US President Donald Trump again declared on 10 July that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and its ceasefire with Iran were “over”. The Trump administration reportedly gave demands to Iran to publicly acknowledge that the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) is open and pledge to cease conducting attacks against commercial vessels.  

On 11 July, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attacked the Cyprus-flagged container ship M/V GFS Galaxy transiting the SoH. The IRGC stated it had fired a warning shot at a vessel attempting to use an “unauthorised route” and declared the SoH closed “until further notice”. The US responded with strikes against approximately 140 Iranian targets, which US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated included missile and drone sites, naval capabilities, ammunition storage facilities, communication networks and coastal surveillance radars.

On 12 July, Iran launched retaliatory strikes across the region. Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman all reported attempted Iranian attacks. Air defences were also activated in the UAE, although officials later claimed this was for Iranian projectiles outside of “UAE borders”.

The US conducted a further wave of strikes overnight 12-13 July, with CENTCOM stating it hit “dozens of targets”. In the Khuzestan province of Iran, a local official claimed that a US strike hit an agricultural water pumping station, according to Iranian media. However, this has not been confirmed. On 13 July, the IRGC conducted a further round of retaliation strikes against targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain.

On 13 July, President Trump announced that the US would reimpose a naval blockade on Iranian ports and levy a 20 per cent charge on all cargo transiting the SoH, to go into effect on 14 July. Also on 13 July, the UAE’s Defence Ministry reported that Iranian missiles hit two UAE tankers in the SoH. The IRGC claimed it had “struck and disabled” two “rogue supertankers” that had ignored warnings and attempted to pass through an unauthorised route.

Overnight 13-14 July, the US conducted a third consecutive night of strikes in a five-hour mission against targets including Bushehr, Chah Bahar, Jask, Konarak, Abu Musa and Bandar Abbas, according to CENTCOM, with Iran then launching further waves of retaliation strikes against targets in Bahrain and Kuwait.

As of 14 July, the US Department of State maintains Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman at “Level 3: Reconsider Travel”.

As of 14 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

However, on 14 July, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB) which recommended that air operators should: “Not operate within the airspace of Bahrain (Bahrain FIR – OBBB), Kuwait (Kuwait FIR – OKAC), Qatar (Doha FIR – OTDF), the United Arab Emirates (Emirates FIR – OMAE), and the airspace over the waters of the Gulf of Oman within the FIR Muscat (OOMM)”.

Following an attempted Houthi attack against Abha International Airport, Saudi authorities issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) which closed Abha, Jizan and Najran airports until 18:00 local time, 14 July.

On 13 July, strikes were conducted against Sanaa International Airport in Houthi-controlled Yemen. The Yemeni Armed Forces of the Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) have claimed that they conducted the strikes to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing on Yemeni soil, while the Houthis have claimed that the strikes were conducted by Saudi Arabia. The attack was highly likely to have been conducted by Saudi Arabia, with Storm Shadow cruise missile (used by Saudi Arabia) fragments being reportedly found at the airport. Moreover, two US officials briefed the media that the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, asked US President Donald Trump for his backing for military action against the Houthis and had secured his support.

Later on 13 July, the Houthis launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and attack drones against Saudi Arabia. A statement by the Houthis claimed that the attempted strikes were targeting Abha International Airport (AHB), with Iranian media reporting that King Khalid Air Base (KKAB) was also targeted. KKAB is located in Khamis Mushait, close to Abha. A spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis stated that the ballistic missile threat was successfully intercepted. However, unverified footage shows smoke rising from KKAB, which could indicate that at least one Houthi projectile successfully penetrated Saudi air defences and struck KKAB.

The Houthi statement said that they “warn all airlines against flying through Saudi Arabian airspace and urge them to take our warnings seriously until the blockade on Sana’a International Airport is lifted.” This highly likely indicates the current main target priority for Houthi strikes is airports, with the Houthi attack having followed the strikes against Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, following the attempted Houthi attack against Abha International Airport, Saudi authorities issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) which closed Abha, Jizan and Najran airports until 18:00 local time, 14 July.

On 12 July, Kuwait’s Ministry of Defence issued a statement saying that three land border posts in the north of the country and one offshore drilling platform belonging to the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) were attacked, resulting in material damage. Based on prior attacks, it is highly likely that the northern border posts were attacked by Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq. Furthermore, the attack against an offshore platform likely indicates an expansion of Iranian targeting beyond US military targets to include energy infrastructure targets.

On 13 July, air defences were again activated in Kuwait with the IRGC claiming that it struck US military infrastructure at Ahmad al-Jaber and Ali Al Salem air bases, which are both close to Kuwait City.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Kuwait’s airspace.

On 12 July, air defences were activated multiple times in Bahrain. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the US Navy’s 5^th Fleet Headquarters in Manama was struck during an Iranian attack.

Early on 13 July, the IRGC claimed to have struck US military infrastructure at the Isa Air Base in southern Bahrain, and air raid sirens were again activated multiple times throughout the day. Bahrain’s military claimed that an unspecified number of Iranian missiles and attack drones were intercepted.

On 14 July, air raid sirens were again activated multiple times, with Iranian state media claiming that several US military targets in the Jaffair area of Manama (where the US Navy’s 5^th Fleet Headquarters is located) were struck.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Bahrain’s airspace.

On 12 July, air defences were activated in Qatar, with explosions heard overhead in Doha. The IRGC claimed that it had targeted Al Udeid Air Base southwest of Doha, with Qatar’s Ministry of Defence claiming that the missile attack was intercepted. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior stated that three people, including a child, were injured by debris due to interception operations.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, Qatar’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Qatar’s airspace.

Excluding attacks in the maritime domain, no confirmed attacks have been reported in the UAE between 10 and 14 July. However, on 12 July, the UAE’s National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority (NCEMA) announced that air defence systems were responding to a missile threat. The NCEMA later stated that the “missile threats detected this morning were outside UAE borders”.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, the UAE’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in the UAE’s airspace.

