On 21 July, US President Joe Biden announced that he would be ending his bid for re-election in 2024, and instead endorsed his Vice President Kamala Harris. Biden’s announcement followed weeks of speculation about the president’s health and fitness that followed a dismal debate performance against Republican nominee and former President Donald Trump.

Following the debate, Biden was asked to step down by senior Democrats and major party donors. Harris’ new presidential bid was met with considerable enthusiasm from the party, with the incumbent vice president raising more than USD 100 million in donations in a matter of days.

Trump has questioned the legality of the swap and has not indicated if he will debate Harris.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The announcement is likely to affect Trump’s chances of election in 2024. The former president narrowly escaped an assassination attempt at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, and subsequent polls indicated that his popularity among voters slightly surpassed Biden’s. Harris is, on paper, a stronger Democrat candidate against Trump, and the party leaders are likely betting that she will be able to better reach on-the-fence voters than the current president.

The Republican Party is likely still struggling to adjust its electoral narratives in the aftermath of the Pennsylvania assassination attempt. While Trump called for unity and pluralism in his post-shooting appearance at the Republican National Convention (RNC), other senior members of the party reiterated old conspiracy theories and illiberal talking points. The discrepancy almost certainly demonstrates the entrenchment of “Trumpism” in the GOP, and the recent assassination attempt highly likely unified the party base away from the moderate wing of the party.

Moreover, Trump’s campaign recently received notable endorsements, most importantly from multiple tech billionaires including Elon Musk, owner of X.com. While Harris’ success in quickly amassing the support of the key Democrat electorate, the momentum of Trump’s campaign may prove hard to stop.

Finally, Trump’s language, which seemingly identifies Harris as an “illegitimate” candidate, could have serious security implications. If Trump were to lose the election, these discourses could be leveraged by the ex-president and by militant right-wing activists to dismiss the 2024 elections as fraudulent. While a repeat of the attempted “January 6” insurrection is highly unlikely, such developments could drive cases of domestic terrorism, civil unrest, and other forms of politically motivated violence. 

On 25 July, the US Justice Department announced that the co-founder and suspected current leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada was arrested in El Paso, Texas. During the joint Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operation, Joaquin Guzman Lopez, the son of Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán, the cartel’s other co-founder, was also arrested.

The exact details of the operation have yet to be released. However, early reports indicate that the cartel members were lured onto a plane supposedly heading to the south of Mexico which actually flew to the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Sinaloa Cartel is considered the largest drug supplier to the US and in recent years has hugely increased its smuggling of fentanyl to the US, a drug which is now the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18 to 45. Their apprehension may temporarily disrupt the cartel’s operations but is unlikely to have any meaningful long-term effect regarding disruption or deterrence.

Their capture could lead to a power vacuum within the Sinaloa Cartel which is likely to trigger infighting among cartel factions, a scenario that will almost certainly lead to violent clashes on the streets of Mexican territory which they control, including the major cities of Culiacan and Durango, and even parts of Chiapas in the far south. Long-term, the arrest of the leadership may lead to increased fragmentation of the cartel, another scenario that will almost certainly lead to increased violence.

Rival cartels like the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) may interpret this lack of leadership as a weakness and seek to exploit this opportunity to expand their influence and control over lucrative areas. This is most likely to manifest itself in the areas disputed between the Sinaloa Cartel and rival cartels. One prominent example is the major tourist city of Tijuana, where territorial disputes have been fierce given the city’s strategic location near the US border and the lucrative tourist market within Tijuana.

Throughout the reporting period, there has been a spate of attacks attributed to dissident groups belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC) guerilla group. The majority of the attacks have been targeted at the Colombian army or police and most were located in southwest Colombia, particularly in the Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Huila departments. However, there have also been several militant attacks in Colombia’s northeastern department of Arauca close to the Venezuelan border.

On 24 July, suspected FARC dissidents dropped a grenade onto a football field in El Plateado, Cauca department, killing a 10-year-old boy and injuring at least a dozen injuries. The attack took place during the middle of a cultural and sports week being held in the district and marks the first deadly use of a drone in Colombia’s war with FARC.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Attacks in southwest Colombia were likely conducted by more than one FARC dissident group, with several rejecting President Petro’s plans for “total peace”. Several dissident groups, including the Carlos Patiño front and the Second Marquetalia are known to operate in the area and are vying for control of a main drug trafficking route to the South Pacific known as the Micay Canyon and much of its surrounding environment. The IED attack was likely in response to the refusal of local residents to expel army troops from the area- an established tactic of many of the dissident groups.

Several of the other attacks can likely be attributed to the largest FARC dissident group, Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC). The government ended a ceasefire agreement with FARC-EMC on 16 July and has recently arrested several of the group’s leaders, with attacks potentially being a form of retribution. FARC-EMC is assessed to have as many as 4,000 fighters and operates in over 200 of Colombia’s 1,100 municipalities. Increased attacks across Colombia are likely a result of these developments, with simultaneous attacks across the country potentially overstretching Colombia’s armed forces.

This trend will be exacerbated if FARC-EMC coordinates or cooperates with other dissident groups like the Second Marquetalia, with both groups known to work together in the past to capitalise on the lucrative drug trade. FARC militants have increasingly used drones to drop munitions on targets, a tactic that has been used to good effect in the Middle East and Ukraine. This will likely become an established tactic of FARC, with drones offering a level of accessibility in Colombia’s rural and mountainous environment, and one that will help them engage superior government forces at a distance.

Should there be a major escalation in fighting, then it is almost certain that the kidnapping risk across the country will increase as this has traditionally been a major source of revenue for FARC dissidents.

Netanyahu gives fourth address to US Congress.

On 24 July, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered his fourth address to a joint session of the US Congress in Washington DC, seeking support for Israel’s war in Gaza. Protests against the war greeted Netanyahu outside and inside Congress, with Representative Rashida Tlaib holding a sign calling him a “war criminal.”

Netanyahu denounced the protesters and accused the International Criminal Court of false accusations. Despite ongoing ceasefire negotiations, Netanyahu reiterated a hardline stance, calling for increased US military aid to ensure a decisive victory against Hamas.

Panama security forces scheduled to start deporting migrants

Panama’s security forces are scheduled to start deporting migrants who try to enter the country through the southern Darien Gap. The new government campaigned on an anti-migrant platform and quickly signed a deal with the US to receive funding for its deportation efforts.

Polls suggest President Maduro will lose the Venezuelan presidential election

The Venezuelan presidential candidates have been holding their last rallies with the election set to take place on 28 July. Current polling indicates that the incumbent President Nicolás Maduro is set to lose the election to former diplomat Edmundo González. However, it is likely that Maduro will refuse to concede the election reminiscent of the presidential crisis of 2019.

The 2019 crisis resulted in widespread civil unrest, political instability, human rights abuses and frequent violent clashes between protestors and the security services. The event was accompanied by extensive sanctions on Venezuela which exacerbated an already fire humanitarian crisis and pushed Caracas towards US adversaries like Russia, China and Iran.

Cartel kills senior Mexico City police figure

On 22 July, Mexico City’s head of intelligence and police operations, Milton Morales Figueroa, was killed in a suspected drug cartel hit while on a family outing in Coacalco. The attackers emerged from two SUVs and also injured two others. The attack on a senior capital officer follows a similar 2020 ambush on then-police chief Omar García Harfuch. The assassination of such a prominent official will almost certainly lead to major police operations with the arrest or killing of cartel members likely to inspire reprisal attacks.

Migrant boat capsizes killing 40 Haitian migrants

On 19 July, a boat fire was reported to have killed at least 40 Haitian migrants. The fire began as the group were attempting to reach the Turks and Caicos Islands. Haitian citizens are reportedly increasingly taking desperate and dangerous measures to escape the island, which continues to have high levels of gang-led violence despite the arrival of Kenyan police. Northbound sea routes are likely appealing to Haitians due to the closure of the Dominican Republic border to the east.

Wildfires spread across the US and Canada.

Wildfires have spread across parts of Canada and the US, forcing thousands to evacuate their homes. In Alberta, Canada, the major tourist town of Jasper faced flames reaching 100 meters high, spreading five kilometres in less than 30 minutes, resulting in up to 50 per cent structural damage and the evacuation of 25,000 people.

In the state of Oregon, the Durkee Fire has burned almost 270,000 hectares, is threatening multiple small towns and killed hundreds of cattle. In California, a man was arrested for allegedly starting the Park Fire, which rapidly grew from 567 to 50,585 hectares, prompting the evacuation of over 4,000 people in Butte County and Chico.

Both regions are battling severe wildfire conditions, with international firefighting support being deployed to Canada.

Bolivian authorities declare state of emergency due to extreme weather

The department of Santa Cruz has declared a state of emergency, scheduled to persist until the end of the year. Authorities cite extreme weather that has led to a combination of torrential rainfall leading to flooding and landslides, droughts, and wildfires.

The response to wildfires in eastern Bolivia has been hampered by fuel shortages. It is likely that large-scale deforestation has contributed to the spread of wildfires in the region, and local authorities are likely to struggle to contain their spread due to the logistical challenges involved, exacerbated by fuel shortages.

In the early hours of 26 July, large-scale disruptions were recorded in much of the French high-speed rail network. During the night between the 25 and 26 July, unknown perpetrators allegedly set fire to rail infrastructure in different parts of the country, near the towns of Arras, Courtalain, Pagny-sur-Moselle, leading to widespread delays. The sabotage action coincided with the opening of the Olympic Games in France.

Solace Global Assessment: 

At this stage, it is impossible to attribute responsibility for the sabotage to any single actor. Two scenarios can be considered the most likely based on previous cases and plots to disrupt the Olympics.

First, there is a realistic possibility that the sabotage was carried out by anti-Olympic Games activists associated with the French far-left. These groups have repeatedly warned that they will disrupt the game if President Emmanuel Macron does not acquiesce to their demands to appoint a left-wing government led by the New Popular Front, the coalition that obtained the largest number of representatives at the recent snap National Assembly elections.

Alternatively, the low-sophistication sabotage could be an example of a hybrid operation sponsored or conducted by a foreign state actor, most likely Russia. Russian or pro-Russian actors have recently been linked to multiple fires or cases of sabotage against infrastructure and in other European countries. France has recently allowed Ukraine to fire French-derived weapons into mainland Russia and has even suggest that French troops could be deployed in some capacity to Ukraine. Moreover, a foreign intelligence service likely has the logistical and operational capabilities to conduct simultaneous sabotage actions like the ones observed on the night of 25-26 July.

The effectiveness, ease and desirability of low-level sabotage make it likely that more incidents will occur during the Paris Olympics. The recent disruption of a Tesla “gigafactory” near Berlin, caused by environmentalists setting fire to an electricity pylon, demonstrates the effectiveness of targeting exposed infrastructure for causing significant disruption. Targeting exposed infrastructure in rural or isolated areas requires minimal expertise and only basic tools, making such actions particularly attractive to saboteurs. Furthermore, with the current high threat of terrorism, it is likely that the French authorities are currently overstretched and largely incapable of assigning substantial resources to lesser threats.

On 24 July, German authorities banned six Islamic institutions with links to the Islamic Republic, identifying them as “outposts” for the Tehran regime to spread its ideology and influence in Europe, and as vehicles to provide financial support to the Lebanese armed group, Hezbollah. Authorities also ordered raids on 53 properties, including a major Hamburg Mosque.

The German Interior Ministry stated that the organisations espoused a militant form of Shia Islam with the goals of radicalising Persian diasporas and other Shia groups in Germany in support of Iran’s activities in the Middle East and, possibly, to carry out terrorist activity in Europe.

The raids come only a week after German and Spanish police detained four individuals accused of trafficking drone parts to Hezbollah via civilian-owned companies registered in Europe.

Solace Global Assessment: 

One of Iran’s strategic objectives is to spread its revolutionary ideology abroad. Iran has long sought to establish groups and institutions abroad that can further its interests and has used religious freedom laws to operate these with little risk of intervention by host countries’ authorities. Iran’s foreign operations are likely unique as they combine a military and civilian component. Military activities include covert operations and the accumulation of assets, including weapons and improvised explosives, for possible terrorist use. Already in 2020, US State Department figures warned that “Hezbollah [was] gradually building up stockpiles of weapons on European soil”.

Civilian activities have two fundamental goals: spreading Tehran’s brand of Shiism to local Shia communities and pooling local communities’ funds to be remitted to its proxy groups in the Middle East, thus indirectly funding terrorism. The drone-parts case falls into this category. In the United Kingdom, a similar scheme was discovered in April 2024, with prosecutors reporting that the London-based Islamic Centre of England redirected around GBP 240,000 of Covid-19 pandemic-period furlough scheme funds to militant groups in the Middle East.

It is highly likely that Iranian operations in Europe have intensified in the aftermath of 7 October, and that Tehran has sought to capitalise on the wave of support for the Palestinian cause to advance its geopolitical interests in target European countries, especially Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The recent setbacks in Germany and the United Kingdom are likely to have a short-term effect on Iranian operations. However, Tehran-linked organisations are likely to be able to effectively reorganise, also using less traceable payment methods (including cryptocurrencies and Hawalas) to maintain remittance flows towards Iran itself and Iranian proxies.

On 19 July, the Houthi Movement in Yemen achieved their first successful fatal drone attack on Israel after a one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV) managed to penetrate Israeli air defence and strike Tel Aviv. The UAV hit an apartment building around 100 metres from the US Consulate, killing at least one individual and injuring at least 10 others. Rather than taking a direct course, the drone reportedly followed GPS waypoints, transiting over the Mediterranean Sea before heading east to strike Tel Aviv.

The Houthis have claimed that the attack involved their new “Yafa” drone which purportedly is a modified Iranian-made Samad-3 UAV with an improved 2,600-kilometre range and decreased radar signature. On 20 July, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted a retaliation strike on Yemen, marking the first time Israel has struck back at the Houthis despite hundreds of attacks.

IAF strikes targeted several military and dual-purpose sites in al-Hudaydah (al-Hodeidah), a major port city under Houthi control. Targets included the port’s energy infrastructure and loading facilities, including 20 fuel depots and multiple container cranes, leading to a huge fire at the port, three deaths and around 80 people injured. A spokesperson for the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) commented that the strikes were conducted to disrupt Iran’s facilitation of lethal aid to the Houthis and that the port had effectively been shut down.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The success of the Houthi drone attack was likely determined by multiple factors. The Houthis have been conducting reconnaissance in force against the IDF’s air defence network, probing for gaps and attempting to identify any vulnerabilities. With Israel faced with Hezbollah to the north, Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq and Syria primarily on its eastern flank and Hamas and the Houthis to the south, it is likely that IDF air defence coverage in the west of Israel was limited.

The Houthis exploited this by approaching Tel Aviv from the Mediterranean Sea which likely caught the IDF off guard. The Houthi’s Yafa drone likely followed a series of GPS waypoints, obfuscated its route by using established civilian flight corridors and exploited the terrain to avoid detection by coalition military assets deployed to the area.

The small and slow-flying projectile, which would ordinarily have a small radar cross-section, was likely improved further by developments in Houthi drone technology- invariably with Iranian assistance. Early indications suggest that the Yafa is made from composite materials like plastic or carbon rather than metal. Such a development would make it lighter and provide it with greater range but would also make it harder to detect on legacy radar systems calibrated to identify metallic objects.

Israel’s advanced air defence network, comprised of the Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow System amongst others, has capable radar systems that can detect a wide range of aerial threats including those made from composite materials. However, these systems are harder to detect and provide air defence operators less reaction time, especially if early warning isn’t provided by allied forces- a factor that was pivotal in April 2024, when Iran and Iranian-backed proxies launched over 350 drones, missiles and rockets towards Israel.

Other Iranian proxies will almost certainly emulate the successful tactics of the Houthis. This could undermine Israel’s venerated air defence and force the IDF into reevaluating its tactics and technology. One immediate response might be to re-position air defence to improve coverage on the western flank. However, such a move could lead to other areas being less protected, a major vulnerability considering the degree of omnidirectional threats.

In the long term, the IDF will likely need to enhance its detection capabilities. Ukraine has successfully incorporated an array of acoustic sensors to provide early warning from Russian aerial threats, a capability that is lacking in Israel’s air defence network. However, these improvements are not immediately achievable and if Israel’s air defence is jeopardised, the IDF may be forced into actively degrading the Houthi’s capabilities with further strikes. It is too early to assess to what degree the IAF strikes have degraded or deterred the Houthis.

The strikes have likely benefitted Houthi propaganda with recent statements indicating that their immediate action will be a comprehensive response as part of their fifth phase of operations. This will almost certainly include an increase of attacks against Israel itself but also an escalation of Houthi attacks against merchant shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, with recent indications suggesting the Houthis have improved the lethality and accuracy of their maritime operations through the increased use of uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).

During the reporting period, up to four or more significant battles have reportedly taken place between Nigerien junta forces and jihadist groups in Niger, resulting in potentially hundreds of casualties.

The first battle allegedly occurred on 20 July in Ikarfane, near the Mali border, where Islamic State–Sahel Province (IS-Sahel, formerly known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara or ISGS) reportedly assaulted a Niger Armed Forces column consisting of 200 soldiers, potentially killing at least 30.

The second occurred on 21 July in the village of Tassia in the Tillaberi region, northwest of Niamey near the Burkina Faso border. The defence ministry announced that 21 were killed in the attack, with three days of national mourning to be observed.

The third battle is speculated to have taken place in Tankademi in the Tahoua region on 21 July, near the Mali border. While unconfirmed, potentially 237 Nigerien soldiers were killed in this single large-scale ambush by hundreds of IS-Sahel fighters who were speculated to be heavily armed and equipped with armoured vehicles.

The fourth battle is claimed to have taken place on 22 July, near the village of Foneko in the Tillaberi region. An official statement on state television announced a preliminary death toll of 15.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The past week is likely to have been the most violent in Niger since the military seized power in the July 2023 coup. The information space in Niger is complex and it can often take weeks for incidents to be confirmed. It is, therefore, a realistic possibility that the details regarding specific battles are inaccurate.

The main jihadist groups active in Niger are the Islamic State-affiliated IS-Sahel and al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusr al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Jihadist groups have been engaged in an insurgency for almost a decade in Niger. Since the coup, however, their activity has risen dramatically. This is highly likely due to a combination of declining state capacity and reduced international support. On 11 July, IS-Sahel conducted a raid at the high-security Koutokale prison near Niamey, claiming to have freed over 200 militants. Since then, further attacks reportedly occurred on 12 July, 17 July, and 18 July, the latter allegedly being conducted by JNIM against a Chinese convoy.

It is highly likely that the intensity, extent and geographic spread of attacks by jihadist groups in July indicate that the control exerted by Niger’s security forces is rapidly deteriorating. The junta has adopted a distinctly anti-Western posture, requesting France and the US withdraw all their troops. Prior to the coup, Niger was a crucial partner for the West in the fight against jihadist groups in the Sahel. Up to 40 per cent of Niger’s budget was funded by international partners, and both France and the US contributed considerably to anti-jihadist military operations.

Post-coup, Western withdrawal is highly likely to have diminished Niger’s security profile. While a contingent of US forces are still deployed in Niger, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) announced on 24 July that their withdrawal will be completed in early August, as per the demands of the junta. The junta has sought closer ties with Russia, who sent 100 Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) personnel in April, and Turkey has reportedly deployed over 1,000 Syrian mercenaries to aid in counterinsurgency. However, it is unlikely that the resources provided by Russia and Turkey will be sufficient to make up for those lost by Western withdrawal.

Niger’s counterinsurgency capacity has likely been severely degraded, which has been exploited by insurgents and attacks will likely continue over the coming weeks. There is a realistic possibility that declining security in Niger will lead to significant ungoverned space, areas that can be used as a base of operations by jihadist groups to conduct attacks in the wider region.

The Kpékankandi outpost in northern Togo’s unsettled Savanes region was attacked on 20 July leading to the deaths of 12 Togolese soldiers and at least 40 militants. The attack has been claimed by the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) Islamist group. The outpost is located close to the border with Burkina Faso where JNIM have a long-established presence. The Togolese army has deployed reinforcements to the area in order to enhance its defence posture.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Savanes region remains in a state of emergency which was first introduced in June 2022 after a series of attacks on Togolese security services and civilians. It is almost certain that JNIM are exploiting an incredibly destabilised Burkina Faso as a safe haven to conduct cross-border attacks into neighbouring Togo. Militants across the region have been afforded a wide area of ungoverned space and increased freedom of movement following multiple military coups, including in Burkina Faso, that have replaced Western-leaning civilian governments with military juntas.

This shift has resulted in the expulsion of Western military forces from Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, leading to an overstretching of domestic forces that have lost access to the advanced military capabilities of nations like the US and France. Furthermore, deterring cross-border attacks into Togo is likely a low priority for the Burkinabe government as they deal with a host of insurgent forces on multiple axes. Togo has increasingly been seen as a stable environment and has attracted heavy foreign investment, particularly from Western countries.

JNIM’s strategy is likely to undermine this notion by destabilising its northern region, a region which is primarily Muslim where JNIM is likely seeking to expand its recruitment of potentially disenfranchised locals. Local recruits could then be exploited to expand JNIM’s operations within northern Togo, with similar trends being observed in nearby Benin and the Ivory Coast. Moreover, Togo, Benin, the Ivory Coast and other West African countries have contributed to initiatives such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the Accra Initiative, both aimed at containing terrorism within the Sahel. Previous involvement in these initiatives invariably makes these countries legitimate targets for violent extremist organisations (VEOs) like JNIM.

Most importantly, creating emerging threats within these countries will force governments to allocate resources to internal issues, thus degrading their ability to contribute to regional counter-terrorism initiatives under organisations like the UN or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Long-term, VEOs like JNIM, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP) likely harbour the intent of expanding their operations further south towards the coastal regions of these countries. These are areas where Western interests are disproportionately located, including tourist resorts which would offer VEOs a coveted high-profile target, as demonstrated by AQIM’s 2016 attack on the Grand-Bassam resort in the Ivory Coast.

Large environmental protests in La Rochelle, France

Large-scale protests took place in the French region of La Rochelle. The protests were organised by environmentalist groups that are opposed to the construction of artificial water collection basins for irrigation. While La Rochelle is a primarily rural and sparsely populated area, there is a high likelihood that the protesters will seek to extend disorders to Paris and other Olympic host cities in order to obtain higher exposure.

Two killed in housing development collapse in Naples, Italy

On 23 July, two people were killed and over a dozen injured in Naples when the walkway of a public housing development – in the Scampia suburb, known for severe levels of poverty and organised crime presence – collapsed. The incident will likely spark civil unrest in Italy, especially in the south and targeted at national government institutions.

Blackouts lead to civil unrest in the Krasnodar region of Russia

Civil unrest occurred in the Krasnodar region on 20 July due to ongoing blackouts. The loss of power has likely been caused by abnormally high heat currently affecting the region. Authorities responded relatively mildly to the rare protest, with the local governor acknowledging the protesters’ grievances. However, multiple arrests were reported. Russian authorities appear to be aiming to suppress potential civil unrest while avoiding broader demonstrations by not resorting to excessively harsh repression in these localised protest incidents.

European Union announced talks with Armenia to relax visa rules

European Union officials announced they will begin talks with Armenia to relax visa rules. The development likely represents a further signal of Armenia’s movement towards the West and away from Russia’s sphere of influence. While Yerevan has long been one of Moscow’s key Caucasus allies, relations between the two countries soured following the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Opposition leader sentenced in Tunisia for vote buying

A Tunisian court sentenced Lofti Mraihi, the main opposition leader, to eight months in prison for “vote buying”. Tunisian President Kais Saied has implemented increasingly authoritarian measures and is seeking re-election at the next elections in October. The announcement is likely to drive civil unrest, which authorities will highly likely meet with further draconian measures, including arbitrary arrests and violent intervention.

Bangladeshis sentenced for protesting own government in UAE

The UAE has sentenced 57 Bangladeshi migrant workers for holding protests within the Gulf State. The protests were aimed at the Bangladeshi government over the recent student protests, not at the Emirati government. However, protests not authorised by the UAE’s Ministry of Interior are highly illegal with the government likely attempting to deter other forms of unrest or future activity that challenges or undermines its rule.

Anti-corruption protestors warned by Uganda’s hardline president

Uganda’s hardline President Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled the country for almost four decades, has warned protesters that they are playing with fire and anti-corruption demonstrations were organised across the country. The Ugandan authorities have already arrested several protestors and have recently cracked down on the opposition. The country’s main opposition leader, Boni Wine, commands a lot of influence among the country’s youth and the government likely fears that Uganda could face protests of a similar scale and nature as the ones that are ongoing in Kenya.

UK radical Islamist preacher convicted

Radical Islamist preacher Anjem Choudary was found guilty of directing a terrorist organisation by a British court. Choudary, despite serving a prior conviction for supporting the Islamic State (IS) and contributing to radicalising individuals in the UK, continued to head a renamed iteration of the banned organisation al-Muhajiroun, which also established a chapter in the US. The arrest and later conviction were the product of a joint investigation involving UK, US, and Canadian counterterrorism units.

US bombers conduct patrol over Finland near Russia’s strategic assets

US Air Force B-52 strategic bombers conducted their first-ever flight over Finland on 21 July whilst being escorted by Finnish fighter jets. The nuclear-capable were intercepted by Russian fighter jets after flying close to Russia’s strategic Kola Peninsula, home to multiple NATO-facing military bases, Russia’s Northern Fleet and much of the Kremlin’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent. The event is almost certainly reflective of the geo-political shift that has occurred after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, causing Finland to renege decades of neutrality and join NATO.

German national sentenced to death in Belarus

A German national has been sentenced to death in Belarus, the only country within Europe that still applies the death penalty, according to Germany’s Foreign Ministry. The Belarussian authorities have not stated on what grounds he has been charged, however, rights groups suggest that it is related to the Kalinouski Regiment, a group of anti-government Belarusian exiles fighting for Ukraine.

Rare mass shooting in Croatia

A man allegedly killed five at a retirement home in Daruvar, killing at least six on 22 July. It is possible that the case will result in similar anti-gun protests as those seen in Serbia following another recent attack.

US reporter guilty of espionage in Russia.

A Russian court found US reporter Evan Gershkovich guilty of “espionage” and sentenced him to 16 years in a penal colony. Gershkovich is the first US journalist sentenced for espionage since the Cold War. It is almost certain that, as with other recent examples, the case results were doctored and skewed by Russian officials in order to put further pressure on US diplomacy. It is highly likely that Moscow will now seek to exchange  Gershkovich for useful nationals currently held in US detention.

No progress made concerning north Cyprus

The 50th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of north Cyprus did not result in the hoped renewal of dialogue between the Cypriot and Turkish sides. Turkish President Erdogan reiterated Ankara’s long-standing stance of the rejection of a federal unitary state in favour of a two-state solution for the island.

Canadian citizen flies to Israel to attack IDF

A Canadian citizen was shot and killed by Israeli soldiers after allegedly trying to attack them with a knife near the Gaza border. The incident is likely to strain diplomatic relations between the two countries and will likely drive civil unrest in Canada.

IED at Kenya border town likely detonated by Somalia-based al-Shabaab

At least five people were injured at a restaurant in the Kenyan town of Madera after an IED was initiated. The attack was likely conducted by al-Shabaab militants operating in the area which is near to the Somali border near al-Shabaab strongholds. Local police have suggested that the restaurant is often frequented by non-locals who were likely the target of the attack.

Al-Shabaab attempt to seize three army bases in southern Somalia

On 22 July, al-Shabaab militants attempted to take over three Somalian army bases in the south of the country in a region only recently captured by government forces. Government forces claim to have repelled the attack and killed over 80 militants after receiving intelligence of the attack, leading them to abandon the army bases and then encircle al-Shabaab’s fighters. Al-Shabaab is likely attempting to reassert its influence in the Jubaland region after ceding territory to the government which has developed alliances with local clans.

Landslides kills over 200 in southern Ethiopia

On 21-22 July, two landslides in southern Ethiopia’s Gofa Zone have killed at least 257 people. The death count is likely to increase as rescue operations continue with some assessments suggesting as many as 500 dead. The first landslide is thought to have killed as many as 50 people, with the remaining deaths largely caused by the second landslide which engulfed many attempting to assist with rescue efforts. While landslides are common during Ethiopia’s July to September rainy season, experts have suggested that they will become more common as a result of climate change.

Severe weather forecasted in South Africa’s Western Cape

Severe weather is expected to persist in Western Cape Province through July 27, with Orange Level 5 and Yellow Level 4 rain warnings in effect. Flooding, landslides, and strong winds are likely to cause disruptions, including potential evacuation orders, utility service interruptions, and impacts on transportation and businesses.

