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Explosions opposite Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus

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Explosions opposite Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus, Syria

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 11:15 UTC 07 Jul 2026

At approximately 0720 UTC, two separate explosions in very close proximity occurred outside the Ministry of Tourism in Damascus. At least 18 people were injured in the blasts, including four police officers, according to Syrian state media. A Ministry of Interior source has said that one of the bombs was placed in a vehicle and another in a dumpster. The first explosion was followed seconds later by a second, more powerful explosion. Security forces have deployed to the scene and have closed the surrounding streets. No group has so far claimed responsibility for the attack.

The Ministry of Tourism is located just opposite the Four Seasons Hotel, where French President Emmanuel Macron was reported to have stayed overnight for a state visit. President Macron was unharmed, but had left the hotel in a motorcade to the presidential palace for a meeting with Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa shortly before the explosions. The office of the French President, the Élysée Palace, has said that President Macron did not hear the explosions from the motorcade.

The attack at the Ministry of Tourism comes days after the 2 July bombing of a café on Al-Nasr Street in the Al-Marjah district of central Damascus, in the immediate vicinity of the Palace of Justice. This bombing resulted in at least ten deaths and 21 injuries, with no group having yet claimed responsibility for this attack.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Damascus IED Attacks Highlight Ongoing Terrorism Risk in Post-Assad Syria

The attacks on both 2 and 7 July share multiple characteristics. Both attacks occurred in central Damascus, both attacks were in close proximity to a government ministry, and both attacks relied on planted explosive devices rather than firearms. Moreover, available footage of the second explosion (reportedly the more powerful blast) at the site does not suggest it was particularly large. The improvised explosive device (IED) detonated at the 2 July café bombing was a “crude [IED] weighing approximately one kilogram equipped with metal shrapnel”, according to the Ministry of Interior. These characteristics indicate that the attacks are likely connected, coordinated, and conducted by the same threat actor.

The attacks also follow another attack against a government ministry on 19 May, when a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) was detonated outside a Defence Ministry building in the Bab Sharqi district of Damascus, killing one soldier and injuring at least 21 people. Just before the explosion, soldiers had identified and defused a separate vehicle rigged with explosives in the same part of the city.

Overall, the attacks highlight that despite a gradually improving security environment in Damascus for foreign travellers since the fall of the Assad regime, the risk of terrorism remains high and regime forces are unable to fully secure central Damascus.

Potential perpetrators of the attack include Salafi jihadist terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, or Assad-regime remnant forces.

ISIS remains the most active terrorist group in Syria. Despite the Islamic State (IS) globally having shifted in strength towards sub-Saharan Africa, the group’s weekly newsletter al-Naba maintains a key focus on Syria and regularly calls for attacks against the Syrian transitional government (STG), which it classifies as “apostate”. Earlier this year in February, the ISIS spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari released a statement announcing a new phase of operations targeting the STG.

Moreover, ISIS channels have previously been observed as calling on supporters to kill foreigners travelling to Syria, with foreign travel to Syria having considerably increased since the fall of the Assad regime. This would align directly with the 7 July attack being conducted close to the Four Seasons Hotel, which hosts foreign diplomats, business travellers, and UN staff, and the attack occurring shortly after President Macron had left the area. Macron’s visit to Syria is notably the first visit by a Western leader to Syria under the STG, and an attack during his visit is likely calculated to undermine President al-Sharaa and Western involvement in Syria.

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah was formed in 2025 as a splinter of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the al-Sharaa-led Islamist rebel group which spearheaded the offensive that brought down the Assad regime in late 2024, by radicals who are disillusioned with the more moderate approach pursued by the government. The group shares much of its ideology with IS, and uses a similar communications style, although links between the two groups are unconfirmed. On 22 June 2025, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah militants carried out a suicide bombing in the Mar Elisa Greek Orthodox Church in Douailah, Damascus, during mass. The attack killed 30 people and injured more than 50, and remains the most deadly terrorist attack to have been conducted in Damascus since the fall of the Assad regime.


Since the HTS-led takeover of Syria, the new al-Sharaa-led STG has cracked down on foreign jihadist fighters who were in the ranks of HTS, particularly Central Asian and North Caucasian militant factions. On 5 May, for example, Syrian security forces arrested over 24 Uzbek militants in Idlib, following an armed standoff between Uzbek fighters and security forces after a raid. In issue 547 of al-Naba published in May, ISIS called on former foreign fighters to join its ranks.

Assad-regime remnants also likely have incentives to have conducted the attacks, and previous unverified sources have suggested the initial investigations of the 2 July café have pointed away from ISIS; however, investigations remain in the early stages. In March 2025, major clashes broke out between STG forces and Assadist insurgents from Syria’s Alawite minority in Latakia and Tartus governorates. The 2 July café bombing, which killed six lawyers, occurred next to the Ministry of Justice, with trials ongoing for former regime figures such as Bashar al-Assad’s cousin, Atef Najib, and Syria’s former grand mufti, Ahmed Hassoun. Surviving Assad-regime networks could be attempting to disrupt the trials and discredit the STG, with the “primitive” nature of the IED on 2 July potentially pointing towards a smaller and less organised actor.

Other potential perpetrators include Druze and Kurdish militants, and Hezbollah. However, initial indications suggest that these actors are less likely to have conducted the attacks.

Druze militant violence has so far been localised in the south of Syria, with no established practice of conducting similar terrorist bombings. While some Kurdish hardliners in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintained opposition to integration into the STG following their effective defeat by STG forces in early 2026, such a campaign of bombings in Damascus would almost certainly undermine their legitimacy for little operational gain.

Finally, while US pressure has been applied against the STG to intervene in Lebanon against Hezbollah in recent days, Syria’s Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, has stated that Damascus has no intention of intervening in the country militarily. A regional expert briefing the media stated after the 2 July attack that there were no indications from Hezbollah’s supporters that pointed to Damascus as a target in recent days.

Security forces are highly likely to maintain a higher threat posture than usual in Damascus in the coming weeks, which will likely materialise with greater numbers of checkpoints and vehicle checks. Authorities may additionally conduct raids against suspected cells, which could lead to localised firefights in the vicinity of the raids. If the attack/s are attributed to Assad-regime remnants, there is a realistic possibility of a crackdown being launched in Latakia and Tartus governorates.


Travel and Safety Guidance for Damascus, Syria

  • Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts. Unverified claims and disinformation will likely be propagated on social media and unvetted sources.
  • If not in-country, reconsider non-essential travel to Syria.
  • Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
  • Avoid all travel to the vicinity of government offices, military facilities, and police stations in Damascus.
  • Delays and increased traffic are likely to persist in Damascus. Allocate additional time for all road movements.
  • Heed any evacuation orders and travel to government-issued meeting points if ordered to do so.
  • Ensure you are carrying the necessary documents.
  • Prepare an emergency ‘go bag’ with essentials such as bottled water, batteries, important documents, and medications.
  • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance.
  • Ensure mobile devices are fully charged. Electricity provision is inconsistent in parts of Syria, including in Damascus.

Alert+

South Africa Faces Nationwide Anti-Migrant Protests

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Escalating Anti-Migrant Protests Raise Security Concerns in South Africa

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 13:00 UTC 30 June 2026

Coordinated anti-migrant protests are scheduled to take place on 30 June across all nine of South Africa’s provinces, with rallies scheduled in major cities including Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and Durban, as well as smaller towns. The protests coincide with an unofficial deadline set by anti-migration campaigners for undocumented foreign nationals to leave the country.

The protests have been primarily organised by the anti-migrant March and March movement. They have been supported by a coalition of approximately 27 anti-migrant and civil society groups, including Operation Dudula, United South Africa, and the Progressive Forces of South Africa.

South African authorities and local officials have increased security measures ahead of the planned protests, with police officers deployed across the country and widespread road closures implemented due to fears that the protests could turn violent. Workers have stayed home, and shops have closed in anticipation of the large-scale marches.

In Johannesburg, three marches have been approved: from Beyers Naudé Square to Constitution Hill (08:00-14:00); a Hillbrow leg running from the Kotze/Hospital streets intersection to the Department of Home Affairs on Plein Street (08:00-12:00); and a Midrand leg from the Dale/Modderfontein roads intersection to the Sandton Plant Hire office (09:00-13:00). In Durban, marchers are gathering at King Dinuzulu Park before proceeding along Dr Pixley KaSeme Street, although the endpoint is subject to confirmation, while in Pretoria the march runs from Church Square to Sunnyside police station (10:00-15:00).

Multiple businesses have reportedly been vandalised by protesters along KaBokweni Road in Ngodini. Officials have also reported looting in Delft, Cape Town, while a flash-bang grenade was deployed against demonstrators in Kraaifontein.

Thousands of migrants have awaited processing in temporary camps for several weeks out of fears of being subjected to violence. Nigeria, Ghana, and Mozambique have initiated the repatriation of citizens, while Zimbabwe’s embassy has issued a warning for nationals to avoid protest areas and limit movement.

President Cyril Ramaphosa has repeatedly called on protesters to act peacefully and responsibly, writing, “[t]he right to protest and freedom of expression does not allow people to threaten or intimidate others, or to engage in acts of vandalism or violence.”


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The preparations followed weeks of violence and disruption tied to anti-immigration unrest. On 28 June, the Ugandan government said one of its nationals was killed in a suspected anti-immigrant attack in KwaZulu-Natal and said 746 Ugandans had voluntarily registered for evacuation ahead of the 30 June protests. On 20 June, one person was killed during anti-immigrant rioting in central Pietermaritzburg, and local media said at least 1,000 Malawian nationals had fled to nearby Durban. By 17 June, local media reported that more than 600 Malawians had been repatriated from South Africa, with humanitarian services set up in Blantyre. According to South African police, at least 25,000 people, most of whom are from other African countries, have been repatriated.

The unrest also included attacks on foreign-owned businesses and properties, leading to cases of displacement. On 18 June, police stated that seven people were arrested near Vrede, Free State, after more than 15 foreign-owned shops were looted. On 15 June, South African media reported that at least 120 foreign nationals were camping outside a Home Affairs office in central Durban after being displaced by recent anti-migration rioting. On 8 June, residents in George reportedly attacked foreign-owned businesses before police dispersed them.

The rise of dedicated anti-migrant groups likely reflects the increasing organisation of anti-migrant movements in South Africa in recent years. Since 2022, Operation Dudula, meaning “to push”, has reportedly harassed migrant traders in Soweto and Johannesburg. The Dudula Movement concurrently emerged, acting as a vigilante organisation targeting foreign nationals believed to be undocumented. March and March, a self-described “grassroots citizen movement addressing growing concerns about undocumented immigration in South Africa”, is a newer movement aiming to mobilise citizens through “peaceful demonstrations and rallies”.

Migrants make up just under four per cent of South Africa’s population, equivalent to approximately 2.4 million people. Most originate from neighbouring countries, including Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Anti-migrant groups claim that there are also between three and five million undocumented migrants, although these figures are contested. A primary driver of anti-migrant sentiment is South Africa’s high unemployment rate, which remains above 30 per cent. Anti-migrant groups have mobilised this to frame migrants as direct competitors for jobs, housing, informal trading space, and state resources, amid rising economic instability triggered by the Strait of Hormuz closure.

This is the latest of a series of waves of unrest targeting foreign nationals and foreign-owned businesses, with major waves in 2008, 2015, and 2019. In 2008, at least 62 foreign nationals were killed, while in 2015, a wave of anti-foreigner violence that began in Durban and spread to Johannesburg left at least seven people dead and saw the widespread looting and burning of foreign-owned shops. In September 2019, renewed rioting concentrated in Johannesburg and Pretoria again targeted foreign-owned businesses and left roughly 12 people dead.

The 30 June protests are highly likely to be accompanied by incidents of vandalism and looting targeting foreign-owned businesses, as well as isolated violence. There is a realistic possibility that the protests will escalate into widespread clashes with security forces into the evening, particularly if they attempt to disperse protesters with measures perceived as excessive, such as tear gas, water cannon, rubber bullets, and mass arrests.


Travel and Safety Guidance for South Africa

  • Reconsider non-essential travel to South Africa on 30 June.
  • Avoid the central business districts in major cities around 30 June.
  • Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and trusted media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.
  • Avoid all areas of unrest due to incidental risks to bystanders. If caught in the unrest, travellers should move with the crowd until they find the nearest opportunity to escape. If in a vehicle, look to turn down the nearest road. If driving away is not an option, lock the vehicle and escape on foot.
  • Always follow all instructions and orders from security forces. Where possible, avoid areas of active unrest and remain in secure accommodation.
  • Prolonged civil unrest can disrupt travel, especially if protesters begin targeting airports. Travellers should have contingency measures in place, including evacuation plans and reliable access to food, water and medication.
  • Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any loss of electricity.
  • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
  • Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

Alert+

Doublet Magnitude 7.2 and 7.5 Earthquakes Strike Venezuela

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Major Earthquakes Cause Widespread Damage in Venezuela

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 9:00 UTC 25 June 2026

At 18:04 local time (22:04 UTC) on 24 June, a magnitude 7.2 earthquake was detected 23 kilometres southeast of Yumare, Venezuela, at a depth of 20.3 kilometres. The first tremor was followed by a magnitude 7.5 earthquake at 18:05 local time, 39 seconds after the initial foreshock, at a depth of 23 kilometres. Shortly after the earthquakes, the National Weather Service (NWS) issued a tsunami advisory for Venezuela, Curaçao, Aruba, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. A separate notice stated that there was no tsunami risk for the US East Coast, Gulf Coast, or eastern Canada. The tsunami threat remained focused on coastal areas closer to the epicentre, particularly parts of the southern Caribbean. The National Weather Service subsequently updated its tsunami advisory for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, stating that tsunami waves of less than one foot were expected.

Damage and disruption were widespread across Venezuela, specifically in Caracas. Local media sources reported dozens of building collapses, road closures, and utility outages reported across the capital region, including in Catia La Mar, Los Teques, La Pastora, Chacao, Altamira, Los Palos Grandes, Lídice, El Paraíso, Ciudad Universitaria, and San Bernardino. Water and power supplies were affected in Caracas and several northern states, while authorities shut off gas services in impacted areas as a precaution.

Social media footage showed shaking in downtown Caracas, damage inside apartments in La Tahona and significant structural damage in Altamira. A building collapse in the Los Palos Grandes area of Caracas reportedly caused at least two deaths. In Las Minas de Baruta, at least three people were killed in two building collapses. Beyond Caracas, significant damage was reported in La Guaira, Catia La Mar, Tucacas, Turmero, Morón, and San Antonio de los Altos. Reports also indicated multiple collapsed homes on fire in La Guaira, cracks in a highway in Morón, and possible damage or leaks at a chemical plant in Morón. Local media have also reported widespread gas outages and telecommunications service disruptions in Venezuela following the earthquake.

Tremors from the earthquakes were also felt in parts of Brazil’s Amazonas and Pará states, although local media have not reported any structural damage or casualties in those regions.

Video footage showed major damage inside Simón Bolívar International Airport in Maiquetía. Reports indicated that all flights at Simón Bolívar International Airport were cancelled. The Caracas Metro was also evacuated.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez said at least 32 people had been killed and around 700 others injured by the earthquakes, and subsequently announced a nationwide state of emergency. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) has made an initial estimate that the death toll could range from 10,000 to 100,000.

Argentina and Colombia indicated readiness to support response efforts, while Ecuador announced plans to send humanitarian aid. El Salvador said it had prepared more than 300 rescuers and 50 tonnes of equipment, supplies, and medicines for deployment. The Dominican Republic said specialised search-and-rescue teams would depart for Venezuela on the morning of 25 June, and US President Donald Trump has pledged to deploy US resources to Venezuela.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Venezuela is highly exposed to seismic activity. The country is near the boundary between the Caribbean and South American tectonic plates, where plate motion is largely accommodated by major strike-slip fault systems across northern Venezuela, including the Boconó fault system. The 24 June earthquake southeast of Yumare occurred at a shallow depth and was associated with strike-slip faulting along this boundary.

Northern Venezuela has a history of significant seismic activity, though large earthquakes near the June 2026 epicentre have been relatively infrequent over the past century. On 21 August 2018, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake struck Venezuela’s northern coast, damaging dozens of buildings and causing multiple injuries across the country. More recently, in September 2025, magnitude 6.2 and 6.3 tremors near Mene Grande caused at least one death, injured more than 110 people, damaged homes and infrastructure, and were felt across several Venezuelan states and parts of Colombia.

Notable historical earthquakes include a 6.4 magnitude earthquake near Morón in 2009, which injured 18 people and damaged buildings, and a 6.0 magnitude event near Valencia in 1989 that caused minor damage. The most destructive modern earthquake in the wider region was the 1967 Caracas earthquake, which caused around 240 deaths, hundreds of injuries, collapsed several high-rise apartment buildings, and led to widespread destruction. Since 1900, at least five magnitude 7 or larger earthquakes have occurred in northern Venezuela or near its coast. However, it is highly likely that the damage, casualties and impact of the 24 June doublet earthquakes will be the worst in Venezuela in a century.

It is likely that aftershocks will be recorded near the epicentre in the short term. On 25 June, USGS assessed that there is a 94 per cent chance of at least one aftershock of magnitude 5 or above within the next week, and a 29 per cent chance of an aftershock of magnitude 6 or above. Even if lower-magnitude compared to the 24 June earthquake, aftershocks can still result in significant damage, causing critical failures in structures damaged during the initial shocks.

