INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The attack comes a day after a vehicle explosion killed at least eight people near the Red Fort landmark in Delhi, India, although there is so far no evidence linking the two events.

Suicide bombings in Islamabad have been less common in recent years relative to other Pakistani urban centres. The city is Pakistan’s most securitised urban space, containing security checkpoints and fortified zones to prevent such attacks.

There is no official confirmation of the perpetrator’s affiliation. Pakistani media has accused “Fitna al-Khawarij”, a term often applied to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which primarily operates in regions next to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The group has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Pakistan’s major cities, including a 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, a 2017 suicide bombing in Lahore, and a 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Karachi. The group has previously targeted Islamabad, attempting a suicide bombing in Islamabad’s government district in December 2022. In August 2025, Pakistan’s intelligence agency announced that it foiled a planned TTP suicide car bombing. Early assessment suggests that the TTP are the most likely perpetrators of the Islamabad District Judicial Court bombing, although there are multiple other terrorist threat actors present in Pakistan.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has also claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the country. PBIEDs are often used by the group; however, most of ISKP’s attacks have taken place in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the group has not previously targeted Islamabad. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is also active in Balochistan, with typical targets including Pakistani security forces, infrastructure projects, and government installations in the Balochistan region.

The attack comes amid heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamabad has frequently accused the Afghan Taliban-led government of allowing TTP militants safe havens across the border, from which attacks are launched into Pakistan. Recent tensions escalated into airstrikes conducted by Pakistan on TTP targets in Kabul on 15 October, following TTP raids on Pakistani military posts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that killed 11 on 11 October.

If confirmed to be TTP, already high tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan will highly likely further increase. There is a realistic possibility that Pakistan will conduct further cross-border strikes into Afghanistan targeting TTP hideouts. Additionally, Islamabad may suspend ongoing diplomatic engagement, fully close partially open border crossings, and/or impose further travel restrictions on Afghan nationals.

Islamabad has also frequently blamed New Delhi for supporting the TTP as a proxy to destabilise Pakistan, and Pakistani media have accused the perpetrators of the attack of being “India-backed”. There is a realistic possibility that protests will occur close to the High Commission of India in Islamabad, although demonstrations are generally restricted inside the diplomatic zone and are likely to be met with a heavy security presence.

A heightened security presence across major cities in Pakistan is highly likely, with increased security checkpoints and road closures. Heightened security will highly likely lead to increased travel disruptions in the short term. Intensified security operations in the border regions, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and/or Balochistan, are highly likely.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Red Fort, also known as the Lal Qila, is a Mughal-era fort located in the old city and is a popular tourist destination with heavy foot traffic. The location of the blast in the area and near a traffic hub likely suggests that, if the explosion is terrorism-related, its perpetrators sought to maximise civilian casualties while also obtaining maximum visibility for their actions.

While a possible terrorist link has not been confirmed by authorities as of the time of reporting, the incident occurred only hours after two separate terror plots were reportedly thwarted by Indian authorities. On the night of 9-10 November, Indian police reported the arrest of seven individuals in Faridabad, part of the Delhi National Capital Region, who were reportedly found in possession of approximately 360 kilograms of explosive material and a “large cache of arms and ammunition”. Authorities reported that the suspects were linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a separatist-Islamist group based in Kashmir.

On 9 November, three individuals were arrested in Gujarat and found in possession of several firearms and approximately 4 kilograms of ricin precursors. Indian authorities have suggested that they had had links with an Afghanistan-based operative of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). In late October, Indian authorities had already arrested two suspected ISKP-linked operatives for planning attacks in New Delhi on Diwali.

If the Red Fort blast is confirmed as terrorism, there is a realistic possibility that the attack is linked to the reported foiled plots, with the perpetrators seeking to quickly conduct an attack due to the increased threat of discovery. Moreover, confirmation of an act of terrorism, particularly if linked to JeM, would highly likely increase tensions between India and Pakistan.

Transport disruptions are highly likely following the blast, with potential closures to the metro and likely road closures in the area. Furthermore, there is highly likely to be a heightened security presence in Delhi and other major cities, with increased checkpoints.