On 12 July, Iranian attack drones were launched at targets in the Musandam and Al Batinah Central Governorates, Oman. The IRGC claimed that an air radar and a vessel detection radar were targeted and destroyed in Oman. This is the first occasion the IRGC has publicly claimed to have conducted an attack against Omani territory since the start of the conflict on 28 February. Previously, Iranian officials either formally denied having conducted attacks or left them unattributed. The IRGC’s public acknowledgement of attacks in Oman likely indicates that Iran is increasingly willing to treat Omani territory as a legitimate target and is less constrained by the political costs of openly conducting strikes in Oman.

The IRGC also claimed to have attacked US-linked logistics and refuelling facilities at Duqm Port, Oman, on 12 July. The port is dual-purpose and is sometimes used to sustain US naval operations. However, the claim has not been independently verified, and Omani authorities have not publicly confirmed that any projectile reached or damaged the port.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, Oman’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in the Gulf of Oman in Oman’s airspace.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The convergence of France’s World Cup semi-final appearance and Bastille Day is likely to generate large crowds and widespread celebrations. This will likely increase the risk of disorder, violence and vandalism across Paris and other major French cities. Crowds will likely begin forming early for Bastille Day events and remain in public spaces to watch the World Cup semi-final. This is likely to result in high crowd densities throughout the day and well into the evening.

Past notable club- and national-level football games have resulted in large-scale and often violent disorder in major French cities. In 2026, several Champions League games involving Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) were followed by dispersed clashes and vandalism throughout central Paris and suburban areas. On 9-10 July, the World Cup quarterfinal game between France and Morocco also resulted in some isolated clashes; however, the deployment of a large police presence likely limited the scale of the disorder.

Cases of unrest could begin in the late afternoon but are likely to intensify during the night, peaking after the game’s conclusion. If the police intervene to counter disorder, there is a realistic possibility of escalation.

Previous clashes were marked by the widespread use of fireworks to attack police, posing a risk to bystanders, and by indiscriminate attacks on transiting private vehicles, with passengers also occasionally being harassed or attacked.

In Paris, unrest is likeliest to take place on the Champs-Élysées and in the Champ de Mars, with other high-risk areas including Trocadéro and Concorde. While most of the higher-risk areas for unrest are in northwest Paris, incidents in other parts of the city, such as the Marais area, République, Canal St. Martin, and Bastille, cannot be ruled out.

Following the earlier reported Iranian strikes against vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) overnight 6-7 July, the US conducted strikes against Iran, which were followed by Iran launching attacks against targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan.

Overnight on 7-8 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted strikes against Iran, stating that it hit more than 80 targets, including Iranian air defence systems, command and control networks (C2), coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities, and more than 60 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) fast attack craft in and near the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). Iranian media reported explosions in the southern port city of Sirik, on Qeshm Island and in areas near Bandar Abbas. A US official described the strikes as larger than previous US retaliatory strike packages against Iran. Concurrently, the US Treasury revoked the sanctions waiver that had permitted the open sale of Iranian oil on international markets under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). In retaliation, Iran conducted strikes against targets in Bahrain and Kuwait on 8 July.

Speaking at the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, on 8 July, US President Donald Trump stated that he believed the MoU with Iran was “over” and that, while he might allow peace talks to continue, he considered them a “waste of time”, referring to the Iranian leadership as “scum”.

Overnight on 8-9 July, the US conducted a larger round of strikes. CENTCOM stated it hit approximately 90 targets across Iran. Preliminary reports indicate that US strikes also targeted Iranian bridges, with state media reporting a strike on a railway bridge in Golestan province, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reporting two bridges struck on the route to Mashhad. Other reported targets in Iran have included Iranshahr Airport (IHR / OIZI) in the Sistan‑Baluchestan province and Iranian port infrastructure, including the Shahid Beheshti Port, Kalantari Port, and the maritime traffic control tower maritime traffic control tower at Chabahar, Iran’s only deepwater port and the most important port outside of the Persian Gulf. Iran responded on 9 July by conducting strikes against targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan.

Later on 9 July, Iranian media outlets claimed that further strikes were being conducted in southern Iran, including reported explosions heard in Bushehr, Bandar Abbas, and Sirik. However, US officials have stated that no further strikes were conducted on 9 July, with one official claiming this was the result of de-escalation efforts. Following a meeting by President Trump with his national security team on 9 July, a US official briefed that the US is “still committed to finding a resolution, and technical-level talks continue”.

On 10 July, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, stated that attacks on infrastructure will be met with retaliation and that Israel would not be excluded from potential retaliation strikes. IRGC-affiliated media also argued on 8 July that Iran should respond to US aggression by disrupting Gulf oil exports and damaging regional energy infrastructure.

As of 10 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 7 and 10 July.

Following the recent escalation in tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen-based Houthis, further threats have been issued. On 7 July, the Houthi political bureau member Abdullah al-Nuaimi issued an ultimatum to Saudi Arabia. The ultimatum threatened to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait (BaM) and the Red Sea to Saudi shipping if the naval and aerial blockades of the Houthis are not lifted. Al-Nuaimi added that Saudi Arabia “may decide to enter a new war against Yemen, but it will not be able to stop it, and the situation will spiral out of control.”

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 10 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

Following escalation in the maritime domain and US strikes against Iran, air raid sirens sounded in Kuwait on 8 July. The IRGC claimed a joint missile and drone operation against Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, with Kuwaiti authorities stating that two ballistic missiles and 13 drones were intercepted. Authorities initially reported no material damage or injuries from the attack. However, the Ministry of Electricity, Water, and Renewable Energy announced that a number of overhead power transmission lines went out of service due to debris from interceptions.

Following further US strikes against Iran, air raid sirens sounded multiple times in Kuwait on 9 July. The Iranian military claimed that it conducted attacks against a “Patriot missile interceptor system”, Ali Al Salem Air Base, and Camp Arifjan in Kuwait. Kuwaiti authorities stated that three ballistic missiles, one cruise missile, and ten attack drones were detected in Kuwaiti airspace, and that all of the projectiles were successfully intercepted. Authorities stated that debris resulted in material damage in several locations and one injury.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 10 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

Following escalation in the maritime domain and US strikes against Iran, air raid sirens sounded multiple times in Bahrain on 8 July. The IRGC claimed a joint missile and drone operation against the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, and Iranian state media claimed attack drones targeted the Isa Air Base in southern Bahrain. Bahraini authorities stated that air defence systems intercepted an unspecified number of projectiles.