The death toll from the 24 June earthquakes will almost certainly considerably exceed the early estimates provided by the Venezuelan government. The impact of the tremors is highly likely to be compounded by the country’s poor disaster preparedness and emergency response infrastructure. Possible failures in government responses to the earthquakes could rapidly become catalysts for civil unrest in Venezuela, particularly as the country’s leadership has likely been destabilised by the US intervention that captured former President Maduro in January 2026. Previously a staunch geopolitical adversary of the US, Venezuela is now increasingly close to Washington as a result of the US intervention.

The economic impact will highly likely be severe and will fall on a state with minimal fiscal and institutional capacity to absorb it. Venezuela’s economy was already critically degraded prior to the earthquake, and the earthquake has had a severe impact on major economic hubs like the Caracas capital region. Acute humanitarian crisis, pre-existing economic crisis, destroyed utilities, and a transitional government which has contested legitimacy are all factors which could quickly materialise into an anti-government movement and violent civil unrest in the coming months.


Travel and Safety Guidance for Venezuela

  • Closely monitor local news reports and government alerts.
  • Expect aftershocks. Be prepared to Drop, Cover, Hold On in case of further tremors.
  • During a tremor, if outside, do not enter buildings and move away from buildings, trees, streetlights and overhead lines.
  • If inside, pick a safe place (under a sturdy table or desk, or against an interior wall and away from windows and heavy furniture). Do not leave until the shaking stops.
  • If evacuating a building, always use the stairs. Look out for fires and falling debris.
  • Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
  • Heed evacuation orders and travel to government-issued shelters if safe to do so.
  • Avoid coastal areas covered by tsunami warnings.
  • Ensure important documents and medications are appropriately stored.
  • Prepare an emergency ‘go bag’ with essentials such as bottled water, batteries, important documents, and medications.
  • Confirm booked flights are running prior to checking out of hotels or travelling to the airport.
  • Prepare for power outages, communication disruptions, and travel delays.
  • Stay away from damaged buildings and affected areas until authorities deem them safe.
  • Management should maintain communication with individuals affected until the event is concluded.

Alert+

Kenya Braces for Nationwide Protests on 25 June

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Large-Scale Protests Planned Across Kenya

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:00 UTC 24 June 2026

Nationwide demonstrations are planned for 25 June, marking the second anniversary of the 25 June 2024 anti-Finance Bill protests and commemorating those who were killed during the unrest in 2024 and 2025.

Victims’ families have called on Kenyans to march to parliament in Nairobi at 10:00 local time (07:00 UTC) to demand justice and lay flowers where their relatives were killed. Activists have urged participants outside Nairobi to hold peaceful vigils near police stations with flowers and flags, and to document events on mobile phones, livestreams, and hidden cameras to capture any incidents.

Opposition figures, including former Vice-President Kalonzo Musyoka, have called for a large turnout. A group including Siaya Governor James Orengo, activist Boniface Mwangi, and families of protest victims marched to parliament on 18 June and formally notified the police of a nationwide march. Organisers have stated that the demonstrations will remain peaceful and constitutional. Orengo added on social media that “June 25th remains a public holiday of remembrance and resistance.”

The government has ruled out a public holiday, with Government Spokesperson Isaac Mwaura insisting that 25 June remains a normal working day. President William Ruto additionally warned against attempts to “shut down the country”. Police maintain they have not received formal notification authorising demonstrations in Nairobi and have warned that they will respond “firmly” to any attempts to disrupt public order.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Widespread youth-led protests have taken place in Kenya in both 2024 and 2025. In June and July 2024, a series of mass protests erupted in response to proposed tax increases in the government’s Finance Bill 2024. The unrest started in Nairobi, quickly spreading to other parts of the country. On 25 June, thousands of protesters stormed the parliamentary complex, setting fire to the Kenyan Parliament Building. Overall, at least 50 people were killed, and several hundred were injured as protesters clashed with security forces, who used live ammunition and conducted mass arrests.

Widespread protests were also staged in June and early July 2025, after a blogger was killed in police custody, with protesters demanding an end to police brutality. Security forces again responded with force, including live ammunition, tear gas, water cannon, and mass arrests. At least 65 people were killed, and over 550 people were injured. No significant concessions were made following the protests, and police brutality almost certainly remains a core grievance in Kenya.

The planned demonstrations are set to take place amid increased pressure on living costs, as well as frustrations over government plans to allow a US Ebola quarantine facility on its territory. Kenya’s fuel imports are heavily tied to Gulf suppliers, and the price of fuel has spiked due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Although President Ruto has moved to cushion consumers by cutting fuel VAT, using stabilisation funds, and pushing through a diesel price reduction, fuel prices remain elevated and continue to feed wider cost-of-living pressures. This almost certainly increases the risk that the planned protests could escalate into broader anti-government unrest.

Kenyan police forces have a precedent of responding forcefully to demonstrations, deploying live ammunition in both 2024 and 2025 unrest and being accused of abducting, torturing, and killing civilians believed to be leaders of anti-government protests. The apparent lack of authorisation for the demonstrations almost certainly raises the risk of crackdowns being imposed. If security forces are perceived as using disproportionate force against protesters, this will highly likely exacerbate demonstrations. This risk almost certainly elevates with calls for protesters to capture footage, with videos of perceived brutality by security forces highly likely to spread quickly through social media, increase anti-government sentiment and provoke larger demonstrations.

Nairobi’s parliament is located within the Central Business District (CBD), and most protesters will highly likely be gathered there. If protests spread, other hotspots in Nairobi include Kangemi, Ngong, Kamukunji, Thika Road, and Kitengela. During the 2025 protests, security forces blocked off major roads into Nairobi, including Waiyaki Way, Mombasa Road, Thika Road, Ngong Road, Valley Road, Juja Road, and Lang’ata Road. Other cities that may see large-scale gatherings and potential clashes include Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru.

In the lead-up to and during the potential protests, there is a realistic possibility that the government will impose internet outages to prevent the spread of calls for anti-government protests. There will highly likely be a heightened security presence in Nairobi and other major cities on 25 June.


Travel and Safety Guidance for Kenya

  • Reconsider non-essential travel to Kenya, particularly Nairobi, Mombasa, and other major cities on 25 June.
  • Avoid the central business district in Nairobi around 25 June, particularly around Kenyatta Avenue, Haile Selassie Avenue, City Hall, and any other wide roads conducive to the staging of protests, as well as all major government buildings such as the Kenyan Parliament or the Governor’s Office.
  • Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and trusted media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.
  • Avoid all areas of unrest due to incidental risks to bystanders. If caught in the unrest, travellers should move with the crowd until they find the nearest opportunity to escape. If in a vehicle, look to turn down the nearest road. If driving away is not an option, lock the vehicle and escape on foot.
  • Always follow all instructions and orders from security forces. Where possible, avoid areas of active unrest and remain in secure accommodation.
  • Prolonged civil unrest can disrupt travel, especially if protesters begin targeting airports. Travellers should have contingency measures in place, including evacuation plans and reliable access to food, water and medication.
  • Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any loss of electricity.
  • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
  • Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

Alert+

Large-Scale Teachers’ Union Protests in Mexico as World Cup Begins

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Teachers’ Strike Raises Operational Risks During World Cup

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 13:00 UTC 11 June 2026

Mexico’s largest teachers’ union, the National Coordinator of Education Workers (Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, CNTE), has continued to coordinate large-scale and disruptive protests across Mexico as the 2026 FIFA World Cup opens. The protests form part of an ongoing nationwide strike that began in May and has involved thousands of teachers and education workers across multiple states. The CNTE is demanding the repeal of pension reforms, higher wages, improved working conditions and direct negotiations with the federal government.

The World Cup, which is being co-hosted with the United States and Canada, is being contested by 48 teams across 104 matches in 16 cities, and opens on 11 June. Mexico is scheduled to play the inaugural match against South Africa at the Estadio Azteca in Mexico City. Mexico’s three host cities are Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey.

Mexico City has remained the epicentre of the protest movement. Demonstrators have maintained a large encampment in the capital’s central district and have repeatedly disrupted transport networks through marches and by establishing roadblocks. On 5 June, teachers blocked several major roads across the capital, causing significant transport disruption. On 9 June, police prevented a teachers’ march from reaching a stadium scheduled to host FIFA World Cup events, and protesters have toppled World Cup symbols in the capital, including statues of football players. Protesters have also effectively blocked access to the central plaza (Zócalo) designated to host the capital’s main fan celebrations. On 10 June, protesters warned that they would block access to Mexico City’s Benito Juárez International Airport (AICM).

Smaller-scale protests have also been observed in the states of Guerrero, Michoacán, Morelos, Zacatecas and Baja California, where teachers have occupied government buildings, blocked roads and organised strikes. In several locations, protesters have reportedly used fireworks and other improvised projectiles during confrontations with authorities.

In response, Mexican authorities have mounted one of the country’s largest peacetime security operations. More than 100,000 soldiers, marines, National Guard and police personnel are reported to be deployed across the three host cities and major tourist destinations for the duration of the tournament, supported by anti-drone teams, surveillance-camera networks and specialised crowd-management units operating at stadiums, fan zones, airports and national-team camps in coordination with FIFA. The deployment also reflects broader security concerns: Guadalajara experienced a severe but brief outbreak of cartel-related violence earlier in the year, and host-city authorities have increased visible patrols to reassure visitors and residents.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Large-scale, disruptive and coordinated protests have almost certainly been staged by the CNTE to maximise pressure on the central government ahead of and during the 2026 FIFA World Cup, and have likely been designed to provide minimal time for President Sheinbaum to concede to their demands. The deliberate targeting of World Cup symbols, such as player statues, and the establishment of an encampment near the capital’s fan zone have almost certainly been intended to signal the CNTE’s intent to disrupt the tournament and to increase the political and reputational cost of failing to resolve the dispute before the tournament begins.

With the World Cup beginning on 11 June, and Mexico hosting the opening match at the Estadio Azteca, it is increasingly unlikely that the government will concede to CNTE demands in the near term. The CNTE is likely to continue using the tournament as leverage by targeting high-visibility locations and key transport routes, which is likely to result in major disruption on the international stage and sustain pressure on the federal government throughout the early stages of the tournament.

The CNTE has successfully organised large-scale and coordinated protests across Mexico on multiple occasions. Moreover, several smaller protest movements, such as farmers’ and transport unions, have threatened to disrupt the tournament. The likelihood of protests continuing throughout the tournament is high, with protesters likely to target fan zones, World Cup venues, transport hubs, airports, border crossings, government buildings and major roads in order to cause significant disruption and achieve maximum visibility.

The government has already deployed security forces to prevent protesters from reaching World Cup venues and to clear or contain demonstrations, and is likely to deploy additional forces during the tournament. As a result, there is a high risk of violent clashes, arrests and the use of dispersal tactics at or near protest sites. If the protests continue to escalate, there is a realistic possibility that security resources will become overstretched, limiting the authorities’ ability to manage unrest while simultaneously protecting tournament sites and transport routes. This risk is likely further compounded in host cities such as Guadalajara, where security forces are also committed to countering organised crime threats. Any concurrent criminal or security incident could further reduce the resources available to manage protest activity.


Travel and Safety Guidance for Mexico

  • Travellers should avoid areas prone to protest or where demonstrations have been organised, particularly around World Cup venues, fan zones and fan festivals, government buildings and central Mexico City.
  • Travellers should closely monitor local news reports, government alerts, official FIFA and venue advisories, trusted local media, and, if available, a security provider’s intelligence feed for updates relevant to the demonstrations and to match-day arrangements.
  • Additional time should be allocated to all transfers to and from stadiums, fan zones and airports, and pre-plan alternative routes due to the high likelihood of roadblocks and marches.
  • Anticipate disruption at Mexico City’s Benito Juárez International Airport (AICM), particularly if protests affect access roads. Where feasible, consider Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA) or Toluca as contingency options and allow additional time for check-in, transfers and security screening.
  • Where possible, vetted or private transport should be used and public transport avoided near demonstrations and city centres.
  • If in the vicinity of a protest, it is advised to leave the area if it is safe to do so, and always abide by the directions of police and security authorities.
  • If caught in a crowd and unable to leave, take precautions to minimise the risk of crowd crush: stay upright, move away from all hard barriers, move with and not against the crowd, and hold your arms at chest level in a boxer-like stance to relieve pressure.
  • Ensure that you always carry personal identification documents or copies.
  • Ensure all travellers know key contact numbers, including local emergency services, their embassy or consulate, accommodation security, venue security and any contracted assistance provider.
  • Organisations should review staff attendance plans for World Cup events, brief travellers on high-risk areas for protests, consider flexible or remote working arrangements during large-scale protests, and confirm emergency communications, check-in and rendezvous protocols before travel.

Alert+

Gulf Security Under Pressure Following Israel-Iran Strikes

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Israel-Iran Strikes Renew Threats to Gulf Stability

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 13:00 UTC 8 June 2026

Following escalating conflict in Lebanon, Israel and Iran engaged in retaliatory tit-for-tat strikes. Late 7 June, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) stated that it had intercepted a wave of Iranian missiles in northern Israel. Iran reportedly launched at least ten ballistic missiles against Israel, all of which the IDF claimed were intercepted. This was Iran’s first direct attack against Israel since the implementation of the 8 April ceasefire.

The strikes followed a rocket attack on northern Israel launched by Hezbollah in Lebanon on 7 June, which the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) responded to with strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh).

A statement from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that Iranian “missile and drone units launched a co-ordinated and intensive attack targeting the heart of the northern cities”. The statement added that “this operation is not a passing event, but rather the beginning of a full week of continuous strikes” and that “waves of missiles and drones will continue to be launched around the clock for the next seven days until the enemy is deterred and ceases its crimes. … Any targeting of Iranian territory will be met with a devastating and overwhelming response beyond all expectation.”

Early 8 June, Israel launched retaliatory strikes on western and central Iran, with Iranian state TV reporting explosions in multiple cities, including Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and near Karaj. The IDF claimed that it launched strikes against “several targets” at an Iranian petrochemical facility in Mahshahr.

Missiles were subsequently fired from Yemen, alongside another Iranian salvo, with the Houthis claiming that they conducted a joint strike with Iran. The group also reiterated their total ban on Israeli vessels transiting the Red Sea. The IRGC stated that it targeted two Israeli air bases in Nevatim and Tel Nof.

The Al-Kharj governorate in Saudi Arabia issued an early warning in the early hours of 8 June “in anticipation of a possible danger”. Al-Kharj hosts the US Prince Sultan Air Base, which was regularly attacked until the 8 April ceasefire. Iranian officials have denied an attempted attack on Saudi Arabia, and an attack against Al-Kharj remains unconfirmed.

US President Donald Trump has reportedly made significant efforts to “restrain” the Israeli response against Iran to allow more time for diplomacy. At approximately 11:30 UTC, the IRGC issued a statement that “the cessation of armed forces operations is hereby announced”, but that if attacks continue, “including in southern Lebanon”, Iran will respond “more severe and forceful than before”. It is not immediately clear whether Israel has also agreed to a pause, and Israeli media have reported that no final decision has been made, as of 13:00 UTC, 8 June.

After this statement, Lebanese media reported further Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon. Three rockets were reportedly launched by Hezbollah at IDF troops in southern Lebanon in response. Two of the rockets were intercepted, while a third struck close to the target. No casualties were reported.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Tehran had previously warned that strikes in Beirut “could derail the diplomatic track” and prompt retaliation, with Iranian officials consistently insisting that the ceasefire includes Lebanon. Continued conflict in Lebanon, which remains highly likely, will almost certainly continue to complicate the wider US-Iran negotiations and could again trigger further cycles of Israel-Iran strikes, which endanger the broader ceasefire.

Hezbollah have historically served as a key component of Iranian deterrence in the region, and its preservation is highly likely a strategic priority for Tehran. However, the regime’s focus on Lebanon and claimed suspension of negotiations also followed President Trump’s request for several amendments to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) being negotiated by the US and Iran.

It is highly likely that the Iranian regime, which is increasingly under the control of hardline IRGC commanders such as Major General Ahmad Vahidi, calculates that it is willing to accept the risk of a return to full-scale conflict or a continuation of the current status quo rather than be perceived as conceding to US demands. By increasingly linking the status of the ceasefire to Lebanon, the regime likely also seeks to divert attention from and gain leverage over the two principal points of contention in negotiations: control of the Strait of Hormuz and the nuclear file.

As of 13:00 UTC, 8 June, it remains unconfirmed whether the current escalation cycle between Israel and Iran has fully ceased. If Israel conducts further strikes against either Iran or Beirut in the coming hours, this would almost certainly be met with further Iranian retaliation.

If further tit-for-tat strikes are sustained, or an Israel-Iran confrontation is again prompted by developments in Lebanon, there is a realistic possibility of Iranian retaliation strikes expanding to include attacks on the Gulf States. Iran’s chief negotiator and parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, threatened that the Israeli strikes against Iran, in addition to the ongoing US naval blockade, have made US bases and assets in the region “legitimate targets”. Moreover, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet Fars, citing a senior Iranian official, reported that if Iranian energy infrastructure is attacked again, Iran will carry out attacks against US oil and gas facilities in the region.

The involvement of the Yemen-based Houthis was almost certainly limited and primarily performative. However, their involvement highly likely serves Tehran as a key deterrence due to the Houthi capability to impact maritime traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The most critical leverage Iran has highly likely been able to impose against the US is the continued impact on the global economy and energy markets due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which remains severely disrupted. In the event of a full-scale escalation, it is likely that Iran would seek to additionally close the Bab al-Mandeb, as repeatedly threatened.


