On 26 June, the US launched strikes against targets in Iran. US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that airstrikes were conducted against Iranian missile and drone storage locations, in addition to coastal radar sites, around the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), as a “powerful response” to “unwarranted aggression” by Iran. The strikes followed the earlier Iranian attack against the Singapore-flagged EVER LOVELY (IMO: 9629110) on 26 June, after the vessel exited the SoH along the Omani coast. US Vice President JD Vance said following the US strikes that “violence will be met with violence”.

On 27 June, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched an attack drone which hit the Panama-flagged oil tanker KIKU (IMO: 9329796) transiting the SoH. Subsequently, the US conducted further strikes with CENTCOM stating that ten Iranian military targets were struck in sites including Sirik, Bandar-e Lengeh and Qeshm. This was followed by Iranian attack drone and ballistic missile launches against targets in Bahrain and Kuwait on 27 and 28 June, with the IRGC claiming to have targeted the Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. During the 28 June attacks against Bahrain, a residential building near Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was damaged, with no fatalities reported.

On 28 June, a US official stated that the US and Iran had agreed to halt attacks and renew talks. US President Donald Trump claimed on 29 June that Iran had “requested a meeting” to take place in Doha, Qatar, on 30 June. An Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson stated that while Iran is sending its technical delegation to Qatar this week, this has no relation to a concurrent visit by US envoys and no US-Iran talks are scheduled. However, a separate senior Iranian official has claimed there will be a meeting in Doha with a focus on managing the SoH and de-escalating tensions, while another official briefed that technical teams will meet separately with Qatari and Pakistani mediators on 30 June. Delegations from Iran and the US are in Qatar as of 30 June, but it remains unconfirmed whether any negotiations will go ahead and in what format.

In Lebanon, on 26 June, US officials announced that the Israeli and Lebanese sides had signed a new “framework agreement”. The new agreement allows the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to replace the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in two areas in southern Lebanon, commits Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon, and calls for the disarmament of all non-state groups in Lebanon. However, Israel’s Defence Minister, Israel Katz, later stated that Israel would maintain the security zone in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah rejected the agreement, and indicated that it would respond to any LAF disarmament attempts.

As of 30 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 26 and 30 June.

On 28 June, a helicopter belonging to the Saudi Arabian state-owned oil company Aramco crashed in Ras Tanura, resulting in the death of 14 people on board who were all Saudi citizens. Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Energy stated that “authorities have launched a full investigation to determine the cause of the crash”. The helicopter crash coincided with elevated tensions following the first kinetic strikes by the US against Iran since the signing of the MoU, and the Ras Tanura terminal has been previously targeted by Iranian strikes in the earlier full-scale regional conflict phase of the war. However, there is currently no available evidence that indicates the crash resulted from hostile action.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

On 28 June, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence stated that two “hostile ballistic missiles” were detected and intercepted inside Kuwaiti airspace, with no material damage or casualties. The IRGC claimed that it launched an attack against “key US military installations” which included the “Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait”, in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian territory.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

On 27 June, Bahraini authorities stated that an unspecified “number of Iranian drones” targeted Bahraini territory. This followed the first US strikes conducted against Iranian territory since the signing of the MoU. A US official anonymously briefed that this attack consisted of two attack drones, with one being shot down and the other landing harmlessly in a remote airfield area.

On 28 June, another attack took place, with Bahrain’s Interior Ministry announcing the interception of an unspecified number of projectiles. During this attack, a residential building near Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was damaged, with no fatalities reported. The IRGC claimed that it launched an attack against “key US military installations”, which included the “US Fifth Fleet headquarters at Salman Port in Bahrain”, in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian territory.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 26 and 30 June, excluding an incident involving a marine vessel which resulted in the death of one Qatari national. After a vessel with two individuals on board failed to return as scheduled on 27 June, search operations were conducted, which located the missing vessel. The Qatari national on board was killed by “shrapnel resulting from the military operations in the area”, and an “Arab resident was also injured” and transferred to hospital for medical treatment, according to the Qatari Ministry of Interior. It is likely that the incident resulted from the interception of Iranian attack drones during the attacks against targets Bahrain and Kuwait. Qatar’s Ministry of Transport subsequently announced a temporary suspension of marine activities involving recreational boats, fishing vessels, jet skis and other similar watercraft until further notice.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 26 and 30 June. On 26 June, phone alerts were issued in the UAE warning of potential missile threats. However, authorities have stated that this resulted from a technical malfunction in the early warning system.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 26 and 30 June, excluding attacks against vessels within Omani territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 30 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The preparations followed weeks of violence and disruption tied to anti-immigration unrest. On 28 June, the Ugandan government said one of its nationals was killed in a suspected anti-immigrant attack in KwaZulu-Natal and said 746 Ugandans had voluntarily registered for evacuation ahead of the 30 June protests. On 20 June, one person was killed during anti-immigrant rioting in central Pietermaritzburg, and local media said at least 1,000 Malawian nationals had fled to nearby Durban. By 17 June, local media reported that more than 600 Malawians had been repatriated from South Africa, with humanitarian services set up in Blantyre. According to South African police, at least 25,000 people, most of whom are from other African countries, have been repatriated.