Following further US strikes against Iran, air raid sirens sounded multiple times in Bahrain on 9 July. The IRGC claimed to have launched joint missile and drone operations targeting the US Fifth Fleet headquarters and Isa Air Base. Bahraini authorities stated that air defence systems intercepted an unspecified number of projectiles. Explosions were audible in Manama, and unverified footage indicates that at least one Iranian projectile may have directly hit the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 10 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

In the early morning of 9 July, Qatar’s Interior Ministry issued an urgent security alert stating that the “[S]ecurity threat level is high and everyone must adhere to staying in homes and safe places.” This is the first time in nearly three months that Qatar residents have received an elevated security threat message. Less than an hour later, the Interior Ministry announced an end to the security threat and stated that the situation had returned to normal. The Iranian military claimed to have targeted an “early warning system” in Qatar with attack drones, following US strikes against Iran.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 10 July, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 7 and 10 July.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 10 July, the UAE’s airspace is open.

Excluding attacks in Omani waters in the Strait of Hormuz, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 7 and 10 July.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 10 July, Oman’s airspace is open.

The funeral of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the early stages of the conflict, began on 4 July and is set to conclude on 9 July, with ceremonies hosted in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad. Qatar’s foreign ministry had earlier said that US-Iran negotiations will be paused during the funeral and will resume after 9 July. International media reported that as many as 12 million people have attended the processions, with some mourners recorded chanting “death to the compromiser” in reference to President Masoud Pezeshkian for engaging in negotiations with the US.

Overnight 6-7 July, the UK Maritime Trade Operations stated that a tanker had been hit by an “unknown projectile” close to the coast of Oman. The tanker was later identified as the Marshall Islands-flagged Qatari LNG tanker AL REKAYYAT (IMO: 9397339). Further reports indicate that another vessel, the Saudi Arabia-flagged crude oil tanker WEDYAN (IMO:9524970), was also struck overnight. US officials have briefed that Iran’s military fired at least two missiles at commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), and that both vessels suffered significant damage but no casualties.

As of 7 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Jordan between 3 and 7 July.

At least 29 people have been injured in Jordan, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Jordan’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 3 and 7 July.

On 3 July, the Houthis’ military spokesman, Yahya Saree, announced that Houthi forces had confronted Saudi Arabian “warplanes” that allegedly attempted to prevent an Iranian civilian aircraft from landing at Sanaa International Airport in Houthi-controlled Yemen. The Houthi spokesman threatened that any allegedly repeated airspace violations would be retaliated against with strikes on Saudi Arabian airports and other “vital interests on land and sea”.

On 4 July, the spokesman of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG), Major-General Turki al-Maliki, pledged a response of “unprecedented determination and force” to any attempts to target Saudi Arabia or violate Yemeni sovereignty, dismissed the Houthi threats, and noted that the group’s posture had exposed civilian infrastructure in Houthi-controlled Yemen to potential targeting.

On 4-5 July, clashes between the Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces were reported south of Hodeidah, likely marking the most serious fighting between the two sides since 2024. On 5 July, a bulk carrier transiting the Red Sea reported being attacked by unknown armed assailants on a skiff, around 13 nm off the Yemen coast near Al-Durayhimi, a Houthi-controlled area. If confirmed as the Houthis, this would mark a further escalation, with the Houthis having suspended attacks against merchant vessels in recent months.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 3 and 7 July.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 3 and 7 July.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 3 and 7 July.

In response to the attack against the Qatari LNG tanker in the SoH overnight 6-7 July, Qatar’s foreign ministry stated that Tehran bore full legal responsibility for the attack. Qatar has been acting as a mediator, alongside Pakistan, between the US and Iran, with no Iranian attacks recorded against Qatar since the implementation of a ceasefire on 8 April.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 3 and 7 July.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, the UAE’s airspace is open.

Excluding attacks in Omani waters in the Strait of Hormuz, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 3 and 7 July.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 7 July, Oman’s airspace is open.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The attacks on both 2 and 7 July share multiple characteristics. Both attacks occurred in central Damascus, both attacks were in close proximity to a government ministry, and both attacks relied on planted explosive devices rather than firearms. Moreover, available footage of the second explosion (reportedly the more powerful blast) at the site does not suggest it was particularly large. The improvised explosive device (IED) detonated at the 2 July café bombing was a “crude [IED] weighing approximately one kilogram equipped with metal shrapnel”, according to the Ministry of Interior. These characteristics indicate that the attacks are likely connected, coordinated, and conducted by the same threat actor.

The attacks also follow another attack against a government ministry on 19 May, when a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) was detonated outside a Defence Ministry building in the Bab Sharqi district of Damascus, killing one soldier and injuring at least 21 people. Just before the explosion, soldiers had identified and defused a separate vehicle rigged with explosives in the same part of the city.

Overall, the attacks highlight that despite a gradually improving security environment in Damascus for foreign travellers since the fall of the Assad regime, the risk of terrorism remains high and regime forces are unable to fully secure central Damascus.

Potential perpetrators of the attack include Salafi jihadist terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, or Assad-regime remnant forces.

ISIS remains the most active terrorist group in Syria. Despite the Islamic State (IS) globally having shifted in strength towards sub-Saharan Africa, the group’s weekly newsletter al-Naba maintains a key focus on Syria and regularly calls for attacks against the Syrian transitional government (STG), which it classifies as “apostate”. Earlier this year in February, the ISIS spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari released a statement announcing a new phase of operations targeting the STG.

Moreover, ISIS channels have previously been observed as calling on supporters to kill foreigners travelling to Syria, with foreign travel to Syria having considerably increased since the fall of the Assad regime. This would align directly with the 7 July attack being conducted close to the Four Seasons Hotel, which hosts foreign diplomats, business travellers, and UN staff, and the attack occurring shortly after President Macron had left the area. Macron’s visit to Syria is notably the first visit by a Western leader to Syria under the STG, and an attack during his visit is likely calculated to undermine President al-Sharaa and Western involvement in Syria.