Travel and Safety Guidance for the Middle East

  • Avoid all non-essential travel to the Middle East.
  • Travellers should follow shelter-in-place orders and advisories, particularly in Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.
  • Do not conduct travel to the airport until shelter-in-place orders or recommendations are lifted. Once lifted, ensure that booked flights are still running before conducting travel to the airport.
  • Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if situated in the Middle East.
  • Sign up for government/embassy alerts.
  • Avoid all military installations, government buildings, and key infrastructure, which may constitute potential targets.
  • Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
  • Expect the security situation in the region to remain unstable in the immediate future. There is an increased risk of further strikes, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest.
  • Prepare an essential “go-bag” containing, at a minimum, travel documents, cash, medications, basic supplies, and communication devices in case of evacuation.
  • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
  • Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

Alert+

Major Earthquake Causes Widespread Disruption in the Philippines

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Tsunami Alert after 7.8-Magnitude Quake Hits the Philippines

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 10:00 UTC 8 June 2026

At 06:37 local time on 08 June (22:37 UTC on 07 June), a magnitude 7.8 earthquake was detected 24 kilometres west-southwest of Burias, Philippines, at a depth of 35 kilometres. The earthquake has killed at least 19 people and injured over 200, in addition to causing widespread infrastructure damage and flight disruptions. The primary earthquake was followed by over 130 aftershocks ranging from 1.3 to 6.7 in magnitude.

Damage and disruption were widespread across southern Mindanao. At least 20 structures were reported damaged in Soccsksargen. Video and photos showed a collapsed school in Jose Abad Santos, damaged buildings in Malapatan, severe damage at the Port of Mabila on the Balut Islands near the epicentre, and landslides into Lake Holon in South Cotabato. Power outages were widely reported in South Cotabato, Sarangani, and General Santos, and at least 17 flights were cancelled at General Santos International Airport (GES / RPMR) because of earthquake damage.

Shortly after the earthquake, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre issued a tsunami alert for the Philippines and across a large part of southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and Australia. A tsunami measuring a few centimetres was later seen in Okinawa, while a 20-centimetre wave was measured in Ogasawara Islands. Tsunami waves were also detected along the coasts of Indonesia, Palau, and the Philippines, ranging from a few centimetres to 1.4 metres. In a later update, the threat was declared largely over.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has stated that evacuation centres are ready and operational. Government agencies have continued to assess damage and clear routes for rescue operations.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Philippines is almost certainly among the most vulnerable countries in the world to natural disasters. The archipelago is hit by approximately 20 typhoons and tropical storms a year, and its location in the Pacific ‘Ring of Fire’ means it is highly seismically active. In 2023, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake killed at least three people and injured 79, and in 2022, a magnitude 7 earthquake killed at least five people and injured 60. However, the 30 September 2025 Cebu earthquake, which killed at least 79 and injured 1,271, stands out as one of the deadliest earthquakes in the Philippines in years.

The Philippines has poor disaster resilience. A country’s disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, is a critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. Due to the confluence of the Philippines’ extreme exposure to natural hazards and its poor disaster resilience, the country is frequently cited as the most disaster-prone country in the world.

In late 2025, mass nationwide protests occurred in the Philippines due to public grievances regarding corruption in disaster resilience projects, particularly flood defences. While the movement had largely declined by early December, it is likely that the devastation of the earthquake may reinforce public perceptions that disaster-resilience funds and infrastructure governance are weak. There is a realistic possibility that this will trigger a resurgence in the protest movement in the coming weeks.


Travel and Safety Guidance for the Philippines

  • Closely monitor local news reports and government alerts.
  • Expect aftershocks. Be prepared to Drop, Cover, Hold On in case of further tremors.
  • During a tremor, if outside, do not enter buildings and move away from buildings, trees, streetlights and overhead lines.
  • If inside, pick a safe place (under a sturdy table or desk, or against an interior wall and away from windows and heavy furniture). Do not leave until the shaking stops.
  • If evacuating a building, always use the stairs. Look out for fires and falling debris.
  • Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
  • Heed evacuation orders and travel to government-issued shelters if safe to do so.
  • Avoid coastal areas covered by tsunami warnings.
  • Ensure important documents and medications are appropriately stored.
  • Prepare an emergency ‘go bag’ with essentials such as bottled water, batteries, important documents, and medications.
  • Confirm booked flights are running prior to checking out of hotels or travelling to the airport.
  • Prepare for power outages, communication disruptions, and travel delays.
  • Stay away from damaged buildings and affected areas until authorities deem them safe.

Alert+

Elevated Unrest Risk in Paris Ahead of Champions League Final

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Paris Braces for Unrest Ahead of Champions League Final

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut-off: 13:30 UTC 29 May 2026

The final game of the UEFA Champions League will be played in Budapest, Hungary, on 30 May, starting at 18:00 local time (16:00 UTC). The final will be contested by Paris Saint-Germain (PSG), the current title-holder, having won the tournament in 2025, and Arsenal. Previous high-profile PSG games in the Champions League have resulted in large-scale, violent civil unrest and disorder in Paris and other parts of France.

In preparation for the final game, the Paris Police Prefecture has implemented a series of traffic management measures, including localised road closures. These will be in place from 17:00 local time on 30 May to 05:00 on 31 May. Restrictions include a blanket traffic ban within a perimeter that includes Place Charles de Gaulle (where the Arc de Triomphe is located) and the Champs-Élysées, with traffic on nearby roads being restricted. Authorities have also imposed restrictions on taking exits from the Périphérique (the ring road) leading to the 16th and 17th Arrondissements.

Public transport will also be restricted: the Charles de Gaulle – Étoile station will remain closed (17:00-05:00), while the Metro Line 6 will bypass Kléber, Charles de Gaulle – Étoile, and Trocadéro starting from 19:30 local time. Other Metro lines that will face closures include Lines 1, 2, 8, 9, 12, 13, as well as RER Line A. Buses are expected not to stop near the security perimeter.

A large official fan zone will be in the Parc des Princes stadium. Authorities have also designated the Champ de Mars (the area near the Eiffel Tower) for post-match celebrations, instead of the previously used Champs-Élysées area.

Approximately 8,000 extra police officers will be deployed in Paris on the day of the match. This represents a notable increase compared to the 5,400 deployed for the previous final game in 2025.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

It is highly likely that the final game will result in large-scale, violent unrest in Paris, regardless of the match result. In 2025, following PSG’s victory against Inter Milan in the Champions League final, riots broke out across Paris and other major French cities. The riots resulted in widespread cases of vandalism, more than 500 arrests, hundreds of injuries, an estimated 264 vehicles set on fire, and severe transport and service disruptions. Two deaths were also recorded, one in Paris and one in Dax, in the southwest of France.

Violent unrest also occurred on 7 May 2026, following PSG’s victory in the 2026 Champions League semi-final over Bayern Munich. At least 127 people were arrested, mostly in Paris, and 30 people were injured, with one being severely hurt by a firework.

Previous clashes were marked by the widespread use of fireworks to attack police, posing a significant risk to bystanders. Previous protests were also marked by indiscriminate attacks on transiting private vehicles, with passengers also occasionally being harassed or attacked.

Violent unrest is likeliest to take place outside the Parc des Princes stadium, on the Champs-Élysées and in the Champ de Mars, with other at-risk areas including Trocadéro and Concorde. While most of the likely high-risk areas for unrest are located in northwest Paris, incidents in other parts of the city, such as the Marais area, République, Canal St. Martin, and Bastille, cannot be ruled out.

Unrest is likely to begin in the early afternoon and will progressively intensify after the match starts. During previous games, unrest reached its peak intensity at night. If police intervene to violently disperse the unrest, this will likely result in violence and vandalism occurring in smaller roadways and residential areas.


Travel and Safety Guidance for Paris

  • Reconsider non-essential travel to central and western Paris on the afternoon and evening of 30 May.
  • Avoid the stadium and any large gatherings. Always maintain situational awareness.
  • If office premises are located near possible unrest hotspots, park company vehicles indoors or relocate them outside of the at-risk area. Choose a parking location that has in-person, 24/7 security.
  • Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and trusted media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.
  • Avoid all areas of unrest due to incidental risks to bystanders. If caught in the unrest, travellers should move with the crowd until they find the nearest opportunity to escape. If in a vehicle, look to turn down the nearest road. If driving away is not an option, lock the vehicle and escape on foot.
  • Always follow all instructions and orders from security forces. Where possible, avoid areas of active unrest and remain in secure accommodation.

Alert+

Large-scale unrest escalates in La Paz and several regions of Bolivia

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Large-scale unrest escalates in La Paz and several regions of Bolivia

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 13:30 UTC 21 May 2026

Large-scale protests have been ongoing in Bolivia since early May, with unrest intensifying in recent days. Protests were organised by the largest federation of labour unions in Bolivia, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), which called for an “open-ended” strike beginning 5 May. The labour unions have been joined by Indigenous organisations, teachers, miners, transport workers, healthcare staff, and agricultural groups.

On 18-19 May, large-scale demonstrations were recorded in La Paz, leading to widespread vandalism, attacks on government buildings, and day-long clashes between protesters and police. The protests coincided with the arrival in the capital of supporters of former president Movement for Socialism (MAS) party leader, Evo Morales, following a six-day march from Oruro in the Andes; some were reportedly carrying dynamite sticks and other weapons.

Morales has endorsed the protest and alleged, on 15 May, that the US ordered the right-wing government of President Rodrigo Paz to stage a “military operation” to capture or kill him. Furthermore, Morales announced on 20 May a “90-day ultimatum” to President Paz, calling on him to resign and organise new elections or face a coordinated escalation of the unrest.

Protesters have imposed a de facto blockade on La Paz, blocking key roadways leading to the administrative capital and causing localised shortages in fuel, some basic goods, and medical supplies. In addition to the protests in La Paz, unrest and roadblocks have been recorded in several regions, including Beni, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Tarija, Potosí, and Oruro, with up to 60–65 roadblocks recorded nationwide. Multiple roadblocks have been established in Cochabamba, an area with a large Indigenous population and a Morales stronghold.

“Indefinite” protests began on 19 May in Chuquisaca. In Chapare, protesters occupied an airport, which led to a shutdown in operations. On 20 May, the main highway between El Alto airport and La Paz was temporarily blocked. Four people have been killed in the protests as of 21 May, with dozens of injuries and more than 100 arrests.

The protests have had an impact beyond Bolivia’s borders. On 17 May, Colombian President Gustavo Petro shared a video that labelled President Paz as a “puppet of the US”, which prompted Bolivian authorities to expel the Colombian ambassador. Washington, which has strongly supported President Paz, claimed that the protests are a “coup d’état”.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The current protest movement in Bolivia has almost certainly evolved into a large-scale challenge to President Paz’s government, as reflected by the increased participation of civil society actors, unions and other sections of Bolivian society. In addition, the drivers of unrest have almost certainly expanded in scope. Initial protests were a direct reaction to fuel subsidy cuts, but have increasingly been driven by broader socioeconomic grievances, including inflation, fuel shortages, wage and pension demands, opposition to the government’s wider reform agenda, and calls for the president to resign.

Paz was elected in November 2025. However, millions of Bolivians view the incumbent government as illegitimate. Paz’s centre-right Christian Democratic Party (PDC) succeeded due to the fragmentation of the long-dominant MAS, which resulted in the left-wing vote being split between several candidates. This means that Paz’s control of the executive is not reflective of an actual political mandate, with most of Bolivia’s electorate likely still aligned with MAS.

This political vulnerability almost certainly constitutes a major structural weakness, which makes the Paz government unable to address the root causes of the unrest and provide a policymaking alternative that could restore order in the short term while preserving government integrity. The ongoing international fuel crisis caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has almost certainly worsened the fallout from the fuel subsidy removal and further constrained the government’s room for manoeuvre.

In the immediate term, it is likely that violent unrest will continue in La Paz and in the rural parts of Bolivia, such as Chapare and Cochabamba, where Morales has a strong base of support. Due to the use of explosives by protesters and the violent response by officers, it is likely that the protests will result in further fatalities.

The highly dispersed system of roadblocks used by protesters is likely aimed at maximising disruption while overstretching police clearance operations. However, if sustained, the government will likely be forced to deploy additional police and military personnel to clear key routes and protect critical supply corridors, increasing the risk of violence between protestors and security forces, which in turn could exacerbate unrest.

Sustained nationwide roadblocks will likely cause protracted travel and service disruptions in La Paz and other large urban centres. Local media have already reported shortages of medicine and medical equipment, which will likely decrease access to quality healthcare. The government has already deployed the Bolivian Air Force to transport food to La Paz from other parts of the country.

Extended fuel shortages are likely to cause power outages, with secondary impacts, such as an increase in property crime, also being possible. For travellers, blockades are likely to reduce options to leave Bolivia, with several roadblocks established on the approaches to airports and international borders.

There is a realistic possibility that the Paz government will increasingly deploy coercive measures to contain the protests, with the likelihood of this increasing if the blockade of La Paz continues. Such efforts would be primarily dedicated to securing La Paz, but would almost certainly provoke a violent reaction, with attacks on security forces and police becoming likelier. In rural areas, these could take the form of ambushes on police units responding to blockades. Previous examples of this include an attack which occurred in June 2025 in the mining town of Llallahua in the Potosí region, where three officers were killed in an ambush.


Travel and Safety Guidance for La Paz, Bolivia

  • Avoid areas prone to protest or where demonstrations have been organised, especially government buildings, universities, and major urban centres.
  • Closely monitor local news reports, government alerts, trusted local media, and, if available, a security provider’s intelligence/alerting feed, for updates relevant to the demonstrations.
  • Avoid all travel to and from La Paz, unless strictly necessary.
  • Allocate additional time for travel to or near areas where protests are scheduled, due to the possibility of increased traffic or travel disruptions.
  • Where possible, use alternative routes to steer clear of city centres and avoid public transport.
  • If in the vicinity of a protest, try to leave if it is safe to do so. Always abide by authority and police directions.
  • If you are in a crowd and unable to leave, take precautions to minimise the risk of crowd crush. These include staying upright, moving away from all hard barriers, going with and not against the crowd, and holding your arms at chest level in a boxer-like stance to relieve pressure.
  • Ensure that you always carry personal identification documents or copies.​​
  • Ensure knowledge of important contact numbers. These should include at least the local emergency number(s) and contacts for your local embassy or consulate.
  • If protests are scheduled to occur near business premises or travel destinations, consider alternative working arrangements, such as remote work, to minimise the threat to employees and business travellers.

Alert+

Nakba Day 2026:
Global Protest Outlook

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Nakba Day 2026 Protest Outlook Amid Elevated Global Unrest Risks

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 13 MAY 2026

The 78th anniversary of the Nakba falls on 15 May, 2026. The Arabic term “Nakba” (“catastrophe”) refers to the mass-displacement of Palestinians following the 1947-49 conflict. The Nakba is central to the formation of Palestinian identity and continues to shape political perspectives and activism in support of Palestine across the world.

Nakba protests have increased in size and volume since the outbreak of the war in Gaza in late 2023. In cities including London, New York, Paris, Berlin, and Barcelona, protests are frequently attended by hundreds of thousands of people, with the 2025 London event reportedly drawing 500,000 participants. Nakba Day protests have mostly occurred in city centres, often in the vicinity of US and Israeli diplomatic facilities.

In both Europe and North America, university-based groups have been actively spearheading the protests, making campuses epicentres of demonstrations. During past anniversaries, student groups in several American and European cities staged large-scale demonstrations and more disruptive forms of activism, including occupations, sit-ins, and blockades.​

Nakba Day protests are also common in the Middle East, due to the commemoration’s lasting political importance. Nakba Day protests often occur in Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon.

The increased visibility of the pro-Palestine movement has driven an increase in the volume of Nakba Day protests outside of North America, Europe, and the Middle East. In past years, large-scale protests were recorded in several South and Central American countries and in Japan.

On previous commemorations, there have been several pro-Israel counterprotests. Tensions between protesters and counterprotesters, or between protesters and security forces, have been observed on multiple occasions. These have included episodes of violence and harassment.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

In 2026, Nakba Day will almost certainly coincide with large-scale protests in major urban centres across North America, Western Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and parts of the Asia-Pacific. Protest activity in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be lower by comparison, although large-scale demonstrations remain likely in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Kenya, and South Africa.

The ongoing but contested ceasefire in Gaza is unlikely to result in a reduction in the volume of protests or their attendance compared to 2025. Instead, the 2026 protests have a realistic possibility of exceeding the scope of last year’s. Developments that will likely drive large-scale Nakba Day protests in 2026 include the ongoing Iran conflict, the continuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, expanded operations in the West Bank, and the resumption of high-intensity conflict in Lebanon.

Other events not directly related to Gaza or the broader Middle East are also likely to influence protests. In Mexico, the US, and Canada, protests may focus on the upcoming World Cup, with several activist groups having been formed to oppose the event. In the United Kingdom, the anniversary will fall a week after the deeply contested local elections, and shortly after the end of a trial for several members of “Palestine Action”, a proscribed pro-Palestine direct action group. In Argentina, recent scandals have destabilised the government of President Milei. In the US, the anniversary falls during the opening stages of the electoral campaign for the November midterm elections.

While many protests will take place on 15 May, several large-scale demonstrations have been organised over the 16-17 May weekend. Areas where protests have already been organised (or are highly likely to be announced) include London, Sydney, Paris, Los Angeles, New York, Washington D.C., Johannesburg, Brussels, Amsterdam, and Barcelona.

The case of London is particularly notable, as a far-right march has also been scheduled to occur in the city’s centre on Nakba Day, where pro-Palestine protests are simultaneously planned. The last “Unite the Kingdom” rally, in September 2025, was attended by more than 100,000 people. The presence of hundreds of thousands of protesters with radically different political positions has a realistic possibility of resulting in severe disruptions in central London, including violent clashes.

