant to affect transport, particularly at airports, train stations, and public transport hubs. Direct action may also include vandalism of government offices or commercial and corporate assets and premises.

While most demonstrations are likely to remain peaceful, there is a threat of violence in connection with the protests. In the past, pro-Palestine protests have resulted in clashes between attendees and responding police. In countries including India, Bangladesh, and the United States, protesters have vandalised businesses and stores perceived to be linked with Israel or Israeli entities. As counterdemonstrations by pro-Israel activists often occur on symbolically important dates, there is a threat of clashes between opposing protesters, although this is often mitigated by large police deployments.

Finally, Nakba Day protests are high-visibility events. As such, there is a realistic possibility of opportunistic extremist action, including terrorist attacks, on or near the day. Organised terror groups as well as self-radicalised “lone wolves” may seek to stage attacks during Nakba Day. High-risk targets also include government buildings and diplomatic offices, Jewish and Islamic places of worship, and university campuses.

Travel and Safety Guidance for Nakba Day 2026

Avoid areas prone to protest or where demonstrations have been organised, especially government buildings, universities, and major urban centres.
Closely monitor local news reports, government alerts, trusted local media, and, if available, a security provider’s intelligence/alerting feed, for updates relevant to the demonstrations.
Allocate additional time for travel to or near areas where protests are scheduled, due to the possibility of increased traffic or travel disruptions.
Where possible, use alternative routes to steer clear of city centres and avoid public transport.
When planning travel, note that most planned demonstrations will begin between 11:00-14:00 local time.
If in the vicinity of a protest, try to leave if it is safe to do so. Always abide by authority and police directions.
If you are in a crowd and unable to leave, take precautions to minimise the risk of crowd crush. These include staying upright, moving away from all hard barriers, going with and not against the crowd, and holding your arms at chest level in a boxer-like stance to relieve pressure.
Ensure that you always carry personal identification documents or copies.
Ensure knowledge of important contact numbers. These should include at least the local emergency number(s) and contacts for your local embassy or consulate.
If protests are scheduled to occur near business premises or travel destinations, consider alternative working arrangements, such as remote work, to minimise the threat to employees and business travellers.

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Calls for Protests in Kenya Over Fuel Price Increases

Kenya Faces Protest Risk After Sharp Fuel Price Increase

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:15 UTC 17 APRIL 2026

Kenyan opposition members have called for protests in Nairobi on 21 April under the social media hashtag #RejectFuelPrices. In response, Nairobi Police Commander Issa Mohamud claimed that the protests are “unlawful”, since protesters must notify the police at least 14 days in advance of planned protests and public gatherings. Mohamud added that they will “take appropriate action” and that violence or theft “will not be tolerated, and arrests will be made”.

The calls for demonstrations follow a 15 April decision from Kenya’s Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA), which sets the maximum retail prices, to increase fuel prices. Under the revision, petrol prices are set to increase by 16.1 per cent and diesel prices by 24.2 per cent. The EPRA cited the costs of imported products, which have increased by up to 68.7 per cent. The new pricing will apply from 16 April to 14 May.

Earlier on 15 April, former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua, on behalf of the opposition coalition United Opposition, gave the government a seven-day ultimatum to act on a series of demands aimed at reducing fuel prices. These demands include scrapping the controversial government-to-government (G-to-G) fuel import deal, reducing fuel taxes, including VAT and the road maintenance levy, and redirecting funds from major government projects to protect consumers. Should the government fail to address these demands, the United Opposition has threatened to call for “mass action”.

President William Ruto spoke the same day, dismissing the need for protests. He stated, “[t]here are others saying that because fuel prices have increased globally, they will hold protests in the country. I want to ask, if they protest, will the cost of fuel decrease? We must use our brains to find ways to reduce the price of fuel.” He has also stated that the government had already absorbed part of the price increase through subsidies.