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INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

While the organisers of the march to Novi Sad have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to peaceful protest, the possibility of political violence on 31 October and 1 November cannot be ruled out. The past twelve months of anti-government protests have significantly deepened divisions in Serbia’s political landscape, and there have been repeated cases of targeted attacks against anti-government protesters during past demonstrations. Moreover, the anniversary falls only days after a shooting occurred outside the Serbian parliament, in an area where supporters of the president had erected an improvised “encampment”. The shooting injured one, and Vučić described it as a “terrorist attack”.

Should the protests turn violent, Serbian police are likely to use heavy-handed crowd control measures such as pepper spray, tear gas, stun grenades and water cannons. These tactics have previously intensified unrest, with their use during past demonstrations often provoking larger turnouts, escalating clashes, and fuelling public anger over perceived police brutality.

While the main rallying point for the demonstrators will be the vicinity of the Novi Sad train station, the protests are likely to create disruptions throughout the city’s centre. In past demonstrations, protesters blocked the city’s main bridges over the Danube, as well as the main roadways leading to and from the city. Even in the absence of violent unrest, the protests are likely to result in traffic disruptions in and around Novi Sad.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Tanzania’s ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has held power since the country’s independence in 1961, initially through its predecessor party, Tanzania Mainland (TANU). Since the 2015 election, which resulted in CCM achieving its smallest vote share of 58 per cent, the government has become increasingly authoritarian. Under incumbent president Samia Suluhu Hassan, the government has cracked down on opposition, civil society, and journalists.

The main opposition party, The Party for Democracy and Progress (CHADEMA), was barred from running in April 2025, with its leader, Tundu Lissu, arrested and charged with treason in response to pro-democracy protests. Luhaga Mpina, the presidential candidate for Alliance for Change and Transparency – Wazalendo (ACT-Wazalendo), was also disqualified from entering the race due to alleged procedural issues within the party’s nomination process.

The general election is widely perceived as cementing the continuation of CCM’s rule, with the party standing effectively unchallenged. Post-2015 elections have been characterised by observers as containing systematic fraud, intimidation, and obstruction. Electoral results have heavily favoured the government, with CCM securing 98.7 per cent of the vote share in the 2020 parliamentary elections and 99.3 per cent in the November 2024 local government elections. The ongoing general elections will highly likely result in the government achieving similarly high numbers to recent elections.

Tanzania has historically responded harshly to civil unrest. Following the 2020 elections, protests against government corruption erupted in Zanzibar. Security forces responded forcefully, with reports of soldiers, police, and a militia linked to the CCM beating civilians and using live ammunition against demonstrators, killing nine. Thousands also demonstrated in January 2024 to demand constitutional changes to reform the electoral commission and reduce presidential powers.

Authorities will highly likely enforce the curfew severely in an attempt to prevent the protests from gaining traction. If the protests continue, the authorities will highly likely respond with crackdowns including mass arrests, tear gas, water cannon, and potentially live ammunition. Internet shutdowns are almost certainly being imposed to prevent the spread of anti-government sentiment, particularly among the youth, with large-scale ‘Gen Z’ protests leading to the ousting of governments in Nepal and Madagascar in recent months.

There is a realistic possibility that major protests will spread beyond Dar es Salaam and become widespread across Tanzania’s urban centres, including Dodoma and Zanzibar, where military personnel have reportedly been deployed. If civil unrest escalates, airport disruptions are likely, with airlines potentially cancelling flights and roadblocks preventing access to major airports.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Protests are highly likely to intensify across major cities and Bakary strongholds, such as Douala, Yaoundé, and Dschang, and could spread nationwide. A significant portion of the population almost certainly believes the vote count was manipulated and is highly likely to mobilise in support of Bakary. The violent confrontations that occurred on 15, 21, and 26 October indicate that demonstrations could rapidly turn violent. The perception that security forces have been stationed outside Bakary’s residence is likely to reinforce public anger and the potential for escalation.