On 25 July, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) released a statement claiming that it had seized the Tatmadaw junta’s Northeastern Regional Military Command headquarters in Lashio, the largest city in Myanmar’s northern Shan State home to around 150,000. The ethnic Kokang rebel group claims that the headquarters was seized after intense fighting with junta forces which surrendered en masse and claimed that “the liberation of Lashio will mark a historic victory in our revolution.”

The commander of Burmese People’s Liberation Army, another group fighting alongside the MNDAA, confirmed the capture of the regional military command headquarters. MNDAA forces are now conducting clearance operations throughout the city.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The capture of the junta’s headquarters Northeastern Regional Military Command headquarters in Lashio was the MNDAA’s primary objective in its war with the junta and if confirmed marks the first military command to fall since the 2021 coup. The loss is also the first major defeat for the junta since the collapse of a Chinese-brokered ceasefire in May. Such a defeat will almost certainly embolden Myanmar’s other rebel groups which are conducting a multi-axis offensive across the country.

The MNDAA’s control of Lashio will enable it to secure a strategic foothold in Shan State that will help facilitate future operations. Despite much damage to roads and reports of landmines, the MNDAA could leverage the city’s infrastructure to establish or improve supply lines and strengthen its command and control. Holding the city will also likely help drive both propaganda and recruitment efforts.

Lashio also sits along a major trade route between Myanmar and China. China maintains good relations with the junta but reports also suggest that it benefits greatly from informal trade and cross-border smuggling associated with rebel forces. If the MNDAA’s capture of Lashio leads to a more stabilised Shan State, Beijing may be deterred from intervening in any capacity. The state’s stabilisation may additionally result in improved access for humanitarian organisations.

However, after such an embarrassing defeat, it is likely that junta forces, which are afforded complete air superiority, will respond with increased air strikes on rebel forces in Lashio resulting in high levels of civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

On 24 July, Typhoon Gaemi made landfall in Taiwan. The typhoon reached maximum wind speeds of 231 kilometres per hour. Forming in the Philippine Sea, Typhoon Gaemi initially tracked past the Philippines between 20-23 July. The tropical cyclone worsened seasonal monsoon rains in the most populous island in the Philippines, Luzon. Torrential rainfall caused flooding and landslides, with at least 20 fatalities. Manila experienced significant flooding which caused widespread disruptions. Approximately 600,000 people in the Philippines have been displaced by the torrential rains.

In Taiwan, at least three deaths have been reported, with hundreds of injuries. The typhoon caused mass power outages, flooding, school and office closures, flight disruptions and the closing of financial markets. Additionally, a tanker and cargo ship were sunk due to the strong winds, with three other vessels running aground. The most serious of these is the sinking of the Philippines-flagged MT TERRA NOVA, which was carrying approximately 1.4 million litres of industrial fuel oil. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is currently attempting to contain the oil spill.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Typhoon Gaemi is the most powerful tropical cyclone to impact Taiwan in eight years, reaching a maximum classification of Category 4 before making landfall. In addition to the high wind speeds, the impact was exacerbated by an unusual looping path that meant the typhoon’s inner core hit Taiwan’s east coast twice. Taiwan is highly typhoon-resistant, due to considerable investment into typhoon-resistant infrastructure and comprehensive disaster preparedness and response plans. While disruptions were widespread, it is almost certain that Taiwan’s typhoon resiliency measures spared the island from a far greater impact.

While the typhoon did not make landfall in the Philippines, the considerable flooding caused a far greater impact than in Taiwan, illustrating the Philippines’ vulnerability to severe weather. In the days preceding the typhoon, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr highlighted flood prevention in his State of the Nation address. While he has since ordered authorities to expedite disaster response efforts, it is likely that the typhoon’s impact will raise further questions about the Philippines’ weak disaster preparedness.

Furthermore, the oil spill resulting from the sinking of MT TERRA NOVA stretches several kilometres, and a spokesman of the Philippine Coast Guard warned that the spill could be the largest in the country’s history if not contained. Gaemi made landfall in Fujian province in mainland China on 25 July, prompting authorities to suspend transport services and close schools. While Gaemi has weakened to a Tropical Storm, heavy rainfall will likely continue to cause disruptions in China over the coming days.

Relative calm in Bangladesh following Supreme Court decision

Following large-scale violent unrest in Bangladesh sparked by a high court decision to reimpose controversial public sector job quotas, there has been relative calm since the Supreme Court overturned the decision on 21 July. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has attributed the recent deadly unrest in the country to political opposition, asserting that the imposition of a curfew was a necessary measure for public safety.

The violence resulted in over 150 fatalities and the arrest of more than 1,000 individuals, including several senior opposition leaders. The government has stated that the curfew will be lifted and internet services reinstated when the situation improves. However, protestors have demanded the resignation of Hasina and government accountability for the violence, indicating that future demonstrations are likely.

Cambodia opposition leader convicted of defamation

A Cambodian court has convicted opposition leader Teav Vannol of defamation and imposed a USD 1.5 million fine for comments he made about the country’s democracy. In an interview with Nikkei this February, Vannol, president of the Candlelight Party, criticised the administration of Hun Manet, the son of long-time leader Hun Sen.

The Candlelight Party was excluded from last year’s general election, which saw Hun Sen’s party win a landslide. The court’s decision, which Vannol intends to appeal, reflects ongoing concerns about political freedom in Cambodia. The move indicates the severe consequences for dissent and follows similarly harsh verdicts against environmental activists deemed critical of the government.

Vietnamese frigate docks in Russia in sign of growing military cooperation

The Vietnamese missile frigate, the HUNG DAO, conducted a port call in Russia’s Vladivostok on 24 July. The Russian-made vessel’s port call is likely reflective of growing military cooperation between the two countries and follows the recent trip of President Putin to Vietnam. Russia is likely trying to entice Vietnam into its sphere of influence and covets long-term access to Vietnam’s deep-water port at Cam Ranh Bay, a facility used extensively during the Cold War which enabled Russia’s Pacific Fleet to conduct bluewater operations.

Taiwan begins annual war games

Taiwan began its annual Han Kuang war games on 22 July, aimed at stimulating the repelling of a Chinese invasion. This year’s iteration is designed to be as realistic as possible, dialling down on military pageantry and focusing on crucial elements like nighttime operations and operating with severed lines of communication.

The drills also include live fire exercises on Taiwan’s outlying islands near the Chinese coast, as well as a civil defence drill in major cities. This comprehensive approach likely aims to demonstrate Taiwan’s capability to leverage all its resources and strategies in a unified effort to deter a Chinese invasion at a time when tensions are increasingly strained.

The Philippines and China reach an agreement in the South China Sea

On 22 July, the Philippines and China reached an agreement to de-escalate tensions at the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. The deal aims to manage the dispute through dialogue without either party compromising on their territorial claims and follows a series of aggressive actions from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Chinese Coast Guard toward the Philippines Navy.

The deal will allow the Philippines to resupply its forces at the shoal but denies Manila the right to bring in construction materials used to fortify the area. The deal may set a precedent for other Southeast Asian nations that have territorial disputes in the South China Sea, including Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.

Islamist militants attack government forces in the south of the Philippines

On 20 July, Dawlah Islamiya militants attacked Filipino forces with small arms fire in Shariff Saydona Mustapha, Mindanao. One soldier reportedly died in the attack. Dawlah Islamiya (DI), formerly known as the Maute Group, is affiliated with Islamic State (IS) and regularly launches attacks against security forces on the southern island of Mindanao.

In March, DI militants ambushed army personnel in the same region, Maguindanao del Sur, killing four. It is highly likely that the group will continue to launch attacks in Mindanao over the coming months.

Several dead in Pakistan during Hyderabad heatwave

According to local sources, at least eleven people have died due to a heatwave in Hyderabad, Pakistan. The death toll is likely to further increase in the coming days, as the region continues to record temperatures of around 40 degrees Celsius, likely worsened by high humidity levels. If the casualties increase considerably, there is a realistic possibility of localised civil unrest breaking out.

Major bridge collapses in Shaanxi province, China

A bridge in the Shaanxi province collapsed on 19 July, killing 11 people. The collapse was caused by floods, which are affecting much of north and central China, as well as by poor infrastructure standards. It is highly likely that, as China continues to be unable to resolve long-standing issues of poor construction quality and materials, further episodes will occur.

18 dead in plane crash in Kathmandu, Nepal

A Saurya Airlines plane crashed shortly after take-off from Kathmandu on 24 July, killing 18 people and injuring the pilot who was the sole survivor. The plane was heading for maintenance in Pokhara and crashed in challenging conditions with low visibility, factors that will likely raise questions concerning the safety record of Nepal, an impoverished country that has to rely heavily on air travel due to its mountainous terrain.

Severe weather forecasted in eastern and northern regions of Japan

Severe weather is forecast to impact most of Japan through 26 July, with warnings for landslides and flooding in eastern and northern regions, and potential lightning, tornadoes, strong winds, and hail in western and northern areas. Evacuation orders are in effect for tens of thousands in affected areas, with significant flooding and landslides reported. Disruptions to transport, utilities, and businesses are expected, and flight delays and port closures may occur due to adverse weather conditions.

Asalha Puja: Increased Threat of Violence Against Buddhist Temples During Dharma Day Celebrations

The Buddhist festival of Asalha Puja, or Dharma Day, takes place on 20 July. The celebration is one of the major ones for Buddhists and it commemorates the Buddha’s first sermon. As with other religious holidays, there is an increased threat of targeted violence against Buddhist temples, especially in countries with large Buddhist minorities.

Shravana Month Begins on 22 July

The Shravana month of the Hindu calendar begins on 22 July. The month is important due to its symbolic connection with the monsoon season in the Indian subcontinent. For Hindus, the month is connected to the deity Shiva, and devotees carry out a series of religious practices, including fasting and pilgrimages. Whilst the festival is typically peaceful, there have been many instances of sectarian violence and heightened tensions in the past.

Olympic Games Set to Begin in France on 26 July Amidst High Terrorism and Unrest Risks

The Olympic Games are scheduled to begin in France on 26 July and continue until 11 August. More than 15 million visitors are expected to arrive in Paris alone during the Games, which have one of the largest audiences of any sporting event. More than three billion people reportedly watched the last Olympics in Japan. Due to their profile and media attention, there are important terrorism and civil unrest risks associated with the Games.

On 13 July, former President Trump was shot and wounded by a lone gunman while speaking at a rally in the battleground state of Pennsylvania. The would-be assassin managed to wound Trump’s ear, as well as kill one attendee and injure a further two before being killed by law enforcement agents. It is unclear what the shooter’s motive was, and US security and intelligence services initiated multiple inquiries to understand how the shooter managed to reach a vantage point from where he could take aim at Trump.

Only two days later, Trump, who also selected Ohio senator JD Vance as his running mate for 2024, was endorsed at the Republican Party’s Annual National Convention (RNC) as the party’s official candidate.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Very little information exists about the attacker, who had a negligible online footprint and unremarkable background, and it is difficult to say whether he was inspired by a particular ideology, or simply by a desire to obtain notoriety. As of the time of writing, no “manifestos”, statements, or other perpetrator-generated material often associated with lone actor terrorists has been found, suggesting that the shooter did not fit within that profile, but may have been motivated by non-ideological factors.

The large volume of conspiracy theories publicised on social media in the assassination attempt’s aftermath suggests that foreign powers are likely seeking to conduct information operations to increase political instability in the US. The episode likely represents a possible driving factor of increased risks of domestic terrorism in the US, especially retaliatory action by self-proclaimed vigilantes. Any updates regarding the shooter’s motive and background will almost certainly cause further division in the United States.

Trump’s announcement of JD Vance as his running mate ends speculation concerning the direction of his campaign. Vance represents the Republican right, particularly the rural, white working class that forms a core demographic base for Trump. Vance is a self-described nationalist and is expected to remain loyal to Trump’s “MAGA” platform, and his nomination likely represents a key indicator of the tilt of the Republican party towards Trump’s populist camp, matching a decrease of the influence of the centrist, neoliberal wing of the GOP.

Moreover, Vance is a young candidate (only 39 years of age) and may represent an important asset in shaping a post-Trump GOP, as the former president cannot run again if he is re-elected. Finally, picking Vance as a running mate over other possibilities may foreshadow some of the foreign policy lines of a possible second Trump administration. Vance has repeatedly stated that he is uninterested in Ukraine and has questioned the American consensus for supporting Kyiv’s war efforts. Trump, has announced that he would immediately end the war if back in the White House, possibly hinting at forcing Ukraine to the negotiating table by threatening the withdrawal of aid. Such a scenario would almost certainly create significant difficulties for the US’ European allies, who are still struggling with procurement and support for Ukraine, and would likely be ineffective without American contributions.

On 18 July, Argentina’s Jewish community marked the 30th anniversary of the 1994 Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) Jewish center bombing in Buenos Aires which killed 85 people. President Milei pledged to rectify decades of inaction and inconsistencies in the investigation into the attack which was the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentina’s history.

Argentina’s top criminal court has attributed blame to Iran for the attack and has suggested that the attack was conducted by Hezbollah militants under the operational command of Tehran. Milei has instigated plans to try suspects in absentia and has committed to improving Argentina’s national intelligence to prevent future attacks. Iran continues to refuse to extradite the suspects and has repeatedly ignored international arrest warrants.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Argentine prosecutors have also charged Iranian officials alongside members of Hezbollah for the 1994 AMIA attack as well as a separate attack in 1992 on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 22 people. In addition, in January 2024 Argentine police apprehended three men from Lebanon and Syria suspected of planning a terrorist attack in Argentina when it was hosting the Pan-American Maccabiah Games, which brings together thousands of Jewish athletes.

Argentina is home to the largest Jewish community in South America at an estimated 200,000-300,000 and there are an estimated 50,000-70,000 Argentine Jews residing in Israel. Furthermore, President Milei is a staunch supporter of both the Jewish community and Israel and has publicly toyed with the idea of converting to Judaism. He has also taken a divergent path from most South American leaders concerning the Israel-Hamas conflict. In January he visited Israel, declared unwavering support for Tel Aviv and recently designated the Iranian-backed Hamas militant group as a terrorist organisation.

These developments have likely made Argentina a target for Iranian-sponsored terrorism, particularly against its large Jewish community. Argentina has heightened surveillance and border controls to prevent the infiltration of Iranian agents from Venezuela and Bolivia where they are suspected of having a considerable footprint. Iran’s most capable proxy force, Hezbollah is also known to have a strong presence within South America, especially in the lawless tri-border area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina- all countries that also have a large Lebanese diaspora where Hezbollah has likely been able to establish ties and exploit for cover.

Hezbollah’s main operations here entail the financing of operations in the Middle East through their connections to South American organised crime where Hezbollah are suspected of being involved in money laundering, drug trafficking and other illicit activity. The group likely sees Argentina’s Jewish community as a legitimate target within the context of the current conflict and a deniable attack sponsored by Iran would help demonstrate Tehran’s reach and operational capabilities.

Milei’s decision to strengthen intelligence and anti-terrorism measures will also likely put it on course for future conflict with Hezbollah, which Argentina has already designated a terrorist organisation. If the Milei administration attempts to dismantle Hezbollah’s invaluable criminal operations, the group may be coaxed into reprisal attacks against the Argentine government, a course of action that may also be endorsed by Iran with indications that it too is involved and profits from illicit activity within South America.

US President Joe Biden Tests Positive for Covid-19

US President Joe Biden tested positive for Covid-19 on 17 July. The development is likely to damage Biden’s re-election bid further and continue to raise worries regarding the president’s health and fitness.

Peru Extends Detention of Ex-President Castillo

Peru’s judiciary has announced that it is extending the pre-trial detention of former President Pedro Castillo by 18 months while an investigation against him on charges of rebellion continues. His apprehension resulted in protests from his base and the judiciary’s plans to sentence him to over 30 years in prison may ignite further unrest in the South American country.

US Receives Intelligence on Iranian Plot to Assassinate Trump

CNN reported on 16 July that the US received intelligence regarding an Iranian plot to assassinate former President Donald Trump. This was almost certainly unrelated to the assassination attempt that took place in Ohio. However, the reports are likely to bring more scrutiny and criticism towards US intelligence and security service, considering the security gaps that allowed the Ohio shooter to get within range of Trump.

Trump Plans to Designate Mexican Cartels as Terrorist Groups, Proposes Military Action if Elected

Former US President Trump has announced plans to designate Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organisations should he secure victory in November. Under his plans, the Pentagon will be ordered to make proper use of US special forces who will be deployed to attack cartel leadership and infrastructure, as well as deploy the US Navy to enforce a blockade on the cartels. Such plans have almost no chance of being endorsed by the Mexican government; however, his plan to deploy US troops to the Mexican border is likely to rally his base as the election looms.

Venezuelan Opposition Leader’s Security Chief Arrested

Opposition members in Venezuela have reported that the chief security officer for opposition leader Maria Corina Machado was arrested. Machado, alongside other opposition candidates, has been barred from competing at the 28 July elections on clearly untenable technicalities. Still, the decimated opposition retains a much higher support than the ruling government, as the few available polls show. It is highly likely that further intimidatory gestures, and possible crackdowns, will continue over the next weeks. The vote is also almost certain to lack transparency, and the result will likewise highly likely be doctored to benefit the Maduro regime.

Midwest Storms Cause Widespread Power Outages and Tornadoes

On 14-16 July, the Midwest of the US experienced extreme weather, with powerful storm systems causing tornadoes and heavy rainfall. Across the region, over 500,000 energy customers were left without power as a result of the storms. Illinois was particularly impacted, and Chicago suffered from major disruptions. The number of tornado warnings issued was abnormally high for the region, with one tornado even being recorded as touching down in Chicago.

New York State Declares State of Emergency After Severe Storms and Tornadoes

The Governor of New York State declared a statewide State of Emergency on July 16, following severe storms and several tornado touchdowns. The storms caused major damage in the City of Rome and significantly impacted areas in Madison County, with one death reported.  110,000 customers lost power across New York State.

7.4 Magnitude Earthquake Strikes Northern Chile

On 18 July, a 7.4 magnitude earthquake hit northern Chile near the Argentina border. The earthquake has not resulted in any immediate casualties but has led to multiple power outages in the wider region.

On 13 July, Israeli forces carried out an airstrike with multiple 2,000-pound bombs on a housing complex in Khan Yunis. The attack, which reportedly killed more than 20 Palestinians, also resulted in the death of Ali Hassan Salameh, the head of Hamas’ Khan Yunis brigade, and, more crucially, possibly Mohammed Deif, the military leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the second most senior Hamas leader in Gaza after Yahya Sinwar. The killing of Deif, which Israeli officials have not yet confirmed, would make this the most high-profile decapitation strike of the Hamas-Israel conflict so far.

Further south, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units are continuing operations in Rafah, as well as clearing tunnels near the Philadelphi Corridor. On 18 July, the Israeli Knesset voted to reject a recognition of a Palestinian state, even following a resolution to the current conflict.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recent developments in the Gaza Strip are likely to have concrete impacts on the future of the conflict, although they will likely not translate into a short-term change in the ongoing attrition stage of the war, where half-depleted Hamas cells continue to carry hit-and-run attacks on IDF forces that are operating in previously cleared areas. The killing of Deif is likely to impact the senior Hamas leadership in Gaza in terms of its effectiveness and organisational capability in the short-term. Deif is considered to be the main architect behind the development of the logistical and training system of Hamas over the last decades, and replacing him will not be easy.

At the same time, Hamas has the advantage of having a decentralised structure, as ongoing Israeli operations have favoured the development of separate chains of command, also giving junior officials the chance to become familiar with operating in a warzone, which will make the immediate impact of Deif’s loss more manageable.

Both Hamas and Israel likely still consider their strategic objectives in the war to be attainable. The latter will have been encouraged by the recent decapitation strikes and the Knesset’s refusal to recognise a future Palestinian state is likely sending a strong message to Hamas and its allies, Israel’s international partners and dovish elements within Israeli society.

In the short-to-medium term, IDF forces are likely to continue clearing operations in the Philadelphi corridor, seeking to further destroy the complex network of tunnels that is Hamas’ main supply line into Gaza. Simultaneously, the decapitation strike on Deif highly likely corroborates early reports that the Hamas leadership in Gaza has relocated to Khan Yunis, rather than Rafah, and especially to the area of the city overlapping with the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone where they can hide within the civilian population and coax the IDF into causing high civilian casualties.

Islamic State (IS) operatives carried out an attack at the Muharram congregation in Mutrah, near Muscat, on 15 July. The attack coincided with the Islamic holiday of Ashura, which is particularly sacred to Shias as it commemorates the death of Husayn ibn Ali, the third Shia imam. Six people were killed and 28 injured during the shooting. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Yemeni province of IS (ISYP).

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is notable as it was the first-ever IS operation in Oman. However, the country has long been a desirable target for multiple reasons. First, the country has close relations with other regional powers and with Iran, as it plays an important mediation role in the context of the ongoing Yemen and Red Sea crises. Attacking the Omani state and possibly reducing international perceptions of its stability could impact the progress of its mediation, leading to greater and more prolonged instability, one of IS’ fundamental goals.

Oman is also a relatively tolerant state compared to its regional neighbours, and much more multireligious. The majority are Ibadi and there are also significant Sunni and Shia minorities, the latter of which are deemed as heretics or rafidi by IS. It is highly likely that the simple availability of multiple Shia targets, with little security to guard them, was the key driver of the attack.

ISYP, like the other IS branches, has the ultimate strategic goal of toppling local regimes to restore an Islamic Caliphate, starting, in this case, from the south of the Arabian Peninsula. Notably, ISYP has likely increased its activity and gained relevance in recent years due to its closeness to the Somali province branch (ISSP), which, according to recent reports, could be headed by the group’s current “caliph”, who allegedly has personal ties to the Yemeni branch and has spent considerable time in Yemen. ISSP, which benefits from less pressure compared to the IS branches in the Middle East, continues to play a crucial role in channelling funds to the more active IS branches in Afghanistan (the Khorasan province, or ISKP) and the Sahel (the West Africa province, ISWAP).

ISYP almost certainly benefits from a close connection to ISSP, both by guaranteeing the inbound and outbound transit of fighters, and even senior members of IS, between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and by being the first step in rerouting funds and assets from Africa towards Asia. There is a remote possibility that the Oman attack is linked to a reported spike in IS attacks further north, in Syria and Iraq. A connection between the two theatres could signal a return in IS’ planning and coordination capacity between different provinces, possibly hinting at a growing IS ability to carry out transregional complex attacks.  

On 15 July, two merchant vessels were attacked by the Houthis in the Red Sea. The MT BENTLEY I, a Panama-flagged, Israel-owned and Monaco-operated tanker vessel transporting oil from Russia to China was initially attacked by one uncrewed surface vessel (USV) and two crewed small boats. The Houthis later launched an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) towards the vessel. These attacks were unsuccessful in disabling the vessel, with no notable damage or any injuries reported.

In a separate incident, the MT CHIOS LION, a Liberian-flagged, Marshall Islands-owned and Greek-operated crude oil tanker was impacted by a USV, causing damage. No injuries were reported.

Additionally, on 19 July, the Singaporean-flagged MV LOBIVIA was reportedly struck by unknown projectiles in the Gulf of Aden. While the vessel suffered damage, no injuries have yet been reported.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The increased use of USVs by the Houthis in their ongoing campaign against merchant shipping highly likely indicates an evolution in Houthi tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). On 12 June, the Houthis struck the bulk carrier MV TUTOR in the Red Sea with a USV, killing one crewmember and disabling the vessel. This marked a significant operational success for the Houthis. Since then, the Houthis successfully used USVs to attack the MV TRANSWORLD NAVIGATOR on 23 June, and the MV SEAJOY on 27 June.

United States Central Command, who are engaged in military operations against the Houthis as part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, have additionally reported destroying 27 USVs since 12 June, compared to a prior total of 26 USVs since their first identified use by the Houthis on 4 January. This almost certainly indicates a significant uptick in the use of USVs by the Houthis, emboldened by their successful attack against the MV TUTOR.

The Houthis pioneered the operational use of USVs when they attacked a Saudi frigate with a USV in January 2017, and currently maintain an arsenal of both uncrewed weaponised skiffs as used against the MV TUTOR, as well as purpose-built craft called Tufan or Blowfish that carry far more powerful warheads. The Houthis claimed the attack against MV Transworld Navigator was conducted with the largest of these Tufan USVs, the Tufan-3 which they claim carries a 1000-1500 kilogram warhead.

The weaponised skiff USVs provide effective camouflage against countermeasures, amplified by the Houthi use of dummies as used in the TUTOR attack, ostensibly appearing to be ordinary crewed fishing vessels. The Tufan USVs, however, carry far more powerful warheads and travel at higher speeds. USVs are exceptionally difficult for merchant vessels to counter, and unless intercepted by naval forces, have proven to be more effective than ASBMs, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) at causing impacts.

The main weakness of Houthi USVs, compared to those used by Ukraine in the Black Sea, is that they are not fully autonomous, relying on a human pilot for the initial line of attack, requiring the use of motherships. Merchant vessels, however, are not equipped to counter USVs and must rely on their hull strength to withstand impacts if naval forces are not successful in intercepting the USVs beforehand. While the sole use of a USV is generally incapable of sinking a merchant vessel (though this is not impossible), a good hit on a weak point, such as the engine compartment, can immobilise a merchant vessel which then makes the vessel far easier to hit with secondary strikes by missiles and drones. This TTP was used effectively against the Tutor.

It is highly likely that the evolution of Houthi TTPs to increasingly use USVs substantially increases the threat to merchant shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

New Far-Right Group Emerges in EU Parliament

After the recent creation of the Patriots for Europe (PfE) group by the far-right parties of countries including Hungary, France, Italy, Czechia and Austria, a further identitarian EU Parliament party, named Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), was officially constituted. The group, which, among others, includes smaller French, Bulgarian and Polish members, is centred on the leadership of the radical right Alternative for Germany (AfD). With 25 members (14 of which are AfD, following the party’s record performance at the European elections), the group is the smallest in the European parliament. Politically, it is virtually indistinguishable from PfE, and its existence is almost certainly only the product of AfD’s “toxicity” for other European identitarians.

The growth of various far-right parties has likely significantly destabilised the centre-right status quo centred on friendly relations between the centrist European People’s Party (EPP) and the right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and may therefore further shift the EPP towards working with the left-wing groups in the EU Parliament. The recent re-election of EU Parliament President Roberta Metsola as part of a deal between EPP and the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) likely further signals this trend, as, more importantly, does Ursula von der Leyen’s successful bid for a second term as European Commission President. On 18 July, von der Leyen was re-elected with the support of much of the EPP, S&D and Greens, with ECR showing only limited support.

This is highly likely a serious issue for Giorgia Meloni’s formation, which now finds itself at a real risk of becoming a minoritarian formation, “stuck” between a left-oriented EPP and two “unelectable” far-right groups.

Welsh First Minister Resigns Amid Donation Scandal

The First Minister of Wales, Vaughan Gething, resigned on 17 July following controversies over his acceptance of GBP 200,000 as a campaign donation from a businessman convicted over environmental offences, and for sacking a government minister. The development may develop into an early challenge for the new UK Labour government, whose Welsh chapter will now have to elect a successor.

Poland Passes Law Allowing Live Fire to Stop Migrants at Border

The parliament of Poland approved a law that allows border security and police forces to fire live ammunition to stop attempts by migrants to cross the border. The law specifically restricts the use of weapons to cases in which other deterrents fail. However, the law’s allowance for “pre-emptive” uses of firearms creates a likelihood of abuses of power. Russia and Belarus are currently favouring migrants’ attempts to reach the Polish border as a tool to destabilise Poland and the wider EU.

EU Parliamentarians Call to Suspend Hungary’s Voting Rights

On 16 July, a group of 63 EU parliamentarians called for Hungary to have its voting rights rescinded following Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s visits to Moscow and Beijing. Hungary holds the EU presidency for this month, and Orban has used the opportunity to launch an impromptu “peace tour” of Europe’s geopolitical adversaries. The move has no legal basis and will not result in a tangible change. Its proposal is instead almost certainly an attempt to further put pressure on Hungary and continue distancing the bloc from its rogue member.

Russia Restricts WhatsApp and YouTube

The Russian government has increasingly slowed down or restricted applications and websites including WhatsApp and YouTube, under the justification of preventing extremist groups’ activities. UK intelligence sources state that Moscow will likely ban YouTube altogether in September. Compared with China, which has built an alternative online space separate from the World Wide Web, Russia relies on many European- and American-based companies and sites. The bans on mainstream sites like YouTube and WhatsApp will likely prompt Russia to increasingly adopt Chinese alternatives, thus increasing reliance on Beijing, or develop its own platforms, although it is unlikely that Russia has the indigenous assets to do so.