To quell potential unrest, Ruto has announced the reduction of fuel VAT from 16 per cent to 8 per cent for the next three months, as well as a crackdown on oil cartels, saying there would be no tolerance for manipulation in the petroleum sector.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

High Likelihood of Protest Turnout in Nairobi

Kenya’s fuel imports are heavily tied to Gulf suppliers, and the price of fuel has spiked due to the recent closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Under the G-to-G framework, Kenya’s petroleum import system set up during Ruto’s government in March 2023, Kenya is supplied by Saudi Arabia’s Aramco Trading; the UAE’s Fujairah FZE and ADNOC Global Trading; and Singapore’s ENOC Singapore.

Kenya has seen major protests in recent years linked to the cost of living. In June and August 2024, a series of mass protests erupted in response to proposed tax increases in the government’s Finance Bill 2024. The unrest started in Nairobi, quickly spreading to other parts of the country. 50 people were killed, and over 230 were injured as protesters torched the Kenyan Parliament Building and clashed with security forces, who used live ammunition and conducted mass arrests. Demonstrations subsided after the government rejected the bill on 28 June.

Widespread protests again took place in June and early July 2025, after a blogger was killed in police custody, with protesters demanding an end to police brutality. Security forces again responded with repression, including live ammunition, tear gas, water cannon, and mass arrests. At least 65 people were killed, and over 550 people were injured. No significant concessions were made, and the issue of police brutality almost certainly remains unresolved.

It is not certain that the #RejectFuelPrices protests will go ahead, since President Ruto has already made minor concessions, and some Kenyans will almost certainly be deterred from attending by the threat of arrest or being subjected to police brutality. However, Kenya, particularly Nairobi, has a strong student movement and experienced several major anti-government demonstrations in recent years, raising the likelihood that the protests will take place and be well-attended

Kenyan police forces have a precedent of responding heavily-handedly to demonstrations, deploying live ammunition in both 2024 and 2025 unrest. If the planned 21 April protests go ahead, they will likely be met with force, particularly since the demonstrations have been deemed unlawful. If security forces are perceived as using disproportionate force against protesters, this will highly likely exacerbate demonstrations.

The opposition’s seven-day ultimatum is set to expire on 22 April, one day after the planned #RejectFuelPrices protest. Aside from cutting fuel VAT, President Ruto has not acquiesced to the United Opposition’s demands, and it is unlikely that he will announce further cost-cutting measures before the deadline, especially since he has publicly defended the G-to-G scheme. If the opposition’s deadline passes without significant government concessions and they call for “mass action”, this will highly likely further escalate unrest.

While precise protest locations have not been specified in the call for demonstrations, hotspots in Nairobi include the Central Business District, particularly near the City Hall and the Kenyan parliament; Kangemi; Ngong; Kamukunji; Thika Road; and Kitengela. During the 2025 protests, security forces blocked off major roads into Nairobi, including Waiyaki Way, Mombasa Road, Thika Road, Ngong Road, Valley Road, Juja Road, and Lang’ata Road.

Multiple other African countries have seen major fuel price increases. Nigeria has seen the steepest increases, with prices increasing by approximately 65 per cent. Senegal, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and South Africa are other notable countries that have seen major price increases and fuel shortages in recent weeks.

Previous waves of Kenyan unrest have inspired similar Gen Z-led movements in other African countries, such as Nigeria and Mozambique. It is likely that a successful high-visibility fuel protest in Kenya will inspire similar demonstrations in other regional countries, particularly if it forces the government into major concessions.

Travel and Safety Guidance for Nairobi, Kenya

Reconsider non-essential travel to Kenya, particularly Nairobi, around 21 April.
Avoid the central business district in Nairobi around 21 April, particularly around Kenyatta Avenue, Haile Selassie Avenue, City Hall, and any other wide roads conducive to the staging of protests, as well as all major government buildings such as the Kenyan Parliament or the Governor’s Office.
Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and trusted media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.
Avoid all areas of unrest due to incidental risks to bystanders. If caught in the unrest, travellers should move with the crowd until they find the nearest opportunity to escape. If in a vehicle, look to turn down the nearest road. If driving away is not an option, lock the vehicle and escape on foot.
Always follow all instructions and orders from security forces. Where possible, avoid areas of active unrest and remain in secure accommodation.
Prolonged civil unrest can disrupt travel, especially if protesters begin targeting airports. Travellers should have contingency measures in place, including evacuation plans and reliable access to food, water and medication.
Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any loss of electricity.