Biya’s government has become increasingly repressive in recent years. Starting in 2016, harsh measures have been imposed on the Anglophone communities in the Northwestern and Southwestern regions, which comprise approximately 15 to 20 per cent of the population. At least 3,000 people have been killed and nearly 700,000 people displaced in the violence. The government has also cracked down on civil society, arresting and intimidating journalists and opposition figures, preventing criticism of the government, and denying permission for gatherings.

Cameroon’s population has struggled with unemployment and a rising cost of living. Cameroon’s young population remains politically disenfranchised, with many viewing the government as deeply corrupt under President Paul Biya, who has ruled since 1982. Bakary declaring victory will highly likely be perceived as a potential catalyst for widespread civil unrest, which could unseat the current government, almost certainly inspired by recent demonstrations in Nepal and Madagascar.

The 2018 election resulted in protests across the country led by opposition figure Maurice Kamto, which the government responded to with a heavy crackdown and excessive force against demonstrators. Security forces have demonstrated similar patterns in response to recent demonstrations, and anti-government demonstrations will almost certainly be met with severe crackdowns, with security forces highly likely to use live ammunition, crowd-dispersal measures such as tear gas and water cannon, internet blackouts, and mass arrests.

If civil unrest escalates, airport disruptions are likely, with airlines potentially cancelling flights and roadblocks preventing access to major airports. Curfews could also be imposed, further disrupting transportation.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Hurricane Melissa is the 13th named storm of 2025’s Atlantic hurricane season (June to November), with the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration having previously predicted an above-normal season with between 13 to 18 named storms and three to five major hurricanes.

Hurricane Melissa is the third Category 5 Atlantic hurricane of the season. However, unlike the other Category 5 hurricanes, Erin and Humberto, which reached such intensities further east over the Atlantic, Melissa is forecast to directly make landfall in Jamaica and then Cuba and will likely have a far more severe level of impact. Moreover, the hurricane is currently moving at only eight kilometres per hour, considered very slow, which, if sustained, will likely exacerbate the impact of the storm.

A country’s disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, remains the most critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. Jamaica is assessed by GDACS as having Medium vulnerability. While mandatory evacuation orders have been issued for at-risk areas, officials have indicated that uptake has not been high enough and are reportedly considering enforcement of the orders. Hurricane Beryl in the summer of 2024 led to at least four deaths in Jamaica and USD 204 million in damages. Melissa will almost certainly have a higher level of impact, with the potential to be the worst hurricane to have ever hit Jamaica.

In Cuba, Melissa is forecast to make landfall at either Category 3 or 4 strength late 28 October or early 29 October local time, with the city of Santiago de Cuba highly likely to be heavily impacted. Cuba has already over the past year been heavily impacted by a series of nationwide power blackouts, leading to rare instances of civil unrest, with these issues with the nation’s energy infrastructure almost certain to be exacerbated by Hurricane Melissa. After Cuba, Melissa is anticipated to impact both the eastern Bahamas and the Turks & Caicos Islands on late 29 October, likely at a reduced strength of Category 2 or 3. The hurricane is not anticipated to have a major impact on the eastern seaboard of the United States.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Despite President Jerí announcing that the death of the protester would be “objectively investigated” and that they would face the “full force of the law”, the killing of Ruiz has almost certainly deepened anti-government sentiment and inflamed protests. This has been further exacerbated by President Jerí’s refusal to step down amid escalating pressure from Peru’s parliament.

The state of emergency will likely be imposed to quell civil unrest over the weekend. Previous bouts of civil unrest in the country, such as the December 2022 to March 2023 demonstrations against the removal of Former President Pedro Castillo from office, have led to the government imposing similar states of emergency.

Under the expanded powers, the government will highly likely deploy military forces, impose curfews, and conduct mass arrests. The state of emergency imposed in 2022 failed to deal with the civil unrest, instead resulting in alleged human rights abuses, such as the use of live ammunition against protesters and forced disappearances; protests continued for months, inflamed by the perceived excessive force used by security forces.