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah was formed in 2025 as a splinter of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the al-Sharaa-led Islamist rebel group which spearheaded the offensive that brought down the Assad regime in late 2024, by radicals who are disillusioned with the more moderate approach pursued by the government. The group shares much of its ideology with IS, and uses a similar communications style, although links between the two groups are unconfirmed. On 22 June 2025, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah militants carried out a suicide bombing in the Mar Elisa Greek Orthodox Church in Douailah, Damascus, during mass. The attack killed 30 people and injured more than 50, and remains the most deadly terrorist attack to have been conducted in Damascus since the fall of the Assad regime.

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Since the HTS-led takeover of Syria, the new al-Sharaa-led STG has cracked down on foreign jihadist fighters who were in the ranks of HTS, particularly Central Asian and North Caucasian militant factions. On 5 May, for example, Syrian security forces arrested over 24 Uzbek militants in Idlib, following an armed standoff between Uzbek fighters and security forces after a raid. In issue 547 of al-Naba published in May, ISIS called on former foreign fighters to join its ranks.

Assad-regime remnants also likely have incentives to have conducted the attacks, and previous unverified sources have suggested the initial investigations of the 2 July café have pointed away from ISIS; however, investigations remain in the early stages. In March 2025, major clashes broke out between STG forces and Assadist insurgents from Syria’s Alawite minority in Latakia and Tartus governorates. The 2 July café bombing, which killed six lawyers, occurred next to the Ministry of Justice, with trials ongoing for former regime figures such as Bashar al-Assad’s cousin, Atef Najib, and Syria’s former grand mufti, Ahmed Hassoun. Surviving Assad-regime networks could be attempting to disrupt the trials and discredit the STG, with the “primitive” nature of the IED on 2 July potentially pointing towards a smaller and less organised actor.

Other potential perpetrators include Druze and Kurdish militants, and Hezbollah. However, initial indications suggest that these actors are less likely to have conducted the attacks.

Druze militant violence has so far been localised in the south of Syria, with no established practice of conducting similar terrorist bombings. While some Kurdish hardliners in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintained opposition to integration into the STG following their effective defeat by STG forces in early 2026, such a campaign of bombings in Damascus would almost certainly undermine their legitimacy for little operational gain.

Finally, while US pressure has been applied against the STG to intervene in Lebanon against Hezbollah in recent days, Syria’s Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, has stated that Damascus has no intention of intervening in the country militarily. A regional expert briefing the media stated after the 2 July attack that there were no indications from Hezbollah’s supporters that pointed to Damascus as a target in recent days.

Security forces are highly likely to maintain a higher threat posture than usual in Damascus in the coming weeks, which will likely materialise with greater numbers of checkpoints and vehicle checks. Authorities may additionally conduct raids against suspected cells, which could lead to localised firefights in the vicinity of the raids. If the attack/s are attributed to Assad-regime remnants, there is a realistic possibility of a crackdown being launched in Latakia and Tartus governorates.

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Following the announcement of a renewed truce on 28 June, US and Iranian officials held indirect talks in Doha, Qatar, on 30 June and 1 July. Mediated by Pakistani and Qatari officials, the indirect talks were reportedly focused solely on technical issues related to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and the unfreezing of Iranian funds. Qatar’s Foreign Ministry has stated that the next meetings are scheduled to take place after the funeral processions for Iran’s now deceased former Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is scheduled to be buried on 9 July.

Iran’s chief negotiator and parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, gave an interview on 30 June in which he said that Iran will not enter further negotiations until conditions in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) are met, notably an end to conflict in Lebanon and the unfreezing of Iranian assets. Furthermore, Ghalibaf reiterated that Iran has sovereignty over the SoH with Oman and that fee-free transit through the SoH will be in place for only 60 days, as per the MoU. Ghalibaf stated that if “the dialogue is not implemented, we are also prepared for war”.

On 30 June, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that he had instructed the IDF to prepare plans for an independent strike against Iran, and that Israel would be ready to go to war “tomorrow”. This was echoed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who stated that Israel would strike Iran to counter the “existential threat” posed by its nuclear programme. Netanyahu also reiterated that Israeli forces would remain in Lebanon as long as Hezbollah constitutes a threat.

On 1 July, a US Navy MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter conducted an emergency landing in the Arabian Sea. US officials stated that “[t]here is no indication the emergency was caused by hostile action.” Three of the helicopter’s four-man crew were recovered, while one is missing as of 3 July.

On 2 July, official channels of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the country’s top operational military headquarters, stated that Iran would respond to any attempt by the US to challenge its control over the SoH, likely indicating its willingness to strike more vessels in the waterway.

On 3 July, US President Donald Trump stated that Iran had “agreed to just about everything” the US demanded during negotiations. On 1 July, US media had reported that the White House had considered options for a return to war but ultimately decided to focus on diplomatic efforts.

As of 3 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 30 June and 3 July.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 3 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 30 June and 3 July.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 3 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 30 June and 3 July.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 3 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 30 June and 3 July.

Qatar hosted the latest round of indirect US-Iran talks on 30 June and 1 July. Qatari officials reported “progress” in the talks and stated that the next round will occur after 9 July.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 3 July, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 30 June and 3 July.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 3 July, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 30 June and 3 July.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 3 July, Oman’s airspace is open.

On 26 June, the US launched strikes against targets in Iran. US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that airstrikes were conducted against Iranian missile and drone storage locations, in addition to coastal radar sites, around the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), as a “powerful response” to “unwarranted aggression” by Iran. The strikes followed the earlier Iranian attack against the Singapore-flagged EVER LOVELY (IMO: 9629110) on 26 June, after the vessel exited the SoH along the Omani coast. US Vice President JD Vance said following the US strikes that “violence will be met with violence”.

On 27 June, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched an attack drone which hit the Panama-flagged oil tanker KIKU (IMO: 9329796) transiting the SoH. Subsequently, the US conducted further strikes with CENTCOM stating that ten Iranian military targets were struck in sites including Sirik, Bandar-e Lengeh and Qeshm. This was followed by Iranian attack drone and ballistic missile launches against targets in Bahrain and Kuwait on 27 and 28 June, with the IRGC claiming to have targeted the Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. During the 28 June attacks against Bahrain, a residential building near Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was damaged, with no fatalities reported.