Request Evacuation Assistance

If you need secure, coordinated support to move personnel out of a high-risk location, our team is ready to help – quickly, calmly, and with care.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence and Travel Advice

This page provides situational awareness and practical guidance for organisations and individuals with personnel in the Middle East following the recent escalation of conflict involving Israel, the United States, and Iran.

The security environment remains highly volatile, with ongoing military activity, airspace closures, travel disruptions, and government advisories likely to change at short notice.

This information is provided for general awareness only and does not constitute operational, legal, or travel advice. Decisions regarding shelter-in-place or evacuation should be made following a tailored risk assessment specific to your personnel, location, and circumstances. You should not rely solely on this guidance without first consulting Solace Global Risk or other qualified professionals, as conditions on the ground may change rapidly and options for movement may be limited or unavailable.

Solace Global Risk is actively supporting clients in the region, including the coordination of secure movements and evacuations from the Middle East. Speak to our security operations team 24/7 to learn more.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 8 SEPTEMBER 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 4 September 2026 – 8 September 2026

Executive Summary

The US and Iran conducted a series of reciprocal attacks against shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). On 4 September, the IRGC launched ballistic missiles towards US Navy vessels, and US forces subsequently struck three Iranian crude oil carriers.
The Iranian targeting of US Navy vessels almost certainly represents a notable escalation, and highly likely increases the risk of miscalculation.
The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Mohsen Rezaei, stated that Iran would announce a restricted zone beginning at the US naval blockade line and extending into the Persian Gulf. This likely sets the conditions for escalated Iranian anti-shipping attacks against vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers outside of the SoH.
Overnight 7-8 September, the Houthis conducted a large-scale missile and drone attack against targets including energy infrastructure and international airports in Khamis Mushait, Abha, Najran and Jazan in southern Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led coalition stated that 73 civilians were injured.
Alongside a Saudi-backed Yemeni government counteroffensive against the Houthis and almost certain regular Saudi air strikes in Yemen, these developments almost certainly confirm the full resumption of the Yemeni civil war. The risk of further escalation is high, with Saudi Arabia likely to continue its intervention and the Houthis likely to continue intensified cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia in response.
As of 8 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia have recently been periodically closed due to the Houthi threat.

The US and Iran conducted a series of reciprocal attacks against shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). On 4 September, the IRGC launched ballistic missiles towards US Navy vessels, and US forces subsequently struck three Iranian crude oil carriers.
The Iranian targeting of US Navy vessels almost certainly represents a notable escalation, and highly likely increases the risk of miscalculation.
The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Mohsen Rezaei, stated that Iran would announce a restricted zone beginning at the US naval blockade line and extending into the Persian Gulf. This likely sets the conditions for escalated Iranian anti-shipping attacks against vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers outside of the SoH.
Overnight 7-8 September, the Houthis conducted a large-scale missile and drone attack against targets including energy infrastructure and international airports in Khamis Mushait, Abha, Najran and Jazan in southern Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led coalition stated that 73 civilians were injured.
Alongside a Saudi-backed Yemeni government counteroffensive against the Houthis and almost certain regular Saudi air strikes in Yemen, these developments almost certainly confirm the full resumption of the Yemeni civil war. The risk of further escalation is high, with Saudi Arabia likely to continue its intervention and the Houthis likely to continue intensified cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia in response.
As of 8 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia have recently been periodically closed due to the Houthi threat.

The US and Iran conducted a series of reciprocal attacks against shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). On 4 September, the IRGC launched ballistic missiles towards US Navy vessels, and US forces subsequently struck three Iranian crude oil carriers.
The Iranian targeting of US Navy vessels almost certainly represents a notable escalation, and highly likely increases the risk of miscalculation.
The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Mohsen Rezaei, stated that Iran would announce a restricted zone beginning at the US naval blockade line and extending into the Persian Gulf. This likely sets the conditions for escalated Iranian anti-shipping attacks against vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers outside of the SoH.
Overnight 7-8 September, the Houthis conducted a large-scale missile and drone attack against targets including energy infrastructure and international airports in Khamis Mushait, Abha, Najran and Jazan in southern Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led coalition stated that 73 civilians were injured.
Alongside a Saudi-backed Yemeni government counteroffensive against the Houthis and almost certain regular Saudi air strikes in Yemen, these developments almost certainly confirm the full resumption of the Yemeni civil war. The risk of further escalation is high, with Saudi Arabia likely to continue its intervention and the Houthis likely to continue intensified cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia in response.
As of 8 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia have recently been periodically closed due to the Houthi threat.