It is likely that a state of emergency resulting in harsher measures by security forces will exacerbate protests. Demonstrations are highly likely over the weekend and into next week.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

This almost certainly constitutes the most significant threat to President Rajoelina’s rule since the disputed 2023 re-election, with the military unit that installed him in 2009 now attempting to oust him. While it is currently unclear to what extent CAPSAT has seized control of the government, the lack of statements from Rajoelina likely confirms reports that he has fled the country.

A previous coup took place in Madagascar in 2009 following a political crisis driven by tensions between President Marc Ravalomanana and opposition forces led by Rajoelina, then mayor of Antananarivo. Following months of protests and clashes, soldiers stormed and seized the Ambohitsorohitra Presidential Palace in March, forcing Ravalomanana to transfer power to a military council, after which the military junta formally handed over power to Rajoelina.

Following the coup, many of Ravalomanana’s supporters refused to accept the legitimacy of Rajoelina’s new government and staged demonstrations in the capital, to which security forces cracked down, resulting in at least 30 to 40 deaths, according to some estimates, in the immediate weeks after the coup. Prominent supporters of Ravalomanana were detained or forced into hiding, and journalists and media critics of the new leadership were censored or attacked. The situation was finally resolved after nine months, with a power-sharing agreement put in place in November 2009.

Another coup was attempted in November 2010 following factional divisions within the military; fighting broke out in Antananarivo, leaving several people dead before loyalist forces regained control.

Significant economic disruptions took place. Rajoelina announced a freeze of all mining contracts with foreign companies due to their alleged failure to pay the required fees and royalties. Major partners such as the World Bank, IMF, EU, and US, suspended aid or downgraded relations, causing foreign aid to drop by over 60 per cent between 2008 and 2010. The tourist sector, a major component of Madagascar’s economy, was severely hit. Hotels, tour operators, and related businesses experienced declines in revenue, triggering extensive layoffs from the hospitality industry and informal sectors that depended on tourism, deepening economic hardship and exacerbating poverty rates nationwide.

Following the ongoing coup, continued instability and protests are highly likely. Rajoelina has seen sporadic counterdemonstrations among supporters in Antananarivo, and these will likely be motivated to engage in pro-Rajoelina rallies in the capital. The military, which is currently attempting to restore order in the country, will highly likely respond to demonstrations with forceful crackdowns, which could trigger further unrest.

The broader protest movement, however, had Rajoelina’s resignation as one of its primary demands. There is a realistic possibility that the widespread Gen Z-led demonstrations will subside following the coup. CAPSAT’s apparent siding with protesters was almost certainly a calculated move to bring an end to the ongoing unrest. Furthermore, access to protest organiser Gen Z Madagascar’s Facebook page is currently restricted, something that could prevent widespread demonstrations from being organised.

However, the 2009 coup exacerbated economic difficulties, a spark for the current wave of unrest, and a further worsening of living conditions will likely increase the risk of unrest.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The anniversary of the 7 October attack will likely result in an increased risk of civil unrest and terrorism, particularly in Western Europe. This will highly likely be particularly severe in the countries that have had recent large-scale ‘Global Sumud Flotilla’ protests, particularly Italy, France, Spain, Germany and the UK, as protest organisers seek to maximise pressure on their governments and capitalise on the large attendance during the previous demonstrations.

Civil unrest is highly likely to consist of both large-scale demonstrations and small-scale targeted direct actions meant to affect local transport and services. The former are highly likely to target high-visibility areas like the vicinity of Israeli diplomatic offices, local government buildings, and the headquarters of companies perceived to be supporting the Israeli war effort.

A common tactic seen in previous protests is the blockade of main roadways, such as the ring roads that surround most large European cities. In terms of direct action, protesters may seek to carry out targeted acts of vandalism against private and public assets, and particularly company offices, or blockades of public transport hubs, such as train and metro stations and airports. While lower, the threat of more sophisticated acts aimed at causing disruptions, such as the targeting of electrical infrastructure or the use of drones to disrupt airport operations, cannot be ruled out.