Gambia Upholds Ban on Female Genital Mutilation

Lawmakers in the Gambia narrowly voted to uphold a ban on female genital mutilation (FGM), striking down proposed legislation that would have made the country the first to remove a ban on the practice, which affects an estimated 75 per cent of women between 15 and 50. While FGM is not religiously sanctioned, Islamic groups have pushed to remove the ban, which entails penalties for people carrying out or assisting in the practice. The vote is likely to continue helping civil society, state, and foreign humanitarian actors in the difficult fight against FGM in the Gambia.

Rwandan President Paul Kagame Re-Elected with Over 99% of Vote

As expected, Rwandan President Paul Kagame was re-elected with more than 99 per cent of the vote. Kagame has been Rwanda’s leader for more than two decades, and his victory at this year’s vote was guaranteed after prominent critics were barred from competing. Kagame’s government is almost certain to continue its militaristic foreign policy in Africa, marked by formal troop deployments and support for paramilitary groups like M23, while also reaching out to Western states.

Kenya Faces Unrest After Arrest of Alleged Serial Killer

In Kenya, the arrest of an alleged serial killer, responsible for reportedly more than 40 murders, has driven localised civil unrest and has contributed to re-ignited protests in areas that saw severe anti-government unrest in the past week. Cases of violence targeting police forces have been recorded in Nairobi. It is highly likely that the case will drive further protests and discontent towards authorities in the short term. Kenya’s President Ruto is set to address the nation on 19 July in a bid to curtail the anti-government protests. However, much of the nation is still demanding his resignation and his speech could help increase current tensions and translate to more unrest.

UK Labour Government Launches Defence Review

The new Labour government of the UK has launched a defence review as promised in its manifesto. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has promised to exceed NATO targets and increase national defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP by mid-2025. The review follows recent reports arguing that the British armed forces are currently unable to fight a conflict of any scale. Among various challenges, London’s military is struggling to match its recruitment goals, faces pressures to modernise assets such as its nuclear-armed Vanguard submarine fleet, and ongoing issues with its support for Ukraine in the context of the Russian invasion.

Germany Plans to Halve Military Aid to Ukraine by 2025

Reuters reported that Germany is planning to halve military aid to Ukraine from EUR eight billion to EUR four billion in 2025. The plans underscore Berlin’s expectations that the allocation of interest from frozen Russian funds, as well as other financial tools deployed to help Kyiv, will allow it to recoup the loss of direct military aid. If implemented, the plans are likely to increase uncertainty regarding the future of Ukraine’s defence, as a possible future second Trump presidency may affect other funding pathways and sources.

Spanish and German Police Arrest Four in Drone Parts Trafficking Case Linked to Hezbollah

Spanish and German police detained four individuals on 18 July on charges of trafficking drone parts to Hezbollah. The scheme reportedly involves the use of Lebanese-owned companies registered in Spain, trading large quantities of technology some of which can be repurposed for use by military drones. While details of the trafficking system are yet to emerge, the case likely demonstrates ongoing difficulties in moderating and preventing the proliferation of cheap and easily manufactured electronic goods that can be used for lethal means. As the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Myanmar, Palestine and the Lebanon-Israel border show, cheap commercial drones and their parts can be easily converted into deadly systems.

Houthi Drone Attack on Tel Aviv Raises Concerns Over Israeli Security

An overnight drone attack on Tel Aviv, Israel on 19 July that killed one and injured several has been claimed by the Houthi Movement in Yemen. A drone attack from such a distance that managed to elude air defence radars and bypass the Iron Dome will likely challenge the security of Israel. The Houthis have claimed that the drone was a new Yafa drone which cannot be detected by radar. Whilst this statement is likely indicative of Houthi propaganda, if the militant group has obtained this capability and it is proliferated to other Iranian proxies, it could hugely increase the risk to Israel. There is also a realistic possibility that the Houthi drone diversified its flightpath and flew west over Egypt and across the Mediterranean to evade Israel air defence.

Al-Shabaab Car Bombing in Mogadishu Kills Nine During European Cup Finals

Al-Shabaab operatives carried out a car bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia during the finals of the European Cup, killing nine people. There is a high likelihood that the action was a retaliation for the killing of at least five al-Shabaab detainees during a prison riot in the days prior, which broke out after the members were sentenced to the death penalty.

Militiamen Attack Ethiopian Military Convoy in Somalia

Also in Somalia, unidentified militiamen attacked a military convoy carrying weapons from Ethiopia on 16 July, killing at least five. The convoy, which was attacked near the central Somali town of Abudwaq, was transporting heavy machineguns, anti-air weapons, and rocket-propelled grenades. There is a high likelihood that part of the arsenal will end in the hands of al-Shabaab. In the medium term, there is a realistic possibility that further cases of proliferation will lead to international organisations reconsidering the December 2023 lifting of a three-decade-long ban on weapons sales and transfers to Somalia.

North Macedonia Declares State of Crisis as Wildfires Force Border Closures

The government of North Macedonia declared a state of crisis on 14 July due to ongoing wildfires that have damaged or destroyed hundreds of hectares of woodland. The threat posed by the fires also forced authorities, on 17 July, to close border crossings to Greece. With temperatures forecasted to remain high, there is a high likelihood that the fires will continue. Outside of increasing their speed and making it difficult to extinguish them, high heat can facilitate the reignition of wildfires, thus posing a protracted danger.

Greece Enacts Partial Ban on Outdoor Work Amid Extreme Heatwave

On 16 July, Greek authorities ratified a partial ban on outdoor work as temperatures in the country continue to exceed 40 degrees Celsius during the hottest areas of the day. Service sector workers, who play a crucial role during the high tourism season in Greece, are especially at risk due to the extreme temperatures, and the ban is especially likely to aim at safeguarding them in particular. The threat posed by increasingly high temperatures is likely to have a long-term impact on the feasibility and risk of tourism to Greece during the hot summer months.

On 19 July, Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) announced the arrest of Amin ul-Haq, a prominent al-Qaeda (AQ) leader listed on a United Nations sanctions list. Ul-Haq, described as a close associate of the late Osama Bin Laden, who orchestrated the 9/11 attacks, was apprehended during a major counter-terrorism operation in the city of Gujrat in the Punjab province. Intelligence indicated that ul-Haq was planning on sabotaging critical national infrastructure (CNI) across the Punjab province.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The arrest of ul-Haq marks Pakistan’s first major AQ arrest in several years. Haq, originally from Afghanistan, headed Bin Laden’s Black Guard which provided personal security for the leader of AQ and fled to Pakistan after the 2001 battle of Tora Bora, where he was apprehended in 2008 but released in 2011 due to insufficient evidence. Reporting indicates that he has risen through the ranks of a weakened AQ to command hundreds of fighters. Ul-Huq returned to Afghanistan in 2021 following the Taliban’s recapture of Kabul. His relationship with Bin Laden and his role within AQ likely made him a pillar one target for the US.

There is a realistic possibility that this operation was coordinated by US intelligence who fear a resurgent AQ in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region capable of conducting external operations way beyond their centre of gravity. For Pakistan, the arrest of a major figure within AQ will be sold as a win for its counter-terrorism operations. However, the apprehension of ul-Haq is likely to provoke reprisal attacks from AQ. This is a potential development that Pakistan may struggle to deal with as it is plagued by a host of resurgent militant groups such as the Pakistani Taliban and several Baluch separatist groups.

Moreover, AQ may be attempting to exploit the current overstretching of Pakistani security services to undermine the government, gain publicity and increase recruitment. AQ’s plans to sabotage Pakistan’s CNI would likely help them achieve these goals and the failed operation may be an indicator of a future increase in AQ operations in the country.

Large-scale ongoing unrest in Bangladesh this week led to at least 39 deaths and hundreds more injuries. The student-led protests arose following a 5 June High Court decision to reinstate a quota system for public sector jobs. While notable disturbances initially followed, major demonstrations were delayed due to Eid and summer holidays, beginning in earnest from 1 July.

On 10 July, the Supreme Court suspended the High Court order, upholding the prior status quo. However, the student protests, self-styled as the “Bangla Blockade” movement, continued, with protest leaders vowing to continue protests until the quota system is permanently overturned. The most major confrontations took place on 15-16 July, with police forces reportedly using rubber bullets, teargas, baton charges and stun grenades. Several of the deaths were attributed to rubber bullets.

In addition to the severe police response, protestors clashed with pro-government groups who were reportedly armed with machetes, bamboo rods and hockey sticks. The government has closed schools and universities indefinitely, and multiple Bangladeshi internet providers restricted access to social media platforms.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In 1972, after the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War when Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan, the founding father of Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, introduced a quota system that reserved 56 per cent of government jobs for specific groups. Most of these reserved jobs were for the offspring of the “freedom fighters” who fought in the 1971 war. In 2018, mass student protests led to significant reform of the quota system, with the freedom fighters’ reservations being abolished. The recent High Court decision, however, overturned these reforms, which led to the current wave of unrest.

Although the Supreme Court decision has enforced the post-2018 status quo, the protests have continued, which has highly likely been conditioned by the wider context for the unrest. The protestors are mainly students, and government jobs are the primary reasonable prospect for their future employment. Bangladesh has undergone substantial economic growth in recent years, but this has been largely predicated on the expansion of readymade garments (RMG) exports, an industry which has not provided adequate employment for educated Bangladeshi youth. Out of a total population of 171 million, 32 million young Bangladeshis are not in work or education, according to a prominent Bangladeshi think tank. Bangladesh has a particularly young population, with 67 per cent being working age, and over 25 per cent being aged 15-29. Considering the unemployment crisis, the anticipated return of the quota system for government jobs almost certainly provided a major threat to the already limited future job prospects of many Bangladeshi students.

Additionally, protestors are frustrated with the prolonged repression of the ruling Awami League party. Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of Pakistan’s founder, Sheikh Rehman, has been the Prime Minister of Bangladesh since 2009. The government was re-elected in January 2024 following an election that was widely criticised as undemocratic, and the main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), boycotted the vote. The ruling party has seized the opportunity to further suppress the opposition, blaming the BNP for the protests. In the aftermath of the recent unrest, police raided the BNP headquarters, making several arrests. Hasina referred to the protestors as “razakars”, a highly derogatory term for traitors who collaborated with Pakistan in the independence war, prompting outrage. While Hasina has since condemned the “murder” of protestors, on 18 July, protest leaders vowed to continue and the civil unrest will highly likely continue over the coming weeks.

While predominantly in Dhaka, particularly in the vicinity of the University of Dhaka, Jahangirnagar University, and other universities and colleges, unrest has also been reported in Chattogram, Khulna and Rangpur. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that instability and government repression may increase the threat of terrorism in Bangladesh – the BNP was historically in government with the banned Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party, and multiple terrorist groups, including Islamic State – Bengal Province, are active in Bangladesh.

In an interview released on 16 July, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump stated that Taiwan should pay the US for its defence. Trump’s comments sparked anxiety regarding the strength of future US support for Taiwan against China. This prompted a dramatic fall in the price of chip stocks, with Wall Street’s semiconductor index losing over 480 billion USD in stock market value on 17 July.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, has been claimed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a de jure territory since the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) government fled the mainland to Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War in 1949. While de facto a separate state, Taiwan’s status as an independent nation is only recognised by a handful of nations. In recent years, tensions have increased dramatically, particularly following a 2022 white paper published by the PRC which called reunification an “indispensable” goal and has held a series of large-scale military drills around Taiwan simulating invasion.

Although ambiguous, the US’s role as a guarantor of Taiwan’s security is highly likely a crucial deterrent against the PRC. While Biden has sought to affirm this role, Trump’s comments have raised doubts about the strength of US support, with polls currently projecting Trump to likely be the next US president. In his previous presidency, Trump employed distinctly anti-PRC rhetoric and aggressive trade policies, and he recently chose JD Vance, a China hawk, as his running mate. Trump’s comments, therefore, have come as a surprise to some, with speculation that Trump is giving Taiwan the “Ukraine treatment”.

On the one hand, Trump’s comments may reflect an isolationist foreign policy which threatens the reduction of US deterrence against future PRC military actions against Taiwan. It is highly likely, however, that these comments are instead part of Trump’s transactional diplomacy. The key point of contention raised by Trump was Taiwan’s dominance of the “chip business”, with Taiwan producing 92 per cent of the global supply of advanced microchips. It is unlikely that a second Trump administration would seriously consider abandoning, albeit ambiguous, commitments to Taiwan’s security. Trump is instead, likely attempting to leverage the US’ vital defence role for Taiwan to pressure the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) into committing to build more chip fabrication plants in the US, should he win the November election.

Pakistan Moves to Ban Imran Khan’s PTI Party

The government of Pakistan has announced that it will move to ban the Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who is currently imprisoned. TPI still retains massive popular support, and a recent Supreme Court ruling made it the largest force in the Pakistani parliament. Alongside banning PTI, the government has also announced that it will press treason charges against Khan. It is almost certain that if the move to ban PTI moves forward, it will translate into extremely severe and widespread violent civil unrest. There is a high likelihood that the government, which has recently further expanded the military’s powers by granting the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) the authorisation to intercept calls and messages for reasons of national security, is betting on provoking large protests to quash dissenting voices and organisations.

Nepalese Prime Minister Dahal Ousted in Confidence Vote

Nepalese Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal lost a confidence vote, leading to the creation of a new government on 12 July, led by K.P. Sharma Oli. The government crisis was initiated by Oli’s party, the liberal Communist Unified Marxist Leninist (UML) party, which struck a government deal with the centrist Nepali Congress (NC) party. UML is considered a pro-Beijing party, and Oli has flirted with the idea of reopening territorial disputes with India. In turn, Delhi has pressured Nepal not to begin projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

North Korea Sacks Senior Officials Over Samjiyon Project, Sparking Speculation of Major Purge

On 14 July, North Korean media reported the sacking of multiple senior officials for their “irresponsible” handling of the construction of Samjiyon, a mega-project consisting of a city in a mountainous part of the country’s north. The building of Samjiyon was reportedly slowed down by North Korea’s economic difficulties, and authorities used dissidents as “slave labour” during the construction works. The announcement of government divisions in the highly controlled North Korean media is extremely rare. There is a realistic possibility that the announcement is a prelude to a major government purge, with the Samjiyon project acting as a convenient justification.

Suicide Bomber and Insurgents Attack Pakistani Military Facility, Protests Erupt in Bannu

On 15 July in Bannu, in northwestern Pakistan’s troubled Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, a suicide bomber and armed insurgents attacked a military facility, resulting in the deaths of at least four soldiers and injuries to numerous others, including civilians. The attack, which involved a vehicle-borne explosive and subsequent gunfire, was quickly suppressed by security forces, with all five attackers reportedly killed. On 19 July, a demonstration was organised in Bannu to protest the rising insecurity in the region. However, the protest was fired upon by with conflicting reports as to whether or not it was militants or government troops.

Uttar Pradesh Police Demand Restaurant Employee Names, Raising Sectarian Tensions

In the Uttar Pradesh state of northern India, police reportedly demanded that restaurant owners display the names of their employees at the beginning of Shravan month. The demand is likely meant to single out Muslim-owned or -staffed businesses at a period of high influx of Hindus, and possibly seeking to inflame sectarian violence. Religion-driven violence, especially targeting physical assets and storefronts, is extremely common in India and is often a response to direct calls from local politicians. Despite their anti-Muslim rhetoric backfiring at the recent elections, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) politicians, especially at the local level, have continued calls for anti-Muslim violence.

Floods in Eastern Afghanistan Kill 40 and Injure 250

At least 40 people have been killed, and 250 injured, by floods in eastern Afghanistan. The entire region is currently experiencing severe flooding coinciding with the height of the monsoon season. The severity of the current flooding is partly anomalous, and reports link it with ongoing anthropogenic climate change. In Afghanistan, the death toll from floods is likely to increase due to insufficient infrastructure and the precarious stability and lack of resources of the Taliban regime.

Six Found Dead from Cyanide Poisoning at Bangkok Hotel

On 16 July, six individuals, four Vietnamese and two US nationals, were discovered dead at a luxury hotel in Bangkok, Thailand. Further analysis of the bodies showed that all died from cyanide poisoning. Currently, the most discussed hypothesis is that of a dispute over debts leading to the killings.

Fire at Zigong Shopping Centre in China Kills 16

16 people died as a result of a fire at a shopping centre in the city of Zigong in Sichuan province, China. The 14-storey building is located in the high-tech district of Zigong, and the entire structure was engulfed in flames leading to a major firefighting and rescue operation. Official national sources reported that 75 people were rescued. According to an official source, China has suffered from 947 fire-related deaths between January and May 2024, indicating the continuing risk of fire hazards in China. The majority of these fires are caused by issues with gas or electrical lines, as well as “carelessness”. China will likely continue to experience sporadic major fires, due to widespread poor and cost-cutting construction practices.

The final of the European Football Championship, between Spain and England, is scheduled to take place on 14 July, while the final of the Copa America, between Argentina and Colombia will occur on 15 July. Due to the nature of the events and their global reach, the matches may result in limited traffic disruptions.

The Islamic holiday of Ashura takes place on 16-17 July. The holiday is not a major one for Sunnis, while it has a particularly notable value for Shias, for whom it is associated with the death of Husayn ibn Ali and, in general, with martyrdom for the faith. Likely due to the sectarian differences linked with the holiday (and its importance to the development of Shia religious identity) attacks targeting Shia communities have occurred on Ashura, the latest taking place in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 2015.

Canada has announced plans to acquire up to 12 new submarines to strengthen its Arctic deterrence at the NATO 75th anniversary summit. Ottawa has cited the need to improve its submarine capabilities to covertly detect and deter maritime threats, to counter challenges from Russia and China in the region and to secure future shipping routes in the Arctic Ocean.

The Department of National Defence indicated that the Royal Canadian Navy’s current inventory of four ageing Victoria-class submarines is becoming obsolete and too costly to maintain. The new submarines will be diesel-electric rather than nuclear-powered and are capable of operating under the ice.

The acquisition also forms part of a broader effort aimed at increasing defence spending to 1.76 per cent of GDP by 2030.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing of the procurement is likely an attempt to deflect from Canada’s sustained failure to meet NATO defence spending pledges of two per cent of GDP, a failure that may soon be emphasised under a potential Trump presidency who has historically lambasted NATO members for not meeting this requirement. However, Canada’s primary reason to improve and triple its current submarine fleet is to protect the hard-to-defend Arctic waters such as the Northwest Passage, with some estimates suggesting that climate change and retreating ice cover will turn the Arctic Ocean into the most efficient shipping route between Europe and East Asia by 2050.

Russia has long coveted the idea of a “Northern Sea Route” which China endorses as part of its “Ice Silk Road”. These maritime trade routes are considerably shorter than the Suez route and require less fuel expenses, currently entail no expensive transit tolls and face a negligible threat from piracy or militant groups. Moreover, Russia has competing claims with Canada in the Arctic, with both countries claiming the Lomonosov Ridge as an extension of their respective continental shelves. China, which hasn’t been so bold as to refer to itself as an Arctic power, published a 2018 White Paper wherein it claimed to be a “near-Arctic state”, citing its right to conduct scientific research and environmental protection.

The Arctic’s potential for trade, abundance in hydrocarbons, mineral wealth, fishing and potential military advantages is attracting both Moscow and Beijing, who tentatively support each other to counter the West. Both countries have also deployed civilian-flagged oceanographic research vessels to the area to collect important bathymetric and hydrographic data such as water column profiles, seafloor mapping, depth measurements, sound velocity profiles, ambient noise levels and much more. This data can inform genuine civilian scientific research but is likely “dual-purpose” research that can be used to expand and improve submarine operations.

In the long term, this may help them assert claims, protect shipping routes, improve their submarine-based strike capabilities, improve intelligence gathering and gain a strategic edge over NATO in an area that will almost certainly become increasingly important in a potential future conflict. Russia and China may also exploit Arctic access to better understand North American undersea critical national infrastructure such as internet cables and gas pipelines- the sabotage of which is highly deniable and likely features as part of their sub-threshold “grey zone” activity that can cause huge economic loss without triggering a kinetic response.

However, Canada’s decision to procure diesel-electric submarines will likely play into the hands of Russia and China. The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) and China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine fleets are becoming increasingly nuclear-powered, providing them a significant advantage in terms of stealth and endurance.

On 8 July, Jimmy “Barbecue” Charizier, leader of Haiti’s largest gang network “G9” and seen as a de facto spokesperson for the country’s criminal syndicates, declared that his group would initiate a “war” against the UN-backed “invaders” — referring to the 400 Kenyan police officers deployed to Haiti to help quell ongoing gang-related violence.

The Kenyan forces have begun carrying out the first series of operations in Port-au-Prince, retaking control of key buildings including the country’s largest hospital. Unconfirmed reports state that the gangs attempted a “counterattack” to retake the building on 10 July.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The gangs almost certainly maintain the strategic objective of extending the period of lawlessness in the country as it allows for them to carry out illegal actions, including running smuggling routes to the US and the Caribbean, without any credible opposition. It is highly unlikely that G9 represents or even seeks to represent a political alternative to the ruling government. Still, the somewhat “anti-imperialist” rhetoric used by the gangs may be an effort to gather popular support and possibly discourage collaboration with Kenyan forces.

In recent months, Haitian gangs have increased attacks on local institutions and on foreign humanitarian workers, including by carrying out targeted killings of American missionaries. Such actions are highly likely meant to force the civilian population to rely on gangs for the provision of basic goods and services.

The capture of the largest hospital in Port-au-Prince may indicate that the joint Kenyan-Haitian police operations are seeking to restore popular confidence in legal administrative rule through the symbolic creation of pockets of “normalcy”. The gangs will likely respond to such efforts by increasing attacks on institutions and individuals involved in humanitarian efforts, including foreigners, to deny the police an opportunity to carry out normalisation efforts.

“La Niña” is a weather pattern that can develop as part of multi-year cycles and follows El Niño. It is marked by cold temperatures in the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean. Usually, the cycle involving El Niño, La Niña, and a neutral period (the cycle is known as ENSO, or “El Niño-Southern Oscillation”) lasts between two and seven years.

Solace Global Assessment: 

La Niña is associated with an increased frequency of hurricanes in the Caribbean. In South America, La Niña can cause heavier rains, possibly leading to floods in countries such as Brazil. However, the weather pattern has also important implications for the APAC region.

There is a realistic possibility that generally lower air pressures in the western Pacific will drive increased rain and flooding in northern Australia. In Southeast and South Asia, La Niña is likely to provoke a more prolonged and heavier monsoon season. While this may stimulate the local economy by increasing crop yields in India and neighbouring countries, increasing rains may also result in floods and landslides, especially in areas victims of deforestation or those with little drainage infrastructure.

La Niña’s positive impacts on South American and South Asian agriculture may reverberate in Africa, possibly resulting in a medium-term improvement in the influx of grain, rice, and other cereals to food-insecure countries. This, in turn, may lead to alterations in local risk profiles where there was previously food insecurity.

La Niña may also cause a decrease in rainfall volumes in the Pacific Islands, possibly leading to localised droughts. In addition, studying La Niña’s impact will likely allow researchers to better understand how the ENSO is impacting, and being affected by, climate change.

Biden Reaffirms 2024 Candidacy Amidst Health Speculations and Criticism

US President Joe Biden reiterated that he will be the Democratic Party’s candidate in the 2024 presidential elections amid speculation about his health. The statement, on 5 July, followed a poor performance at the first presidential debate with Republican opponent and former President Donald Trump and calls from party insiders to replace the incumbent Biden with another Democrat. On 11 July, Biden was further challenged after his poor performance at the NATO summit which was criticised by Democrat party members and supporters.

Argentine President Milei Skips Mercosur Meeting

Argentine President Milei skipped a Mercosur trade block meeting in Paraguay and instead headed to Brazil on 7 July, where he met former President Bolsonaro. Milei’s decision to attend an anti-Socialism event in Rio de Janeiro, instead of meeting current President Lula, is likely meant to continue rallying support at home. At the same time, Milei’s constant diplomatic insults towards the leftist president of Brazil risk resulting in tangible negative effects on the two countries’ relations.e as usual.

Argentina’s Inflation Rate Rises to 5% in June

Argentina’s monthly inflation rate marginally increased to 5 per cent in June, ending a five-month streak of decreases. The increase is likely a result of revisions in utility rates. The development, albeit likely not particularly relevant to Argentina’s broader economic outlook, is likely to be widely reported on by local media and may drive further anti-government unrest.

Cuba Foils US-Sourced Arms Smuggling Plot

On 8 July, Cuban authorities announced they had foiled a plot to smuggle arms and ammunition from the United States into Cuba, detaining nearly three dozen people involved in a scheme to destabilise the government. The plot was first revealed in December when a Cuban man arrived from the US by jetski with weapons to recruit others for acts of violence. According to the Cuban authorities, a seven-month investigation exposed a broader plan involving at least 32 Cuban residents connected to a US-based group, La Nueva Nación Cubana.

Havana has accused the US of allowing the accused to act with impunity in the US, with the US State Department responding by stating that it only prosecutes based on US law- a development that will likely further strain relations between the two countries.

Deadly Heatwave Hits Western US

In the United States, at least 28 people have reportedly died because of an ongoing heatwave in California, Oregon and Arizona. 14 of these cases were in California. Over the past week, temperatures have persistently exceeded 38 degrees Celsius across the American West, with multiple record highs recorded across the region. A record high of 48.8 degrees Celsius (120 degrees Fahrenheit) in Las Vegas was recorded on 7 July.

Officials have indicated that many of the victims were elderly or homeless and that the number of deaths is not exceptionally high for the region and therefore not yet a cause for alarm. However, in part aided by improved data collection and classification methods, heat-related deaths have been steadily increasing in recent years, a trend which is likely to continue as global warming increases both the intensity and regularity of heat waves.

Pantanal Fires Devastate Nearly 800,000 Hectares

Reporting from Brazil indicates that nearly 800,000 hectares have now been burned in the Pantanal, the world’s largest wetland and one of the most biodiverse areas globally. This region, spanning 16.9 million hectares and also encompassing parts of Bolivia and Paraguay, supports a rich diversity of flora and fauna, much of which is endangered.

The Pantanal is not only crucial for its biodiversity but also home to many indigenous communities who rely on the land and its resources. The recent fires have already claimed livestock, a vital asset for these communities, which may escalate tensions and unrest, potentially pressuring the central government for assistance.

Undisclosed US defence sources have reported that US military bases were recently placed on Force Protection Condition (FPCON) “Charlie,” indicating a high alert status. This response comes in light of credible threats suggesting potential sabotage attacks by Russian-backed actors. Intelligence sources indicated that Russian proxies were planning attacks against US military personnel and facilities across multiple European countries.

The planned attacks were purportedly designed to replicate a series of recent successful or disrupted attacks in the region. In April, two German-Russian nationals were apprehended for allegedly plotting arson and bomb attacks under Russian direction. Similarly, in March, several individuals were arrested and charged with conspiring with Russian intelligence to commit arson against a Ukrainian-linked warehouse. Additionally, there have been numerous incidents of suspicious fires and explosions in countries where Russian intelligence historically maintains strong influence, such as the Baltics, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

Solace Global Assessment: 

These attacks are almost certainly part of Russia’s broader strategy of “grey zone” or “hybrid” warfare against the West, motivated by its support for Ukraine. Despite significant military setbacks in Ukraine, Russia’s foreign intelligence agencies like the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) are likely operational and focused on identifying and targeting logistical support for Kyiv.

With kinetic strikes against facilities supporting Ukraine not feasible, Russia appears to be relying on proxy groups to carry out sabotage acts. This approach allows the Kremlin to maintain plausible deniability and reduce the risk of direct escalation. By leveraging proxy groups, nationalist elements in Europe, and potentially criminal networks, Russia aims to disrupt weapon deliveries to Ukraine, deter NATO support, and sow division within the alliance.

However, Russian proxy groups likely face challenges accessing highly secure military bases or weapons facilities. Therefore, they may target less secure infrastructure such as factories producing non-lethal aid, communication equipment, or vulnerable parts of Ukraine’s logistics network like railway lines.

As the conflict persists, Russia may escalate its asymmetric activities. This could involve intensifying disinformation campaigns to stoke divisions in the West, expanding maritime capabilities for deniable undersea sabotage against critical infrastructure, or increasing cyber operations.