Magnitude 7.4 Earthquake Strikes Colombia

Major Earthquake Strikes Colombia’s Chocó Department

Aftershocks Could Prolong Disruption Across Colombia

Travel and Safety Guidance for Colombia

Powerful Earthquake hits Japan’s Southern Kumamoto Prefecture

Kyushu Earthquake Disrupts Southern Japan

Tsunami Advisory Issued for Southern Kyushu, Japan

Travel and Safety Guidance for Japan

France Steps Up Security for Bastille Day and World Cup Semi-final

Elevated Unrest Risk During Bastille Day and France’s World Cup Semi-final

Crowd Convergence Raises Unrest Risks Across France

Travel and Safety Guidance for France

Explosions opposite Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus

Explosions opposite Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus, Syria

Damascus IED Attacks Highlight Ongoing Terrorism Risk in Post-Assad Syria

Damascus Bombings: Assessing the Most Likely Threat Actors

Travel and Safety Guidance for Damascus, Syria

South Africa Faces Nationwide Anti-Migrant Protests

Escalating Anti-Migrant Protests Raise Security Concerns in South Africa

Longstanding Grievances Continue to Fuel Anti-Migrant Mobilisation in South Africa

Travel and Safety Guidance for South Africa

Doublet Magnitude 7.2 and 7.5 Earthquakes Strike Venezuela

Major Earthquakes Cause Widespread Damage in Venezuela

Economic and Political Grievances Continue to Shape Unrest Risks in Kenya

Travel and Safety Guidance for Venezuela

Kenya Braces for Nationwide Protests on 25 June

Large-Scale Protests Planned Across Kenya

Economic and Political Grievances Continue to Shape Unrest Risks in Kenya

Travel and Safety Guidance for Kenya

Large-Scale Teachers’ Union Protests in Mexico as World Cup Begins

Teachers’ Strike Raises Operational Risks During World Cup

Disruption Risks in Mexico Likely to Persist Throughout the Tournament

Travel and Safety Guidance for Mexico

Gulf Security Under Pressure Following Israel-Iran Strikes

Israel-Iran Strikes Renew Threats to Gulf Stability

Drivers of Further Middle East Escalation Remain Unresolved

Travel and Safety Guidance for the Middle East

Major Earthquake Causes Widespread Disruption in the Philippines

Tsunami Alert after 7.8-Magnitude Quake Hits the Philippines

Philippines Earthquake Triggers Significant Operational Challenges

Travel and Safety Guidance for the Philippines

Elevated Unrest Risk in Paris Ahead of Champions League Final

Paris Braces for Unrest Ahead of Champions League Final

Transport and Mobility Disruptions Expected across Paris

Travel and Safety Guidance for Paris

Large-scale unrest escalates in La Paz and several regions of Bolivia

Large-scale unrest escalates in La Paz and several regions of Bolivia

Bolivia Unrest Highlights Structural Weaknesses in Paz Government

Travel and Safety Guidance for La Paz, Bolivia

Nakba Day 2026:Global Protest Outlook

Nakba Day 2026 Protest Outlook Amid Elevated Global Unrest Risks

Large-Scale Nakba Day Protests Expected Globally

Travel and Safety Guidance for Nakba Day 2026

Calls for Protests in Kenya Over Fuel Price Increases

Kenya Faces Protest Risk After Sharp Fuel Price Increase

High Likelihood of Protest Turnout in Nairobi

Travel and Safety Guidance for Nairobi, Kenya

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence and Travel Advice

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Nakba Day 2026:
Global Protest Outlook