On 28 June, a US official stated that the US and Iran had agreed to halt attacks and renew talks. US President Donald Trump claimed on 29 June that Iran had “requested a meeting” to take place in Doha, Qatar, on 30 June. An Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson stated that while Iran is sending its technical delegation to Qatar this week, this has no relation to a concurrent visit by US envoys and no US-Iran talks are scheduled. However, a separate senior Iranian official has claimed there will be a meeting in Doha with a focus on managing the SoH and de-escalating tensions, while another official briefed that technical teams will meet separately with Qatari and Pakistani mediators on 30 June. Delegations from Iran and the US are in Qatar as of 30 June, but it remains unconfirmed whether any negotiations will go ahead and in what format.

In Lebanon, on 26 June, US officials announced that the Israeli and Lebanese sides had signed a new “framework agreement”. The new agreement allows the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to replace the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in two areas in southern Lebanon, commits Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon, and calls for the disarmament of all non-state groups in Lebanon. However, Israel’s Defence Minister, Israel Katz, later stated that Israel would maintain the security zone in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah rejected the agreement, and indicated that it would respond to any LAF disarmament attempts.

As of 30 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 26 and 30 June.

On 28 June, a helicopter belonging to the Saudi Arabian state-owned oil company Aramco crashed in Ras Tanura, resulting in the death of 14 people on board who were all Saudi citizens. Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Energy stated that “authorities have launched a full investigation to determine the cause of the crash”. The helicopter crash coincided with elevated tensions following the first kinetic strikes by the US against Iran since the signing of the MoU, and the Ras Tanura terminal has been previously targeted by Iranian strikes in the earlier full-scale regional conflict phase of the war. However, there is currently no available evidence that indicates the crash resulted from hostile action.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

On 28 June, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence stated that two “hostile ballistic missiles” were detected and intercepted inside Kuwaiti airspace, with no material damage or casualties. The IRGC claimed that it launched an attack against “key US military installations” which included the “Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait”, in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian territory.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

On 27 June, Bahraini authorities stated that an unspecified “number of Iranian drones” targeted Bahraini territory. This followed the first US strikes conducted against Iranian territory since the signing of the MoU. A US official anonymously briefed that this attack consisted of two attack drones, with one being shot down and the other landing harmlessly in a remote airfield area.

On 28 June, another attack took place, with Bahrain’s Interior Ministry announcing the interception of an unspecified number of projectiles. During this attack, a residential building near Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was damaged, with no fatalities reported. The IRGC claimed that it launched an attack against “key US military installations”, which included the “US Fifth Fleet headquarters at Salman Port in Bahrain”, in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian territory.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 26 and 30 June, excluding an incident involving a marine vessel which resulted in the death of one Qatari national. After a vessel with two individuals on board failed to return as scheduled on 27 June, search operations were conducted, which located the missing vessel. The Qatari national on board was killed by “shrapnel resulting from the military operations in the area”, and an “Arab resident was also injured” and transferred to hospital for medical treatment, according to the Qatari Ministry of Interior. It is likely that the incident resulted from the interception of Iranian attack drones during the attacks against targets Bahrain and Kuwait. Qatar’s Ministry of Transport subsequently announced a temporary suspension of marine activities involving recreational boats, fishing vessels, jet skis and other similar watercraft until further notice.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 26 and 30 June. On 26 June, phone alerts were issued in the UAE warning of potential missile threats. However, authorities have stated that this resulted from a technical malfunction in the early warning system.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 26 and 30 June, excluding attacks against vessels within Omani territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The preparations followed weeks of violence and disruption tied to anti-immigration unrest. On 28 June, the Ugandan government said one of its nationals was killed in a suspected anti-immigrant attack in KwaZulu-Natal and said 746 Ugandans had voluntarily registered for evacuation ahead of the 30 June protests. On 20 June, one person was killed during anti-immigrant rioting in central Pietermaritzburg, and local media said at least 1,000 Malawian nationals had fled to nearby Durban. By 17 June, local media reported that more than 600 Malawians had been repatriated from South Africa, with humanitarian services set up in Blantyre. According to South African police, at least 25,000 people, most of whom are from other African countries, have been repatriated.

The unrest also included attacks on foreign-owned businesses and properties, leading to cases of displacement. On 18 June, police stated that seven people were arrested near Vrede, Free State, after more than 15 foreign-owned shops were looted. On 15 June, South African media reported that at least 120 foreign nationals were camping outside a Home Affairs office in central Durban after being displaced by recent anti-migration rioting. On 8 June, residents in George reportedly attacked foreign-owned businesses before police dispersed them.

The rise of dedicated anti-migrant groups likely reflects the increasing organisation of anti-migrant movements in South Africa in recent years. Since 2022, Operation Dudula, meaning “to push”, has reportedly harassed migrant traders in Soweto and Johannesburg. The Dudula Movement concurrently emerged, acting as a vigilante organisation targeting foreign nationals believed to be undocumented. March and March, a self-described “grassroots citizen movement addressing growing concerns about undocumented immigration in South Africa”, is a newer movement aiming to mobilise citizens through “peaceful demonstrations and rallies”.

Migrants make up just under four per cent of South Africa’s population, equivalent to approximately 2.4 million people. Most originate from neighbouring countries, including Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Anti-migrant groups claim that there are also between three and five million undocumented migrants, although these figures are contested. A primary driver of anti-migrant sentiment is South Africa’s high unemployment rate, which remains above 30 per cent. Anti-migrant groups have mobilised this to frame migrants as direct competitors for jobs, housing, informal trading space, and state resources, amid rising economic instability triggered by the Strait of Hormuz closure.

This is the latest of a series of waves of unrest targeting foreign nationals and foreign-owned businesses, with major waves in 2008, 2015, and 2019. In 2008, at least 62 foreign nationals were killed, while in 2015, a wave of anti-foreigner violence that began in Durban and spread to Johannesburg left at least seven people dead and saw the widespread looting and burning of foreign-owned shops. In September 2019, renewed rioting concentrated in Johannesburg and Pretoria again targeted foreign-owned businesses and left roughly 12 people dead.