Notably, Russia has refrained from conducting sabotage on US soil, potentially due to the risk of severe escalation. Yet, concerns arise from an influx of illegal Russian immigrants into the US, raising fears of Kremlin exploitation to establish networks capable of mimicking European-style asymmetric tactics. This could include targeting facilities associated with Ukraine on American soil if tensions escalate significantly.

In summary, Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics continue to evolve, leveraging proxies and asymmetric methods to achieve strategic objectives while managing international perceptions and minimizing direct military confrontation with Western powers.

US intelligence has stated that it discovered a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, the CEO of the major German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall. The assassination plot was reportedly in advanced stages and was part of a broader effort to target defence industry executives providing support for Ukraine’s military campaign against Russia. US intelligence reportedly warned the German security services which then protected Papperger.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Rheinmetall is one of the world’s largest arms producers which manufactures vital conventional weapon systems such as artillery shells, tank munitions and armoured vehicles. Rheinmetall’s arms have been used extensively in the war in Ukraine and the company has plans to establish factories within Ukraine’s borders, making the company a primary target for Russia.

The plot to assassinate Rheinmetall’s CEO was likely sanctioned by the Kremlin to deter privately-run arms companies from providing assistance to Ukraine and likely falls under Moscow’s wider hybrid warfare strategy. However, unlike Russia’s sabotage campaign, the Kremlin would unlikely be able to rely on proxy groups within Europe due to the sensitivity and complexity of such an operation.

Russian intelligence has a long history of assassinating Russian dissidents throughout Europe and has traditionally escaped with only minor repercussions such as the expulsion of diplomats, many of whom were suspected of being undercover intelligence agents. The assassination of a European executive would be a marked escalation but one Russia is likely willing to pursue given the circumstances and its potential to deter future assistance.

The Russian military has sustained huge losses on the battlefield, Kyiv has recently been authorised to conduct limited strikes into mainland Russia and the Kremlin is struggling to counter Ukraine’s ever-developing asymmetric capabilities such as drones and uncrewed surface vessels (USVs). Moreover, the success of sanctions on Russia has been questionable and has driven Moscow closer to the West’s adversaries, providing the West with few effective deterrents against Russia’s increasingly emboldened grey zone activity.

Private arms companies supporting Kyiv have frequently visited Ukraine, a detail widely covered by the media. If Russia is conducting an assassination campaign against private arms companies, there is a high likelihood that it will aim to target them in Ukraine, given the more permissive operational environment and the opportunity to attribute the attacks to a pro-Russian proxy involved in the war. 

Having been operational for only 20 days over the last two months, the US-built pier in Gaza is set to be dismantled in “short order”. Meanwhile, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has been conducting operations in Gaza City, particularly Shujaiya. On 10 July, the IDF urged all Gaza City residents to evacuate south.

Both Hamas and Israel have been accused of stalling ceasefire negotiations, and there have been reports that the Hamas political leadership is considering moving from Qatar to Iraq. In Lebanon, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah in a 10 July speech projected confidence against the potential of a major IDF offensive and indicated that Hezbollah would accept Hamas’ decision on the outcome of their negotiations, ceasing cross-border operations if a ceasefire is reached. On 11 July, drone strikes launched from Lebanon hit northern Israel, killing one IDF reservist.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The US-built and military-run Gaza humanitarian pier operation, which cost USD 230 million, has been plagued by two key challenges since it first started operating on 17 May. Firstly, inclement weather has resulted in operations being suspended at the pier multiple times. Secondly, the onshore distribution of the aid has been considerably hampered by what aid organisations consider to be intolerable security risks for its workers. In its two-month history, the pier has only delivered a single day’s worth of pre-war aid into Gaza. The pier was met with suspicion by both Israelis and Palestinians, the former due to the pier’s perceived role as a US reaction to endemic humanitarian concerns in Gaza, and the latter due to the US’s role as Israel’s primary military ally. Overall, it is highly likely that the pier, marred by problems, has failed in offsetting the Palestinian perception of the US as being fundamentally pro-Israel.

The IDF’s operations in Gaza City over the past week, in both Shujaiya and Tel al-Hawa, reveal the continued presence of Hamas in northern Gaza. The IDF has previously claimed such areas had been cleared of fighters. However, the current operations have been notably intense and this is only the second during the conflict that evacuation instructions have been leafleted across Gaza City. 250,000 people are estimated to be in Gaza City, and it is unlikely that the new evacuation orders will be followed en masse.  Most of the city’s previous population that were more willing or able to relocate have done so already, and some residents have indicated that would not feel any safer in the south, where Israel has allegedly ignored humanitarian zones. While ceasefire negotiations are ongoing in Doha, key issues remain divisive.

Supported by recent claims from Hamas spokespeople regarding the regeneration of combatants and materiel in previously “cleared” areas, Hamas likely remains confident that they are maintaining sufficient combat effectiveness across the Strip to continue pursuing its demands in the negotiations. Hamas has been resistant to any deal that does not commit Israel to a permanent ceasefire and full IDF withdrawal, while Israel has objected to terms which might enable Hamas to continue holding hostages and indefinitely halt IDF operations. The IDF will likely be unable to compel Hamas to accept Israel’s strategic objectives coercively with military force, as long as Hamas remains combat-effective across the Strip.

On 6 July, the three junta-led states of the Sahel region – Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso – signed a “confederation treaty” at the first summit of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). All three junta governments came to power after 2020, and, in January 2024, all three removed their countries from the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The regional bloc said it was “disappointed” by the lack of rapprochement and called for further “reconciliation” efforts.

Solace Global Assessment: 

All three juntas have adopted somewhat convergent foreign policies characterised by a rejection of ties with Western governments, and instead increased relations with Russia.

The three juntas are particularly plagued by a growing threat posed by Islamist insurgents, with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), among other fundamentalist groups, gaining considerable ground in areas where government control is tenuous (this is especially the case in Niger, where the eastern border region of the Chad basin continues to provide a sanctuary for insurgent groups).

The joint counterterrorism initiative launched by the three states in March is unlikely to pose a sufficient obstacle to the insurgents, and it is almost certain that the announcement of the latest agreement will be followed by further deals with Moscow.

The worsening in the relations between AES and ECOWAS, with the latter likely to impose further rounds of sanctions following the failure of the latest rapprochement efforts, may benefit regional violent extremist organisations (VEOs), which likely aim to destabilise the juntas to establish alternative administrative organs.

Still, ISWAP and other Islamist groups likely have a long-term strategic interest in establishing a presence in the comparatively wealthier coastal states that border the junta ones, including Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.

The completion of the withdrawal of US troops from a key base for counterterrorism in Niger overlapped with the AES’ announcement of the treaty. The withdrawal of Western troops could result in a more marked regionalisation of the Sahel region, with Washington likely seeking to increase efforts to court coastal powers.  

On 8 July, a UN report indicated that at least 3,000 Rwandan troops are directly fighting the DRC’s army alongside the M23 group, a militia operating in the eastern DRC that is led by ethnic Tutsis. Moreover, the report states that the Ugandan government is at least enabling M23 operations by granting M23 and Rwandan troops free access to its territory. The M23 group is mostly active in the North Kivu province which borders both Rwanda and Uganda and is rich in natural resources including gold, diamonds, coltan, and cassiterite.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The M23 militia likely represents a strategic asset for Kigali, as the group is directly involved in the informal trade of rare earth minerals and other resources to developed countries through its territorial control over DRC mining areas. Kigali, which responded to the report by accusing the DRC of funding ethnic Hutu insurgents, almost certainly exercises much control over the group, and the presence of large numbers of Rwandan troops in the M23’s ranks further demonstrates this point.

Possibly, the recent escalation is a reflection of Rwanda’s improving position on the international stage, marked by increasingly closer relations with Western states. Uganda’s seeming acquiescence to M23 troop movements is not necessarily proof of direct government support for the militia, but may rather reflect localised support, possibly of Ugandan officials benefitting from M23 operations, or a simple lack of administrative and security assets that would allow Ugandan forces to efficiently control their borders.

Much of the southern border area between Uganda, Rwanda and North Kivu is sparsely populated and characterised by rough and uneven terrain, with the border marked by a string of dormant volcanoes, and there is a high likelihood that militia troops moving in the direction of Goma can evade government forces with relative ease.

In late June, M23 seized the strategic town of Kanyabayoinga, North Kivu, which is a transport hub to northern DRC. Currently, DRC forces, which are also dealing with crises in the western border regions, as well as constant threats of disaggregation and rebellion (as testified by the recent failed coup) are likely worse equipped than M23 forces and are almost certainly unable to effectively prevent further advances.

The ongoing challenges faced by the DRC’s forces are likely driving the delay in the withdrawal of UN forces from the country. After asking the UN to fast-track the exit of peacekeepers from the country, the government asked, on 9 July, to pause the second phase of the withdrawal process, citing “Rwanda’s continued aggression in North Kivu”. Currently, the MONUSCO mission maintains a 17,000-strong contingent. On 25 June, its South Kivu region centre was disbanded.

There is a realistic possibility that the scaling back of the UN deployment will produce a localised power vacuum in the region, allowing for regional powers to more actively pursue their ambitions in the eastern DRC. So far, local Congolese rebel groups, mostly the Hutu-led Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), have controlled and allowed foreign access to mining areas, often to the benefit of Europe-based suppliers, or suppliers from regional powers including South Africa.

The M23’s advances could allow for powers with a lesser footprint in the area, including China, which is reportedly engaged in illegal gold extraction operations in the bordering region of South Kivu, to establish new informal extraction and shipping networks, possibly playing out broader geopolitical rivalries.

UK Labour Government Announces Moderate Agenda with National Wealth Fund and Policy Reversals

The new Labour government of the UK announced its first set of measures of its five-year legislature. They include the creation of a National Wealth Fund, the withdrawal of the controversial Rwanda deportation plan, and the scrapping of a ban on onshore wind farms.

The new Labour government has not promised particularly drastic reforms, instead concentrating on a growth-centric moderate plan marked by targeted spending. Early data suggests that the government’s start has been welcomed warmly by foreign investors, who are likely increasingly looking to the UK as more stable than its continental counterparts, and possibly the US, where the Trump campaign continues to gain traction.

Read our UK Election review here.

French National Assembly Elections: New Popular Front Wins Second Round, Coalition Government Uncertain

The second round of the French National Assembly elections was won by the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP), although they did not win enough seats to form a majority. Currently, the parliament is divided into three blocs, none of which have the seats to form a government.

There is a high likelihood of further protests as President Emmanuel Macron seeks to assemble a viable coalition. In particular, unrest is likely to be driven by the French Unbowed (LFI) party, which, despite receiving the highest number of votes among the NFP members, is unlikely to be included in a new coalition government.

Read our French Election Review here.

Catalan Independence Protest March Planned in Barcelona, 13 July

Activists affiliated with the Catalan National Assembly plan to conduct a protest march through central Barcelona on 13 July. The purpose of the demonstration is to condemn the Spanish application of the Amnesty Law and show support for Calalunya’s independence. There will likely be an increase in security forces within the vicinity of the demonstration and travel disruptions between Urquinaona Square and Saint Jaume Square are to be anticipated.

G7 Trade Ministers’ Meeting in Calabria: Security Tightened Amidst Protest Concerns

The G7 Trade Ministers’ Meeting will be held in Villa San Giovanni and Reggio Calabria in the Italian region of Calabria on 16-17 July 2024. The meeting will almost certainly involve heightened security measures and has the capacity to attract protest movements.

Russia Introduces Progressive Income Tax

The Russian government has passed new legislation introducing progressive income tax rates that will affect around 3.2 per cent of working Russians. The Ministry of Finance projects that the tax will boost its 2025 inflows by 533 billion rubles (USD 6 billion). The move likely reflects Moscow’s prediction of a protracted war in Ukraine, and Putin’s recent turn towards a more statist economic policy.

EU Suspends Georgia’s Accession Process Over “Foreign Agents” Bill

EU officials announced on 9 July that, following the approval of the controversial and authoritarian “foreign agents” bill, the accession process of Georgia has been suspended, leading to pauses in the provision of military aid through the European Peace Facility (EPF). The government in Tbilisi will likely use the announcement to redouble efforts to quash dissent and move the country closer to Moscow’s orbit.

Modi-Putin Summit Highlights India-Russia Relations Amidst Global Tensions

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the Kremlin on 9 July, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Despite Delhi’s historic commitment to non-alignment, Russia represents a vital supplier of cheap oil for India, more so after Russia’s trade with the West decreased due to the growing sanctions regime.

Moreover, Indian officials likely seek to appeal to Russia for a change of stance regarding the large influx of Indian “foreign fighters” joining Russian forces in Ukraine in exchange for promises of large pay, and sometimes even following coercion.

For Putin, the summit is highly likely a diplomatic success, as Russia continues to herald the BRICS group as a possible alternative to Western summits and claims to have resisted Western attempts to isolate it following its invasion of Ukraine.

Syrian Parliamentary Election Expected to Maintain Status Quo Under Assad’s Ba’ath Party

The Syrian parliamentary election is set to be held on 15 July with a victory for President Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’ath Party-dominated National Progressive Front almost certain after years of electoral reform and vote rigging that favours the incumbent government. With no major political change forecast it is highly unlikely that there will be any positive steps towards peace in Syria, which has now experienced over 13 years of civil war.

Moderate Candidate Pezeshkian Wins Iranian Presidential Election

The reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian defeated his hardline opponent in the second round of the Iranian presidential elections. Pezeshkian was likely aided by an increase in voter turnout in the second round, although overall participation remains lower than in past elections.

It is unlikely that Pezeshkian will usher in fundamental reforms of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. However, the new moderate candidate has already sent signals of willingness to negotiate with the West, including by choosing advisors who already participated in the Rouhani government, which saw the establishment of the Nuclear Deal.

Moody’s Downgrades Kenya’s Debt Rating Amid Political and Economic Uncertainty

Moody’s Ratings has further downgraded Kenya’s debt rating after protests forced the Ruto administration to abandon its tax hikes. The reversal of tax rises has resulted in a major decrease in violent demonstrations and looting.

However, President Ruto has warned of huge consequences for not managing the country’s debt and has not ruled out additional cuts or tax rise moves that are likely to fuel further unrest whilst tensions remain high.

Adding to the ongoing uncertainty, on 11 July Ruto dismissed almost the entirety of his cabinet, likely in a last-ditch effort to improve public support.

Rwanda Prepares for Elections Amidst Criticism and Predictions of Kagame’s Fourth Term

General elections are to be held in Rwanda on 15 July to elect the president and members of the Chamber of Deputies. Incumbent president Paul Kagame will likely extend his 23-year presidency by securing a fourth term and the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) retain its majority in parliament.

Kagame has faced criticism for leading a repressive state accused of widespread human rights abuses and the suppression of political opposition, evidenced by nine candidates being denied the opportunity to campaign.

The election results will likely trigger nationwide unrest, which could turn deadly, as seen during a crush at an election rally in June that resulted in one death.

Trump May Decrease Intelligence Sharing with European NATO Members if Reelected

According to a senior NATO official and three European officials, speaking to journalists anonymously, Donald Trump is considering decreasing levels of intelligence sharing with European NATO members, should he win the US presidential election. Under Biden’s administration, intelligence sharing between the US and NATO allies has increased – the provision of US intelligence is considered to have been vital in countering Russia in Ukraine, as well as foiling their clandestine activities in other European countries, and some senior former intelligence figures have expressed grave concern at the impact diminished intelligence sharing will have on European security.

Trump has long-standing frustrations with NATO members not meeting the 2 per cent of GDP defence spending guideline, as well as advocating a more isolationist foreign policy in general. There are, however, valid concerns regarding the level of Russian penetration in various European NATO member-states, as well as the reliability of partners such as Turkey and Hungary.

Additionally, it is unlikely that such limits on intelligence sharing would apply to NATO partners such as the UK and Canada, who engage in advanced intelligence cooperation through separate intelligence alliances such as Five Eyes.

Belarus and China Launch Joint Military Drills Near Polish Border

Belarus and China started joint military drills on 10 July near the Polish border under what is being termed as “Exercise Attacking Falcon”. The exercise will last until 19 July and is almost certainly strategic messaging aimed at NATO, which is concurrently holding its 75th-anniversary summit. The exercise comes after Belarus joined the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), suggesting an increasing military collaboration between the two authoritarian regimes and reflecting broader efforts by Beijing and Moscow to promote a multi-polar global order.

Houthis Resume Red Sea Attack

The Houthis conducted at least four attacks in the Red Sea over two days on 9-10 July after a ten-day hiatus of attacks. The brief cessation of attacks was potentially linked to the departure of the Nimitz-class USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier, which likely allowed the militant group time to regroup. The Houthis have been using a layered attack of drones and missiles to bypass coalition air defence and maximise success rates.

Of note, the US military also claims to have destroyed five uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) on 12 July, perhaps indicating an increased reliance on this capability due to its low cost, civilian profile and smaller radar cross-section which makes it harder to detect.

Iraq Sentences Wife of IS Leader al-Baghdadi to Death for Crimes Against Yazidis

On 10 July, an Iraqi court sentenced to death one of the wives of former Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for crimes against Yazidi women and girls captured and abused by the jihadist group. A court statement did not directly name the defendant but it is expected that she is Asma Mohammed, who was arrested in 2018 in Turkey and later extradited to Iraq. There is a realistic possibility that IS will conduct reprisal attacks against the Iraqi government in response to the ruling.

Ethiopia: Oromo Liberation Army Abducts 100, Including Students, for Ransom

Reports emerging on 5 July indicate that at least 100 people, including students, were kidnapped the previous week in the Oromia region of Ethiopia. Gunmen stopped three buses approximately 120km north of the capital Addis Ababa, forcing the victims to exit the buses before being abducted.

The attackers have been identified as belonging to the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) rebel group, which the UN has accused of targeted killings, property destruction and rape as part of their efforts to establish an independent Oromo state.

The abductions are likely part of a wider effort to obtain ransom to fund future operations against the Ethiopian government in the Oromo region, and if successful will likely inspire an increase in this tactic.

Wildfires in Attica, Greece Cause Evacuations and Property Damage

Wildfires broke out in Patras and Menidi, in the west of the Greek region of Attica, leading to evacuations and the destruction of at least one residential property and damage to a paediatric hospital. The fires reportedly started from uncleared plots of land, where flammable materials including dried wood and grass had accumulated.

Due to the currently hot and dry temperatures, fires tend to spread quickly and easily reignite even after being extinguished. While the current wildfire season in Greece has not yet reached the severity of last year’s, there is a realistic possibility of further episodes due to the prolonged extreme heat.

Burkina Faso Considers Criminalising Homosexuality, Stirring International Concerns

On 10 July, the Burkinabe military government reviewed a series of draft laws, including a proposal to criminalise homosexuality. Same-sex relations have been legal in Burkina Faso since its independence, with most former French colonies inheriting colonial penal codes that criminalised such acts. While this move is unlikely to face any significant domestic opposition from Burkina Faso’s conservative Muslim and Christian populations, it may provoke international backlash.

Cape Town Storms Destroy 1,000 Homes in Informal Settlements

Nearly 1,000 homes located in informal settlements of Cape Town, South Africa, have been destroyed following days of strong winds, caused by overlapping cold fronts, and the bursting of two riverbanks on 9 July.

A level 8 (out of 10) warning for disruptive rain was issued by local authorities for 10-11 July. The particularly severe impact of the storms is almost certainly linked to the lack of structural viability of many of the buildings in informal settlements, which, in Cape Town alone, house approximately 150,000 households.

Informal settlements, lacking proper drainage and sewage removal infrastructure, are especially at risk from waterborne diseases. Rain is set to continue for several days and authorities have warned of increased flooding, mudslides and rockfalls in the Cape Town, Drankenstein and Stellenbosch areas.

Rebel fighters belonging to the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) claimed to have conducted a series of attacks against the Taliban across Afghanistan during the reporting period. Multiple NRF attacks have occurred outside of the traditional areas of operations for the resistance group, including several attacks in western Afghanistan in the provinces of Nimroz, Farah and Herat. The NRF also carried out multiple attacks in Kabul, which has largely been considered a safe haven for the Taliban since its recapture in 2021.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The NRF, also known as the Second Resistance, emerged in 2021 in response to the Taliban’s rapid takeover of much of Afghanistan. The NRF’s main stronghold is in the Panjshir Valley, located northeast of Kabul, where the Taliban have historically been unable to assert control but the group also has an established presence throughout northeast Afghanistan.

The NRF is comprised of vestiges from the Northern Alliance and several smaller groups which together pose the main organised resistance to the Taliban and include substantial elements from Afghanistan’s minority groups like the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. The NRF is largely non-extremist and is led by Ahmad Massoud, the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, who led resistance efforts against the Soviets and Taliban in the 1980s and 1990s.

After managing to survive the Taliban’s attempts to control the entirety of Afghanistan, the NRF was largely limited to operating in the provinces close to the Panjshir Valley and the predominantly Tajik regions of northeastern Afghanistan. Attacks against the Taliban typically increase during the spring and summer fighting season but recent attacks outside of their traditional stronghold may suggest an increase in the NRF’s freedom of movement and operational capabilities.

In recent months there has been a spate of attacks in Afghanistan’s western provinces but also dozens in Kabul, presenting a major challenge to the Taliban’s credibility. However, in most of these attacks, the NRF has not sought to directly engage with the Taliban due to their numerical superiority and abundance of advanced weapons seized after the US withdrawal. With no external support, the NRF attacks will likely limit their attacks to harassment operations.

Nevertheless, escalating attacks outside NRF strongholds, particularly in Kabul, will likely compel the Taliban to respond, which may ultimately be the NRF’s objective. The Taliban, whose rule is partially sustained through fear, would look weak for failing to respond. An escalation of fighting between the Taliban and NRF would likely yield several negative consequences.

Firstly, it would likely lead to more civilian casualties, displacement, economic hardship, curtail the freedom of aid agencies and result in the further degradation of an already severe humanitarian situation. Secondly, the Taliban have been the most effective force in containing the Islamic State’s most active branch, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which has increasingly expanded its focus outside of Afghanistan.

ISKP would likely seek to exploit the overstretching of Taliban resources and the continued destabilisation of Afghanistan to expand its operations, recruit disaffected individuals, fuel propaganda campaigns and potentially even seize territory. In the long term, this could increase the threat from Afghanistan to neighbouring countries and further afield. The VEO has expanded its networks westward into Iran, Turkey and parts of Europe, pivoting from regional operations to focus on external attacks.

This shift has already been evidenced by the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow alongside a series of thwarted attacks in Western Europe.

On 10 July, Pakistani officials authorised the country’s main spy agency, the military-run Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to tap telephone calls and messages. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s coalition government has defended the move, stating that these new powers will only be used in criminal and terrorism investigations. Furthermore, the government has stressed that anyone abusing the law will face action and that the application of wiretapping will not infringe on people’s lives and privacy. However, numerous critics have lambasted the move, citing it as unconstitutional and an attack on civil liberties.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Considering the significant influence of the Pakistani military in national politics, it is highly probable that extensive electronic surveillance was already in place, as indicated by past leaks of conversations involving Imran Khan and other members of his Tehreek-e-Insaf party.

However, the government’s formal recognition of these powers is likely to legitimise the practice and lead to greater abuse, likely resulting in increased electronic surveillance of the opposition and an expanded role for the military in politics.

Wiretapping could be exploited to justify the apprehension of the media, activists and opposition members, which in turn may incite civil unrest within the country, as seen during the arrest of Imran Khan.

For foreign entities operating in Pakistan, the decision will likely increase exposure to both direct and indirect electronic surveillance, potentially leading to heightened risks of corporate espionage and the compromise of sensitive information.

Pakistan Temporarily Halts Deportation of Afghan Refugees

Pakistan announced on 10 July that it is temporarily suspending the forced deportation of Afghan refugees, allowing almost 1.5 million Afghans to stay another year in Pakistan if they have proper documentation. The decision follows a recent visit by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which, alongside many other international observers, has condemned Islamabad for its often-violent anti-migrant crackdown which started in 2023. The crackdown has sparked fears over human rights abuses and increased rates of radicalisation within the Afghan border, a trend that could increase the threat of terrorism on both sides of the border.

India Plans Hydropower Expansion in Arunachal Prades

Indian government sources have stated that Delhi is planning to build 12 hydropower stations in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, a northeastern Himalayan region that is partly claimed by China. The move has an obvious economic rationale: India’s production of hydroelectric power has stagnated over the last decade, and the state has a large energy-generation potential. Nevertheless, the move is also highly likely intended to increase India’s security and administrative footprint in the region and decrease the chances of Chinese encroachment. There is a realistic possibility of diplomatic tensions between Delhi and Beijing if the plans are carried out.

Thailand Approves 200 New Senators

Thailand’s Election Commission has approved 200 new senators to replace the military-appointed upper house, potentially complicating governance for the ruling Pheu Thai party. Although the new senate won’t vote on the prime minister, it retains the authority to vet laws and appoint key officials, reflecting a shift towards conservative-royalist interests and signalling continued political polarisation within Thailand.

South Korea Reverses Decision on Striking Doctors’ Licences

The South Korean government reversed its plans to retract the medical licences of striking junior doctors. More than 10,000 doctors are currently on strike due to government plans to boost medical school admissions. The move is likely an attempt at enticing the striking doctors to return to work, but it is unlikely that it will succeed, as it fails to address their fundamental grievances.

Fatal Shooting in New Caledonia Amidst Unrest Over Electoral Changes

On 10 July, French police in New Caledonia fatally shot an alleged gunman, bringing the death toll to 10 following nearly two months of unrest in the French Pacific territory. Protestors have continued to block roads, commit arson and loot after fears that changes to the electoral roll would reduce the chances of the indigenous Kanak people to secure independence. However, in the French parliamentary elections, indigenous Kanak Emmanuel Tjibaou became the first pro-independence candidate to win a seat in nearly four decades, a development that may help to quell unrest.

Political Leader Killed in Tamil Nadu Sparks Controversy

In the Tamil Nadu region of India, a state leader of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) was killed by unknown assailants on 5 July. Early police reports claim that the killing was in retaliation for a crime-related dispute. BSP is a party advocating for the interests of Scheduled Castes – the disadvantaged groups that, combined, constitute India’s demographic majority. The party decided to run alone in the 2024 elections, and suffered a complete collapse, losing all of its seats. BSP activists have rejected the official version of events, and have instead alleged that the killing was a political act.

Balochistan Liberation Front Reports 108 Attacks in Occupied Balochistan

The Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) has released a report detailing its operations from January to June, highlighting 108 attacks across Pakistan-occupied Balochistan. The attacks targeted Pakistani forces, military installations, construction companies and a range of “collaborators”.  The BLF has vowed to continue its fight for Balochistan’s liberation and is likely using the report as a propaganda tool to undermine Islamabad as well as to bolster its recruitment efforts.

Baloch Liberation Army Releases Video Showing Attacks in Occupied Balochistan

Another pro-Balochistan independence group, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) released a 21-minute video on their official media channel, Hakkal, showcasing 25 attacks against the Pakistani Army and infrastructure in Pakinstan-occupied Balochistan. The video has likely been released to increase recruitment and also depicts attacks on gas pipelines and convoys transporting minerals extracted from within Balochistan and exported to the rest of Pakistan, a major grievance for the Baloch people. The video shows BLA militants with advanced US weaponry, likely indicating a relationship with the Afghan Taliban who acquired similar arms after the rushed US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Indian Security Forces Conduct Operations in Jammu and Kashmir

Indian security forces in the contested region of Jammu and Kashmir have been conducting search operations in the border areas near Pakistan following reports of suspicious movements. The operations follow a series of attacks on Indian security services within a 48-hour period which have killed several Indian soldiers and have largely been concentrated in the south of the region. Whilst the line-of-control between India and Pakistan has been successful at denying militants entry to the area, the redeployment of troops to the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh in the aftermath of the 2020 standoff with China has likely given militants more freedom of movement which they are now exploiting.

Myanmar Rebels Fund Offensives with Drug Trafficking Across Thai Border

Thai media reported on 8 July that Myanmar rebels are funding their offensive operations against the country’s junta by “flooding” the Thai border with narcotics. The Thai border force reported seized more than 151,000,000 amphetamine pills during this fiscal year, almost four times the amount of the previous year, and more than 1,300 kilogrammes of crystal meth. The increased flow of narcotics towards Thailand could damage the rebels’ hopes to gather further international support, to match their ongoing battlefield successes. In the short term, the increased volume of drug trafficking could destabilise the Myanmar-Thai border, and drive an increase in organised crime in Thailand.