Planned Nakba Day rallies are mostly scheduled to begin in the late morning, although disruptions may begin earlier and continue throughout the day. In addition to planned demonstrations, smaller gatherings are likely to occur, possibly as groups splinter from the main crowd. Common protest methods on Nakba Day include slow marches through city centres, the symbolic “occupation” of government offices or, more frequently, academic buildings on university campuses. Particularly in large cities, protests will almost certainly be heavily policed, and authorities will implement road closures and other mitigation measures ahead of Nakba Day.

Protests are particularly likely to occur in high-visibility areas of city centres, particularly in the vicinity of government offices, Israeli and US embassies, and other diplomatic offices such as consulates. In addition to these, past pro-Palestine protests have targeted businesses that have links with Israel or have been accused of directly or indirectly aiding the Israeli war effort, such as insurance companies. Universities are highly likely to be particularly at-risk hotspots for civil unrest.

Pro-Palestine activist groups are highly likely to stage direct action on or near Nakba Day. This form of unrest may include targeted actions meant to affect transport, particularly at airports, train stations, and public transport hubs. Direct action may also include vandalism of government offices or commercial and corporate assets and premises.

While most demonstrations are likely to remain peaceful, there is a threat of violence in connection with the protests. In the past, pro-Palestine protests have resulted in clashes between attendees and responding police. In countries including India, Bangladesh, and the United States, protesters have vandalised businesses and stores perceived to be linked with Israel or Israeli entities. As counterdemonstrations by pro-Israel activists often occur on symbolically important dates, there is a threat of clashes between opposing protesters, although this is often mitigated by large police deployments.

Finally, Nakba Day protests are high-visibility events. As such, there is a realistic possibility of opportunistic extremist action, including terrorist attacks, on or near the day. Organised terror groups as well as self-radicalised “lone wolves” may seek to stage attacks during Nakba Day. High-risk targets also include government buildings and diplomatic offices, Jewish and Islamic places of worship, and university campuses.


Travel and Safety Guidance for Nakba Day 2026

  • Avoid areas prone to protest or where demonstrations have been organised, especially government buildings, universities, and major urban centres.
  • Closely monitor local news reports, government alerts, trusted local media, and, if available, a security provider’s intelligence/alerting feed, for updates relevant to the demonstrations.
  • Allocate additional time for travel to or near areas where protests are scheduled, due to the possibility of increased traffic or travel disruptions.
  • Where possible, use alternative routes to steer clear of city centres and avoid public transport.
  • When planning travel, note that most planned demonstrations will begin between 11:00-14:00 local time.
  • If in the vicinity of a protest, try to leave if it is safe to do so. Always abide by authority and police directions.
  • If you are in a crowd and unable to leave, take precautions to minimise the risk of crowd crush. These include staying upright, moving away from all hard barriers, going with and not against the crowd, and holding your arms at chest level in a boxer-like stance to relieve pressure.
  • Ensure that you always carry personal identification documents or copies.
  • Ensure knowledge of important contact numbers. These should include at least the local emergency number(s) and contacts for your local embassy or consulate.
  • If protests are scheduled to occur near business premises or travel destinations, consider alternative working arrangements, such as remote work, to minimise the threat to employees and business travellers.

Alert+

Calls for Protests in Kenya Over Fuel Price Increases

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Kenya Faces Protest Risk After Sharp Fuel Price Increase

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:15 UTC 17 APRIL 2026

Kenyan opposition members have called for protests in Nairobi on 21 April under the social media hashtag #RejectFuelPrices. In response, Nairobi Police Commander Issa Mohamud claimed that the protests are “unlawful”, since protesters must notify the police at least 14 days in advance of planned protests and public gatherings. Mohamud added that they will “take appropriate action” and that violence or theft “will not be tolerated, and arrests will be made”.

The calls for demonstrations follow a 15 April decision from Kenya’s Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA), which sets the maximum retail prices, to increase fuel prices. Under the revision, petrol prices are set to increase by 16.1 per cent and diesel prices by 24.2 per cent. The EPRA cited the costs of imported products, which have increased by up to 68.7 per cent. The new pricing will apply from 16 April to 14 May.

Earlier on 15 April, former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua, on behalf of the opposition coalition United Opposition, gave the government a seven-day ultimatum to act on a series of demands aimed at reducing fuel prices. These demands include scrapping the controversial government-to-government (G-to-G) fuel import deal, reducing fuel taxes, including VAT and the road maintenance levy, and redirecting funds from major government projects to protect consumers. Should the government fail to address these demands, the United Opposition has threatened to call for “mass action”.

President William Ruto spoke the same day, dismissing the need for protests. He stated, “[t]here are others saying that because fuel prices have increased globally, they will hold protests in the country. I want to ask, if they protest, will the cost of fuel decrease? We must use our brains to find ways to reduce the price of fuel.” He has also stated that the government had already absorbed part of the price increase through subsidies.

To quell potential unrest, Ruto has announced the reduction of fuel VAT from 16 per cent to 8 per cent for the next three months, as well as a crackdown on oil cartels, saying there would be no tolerance for manipulation in the petroleum sector.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Kenya’s fuel imports are heavily tied to Gulf suppliers, and the price of fuel has spiked due to the recent closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Under the G-to-G framework, Kenya’s petroleum import system set up during Ruto’s government in March 2023, Kenya is supplied by Saudi Arabia’s Aramco Trading; the UAE’s Fujairah FZE and ADNOC Global Trading; and Singapore’s ENOC Singapore.

Kenya has seen major protests in recent years linked to the cost of living. In June and August 2024, a series of mass protests erupted in response to proposed tax increases in the government’s Finance Bill 2024. The unrest started in Nairobi, quickly spreading to other parts of the country. 50 people were killed, and over 230 were injured as protesters torched the Kenyan Parliament Building and clashed with security forces, who used live ammunition and conducted mass arrests. Demonstrations subsided after the government rejected the bill on 28 June.

Widespread protests again took place in June and early July 2025, after a blogger was killed in police custody, with protesters demanding an end to police brutality. Security forces again responded with repression, including live ammunition, tear gas, water cannon, and mass arrests. At least 65 people were killed, and over 550 people were injured. No significant concessions were made, and the issue of police brutality almost certainly remains unresolved.

It is not certain that the #RejectFuelPrices protests will go ahead, since President Ruto has already made minor concessions, and some Kenyans will almost certainly be deterred from attending by the threat of arrest or being subjected to police brutality. However, Kenya, particularly Nairobi, has a strong student movement and experienced several major anti-government demonstrations in recent years, raising the likelihood that the protests will take place and be well-attended​

Kenyan police forces have a precedent of responding heavily-handedly to demonstrations, deploying live ammunition in both 2024 and 2025 unrest. If the planned 21 April protests go ahead, they will likely be met with force, particularly since the demonstrations have been deemed unlawful. If security forces are perceived as using disproportionate force against protesters, this will highly likely exacerbate demonstrations.

The opposition’s seven-day ultimatum is set to expire on 22 April, one day after the planned #RejectFuelPrices protest. Aside from cutting fuel VAT, President Ruto has not acquiesced to the United Opposition’s demands, and it is unlikely that he will announce further cost-cutting measures before the deadline, especially since he has publicly defended the G-to-G scheme. If the opposition’s deadline passes without significant government concessions and they call for “mass action”, this will highly likely further escalate unrest.

While precise protest locations have not been specified in the call for demonstrations, hotspots in Nairobi include the Central Business District, particularly near the City Hall and the Kenyan parliament; Kangemi; Ngong; Kamukunji; Thika Road; and Kitengela. During the 2025 protests, security forces blocked off major roads into Nairobi, including Waiyaki Way, Mombasa Road, Thika Road, Ngong Road, Valley Road, Juja Road, and Lang’ata Road.

In the lead-up to and during the potential protests, there is a realistic possibility that the government will impose internet outages to prevent the spread of calls for anti-government protests. There will highly likely be a heightened security presence in Nairobi and other major cities on 21 April.

Multiple other African countries have seen major fuel price increases. Nigeria has seen the steepest increases, with prices increasing by approximately 65 per cent. Senegal, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and South Africa are other notable countries that have seen major price increases and fuel shortages in recent weeks.

Previous waves of Kenyan unrest have inspired similar Gen Z-led movements in other African countries, such as Nigeria and Mozambique. It is likely that a successful high-visibility fuel protest in Kenya will inspire similar demonstrations in other regional countries, particularly if it forces the government into major concessions.


Travel and Safety Guidance for Nairobi, Kenya

  • Reconsider non-essential travel to Kenya, particularly Nairobi, around 21 April.
  • Avoid the central business district in Nairobi around 21 April, particularly around Kenyatta Avenue, Haile Selassie Avenue, City Hall, and any other wide roads conducive to the staging of protests, as well as all major government buildings such as the Kenyan Parliament or the Governor’s Office.
  • Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and trusted media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.
  • Avoid all areas of unrest due to incidental risks to bystanders. If caught in the unrest, travellers should move with the crowd until they find the nearest opportunity to escape. If in a vehicle, look to turn down the nearest road. If driving away is not an option, lock the vehicle and escape on foot.
  • Always follow all instructions and orders from security forces. Where possible, avoid areas of active unrest and remain in secure accommodation.
  • Prolonged civil unrest can disrupt travel, especially if protesters begin targeting airports. Travellers should have contingency measures in place, including evacuation plans and reliable access to food, water and medication.
  • Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any loss of electricity.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence and Travel Advice

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This page provides situational awareness and practical guidance for organisations and individuals with personnel in the Middle East following the recent escalation of conflict involving Israel, the United States, and Iran.

The security environment remains highly volatile, with ongoing military activity, airspace closures, travel disruptions, and government advisories likely to change at short notice.

This information is provided for general awareness only and does not constitute operational, legal, or travel advice. Decisions regarding shelter-in-place or evacuation should be made following a tailored risk assessment specific to your personnel, location, and circumstances. You should not rely solely on this guidance without first consulting Solace Global Risk or other qualified professionals, as conditions on the ground may change rapidly and options for movement may be limited or unavailable.

Solace Global Risk is actively supporting clients in the region, including the coordination of secure movements and evacuations from the Middle East. Speak to our security operations team 24/7 to learn more.

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 7 JULY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 3 June 2026 – 7 July 2026

Executive Summary

  • Overnight 6-7 July, at least two vessels were attacked in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). These attacks have taken place just over a week after the US and Iran agreed to halt tit-for-tat strikes that were exchanged 26-28 June, which also followed attacks against vessels in the SoH.
  • There is a realistic possibility of a similar cycle of escalation occurring in the coming days, with limited US strikes against Iranian territory highly likely to be followed by limited Iranian strikes targeting US regional bases, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain, given recently established target prioritisation.
  • On 3 July, a spokesman for Yemen’s Houthis announced that Saudi Arabian “warplanes” had been confronted by Houthi air defence, and that repeated airspace violations would be retaliated against with strikes on Saudi Arabia’s airports and other “vital interests”. A spokesman for the Saudi Arabia-led coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG) issued threats in response.
  • The exchange of threats marks what is likely the most significant escalation in rhetoric between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia in years, and was followed by clashes between Houthi and Yemeni IRG forces. While the risk of a full resumption of the Yemeni civil war and a return to full-scale conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia is unlikely in the immediate term, the risk has risen significantly in the last few days.
  • As of 7 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 3 JULY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 30 June 2026 – 3 July 2026

Executive Summary

  • US and Iranian officials held indirect talks in Doha on 30 June and 1 July. Officials reported that the talks were focused solely on the technical issues of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and the unfreezing of Iranian funds.
  • Qatar’s Foreign Ministry stated that the next meetings are scheduled to take place after the funeral processions for Iran’s now deceased former Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is scheduled to be buried on 9 July.
  • Iranian channels have continued to claim sovereignty over the SoH, and have threatened to resume strikes on vessels that do not abide by Iranian instructions.
  • US media reported on 1 July that US President Donald Trump had considered the possibility of carrying out a new wave of strikes on Iran, but eventually decided against it.
  • Israeli and Hezbollah forces have continued to engage in clashes in southern Lebanon. Ongoing conflict in Lebanon is likely to be a key trigger for destabilising the broader ceasefire.
  • There remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement. These cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to strikes against regional countries, with targets in Bahrain and Kuwait being more recently prioritised by Iran.
  • As of 3 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 30 JUNE 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 26 June 2026 – 30 June 2026

Executive Summary

  • Since 26 June, the fragile ceasefire formalised in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the US and Iran on 17 June has come under serious strain, with the US and Iran trading direct fire for the first time since the MoU’s signing.
  • On both 26 and 27 June, the US conducted strikes in Iran. These strikes followed Iranian attacks against two vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH).
  • In retaliation, Iran launched attack drones and ballistic missiles against targets in Bahrain and Kuwait on 27 and 28 June, with the IRGC claiming to have targeted the Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.
  • During the 28 June attacks against Bahrain, a residential building near Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was damaged, with no fatalities reported.
  • Despite the first direct kinetic engagement between the US and Iran since the signing of the MoU, the strikes conducted by both Iran and the US were likely calibrated to remain sub-threshold for a return to full-scale conflict.
  • Delegations from Iran and the US are in Qatar on 30 June, but it remains unconfirmed whether negotiations will go ahead and in what format.
  • There remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement. These cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to strikes against regional countries, with targets in Bahrain and Kuwait being more recently prioritised by Iran.
  • As of 30 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 26 JUNE 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 23 June 2026 – 26 June 2026

Executive Summary

  • Despite the ceasefire remaining formally in place, Israel and Hezbollah continue to engage in clashes in southern Lebanon.
  • Iran reportedly carried out a strike on a vessel trying to exit the Strait of Hormuz. The strike followed the announcement of a UN-led effort to evacuate the personnel of vessels that have remained in the area. Following the strike, the evacuation effort was halted.
  • On 25 June, the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) released a joint statement following a ministerial meeting in Bahrain, which reiterated US-GCC partnership commitments. Iran criticised the statement as “interventionist”.
  • US Vice-President J.D. Vance stated on 25 June, that the United States and Iran had established a direct channel of communication in Doha to support deconfliction and reduce the chance of the conflict resuming.
  • As of 26 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 23 JUNE 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 19 June 2026 – 23 June 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 19 June, within an hour of a renewed Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire coming into effect, Israel conducted further strikes in southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah launched drones towards northern Israel.
  • On 20 June, Iran’s military headquarters announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, citing continued conflict in Lebanon. US Central Command (CENTCOM) said it had tracked no Iranian movements to close the Strait and that traffic continued to flow, while Iran’s own foreign ministry told Iranian media that shipping was operating normally.
  • On 21 June, the first round of Qatar and Pakistan-mediated direct US-Iran talks began at Lake Lucerne, Switzerland. Threats from US President Donald Trump to strike Iran again led to the Iranian delegation reportedly threatening to walk out.
  • The second day of the Lucerne Summit went ahead on 22 June, with mediators announcing a 60-day roadmap and several working groups on the key issues. Subsequent statements from both parties contradicted each other on agreements made regarding an invitation for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and the release of some frozen Iranian assets.
  • On 22 June, an Israeli statement was issued, which said that Israel Defence Forces (IDF) operations will continue in southern Lebanon. Israeli and Lebanese diplomats are scheduled to hold another round of direct talks on 23 June.
  • As of 23 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 19 JUNE 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 16 June 2026 – 19 June 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 17 June, US and Iranian officials electronically signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed by both countries. The 14-point document extends the ceasefire and entails several provisions to resume shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
  • The immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict has likely decreased with the MoU’s implementation. However, it is likely to be only a ceasefire extension, not yet a substantive and lasting peace agreement.
  • The reported agreement is likely vulnerable to continuing conflict in Lebanon, disagreements on the nuclear file in a 60-day negotiating period, and issues regarding the Strait of Hormuz.
  • The planned formal signing ceremony between US and Iranian officials in Switzerland on 19 June has been postponed, highly likely due to Israel’s continued attacks in Lebanon.
  • A US force withdrawal from the region is reportedly tied to progress on further negotiations. As long as the US force posture is maintained, renewed escalation could rapidly break out with minimal indicators and warnings.
  • As of 19 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 16 JUNE 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 12 June 2026 – 16 June 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 14 June, an agreed memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Iran and the US was announced. The MoU is reportedly scheduled to be formally signed on 19 June, with the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to follow.
  • Almost certainly the biggest diplomatic breakthrough since the implementation of the 8 April ceasefire, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease with the MoU’s implementation. However, it is likely to only be effectively a ceasefire extension and not yet a substantive and lasting peace agreement.
  • The announcement of the MoU’s agreement was preceded by further conflict in Lebanon on 14 June, which reportedly almost derailed the deal. Sustained Israeli operations in Lebanon are likely to represent the first major test of the MoU’s implementation. Israeli operations in southern Lebanon have continued as recently as 16 June.
  • The reported agreement is likely vulnerable to continuing conflict in Lebanon, disagreements on the nuclear file in a 60-day negotiating period, and issues pertaining to the Strait of Hormuz.
  • A US force withdrawal from the region is reportedly tied to progress on further negotiations. As long as the US force posture is maintained, renewed escalation could rapidly break out with minimal indicators and warnings.
  • As of 16 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 9 JUNE 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 5 June 2026 – 9 June 2026

Executive Summary

  • Israeli operations have continued in southern Lebanon, with an airstrike being conducted against the southern Lebanese city of Tyre on 9 June, resulting in at least eight deaths, which followed the issuance of an Israeli evacuation order for the entire city. There is a realistic possibility of this triggering further Iranian strikes against Israel, which could lead to further exchanges of tit-for-tat strikes and endanger the broader ceasefire.
  • Should further Israel-Iran confrontation be triggered by developments in Lebanon, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian retaliation would again extend to the Gulf States. Senior Iranian officials have threatened that the Israeli strikes against Iran, in addition to the ongoing US naval blockade, have made US bases and assets in the region “legitimate targets”.
  • Overnight 5-6 June, further Iranian strikes were conducted against Kuwait and Bahrain following confrontation in the maritime domain between the US and Iran. The Kuwaiti military announced the interception of seven ballistic missiles, with interceptions occurring over several residential areas, and authorities stated that debris caused material damage but no injuries. The Bahrain Defence Force announced the interception of three missiles and “several drones”.
  • As of 9 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Overnight 5-6 June, Kuwait announced the temporary closure of its airspace, which was reopened on 6 June.