The unrest also included attacks on foreign-owned businesses and properties, leading to cases of displacement. On 18 June, police stated that seven people were arrested near Vrede, Free State, after more than 15 foreign-owned shops were looted. On 15 June, South African media reported that at least 120 foreign nationals were camping outside a Home Affairs office in central Durban after being displaced by recent anti-migration rioting. On 8 June, residents in George reportedly attacked foreign-owned businesses before police dispersed them.

The rise of dedicated anti-migrant groups likely reflects the increasing organisation of anti-migrant movements in South Africa in recent years. Since 2022, Operation Dudula, meaning “to push”, has reportedly harassed migrant traders in Soweto and Johannesburg. The Dudula Movement concurrently emerged, acting as a vigilante organisation targeting foreign nationals believed to be undocumented. March and March, a self-described “grassroots citizen movement addressing growing concerns about undocumented immigration in South Africa”, is a newer movement aiming to mobilise citizens through “peaceful demonstrations and rallies”.

Migrants make up just under four per cent of South Africa’s population, equivalent to approximately 2.4 million people. Most originate from neighbouring countries, including Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Anti-migrant groups claim that there are also between three and five million undocumented migrants, although these figures are contested. A primary driver of anti-migrant sentiment is South Africa’s high unemployment rate, which remains above 30 per cent. Anti-migrant groups have mobilised this to frame migrants as direct competitors for jobs, housing, informal trading space, and state resources, amid rising economic instability triggered by the Strait of Hormuz closure.

This is the latest of a series of waves of unrest targeting foreign nationals and foreign-owned businesses, with major waves in 2008, 2015, and 2019. In 2008, at least 62 foreign nationals were killed, while in 2015, a wave of anti-foreigner violence that began in Durban and spread to Johannesburg left at least seven people dead and saw the widespread looting and burning of foreign-owned shops. In September 2019, renewed rioting concentrated in Johannesburg and Pretoria again targeted foreign-owned businesses and left roughly 12 people dead.

The 30 June protests are highly likely to be accompanied by incidents of vandalism and looting targeting foreign-owned businesses, as well as isolated violence. There is a realistic possibility that the protests will escalate into widespread clashes with security forces into the evening, particularly if they attempt to disperse protesters with measures perceived as excessive, such as tear gas, water cannon, rubber bullets, and mass arrests.

The ceasefires between the US, Israel, and Iran, and between Israel and Lebanon, remain extant. However, the agreements remain unstable. US Vice-President J.D. Vance stated on 25 June, that the United States and Iran had established a direct channel of communication in Doha to favour deconfliction and reduce the chance of the conflict resuming.

On 23 June, US President Donald Trump stated that US forces would halt their blockade of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). On the same day, the UN’s International Maritime Organisation (IMO) announced that it would, alongside Oman, begin coordinating the evacuation of approximately 11,000 personnel on board vessels that have remained within the SoH due to the conflict. On 25 June, the Islamic Security Guard Corps (IRGC) struck a vessel approximately 7.5 nautical miles southeast of Dahit, Oman. The attack followed IRGC statements that attempts to cross the SoH via the route designated by IMO would be “unacceptable”, and that all crossings would need to be coordinated with the newly-established Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), an Iranian government agency that is responsible for regulating traffic in the SoH. Following the strike, UN channels stated that they would pause evacuation efforts and noted that several vessels had already exited the waterway.

On 25 June, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it would hold talks with Oman to “define future administration and maritime services” in the SoH. US officials have reiterated their opposition to Iran’s plan to charge vessels transiting through the SoH.