South Korea Begins Mass Production of Low-Cost Laser Weapon to Counter Drones

On 11 July, South Korean officials announced that they would begin mass-producing a new low-cost laser weapon that has the potential to cheaply and reliably destroy small drones at short distances. The system, named Block-I, is the first of its kind to be officially mass-produced, although other countries, including the US and Israel, have developed equivalents. While unlikely to be practical or effective in combat between highly sophisticated contemporary conventional armed forces, laser systems likely have the highest potential in narrowing the cost differential when defending against low-sophistication drones and projectiles used by insurgencies and armed groups. Seoul also announced plans to develop a Block-II version, with greater power and reach.

Philippines and Japan Forge Military Alliance with Reciprocal Access Agreement

On July 8, the Philippines and Japan signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), allowing their armed forces to train and potentially operate together. This agreement, announced by Malacañang Palace, was witnessed by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., with Japanese Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko and Defence.

Minister Kihara Minoru present. The RAA, similar to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) but unique to the two countries, is likely aimed at enhancing military cooperation and enabling joint training and operations. The agreement comes amid rising tensions with China and represents Japan’s developing proactive security role in the Indo-Pacific, benefiting the Philippines’ security strategy. Japan has also announced that it is willing to deepen military ties with the United States and Australia under trilateral or quadrilateral security arrangements that may involve the Philippines, in a move that is almost certainly being designed to counter China.

Chinese Aircraft Carrier Sails Near Northern Philippines in Show of Force

On 10 July, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) responded to recent security developments made by the Philippines by sailing its Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier, the SHANDONG, close to the northern Philippines. The carrier was joined by dozens of PLAN warplanes and was almost certainly strategic messaging to Manila aimed at communicating that China has the firepower to enforce all its claims in the South China Sea.

Deadly Floods Strike Nepal

At least 14 people have been killed by floods in Nepal, caused by monsoon rains which have also affected neighbouring South Asian countries. The monsoon season runs from June to September, but protracted rains and particularly severe weather events have driven increasingly high fatality rates, with a realistic possibility of increasing severity being linked to anthropogenic climate change.

Japan Issues Heatstroke Alerts as Temperatures Soar to 40°C

Japan’s meteorological agency has issued heatstroke alerts for 26 prefectures, advising residents to stay indoors, use air conditioning, and stay hydrated as temperatures soared to 40 degrees Celsius in multiple areas, marking the start of a severe summer heatwave. The extreme heat poses significant risks, particularly to the elderly and young children, with numerous cases of heatstroke reported across the country and several heat-related deaths already registered.

Severe Monsoon Causes Record Rainfall and Fatalities in South Korea

An unusually severe monsoon season has caused record rainfall in parts of central, southern and eastern South Korea, leading to at least four deaths and causing landslides. North and South Chungcheong, North Gyeongsang and Jeonbuk have been particularly affected. Multiple central regional train services were suspended, and the bullet trains ran at reduced speeds in particular areas. Heavy rains are forecast to continue following a brief intermission, and the Interior Minister has asked people to avoid underground parking, underpasses and streams during periods of heavy rainfall.

Deadly Mudslide at Illegal Gold Mine in Indonesia

On 8 July, a mudslide caused by heavy rains killed at least 8 workers at an illegal gold mine in the Suwawa district of Sulawesi Island, Indonesia. The incident was one of several taking place outside of the Indonesian rainy season (from November to February). It is highly likely that anthropogenic changes to the local environment, including the heavy deforestation of the country’s tropical forest, are contributing to making these episodes more frequent.

An experienced former Royal Navy Navigator and Counter Terrorism specialist, he transitioned to private security and travel risk management to help organisations develop robust security strategies.

Robert advised on security protocols, leading BP’s first Response Information Centre before moving to a global insurers to develop an award-winning Enterprise Risk platform.

So far, approximately 200 of the 1,000 police officers promised by Kenya to restore order in Haiti have arrived in the country. The force is part of a 2,500-strong UN-backed intervention mission, which is expected to be deployed in the coming months.

Gangs, which currently control much of Haiti and approximately 80 per cent of the capital Port-au-Prince, are assessed as numbering about 12,000 members in total. Following the deployment of the first Kenyan police, gangs reportedly intensified attacks on local police and government institutions. On 2 July, gang members reportedly attacked a police station in Port-au-Prince, killing more than 20 police officers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The gangs, who recently released statements calling Haitians to oppose the “imperialistic” UN intervention, almost certainly do not have any plan to transition the country out of its ongoing state of chaos. Rather, gangs almost certainly highly benefit from the breakdown of government, as it allows them to more freely operate within the country, and to benefit from international smuggling routes, including the influx of illegal firearms from the southeastern US.

Reports indicate that the “Viv Ansamn” coalition of gangs is currently the most influential in Haiti’s capital. However, there is a high likelihood that the network of gangs and criminal groups in Haiti remains highly disorganised and prone to infighting. Gangs are also highly armed due to the high presence of smuggled arms, and currently likely outgun the depleted Haitian police. Gangs will likely seek to undermine Kenyan efforts to secure control of residential areas by attacking the local population. While there is a realistic possibility of gangs opting for occasional “frontal attacks” against the UN-backed forces, the path of low-intensity operations to discourage civil society from collaborating with the police mission is more likely.

The 2024 Atlantic hurricane season’s first hurricane entered the Caribbean Sea on 30 June, peaking at category five with maximum windspeeds of 269 kilometres per hour and causing at least ten deaths. Multiple countries were impacted, including Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG), Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, Jamaica, the Cayman Islands and Venezuela. Hurricane Beryl has now weakened to category two and is currently making landfall in Mexico on the Yucatan Peninsula, prompting multiple alerts for tourist hotspots including Cancún and Tulum.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Many Caribbean island nations are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes due to fragile architecture, poor infrastructure and limited state capacity, and approximately 2.8 million people were in the impact zone.

Beryl has already caused widespread property damage and flooding. SVG was especially affected, with widespread destruction reported on the southern Union Island and Canouan. Grenada also suffered a notably significant impact, and in Jamaica, roofs were ripped off and the airports were closed. While at least ten deaths have so far been reported, it is almost certain the death toll will increase as emergency responders access the affected areas. While Beryl has weakened to category two, the hurricane’s imminent landfall in Mexico through the Yucatan Peninsula still poses a high risk, prompting tourists to rush to Cancún International Airport despite mass flight cancellations. Beryl is the earliest category five hurricane of an Atlantic hurricane season on record, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has previously predicted that the 2024 season is highly likely to be particularly severe, due to extremely high sea temperatures, La Niña conditions in the Pacific, reduced wind shear and low Atlantic trade winds.

There is widespread consensus amongst climatologists that climate change is a major contributing factor to increasingly intense hurricane seasons, due to higher sea temperatures conditioning stronger hurricanes. The prime minister of SVG condemned Western Europe and the US for failing to tackle climate change and raised concerns about accessing aid. The 2024 hurricane season is highly likely to pose continued major challenges in Caribbean nations, exacerbated by their increased vulnerability.

Due to disruptions to law enforcement, the impact of property destruction and pre-existing problems with poverty, hurricanes can significantly increase crime rates in their immediate aftermath – it is likely, therefore, that the threat posed by crime will increase as a result of the hurricane in the impacted countries.

On 1 July, the Cuban government announced new drastic economic measures to combat the country’s high fiscal deficit and inflation. Previous attempts by Havana to pass services, welfare and subsidy cuts, especially targeting fuel, resulted in unusually vocal protests. Likely for this reason, the new measures instead focus on fighting tax evasion, reforming state-run businesses, and favouring foreign exchange. Still, the prospect of renewed civil unrest following further government measures remains a realistic possibility.

Panama’s new President Jose Raul Mulino was sworn in on 1 July. Mulino ran on an anti-immigration platform, primarily directed at addressing the increasing migrant flows through the dangerous Darien Gap, where gangs and human traffickers operate. The president’s oath was followed almost immediately by the signature of a memorandum of understanding with Washington, focused on the Darien Gap issue. As part of the memorandum, the US will foot the bill for the repatriation of migrants from Panama to southern countries. There is a possibility that the prospect of economic returns will increasingly drive the securitisation of the border area, which may negatively affect not only the migrants themselves but also humanitarian organisations active in southern Panama.

The Venezuelan presidential campaign began on 4 July, with President Maduro aiming to retain power despite low approval ratings. Nationwide protests and highly charged political rallies are highly likely until the campaign period concludes on 25 July, with significant gatherings in Caracas and other major cities.

On 5 July, former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro was formally accused of embezzlement for allegedly misappropriating luxury gifts that he received from Saudi Arabian officials while he was head of state. This represents the second time Bolsonaro has been formally accused of a crime, the first dating back to March 2024 and being related to allegations of faked Covid records. There is a high likelihood that, if the accusation progresses and reaches the courts, it will drive civil unrest, with a realistic possibility of violence.

On 1 July, a man opened fire and wounded seven of his neighbours in Crete, Nebraska. The man, who killed himself following the shooting, allegedly was a “recluse” and may have carried out the attack because of extremist ideology, as the seven victims are all Guatemalan migrants. If so, the attack represents a case of lone-actor terrorism and may have been motivated by recent media discourses on migration into the US, a topic that is particularly central to the presidential election season which may inspire similar attacks.

Colombia’s national government and the Second Marquetalia (FARC-SM), a faction of dissidents within the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), announced a unilateral ceasefire agreement on 29 June. In 2016, a peace deal was signed between FARC and Bogota,  which although largely successful, led to the creation of several splinter groups such as FARC-SM who continued engaging in armed insurgency. FARC-SM reportedly has approximately 1000 members, and their commitments to release captives and de-escalate conflict will like reduce the threat of armed conflict. However, the Colombian government has yet to formally agree to a cessation of hostilities, with a meeting promised no later than July 20 to present a formal agreement that will then need to be implemented by Presidential Decree. Additionally, it is likely that small numbers of FARC-SM fighters will form splinter groups or join other dissident groups to continue fighting.

On 4 July, Ecuador’s police freed more than 40 hostages being held by the Los Lobos gang, active in the southern Azuay province. Gangs in Ecuador are highly armed and can often match the firepower of security forces. The recent operation likely testifies to the high level of internal organisation of the gangs, allowing them to simultaneously hold dozens of hostages, a prospect that will challenge President Noboa’s attempts to pursue the same path as President Bukele in El Salvador.

A rapidly growing wildfire in north California has prompted the evacuation of at least 25,000 people in the vicinity of Sacramento. The region is particularly at risk from severe wildfires and, in July, the threat is exacerbated by hot and dry temperatures. Most wildfires are started by humans, and there is a high likelihood that the 4 July weekend will drive an increase in fires across the US, also due to the widespread use of fireworks in celebrations.

On 3 July in Colorado, a fourth case of bird flu resulting from the current outbreak amongst dairy cows was announced. The other cases were previously reported in Michigan and Texas. All the cases have involved dairy farm workers, who are susceptible due to their consistent close contact with infected cows. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has stated that there is currently only a low risk to the general public.

Authorities in Boyacá, Colombia have declared a state-wide health emergency over a dengue outbreak with over 1,000 cases recorded since the start of the year. Whilst dengue fever is a year-round nationwide threat in Colombia, projections for 2024 suggest that transmission rates have increased despite the release of genetically modified mosquitoes to curb the prevalence of the disease.

During the last reporting period, Israeli and Hamas officials made progress regarding a long-discussed ceasefire plan for Gaza. On 4 July, Tel Aviv announced that it would send a delegation to Doha to negotiate with the Hamas leadership in Qatar. Despite moves towards a ceasefire, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have ordered a further series of evacuation zones in Khan Yunis, north of Rafah, in preparation for new ground operations. In the West Bank, the Israeli government approved three settlements, Givat Hanan, Machane Gadi, and Kedem Arava, and the construction of new homes, which a local NGO assessed as the largest land annexation of the kind “in 30 years”.

The announcement came amidst further reported attacks on West Bank Palestinians by Israeli settlers. On 3 July, the IDF carried out a successful decapitation strike that killed Muhammad Nimah Nasser, a senior official of the Iranian proxy group. In response, Hezbollah fired up to 200 rockets and 20 drones into northern Israel in one of its largest relatiations to date which caused minor damage and wildfires near the border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The progress recorded by Israeli authorities likely reflects a greater willingness on behalf of Hamas to negotiate the terms of the disengagement of IDF troops from areas of Gaza during the early stages of the hostage exchange process. Hamas and Israeli disagreements are likely focused on the question of the Philadelphi Corridor, the border between Gaza and Egypt from which Hamas has access to a vital supply of material and weapons.

There is a realistic possibility that Tel Aviv will agree to some limited withdrawal from the border while retaining the ability to monitor border crossings. IDF forces have likely made significant progress in dismantling the network of tunnels used by Hamas operatives under the Philadelphi Corridor, and Israeli officials may assess that Hamas will remain incapable of building or repairing its underground infrastructure, thus being forced to rely on weaponry smuggled through the crossings themselves.

The evacuation orders for Khan Yunis almost certainly continue to highlight Hamas’s capacity to reinfiltrate areas previously cleared by the IDF. There is also a realistic possibility that much of the Hamas leadership left in Gaza will be in Khan Yunis or its proximity, having moved to the area during the IDF’s Rafah offensive. Finally, it is important to note in the context of negotiations that there may be a difference of opinions between the Hamas leadership in Qatar and that in Gaza. Moreover, the low profile that the Gaza leadership necessarily needs to take due to ongoing IDF operations will highly likely have isolated some Hamas units (or what is left of them) from the central command, possibly driving them to operate independently. Consequently, even if a ceasefire agreement is achieved, independent Hamas fighters or other Palestinian militias may continue to attack IDF forces, possibly hindering the hostage exchanges.

The developments in the West Bank also may reverberate in Gaza. Recent reports of settler violence being enabled or tacitly supported by IDF troops in the area may further spur Palestinian dissatisfaction with the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA continues to verge on collapse due to long-standing economic issues and a lack of perceived legitimacy. The acceleration of the settlement-building process may further embolden anti-PA factions, especially ones affiliated with Hamas.

The Hamas Doha leadership likely sees an increase in power in the West Bank as a desirable strategic development and may seek – possibly through covert Iranian support – to accelerate instability there. At the Israel-Lebanon border, the wave of Hezbollah strikes almost certainly reflects the group’s desire not to lose face following a further successful Israeli decapitation strike but is still likely under the threshold of provoking all-out war. Israel’s ability to effectively detect and eliminate senior Hezbollah leaders is expected to severely impair the group’s operational capabilities and may ultimately provoke war. This development is likely a major concern for Tehran, as it seeks to avoid full-scale conflict with Israel to safeguard Hezbollah’s substantial rocket and drone arsenal, which serves as a crucial regional deterrent and tool for power projection for Iran.

Uncorroborated reports citing an unnamed US intelligence official indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has asked Saudi Arabia’s permission to arm Yemen’s Houthi Movement with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The discussions reportedly took place after Putin’s December visit to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Russia maintains an open dialogue with the Houthi Movement and has strong relations with its primary backer, Iran. Moscow has also previously struck a deal with the Houthis to guarantee that Russian ships can safely transit the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden without being targeted by the group and abstained from voting in a UN Security Council resolution which condemned the militant group’s attacks on merchant shipping.

Furthermore, the Kremlin has set a precedent of arming anti-Western groups, with two major examples being the arming of Libyan rebels with advanced weaponry via the Wagner Group and accusations of arming the Taliban to fight coalition forces. Whilst Russia is in critical need of various types of weaponry for its war in Ukraine, it could easily divest itself of much of its ASCM capabilities as the Ukrainian Navy has no ships and is almost solely reliant on asymmetric capabilities such as uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).

Russia is also becoming heavily dependent on Iranian military aid and Tehran may leverage this to convince Moscow to help supply its Axis of Resistance against Israel- especially if a new front is opened against Hezbollah. Such a conflict may also bring Russia more into the fold if Washington directly supports Israel.

However, Russia is also courting rich Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE in its attempts to challenge US influence in the Middle East. Several Arab nations have previously been at war with the Shia Houthi Movement. They will likely protest this development, with unverified reports suggesting Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has already intervened. Should Russia pursue this course of action, it will likely involve the transfer of legacy weaponry such as the P-800 ONIKS (NATO: SS-N-26) or ASCM. However, these systems are still supersonic (Mach 2.5), have a range of 300km and have relatively advanced features such as electronic countermeasures and active radar homing. The cruise missile’s low trajectory makes them hard to detect and would provide air defence less time to react, increasing the threat to international shipping, especially at a time when the Houthis are also improving their USV capabilities.

For the Kremlin, the Houthis’ use of these systems could overstretch and potentially undermine coalition navies, divert resources from Ukraine and serve as payback to the West for supplying Kyiv. It would also impose a higher financial burden on the West, as Russian systems are invariably cheaper than the advanced air defences used by the West to intercept them.

Reports released during the reporting period indicate that the leader of the Islamic State’s Somalia Province (ISSP), known primarily as Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi or Abdulqadir Mumin has been identified as the overall leader or Caliph of the Islamic State (IS). Mumin is a Somali-born British citizen, who escaped to Somalia and declared allegiance to then-Caliph al-Baghdadi in 2015. The information, which is as of yet unconfirmed, was released on a channel of IS defectors. The ruling fifth Caliph of IS was reported by Turkish forces to have been killed in Syria in 2023, while US forces targeted Mumin in May 2024. However, this new information states that al-Qurashi is still alive and operating out of the Somalian breakaway region of Puntland.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the Somalia Province is much smaller compared to many of IS’ other provinces like Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) or Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), it has played a major role in the financial facilitation of IS operations. The al-Karrar office, in Puntland, which is almost certainly run by Mumin himself, was reportedly able to channel donations from South Africa and other Subsaharan states towards the provinces in the broader Middle East as early as 2020.

With decapitation strikes and territorial losses decreasing IS’ operational capabilities in the Levant in the late 2010s and early 2020s, funds from Subsaharan Africa likely played an important part in boosting ISSP’s importance within the broader IS network. The al-Karrar office has played a major role in the transfer of funds from Yemen to Afghanistan, enabling the most active branch, ISKP. ISSP has also likely been able to grow in significance with regional counterterrorism operations concentrating on its local rival, the al-Qaeda-aligned al-Shabaab.

There is also a growing concern that a stronger ISSP is forcing al-Shabaab to develop ties with the Houthis, with recent intelligence indicating the transfer of arms from Yemen to Somalia. While little information on Mumin exists, he is known as having played a fundamental role in radicalisation networks and networks seeking to entice foreigners, especially Britons, to travel to IS units in the Middle East. Given his European connections, Mumin’s appointment may also inspire IS to recalibrate its operations more towards European targets.

Russia is likely to be nominated as a prime target as its Africa Corps expands its counterterrorism operations in Africa, especially if Mumin holds considerable influence over ISKP which recently took credit for a major terror attack in Moscow. However, the credibility of Mumin’s appointment has yet to be assessed and this could be disinformation designed to deflect from the true Caliph, given the success rates against former IS leaders. All of IS’ former leaders have been Arab as well as the majority of its Delegated Committee. Many members will likely protest Mumin’s leadership which would represent a major political change, which may also account for Mumin’s nom de guerre, which includes the patronyms al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, claiming direct links to the Prophet Muhammed.

Four almost simultaneous suicide bombings were conducted in the Nigerian town of Borno state on 29 June. Government officials on 2 July released a statement indicating that the death toll had reached 32, with dozens more requiring hospitalisation. A wedding and a funeral were two of the locations targeted by the suicide bombers. All of the attacks included female suicide bombers, and the attack that targeted the wedding venue purportedly involved a suicide bomber carrying a baby on her back.

Solace Global Assessment: 

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack but the jihadist group Boko Haram is known to operate in the area around Gwoza, a town they once declared the heart of their self-proclaimed caliphate. Furthermore, the use of female suicide bombers to attack mass gatherings is an established tactic of Boko Haram and one championed by their former leader Abubakar Shekau.

This tactic has been a source of friction between Boko Haram and its regional counterpart, the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) which has denounced this methodology. In addition, research conducted by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point indicated that Boko Haram has used females in at least 244 of its 434 suicide bombings between 2014-17. Boko Haram have likely employed this tactic to arouse less suspicion, avoid security searches, encourage more thorough searching of females (which in turn generates outrage), and because of the psychological impact it produces, especially when the bombers are accompanied by children. Furthermore, the group has been involved in multiple mass kidnappings of young females whom they have likely been able to indoctrinate in captivity to conduct suicide attacks.

Boko Haram was ousted from Gwoza in 2015 by a joint Nigerian and Chadian military offensive and has since been largely confined to attacks in rural areas. The organised and coordinated nature of the attacks may indicate a resurgence in the group’s capabilities. Junta governments have expelled Western military forces from countries where Boko Haram has historically operated, such as Niger and Mali and Nigeria’s domestic security is likely being overstretched by a host of issues ranging from kidnap gangs in the northwest to a revival of the Biafra movement in the southeast. These trends are potentially shaping the conditions which a resurgent Boko Haram could exploit to increase the frequency and scale of their attacks.

The UK parliamentary elections were convincingly won by the centre-left Labour Party, led by Keir Starmer. The election results are unlikely to drive large-scale civil unrest in the United Kingdom, although there is a realistic possibility that left-wing minority groups, including environmentalist and pro-Palestine activists, will take advantage of the transition of power to stage symbolic demonstrations, possibly leading to minor and localised disruptions.

The first round of the French National Assembly elections was won by Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN), which finished ahead of a populist left-wing coalition and President Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble Party (EN). The results’ announcement drove almost immediate mass protests across France’s main urban centres, with reported cases of clashes between protesters and police. The centre and left candidates have agreed on an ad hoc cordon sanitaire strategy, meant to prevent RN candidates from being elected at the second round runoff vote.

So far, more than 200 third-place candidates from Ensemble and the left-wing coalition have withdrawn their candidacies to try centralising the anti-RN vote. The strategy has been effective before, most importantly twice barring Le Pen from winning the presidency, and there is a high likelihood that it will result in the RN not reaching its stated goal of an absolute parliamentary majority. Still, the positive results of the right are highly likely to continue driving civil unrest and possible political violence, likely posing a security threat during the Olympic Games, now only weeks away.

In the Netherlands, a new right-wing coalition government was installed after months of negotiations that followed the November 2023 general election. The government includes the far-right populist Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders, the conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the Christian-democratic New Social Contract (NSC), and the Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB), a populist, big tent group representing farmers’ interests. The government, which has a populist right-wing orientation, is led by independent bureaucrat Dick Schoof.

The ministry split, with BBB obtaining the agriculture and housing ministries, and the PVV securing control over immigration, foreign aid, security and justice. This almost certainly demonstrates that while unlikely to pass any major economic reform (the VVD remains solidly at the helm of economic and fiscal institutions), the new government will seek to pass wide-ranging social and travel reforms, which will likely have an important impact on Brussels. In reaction, protests took place at Huis ten Bosch Palace, The Hague on July 2, though these had low attendance, with further unrest likely in the coming weeks.

Turkish authorities have arrested almost 500 people in connection to anti-Syrian riots that resulted in multiple violent confrontations with the security services. The riots were ignited in response to accusations that a Syrian refugee had assaulted a Turkish child in the city of Kayseri in Central Anatolia. Riots and protests have spread to multiple Turkish cities including Ankara, Konya and Istanbul. The riots have instigated issues outside of Turkey’s border, with reports of deadly clashes between Turkish forces and protestors in northwest Syria and Syrian refugees were reportedly attacked by ethnic Turks on the streets of Berlin.

At least three people were killed in election protests after President Ghazouani was re-elected in Mauritania. The authorities used heavy-handed tactics, internet suspensions and mass detentions to suppress dissent in the town of Kaédi, an opposition stronghold near the Senegal border. The protests were motivated by accusations of electoral fraud, a factor that will likely concern the African Union with President Ghazouani currently holding the chairmanship of the regional bloc.

Turkey has initiated mediation talks between Somalia and Ethiopia regarding a port deal Ethiopia signed with the breakaway region of Somaliland earlier this year. The negotiations aim to repair diplomatic ties strained when Ethiopia agreed to lease 20 km of coastline from Somaliland in exchange for recognition of its independence, with Ankara likely attempting to increase its influence in Somalia where it has built schools, hospitals and other infrastructure and established a military base. The Horn of Africa has become increasingly important for Turkey because of its geographical position, maritime access, mineral wealth and potential for development. Because of this, Ankara has likely calculated that a war between Somalia and Ethiopia would be hugely deleterious to its objectives.

Thousands of Kenyans have continued to protest against the Ruto administration despite the overhauling of the controversial tax bill. Looting and violent clashes between protestors and the authorities have occurred in Nairobi, Mombassa and several smaller towns and cities across the country, leading to over 40 deaths and hundreds of arrests. Protestors are demanding the resignation of President Ruto and will likely sustain unrest until he either steps down or makes major concessions.

On 1 July, South Africa announced its new cabinet government, led by a coalition of parties involving the African National Congress (ANC) and Democratic Alliance (DA). The coalition government is unprecedented and follows ANC’s failure to win a majority of seats at the latest parliamentary election. The new right-liberal government is likely to reassure foreign investors in South Africa. However, the inclusion of DA, perceived by many as a quintessentially “white” party, will likely result in cases of civil unrest and possible inter-ethnic strife in the coming months. A significant driver of unrest is the government’s probable rejection of calls for sweeping land reform and expropriation, which are strongly favoured by the political left, including the Economic Freedom Fighters (EEF) which has historically been accused of inciting violence against white farmers.

Several US bases throughout Europe have been placed on high alert, or Force Protection Condition “Charlie”, in response to undisclosed intelligence relating to a planned terrorist attack, according to officials from the US European Command (EUCOM). The security shift likely indicates EUCOM has received information of an active and credible threat as it has not raised its alert level to Charlie for over a decade. The change coincides with high-profile events and dates such as the Euros in Germany, the Paris Olympics and the 4 July celebrations which will be celebrated by  US service personnel throughout the continent. Terrorist actors may exploit these events and dates for publicity and may take advantage of a current overstretching of domestic security services.

On 1 July, the Financial Times released an interview with a senior UK Ministry of Defence official, Rob Johnson. Johnson assessed that the UK’s armed forces are currently unprepared for a “conflict of any scale”, citing large issues with weapons and ammunition procurement, as well as recruitment. The article, which was almost certainly aimed at reintroducing the issue of the armed forces in the political debate days before the elections, follows months of warnings about the state of the British military.

On 29 June, a security guard outside the Israeli embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, was shot with a crossbow. The guard, who survived, managed to kill the attacker, who early investigations allege was a radicalised Islamist extremist who had pledged allegiance to Islamic State. The attack is almost certainly a case of lone-actor terrorism linked with the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. While most lone-actor attacks do not follow specific events, this case may have been partly influenced by the Israeli ambassador’s statement, in April 2024, that Tel Aviv would not categorise the 1995 Srebrenica massacre as a genocide.

On 2 July, Kazakh government critic Aidos Sadykov died in Ukraine, only days after being shot by unidentified gunmen. There is a high likelihood that Sadykov’s killing was orchestrated by Kazakh intelligence, highlighting how the ongoing war in Ukraine may have created a more permissive environment with reduced security for third-party operations in the region.

On 5 July, the Turkish Interior Minister announced the detention of 45 suspects across 16 provinces linked to the Islamic State during BOZDOĞAN-48 counterterrorism operations. The operations also led to the seizure of large amounts of foreign currency, Turkish Lira and digital material. Turkish counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State frequently trigger reprisal attacks, with the group primarily targeting the security forces, places of worship and symbols of Western decadence.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has indicated that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may be invited for an official visit, when speaking to journalists at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Kazakhstan on 5 July. While Ankara historically supported some rebel groups fighting against Assad in the Syrian Civil War,  tensions between Turkey and Syria have eased in recent years. Erdogan likely is seeking to promote better relations with Assad to assist their current primary strategic objective in Syria, which is defeating the Kurdish separatist groups that have a foothold in northern Syria as well as neighbouring Iraq.

A jihadist attack on 3 July in central Mali near the town of Bandiagara killed over 20 civilians, likely suggesting that extremist groups are continuing to exploit a weak government and the retrograde of Western forces from the region. In addition, around 60 bodies have been discovered near Abeibara, in the Kidal region of northeast Mali close to the Algerian border. The victims, many of whom were found in mass graves, were largely civilians and are thought to have been killed in late June. It is suspected that the killings were conducted by Malian troops in cohort with the Russian “Africa Corps”, its rebranded Wagner Group. The incident may point to an increased trend of brutal tactics used to counter extremist groups, with the intimidation of civilians suspected of harbouring or assisting extremist groups being used to reduce militant groups’ freedom of movement and to disrupt their support networks.