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Gulf Security Under Pressure Following Israel-Iran Strikes | Alert+

Alert+

Intelligence cut off: 13:00 UTC 8 June 2026

Following escalating conflict in Lebanon, Israel and Iran engaged in retaliatory tit-for-tat strikes. Late 7 June, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) stated that it had intercepted a wave of Iranian missiles in northern Israel. Iran reportedly launched at least ten ballistic missiles against Israel, all of which the IDF claimed were intercepted. This was Iran’s first direct attack against Israel since the implementation of the 8 April ceasefire.

The strikes followed a rocket attack on northern Israel launched by Hezbollah in Lebanon on 7 June, which the Israel Defence Forces responded to with strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh).

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 2 JUNE 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 29 May 2026 – 2 June 2026

Executive Summary

  • Following reports that a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) had been agreed by US and Iranian negotiators, President Donald Trump reportedly requested several amendments to the MOU regarding the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz.
  • On 1 June, Israel’s Prime Minister publicly ordered strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh). IRGC-affiliated media reported that due to the developments in Lebanon, “the Iranian negotiating team is suspending dialogues and exchange of texts through mediators”. President Trump announced a claimed fresh cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and that talks with Iran were “continuing.”
  • The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes across the region, likely remains high. Furthermore, the continuing competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz by the US and Iran continue to lead to conflict in the maritime domain, which has repeatedly escalated into broader ‘tit-for-tat’ strikes which have impacted the Gulf States.
  • On 30 and 31 May, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that it conducted “self-defense strikes on Iranian radar and command and control sites for drones in Goruk, Iran and Qeshm Island”. These followed “aggressive Iranian actions that included the shootdown of a U.S. MQ-1 drone that was operating over international waters.” The IRGC subsequently announced attempted retaliation strikes against a US air base in Kuwait, with Kuwaiti air defences being activated early 1 June and CENTCOM claiming the interception of two Iranian ballistic missiles.
  • As of 2 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 29 MAY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 26 May 2026 – 29 May 2026

Executive Summary

  • Reports on 28 May have said that the US and Iranian negotiating teams have reached an agreement on a memorandum of understanding (MOU). However, reports also indicate that US President Donald Trump and potentially Iran’s Supreme Leader have yet to give final approval.
  • The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes across the region, likely remains high despite the reported progress on a potentially imminent MOU. Moreover, the continuing competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz by the US and Iran continue to lead to conflict in the maritime domain, which has repeatedly escalated into broader ‘tit-for-tat’ strikes which have impacted the Gulf States.
  • Should an MOU be agreed, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved.
  • On 27 May, further US strikes were conducted against Bandar Abbas in Iran, following Iran’s reportedly launching five one-way attack drones at a US commercial vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
  • On 28 May, authorities announced that Kuwaiti air defences were “confronting hostile missile and drone attacks”. The IRGC stated that, following the US attack against Bandar Abbas, “the US air base from which the attack originated was targeted with aerial projectiles”. US CENTCOM stated that Iran launched a ballistic missile towards Kuwait that was successfully intercepted by Kuwaiti forces.
  • As of 29 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 26 MAY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 22 May 2026 – 26 May 2026

Executive Summary

  • Since 22 May, indirect negotiations between the US and Iran have intensified for a potential memorandum of understanding (MOU). Should a framework agreement be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement.
  • Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved, and escalation in Lebanon threatens the wider ceasefire.
  • In a written statement broadcast on 26 May, Iran’s Supreme Leader stated that “the nations and lands of the region will no longer serve as shields for American bases”. This is almost certainly in reference to the US military presence in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf States.
  • On 25 May, the US conducted what Central Command (CENTCOM) described as “self-defence strikes” against “missile launch sites and Iranian boats attempting to emplace mines”, with strikes taking place in the Iranian city of Bandar Abbas next to the Strait of Hormuz. This followed tit-for-tat escalation in the Strait of Hormuz resulting from the competing US and Iranian blockades.
  • In addition to endangering the negotiation process, there is a realistic possibility of further Iranian retaliation strikes being soon launched against regional targets, particularly the UAE, in response to the US strikes against Bandar Abbas.
  • As of 26 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 22 MAY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 19 May 2026 – 22 May 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 19 May, it was reported that the US and Iran are working on a “letter of intent”, with a US source claiming that the framework agreement involves a formal end to the war, and the launching of a 30-day negotiation period on the nuclear file and opening the Strait of Hormuz.
  • On 21 May, it was reported that two senior Iranian sources have said that Iran’s Supreme Leader gave a directive that Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) should not leave the country. The HEU’s removal is a stated red line for the Trump administration, and White House and other senior Iranian sources denied the reporting.
  • Iranian adherence to any interim framework is likely to be undermined by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands.
  • The two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines, and a potentially imminent framework agreement would be unlikely to fully resolve these red line issues. If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.
  • Escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that sporadic Iranian strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE unless there is a return to full-scale regional conflict.
  • On 19 May, the UAE Defence Ministry stated that forces intercepted and destroyed six attack drones in the country’s airspace over the previous 48 hours.
  • As of 22 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 19 MAY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 15 May 2026 – 19 May 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 17 May, Pakistani mediators shared with the US a revised Iranian proposal, which was again rejected as insufficient. US President Donald Trump stated on 18 May that the US had planned to conduct strikes against Iran on 19 May but that this was called off following calls with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.
  • The two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines, particularly regarding the nuclear file. If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.
  • Escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that sporadic Iranian strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE unless there is a return to full-scale regional conflict.
  • On 17 May, the UAE’s Ministry of Defence announced that three attack drones had entered the UAE from the western direction, with one attack drone striking an electrical generator at the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in the Al Dhafra Region. Authorities have stated that “the incident did not affect the safety of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant” and no increase in radiation has been recorded.
  • On 17 May, the Saudi Ministry of Defence stated that “three drones were intercepted and destroyed after entering the Kingdom’s airspace coming from Iraqi airspace.” These are the first public claims of hostile projectiles over Saudi Arabia since 12 April, but it is unconfirmed where the drones were targeting, and the incursion may be linked to the attack targeting the UAE.
  • As of 19 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Flight restrictions were reactivated in the UAE following renewed Iranian attacks.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 15 MAY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 12 May 2026 – 15 May 2026

Executive Summary

  • Following the 11 May reports that the UAE had earlier secretly participated in the conflict as an active combatant with kinetic strikes against Iran, reports emerged on 12 May that Saudi Arabia had also launched several strikes against Iran.
  • The Saudi strikes likely resulted in an opposite effect to those conducted by the UAE, reducing rather than increasing Iran’s willingness to attack Saudi territory. Riyadh likely ordered limited, calibrated attacks against Iran to restore deterrence, and Tehran likely views an escalation with Saudi Arabia as a higher risk than with the UAE.
  • As recently demonstrated, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has highly likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that sporadic Iranian strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE unless there is a return to full-scale regional conflict.
  • With the current diplomatic track facing major difficulties, Washington may conclude that a return to conflict is the only means of forcing compliance from Tehran. If this occurs, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.
  • Recent leaked assessments by US intelligence services indicate that Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz; regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities; fields 70 per cent of its transporter erector launchers; and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments likely suggest Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes for several more months.
  • As of 15 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Flight restrictions were reactivated in the UAE following renewed Iranian attacks.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 12 MAY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 8 May 2026 – 12 May 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 10 May, Tehran sent through its response to the US-proposed draft agreement, which reportedly included several maximalist demands and minimal to no concessions. US President Donald Trump described the Iranian response as “TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE” and said that the “ceasefire with Iran is on massive life support”.
  • On 10 May, Kuwaiti authorities announced the detection of an unspecified number of “hostile drones”, the UAE’s Ministry of Defence announced that Emirati air defence systems successfully engaged two attack drones launched from Iran, and a bulk carrier was reported to have been struck by a drone in Qatar’s territorial waters.
  • On 11 May, US media reported that the UAE has secretly participated in the Iran conflict as an active combatant. The emerging reports will likely reinforce Iran’s prioritisation of the UAE as a target over other Gulf States.
  • On 12 May, Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior announced that the four individuals arrested early this month for attempting to infiltrate Bubiyan Island, Kuwait, were members of Iran’s IRGC. The attempted infiltration, if confirmed, highlights the ongoing threat of IRGC asymmetric and sabotage operations, particularly against high-value targets such as critical national infrastructure.
  • As recently demonstrated, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE in the immediate term due to these factors.
  • With the current diplomatic track facing major difficulties, Washington may conclude that a return to conflict is the only means of forcing compliance from Tehran. If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.
  • As of 12 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Flight restrictions were reactivated in the UAE following renewed Iranian attacks.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 8 MAY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 5 May 2026 – 8 May 2026

Executive Summary

  • Iran launched another wave of strikes against the UAE on 5 May. Emirati air defences were activated again on 8 May, with no immediate reports of damage.
  • On 5 May, President Trump announced that Project Freedom would be suspended, the US being highly likely constrained by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait suspending the use of their territory and airspace. However, reporting on 7 May indicates that these restrictions have been lifted. Should Project Freedom restart, this would likely lead to further Iranian strikes against the UAE.
  • On 7 May, Iranian forces launched missiles and attack drones at three US naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. US forces subsequently conducted strikes against the Iranian city of Bandar Abbas and the island of Qeshm.
  • As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE in the short term due to these factors.
  • As of 8 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Flight restrictions have been reactivated in the UAE.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 5 MAY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 1 May 2026 – 5 May 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 4 May, Iranian forces launched 15 missiles and four attack drones at the oil terminal in Fujairah, UAE. This marks the first attacks originating directly from Iran against the Gulf States since the implementation of a ceasefire on 8 April.
  • Omani officials also reported that a building housing workers was damaged by an “attack” in the Tibat area of Bukha, which is in close proximity to the Emirati border, with “moderate injuries to two expatriates”.
  • The attacks followed the 3 May announcement by US President Donald Trump of the new Project Freedom initiative and escalated conflict in the Strait of Hormuz.
  • The Iranian strikes on the UAE almost certainly represent the most significant escalation since the ceasefire’s implementation on 8 April. However, messaging from US President Donald Trump has so far refrained from stating that the ceasefire has been violated or is no longer in effect.
  • There is a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring in the maritime domain, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be contained to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain.
  • If the US and/or Israel resume strikes against Iran in an effort to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Such attacks would likely involve Iran broadening its targeting, in particular to include oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Emirati port of Fujairah (as it did on 4 April).
  • As of 5 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Following the 4 May attacks, flight restrictions have been reactivated in the UAE.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 1 MAY 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 28 Apr 2026 – 1 May 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 29 April, Trump reiterated that US forces will continue to impose a naval blockade on Iran until the Iranian government agrees to a deal that addresses its nuclear programme. Overall, it is unlikely that the US blockade will be capable of compelling Iran to make immediate concessions.
  • On 29 April, US officials said that the USS Gerald R Ford carrier is set to depart the Middle East and return to its homeport in Virginia in the coming days. This may be in anticipation of a relief in place with an additional carrier.
  • On 30 April, President Trump reportedly received a briefing on potential plans for new military action against Iran. US officials have briefed that the proposals include a “short and powerful” wave of strikes, likely including infrastructure targets.
  • If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Attacks would likely involve Iran broadening its targeting to include assets and infrastructure that enable the Gulf States to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz, such as oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Emirati port of Fujairah.
  • An Iran-affiliated group reportedly targeted US troops in Bahrain in an information campaign on social media.
  • As of 1 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 28 APRIL 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 24 Apr 2026 – 28 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 25 April, Iran’s foreign minister reportedly set forth demands from Tehran in Islamabad that the US naval ‘blockade’ of the Strait of Hormuz be lifted as a precondition for talks, giving a proposal to solve the Strait crisis first with a ceasefire extension, with nuclear negotiations delayed to a later stage.
  • US President Donald Trump subsequently announced that a planned trip to Islamabad by US negotiators had been cancelled due to Tehran’s unchanged negotiating position and a lack of commitment to meet, but that this does not mean a resumption of war.
  • Continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and the current lack of further US-Iran talks to formally extend the ceasefire have increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict. Such a conflict would highly likely result in renewed Iranian attacks against targets in the Gulf States.
  • The current status quo in the Strait of Hormuz is almost certainly untenable for both the US and Iran in the long term, and it is unlikely that either party will be willing to prolong the situation indefinitely.
  • On 24 April, Kuwait’s Ministry of Defence stated that two northern border posts were targeted by drones originating from Iraq, resulting in material damage but no casualties.
  • As of 28 April, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman’s airspaces are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 24 APRIL 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 21 Apr 2026 – 24 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 21 April, potential US-Iran talks in Pakistan were put on hold after Iran refused to send a delegation to the negotiations. US President Donald Trump subsequently unilaterally extended the ceasefire indefinitely, although US officials briefed on 22 April that the extension is expected to last only three to five days.
  • The USS George H.W. Bush carrier strike group (CSG) entered the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AoR) on 23 April, transiting past eastern Africa. Depending on transit speed, the Bush CSG is anticipated to be on station within two to four days.
  • On 22 April, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media outlet Fars News Agency published a list of threatened targets in the Gulf States if their “geography and facilities are used” in attacks against Iran. These included specific oil and gas facilities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.
  • As of 24 April, Kuwaiti airspace has been opened following an announcement by the authorities. Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar’s airspaces are open, although carriers must adhere to strict procedures. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspaces remain fully open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 21 APRIL 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 17 Apr 2026 – 21 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

  • US President Donald Trump stated on 20 April that the deadline for the two-week ceasefire is now Wednesday evening (22 April), Washington time.
  • The ceasefire came under significant pressure and has been considered on the verge of collapse following continuing disputes in the Strait of Hormuz.
  • As of 21 April, it remains unclear whether further potential talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, between the US and Iran will go ahead. US Vice President JD Vance is expected to travel to Islamabad imminently, with Iranian participation unconfirmed.
  • If a ceasefire extension is not agreed upon before its expiration or potential talks result in a total breakdown in negotiations, there is a high likelihood of kinetic activity returning to pre-ceasefire levels. All parties have likely exploited the ceasefire to improve their offensive and defensive positions.
  • On 20 April, the UAE’s State Security Agency announced that it dismantled a “terrorist organisation” and arrested its member over an alleged plot which included plans for “coordinated terrorist and sabotage attacks”.
  • As of 21 April, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahraini airspace is open, but with a high rate of flight cancellations. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains unused by almost all carriers, but Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 17 APRIL 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 14 Apr 2026 – 17 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

  • US officials have briefed that further direct in-person talks are likely before the expiration of the ceasefire. A Pakistani delegation visited Tehran on 16 April, and calls and draft proposal exchanges have reportedly continued remotely between the US and Iran.
  • Both Iran and the US almost certainly remain incentivised to continue negotiations in the immediate term, although the ceasefire remains highly fragile and could break down rapidly with minimal advanced warning.
  • If a ceasefire extension is not agreed upon in the coming days, there is a high likelihood of kinetic activity returning to pre-ceasefire levels. All parties have likely exploited the ceasefire to improve their offensive and defensive positions.
  • On 16 April, US President Donald Trump stated that Israel and Lebanon agreed to a 10-day ceasefire. The status of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire likely plays a key role in either strengthening or weakening the Iran-US ceasefire.
  • On 17 April, it was reported that Dubai Police confirmed in official internal documents that “electronic monitoring operations” were used to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group. The individual who sent the video was then reportedly located, lured to a meeting point, and arrested by police.
  • As of 17 April, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahraini airspace is open, but with a high rate of flight cancellations. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains unused by almost all carriers, but Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 14 APRIL 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 10 Apr 2026 – 14 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

  • Both Iran and the US almost certainly remain incentivised to continue negotiations in the immediate term, although the ceasefire remains highly fragile and could break down rapidly with minimal advanced warning.
  • On 11 April, the US began engaging in Pakistan-mediated talks with Iran. However, on 12 April, the talks ended without an agreement.
  • Despite the failure of the Islamabad post-ceasefire talks to produce a peace agreement, neither side has declared an end to talks or the ongoing two-week truce.
  • Sources indicated on 14 April that a second round of post-ceasefire talks may occur later this week.
  • On 12 April, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Iraqi Ambassador following alleged low-scale drone attacks targeting Gulf States that are claimed to have originated from Iraq.
  • On 11 April, unconfirmed Bahraini media reports stated that one attack drone was intercepted over the past 24 hours in Bahrain.
  • As of 14 April, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahraini airspace is open, but with a high rate of flight cancellations. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains unused by almost all carriers, but Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 10 APRIL 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 8 Apr 2026 – 10 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

  • Following the agreement of a 15-day ceasefire on 7 April, US and Iranian officials are scheduled to begin negotiations in Pakistan. Iranian forces have largely paused their attacks on Gulf states, although occasional reports of drone launches have been recorded on 8 and 9 April.
  • As of 10 April, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahraini airspace is partially open, with operations gradually resuming. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, while the airspace is closed to almost all commercial flights, but Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 8 APRIL 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 7 Apr 2026 – 8 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