The increased likelihood of terrorism on 7 October is driven by the date’s symbolic importance. In addition to the thwarted plot in Germany in early October 2025, there have been several foiled or successful terrorist attacks in Europe and North America, which have coincided with notable dates associated with Judaism or Israeli history. This most recently occurred with the 2 October Manchester synagogue stabbing attack on Yom Kippur, which killed two people and was perpetrated by a highly likely self-radicalised “lone wolf” inspired by extremist Islamist ideology.

While 7 October 2025 remains the most high-risk date for both civil unrest and terrorism, the threat is likely to remain elevated in the short term following the attack anniversary. Protests are highly likely to occur on the 10-13 October period, the first weekend following the anniversary and the second anniversary of the beginning of the Israeli invasion of Gaza. Moreover, ongoing significant developments in negotiations between Hamas and Israel are highly likely to serve as triggers for demonstrations.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The protests, Morocco’s largest in years, come amid widespread youth frustrations with unemployment, education, and healthcare. According to the national statistics agency, Morocco has an unemployment rate of 12.8 per cent, with youth unemployment standing at 35.8 per cent, and 19 per cent among graduates. The protests have targeted the government, which is perceived as neglecting public services while investing billions of dollars into football infrastructure ahead of hosting the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations and co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

The catalyst for the public anger was the deaths of eight pregnant women in the maternity ward of a public hospital in Agadir following caesarean operations in September, which had initially sparked smaller-scale protests. According to the World Health Organisation, Morocco has fewer than eight doctors per 10,000 people, far below the recommended 25.

The government’s appeal for dialogue is unlikely to appease protesters in the short term. The civil unrest likely constitutes a culmination of public anger after years of neglect in public services, a state of affairs unlikely to be quickly remedied. The government statement defended the security forces’ crackdown, praising the “balanced reaction of security authorities in line with relevant legal procedures”. This will highly likely further inflame the unrest, with the van ramming being widely shared across social media. The further deaths of protesters on 1 October will almost certainly add to protester anger, likely sustaining the civil unrest.

The Gen Z 212 movement, which emerged in the weeks prior, has rapidly gained traction across social media. The “212” almost certainly refers to Morocco’s country code, suggesting that organisers view themselves as part of a broader youth-driven movement. The demonstrations share key traits with other Gen Z-led protests in the region: mobilisation through online platforms, an explicitly leaderless structure, and a lack of formal ties to political parties.

These protests are highly likely inspired by similar youth movements, including the recent Nepalese unrest that overthrew the government, as well as ongoing mobilisation across Africa, notably in Kenya and, most recently, Madagascar. It is highly likely that the global surge in youth protests will lead to further civil unrest across many other African countries, where economic frustrations, such as unemployment and a rising cost of living, are similarly felt among the population, particularly Gen Z.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Madagascar is one of the world’s poorest countries. According to a 2022 report from the World Bank, 75.2 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. Poverty rates have remained high over the past decade, with rural poverty decreasing marginally while urban poverty has almost doubled. Many households suffer from overlapping deprivations in health, education, sanitation, and infrastructure.

​The poor economic situation is exacerbated by Madagascar’s high vulnerability to environmental risks, including cyclones and droughts. Damage from four tropical storms in 2022 was estimated to have cost as much as 5 per cent of Madagascar’s GDP.

The protests have been in line with other Gen Z-led protest movements in Africa. The movement gained momentum on social media, which was used to mobilise protests, coordinate meeting points, and share live updates.

Smaller demonstrations were also observed in provincial towns like Toamasina, Antsirabe, Toliara, and Antsiranana, likely reflecting wider discontent with the incumbent government.

The lack of political figures among the protesters highlights the grassroots nature of the movement. The use of Straw Hat Jolly Roger, which was widely used in the recent Nepalese protests which deposed the government, suggests a broader Gen Z-focused sentiment and the potential desire of a far more radical intent to likewise overthrow the government.

There is a realistic possibility that the government’s strict measures to curtail the protests will succeed. While protesters defied the protest ban on 25 September, the demonstrators were largely made up of relatively small groups. The authorities will likely impose internet and social media restrictions to stop protesters from being able to mobilise. This will also likely limit the circulation of footage of excessive force, which has the capacity to further fuel anti-government sentiment.