On 24 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that its inspectors would visit Iranian enrichment sites under the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). On the following day, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi rejected the IAEA statement, claiming that there is “no plan” for future visits to Iranian nuclear sites.

On 25 June, the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council released a joint statement following a ministerial meeting in Bahrain. The statement reiterated “the enduring U.S. commitment to GCC security” and the “importance of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, noting that free, unconditional, and unrestricted navigation, including the right of transit passage as guaranteed under international law, remains essential to regional and global security”. The statement also condemned regional attacks by Iran and it proxies. On 26 June, Iranian diplomatic channels called the statement “provocative” and “interventionist”.

As of 26 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 23 and 26 June.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 23 and 26 June.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 23 and 26 June.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 23 and 26 June.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 23 and 26 June.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

On 25 June, IRGC forces carried out a strike that damaged a cargo vessel approximately 7.5 nautical miles from the coast of Dahit. MV EVER LOVELY (IMO: 9629110), a Singapore-flagged vessel, was reportedly struck by a projectile while transiting on the route designated by the IMO, with the impact causing limited damage to the bridge,

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 26 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Venezuela is highly exposed to seismic activity. The country is near the boundary between the Caribbean and South American tectonic plates, where plate motion is largely accommodated by major strike-slip fault systems across northern Venezuela, including the Boconó fault system. The 24 June earthquake southeast of Yumare occurred at a shallow depth and was associated with strike-slip faulting along this boundary.

Northern Venezuela has a history of significant seismic activity, though large earthquakes near the June 2026 epicentre have been relatively infrequent over the past century. On 21 August 2018, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake struck Venezuela’s northern coast, damaging dozens of buildings and causing multiple injuries across the country. More recently, in September 2025, magnitude 6.2 and 6.3 tremors near Mene Grande caused at least one death, injured more than 110 people, damaged homes and infrastructure, and were felt across several Venezuelan states and parts of Colombia.

Notable historical earthquakes include a 6.4 magnitude earthquake near Morón in 2009, which injured 18 people and damaged buildings, and a 6.0 magnitude event near Valencia in 1989 that caused minor damage. The most destructive modern earthquake in the wider region was the 1967 Caracas earthquake, which caused around 240 deaths, hundreds of injuries, collapsed several high-rise apartment buildings, and led to widespread destruction. Since 1900, at least five magnitude 7 or larger earthquakes have occurred in northern Venezuela or near its coast. However, it is highly likely that the damage, casualties and impact of the 24 June doublet earthquakes will be the worst in Venezuela in a century.

It is likely that aftershocks will be recorded near the epicentre in the short term. On 25 June, USGS assessed that there is a 94 per cent chance of at least one aftershock of magnitude 5 or above within the next week, and a 29 per cent chance of an aftershock of magnitude 6 or above. Even if lower-magnitude compared to the 24 June earthquake, aftershocks can still result in significant damage, causing critical failures in structures damaged during the initial shocks.

The death toll from the 24 June earthquakes will almost certainly considerably exceed the early estimates provided by the Venezuelan government. The impact of the tremors is highly likely to be compounded by the country’s poor disaster preparedness and emergency response infrastructure. Possible failures in government responses to the earthquakes could rapidly become catalysts for civil unrest in Venezuela, particularly as the country’s leadership has likely been destabilised by the US intervention that captured former President Maduro in January 2026. Previously a staunch geopolitical adversary of the US, Venezuela is now increasingly close to Washington as a result of the US intervention.

The economic impact will highly likely be severe and will fall on a state with minimal fiscal and institutional capacity to absorb it. Venezuela’s economy was already critically degraded prior to the earthquake, and the earthquake has had a severe impact on major economic hubs like the Caracas capital region. Acute humanitarian crisis, pre-existing economic crisis, destroyed utilities, and a transitional government which has contested legitimacy are all factors which could quickly materialise into an anti-government movement and violent civil unrest in the coming months.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Widespread youth-led protests have taken place in Kenya in both 2024 and 2025. In June and July 2024, a series of mass protests erupted in response to proposed tax increases in the government’s Finance Bill 2024. The unrest started in Nairobi, quickly spreading to other parts of the country. On 25 June, thousands of protesters stormed the parliamentary complex, setting fire to the Kenyan Parliament Building. Overall, at least 50 people were killed, and several hundred were injured as protesters clashed with security forces, who used live ammunition and conducted mass arrests.