The Tutsi-led and reportedly Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group has captured two more strategic towns in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s North Kivu province, causing mass displacement and placing further pressure on the humanitarian situation. In addition, two employees of the UK-based NGO Tearfund were killed on 1 July after their convoy was attacked by gunmen likely belonging to the M23 group whilst operating in the North Kivu province. M23 has conducted mass executions and human rights abuses in the past and by targeting international aid workers the group may be attempting to decrease foreign access and oversight of their operations.

In a separate incident in the DRC, six Chinese nationals and at least two Congolese soldiers were killed on 4 July by suspected militants from the Development of the Congo (CODECO) militia group. The attack occurred at a mining site near Abombi, Djugu Territory, Ituri Province in the northeast of the country.

The largely ethnic Lendu CODECO group is notorious for its brutal tactics and has its roots in disputes over land and resources. The group has likely targeted Chinese nationals as it perceives China and the DRC government are exploiting resources that belong to the Lendu people, with its long-term strategy aimed at deterring international investment.

The Iranian presidential election runoff takes place on 5 July. The two remaining candidates to succeed President Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash in mid-May, are Saeed Jalili and Massoud Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian, who represents the reformist front, obtained the most overall votes during the first round of the elections. However, Jalili is likely to win, as he was implicitly endorsed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and as the reformist candidate is likely to be particularly damaged by the low voter turnout. The first round of the elections only had a 40 per cent turnout, the lowest in Iran’s post-1979 history and likely a demonstration of widespread dissatisfaction with the oppressive Shia regime.

Almost unprecedented temperatures of above 35 degrees Celsius were recorded in Moscow during the reporting period, caused by a severe heatwave that is affecting much of European Russia. There is a realistic possibility that the high temperatures will result in the outbreak of further wildfires. Due to Russia’s extensive forest cover and particularly carbon-rich soils, wildfires risk having an especially negative impact far beyond Russia’s borders, possibly accelerating the release of large volumes of CO2 into the atmosphere.

At least seven people have been killed and several remain missing after severe flooding caused by torrential rain that began on 30 June hit parts of southern Switzerland, southern France, and northern Italy. Further rain is forecasted in much of the region, increasing the risk of landslides, flash floods and falling trees which have already caused widespread transport disruption.

On 5 July, the Etna and Stromboli volcanoes, in Sicily, erupted, releasing large quantities of ash and leading to temporary closures of the airport in Catania. Italy has a large number of active volcanoes and eruptions are common, however, they do not always result in transport disruptions. The recent eruptions are unlikely to directly threaten the inhabited areas of Sicily, although there is a realistic possibility of further volcanic activity.

At least 1,000 acres of forest have been burned by ongoing wildfires on the Greek island of Zante. The fires are especially focused on the island’s mountainous areas and have not threatened residential areas as of the time of writing. Fires and extreme heat have been reported in other parts of the country, with hotels being evacuated in Kos and Chios, as well as fires developing on the outskirts of Athens. July is the hottest month of the year in Greece, and the summer of 2023 had extremely severe wildfires that were exacerbated by especially high temperatures. The current weather forecasts make a repeat of last year’s crisis a realistic possibility, with temperatures commonly exceeding 35 degrees Celsius.

In Hathras, Uttar Pradesh state, at least 120 people died following a crowd crush that took place at a religious event hosted by a “godman”, known as Bhole Baba. According to early reports, about 250,000 people gathered at an event hosted at a venue that could accommodate less than 80,000. The stampede reportedly was caused by the attendees’ attempts at collecting soil on which the godman and his entourage had treaded upon exiting the venue. Notably, at least 110 of the casualties were women

Solace Global Assessment: 

Godmen and other gurus are not a new phenomenon in India or the broader Indian subcontinent. Popular gurus play an important role in local and national politics. Candidates from religiously-affiliated parties, such as the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have formally or informally endorsed local preachers, likely in efforts to bolster appeal with local communities.

Observers have remarked that the popularity of religious personalities likely has economic, class- and caste-based implications, with many faithful often coming from disadvantaged groups. In many cases, the attendees at these events hope to gain material riches from touching or interacting with the godmen. However, this creates risks to attendees. Improvised, ad hoc religious events are often held in areas and venues with insufficient capacity or few safety features and are likely to attract more attendees through social media. Stampedes are common as the attendees try to approach the godmen, with little regard for others in the crowd.

Travellers who are not familiar with these events may be tempted to approach large impromptu gatherings. However, the risk of becoming involved in a stampede is high. Albeit much less impactful and influential, it is important to note that charismatic preachers are not solely popular in Hindu contexts. Pakistani Muslim communities also have a history of preachers drawing a considerable number of followers by espousing various religious messages. A contemporary example is a preacher and blogger known as “Muhammad Qasim” who, in addition to sharing visions of God and Prophet Mohammed, blends apocalyptic and millenarist messaging with endorsements of former Prime Minister Imran Khan which has enabled him to draw large crowds.

On 30 June, 16 senior leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) released a video statement from Bogor, Indonesia, announcing that the transnational jihadist militant network based in Southeast Asia would be dissolved. The statement also declared commitment to the Republic of Indonesia and the changing of teachings in JI-run schools to orthodox Islam.

Solace Global Assessment: 

JI is a major terrorist group in Southeast Asia with established links to al-Qaeda, that is known to operate in Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Philippines, Singapore, Brunei and southern Thailand. In 2021, Indonesian security forces estimated that JI had approximately 6000 active members in Indonesia alone.

The group are most infamous for having conducted the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed over 200 people, mostly foreign tourists. However, this attack was reportedly carried out without the support of JI’s leadership. The group are also suspected to have conducted several other notable attacks targeting foreign nationals between 2002-2005. While historically significant and still a prominent force, the group has had a gradually declining influence in Southeast Asia.

The announcement is likely driven by a combination of factors. Firstly, JI runs many religious schools, a key asset, and aims to shield them from government suppression. Secondly, JI’s leadership may be seeking political legitimacy by aligning with the Indonesian Republic, akin to the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy in the Middle East and North Africa. Thirdly, Indonesian counterterrorism efforts, led by Detachment 88, have successfully foiled plots, arrested senior members, implemented deradicalisation programs, and engaged with JI-aligned intellectuals, putting significant pressure on JI’s leadership.

The decision is highly likely to have implications in both Indonesia and wider Southeast Asia, where the group has also historically operated. In the short term, the announcement will likely enable greater success for JI-affiliated schools and it is a realistic possibility that the leaders will, to varying degrees, enter public life. While the leaders who made the statement are assessed to have considerable credibility within the organisation, active splinter groups are highly likely to emerge.

These splinter groups may seek to publicly assert themselves and gain legitimacy amongst jihadists by conducting terrorist attacks. They may have a much greater disposition towards terrorism, supported by the 2002 Bali bombings being conducted by more extreme JI members without the approval of senior leadership. Dissidents may also seek closer relations and affiliation with more extreme jihadist groups, namely the Islamic State (IS) who already have an established presence in Indonesia through affiliate groups such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD). Considering the historical modus operandi of JI terror attacks, as well as the prevalence of Westerners in heavily touristed areas of Indonesia, high-value targets for terror attacks will likely include major tourist resorts, premium hotels and buildings associated with Western governments such as embassies and consulates.

Residents of Karachi staged protests on 1 July over prolonged load-shedding-driven losses of power in the city’s old town. Pakistan suffers from obsolescent and poorly maintained infrastructure, and the high temperatures currently being recorded in the country have exacerbated difficulties in delivering consistent power to densely populated communities. More than 1,000 deaths were reported in Karachi over the past week due to heatstroke, and recent reports signal that most took place in areas where load-shedding was underway, possibly due to the disruption to domestic and public air conditioning, and delays in the reporting and managing of health emergencies.

In Astana, Kazakhstan on 04 July, during the final day of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, Russian and Chinese presidents, Vladamir Putin and Xi Jinping called for the establishment of a new Eurasian security club. This reflects the increasingly close ties and strategic visions of Moscow and Beijing, who both desire a multipolar world order to counter perceived US and NATO hegemony. The proposal remains in its early stages, and although it is unlikely to be implemented imminently, the deal could result in substantial shifts in the geopolitical landscape. Moscow and Beijing are also likely seeking to expand their power in their respective Eurasian spheres of influence; the newly proposed security pact could be a vehicle to enable these goals. However, given Russia’s and China’s historic rivalries and areas of future competition, an alliance that emulates the same levels of inter-operability as NATO is highly unlikely.

Ten Cambodian environmentalist activists were jailed for “plotting” against the government and for “insulting the king”, and sentenced to up to eight years in prison. The activists had previously reported on the mismanagement of the country’s natural resources by leaders, including the monarchy. The case is highly likely similar to others that occurred in Thailand, where lese majeste laws are often used as a pretext to silence opposition voices from outside of the political establishment.

Over 800,000 people have signed an online petition calling for the impeachment of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol. The number of people attempting to sign the petition was so great that significant issues with accessing the National Assembly’s website arose. The president is deeply unpopular, and the petition’s extensive engagement is reflective of this widespread dissatisfaction. While civil unrest in South Korea is generally peaceful, it is highly likely that protests against the president will continue, in tandem with the ongoing doctors’ strike which has caused disruptions to medical treatment since February 2024.

Despite often tense relations, the Pakistani and US infantry have begun a two-week joint anti-terror exercise at the National Counter-Terrorism Centre in Pabbi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The exercise aims to share counter-terrorism experiences, refine drill procedures, and enhance marksmanship skills during urban warfare and is likely being conducted to help Pakistan counter the rise of ISKP in western Pakistan.

Also in Pakistan, Baluch leaders associated with the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) have accused China of being politically responsible for the ongoing Azm-e-Istehkam counterterrorism operations, targeting BLA and Pakistani Taliban (TTP) militants. The BLA has sought to target Chinese interests, nationals, and physical assets in Pakistan, likely with the strategic aim of undermining Islamabad and discouraging foreign investment. Perceptions of growing Chinese influence on Pakistani authorities’ security policy may become a driver of further attacks, and will likely result in China becoming a more frequent target for extremist propaganda in the region.

A senior Australian diplomat has indicated that adding partners to the AUKUS defence pact would be “complicated”, a development that will almost certainly be welcomed by China. The 2021 agreement was established to counterbalance China’s power and maritime capability. The collective security arrangement involves Australia’s acquisition of sensitive nuclear-submarine technology and it is unlikely that Washington will sanction the further circulation of these capabilities.

On 2 July, police in Sydney Australia arrested a 14-year-old boy after a stabbing at the University of Sydney, which resulted in a lockdown of the university’s buildings. To boy’s ideology or motivation has yet to be determined, however, New South Wales police have expressed concerns over increased rates of young people being radicalised online. The incident also follows the recent stabbing of a bishop in Sydney by a teenage assailant and a mass stabbing attack at a Bondi area shopping mall.

On 1 July, Indian authorities announced that the New Delhi domestic flights airport terminal is scheduled to remain closed for a “few weeks”, after a portion of the terminal roof collapsed on 29 June, killing one and destroying numerous vehicles. The collapse followed heavy rains and resulted in limited closures of the Indira Gandhi International Airport. The accident is likely to result in localised travel disruptions and may have a limited adverse political impact on the ruling Modi government.

Thousands of people have been trapped in their homes in Kachin and Sagaing provinces in northern Myanmar after major flooding caused by several rivers overflowing, with further rain forecasted. Rescue and humanitarian efforts will almost certainly be stretched by the ongoing civil war, with the central government highly unlikely to provide any support in rebel-held areas.

The Japan Meteorological Agency has issued an alert for heat-related illnesses as a heatwave is set to affect much of eastern and western Japan, with dozens of people already hospitalised. The agency has warned that temperatures may hit a record 39.3 degrees Celcius in Shizuoka City, with temperatures in Tokyo already exceeding 35 degrees Celcius. The extreme heat is forecasted to last until mid-July.

On 5 July, a tornado in Dongming County, Shandong Province in northeast China has resulted in at least one death, dozens of injuries and extensive property damage. Tornadoes are rare in this area but may become more frequent due to the altering of atmospheric conditions caused by climate change. Moreover, buildings are likely to be unprepared for tornadoes and there is a lack of shelters, factors that will increase pressure on the authorities.

Several elections are scheduled to take place over the coming week (28 June – 5 July):

An investigation conducted by the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) indicates that as many as 400 migrants who illegally entered the country in the last four years were enabled by a human smuggling network reportedly connected to the Islamic State (IS). The investigation has prompted an additional review of the identified individuals.

The report suggests that the primary objective of the network was to smuggle in people, and not to facilitate the entry of terrorists into the US. However, the smuggling network is assessed to have direct links to another network with established ties to the trans-regional violent extremist (VEO) group that expedited the entry of a group of Uzbek nationals.

The 400 migrants that will require further investigation are mostly from Central Asian nations, and the report has been released after an operation in early June by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) which arrested eight Tajik nationals with alleged ties to IS.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Reports of IS-linked groups smuggling migrants into the US will likely be used during the current presidential campaign to undermine President Biden’s record on border security and immigration. On 26 June, House Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Mark E. Green released a statement suggesting that there is no one the Biden administration won’t allow into the country. The Republicans will likely exploit the timing of this report for political gain, with polls indicating most Americans trust Trump over Biden regarding border security and immigration.

The investigation has already resulted in the apprehension of over 150 migrants, but the whereabouts of at least 50 remain unknown, a development likely to evoke fear in the US. Currently, there is no evidence to suggest that the Central Asian migrants are planning on conducting attacks within the US, and the vast majority are likely economic migrants with no real connections to terrorism. The most likely threat posed by the operation is that it is being used by members of the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) to generate money, which is then used to fund ISKP activity.

The ISKP is primarily based in Afghanistan, but its senior leadership is predominantly Tajik and is successfully recruiting Central Asians. Likely, elements of ISKP within Central Asia will also target the families of the smuggled individuals to extort a portion of their remittance payments. There is also a realistic possibility that some of the 400 are vulnerable to radicalisation after entry to the US and potentially susceptible to IS propaganda if struggling with isolation or economic hardship. However, the lack of current evidence regarding planned attacks is unlikely to blunt concerns in the US.

The report was released shortly after a resurgence in ISKP activity, characterised by an increase in external attacks in places like Russia, Iran, and Pakistan. Long-term, ISKP is likely to exploit funds through smuggling to consolidate its power within Afghanistan and increasingly so in neighboring countries like Pakistan, Tajikistan, and other Central Asian countries. This is likely to put it in a stronger position to conduct future external operations, which will likely include coveted Western targets and interests, with the group using the remote, mountainous, and destabilised parts of Afghanistan and Central Asia in a similar manner to how the Taliban did prior to 9/11.

Whilst this revenue stream will only play a minor part in ISKP’s financial operations, the fact that the US’ weak southern border is being exploited to fund its enemies’ activities is likely to be highly contentious and exacerbate political tensions during an already heightened time in the US.

On the afternoon of 26 June, the commander of the Bolivian Army, General Juan José Zúñiga, led an attempted coup d’état against leftist President Luis Arce. Hundreds of soldiers, equipped with armored vehicles, moved into Plaza Murillo in central La Paz, Bolivia’s capital. They then attempted to storm Casa Grande del Pueblo, the presidential palace, with an armored vehicle, reportedly slamming into the palace doors. Zúñiga publicly called for a restructuring of democracy and a change of government.

In the days prior, Arce had relieved Zúñiga of his post following threats allegedly made by Zúñiga to arrest former President Evo Morales should Morales run for president again in 2025. Arce personally confronted Zúñiga at the presidential palace, and Zúñiga was arrested shortly afterward. Along with Zúñiga, Vice-Admiral Juan Arnez Salvador, head of the navy, has also been arrested.

The attempted coup only lasted a few hours and was condemned by regional leaders in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, Chile, Venezuela, and the Organization of American States (OAS). The US, UK, and the European Union’s foreign policy chief also condemned the attempted coup. Zúñiga reportedly urged his troops to withdraw after it became clear the coup had failed, and newly appointed Army commander, José Wilson Sánchez, ordered soldiers to return to their barracks.

Solace Global Assessment:

Zúñiga cited dismay with Bolivia’s endemic issues as his motivation for the coup. However, it is likely that personal motivations served as the primary catalyst for the coup due to his recent dismissal by Arce. Alternatively, another key trigger may have been large-scale protests that have recently gripped La Paz due to growing economic insecurity.

Arce is presiding over a challenging period for Bolivia, with a financial crisis crippling currency reserves amid low gas exports and nationwide fuel shortages. In March, approval ratings for Arce were reported to be as low as 38 percent. There has been discontent from across the political spectrum. From the right-wing, there has been longstanding severe dissatisfaction with the far-left Movement for Socialism’s (MAS) return to power under Arce in 2020, after former president Morales’ removal from power in 2019. The right-wing former interim President Jeanine Anez, however, condemned the coup. A major contributing factor to the military coup’s failure was highly likely to be a lack of support from the political right.

From the left wing, there has also been considerable discontent and divisions arising within MAS. Morales has stated his intent to stand in Bolivia’s 2025 election, ousting Arce. It was Zúñiga’s threats against Morales in anticipation of this that reportedly sparked the general’s initial dismissal.

While very short-lived, the failed coup reveals the continued threat posed by the military and exposes fundamental weaknesses in Bolivia’s democratic system. Arce is likely to receive a boost in his ratings amid almost universal international condemnation of the coup. However, there has been speculation that the coup was actually organised by the government themselves to galvanise such support in the face of a political crisis. While the veracity of such claims is unclear, these claims are likely to be believed by a significant proportion of Bolivia’s anti-Arce groups.

The threat posed by civil unrest in Bolivia is likely to increase in the short-to-medium term, with disgruntled right-wing groups lamenting the coup’s failure and leftists being called to march in solidarity with the government. However, the coup’s critical failure is likely to bolster the government’s grip on power, although this is unlikely to persist in the medium to long term as Bolivia’s economic poor performance is almost certain to continue.

Argentina’s parliament, the National Congress of Argentina, has approved President Milei’s economic reform package after months of debate and revisions to the bill within the country’s upper and lower houses. Milei described his first real major legislative victory as the “greatest fiscal adjustment” in Argentine history and has castigated the opposition for delaying the bill.

Solace Global Assessment: 

This legislative victory essentially provides President Milei with the tools he has demanded for months to reform the Argentine economy. The legislation will enable him to introduce a raft of controversial right-wing policies aimed at incentivising investment, privatising state-owned entities, restructuring taxes, and cutting away at Argentina’s large public sector. Milei’s policies to date have helped reduce Argentina’s inflation and have brought about the country’s first fiscal surplus in years. However, they also have incited widespread civil unrest and resulted in many job losses.

Recent reporting indicates that Argentina has officially entered a technical recession in the first quarter of 2024, with GDP shrinking 2.6 percent from the previous quarter, marking the second consecutive contraction. Under Milei, the jobless rate has risen to 7.7 percent, resulting in 300,000 more unemployed people, and many services and goods have spiked in price. Spending cuts have halted infrastructure projects, causing significant job losses in construction, while triple-digit inflation and the recession have severely impacted consumers. Despite achieving a fiscal surplus that boosted markets, poverty and homelessness have increased, though Milei insists these measures are necessary as part of his long-term recovery plan.

However, the announcement of a technical recession will likely be interpreted as a failure of Milei’s austerity measures, and his impending implementation of further measures following his victory in parliament will almost certainly be a catalyst for further civil unrest.

The first US presidential debate was held on 27 June in Georgia, a key battleground state for the 2024 election. Observers have stated that, although Republican candidate and former President Donald Trump’s performance was marked by numerous false statements, incumbent President Biden almost certainly “lost”. In particular, Biden repeatedly seemed to lose his train of thought and gave somewhat incoherent responses to otherwise straightforward questions.

Some Democrat Party politicians informally raised the possibility of asking Biden to step down in favor of an alternative candidate before the party’s national convention. This remains a remote possibility, as replacing Biden would be incredibly challenging due to party rules and would likely result in a Trump victory. Still, it is highly likely that the debate largely improved the controversial former president’s chances.

The Honduran ex-President Juan Orlando Hernández was sentenced to 45 years in prison on 26 June. He was found guilty of accepting millions of dollars in bribes to protect US-bound cocaine shipments belonging to traffickers. The case likely illustrates the extent of corruption present in Honduras as individuals in government use their position of power for personal gain, neglecting the interest of citizens.

On 25 June, the first contingent of Kenyan police, numbering 400, arrived in Haiti following repeated delays. Much of the country is still under gang control, with rival groups increasingly targeting institutions likely in the hope of reducing officials’ ability to restore order to the country. The Kenyan mission, whose stability is already likely compromised by the severe protests currently taking place in Nairobi, will almost certainly face extreme logistical difficulties in its attempts to re-establish order in Port-au-Prince and the rest of Haiti.

There is a high likelihood that the UN-backed force’s first task will be securing key locations in the capital, allowing for a safer environment for the carrying out of humanitarian and governance operations. However, there is a high likelihood of retaliation from the well-armed gangs, many of which have decried foreign intervention as a fundamental threat to their interests.

Authorities in Colombia have started talks with a third guerrilla group that broke away from a 2016 ceasefire deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC). The Segunda Marquetalia faction, which reportedly has around 1,600 members, launched a new rebellion in 2019 and has yet to subscribe to President Petro’s “total peace” plan.

Successfully signing a peace deal would help stabilise the country, reduce violence, and improve national security. However, Petro has had mixed success with other groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN), and there are fears that rebel groups are using ceasefires to expand their influence, appropriate more territory, and recruit more members.

Research studying the 2023 wildfires that affected much of Canada revealed that the fires resulted in the release of 3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2), equivalent to the total emissions of the global airline industry for 2022. The 2023 fires were among the most severe ever recorded, with Canada alone accounting for more than a quarter of global tree cover loss over the year.

As the warmest months of the year begin, the Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) office warned of a “high probability” of above-average temperatures in July and August. Warm and dry conditions are especially conducive to exacerbating the severity of wildfires, highlighting ongoing concerns about climate impacts and the potential for further environmental and atmospheric consequences.

In Mexico City, thousands of citizens have been forced to evacuate their homes as storms and heavy rainfall continue. As of 21 June, the death toll had reached 30, including six children. Warnings have been issued for wind speeds up to 70 kilometers per hour and waves up to 3 meters around the Gulf and Caribbean coasts.

These extreme weather patterns are attributed to Storm Alberto, which has caused significant economic losses for Mexico due to widespread damage to infrastructure and the displacement of thousands of citizens.

28 June an earthquake of magnitude of 7.0 struck near the coast in southern Peru’s Arequipa region. No deaths have been reported, but eight people have been injured. Arequipa has been hit with four aftershocks of 4 to 4.6 magnitude, creating landslides on local roads. There’s the potential for further damage which will add additional pressure on the region’s infrastructure and the need for emergency response efforts.

On 23 June, six gunmen from the Islamic State Caucasus Province (ISCP) carried out a series of attacks in the cities of Derbent and Makhachkala in Dagestan. The attacks resulted in the deaths of at least 22 people, with more than 40 wounded, and significant damage to two synagogues and two churches. These incidents follow a rise in Islamist terror activities in the region and across Russia.

In late October, anti-Semitic riots occurred in Dagestan, including in the same cities targeted by ISCP. In March, the IS’ Khorasan branch (ISKP) carried out a deadly attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, killing 145 people. More recently, supporters of the Islamic State staged a prison uprising in Rostov. Additionally, reports indicate that cooperation between Russia and Turkey led to the dismantling of an IS cell that was planning further attacks in Moscow.

These events underscore ongoing security challenges posed by Islamist extremist groups in Russia and the broader Caucasus region, prompting heightened vigilance and counterterrorism efforts by authorities.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The various branches of the Islamic State (IS) have likely identified the ongoing war in Ukraine as an opportunity to destabilise the Russian state. Russia’s internal security is primarily managed by the Russian National Guard, but many of its forces have been redeployed to occupied parts of Ukraine, border security, and protecting the Kremlin post-Wagner rebellion, leaving other areas of Russia less secure.

Russia’s extensive counterterrorism efforts in Syria, the broader Middle East, and through its Africa Corps in the Sahel have likely strained its security and intelligence capabilities, making Moscow a desirable target for Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs). Recent improvements in Russia’s relations with the Afghan Taliban regime, potentially nearing full diplomatic recognition, may further embolden groups like the IS Khorasan Province (ISKP) and IS Caucasus Province (ISCP) to target Russian civilians and assets.

The Caucasus region, with its history of Russian domination and conflicts such as the Chechen wars, coupled with economic stagnation and lack of socioeconomic progress, provides fertile ground for Islamist sentiments. The resurgent IS has found receptive audiences for recruitment in former Soviet republics, particularly Tajikistan, where local governments are viewed as oppressive toward Islam, echoing similar grievances in Chechnya and Dagestan.

The involvement of family members of a local government official in the attacks underscores the penetration of extremist ideologies among educated youth, possibly indicating growing social acceptance of violent forms of Salafi Islam among elites. The Russian government’s relatively muted response following the attacks, compared to previous incidents like the Crocus City Hall attack, reflects Moscow’s concern over public perception of its ability to prevent Islamist violence. The implication of a local government official in the attack adds to Kremlin embarrassment.

While some officials have attempted to shift blame for the attacks onto Ukraine or the West, claiming stable interfaith relations within Russia, tensions likely persist. Anti-Islamic sentiment in European Russia contrasts with growing sympathy for Islamist causes in the Caucasus, potentially fueling further disorder.

The aftermath of these attacks may embolden Christian Orthodox nationalists to perpetrate mob violence against Muslim communities in Russia and increase the likelihood of further lone-wolf attacks by radicalised individuals, particularly in major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his administration have remarked that the phase of most intense fighting in the ongoing war in Gaza is approaching its end, and have increasingly shifted attention to the Israeli northern border, where Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah continue to trade a growing volume of tit-for-tat airstrikes. Most notably, on 21 June IDF airstrikes targeted a compound belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran located in al-Bukamal, Syria. Defence Minister Yoav Gallant recently threatened to send Lebanon “back to the stone age”. The approval of a controversial draft bill, which allows for the state to force Orthodox Haredi Jews into partaking in a period of mandatory military service, has simultaneously resulted in demonstrations and growing discontent with the Netanyahu government.

Solace Global Assessment:

An Israeli offensive into Lebanon would most likely be extremely costly for Tel Aviv. Hezbollah is comparatively much better equipped than Hamas and has access to more solid positions, as well as clear support and logistics lifelines via its “Axis of Resistance” allies through Iraq and Syria. Despite this, the plan is viewed favourably by the more hawkish figures in the Netanyahu administration, which likely consider the continuation of a Hezbollah conventional threat at the border as an unacceptable long-term security vulnerability.

On the Axis of Resistance side, there likely is not a clear consensus on the possibility and desirability of a conflict with Israel. An outbreak of open conflict between the IDF and Hezbollah will likely be used by other Iranian proxies, such as the various Iraqi militias, to widen the conflict and target US assets in neighbouring countries, such as Jordan, with a broader aim of destabilising the region.

However, Tehran likely perceives this as risky, both due to the risk of the rise of Sunni insurgent groups, and due to that of rapidly worsening already tense relations with regional powers. Tel Aviv’s statement that the IDF has defeated the remaining Rafah battalion, and will therefore move to a stage of occasional raids and “management” of Hamas is highly likely premature. The Palestinian militant group likely still retains an ability to recruit new fighters, and manufacture or acquire weapons to replenish its arsenals, and will almost certainly continue carrying out re-infiltration operations in areas cleared by the IDF.

While it is unlikely that these actions will result in anything more than a manageable level of attrition for the IDF, the continuation of IDF deployments in Gaza is likely to become increasingly costly for Tel Aviv. Moreover, the Hamas leadership in Gaza continues to evade Israeli intelligence, and its survival is almost certainly politically unacceptable for Netanyahu, who has indicated the destruction of Hamas as his key objective of the war.

In the West Bank, Axis of Resistance groups are highly likely continuing their attempts to smuggle weapons to Hamas fighters and other Palestinian groups in the area with the intention of opening an additional front – a development that will become increasingly important if a confrontation in the north breaks out.

On 24 June, the Houthi Movement claimed to have used a “new” ballistic missile to carry out a direct hit on the Liberian-flagged vessel MSC SARAH V in the Arabian Sea, which it claims is linked to Israel. The vessel was targeted whilst heading to port at Abu Dhabi at approximately 04.45 hours UTC about 450 kilometres (246 nautical miles) southeast of Nishum, a Yemeni town near the Oman border.

The vessel’s operators claim that it was not hit by the missile but landed just 50m off the starboard side of the ship. The Houthis have stated that the missile used was the Hatem/Hadim-2, a domestically produced hypersonic missile which the militant group claims can reach speeds of up to Mach 8 (eight times the speed of sound).