  • On the evening of 7 April, US and Iranian officials agreed to a two-week ceasefire, in a deal brokered by Pakistani officials. The agreement was announced shortly before the deadline set by US President Donald Trump. The deal involves an immediate cessation of hostilities between the US, Israel, and Iran.
  • Despite the deal, several Iranian attacks on Gulf states have been recorded on 7-8 April. This is likely due to the breakdown of command and control in Iran caused by US and Israeli strikes.
  • Late 7 April, vehicular movement was once again suspended along the King Fahd Causeway connecting Saudi Arabia to Bahrain due to a missile threat, before reopening early 8 April.
  • As of 8 April, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 7 APRIL 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 2 Apr 2026 – 7 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 2 April, two US strikes targeted the newly built B1 bridge linking Tehran to Karaj. In response, Iranian media published a list of major bridges across the region. The list includes the Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah Sea Bridge in Kuwait, King Fahd Causeway linking Saudi Arabia to Bahrain, the Sheikh Zayed Bridge and Sheikh Khalifa Bridge in the UAE, and the King Hussein Bridge, the Damia Bridge, and the Abdoun Bridge in Jordan. On 7 March, the King Fahd Causeway was closed due to the threat of Iranian attacks.
  • On 7 April, the Israeli military warned the people of Iran not to use trains, with their X account stating: “Dear Citizens, for the sake of your security, we kindly request that from this moment until 21:00 Iran time, you refrain from using and travelling by train throughout Iran. Your presence on trains and near railway lines endangers your life.” This almost certainly increases the likelihood that Iran will target rail infrastructure in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.
  • On 5 April, US President Donald Trump issued an ultimatum to Iran, calling on authorities to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and agree to a deal on ending the conflict. President Trump later added that the deadline to reach an agreement would be 20:00 EST on 7 April (00:00 UTC on 8 April).
  • Following the US ultimatum, Iranian officials threatened to “irreversibly destroy” critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the region, including power plants and water systems, in response to potential US strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure.
  • Multiple CNI sites were struck in Kuwait, including Al Ahmadi Port Refinery, a water and desalination plant, and Shuaiba oil complex.
  • Bahraini authorities noted that an Iranian drone attack had likely damaged the GPIC petrochemicals plant. Further damage was also reported at a BAPCO Energies storage facility.
  • Multiple civilian and CNI sites were targeted in the UAE, including buildings belonging to the US company Oracle in Dubai, Habshan gas plant, an Emirates Global Aluminium plant near Abu Dhabi, Borouge petrochemicals plant, and the Sharjah telecom building. On 3 April, two fires were reported at the Royal Airwing building at Dubai International Airport (DXB / OMDB).
  • The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 7 April, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 2 APRIL 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 31 Mar 2026 – 2 Apr 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 31 March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that it would attack US companies in the region starting on 1 April in retaliation for attacks on Iran. The IRGC published a list of 19 companies with corporate offices in the region: Microsoft, Apple, Google (Alphabet), Nvidia, Intel, IBM, Amazon, Meta, Tesla, Boeing, Cisco, Dell, HP, Oracle, Palantir, JPMorgan, General Electric, G42, and Spire Solutions.
  • The IRGC’s threat was followed by an additional drone strike on an Amazon data centre in Bahrain, air defences being activated over Dubai, and “minor” damage being reported in the Khalifa Economic Zones Abu Dhabi (KEZAD), UAE, due to debris.
  • On 1 April, President Trump gave a televised address in which he said that he expects the war to last another two to three weeks, and reiterated serious threats against Iran if it does not open the Strait of Hormuz.
  • Air defences were activated in Bahrain on 1-2 April, with the IRGC Navy claiming to have targeted the “Al-Hidd Industrial City, Bahrain” and “Remaining aluminium infrastructure, Bahrain”.
  • In the UAE, one Bangladeshi national was killed on 1 April after debris from an intercepted drone reportedly fell in the Al-Rifaa area. Interceptions have been reported over Dubai and Abu Dhabi on 2 April, with Abu Dhabi authorities reporting “minor” damage in the Khalifa Economic Zones Abu Dhabi (KEZAD) following debris from a missile interception. The IRGC Navy claimed that attacks were launched against “Abu Dhabi American Steel Industries”.
  • The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 2 April, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 31 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 30 Mar 2026 – 31 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 30 March, US President Donald Trump threatened strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure and desalination plants if a “deal is not shortly reached” and the Strait of Hormuz is not immediately opened. Moreover, an Iranian Health Ministry official claimed on 31 March that a desalination plant on Iran’s Qeshm Island has been out of service since an alleged attack on 7 March.
  • President Trump’s threats and Iran’s claims of Qeshm’s desalination plant being out of order almost certainly raise the risk of future Iranian retaliation strikes targeting CNI and desalination plants in the Gulf States. Following President Trump’s initial ultimatum earlier in March, the IRGC-linked FarsNews Agency published a list of potential targets for retaliation strikes, including power and/or desalination plants in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE.
  • Early 31 March, a spokesman for Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence stated that Saudi air defences intercepted and destroyed a total of seven ballistic missiles launched towards Riyadh.
  • The US Embassy in Qatar published an alert on 30 March, stating, “[t]he U.S. Embassy in Doha lifted its shelter in place advisory.”
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets, and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 31 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 30 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 27 Mar 2026 – 30 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the USS Tripoli, which has embarked around 2,200 Marines, arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility on 27 March. A further 2,000 US Army paratroopers have reportedly been ordered to deploy to the region, with the Pentagon also alleged by US media to be considering deploying an additional 10,000 ground troops.
  • The Houthis’ entry into the conflict on 28 March, marked by strikes against Israel, raises the risk of a broader threat across the Arabian Peninsula if the group escalates its involvement further. The Houthis are almost certainly the most capable Iran-backed proxy force in the region. During the 2014-2022 civil war in Yemen, the Houthis launched multiple attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including international airports and oil and gas infrastructure.
  • On 28 March, civil aviation authorities stated that Kuwait International Airport (KWI / OKKK) was impacted by several attack drones, resulting in “significant” damage to the radar system, but no injuries. Another attack on 29 March targeted a service building at an unspecified power and water desalination plant, killing one Indian national.
  • Following strikes in the UAE overnight 28-29 March, officials in Abu Dhabi stated that the fire department was dealing with three fires in the Khalifa Industrial Zone caused by ballistic missile debris. At least five people were injured. Emirates Global Aluminium also reported that multiple employees were injured and that the plant sustained “significant damage”.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets, and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 30 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 27 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 25 Mar 2026 – 27 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 27 March, US President Donald Trump extended the deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz by 10 days to 6 April. The ultimatum initially led to Iranian threats against desalination and power plants across the region.
  • A combined attack drone and cruise missile attack led to material damage at Mubarak al Kabeer Port in Kuwait, with no injuries recorded, and an attack drone strike against Shuwaikh Port also resulted in material damage but no injuries.
  • On 26 March, at least two people were killed, and multiple others were injured when debris from a ballistic missile interception fell onto Sweihan Road, Abu Dhabi, UAE. Pakistani, Indian, Emirati and Jordanian citizens were reportedly among the casualties.
  • The potential entry of Saudi Arabia into the war against Iran, which remains reportedly under consideration in Riyadh, would highly likely result in an increased rate and scale of retaliation attacks being launched by Iran.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets, and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 27 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatar is allowing limited flights with prior permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 25 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 23 Mar 2026 – 25 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 23 March, reports emerged that Saudi Arabia is strongly considering entering the war against Iran. With Iranian attacks against the Gulf States having been so significant, Saudi Arabia likely calculates that deterrence against Iran may need to be re-established with offensive operations. The entry of Saudi Arabia, in addition to potentially other Gulf States such as the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar, into the war against Iran, would highly likely result in an increased rate and scale of retaliation attacks being launched by Iran into these countries.
  • A rare storm system has moved through the region this week, leading to heavy rainfall and thunderstorms in eastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman.
  • On 24 March, Amazon Web Services (AWS) stated that it had been “disrupted” following attack drone activity in Bahrain, although it is unconfirmed whether Amazon’s Bahrain facility was directly hit by an attack drone or if the disruption was due to nearby strikes.
  • On 25 March, QatarEnergy declared force majeure on its long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply contracts with South Korea, Italy, Belgium, and China following damage to key production facilities caused by an Iranian ballistic missile strike overnight 18-19 March.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drone and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 25 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatar is allowing limited flights with prior permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 23 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 20 Mar 2026 – 23 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • In response to a 48-hour ultimatum delivered by US President Donald Trump to Iran on 21 March to open the Strait of Hormuz, or the US would conduct strikes against Iranian power plants, Tehran issued threats to “irreversibly destroy” critical national infrastructure across the region, including desalination plants. On 23 March, President Trump stated that the ultimatum would be extended for a “FIVE DAY PERIOD” due to claimed productive talks.
  • Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media published a list of power and desalination plants that would be targeted in retaliation strikes, in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.
  • The Gulf States are highly dependent on desalination for drinking water, domestic use, and industrial purposes. Sustained attacks on desalination facilities are likely to have significant impacts on national water security in the Gulf States.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drone and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 23 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatar is allowing limited flights with prior permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; and Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 20 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 18 Mar 2026 – 20 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reported on 20 March that its spokesman was killed in overnight strikes by the US and Israel. This follows a series of high-profile “assassinations” of senior Iranian military and political figures, which have triggered retaliation attacks from Iran.
  • On 20 March, Iran issued a threat to US and Israeli officials and military personnel, stating they will not be safe in “resorts and tourist centres around the world.”
  • In retaliation for the Israeli attack against the Iranian South Pars gas field on 18 March, Iranian forces conducted significant strikes targeting oil and gas facilities across the region.
  • UAE authorities announced that they had dismantled a terrorist network operating in the country, which had links to Hezbollah and Iran.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 20 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatar is allowing limited flights with prior permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; and Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 18 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 17 Mar 2026 – 18 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 18 March, Iran issued an evacuation warning for oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, threatening that they would be targeted in “in the coming hours”. The warning follows gas facilities at Iran’s South Pars field being reportedly struck by Israel a few hours earlier. Specifically, the warning was directed towards: Saudi Arabia’s Samref Refinery and Jubail Petrochemical Complex, the UAE’s Al Hosn Gas Field, and Qatar’s Mesaieed Petrochemical Complex, Mesaieed Holding Company and Ras Laffan Refinery.
  • On 17 March, Kuwaiti authorities reported two people injured by debris over the previous 24 hours, following attacks involving two ballistic missiles and 13 attack drones.
  • Saudi authorities stated that two attack drones were intercepted on approach to the Diplomatic Quarter in Riyadh on 18 March, with a third attack drone also announced as intercepted over Riyadh.
  • Australia’s Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, stated that deployed Australian troops were safe after an Iranian projectile hit an area near Al Minhad Air Base on 18 March, which is around 24km south of Dubai.
  • Travel agents in Oman are reportedly recording a significant surge in interest for getaways for UAE residents during the upcoming Eid Al Fitr holidays. Heavy traffic is expected at key crossings such as the Hatta border crossing.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 18 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 17 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 16 Mar 2026 – 17 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 17 March, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, stated that Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, and the commander of the paramilitary militia Basij, Gholamreza Soleimani, had been killed in overnight strikes. If confirmed, the killing of two senior leadership figures in Iran is likely to trigger an increased rate of Iranian strikes across the region in retaliation.
  • The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March. 16 March recorded the highest daily number of combined missiles and drones targeting Saudi Arabia, at 72.
  • The UAE’s Ministry of Defence claimed that ten ballistic missiles and 45 attack drones had been intercepted so far on 17 March at 11:35 UTC. At least three explosions were reportedly heard in Dubai; and authorities stated that a Pakistani national was killed by debris in the Bani Yas area of Abu Dhabi.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 17 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 16 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 15 Mar 2026 – 16 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 16 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 64 attack drones in Riyadh and Eastern Province. The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March. The areas most targeted are Riyadh, Al-Kharj (where the Prince Sultan Air Base is located), and the Eastern Province (where key Saudi oil refineries are located).
  • Early 16 March, an attack drone struck fuel tanks in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB), prompting a temporary suspension of operations at the airport. DXB resumed operations later on 16 March.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 16 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 15 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 14 Mar 2026 – 15 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • Iranian officials have reiterated threats to target US and Israeli private companies across the region, characterising these attacks as “retaliatory” for potential future US-Israeli strikes on Iran’s oil infrastructure.
  • On 15 March, Iran reportedly fired six missiles and 34 drones against targets located in Saudi Arabia. Since 12 March, the volume of Iranian strikes targeting Saudi Arabia has increased.
  • Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 15 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar are allowing limited flights, requiring prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 14 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 13 Mar 2026 – 14 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region.
  • On 14 March, Iranian media linked to the IRGC has advised residents of the UAE to evacuate ports, labelling them “legitimate targets”, following US strikes in Kharg Island. In a follow-up statement, the same media outlet warned residents to “immediately move away” from Jebel Ali, Khalifa, and Fujairah port areas due to likely impending attacks.
  • Overnight 13-14 March, Iranian officials claimed to have struck two Citibank locations in Manama and Dubai with attack drones.
  • Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 14 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 13 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 12 Mar 2026 – 13 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March.
  • On 12 March, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media stated that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.
  • On 13 March, Dubai officials reported minor damage to a building in the Dubai International Financial Centre caused by debris from a successful interception.
  • On 13 March, the Omani authorities reported the downing of two drones in the Suhar Governorate. One of the drones fell in the Al-Awahi Industrial Area, resulting in the death of two expatriates and several injuries.
  • Iran continues strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 13 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

Continue Reading →

 

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 12 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 11 Mar 2026 – 12 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • The threat of attacks against US and Israeli-linked banks and economic centres issued by the Iranian KACHQ on 11 March is highly likely to increase the risk profile of offices, facilities, and other assets associated with major US and Israeli-linked companies across the region. The threat reportedly triggered major firms, including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered, to evacuate or shut their Dubai, UAE, offices on 11 March.
  • As of 12 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
  • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained high, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • In Dubai, UAE, 11-12 March attack drones impacts were recorded in the Al Bada’a area and onto the façade of a building on Sheikh Zayed Road, causing no injuries. An attack drone also hit the Address Creek Harbour hotel, sparking a fire that was brought under control and causing no injuries.
  • On 11 March, Iranian drone strikes hit fuel tanks in Salalah, Oman, setting off a large blaze. Omani authorities said there were no injuries.
  • In Kuwait on 12 March, an attack drone strike injured at least two people after impacting a residential building in Mangaf, southern Kuwait.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 11 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 10 Mar 2026 – 11 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • On 11 March, a spokesman for KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces, declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia and Oracle. Moreover, the KACHQ stated that Iran will now move from a claimed policy of “reciprocal hits” after attacks to continuous strikes on its adversaries.
  • As of 11 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
  • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • Qatar Airways announced a limited flight schedule to and from Doha, Qatar, on 13 and 14 March, dependent on the airspace reopening.
  • In Dubai, UAE, four people were injured on the morning of 11 March, after “two drones fell in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB)”. The Dubai Media Office added that air traffic is operating as normal.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 10 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 09 Mar 2026 – 10 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • As of 10 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
  • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • Overnight 9-10 March, one person was killed, and eight were injured in an Iranian attack drone strike on a residential building in Manama, Bahrain.
  • The frequency of Iranian attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia is highly likely increasing, in comparison to the earlier phases of the conflict when Saudi Arabia was targeted significantly less than other countries in the Arabian Peninsula.
  • A drone strike on 10 March at the UAE’s state-run ADNOC’s Ruwais refinery resulted in a fire, leading to the closure of the facility. Iranian strikes against oil and gas infrastructure have likely escalated in retaliation for Israeli strikes against Iranian oil infrastructure.

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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update | 9 MARCH 2026

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 08 Mar 2026 – 09 Mar 2026

Executive Summary

  • As of 9 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar has permitted limited repatriation flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.
  • Iran has escalated strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, attack drone use has remained consistent, with the threat of attack drone strikes likely to remain high in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • Overnight 8-9 March, at least 32 people were injured in the Sitra area south of Manama, following an alleged drone strike on a residential area. All those injured were Bahraini citizens. Contrary to initial reports, videos shared on social media show an interceptor missile mistakenly striking the area. The exact cause of the injuries remains unconfirmed.
  • On 8 March, Saudi officials reported that two people were killed and several more injured by a strike on a residential area in Al-Kharj. These are the first reported casualties recorded in Saudi Arabia since the start of the conflict.
  • On 9 March, Iranian officials selected Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Ali Khamenei, as the regime’s new Supreme Leader. The appointment constitutes a victory for the hardline political and religious factions of the Islamic Republic, and for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). US officials have threatened to target Khamenei.​

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The Global Risk Podcast | Is the US Prepared for a Prolonged War with Iran?

Intelligence

This week’s Global Intelligence Briefing covers the increased terrorism threat in the United States following the outbreak of war with Iran, nationwide Bolsonaro rallies in Brazil, Ukrainian frontline advances, US-Israeli strikes on Iran and the resulting regional conflict, Israeli operations in Lebanon, Iranian attacks across the Gulf, Pakistan’s open conflict with the Afghan Taliban, and Shia protests across South Asia.

Listen now:

 

Outlook: Gulf Security Under Pressure From Iranian Attacks

Intelligence

Iran’s shift to the targeting of critical infrastructure and other civilian profile targets is likely reflective of an attempt to increase economic disruption across the Gulf, pressure regional governments that host US military bases and support operations, and demonstrate Iran’s capacity to impose widespread costs across the region despite being under sustained pressure from US and Israeli joint strikes. Iran may have also calculated that attacks of this magnitude may undermine the long-term presence of the US military in the Middle East by increasing the political and security costs for host nations and raising domestic pressure within Gulf states to distance themselves from US military operations.