The 30 June protests are highly likely to be accompanied by incidents of vandalism and looting targeting foreign-owned businesses, as well as isolated violence. There is a realistic possibility that the protests will escalate into widespread clashes with security forces into the evening, particularly if they attempt to disperse protesters with measures perceived as excessive, such as tear gas, water cannon, rubber bullets, and mass arrests.

The ceasefires between the US, Israel, and Iran, and between Israel and Lebanon, remain extant. However, the agreements remain unstable. US Vice-President J.D. Vance stated on 25 June, that the United States and Iran had established a direct channel of communication in Doha to favour deconfliction and reduce the chance of the conflict resuming.

On 23 June, US President Donald Trump stated that US forces would halt their blockade of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). On the same day, the UN’s International Maritime Organisation (IMO) announced that it would, alongside Oman, begin coordinating the evacuation of approximately 11,000 personnel on board vessels that have remained within the SoH due to the conflict. On 25 June, the Islamic Security Guard Corps (IRGC) struck a vessel approximately 7.5 nautical miles southeast of Dahit, Oman. The attack followed IRGC statements that attempts to cross the SoH via the route designated by IMO would be “unacceptable”, and that all crossings would need to be coordinated with the newly-established Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), an Iranian government agency that is responsible for regulating traffic in the SoH. Following the strike, UN channels stated that they would pause evacuation efforts and noted that several vessels had already exited the waterway.

On 25 June, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it would hold talks with Oman to “define future administration and maritime services” in the SoH. US officials have reiterated their opposition to Iran’s plan to charge vessels transiting through the SoH.

On 24 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that its inspectors would visit Iranian enrichment sites under the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). On the following day, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi rejected the IAEA statement, claiming that there is “no plan” for future visits to Iranian nuclear sites.

On 25 June, the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council released a joint statement following a ministerial meeting in Bahrain. The statement reiterated “the enduring U.S. commitment to GCC security” and the “importance of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, noting that free, unconditional, and unrestricted navigation, including the right of transit passage as guaranteed under international law, remains essential to regional and global security”. The statement also condemned regional attacks by Iran and it proxies. On 26 June, Iranian diplomatic channels called the statement “provocative” and “interventionist”.

As of 26 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 23 and 26 June.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 23 and 26 June.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 23 and 26 June.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 23 and 26 June.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 23 and 26 June.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

On 25 June, IRGC forces carried out a strike that damaged a cargo vessel approximately 7.5 nautical miles from the coast of Dahit. MV EVER LOVELY (IMO: 9629110), a Singapore-flagged vessel, was reportedly struck by a projectile while transiting on the route designated by the IMO, with the impact causing limited damage to the bridge,

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Venezuela is highly exposed to seismic activity. The country is near the boundary between the Caribbean and South American tectonic plates, where plate motion is largely accommodated by major strike-slip fault systems across northern Venezuela, including the Boconó fault system. The 24 June earthquake southeast of Yumare occurred at a shallow depth and was associated with strike-slip faulting along this boundary.

Northern Venezuela has a history of significant seismic activity, though large earthquakes near the June 2026 epicentre have been relatively infrequent over the past century. On 21 August 2018, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake struck Venezuela’s northern coast, damaging dozens of buildings and causing multiple injuries across the country. More recently, in September 2025, magnitude 6.2 and 6.3 tremors near Mene Grande caused at least one death, injured more than 110 people, damaged homes and infrastructure, and were felt across several Venezuelan states and parts of Colombia.

Notable historical earthquakes include a 6.4 magnitude earthquake near Morón in 2009, which injured 18 people and damaged buildings, and a 6.0 magnitude event near Valencia in 1989 that caused minor damage. The most destructive modern earthquake in the wider region was the 1967 Caracas earthquake, which caused around 240 deaths, hundreds of injuries, collapsed several high-rise apartment buildings, and led to widespread destruction. Since 1900, at least five magnitude 7 or larger earthquakes have occurred in northern Venezuela or near its coast. However, it is highly likely that the damage, casualties and impact of the 24 June doublet earthquakes will be the worst in Venezuela in a century.

It is likely that aftershocks will be recorded near the epicentre in the short term. On 25 June, USGS assessed that there is a 94 per cent chance of at least one aftershock of magnitude 5 or above within the next week, and a 29 per cent chance of an aftershock of magnitude 6 or above. Even if lower-magnitude compared to the 24 June earthquake, aftershocks can still result in significant damage, causing critical failures in structures damaged during the initial shocks.

The death toll from the 24 June earthquakes will almost certainly considerably exceed the early estimates provided by the Venezuelan government. The impact of the tremors is highly likely to be compounded by the country’s poor disaster preparedness and emergency response infrastructure. Possible failures in government responses to the earthquakes could rapidly become catalysts for civil unrest in Venezuela, particularly as the country’s leadership has likely been destabilised by the US intervention that captured former President Maduro in January 2026. Previously a staunch geopolitical adversary of the US, Venezuela is now increasingly close to Washington as a result of the US intervention.

The economic impact will highly likely be severe and will fall on a state with minimal fiscal and institutional capacity to absorb it. Venezuela’s economy was already critically degraded prior to the earthquake, and the earthquake has had a severe impact on major economic hubs like the Caracas capital region. Acute humanitarian crisis, pre-existing economic crisis, destroyed utilities, and a transitional government which has contested legitimacy are all factors which could quickly materialise into an anti-government movement and violent civil unrest in the coming months.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Widespread youth-led protests have taken place in Kenya in both 2024 and 2025. In June and July 2024, a series of mass protests erupted in response to proposed tax increases in the government’s Finance Bill 2024. The unrest started in Nairobi, quickly spreading to other parts of the country. On 25 June, thousands of protesters stormed the parliamentary complex, setting fire to the Kenyan Parliament Building. Overall, at least 50 people were killed, and several hundred were injured as protesters clashed with security forces, who used live ammunition and conducted mass arrests.