Widespread protests were also staged in June and early July 2025, after a blogger was killed in police custody, with protesters demanding an end to police brutality. Security forces again responded with force, including live ammunition, tear gas, water cannon, and mass arrests. At least 65 people were killed, and over 550 people were injured. No significant concessions were made following the protests, and police brutality almost certainly remains a core grievance in Kenya.

The planned demonstrations are set to take place amid increased pressure on living costs, as well as frustrations over government plans to allow a US Ebola quarantine facility on its territory. Kenya’s fuel imports are heavily tied to Gulf suppliers, and the price of fuel has spiked due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Although President Ruto has moved to cushion consumers by cutting fuel VAT, using stabilisation funds, and pushing through a diesel price reduction, fuel prices remain elevated and continue to feed wider cost-of-living pressures. This almost certainly increases the risk that the planned protests could escalate into broader anti-government unrest.

Kenyan police forces have a precedent of responding forcefully to demonstrations, deploying live ammunition in both 2024 and 2025 unrest and being accused of abducting, torturing, and killing civilians believed to be leaders of anti-government protests. The apparent lack of authorisation for the demonstrations almost certainly raises the risk of crackdowns being imposed. If security forces are perceived as using disproportionate force against protesters, this will highly likely exacerbate demonstrations. This risk almost certainly elevates with calls for protesters to capture footage, with videos of perceived brutality by security forces highly likely to spread quickly through social media, increase anti-government sentiment and provoke larger demonstrations.

Nairobi’s parliament is located within the Central Business District (CBD), and most protesters will highly likely be gathered there. If protests spread, other hotspots in Nairobi include Kangemi, Ngong, Kamukunji, Thika Road, and Kitengela. During the 2025 protests, security forces blocked off major roads into Nairobi, including Waiyaki Way, Mombasa Road, Thika Road, Ngong Road, Valley Road, Juja Road, and Lang’ata Road. Other cities that may see large-scale gatherings and potential clashes include Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru.

In the lead-up to and during the potential protests, there is a realistic possibility that the government will impose internet outages to prevent the spread of calls for anti-government protests. There will highly likely be a heightened security presence in Nairobi and other major cities on 25 June.

On 20 June, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya central military headquarters announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, just three days after it had been reopened as part of the MoU. Khatam al-Anbiya cited Israel’s alleged ceasefire violations in Lebanon and the US failure to implement the first clause of the MoU, the article requiring an immediate end to military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. US Central Command (CENTCOM) said it had tracked no Iranian movements to close the Strait and that traffic continued to flow, while Iran’s own foreign ministry told Iranian media that shipping was operating normally. In response, US President Donald Trump threatened on social media to impose American tolls in the Strait of Hormuz if a deal is not reached in 60-days.

On 21 June, the first round of Qatar and Pakistan-mediated direct US-Iran talks began at the Bürgenstock resort on Lake Lucerne, Switzerland, having been postponed from 20 June due to the aforementioned developments. US Vice President JD Vance led the US delegation, which included President Trump’s envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. Iran’s parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has become increasingly powerful in Tehran since the outbreak of war on 28 February, led the Iranian delegation, which also included the foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi.

During this first day of talks, President Trump threatened on social media to “hit Iran very hard again, just like we did last week, only harder!!!” if Iran did not stop Hezbollah from “causing trouble”. The Iranian delegation lodged a protest and reportedly threatened to walk out, but Vance later said that the Iranians never left the talks.

The second day of the Lucerne Summit went ahead on 22 June, with mediators announcing: a 60-day roadmap,  a high-level oversight committee, a US-Iran communication line on the Strait of Hormuz, and a “de-confliction cell” to support adherence to the cessation of operations in Lebanon. Working groups will also be established regarding the nuclear file, sanctions, and monitoring and dispute resolution. Vice President Vance claimed that Iran had agreed to invite International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, possibly within the week. However, Iran’s foreign ministry denied this and stated they had made no such commitment. Furthermore, Araghchi stated that an agreement was reached on the release of some frozen Iranian assets, while Vance said this has not yet happened.