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack on the MSC SARAH V marks one of the longest-range Houthi attacks on merchant shipping and was likely launched to coincide with the withdrawal of the USS Dwight Eisenhower-led carrier group that spearheaded allied efforts to combat the Yemeni group.

Whilst the Houthis claim that the missile was domestically produced, the Hatem-2 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) bears a strong resemblance to the Iranian “Kheybar Shekan” ASBM. Iran has a track record of providing its proxy groups with capable weapon systems so that Tehran can indirectly attack or influence its enemies with a high degree of plausible deniability.

Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the Houthi Movement have direct access to the technology or the domestic capability to produce an ASBM similar in nature to one of Iran’s most capable anti-ship systems. The Kheybar Shekan ASBM is purported to have a range of 1,450 kilometres (782 nautical miles); can reach altitudes of 135 kilometres; has a circular error probable (CEP) of under 20m; and according to some sources can reach speeds of up to Mach 8.

In addition, the missile uses a solid-propellant so doesn’t require fuelling before launch which would reduce the Houthis’ targeting cycle. Whilst it is unlikely that the Houthi variant is as technologically advanced as the Iranian model, if the Houthis have acquired some of this technology and are capable of proliferation, it will increase their ability to target international shipping.

The Houthis’ capability will be further augmented if their intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) are provided by Iran, allowing the proxy group to detect and track ASBM targets outside the ranges of their organic targeting assets.

The missile’s potential speed, ability to manoeuvre at speed if equipped with advanced control systems, and its parabolic trajectory may enable it to bypass coalition air defence and radars by reducing response times, creating unpredictable flight paths, and exploiting gaps in radar coverage.

This development could help to overstretch coalition naval assets currently providing air defence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the weapon system will almost certainly be nominated as a high-value target for US and UK strikes.

On 25 June, the Parliament of Kenya was set on fire after being stormed by crowds of protesters, gathering in opposition to a finance bill proposed by the government, which would have increased taxes on a wide range of goods. Despite a heavy-handed and violent police response, civil unrest has continued, with crowds calling for the resignation of President William Ruto, despite the withdrawal of the bill.

More than 20 deaths and hundreds of arrests and injuries have resulted from the protests as of the time of writing. On 28 June, the Kenyan High Court barred the police from using violent crowd dispersal methods, including water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, following widespread cases of police brutality.

Solace Global Assessment:

The bill was proposed by the government of President William Ruto, who is trying to portray Kenya as a modern and stable African country and sees the reduction of the country’s USD 80 billion debt as vital to this end. Related to this is Ruto’s support for a UN-sponsored policing mission to Haiti to combat the recent wave of severe gang-led violence, as part of which 400 Kenyan police officers were deployed to the country last week.

The Ruto administration’s decision to increase taxes on a multitude of common goods such as bread, milk and sanitary towels, while pursuing the costly Haitian expedition, has almost certainly been the main trigger for civil unrest in a country where millions live below the international poverty line and are struggling to pay for basic commodities. The demonstrations are likely to continue and expand to other cities in Kenya’s south, beyond the epicentre of Nairobi.

Reports of cases of looting of assets owned by pro-government politicians in Nairobi and other cities highly likely indicate the important class dimension of the protests, and how the civil unrest is also linked to a broader dissatisfaction with the Kenyan political elite. The protests are likely to cause significant damage to infrastructure and result in a decrease in the government’s administrative capacity in the short term. This may create opportunities for further unrest and violence in the short-to-medium term, especially in the south.

There is a high likelihood of the protests impacting Kenya’s economy directly and indirectly, affecting business and travel within the country. The willingness of the government to employ violent crowd dispersal methods, and repeated failures of police forces to protect government assets, make it likely that the Ruto administration will have to deploy the military to curb the unrest. Such a scenario would likely further increase the risks faced by foreign humanitarian organisations operating in Kenya.

The suspension of internet services and damage to infrastructure will likely further complicate the provision of healthcare and limit opportunities to evacuate the country. Finally, the widespread reports of police brutality are likely to create important worries regarding the potential damages that the Kenyan police deployment may cause in Haiti, where conditions are even more chaotic than in their home country.

The repeated instances of police officers using extreme levels of brutality to target protesters likely demonstrate a significant and structural lack of oversight, which, if transferred to Haiti, could undermine the legitimacy of the UN-backed mission and bolster the gangs’ position and authority in the country.

Ursula von der Leyen was re-elected as President of the European Commission, and Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas was elected as the EU’s next foreign policy chief on 28 June. Portuguese former Prime Minister Antonio Costa was nominated as President of the European Council. These nominations were expected and received support from a cohesive coalition of the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists & Democrats (S&D), and the liberal Renew Europe group.

Von der Leyen will now proceed to the European Parliament to seek reconfirmation for her second term. The significant aspect of the vote was the abstention of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, leader of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, which von der Leyen had actively courted in recent months. The parliamentary vote is expected to compel the EPP-led bloc to either maintain its alliance with the S&D or risk losing support from the left in favor of Meloni’s ECR and other smaller right-wing groups.

The UK general election is scheduled to take place on 4 July. The Labour Party led by Keir Starmer is highly likely to win in a landslide. However, there is a realistic possibility of some minor demonstrations following the vote, especially from left-wing groups who feel disappointed by Starmer’s moderate policies and positions on the ongoing conflict in Gaza.

The first turn of the French National Assembly snap election will take place on 30 June. The right-wing National Rally (RN) is likely to win the most votes in the first round, with a broad left-wing coalition led by the France Unbowed party (LFI) likely securing the second spot. Both are considered radical and outside of the “traditional” French centre-right and centre-left spheres. Consequently, it is almost certain that civil unrest will continue, and likely intensify after the first round and into the Paris Olympics.

Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte was selected as NATO’s next secretary-general, scheduled to take over the post from Stoltenberg on 1 October. Rutte’s appointment, which was guaranteed after the Romanian candidate, President Klaus Iohannis, withdrew his candidacy, ensures a continuation of Stoltenberg’s status quo.

On 22 June, an estimated 30,000 Hungarians held a Pride rally in Budapest in defiance of the country’s anti-LGBTQ laws. The rally follows a joint statement by 44 embassies in the Hungarian capital protesting the Orban government’s restrictions on LGBTQ rights.

Moldova, Ukraine and the EU began membership talks on 25 June. The timing of the talks was likely arranged to predate the beginning of Hungary’s EU presidency on 1 July. The two countries’ candidacies for EU membership are almost two decades old, and, despite this step, there is a high likelihood that the timeline of their membership bids will continue to extend relatively far into the future. The announcement of talks is therefore likely a symbolic move, meant to respond to both Russophiles within the union, and to Russia itself, following Putin’s proposal of a “peace plan” which would have included major territorial concessions as well as Ukraine’s pledge to remain essentially isolated from the West. In Moldova, there is a high likelihood that pro-Russian separatist groups will intensify civil unrest and possible violence against institutions.

The parliament of Georgia passed the first reading of a new anti-LGBTQ law that emulates similar procedures passed in Russia. The ruling Georgian Dream coalition, which has faced massive protests due to its controversial “foreign agents bill”, is highly likely using “traditionalist” and anti-LGBTQ talking points to try to recuperate some support and embolden its conservative base. The law’s approval is likely going to further stoke anti-government sentiment and may open further space for violent police crackdowns on dissent.

Presidential elections will be held in Mauritania on 29 June. Incumbent President Mohamed Ould Cheikh Ghazouani is almost certain to win. Despite gradually moving in the direction of greater political pluralism, Mauritania remains unstable and there is a high likelihood that the vote will coincide with greater civil unrest and possible violence.

The Iranian elections’ first round is taking place on 28 June. Two hardline candidates dropped out on the eve of the vote, likely to bolster the victory chances of the two remaining conservatives aligned with Ayatollah Khamenei’s views. The one moderate that was allowed to run, Massoud Pezeshkian, remains unlikely to win. His candidacy was likely allowed to progress to bolster low voter turnout figures, which the Ayatollah sees as proof of the regime’s low popularity following years of protests.

The French Interior Ministry ordered the dissolution of multiple extremist groups, either associated with identitarian or Islamist movements, in the days before the election. These include the identitarian Groupe Union Défense (GUD), one of the major neofascist organisations in Paris. There is an increased likelihood that supporters of the groups will carry out actions to stoke violence during the elections.

An attack by an unspecified terrorist group in Tassia, Niger, resulted in the deaths of 20 Defence and Security Forces (FDS) troops and one civilian. The village, located in the Tillaberi region close to Mali and Burkina Faso, was targeted in a sophisticated attack, involving armed gunmen and suicide bombers. It is highly likely that the attack was perpetrated by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), whose fighters conducted another attack in Tillaberi in March. The EU will also end its military mission to Niger on 30 June, citing the country’s “grave political situation”, a move that will likely encourage further attacks and influence Niger to increasingly court Russian assistance.

On 21 June, Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) militants reportedly attacked a village in the province of Ituri, northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). CODECO is an armed militia with an ethnoreligious character and is linked with the Lendu tribe. It carries out frequent attacks especially targeting the Hema tribe. The Ituri province is rich in gold, and competition over mineral resources continues to be a fundamental driver of inter-ethnic conflict. The attack, which resulted in the deaths of more than 20 civilians, highly likely demonstrates the DRC government’s waning control over its eastern provinces. Rwanda and other international powers continue to more or less directly back armed groups operating in the DRC’s eastern border regions, with the aim of informally securing control over the area’s mineral deposits and controlling the smuggling of minerals out of the country.

On 24 June, Somalia’s ambassador to the UN accused Ethiopia of carrying out an “incursion” into the country’s territory. Ethiopia currently deploys 3,000 troops as part of the peacekeeping African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), aimed at containing al-Shabaab’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. ATMIS is committed to withdrawing by the end of 2024, and the Somali government has announced that it expects to be able to contrast the Islamist group. However, with al-Shabaab having recently made significant territorial conquests, these statements are likely far too optimistic. Mogadishu is likely experiencing far too excessive domestic pressures to mount a significant challenge to al-Shabaab. These include tensions with the breakaway regions of Puntland and Somaliland, as well as a host of other security and economic issues.

Bandits have conducted a series of attacks in Nigeria’s Katsina State. Multiple attacks have now occurred throughout June, forcing farmers to abandon their land which has resulted in higher food prices. The trend of attacks in Nigeria’s rural communities has been partially responsible for the country’s high inflation. Multiple commodities such as beans, beef, bread, rice and a host of vegetables have more than doubled in price during the last year, high food prices often sustaining periods of civil unrest throughout the country.

Senior leadership from the United State’s Africa Command (AFRICOM)  and NATO met with multiple African defence chiefs in Botswana from 24 to 26 June. The conference addressed multiple security issues confronting Africa and is being used to bolster defence relationships in a continent where the West continues to cede ground to Russia and China. Containing the spread of jihadist groups was almost certainly on the agenda and the US attendees were reportedly seeking new bases in West Africa after their prompt withdrawal from Niger.  

The UN has warned that Nitazenes, a group of synthetic opioids stronger than fentanyl, are spreading across Europe after previously circulating in the US. The UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated in its most recent World Drug Report that synthetic opioids have now been detected in the UK, US, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Belgium and Canada, stoking fears over a new drug epidemic, strains on public health services and spikes in associated crime.

Wildfires in the Russian Arctic territories have caused the third-highest levels of emissions for this period of the year over the last two decades. Wildfires in carbon-rich soils such as the Russian tundra and boreal forest tend to be particularly damaging in terms of CO2 emissions. This year, the increase in severity in regional wildfires has been recorded weeks earlier than the usual peak of July and August, making it likelier that the warmest part of the summer will record even more severe statistics.

An outbreak of toxic strands of E. Coli bacteria, reportedly originating from grocery store products, has affected more than 200 people across the United Kingdom and killed at least one person. Symptoms of the infection include gastrointestinal issues and flu-like effects such as a temperature and headaches. Infection can be especially dangerous for individuals with pre-existing conditions.

At least one person was killed and hundreds were displaced after heavy rains caused flash floods in the southeastern Misox valley of the Swiss canton of Grisons. Weather conditions in Switzerland are variable, and forecasts indicate that the country may face a heatwave in the immediate aftermath of the floods.

On 23 June, crewmembers of a yacht in Greece were arrested after allegedly starting a fire by firing fireworks towards the island of Hydra, resulting in the destruction of 300,000 square metres (30 hectares) of pine forest. Greece faces a high threat from wildfires, most of which are started by humans, and exacerbated by the country’s summer dry and hot conditions. The incident is highly likely to cause increased scrutiny of over-tourism and luxury tourism in Southern Europe and may inspire acts of vandalism by environmental activists. For more information on the threat of “Ecotage” – or vandalism carried out by environmentalists – further information can be found here.

Also in Greece, the number of tourists reported as having died due to the ongoing heatwave affecting the country has risen to six. It is notable that June is not the hottest month in Greece, and that temperatures are likely to marginally increase in July. The climate change-related extreme heat affecting southern Europe, and Greece in particular, in recent years has exacerbated the severity of the risks faced by travellers to the country. There is a high likelihood that the threat from high temperatures will have impacts on Greece’s economy, especially damaging the tourism sector.

More than 400 people were reported to have died in Karachi between 22 and 25 June alone due to the extreme heatwave currently affecting the country. The Sindh province, where Karachi is located, had multiple consecutive days of above-40 degrees Celsius temperatures. In May, it, alongside regions of India, recorded a temperature of more than 52 degrees Celsius. Conditions in Karachi are worsened by the high levels of humidity.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The casualty numbers are likely understated, as they only account for identified bodies with clear causes of death assessed. Many of those who perished were homeless, complicating accurate reporting. The prolonged heatwave in Pakistan is expected to exacerbate health conditions, particularly impacting the poorer segments of the population disproportionately.

Additionally, the high temperatures have sparked fires and led to electrical failures, causing numerous power outages worsened by Pakistan’s inadequate energy infrastructure. This situation is likely to increase the use of diesel generators, contributing to additional pollution. Both India and Pakistan have experienced extreme heat over the past year, the hottest on record globally.

Factors such as poor sanitation, high humidity, overcrowded urban areas lacking green spaces, which help mitigate heat and lower nighttime temperatures, put the Indian subcontinent at heightened risk from extreme weather events. Apart from causing significant human suffering, heatwaves are also expected to adversely affect the economy by disrupting business activities and travel throughout the day.

With climate projections indicating a trend towards more frequent and severe heatwaves, countries like Pakistan face an escalating climate-related threat that demands urgent adaptation and mitigation measures.

In the first month of its third consecutive term, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi continued implementing policies aimed at targeting the country’s Muslim minority. In June alone, several Mosques were demolished, often on pretence of alleged encroachment, in Delhi alone. On 27 June, a severed cow’s head was found near a Hindu temple in Delhi, and a BJP local politician responded to the incident by threatening to “slaughter” 200,000 of the city’s Muslims.

Solace Global Assessment:

Inter-religious tensions have been a central element of the BJP’s electoral strategy, with elected officials frequently endorsing conspiracy theories portraying Muslims as foreign agents aiming to destabilise the Indian state. Some BJP leaders advocate for transforming India into “Bharat,” a Hindu nationalist non-secular state. However, the BJP’s underperformance in the 2024 parliamentary elections, where it failed to secure a simple majority and was unexpectedly forced into a coalition, suggests that this identitarian domestic focus may not be as popular as previously thought.

Despite this setback on the national stage, BJP politicians at the local level are persisting in efforts to curb Muslim influence and presence in society. There is a significant likelihood that the continuation, and even escalation in some instances, of anti-Muslim policies in places like Delhi reflects efforts by local BJP officials to regain public support following the party’s electoral setbacks.

This approach carries the risk of provoking inter-communal tensions and potentially sparking violence, particularly in major urban centers where communal fault lines are more pronounced. The prospect of such tensions erupting into severe clashes remains a realistic concern, especially amidst a backdrop of heightened political polarisation and societal divisions.

Mongolians will vote in parliamentary elections on 28 June, with the ruling party expected to retain its majority despite concerns over corruption, inflation, and the state of the economy. The Mongolian People’s Party, led by Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene, is likely to benefit from a booming coal sector, but major frustrations remain over economic inequality and corruption which were some of the main drivers of the 2022 protests.  

Vietnam has announced that is ready to hold talks with the Philippines over its overlapping claims in the South China Sea, in a diplomatic approach that contrasts with China’s assertive approach and use of grey zone tactics. Hanoi is responding to Manila’s submission to the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to extend its exclusive economic zone to 350 nautical miles, which has created rival claims in the Spratly Islands. If both nations settle the dispute diplomatically and in line with the rules established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it could help to undermine China’s claims and activities in the South China Sea, leading to international pressure for Beijing to follow suit.

Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, returned to Australia after more than a decade-long battle against extradition to the US, where he faced potential life imprisonment for publishing classified documents demonstrating that US troops committed crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as thousands of sensitive information and diplomatic cables. It is unlikely that the development will result in civil unrest.

Civil unrest has erupted again on the French territory of New Caledonia after seven pro-independence activists were arrested and flown to mainland France for detention, including the leader Christian Tein. The Indigenous Kanak people will likely interpret the moving of their leaders to France as “colonial tactics” and as a further challenge to their sovereignty, and may sustain unrest until those arrested are returned to New Caledonia.

On 29 June, Hindu pilgrims will head to Pahalgam in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir for the start of the annual Amarnath Yatra. The region has seen a spate of attacks against Hindu pilgrims in recent months and the pilgrimage has been targeted by Islamist extremists in the past, such as during the 2017 Amarnath Yatra massacre. It is almost certain that the pilgrimage remains a high-profile target for VEOs in the area and the Indian authorities will be forced to increase security during the event.

On 22 June, India and Bangladesh strengthened their defence relationship by signing agreements to enhance cooperation in maritime security, the ocean economy, space, and telecommunications during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to New Delhi. India’s Prime Minister Modi celebrated Bangladesh’s decision to join the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative- a regional initiative aimed at enhancing regional maritime security, sustainable use of marine resources, and fostering cooperation among countries in the Indo-Pacific region, likely viewing this as a strategic move to draw Bangladesh away from China.

In Hwaseong, South Korea, a battery factory fire killed 23 workers. Surveillance video footage reveals that the fire followed the sudden explosion of multiple lithium batteries, which started a chain reaction that led to the destruction of much of the building. As of the time of writing, it is unclear what caused the batteries’ explosion, which resulted in a particularly destructive chain reaction. The incident is likely to spark significant security concerns, and possibly have important impacts on battery manufacturing in South Korea.

The most powerful solar storm to hit the Earth in the last 20 years took place during this reporting period. Despite some worries about possible disruptions to power grids and satellite communications, the event did not have any major adverse effects on the general population but caused some degradation in the accuracy of some satellite-based services.

Nakba Day, the commemoration of the expulsion of 750,000 Arab Palestinians from the Palestinian territories during the 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli War, occurred on 15 May. Protests were recorded across Europe, North America, and the Middle East, which focused on opposing current Israeli operations in Gaza.

On 21 May, Ireland, Spain and several other EU members will jointly recognise Palestine as a sovereign state. The move, is likely to result in civil unrest, and may prompt an immediate degradation in relations with Tel Aviv, also affecting Brussels. It was most likely prompted by domestic pressures.

Firefighters in western Canada are fighting the first major wildfires of the 2024 wildfire season. Thousands of residents have been ordered to evacuate the areas around the town of Fort Nelson, British Columbia, as an out-of-control wildfire approaches the area which has already burnt an estimated 20,000 acres. Reporting from the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre indicates that Canada is currently struggling to contain nearly 120 major wildfires, with most located in the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta.

Solace Global Assessment:  Canada’s wildfire season typically runs from April to September or October when temperatures decrease, and precipitation increases. However, the extent of the current wildfires, in terms of both size and intensity, has prompted concerns that this year’s wildfire season will be worse than average. Unseasonably warm temperatures and drought have almost certainly shaped conditions favourable to the spread of wildfires. The current drought monitor map released by the Government of Canada highlights severe, extreme, or exceptional drought conditions across significant portions of British Columbia, Alberta, the Northwest Territories, and Saskatchewan provinces. Additionally, nearly half of the country is experiencing moderate drought, indicating a heightened risk of wildfires spreading rapidly across various regions of Canada. In 2023, nearly three-quarters of the Northwest Territories were forced to flee their homes, an area traditionally immune to wildfires. The fires have also highlighted the fragility of rural communities that often rely on limited infrastructure. Communities not directly affected by the wildfires have suffered from internet and phone blackouts with residents unable to contact emergency services, failed electronic payments, ATM failures and transport disruption, with some communities reliant on only one supply route. The scale of the wildfires has been attributed to climate change with experts warning that it will result in areas historically spared by wildfires being affected. There have already been calls for Canada to tighten its emission caps on the oil and gas sector – a contentious issue in a country where these industries contribute approximately 5-7 per cent of its GDP. As the wildfires continue to spread, there is a high probability that climate-motivated protests will increase across Canada.

A UNICEF report estimates that, so far in 2024, more than 30,000 children have traversed the dangerous routes that cross the jungle between Colombia and Panama, out of a total of 140,000 people. UNICEF predictions project that up to 800,000 migrants, 160,000 children, will travel through the area this year. The Darien Gap is one of the last completely undeveloped regions on earth, and traversing the thick jungle poses massive health risks, with chances of rescue almost non-existent. Panama’s President-elect José Raúl Mulino has vowed to shut down migration routes through the country.

Solace Global Assessment: So far, Panama has been a necessary stop for migrants seeking to reach the US from South America. The country’s governments have aided migration, providing busses to transport migrants from the edge of the Darien Gap to the country’s northern borders. Still, the Gap continues to represent a particularly perilous journey, but it is likely preferred by migrants who do not have the means to tackle maritime routes. Moreover, organised crime in Colombia has increasingly profited from helping migrants reach and cross the approximately 100 kilometres of jungle. Still, migrants paying smugglers face increased risks, including sexual assault, theft, and murder. Additionally, the increase in migrant inflows has likely favoured the development of local bandit networks, which carry out violent attacks and kidnappings on the transiting migrants. President Mulino, who will take office on 1 July, is likely responding to increasing pressure from the US government, which is increasingly trying to stifle migration at its southern border. With little border infrastructure currently in place, it is almost certain that efforts in this direction will be conducted through a massive deployment of security forces in and around the Gap, seeking to intercept migrants before they reach the inhabited parts of the country. However, such a measure would likely exacerbate humanitarian issues in the Darien Gap, possibly increasing transit times and therefore worsening health risks. Moreover, if it achieves its deterrent purpose, it will almost certainly result in an increased number of migrants undertaking the more perilous maritime routes, possibly creating broader regional consequences, as well as impacting maritime transport and activity in the Gulf of Panama. 

Solace Global Assessment:  The budget surplus is likely to further boost Milei’s claims that his unorthodox economic policies are working to change course on decades of economic stagnation. Coming from a period of severe protests, it may improve the president’s approval ratings, currently hovering at around 50 per cent. While praised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for his reforms, Milei is still seeking to unlock further IMF funds, in addition to the USD 800 million that are part of the loan programme’s current schedule, and which are needed to repay interest on Buenos Aires past borrowing. After taking office, Milei simply warned that “there is no money”, and the statement, months into the administration, has taken a tangible form. On 10 May, a major train collision in the Palermo neighbourhood of Buenos Aires resulted in at least 90 injuries and has promoted a judicial enquiry. Early indications suggest that the copper cable used to carry power along the tracks had been stolen leading to a signal failure. Union leaders had been demanding that the stolen cables be repaired for ten days before the incident to which the government allegedly replied that there were no funds for spare parts. The incident will almost certainly be linked to President Milei’s economic austerity measures and refusal to invest in public infrastructure, and it may hint at a growing risk regarding public and private transport within Argentina. Declining infrastructural standards may have unpredictable adverse effects on business in the country, leading to disruptions and delays, as well as physical damages to individuals and assets. Further warning signals have also been recorded at the social level. Over the course of last week, three women died days after having been deliberately burned in a homophobic attack. On 6 May, a man reportedly threw a Molotov cocktail inside a boarding house room where two lesbian couples were staying. The only surviving victim remains at the hospital but is expected to survive as of the time of writing. Over the last few years, Argentina has become considered one of the most socially progressive South American countries. In 2010, Buenos Aires legalised same-sex marriage, and the country has introduced stricter legislation against identity-based discrimination. While Milei describes himself as an “anarchist” socially, civil society actors have raised alarms concerning the rise of hate crimes and discrimination in the country, seemingly encouraged by the president’s “anti-woke” rhetoric and actions. Activists have decried the abolition of state institutions providing resources for victims, and others monitoring incidents of violence and harassment. While these gestures could be construed as “cost-cutting” measures, Milei has also more directly engaged in anti-progressive discourse, for instance symbolically renaming, on International Women’s Day, the presidential palace’s “Hall of Women” into the “Hall of Heroes”. Furthermore, Milei’s increasingly violent repression of anti-government demonstrations has likely emboldened far-right voices within the country, possibly leading to an increase in the risk of civic violence and unrest.

The two candidates for the 2024 US Presidential elections have agreed on holding two presidential debates before the vote in November. Former President Donald Trump and incumbent President Joe Biden will meet to debate their platforms in Georgia, on 27 June, and in an unspecified location on 10 September. The Georgia debate, which will take place in an important swing state, will not be attended by a live audience, as the organisers likely worry about the extremely charged nature of this electoral season. The debates are almost certainly going to result in localised travel disruptions and may entail an increased risk of domestic, “lone-wolf”, terrorism.

On 15 May, Washington removed Cuba from its list of countries “not cooperating fully” against terrorism. The move is likely meant to signal the US’ openness to further improve diplomatic relations with the island state. In recent years, Cuba has improved security and intelligence ties with Moscow, and there is a high likelihood that Russian intelligence assets operate on the island from the Lourdes SIGINT station, which had already been used by their Soviet predecessors. While unlikely to result in any short-term changes, the announcement will likely be received warmly in Havana.

On 19 May, voters in the Dominican Republic will decide the country’s next president and members of Congress. All three of the leading candidates have promised to tackle illegal immigration from neighbouring Haiti which continues to be afflicted with gang warfare and a total lack of security. Incumbent President Luis Abinader has promised to finish constructing a border wall, a move that has been condemned by human rights groups due to the extent of violence in Haiti.

Observers in the United States have recorded an increase in the number of threats targeting New York Justice Juan Merchan and other individuals involved in the hush money trial of former President Donald Trump, following the latter’s online posts. Having been banned from X.com (formerly Twitter), Facebook, and other “mainstream” social media channels, Trump has increasingly been communicating with supporters through “Truth Social”, a Twitter-like site which has attracted almost exclusively pro-Trump users. The trial proceedings have increased the threat of lone-actor terrorist action in New York, and a verdict adverse to Trump’s camp may lead to a growing likelihood of ideologically motivated violent action.

In Canada, a fourth man was charged with killing Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar. Canadian officials are currently investigating possible connections between the alleged killers and the Indian government, claiming that Delhi organised the assassination of the leader to stifle the reach of the Khalistan independentist movement. The case will likely continue to affect tensions in Canada, and, in particular, regarding the country’s current immigration system.

Thousands of people in Canada’s British Columbia province have been evacuated due to the growth of a large wildfire in the province’s northeast. British Columbia is one of Canada’s main centres for the extraction of natural gas, and a hub for Canadian commerce towards Asia. Disruptions caused by the fire could negatively affect the local economy, and create shipping delays to and from Canada, were the phenomena to worsen. In 2023, Canada saw its worst wildfire season on record, as fires have become more severe due to drier and hotter weather conditions. This case is highly likely not to remain isolated, as the risk of wildfires will grow significantly in the coming months across Canada and much of North America.

Two people have died in Louisiana, and hundreds have been displaced due to tornadoes sweeping through the southern US. Power cuts and traffic disruptions have also been recorded, with the area of Baton Rouge particularly affected. Tornado season in the US takes place between March and June, and this spring has seen a high frequency of extreme weather events. In Texas, recent flooding has been compounded by severe hailstorms, which have damaged infrastructure, and particularly affected agricultural businesses in the area.

Authorities in the southernmost Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul have warned that flooding that has affected much of the state, including the metropolitan area of Porto Alegre, will take weeks to subside. Parts of the state have seen more than 630mm (25 inches) of rain already this month. Flooding has resulted in widespread supply chain disruption, killed almost 150 people and displaced over half a million, with further rain forecasted in the coming days.  