Iran is also likely attempting to pressure Washington and Tel Aviv by provoking international condemnation and economic pressures on a global scale. Attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, followed by the suspension of operations at these sites, combined with a de facto Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, will almost certainly trigger economic shocks and volatility in global energy markets, as well as disruptions to maritime trade and energy supply chains. This strategy is likely to increase international pressure and could help to isolate Washington.

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Outlook: Escalation Risks Persist After US–Israel Strikes on Iran

Intelligence

Current US and Israeli military operations mark a significant escalation from Operation Midnight Hammer, which involved preliminary strikes on Iranian conventional military capabilities to enable a US bombing run on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the scale of the US’s current force posture and forward positioning of military assets is the largest buildup in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Iran’s current strategy is likely aimed not only at striking Israel and US military forces but also at generating widespread economic disruption, undermining US regional security guarantees and restoring deterrence by positioning itself as a resilient power capable of inflicting widespread damage and costs despite suffering major losses, evidenced by its attacks on Arab nations and attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz.

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Latest Update: Airspace & Ground Routes – Israel and Gulf States

Operations

Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 06 MARCH 2026

Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat increasingly used by regional airlines as a hub for relief flights, including services operated by Qatar Airways.

Israel’s airspace continues to be closed to most civilian traffic. Access is currently limited to military operations and civilian flights that have received prior authorisation.

Jordan’s airspace remains open; however, operators are being advised to plan for potential delays and carry additional fuel as a precaution.

  • Saudi Arabia: Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf  – Expires 2200 UTC | 5 March
  • Iran: Total closure – Expires 0830 UTC | 7 March
  • Iraq: Total closure – Expires 0900 UTC | 7 March
  • Qatar: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 5 March
  • Bahrain: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 5 March
  • Kuwait: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 5March
  • Syria: Total closure – Expires 2100 UTC | 7 March
  • United Arab Emirates: Closure by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones – All expire 1200 UTC | 6 March
  • Israel: Total closure – Expires 1000 UTC | 9 March
  • Azerbaijan: Southern sector closed – Expires 1939 UTC | 5 March

 

Latest Update: Airspace & Ground Routes – Israel and Gulf States

Operations

Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 05 MARCH 2026

 

Latest Update: Gulf Airspace Closures Amid Iranian Strikes

Operations

Intelligence cut off: 08:47 UTC 04 MARCH 2026

We note that Oman airspace remains open. In addition, Jordan has removed its nighttime ban.

  • Saudi Arabia: Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf  – Expires 2200 UTC | 4 March
  • Iran: Total closure – Expires 0830 UTC | 7 March
  • Iraq: Total closure – Expires 0900 UTC | 7 March
  • Qatar: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 4 March
  • Bahrain: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 4 March
  • Kuwait: Total closure – Expires 1600 UTC | 4 March
  • Syria: Total closure – Expires 2100 UTC | 7 March
  • United Arab Emirates: Partially closed – Expires 1200 UTC | 4 March
  • Israel: Total closure – Expires 1000 UTC | 9 March

Solace Global is currently able to evacuate personnel from Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Israel. If you require assistance, our security team is available 24/7 to discuss secure transportation.

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Latest Update: Ground Routes & Border Crossings

Operations

Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 03 MARCH 2026

Gulf States Ground Evacuation Routes and Border Crossings Map

Israel Ground Evacuation Routes and Border Crossings Map

Please Note:

All ground movements are subject to current immigration and border regulations. Travellers must confirm entry requirements in advance, including visa eligibility, residency status, and passport validity. Border policies and processing times may change with little notice.

Evacuations conducted by Solace Global are assessed case by case, based on the evacuee’s citizenship and the entry requirements of the receiving country. Route selection depends on border accessibility, security conditions, and onward travel options.

 

Gulf Airspace Closures Amid Iranian Strikes

Operations

Intelligence cut off: 09:00 UTC 03 MARCH 2026

We note that Oman (OOMM) airspace remains open.

  • Saudi Arabia (OEJD) — Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf  — Expires 2200 UTC | 3 March
  • Iran (OIIX) — Total closure — Expires 0830 UTC | 7 March
  • Iraq (ORBB) — Total closure — Expires 0900 UTC | 4 March
  • Qatar (OTDF) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 3 March
  • Bahrain (OBBB) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 3 March
  • Kuwait (OKAC) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 3 March
  • Syria (OSTT) — Total closure — Expires 2100 UTC | 3 March
  • United Arab Emirates (OMAE) — Partially closed — Expires 1200 UTC | 4 March
  • Israel (LLLL) — Total closure — Expires 1000 UTC | 6 March
  • Jordan (OJAC) — Closed daily from 1500 to 0600 — Expires 0600 UTC | 5 March

Solace Global is currently able to evacuate personnel from Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Israel. If you require assistance, our security team is available 24/7 to discuss secure transportation.

Contact us →

 

Gulf Airspace Closures Amid Iranian Strikes

Operations

Intelligence cut off: 16:30 UTC 02 MARCH 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted ballistic missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran.
  • Iran has further escalated strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, including oil and gas infrastructure, in addition to strikes targeting US military facilities.
  • Airspaces remain closed across Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, as of 2 March.
  • In Kuwait, the Doha West power station, Mina Al Ahmadi Refinery, and US Embassy in Kuwait City were impacted. Most drones were reportedly intercepted near Rumaithiya and ⁠Salwa neighbourhoods.
  • In Bahrain, a foreign vessel in Salman Industrial City and a US-flagged tanker in the Port of Bahrain were impacted. Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was targeted on 1 March by an Iranian drone, causing material damage but no casualties.
  • In Qatar, air defences intercepted attacks reportedly aimed at civilian infrastructure, including Hamad International Airport (DOH / OTHH). A water tank in Ras Laffan Industrial City was also impacted.
  • The UAE has been the second most targeted country behind Israel. Further explosions were reported in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai on 2 March.
  • Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term, and while likely continuing to prioritise the targeting of US military installations, they will also likely continue against civilian-profile targets due to the escalation in Iranian targeting patterns.
  • The UK FCDO maintains its travel advice to advise against all but essential travel to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.

 

Airspace Closures across the Middle East

Operations

Intelligence cut off: 11:00 UTC 02 MARCH 2026

Latest Updates: Airspce Closures across the Middle East
  • Cyprus: Airspace Open
  • Egypt: Airspace open. Israeli passport holders NOT permitted entry.
  • Jordan: Partial closure on a daily basis, between UTC 1500 and 0600, until March 5th. Israeli passport holders must use this route, open to all other passport holders.
  • Saudi Arabia: Partial closure affecting area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf
  • Bahrain: Total closure
  • Israel: Total closure
  • Iran: Total closure
  • Iraq: Total closure
  • Kuwait: Total closure
  • Qatar: Total closure
  • Syria: Total closure
  • United Arab Emirates: The United Arab Emirates (OMAE) airspace is not outright closed, but remains restricted by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones, effectively limiting commercial air traffic.

 

Travel Advice for the Middle East

Travel Advice

Intelligence cut off: 12:30 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

  • Avoid all non-essential travel to the Middle East.
  • Travellers should follow shelter-in-place orders and advisories, particularly in Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.
  • Do not conduct travel to the airport until shelter-in-place orders or recommendations are lifted. Once lifted, ensure that booked flights are still running before conducting travel to the airport.
  • Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if situated in the Middle East.
  • Travellers in Israel should familiarise themselves with the nearest air raid shelter and ensure that they have downloaded applications that provide early warning of incoming threats, such as Home Front Command or Red Alert.
  • Avoid all military installations, government buildings, and key infrastructure, which may constitute potential targets.
  • Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
  • Expect the security situation in the region to remain highly unstable in the immediate future. There is an increased risk of further strikes, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest.
  • Prepare an essential “go-bag” containing, at a minimum, travel documents, cash, medications, basic supplies, and communication devices in case of evacuation.
  • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
  • Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

 

Iran Retaliation Strikes Against US Bases in the Gulf

Alert+

Intelligence cut off: 12:30 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

On 28 February, Iran conducted ballistic missile strikes targeting United States military facilities in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in response to joint United States and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The strikes targeted US military installations across the Gulf region, including facilities associated with force posture, command and control, and logistics.

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US and Israel Conduct Major Strikes Against Iran

Alert+

Intelligence cut off: 08:10 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

At approximately 10:00 Iranian local time on 28 February, the US and Israel conducted strikes against Iran. The strikes followed weeks of escalating regional tensions, large-scale US military build-up across the region and Tehran’s refusal to concede to US demands regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

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Free Download: Evacuation Checklist

Our Evacuation Checklist provides a clear, structured framework to support security and incident management teams during relocation or evacuation scenarios. Covering verification, staff accountability, movement planning, communications, and post-evacuation review, it brings together the actions that matter most when decisions need to be measured and well-coordinated.

Designed for organisations operating across both routine and complex environments, the checklist enables consistent decision-making, accurate staff tracking, and organised execution from initial trigger through to safe arrival. It supports your teams in protecting people, maintaining oversight, and meeting duty of care responsibilities with confidence.

Alert+

Iran Retaliation Strikes Against US Bases in the Gulf

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Iran Conducts Ballistic Missile Strikes Across the Gulf

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 12:30 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

On 28 February, Iran conducted ballistic missile strikes targeting United States military facilities in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in response to joint United States and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The strikes targeted US military installations across the Gulf region, including facilities associated with force posture, command and control, and logistics.

In Kuwait, air defence systems have neutralised most incoming missiles. However, “significant damage” has been reported to the runway of an air base hosting Italian air force personnel. Following the attack, Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry declared that it reserves the right to respond in a manner that is “commensurate with the scale and nature of this attack”.

In Bahrain, the service centre of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet has been “subjected to a missile attack”, according to a statement quoted by the state-run Bahrain News Agency (BNA). The headquarters was reportedly hit, and while extent of the damage is unclear, thick smoke has been reported from the Juffair area of Manama. Bahrain’s Interior Ministry has declared that it has started evacuating people from Juffair.

In Qatar, which is home to Al Udeid Air Base, the US’s largest military base in the region, explosions have been heard, and air raid sirens have sounded. Qatar’s defence ministry stated that it “successfully countered a number of attacks targeting the country’s territory”, with reports that a US-made Patriot battery had intercepted an Iranian missile. The attacks caused no damage to the air base, according to Qatar’s interior ministry. Its Foreign Ministry has announced that it reserves the right to respond.

In the UAE, one person had been killed by debris in a residential area of Abu Dhabi following the interception of Iranian missiles.

Direct strikes have not been confirmed in Jordan or Saudi Arabia. Debris has been reported in the governorates of Amman, Zarqa, Jerash, Madaba and Irbid, damaging several buildings. No casualties have been reported.

Saudi Arabian media have reported loud bangs and several heavy explosions shortly after the strikes in Qatar and Bahrain. However, direct strikes on Saudi Arabia are unconfirmed.

Multiple national governments have issued shelter-in-place advisories to their citizens in the affected countries, reflecting the elevated threat environment and the risk of further strikes or indirect impacts.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has stated that “[t]his operation will continue relentlessly until the enemy is decisively defeated”, adding that all US assets in the region constitute a legitimate target. Kataib Hezbollah, an Iraqi paramilitary group, has declared that it will soon begin attacking US bases following strikes which killed two of its fighters in southern Iraq.

Airspaces are closed across at least eight countries, including Iran, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. Syria also announced it had closed part of its airspace in the south for 12 hours. Numerous airlines have cancelled flights to the region.

Multiple foreign governments have issued shelter-in-place warnings for Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Iranian retaliation strikes against US military facilities across the region are a major escalation in comparison to Iranian retaliatory actions during the June 2025 12-Day War. The Iranian ballistic strikes against Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, Qatar, following US intervention in June 2025, were highly likely intended to be subthreshold for further escalation while maintaining deterrence. In contrast, these strikes were likely intended by Tehran to cause maximum damage against US military interests and fulfil the repeatedly stated threat that Iran would do such strikes in retaliation for US-Israeli strikes.

Early indications are that the interception rates have been very high, with the US having engaged in a significant buildup of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot anti-ballistic missile air defence systems over the past month. However, early reports indicate that air defences were penetrated by Iranian projectiles at the headquarters of US Navy’s 5th Fleet in Manama, Bahrain. This highlights that even with comprehensive air defence coverage, large-scale Iranian strikes are capable of saturating advanced air defence systems, leading to penetration.

Moreover, the use of ballistic missiles presents a significant risk of collateral impact, particularly from falling debris outside intended target areas, as highlighted by the death of one civilian in Abu Dhabi from debris. Emergency services are also likely to be operating at increased capacity, which may result in longer response times and reduced availability for non-critical incidents.

Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term and will highly likely prioritise the targeting of US military installations. However, there is a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, airspace closures, flight diversions, airport disruption, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region. Civilian infrastructure in proximity to military facilities is at risk of incidental targeting.

Over the coming days, Iran’s capability to conduct mass large-scale ballistic missile launches capable of penetrating advanced air defences could notably reduce. Iran’s ballistic missile Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) are almost certainly high-value targets for joint US-Israel operations, and their use reduces their concealability. However, airspace closures and disruptions are highly likely to be protracted, and shelter-in-place orders are highly likely to remain in place while Iranian retaliation strikes continue.

If the regime is threatened existentially, Tehran is likely to escalate even further. A currently less likely but most dangerous course of action for Tehran would be to fulfil previously issued threats to launch attacks at US economic interests in the region, particularly oil and gas infrastructure. Furthermore, the Iranian naval forces could attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint for the transportation of oil. Finally, Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Yemen could launch their own attacks against US military bases or economic interests in the Arabian Peninsula. Shia militias in Iraq have the capability to conduct attacks into Kuwait, and the Houthis in Yemen are capable of launching missile and long-range drone attacks across the peninsula, in addition to resuming attacks against merchant vessels.


Travel and Safety Guidance for the Middle East

  • Avoid all non-essential travel to the Middle East.
  • Travellers should follow shelter-in-place orders and advisories, particularly in Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.
  • Do not conduct travel to the airport until shelter-in-place orders or recommendations are lifted. Once lifted, ensure that booked flights are still running before conducting travel to the airport.
  • Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if situated in the Middle East.
  • Sign up for government/embassy alerts.
  • Avoid all military installations, government buildings, and key infrastructure, which may constitute potential targets.
  • Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
  • Expect the security situation in the region to remain highly unstable in the immediate future. There is an increased risk of further strikes, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest.
  • Prepare an essential “go-bag” containing, at a minimum, travel documents, cash, medications, basic supplies, and communication devices in case of evacuation.
  • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
  • Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts.

Alert+

US and Israel launch attack on Iran

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US and Israel Conduct Major Strikes Against Iran

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 08:10 UTC 28 FEBRUARY 2026

At approximately 10:00 Iranian local time on 28 February, the US and Israel conducted strikes against Iran. The strikes followed weeks of escalating regional tensions, large-scale US military build-up across the region and Tehran’s refusal to concede to US demands regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. 

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz has stated that the attack was a “pre-emptive strike” to “remove threats against the State of Israel”. A senior US official has stated that the strikes were conducted against military targets. Israeli media, citing an Israeli official, has reported that Israel is preparing for several days of conflict with Iran. 

US President Donald Trump has said the US has launched “major combat operations” in Iran, stating in a video on Truth Social that “we’re going to destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground . . . we’re going to annihilate their navy, we’re going to ensure that the region’s terrorist proxies can no longer destabilise the region or the world and attack our forces”. To Iranian citizens, he stated “when we are finished, take over your government, it will be yours to take”. 

Early reporting indicates that the operation involved at least three initial strikes delivered by Israel, followed by multiple more strikes delivered by Israel and the US. Iranian media have reported at least three initial strikes in central Tehran, with several further strikes in the north and east of Tehran.  

Reported targets include at least six Iranian cities: Tehran, Qom, Kermanshah, Isfahan, Karaj, and Tabriz, as well as Lorestan province. According to Iranian media, explosions have been reported in the district where the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reportedly resides, with further explosions taking place in District 11, containing the presidential palace and the National Security Council. Based on initial reports, the strike profile appears to be major. 

Initial indications regarding the effect of the strikes are unconfirmed, but Israeli media reports claim that the Commander-In-Chief of the Iranian Army, Amir Hatami, may have been killed in Tehran. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Khamenei was not in Tehran during the initial attack and had been transferred to a secure location. According to Iranian media, President Masoud Pezeshkian is “in full health.” 


As of 0810 UTC 28 February, there are reports of Iranian kinetic retaliation being initiated, with Iranian missile launches detected by the IDF. An Iranian official told international media that Iran is preparing for retaliation and that the response is set to be “crushing”.  

In Israel, authorities have enacted a “special and permanent state of emergency” and closed the country’s airspace, with Home Front Command / the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issuing guidance including advising citizens to stay near protected shelters and minimise travel, and announcing the closure of schools, workplaces, and public gatherings. Sirens sounded across Israel at approximately 08:15 Israel local time (06:15 UTC), warning of a possible impending missile attack. The Israeli government has suspended civilian flights to and from the country in the wake of the attack on Iran.

Diplomatic missions have issued advisories for countries across the Middle East. The US has issued shelter-in-place advisories in Israel, Qatar, and Bahrain. 

The air and maritime disruption is immediate and almost certain to expand. Authorities are confirmed to have closed the entirety of the airspace in Israel, Iran and Iraq. Flight tracking websites confirm that this has already resulted in major region-wide flight diversions, cancellations, and delays.  


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The strikes almost certainly significantly elevate the risk profile of the entire Middle East. Given the early indications of the significant scale of the attack, major Iranian retaliation is highly likely. 