Widespread protests were also staged in June and early July 2025, after a blogger was killed in police custody, with protesters demanding an end to police brutality. Security forces again responded with force, including live ammunition, tear gas, water cannon, and mass arrests. At least 65 people were killed, and over 550 people were injured. No significant concessions were made following the protests, and police brutality almost certainly remains a core grievance in Kenya.

The planned demonstrations are set to take place amid increased pressure on living costs, as well as frustrations over government plans to allow a US Ebola quarantine facility on its territory. Kenya’s fuel imports are heavily tied to Gulf suppliers, and the price of fuel has spiked due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Although President Ruto has moved to cushion consumers by cutting fuel VAT, using stabilisation funds, and pushing through a diesel price reduction, fuel prices remain elevated and continue to feed wider cost-of-living pressures. This almost certainly increases the risk that the planned protests could escalate into broader anti-government unrest.

Kenyan police forces have a precedent of responding forcefully to demonstrations, deploying live ammunition in both 2024 and 2025 unrest and being accused of abducting, torturing, and killing civilians believed to be leaders of anti-government protests. The apparent lack of authorisation for the demonstrations almost certainly raises the risk of crackdowns being imposed. If security forces are perceived as using disproportionate force against protesters, this will highly likely exacerbate demonstrations. This risk almost certainly elevates with calls for protesters to capture footage, with videos of perceived brutality by security forces highly likely to spread quickly through social media, increase anti-government sentiment and provoke larger demonstrations.

Nairobi’s parliament is located within the Central Business District (CBD), and most protesters will highly likely be gathered there. If protests spread, other hotspots in Nairobi include Kangemi, Ngong, Kamukunji, Thika Road, and Kitengela. During the 2025 protests, security forces blocked off major roads into Nairobi, including Waiyaki Way, Mombasa Road, Thika Road, Ngong Road, Valley Road, Juja Road, and Lang’ata Road. Other cities that may see large-scale gatherings and potential clashes include Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru.

In the lead-up to and during the potential protests, there is a realistic possibility that the government will impose internet outages to prevent the spread of calls for anti-government protests. There will highly likely be a heightened security presence in Nairobi and other major cities on 25 June.

On 20 June, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya central military headquarters announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, just three days after it had been reopened as part of the MoU. Khatam al-Anbiya cited Israel’s alleged ceasefire violations in Lebanon and the US failure to implement the first clause of the MoU, the article requiring an immediate end to military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. US Central Command (CENTCOM) said it had tracked no Iranian movements to close the Strait and that traffic continued to flow, while Iran’s own foreign ministry told Iranian media that shipping was operating normally. In response, US President Donald Trump threatened on social media to impose American tolls in the Strait of Hormuz if a deal is not reached in 60-days.

On 21 June, the first round of Qatar and Pakistan-mediated direct US-Iran talks began at the Bürgenstock resort on Lake Lucerne, Switzerland, having been postponed from 20 June due to the aforementioned developments. US Vice President JD Vance led the US delegation, which included President Trump’s envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. Iran’s parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has become increasingly powerful in Tehran since the outbreak of war on 28 February, led the Iranian delegation, which also included the foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi.

During this first day of talks, President Trump threatened on social media to “hit Iran very hard again, just like we did last week, only harder!!!” if Iran did not stop Hezbollah from “causing trouble”. The Iranian delegation lodged a protest and reportedly threatened to walk out, but Vance later said that the Iranians never left the talks.

The second day of the Lucerne Summit went ahead on 22 June, with mediators announcing: a 60-day roadmap,  a high-level oversight committee, a US-Iran communication line on the Strait of Hormuz, and a “de-confliction cell” to support adherence to the cessation of operations in Lebanon. Working groups will also be established regarding the nuclear file, sanctions, and monitoring and dispute resolution. Vice President Vance claimed that Iran had agreed to invite International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, possibly within the week. However, Iran’s foreign ministry denied this and stated they had made no such commitment. Furthermore, Araghchi stated that an agreement was reached on the release of some frozen Iranian assets, while Vance said this has not yet happened.

Also on 22 June, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a joint statement with Israel’s Defence Minister and the IDF chief of staff, which said that the IDF will continue “to act decisively to neutralise threats to our soldiers and citizens, destroy terrorist infrastructure, and maintain the security zone in southern Lebanon.” On 23 June, Israeli and Lebanese diplomats are scheduled to hold a round of direct talks, mediated by the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 19 and 23 June.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 19 and 23 June.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 19 and 23 June.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 19 and 23 June. On 21 June, a large explosion occurred at the Barzan LNG plant in Ras Laffan Industrial City, with authorities stating that at least 13 people were killed and 66 others injured. Due to the high regional tensions, there has been speculation that the explosion was related to Iran. However, Qatari authorities have announced that sabotage has been ruled out, and Qatar Energy has said that the explosion was caused by an operational incident during start-up of operations.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 19 and 23 June.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 19 and 23 June.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

The MoU comprises 14 points, including the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the cessation of hostilities on all fronts, the lifting of the US blockade on Iran, and sanctions relief for Tehran. The signing of the MoU resulted in the de facto suspension of the US naval blockade on Iranian ports, with several Iranian tankers crossing the US blockade line on 17 June. On 19 June, a 60-day period of negotiations on some unresolved triggers of the conflict, such as Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, began.

Both Israeli and Hezbollah forces carried out reciprocal attacks during the 14-19 June period in southern Lebanon. Iranian officials have continued to describe Israeli military operations as violating the ceasefire and have called on Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon.

The planned formal signing ceremony between US and Iranian officials in Switzerland on 19 June has been postponed. The talks were intended to address the technical terms of the ceasefire agreement, but Iran has reportedly delayed the process by holding back its delegation. Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, stated that any talks would remain bound by Tehran’s “red lines”, highly likely referring to a halt to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon.

Following the signing of the MoU, the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) reduced its travel security alert levels for Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 16 and 19 June.  