In the morning of 14 May, a prison van carrying a high-ranking drug cartel member from Marseille was ambushed at a highway toll booth in the Eure department, in the country’s north. Videos released online show at least three assailants, armed with submachineguns, open fire on the prison van and its police escort, after crashing an SUV into the lead vehicle to immobilise it. At the time of the attack, the van was transporting Mohamed Amra, reportedly a leader of a drug-trafficking syndicate based in Marseille who had been a suspect in various cases of homicide, armed theft, and attempted homicide. French authorities have launched a massive search to find the fugitive and the perpetrators of the attack.

Solace Global Assessment:  The ambush took place in the Eure district, which borders the region of Paris. In recent years, the city of Marseille has become a hotspot for drug trafficking in France and Europe, especially due to the arrival of large shipments of South American cocaine which have increasingly carved a larger portion of the European drug market. Gangs in Marseille have increasingly engaged in clashes for control within the city and in its outskirts, which have resulted in dozens of deaths. French authorities recorded 2023 as the deadliest year for drug wars in the city, with a reported 47 deaths and 118 injuries. The Macron administration has been haemorrhaging votes to its right-wing opposition and has increasingly sought to take a “tough on crime” stance to recover some lost support. This imperative has become even more important with the approaching Olympic Games, set to begin in July. In March 2024, the administration launched a major crackdown operation in Marseille, which led to almost 200 arrests. Still, it is unlikely that past operations have dented the pervasiveness of gang presence in the city, which is fuelled by socioeconomic inequalities and important levels of deprivation, as well as the existence of quasi-segregated peripheral quarters, where the French police exercise very little control. Importantly, these same parts of the city often see a strong Islamist presence, including by groups associated with Middle East-based Sunni radical organisations. In 2018, a radical Salafi preacher was expelled from France to Algeria after being reported for preaching sermons targeting Jews, women and Shiites in one of Marseille’s main mosques, and, in more recent years, local imams have launched appeals to Paris warning against the local penetration of Salafi extremist thought in the more deprived parts of the city. The high sophistication of the attack on the prison van is likely indicative of France’s drug gangs’ growing offensive capabilities and there is a realistic possibility that Islamist groups have access to much of the same assets due to their overlap with gang networks and the communities where they operate. With the Paris Olympics on the horizon, the ambush highlights the severe security risks that the Games will face.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico is in a serious but stable condition after being shot multiple times on 15 May. The attack occurred in the small town of Handlova while Fico was meeting with supporters outside a cultural centre. He was rushed to F. D. Roosevelt University Hospital in Banska Bystrica, where he underwent a five-hour surgery and is in intensive care at the time of writing. The alleged suspect, reportedly a 71-year-old writer and political activist, was detained at the scene.

Solace Global Assessment: The shooting of Prime Minister Fico was almost certainly politically motivated and is widely being reported as an assassination attempt. At the time of writing, however, no group has claimed responsibility for it, and it appears almost certain that the perpetrator acted alone. Fico secured office in October 2023 after running a divisive campaign marked by a populist agenda. He has been one of the few outspoken European leaders championing rapprochement with Russia and Slavonic solidarity, often calling for an end to the EU’s military support for Ukraine, with Slovakia halting all arms deliveries to Kyiv. Fico’s populist government has recently approved a proposal to abolish the country’s public broadcaster and replace it with a new body as well as weakening anti-corruption laws. These developments have generated fears regarding the independence of the media and the state of democracy in Slovakia, leading to widespread protests. Anecdotal reporting indicates that this may have been the motivation for the assassination, with Fico’s ruling SMER party also suggesting that false narratives propagated by the opposition have contributed to the shooting. The incident will almost certainly lead to heightened security measures in the country and, in the long term, it could be exploited to suppress dissent and push through some of SMER’s more contentious proposals. Finally, there have been reports of Russian-affiliated accounts on social media channels carrying out information operations alleging Ukrainian or NATO responsibility for the attempted assassination, with some posts calling for violence against European officials. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has contributed to this discourse, hinting at the theory that the attack was linked to Fico’s “reasonable” stance on Russia. While the risk of terrorism remains low, there is a realistic possibility of cases of targeted violence and harassment against Slovakian pro-EU officials and political figures in the coming weeks.

After launching the first phase of their offensive into the southern Gazan city of Rafah, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have re-entered the Jabalia, in the north, where they were met with heavy resistance from Hamas elements. With the invasion of Gaza so far having failed in its objectives to destroy Hamas and rescue the approximately 100 Israeli hostages still in Palestinian captivity, a rift opened, or came to the fore, in the Netanyahu administration as Defence Minister Yoav Gallant raised a public objection to the proposal of setting up an Israeli military government in Gaza after the end of hostilities.

Solace Global Assessment:  The IDF identified Jabalia as a stronghold of Hamas resistance in Gaza and conducted operations to neutralise it shortly after entering the Gaza Strip in October 2023. By late December 2023, IDF forces reported having destroyed three Hamas battalions following heavy combat in the Jabalia refugee camp. The recent restart of fighting there, the most severe increase in the north of the Gaza Strip since the Al-Shifa hospital raid, encapsulates the failures of the IDF to prevent the re-infiltration of Hamas elements in previously cleared areas. It is likely that Tel Aviv recognises that these difficulties are endemic. Despite significant casualties, Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups continue to retain enough assets to challenge IDF units in the Gaza Strip’s dense urban landscape. They are also still able to recruit from the hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians. Moreover, the Netanyahu administration likely realises the important political dimension of the conflict for its “survival” at home. Seven months into the conflict, having expended significant political capital at home and abroad, the Likud-led government finds itself in a political dilemma. On one side, its electoral base continues to support the war effort in a rather hawkish manner and is impatient due to the ongoing failures to achieve the war’s stated strategic goals. On the other, the remark by Gallant seems to indicate a growing realisation, or admission, that Gaza is essentially “unwinnable”: even if Sinwar and the other Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip are captured or killed, and the remaining Hamas elements neutralised, large numbers of IDF troops would necessarily need to remain stationed in the area to prevent the creation of new Hamas units or successor groups. Essentially, this would rewind the Israeli position on Gaza by two decades, likely, however, reigniting the same political pressures for the recognition of a Palestinian state that had expedited the decision for the 2005 troop withdrawal from the Strip (albeit without the added issue of the dismantling of settlements). The prospect of a protracted military occupation, which a reported leaked confidential paper puts at a cost of USD 5.4 annually, would also bring back memories from southern Lebanon, whose occupation after the 1982-1985 war proved economically and strategically unfeasible. However, it is unclear what other exit scenarios exist, even if Israeli goals are achieved. Among the plans being discussed in Tel Aviv, an appealing one likely sees local clan leaders and civilian parties create a joint government to manage the Gaza Strip, with limited but constant cooperation with Israeli forces, and possibly with the oversight of an Arab state. However, it is unlikely that Cairo, or any of the Gulf States, will seek to engage in a policy of management that would prove extremely unpopular at home – and would possibly expose it to diplomatic embarrassment were a successor of Hamas to gain traction in Gaza. Moreover, it is not clear if any such internal parties exist. Hamas’ killing of a Doghmush clan leader in March highlights the group’s keen awareness of its necessity to root out potential challengers, and it is likely that significant progress has been made in this direction. No matter how unlikely to succeed this scenario, and other ones, are, however, it is almost certain that the Netanyahu administration will try to avoid mentioning a clear alternative: the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces following the end of hostilities, and the return to a policy of isolating Gaza while carrying out occasional incursions to reduce the strength of a resurgent Hamas. This would amount to a political failure – and a self-inflicted one, due to Netanyahu’s continuous pledge to destroy Hamas – and will almost certainly represent the end of the current Likud administration.

On 15 May, Jordanian sources reported that the Kingdom of Jordan had foiled a plot by Iran to smuggle weapons into the country to arm anti-monarchy activists and members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood organisation. The plot’s dismantling reportedly dated back to March. The routes allegedly ran through Syria and were coordinated through connections between Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas elements. Iran has already been reported as running weapons smuggling operations into the West Bank, in an effort to arm Palestinian militants. Jordan is considered to be one of the most stable countries in the region, and the Kingdom contributed to the interceptions of Iranian drones and missiles during Tehran’s massive strike against Israel in April.

Solace Global Assessment:  Jordanian intelligence and security forces have likely been aware of Iranian arms smuggling efforts aimed at arming the Palestinians, and the timing of the crackdown suggests a likely growing worry in the Kingdom’s ruling circles. Jordan’s population is largely of Palestinian heritage, and almost wholly supportive of the Palestinian cause. The monarchy’s pro-Western stance is largely tolerated, but the ongoing Israeli offensive in Gaza has contributed to making anti-government dissent more vocal and bolder. The Hashemite family has responded to this situation by boosting its criticism of Israel, including by withdrawing their ambassador from Tel Aviv, in an effort to align itself more with popular feelings. However, the exacerbation of the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip has resulted in a growing number of particularly aggressive demonstrations, with protesters notably attempting to storm the Israeli embassy in Amman in late March. Iran, which has placed itself successfully at the head of the global pro-Palestine movement, likely sees the destabilisation of Jordan as particularly desirable to both reinforce its influence in the West Bank through a loosening of the frontier between the two territories and to reduce the American footprint in the region. By arming Muslim Brotherhood elements, Tehran possibly seeks to favour acts of terrorism targeting local authorities and security forces, or alternatively spark further protests more directly aimed at the government. A worsening of the political situation in Jordan would negatively affect the numerous NGOs and humanitarian organisations that operate in the country. In a worst-case scenario, it may result in a reduction of Western counterterrorism operations in neighbouring Syria and Iraq, creating a medium-term opening for a growing influence of Islamist groups.

The results of a series of studies carried out by the Russian ship Alexander Karpinsky in 2020 have revealed the presence of massive oil and gas deposits in the Antarctic territory claimed by Britain. Last week, the findings have sparked debate in the UK Parliament. Both Russia and the UK are signatories to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, which bans the exploitation of mineral resources in the continent.

Solace Global Assessment: The Alexander Karpinsky, which was formally in the region to conduct scientific research, was much more likely involved in Russian prospecting operations. The find, which dates back four years, is strategically extremely important. According to current estimates, the deposits, located under the Weddell Sea, would amount to around 511 billion barrels worth of oil, or ten times the output of the North Sea deposits over the last 50 years. The deposits fall not only under the UK’s claim but also under claims by Chile and Argentina, which partially overlap with the British one. The question of Antarctic sovereignty continues to be a grey area, as the 1959 Treaty clearly states its non-impact over signatories’ sovereignty claims, which remain pending. Moreover, while the treaty covers Antarctic land and ice shelves, it does not extend to the seas surrounding it, meaning that possible claims of exclusive interest would fall under customary and treaty law. While the treaties’ texts seemingly state that Arctic claims do not generate Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), claimant states have de facto repeatedly asserted their ownership of Antarctic maritime zones. The result of this situation is a status quo where the legitimacy of a specific state’s claims would necessarily rest only upon the acquiescence of other treaty signatories, a condition that is unlikely to materialise due to the, so far, perceived lack of meaningful incentives. The lack of clarity and coverage in the Antarctic treaties has already led to increased competition, especially with regard to the marine resources present in the area. Russia and China, in particular, continue to hinder efforts to extend protections to wildlife in the areas and conduct intensive fishing operations that are likely contributing to threatening the volume of krill and fish in Antarctic waters. In strategic terms, Britain’s Antarctic claim is bolstered by the UK’s overseas Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the Falkland Islands and the South Georgian and the South Sandwich Islands, all of which are disputed by Argentina, that claims the islands as part of its own sovereign territory. It is almost certain that the increase in Russia’s exploration and prospecting operations in the Antarctic follows from broader strategic imperatives. Even before the invasion of Ukraine, the Putin regime, whose attempts to effectively diversify Russia’s economy have failed, increasingly sought to maintain capital inflows and domestic government spending levels through the provision of cheap fossil fuels to China and other international partners. With the isolation that followed the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s interest in further oil and gas deposits has likely increased. In recent years, almost certainly due to the opportunities posed by the exploitation of fishing grounds, China has also seen its interest in the Antarctic increase. In February 2024, Beijing inaugurated its fifth research station on the continent, raising concerns about a possible increase in Chinese security and intelligence activities. The Russian discovery, as well as possible future ones, may reduce the stability of the precarious status quo that has so far “frozen” the various states’ claims, and lead to a much more unclear regional environment.

In Sweden, the nation’s largest labour union, Unionen, stated, on 14 May, its support for the Tesla workers currently engaged in a six-month-long strike. The strike concerns workers’ demands for collective bargaining. The announcement may result in an increase in the cases of sabotage of Tesla cars and assets by leftist and ecological activists.

The Catalan Socialist Party (PSC) has secured the most seats in the Catalan regional elections after independence parties lost support. Nationalist parties no longer control Catalonia’s regional parliament, a development that will almost certainly be deemed a major blow for the independence movement. The results will likely be sold as a vindication for Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s coalition tactics and controversial amnesty bill that has garnered opposition from the right and triggered unrest within Spain.

On 12 May, voters in Lithuania voted in the nation’s presidential elections. Incumbent Gitanas Nauseda won the first round in voting, winning 44 per cent of votes, just coming short of the 50 per cent required to automatically secure a victory. Nauseda will now go up against Prime Minister Ingrdia Šimonytė during a run-off election on 26 May. This repeats the 2019 elections where a run-off between these two were held. Early indications are that Nauseda will secure a re-election; however, the election highlighted growing anti-establishment sentiment, potentially signalling a move in favour of pro-Russian parties in the country’s upcoming parliamentary elections.

Unionised public sector workers belonging to the Greek Civil Servants’ Confederation (ADEDY) are set to conduct a nationwide 24-hour strike on 21 May over issues of pay and workers’ rights, with protestors set to convene outside the Ministry of Finance in Athens. The organisers of the strike have yet to announce which areas will be affected but there is a realistic possibility that the strikes will impact the transport and health sectors, leading to localised disruptions.

Renewed protests have taken place in the Armenian capital of Yerevan. Demonstrators have called on the government to reverse its decision to concede land to neighbouring Azerbaijan and the opposition is seeking ways to impeach the current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Protests have blocked major roads in and out of the capital and the security services have arrested hundreds of demonstrators. The demonstrations are unlikely to end soon with thousands calling for the resignation of Pashinyan and elements of the Armenia Apostolic Church endorsing the protests.

On 12 May, Tunisian protesters took to the streets in Tripoli to demand the release of imprisoned journalists and activists and a date for new elections. While his five-year term is set to expire in 2024, Tunisian President Kais Saied is yet to announce a date for the vote. At the same time, the country, at one point considered the only “success story” of the Arab Spring, has continued to experience significant authoritarian backsliding, with Saied concentrating significant powers under the presidency. The protests, which continue at the time of writing and are yet to reach severe proportions, may cause significant disruption, or violence, depending on the authorities’ response.

Three men in the UK have been charged with offences under the National Security Act, including assisting Hong Kong’s intelligence service and foreign interference. The men are accused of undertaking information gathering, surveillance, and acts of deception likely to aid a foreign intelligence service. The arrests were part of the Metropolitan Police’s counterterrorism investigations and follow a suspected Chinese hack of the UK Ministry of Defence’s payroll system, likely indicating the level of espionage China conducts within or against the UK. The Chinese embassy in London condemned the UK’s accusations, stating Hong Kong’s affairs are China’s concern.

In Rouen, France, a suspected terrorist was shot and killed by police forces after setting fire to the city’s Synagogue. The attack was likely linked to anti-Israeli sentiment. France is the Western European state with the largest Jewish population and has seen a massive increase in antisemitic attacks following 7 October.

Turkey has expanded its military operations against Kurdish militants in Syria with reports suggesting that Turkish forces, alongside the allied Syrian National Army (SNA), have been shelling villages and burning farmlands in the Manbij province, provoking concerns over food security in the area. Turkish forces have also prosecuted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ankara is likely exploiting the withdrawal of Western forces from the region, the world’s preoccupation with Gaza and Iraq’s shifting stance towards the Kurds. After high-level talks between Iraqi and Turkish officials, Iraq announced the designation of the PKK as a banned organisation, a move that will likely invite more Turkish influence to the region. The Kurdish National Congress (KNK) has stated that President Erdogan is seeking to gain strategic and economically important territory after electoral setbacks, warning that such a policy could provoke a regional conflict.

European Union member states have agreed to end their military training mission to Mali after the mandate expires on 18 May. The EU cited the “evolving political and security situation”. The European bloc is likely unwilling to support a junta government that has stifled democracy and pivoted towards Russia. Jihadist groups may seek to exploit a lesser-trained military, but it is likely that the provision of military training will be undertaken by the Kremlin’s Africa Corps.

Overnight on 10 May, more than 100 people were kidnapped by gunmen during night raids in three villages, Gora, Madomawa, and Jambuzu, in Nigeria’s northwest Zamfara state. Kidnappings are a growing issue in Zamfara state with criminals almost certainly conducting them for ransom payments and those responsible have already demanded negotiations. Kidnappers are likely targeting remote villages and exploiting an overstretched security service in northern Nigeria that is having to contend with a host of Islamist groups. Security forces’ efforts to rescue the abducted may result in road closures and potentially armed clashes in the region.

On 10 May, an Italian vessel operating as part of the EU’s anti-piracy mission ATALANTA detained six Somalis suspected of having attempted to hijack an oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden. The case likely illustrates the growing threat posed by Somali piracy, which has increased due to the Houthi’s campaign of Red Sea strikes. The ability of Somali pirates to target vessels at increasingly large distances from their coasts is particularly worrying and may further influence the shipping sector in the region.

As the South African electoral campaign nears its end, President Cyril Ramaphosa signed a bill into law that overhauls the country’s healthcare system. Currently, 84 per cent of South Africans access state-provided healthcare facilities, while the remaining 16 per cent can afford private care. The two-tier system contributes to fueling the country’s severe socioeconomic inequalities, which are some of the sharpest in the continent. The reform introduced the National Health Insurance (NHI), a system that provides funds for poorer South Africans to access private care. The opposition has warned that the policy will result in higher taxation and called it a ploy to bolster the ruling party’s chances in an election that is projected to be strongly contested.

On 16 May, China’s President Xi hosted Russian President Putin and a delegation of key officials and CEOs in Beijing, marking Putin’s second visit to China in the last year and his first state visit since being inaugurated for his fifth term. The two leaders praised their strategic relationship and suggested that it was not “opportunistic”. President Xi called for an urgent resolution to the war in Gaza and was praised by Putin for China’s efforts in attempting to resolve the Ukraine crisis with both leaders suggesting that there needs to be a political resolution to the conflict. The talks also covered Sino-Russian trade, energy and a shared view concerning the decline of the West.

Solace Global Assessment:  For Putin, Xi’s China has been a major economic lifeline since the imposition of hundreds of sanctions from the US and its Western allies and one of the closed-doors meeting talking points was likely how to effectively circumvent these sanctions. Putin’s visit comes as Russia has opened up a new front in Ukraine and is attempting to seize as much territory before the arrival of Washington’s latest USD 61 billion military aid package. Whilst China has not provided conventional arms to Russia, it has supplied a range of “dual-purpose” equipment and crude components. These have included semiconductor chips for precision-guided munitions, jet parts, ball bearings, motorbikes and all-terrain vehicles. These are considered “dual-purpose” as despite their obvious military applications, these systems and components can in theory be used for civilian purposes. Russia would invariably want to go one step further and secure finished military hardware from China to alleviate pressures on its military-industrial base and to get weapons onto the battlefield with reduced timelines. However, it is unlikely that Xi would authorise this as he attempts to balance opportunities with Russia against relations with the West. For China, the war in Ukraine has afforded it improved access to cheaper Russian oil and gas. In 2023, Russia was China’s largest supplier of oil, clearly showing that China knows it has the freedom to ignore US sanctions without facing any major reprisals. Russia has also become a major destination for Chinese imports after the West’s refusal to export to Russia, and Russian debt to China has increased significantly. Furthermore, public opinion in China is largely supportive of Russia or indifferent, with it being widely believed that Russia had to invade Ukraine to counter the expansion of NATO. With Western efforts doing little to deter China, economic opportunities abounding and domestic public sentiment not challenging China’s stance, there is little reason for Beijing to truly work towards ending the conflict. The continuation of the war in Ukraine is likely in Beijing’s interests given the economic opportunities it has exploited and the fact that Western support in Ukraine has put it in a weaker position to support Taiwan.

Authorities in the French territory of New Caledonia implemented a curfew on 14 May and prohibited public gatherings in the capital Nouméa following violent protests against proposed constitutional changes. During the clashes, businesses, including car dealerships and shops, were damaged. Flights were also cancelled, schools closed, and impositions placed on the sale of alcohol. These measures failed to curb the civil unrest and, on 15 May, French President Macron declared a state of emergency in New Caledonia. Ongoing violent protests have resulted in at least four deaths including that of a gendarme, over 300 injured, hundreds of arrests and damage estimated at several hundred million Euros. Macron also promised to meet the violence with an “unyielding response” with reports indicating that the French military would be deployed to the territory alongside four gendarmerie squadrons.

Solace Global Assessment:  New Caledonia has been deeply divided by proposals to increase the territory’s autonomy from Paris, with many calling for outright independence. However, recent referendums have rejected independence. In the 2018 and 2020 referendums, 56 per cent and 53 per cent of voters decided to remain part of France. During the 2021 referendum, 96 per cent decided to remain with France but only after a boycott by pro-independence groups. These developments have likely galvanised the indigenous Kanak people who broadly support independence and comprise an estimated 40 per cent of the territory’s 300,000 people, as well as some smaller ethnic groups. The current violence has almost certainly been triggered by lawmakers in Paris who recently made changes to voting rolls that indigenous people have claimed will dilute their political influence. Moreover, as the protests have been triggered by decisions made by France’s central government, they may result in a “domino effect” causing protests to spark in France’s other overseas territories. France’s measures to curtail the protests, such as the imposition of a curfew, banning of social media apps and the deployment of military and police units from the mainland, will likely be interpreted as a colonial power exercising its illegitimate authority over an indigenous people and are likely to antagonise the rioters and ultimately strengthen the independence movement. Local populations have also likely been provoked by the 1998 Nouméa Accord which promised to grant the territory more independence but also confirmed its existence as part of France, leading to 40,000 French people moving to the relatively small territory and further diluting indigenous influence. For Paris, New Caledonia holds strategic importance, and its loss would decrease French military and political influence in the Asia Pacific at a time when France is attempting to increase it. The island territory lies between Australia and Fiji, is host to a French air and naval base and has a large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), contributing to France’s global power projection capabilities. France has maintained this network more successfully than other colonial powers by recognising them as part of France. However, the possible loss of New Caledonia could trigger a chain reaction of independence movements that would significantly decrease France’s international standing, suggesting that France will likely allocate substantial resources to quell the New Caledonian protests which may lead to more energised riots and deaths in the short term.

In Thailand, a 28-year-old monarchy reform activist charged with insulting the monarchy died on 14 May of cardiac arrest following a hunger strike. The activist had demanded a reform of Thailand’s lese majeste law which can lead to sentences of up to 15 years for insulting the monarchy. Her death may lead to student-led democracy protests like the ones which erupted in 2020. Thailand’s recent shock decision to re-criminalise cannabis just two years after it was legalised is also likely to lead to street protests, with some minor street protests being staged on 16 May.

Officials in Pakistan have stated their intent to speed up the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the most high-profile symbol of cooperation between the two countries. The call for urgency has been driven by a surge in attacks on Chinese nationals in the country, largely attributed to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and other ethnic Baloch and Sindhi insurgent groups that strongly oppose the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). These groups argue that the CPEC disproportionately benefits other areas of Pakistan and will likely aim to intensify their attacks if the CPEC is accelerated.

China and Cambodia started their annual military exercise “Golden Dragon 2024” on 16 May. The 15-day exercise will include over 1300 personnel and 11 Cambodian vessels combined with almost 800 Chinese troops and three warships from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The exercise is almost certainly symbolic of developing military cooperation between the two countries and will further provoke fears over the establishment of a PLAN base on the Cambodian coast that will enable it to sustain more operations in the disputed South China Sea and further afield.

At least 300 people have been killed after flash flooding hit the north of Afghanistan. The floods also caused widespread economic disruptions, bringing to a halt the agriculture-based economy of the Baghlan, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces. The Taliban government has increasingly had difficulties responding to the extreme weather events affecting the country, which are exacerbated by the combination of Afghanistan’s rough and mountainous terrain and its extremely poor infrastructure. Terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, firstly the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), may seek to intensify attacks on authorities in an effort to enhance the disruptions currently faced by Kabul to undermine the Taliban’s rule.

Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has warned that three heatwaves are set to hit several of the country’s major cities during late May and early June. The first heatwave is expected in cities including Umarkot, Tharparkar, and Bahawalpur, with temperatures reaching up to 40°C. A second heatwave, lasting four to five days, may occur later in May or early June, with temperatures rising to 45°C. The third heatwave is predicted for the first 10 days of June, affecting several cities in Sindh and Punjab. Additionally, the Punjab Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) cautions of increased temperatures and heavy rains in South Punjab from May 10 to 11, posing threats to crops.

In Mumbai, India, 14 people were killed and dozens more injured after a large billboard collapsed on a local gas station during a particularly intense storm on 13 May. At least 15 planes were diverted from the area due to the phenomenon’s severity. More extreme weather events remain a realistic possibility, as the North Indian Ocean cyclone season, which affects weather in much of the Indian subcontinent, enters its peak between May and November.

On 11 May monsoon rains and a major mudslide from a cold lava flow or lahar on Mount Marapi caused a river to breach its banks and tear through mountainside villages in four districts in Indonesia’s West Sumatra province. The floods have killed at least 40 people and damaged hundreds of homes, with relief efforts disrupted by damaged or blocked roads. With Mount Marapi being active since January, it is likely that further eruptions and heavy rain will lead to more landslides in the area.

During a televised address, Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita resigned. The announcement comes after the president was detained by soldiers on Tuesday, 18 August. The country’s parliament has also been dissolved, plunging the country into political uncertainty. It remains unclear if the military is now officially in charge of the country.

The news of the president’s departure was met with jubilation by protesters in the country’s capital. Footage on social media and media websites show people dancing and cheering on military vehicles and soldiers as they move around Bamako. The Ministry of Justice building was also set alight in celebration.

All land and air borders in the country have been closed and a curfew has been implemented from 09:00 to 17:00 until further notice. Military leaders have pledged to set up a civilian transitional government, inviting the country’s civil society and political parties to join them to prepare for elections.

The driving force behind the apparent coup appears to have stemmed from mutinying soldiers who took control of the Kati military camp. The soldiers then moved on the capital and arrested the president, Prime Minister Boubou Cisse and other senior government officials. The numbers of those involved remains undetermined as well as who will now take the leadership of the government.

The events came following a long political crisis where opposition protesters have taken to the streets demanding the departure of Keita. Protesters have accused Keita of allowing the economy to collapse thus worsening the security situation across the country.

Foreign embassies have announced that citizens/travellers based in Bamako should remain indoors where possible and avoid protests, especially within the capital. The coup has been condemned by the European Union, African Union and the United Nations, as well as representatives of several countries.

SOLACE GLOBAL COMMENT

Details surrounding the coup remain unclear, the mutiny appears to have started in Kati, similarly to the coup that occurred in 2012. The mutiny also comes off the back of ongoing protests that began on 5 June.

The country’s protests had been growing in recent weeks, with demonstrators complaining that not enough has been done to address the issues that the country faces. The protesters pointed fingers at those in charge for failing to adequately address the country’s struggling economy, improve job prospects, and fight corruption and the ongoing insurgency that is not only destabilising the country, but also the wider region.

Keita has, in 2013 when he won election by a landslide, vowed a zero-tolerance for corruption. However, the former president’s popularity has faded over time. While he was reelected in the 2018 presidential elections, they were marred by low turnout and fraud allegations, which created frustration among the public, particularly among the country’s youth.

The pressure on Keita has only grown since the beginning of the protests in June. With the fight against insurgents dragging on, despite French military support, poor economic prospects and violent protests, the former president’s position was becoming untenable. Indeed, regional mediators had arrived in Bamako to try and ease the unrest; however, the military decided to step in.

The coup represents a major setback for France. Paris has invested heavily in the country both financially and militarily with over $1 billion in funding and 5,000 soldiers. Many Malians are now calling on the French to withdraw their troops following the perceived lack of progress.

The instability created by the coup also heightens the risk that Islamic extremist insurgents and Tuareg rebels may look to exploit the situation. With the Malian military struggling to maintain control over large parts of the country, France has recently increased its efforts and is seeking increased European military support.

SOLACE GLOBAL ADVICE