The government’s reaction to demonstrations, particularly security forces’ use of force, is highly likely to be perceived as excessive. If footage spreads across social media of security forces using live ammunition against protesters, this could significantly inflame demonstrations, despite a lack of leadership. The rhetoric of protest organisers indicates broader anti-government sentiment, which could escalate unrest motivated by more radical objectives.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The two planned events will likely exacerbate security threats and result in disruption during the day. The marches are scheduled to begin on opposite sides of the Thames and converge in Whitehall. While the Metropolitan Police will likely be able to secure the two marches’ route and prevent the two sides from coming into contact in Whitehall, there is a realistic possibility of occasional clashes between dispersed groups of protesters throughout the day, and particularly near public transport hubs that both marches’ attendees will likely have to use to reach the assembly points.

Note that several major football games will be held in London on 13 September. This will likely further stretch the resources of the Metropolitan Police and is likely to further exacerbate the threat of dispersed violence and clashes during the day, with public transport hubs again being particularly at risk.

The threat of clashes is likely to be highest before 11:00 local time and in the late afternoon, after the end of the rallies and the football games.

Finally, there is a remote possibility of more serious political violence occurring in connection with the event. While not directly linked with it, the march is scheduled to take place only days after the assassination of a prominent American right-wing political commentator. The killing has resulted in a surge in calls for political violence on English-speaking social media, targeting prominent right-wing and left-wing figures, as well as activists.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The protests follow a period of worsening relations between Israel and the United Kingdom, linked with the ongoing war in Gaza. Recent developments in both Gaza and the United Kingdom are likely to exacerbate the protests. First, on 6 September, UK police carried out around 900 arrests at a pro-Palestine demonstration in central London, with the majority of the arrested being accused of supporting a proscribed terror group, Palestine Action. Second, on 9 September, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) issued evacuation orders for the entirety of Gaza City, in preparation for a large-scale offensive meant to occupy the city. Third, Israel launched a series of high-profile airstrikes in Doha on 9 September targeting Hamas’ exiled leadership, a move that has been widely condemned by the international community.

The Metropolitan Police will likely be able to secure the areas of Whitehall and St James’s Square during the scheduled meeting, and the protests are likely to remain peaceful. However, the unrest is highly likely to result in transport disruptions in the nearby areas, particularly affecting the nearby public transport system. Cases of sporadic violence and vandalism, particularly targeting large multinational companies linked to Israel, cannot be discounted. Direct action-style protests, including road and public transport blockades, remain likely during the 10-11 September period.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The attack is unprecedented and almost certainly a significant escalation with ramifications across the Arabian Peninsula. The most immediate ramifications are highly likely to be a dramatic breakdown in ceasefire negotiations, condemnation from the Gulf States, and increased civil unrest in urban centres globally.

Since 2012, Qatar has hosted the Hamas political leadership in exile. It has been this external leadership that has engaged in ceasefire negotiations with Israel, facilitated by international mediators, which have included Qatar. It is almost certain that the attack marks an end to this arrangement. The impact of this is twofold: first, the previously ongoing ceasefire negotiations are likely to completely collapse, given that the Hamas negotiating team has reportedly been largely killed. Second, power within Hamas will likely further concentrate within on-the-ground militants in the Gaza Strip, who have been more hardline and less amenable to any potential diplomacy.

Qatar is a major non-NATO ally of the US, hosting the Al-Udeid Air Base, which is currently the largest US military installation in the Middle East. According to a senior Israeli official talking to Israeli media, US President Donald Trump gave the green light for the Israeli strike in Qatar. Just days prior, on 7 September, Trump issued a “last warning” to Hamas to accept a deal to release all the hostages. If Washington’s approval of the strike is confirmed, the attack almost certainly follows the previous ultimatum, and it is likely that there will be major diplomatic ramifications among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While Qatar’s relations with other GCC states have previously experienced significant strain, it is almost certain that GCC states will strongly condemn the attack.

It is highly likely that civil unrest will result from the attack. Pro-Palestine protests will likely be organised outside Israeli and US embassies across the Middle East, and protests will also highly likely be organised in major European and US cities.