In the immediate term, further airspace closures are highly likely, which will almost certainly further impact air travel and, in some cases, reduce options for evacuation via commercial airlines. Further revisions to government travel advisories are highly likely, and any evacuation of non-essential embassy personnel would likely reduce consular capacity and complicate support to nationals remaining in-country. 

The region-wide risk of terrorist attacks, kidnappings, and civil unrest, including the staging of protests targeting US and Israeli businesses and diplomatic missions, has now likely increased.  


Although the strikes will likely lead to the degradation of Iran’s capability to retaliate, Iran likely retains multiple means of retaliation through its own ballistic missile and attack drone capabilities, as well as through the activation of its regional proxy forces.  

During the June 2025 12-Day War, Iran either used or lost a significant proportion of its ballistic missile and attack drone stockpiles. However, since the 12 Day War, Iran has reportedly expanded production rates, with recent estimates indicating that Iran holds an inventory of approximately 1,500-2,000 ballistic missiles and far higher numbers of long-range attack drones.  

While considerably degraded in the various conflicts since October 2023, Iran’s proxy forces retain considerable capabilities across the region. The Houthis in Yemen maintain large stockpiles of missiles and long-range attack drones, which are in range of Israel and all of the Arabian Peninsula. Hezbollah in Lebanon likely retains the capability to conduct attacks into northern Israel, and Iraqi Shia militias are capable of launching rocket and drone attacks from Iraq.  

There are numerous possible courses of action for Iranian retaliation, each with variable likelihood and potential impact.  


It is highly likely that Iran will launch large-scale layered ballistic missile and attack drone strikes against Israel. Attacks on Israel are likely to result in mandatory shelter-in-place orders, business closures, suspension of public gatherings, restrictions on travel, curfews, and other restrictions and emergency protocols. 

During the 12-Day War, Iran launched over 500 ballistic missiles and approximately 1,000 attack drones towards Israel. Likely target sets include Ben Gurion International Airport, military bases, government and security facilities, and infrastructure such as ports and energy facilities. Likely due to both intentional targeting and poor accuracy, Iranian retaliation strikes in Israel also almost certainly pose a high risk to civilian-profile targets, including international hotels, in high-density urban areas.  

It is likely that Israeli air defence interception will initially be successful at intercepting the vast majority of incoming projectiles, although debris from successful interceptions can still pose a threat to life. However, during the 12-Day War, penetration rates of Iranian ballistic missiles increased from around 8 per cent at the start of the conflict to around 25 per cent at the end. This was likely due to Israeli interceptor shortages and Iran’s increased use of more advanced weapon systems.   

Large-scale Iranian strikes against Israel are likely to lead to a protracted closure of Israeli airspace and disruption to regional air traffic. This would almost certainly render air evacuation from Israel unavailable, necessitating alternative options such as potential overground evacuation to neighbouring Jordan or Egypt, or maritime evacuation to Cyprus. 

However, in a rapidly evolving and dynamic threat environment, any evacuation plan will need to be tailored to conditions at the time and consider factors like border closures, regional airspace closures, and maritime threat advisories. 

Due to Jordan’s geographic location between Israel and Iran, attempted strikes against Israel almost certainly pose a threat of falling debris, unexploded ordnance, and airspace closure. In the medium term, there is an increased risk of civil unrest in Amman, particularly outside the US and Israeli embassies. 


It is likely that Iran, potentially supported by the Yemen-based Houthis, will attempt to conduct attacks against US naval assets operating in the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, or Red Sea, particularly the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG). The threat environment for maritime transit through these areas is likely to be severe in the event of active hostilities between the US and Iran.  

Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that a US attack would result in retaliatory strikes against US bases and facilities across the region. There is a realistic possibility that Iran will launch ballistic missiles towards US bases in Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, or Qatar. Following the US intervention in the 12-Day War, Iran launched 14 ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, Qatar. Despite resulting in no casualties, the attack caused notable air travel disruption.  

Iranian retaliation strikes against US regional bases would likely lead to significant air travel disruption in the targeted country, a threat of debris from successful interceptions, and the imposition of shelter-in-place orders. Moreover, while strikes in these countries are highly likely to prioritise US military bases, such as Al Dhafra Air Base outside Abu Dhabi, UAE, the targeting of civilian areas cannot be discounted.  


Tehran is likely to leverage the capabilities of its proxy forces to retaliate. The Houthis have threatened to restart their anti-shipping campaign and will likely launch long-range attacks against Israel, particularly Eilat, Tel Aviv, and Ben Gurion International Airport. If the conflict escalates, there is also a realistic possibility of the Houthis launching attacks against US bases in the Arabian Peninsula. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), the loose network of Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq, are likely to launch its own attacks against Israel and US military bases in the region.

Lebanese Hezbollah did not intervene during the 12-Day War due to their severe degradation and continued Israeli military pressure. However, particularly if the Iranian regime is existentially threatened, there is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah will conduct attacks targeting northern Israel. This would highly likely lead to major IDF operations in Lebanon, including strikes in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and in Beirut targeting Hezbollah senior leadership.


Iranian officials and proxy force leaders have previously warned of retaliation strikes targeting US economic interests in the region, particularly oil and gas infrastructure. This would almost certainly further escalate the conflict and risk drawing in Gulf States against Iran. However, if existentially threatened, there is a realistic possibility of Iran and its proxy forces conducting region-wide attacks against oil and gas infrastructure and other economic targets. Iranian state media has previously threatened to target key economic and technology zones in Dubai, UAE, and the Saudi port of Jubail.


Active conflict in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, and adjacent waters is likely to disrupt international shipping and trade. It is estimated that 20 per cent of global daily oil consumption passes through the Strait of Hormuz. 

There is an elevated global risk of large-scale and potentially violent civil unrest in response to any potential conflict.  Large-scale protests may be staged in major US cities, other Western cities and across the Islamic world. Protests outside of US and Israeli embassies are likely. 


 

Recommendations 

  • Avoid all non-essential travel to the Middle East. 
  • Travellers should follow shelter-in-place orders and advisories, particularly in Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.  
  • Do not conduct travel to the airport until shelter-in-place orders or recommendations are lifted. Once lifted, ensure that booked flights are still running before conducting travel to the airport.  
  • Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if situated in the Middle East. 
  • Travellers in Israel should familiarise themselves with the nearest air raid shelter and ensure that they have downloaded applications that provide early warning of incoming threats, such as Home Front Command or Red Alert.  
  • Avoid all military installations, government buildings, and key infrastructure, which may constitute potential targets. 
  • Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities. 
  • Expect the security situation in the region to remain highly unstable in the immediate future. There is an increased risk of further strikes, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest. 
  • Prepare an essential “go-bag” containing, at a minimum, travel documents, cash, medications, basic supplies, and communication devices in case of evacuation. 
  • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages. 
  • Closely monitor alerts from a security provider if available, trusted local news reports and government alerts. 

Alert+

Afghanistan–Pakistan Clashes Escalate

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Pakistan strikes Kabul as Afghan Taliban escalate cross-border attacks

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 11:45 UTC 27 FEBRUARY 2026

On 26 February, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan escalated, with the Taliban-led Afghan government launching strikes on Pakistani military posts along the border. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid described “large-scale offensive operations” against Pakistani military bases and installations along the Durand Line. Both sides exchanged fire overnight, and Afghanistan’s Defence Ministry claimed it destroyed 19 Pakistani posts and two bases, capturing numerous personnel, which Pakistan denies.

Pakistan accused Afghan forces of initiating “unprovoked firing” and launched Operation Ghazab lil-Haq (“Righteous Fury”) in response, declaring an “open war” against Afghanistan. On 27 February, Pakistan launched airstrikes targeting Afghan military facilities in Kabul, Kandahar, and Paktia. At least three explosions were heard in Kabul, and both sides have made competing claims. According to Pakistan’s federal minister for information and broadcasting, Attaullah Tarar, the strikes killed at least 133 Afghan officials and injured over 200.

In response to the Kabul strikes, the Taliban claimed that it conducted drone strikes on Pakistani military targets in Islamabad’s Faizabad district and Nowshahr and Jamrud in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Afghan local media have claimed that the airstrikes left “hundreds of dead and wounded”, with unverified videos allegedly showing ambulances rushing to a hospital in Islamabad. According to the Pakistani information minister, no injuries were reported after Pakistan’s air defence system downed all Afghan drones with “no damage to life”.

Following the clashes, Afghan Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid released a statement that the Taliban want to engage in talks to resolve the conflict.

There are no confirmed reports that either Pakistan or Afghanistan have formally closed their airspace. Airlines are continuing to operate from Kabul and Islamabad international airport, with some delays.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The recent escalation comes after Pakistani strikes on alleged Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) camps and hideouts located in Nangarhar and Paktika provinces on 22 February. These strikes followed a series of high-profile terror attacks and increased militancy in Pakistan, particularly from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad has long accused the Afghan Taliban of sponsoring or failing to restrain.

The strikes also follow the 6 February mass casualty attack on a Shia Mosque in Islamabad, which was claimed by Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP), which largely derives from Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional branch of IS operating primarily in Afghanistan and parts of western Pakistan.

This escalation marks the first time that Pakistani forces have directly targeted Taliban installations in Kabul. Previous Pakistani strikes in Afghanistan have targeted militant camps and have generally been subthreshold to avoid all out conflict. This almost certainly marks the most significant escalation since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021.

Pakistan’s armed forces significantly outmatch Afghanistan’s, with roughly 660,000 personnel and extensive materiel, including at least 465 combat aircraft, around 6,000 armoured vehicles, and approximately 4,600 artillery systems. Afghanistan, on the other hand, has approximately 172,000 troops and no functioning air force excluding drones.

A prolonged conflict is highly likely undesirable to both sides. Pakistan has multiple ongoing insurgencies, and a conflict would significantly increase the probability of exacerbating the militant threat, with the TTP highly likely to increase its attack volume against security personnel and civilians in Pakistan in the short-to-medium term. Furthermore, sustained clashes risk significantly disrupting Pakistan’s economy, increasing pressure on an already unpopular government.

For Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military advantage means it can almost certainly impose disproportionate physical and political costs on Afghanistan, including targeting Taliban officials and important military sites. Furthermore, a conflict would almost certainly undermine the Taliban’s attempts to improve external relations and reduce its isolation on the international stage, which has been a primary goal of the Kabul-based Taliban faction.

The Taliban potentially being open to talks almost certainly provides an offramp to Pakistan to de-escalate. However, both governments are likely to face significant internal pressure from their civilian populations to not be perceived as backing down, which risk further escalating the conflict. There is a large degree of disinformation from both countries’ media outlets, as well as on social media, which is highly likely to exacerbate nationalist sentiment. Should the governments be perceived as backing down, protests in major population centres are likely.

If clashes continue to escalate, the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments are highly likely to further restrict border crossings and impose airspace restrictions. The risk of terror attacks in major Pakistani urban centres, including Islamabad, has highly likely further increased.


Travel and Safety Guidance for Afghanistan and Pakistan

  • Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if stranded in Afghanistan or Pakistan.
  • Avoid all military installations, government buildings, and key infrastructure, which may constitute potential targets.
  • Avoid all travel to regions close to the border.
  • Ensure you have robust evacuation, communication, and contingency plans in place.
  • Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
  • Expect the security situation in the region to remain highly unstable in the immediate future. There is an increased risk of further strikes, border clashes, and civil unrest.
  • Prepare an essential “go-bag” containing, at a minimum, travel documents, cash, medications, basic supplies, and communication devices in case of evacuation.
  • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged in case of potential power outages.
  • Closely monitor trusted local news reports and government alerts. Unverified claims and disinformation will almost certainly be widely propagated on social media and unvetted sources.

Security Update

Puerto Vallarta and Jalisco
Following Cartel Violence

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Jalisco Security Update After CJNG Retaliation

SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:30 UTC 24 FEBRUARY 2026

The resort town of Puerto Vallarta in Jalisco state, near the border with Nayarit, was severely impacted by the violence following the 22 February raid that killed Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as “El Mencho”, the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG).

On the night between 22 and 23 February, several cases of arson, firebombing and vandalism occurred throughout Puerto Vallarta. Gunmen, suspected to be associated with CJNG, carried out an attack at the Ixtapa prison, located approximately 8 kilometres northeast of Puerto Vallarta International Airport, which resulted in the killing of one guard, an unspecified number of injuries, and the escape of 23 inmates.

Across the state of Jalisco, cartel members and other criminals erected dozens of improvised roadblocks, repeatedly attacking transiting vehicles. Levels of violence in Jalisco prompted dozens of flight cancellations and the halting of public transport services in several municipalities.

Mexican authorities have deployed approximately 10,000 additional troops to parts of Mexico that have been affected by the surge in cartel violence, particularly in the states of Jalisco and Nayarit. On 23 February, road-clearing operations were started across Jalisco state to reduce the number of roadblocks. According to authorities, approximately 80 per cent of roadblocks were removed by 23 February. In Puerto Vallarta, 92 torched vehicles were removed on 23 February during road-clearing operations. On the same day, the Mexican Navy deployed the transport vessel ARM Usumacinta to Puerto Vallarta, carrying an estimated 400 troops. The Mexican Air Force has also deployed planes and helicopters to support surveillance.

The most recent update from the US Mission to Mexico on 23 February continues to urge citizens in specific locations to shelter in place until all blockades are cleared. These locations are Jalisco State (including Puerto Vallarta, Chapala, and Guadalajara) and Nayarit State (including the Nuevo Nayarit/Nuevo Vallarta area near Puerto Vallarta).

The advisory states that “the situation has returned to normal” in: Baja California (including Tijuana, Tecate, and Ensenada), Quintana Roo State (including Cancun, Cozumel, Playa del Carmen, and Tulum), Colima, Guanajuato, Estado de Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and Zacatecas.

Regarding air travel disruptions, the US Mission to Mexico states that all airports are open, with most airports operating normally. The US Mission reports having received no indication of security-related flight disruptions to any Mexican airport other than Guadalajara or Puerto Vallarta. In Guadalajara and Puerto Vallarta, some but not all flights have begun departing, with multiple airlines now operating from these airports. The advisory notes that travellers may also be able to book a connecting flight through another Mexican city to leave the country.


INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

While episodes of violence have been recorded in the early hours of 24 February in Guadalajara, there are early signs that the security situation in Puerto Vallarta is improving. The security forces are likely prioritising the security of the tourist resorts and their immediate surroundings, including access roads, transport hubs and key infrastructure.

Jalisco governor Pablo Lemus has announced the resumption of in-person teaching at all levels on 25 February. In Puerto Vallarta itself, available reporting indicates that stores have started to reopen on 23-24 February.

Several airlines have announced they would operate flights to and from Puerto Vallarta on 24 or 25 February, including Air Canada and United Airlines. Others, like Southwest Airlines, have assessed that disruptions will continue until 26 February.

Disruptions for cruise services remain extant. Operators such as Carnival Corporation and Norwegian Cruise Line have stated that they have cancelled scheduled port calls in Puerto Vallarta. Likely, cruise services to Puerto Vallarta will gradually resume during the 25-28 February period.

The large armed forces and security contingent deployed to Jalisco has likely decreased the risk of another severe outbreak of violence in tourist locations like Puerto Vallarta in the short term, whereas isolated episodes of violence, such as targeted killings by cartel operatives, cannot be ruled out. The reduction in the immediate threat of widespread violence will likely allow travellers to conduct road movements on key roadways and between central Puerto Vallarta and the airport, provided they take mitigation measures such as using low-profile vehicles with security-trained drivers who are familiar with the local area.

However, the killing of El Mencho has likely significantly destabilised CJNG and could lead to a fragmentation of the cartel and provoke the outbreak of infighting, similarly to what occurred in the Sinaloa Cartel after its leaders were apprehended. This would likely lead to a longer-term deterioration of the security environment in Jalisco and Nayarit states.

It is important to note that 24 February is Día de la Bandera, a nationwide commemoration which usually coincides with official events in large urban centres. In Puerto Vallarta, past Día de la Bandera events were held in Plaza Armas or at Agustín Flores Contreras Stadium. There is a remote possibility of cartels seeking to disrupt any celebrations or carry out demonstrative and symbolic operations targeting state officials. Travellers should avoid large public events in Puerto Vallarta or other parts of Jalisco.


Travel and Safety Guidance for Mexico

  • Expect the security situation in the states of Jalisco and Nayarit to remain unstable in the immediate future.
  • Shelter-in-place and avoid any non-essential travel within Puerto Vallarta and other parts of Jalisco due to the risk of military operations and cartel activity.
  • If conducting road travel, do so during the day and on key roadways.
  • Avoid all large-scale gatherings across Jalisco.
  • Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.
  • Adhere to all shelter-in-place warnings until they are lifted.
  • Expect heightened travel disruptions due to road obstructions and blockades and subsequent security checkpoints.
  • Some roadblocks may be cartel-imposed. If possible, avoid roadblocks.
  • When approaching a roadblock, if unable to avoid it, remain in your vehicle with your hands visible, seatbelts on, and windows up. Adhere to all instructions issued by authorities.
  • If travel is necessary, avoid road travel outside major routes. Keep to intercity road travel during daylight hours and use pre-arranged transport only. Do not travel after dark.
  • Avoid facilities associated with security forces, government institutions and embassies.
  • Do not take pictures of government buildings, roadblocks, or ongoing incidents.
  • Travellers with upcoming flights to/from/via Mexican airports, especially Puerto Vallarta International Airport (PVR) and Guadalajara International Airport (GDL), are advised to check their flight status with their respective airlines and plan accordingly.
  • Keep emergency contact numbers saved on your phone, including those for local authorities, medical services, and consular assistance. Ensure mobile devices are fully charged.
  • If available, monitor your intelligence provider’s alerting platform and trusted local media for updates relevant to the unrest.