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 16 and 19 June. On 19 June, Kuwait’s oil minister stated that all force majeure declarations will be lifted following the US-Iran agreement. He added that pre-war production levels are possible within a week. An earlier statement on 18 June declared that repairs of war-related damages have advanced faster than projected.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 16 and 19 June. On 17 June, clashes took place between police and protesters in Abu Saiba after security forces attempted to remove the Husseini flags that had been erected, according to local media.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 16 and 19 June.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 16 and 19 June.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 16 and 19 June. 

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

On 14 June, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Iran and the US was announced as agreed by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. US President Donald Trump announced that the deal includes the “toll-free opening of the Strait of Hormuz” and ordered “the immediate removal of the [US blockade].” Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, confirmed the agreement of the deal on state television. The MoU is reportedly scheduled to be formally signed on 19 June in Switzerland, with the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to follow its signing.

The exact terms of the MoU remain publicly undisclosed as of 16 June, with contradictory reporting of specific terms, particularly from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media. Most reporting indicates that the MoU includes: the toll-free opening of the Strait of Hormuz, an immediate end to the US naval blockade, a ceasefire “on all fronts” (which extends to Lebanon), and a 60-day negotiating period for technical talks on the nuclear file and potential Iranian sanctions relief.

The announcement of the MoU’s agreement was preceded by further conflict in Lebanon on 14 June, which reportedly almost derailed the deal. On the morning of 14 June, Hezbollah launched several drones at northern Israel, with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) then conducting strikes in Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh). Several senior Iranian military and political figures subsequently warned that the attack on Beirut “will not go unanswered” and that a “strong response is coming”.

US negotiators reportedly “scrambled to avoid an Iranian attack on Israel”. No Iranian attack was conducted, with Gharibabadi claiming that Iran’s threats “helped facilitate progress in the negotiations” with requested Iranian amendments to the MoU being granted. IRGC-affiliated media reported that the attack was called off due to “last-minute concessions” offered by the US, including guarantees on Lebanon’s territorial integrity, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and the US blockade being lifted immediately rather than gradually.

As of 16 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 12 and 16 June.  

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 12 and 16 June. 

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 12 and 16 June. 

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 12 and 16 June.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 12 and 16 June.

Citing four sources, international media reported on 12 June that the UAE agreed “to unlock billions of dollars for Iran”. The report claims that the UAE has agreed to release a total of USD 10 or 20 billion, with over USD 3 billion having already been delivered. The Emirati Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically denied the reports.

It is notable that Iranian retaliation strikes following US-Iran confrontations in the maritime domain have not been directly conducted against the UAE since early May. It is likely that this is related to increased backchannel diplomatic contacts between the UAE and Iran seeking to de-escalate, which is alleged to have included the payment of funds, in a marked shift from the UAE’s earlier hawkishness against Iran.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 12 and 16 June, excluding US attacks in Omani waters against Iran-linked vessels as part of efforts to enforce the blockade.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

Following the announced end of the Israel-Iran confrontation on 8 June, a US AH-64 Apache helicopter crashed in the Strait of Hormuz following an incident with an Iranian attack drone, with two crew members being subsequently rescued. CENTCOM stated that the crash is under investigation, and some US officials have stated that it remains unclear whether the collision was intentional, but US President Donald Trump has stated that it was an intentional attack, with the attack drone failing to detonate.

US forces subsequently conducted strikes against around 20 targets in southern Iran, with Iranian forces then launching strikes against US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. On 10 June, US forces conducted further strikes against southern Iran, which were reportedly “calibrated to avoid casualties and leave open the possibility of a deal”. Iranian forces then again conducted strikes against US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain.

On 11 June, President Trump threatened on social media that the US “will be hitting Iran VERY HARD TONIGHT”, and that “[a]t some point in the not too distant future, we will be taking Kharg Island”. However, later on 11 June, President Trump announced that he had cancelled planned strikes against Iran and claimed that Iranian leadership had “approved” a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU). Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media denied that Iran has confirmed the agreement yet, but there was a “possibility” it will be approved as the US has accepted “Iran’s proposed text”.

On 11 June, Israeli military officials stated that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had moved armour and troops into position in southern Lebanon in preparation for a potential offensive on Nabatieh. Nabatieh is one of the largest urban centres in southern Lebanon and a known Hezbollah stronghold.

As of 12 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Early 11 June, Kuwait announced the temporary closure of its airspace, which was reopened shortly afterwards.  

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 9 and 12 June.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 12 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

On 10 June, Kuwait’s armed forces stated that air defence systems were “intercepting hostile aerial targets”. The IRGC stated that the attack was conducted in retaliation for the US strikes against southern Iran, targeting the Ali Al Salem and Ahmad Al-Jaber airbases. On 11 June, Kuwait’s air defences were again activated due to another Iranian attack. During this attack, Kuwait’s civil aviation authority said that radar facilities and equipment linked to air traffic management were seriously damaged at Kuwait International Airport, with injuries reported. Kuwait’s armed forces later announced on 11 June that in the previous 48 hours, 24 attack drones had been intercepted.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 11 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open. During the 11 June attack, which involved an attack against Kuwait International Airport, Kuwait’s civil aviation authority announced the temporary closure of Kuwait’s airspace starting 04:50 local time. Around two hours later, authorities announced” the return of air traffic in Kuwaiti airspace to normal.”

On 10 June, the Bahraini air defences were activated due to incoming Iranian attacks. The IRGC stated that the attack was conducted in retaliation for the US strikes against southern Iran, targeting Sheikh Isa airbase. Bahrain’s Ministry of the Interior stated that the attacks resulted in a minor injury and damage to homes and vehicles in Hamad City and Manama due to debris from intercepted Iranian drones. On 11 June, Bahrain was attacked again, with the foreign minister stating that Bahrain was targeted by 36 attack drones. IRGC-affiliated media claimed to have struck the AR-327 early warning radar site located in Bahrain’s Mount Dukhan.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 12 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 9 and 12 June.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 9 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 9 and 12 June.

Notably, Iranian retaliation strikes have not recently been conducted against the UAE, which is likely related to reportedly increasing backchannel diplomatic contacts between the UAE and Iran seeking to de-escalate.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 12 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 9 and 12 June, excluding US attacks in Omani waters against Iran-linked vessels as part of efforts to enforce the blockade.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 12 June, Oman’s airspace is open.