Also on 22 June, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a joint statement with Israel’s Defence Minister and the IDF chief of staff, which said that the IDF will continue “to act decisively to neutralise threats to our soldiers and citizens, destroy terrorist infrastructure, and maintain the security zone in southern Lebanon.” On 23 June, Israeli and Lebanese diplomats are scheduled to hold a round of direct talks, mediated by the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 19 and 23 June.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 19 and 23 June.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 19 and 23 June.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 19 and 23 June. On 21 June, a large explosion occurred at the Barzan LNG plant in Ras Laffan Industrial City, with authorities stating that at least 13 people were killed and 66 others injured. Due to the high regional tensions, there has been speculation that the explosion was related to Iran. However, Qatari authorities have announced that sabotage has been ruled out, and Qatar Energy has said that the explosion was caused by an operational incident during start-up of operations.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 19 and 23 June.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 19 and 23 June.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 23 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

The MoU comprises 14 points, including the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the cessation of hostilities on all fronts, the lifting of the US blockade on Iran, and sanctions relief for Tehran. The signing of the MoU resulted in the de facto suspension of the US naval blockade on Iranian ports, with several Iranian tankers crossing the US blockade line on 17 June. On 19 June, a 60-day period of negotiations on some unresolved triggers of the conflict, such as Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, began.

Both Israeli and Hezbollah forces carried out reciprocal attacks during the 14-19 June period in southern Lebanon. Iranian officials have continued to describe Israeli military operations as violating the ceasefire and have called on Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon.

The planned formal signing ceremony between US and Iranian officials in Switzerland on 19 June has been postponed. The talks were intended to address the technical terms of the ceasefire agreement, but Iran has reportedly delayed the process by holding back its delegation. Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, stated that any talks would remain bound by Tehran’s “red lines”, highly likely referring to a halt to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon.

Following the signing of the MoU, the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) reduced its travel security alert levels for Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 16 and 19 June.  

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 16 and 19 June. On 19 June, Kuwait’s oil minister stated that all force majeure declarations will be lifted following the US-Iran agreement. He added that pre-war production levels are possible within a week. An earlier statement on 18 June declared that repairs of war-related damages have advanced faster than projected.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 16 and 19 June. On 17 June, clashes took place between police and protesters in Abu Saiba after security forces attempted to remove the Husseini flags that had been erected, according to local media.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 16 and 19 June.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 16 and 19 June.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 16 and 19 June. 

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 19 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

On 14 June, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Iran and the US was announced as agreed by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. US President Donald Trump announced that the deal includes the “toll-free opening of the Strait of Hormuz” and ordered “the immediate removal of the [US blockade].” Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, confirmed the agreement of the deal on state television. The MoU is reportedly scheduled to be formally signed on 19 June in Switzerland, with the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to follow its signing.

The exact terms of the MoU remain publicly undisclosed as of 16 June, with contradictory reporting of specific terms, particularly from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media. Most reporting indicates that the MoU includes: the toll-free opening of the Strait of Hormuz, an immediate end to the US naval blockade, a ceasefire “on all fronts” (which extends to Lebanon), and a 60-day negotiating period for technical talks on the nuclear file and potential Iranian sanctions relief.

The announcement of the MoU’s agreement was preceded by further conflict in Lebanon on 14 June, which reportedly almost derailed the deal. On the morning of 14 June, Hezbollah launched several drones at northern Israel, with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) then conducting strikes in Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh). Several senior Iranian military and political figures subsequently warned that the attack on Beirut “will not go unanswered” and that a “strong response is coming”.

US negotiators reportedly “scrambled to avoid an Iranian attack on Israel”. No Iranian attack was conducted, with Gharibabadi claiming that Iran’s threats “helped facilitate progress in the negotiations” with requested Iranian amendments to the MoU being granted. IRGC-affiliated media reported that the attack was called off due to “last-minute concessions” offered by the US, including guarantees on Lebanon’s territorial integrity, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and the US blockade being lifted immediately rather than gradually.

As of 16 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 12 and 16 June.  

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 12 and 16 June. 

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 12 and 16 June. 

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 12 and 16 June.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 12 and 16 June.

Citing four sources, international media reported on 12 June that the UAE agreed “to unlock billions of dollars for Iran”. The report claims that the UAE has agreed to release a total of USD 10 or 20 billion, with over USD 3 billion having already been delivered. The Emirati Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically denied the reports.

It is notable that Iranian retaliation strikes following US-Iran confrontations in the maritime domain have not been directly conducted against the UAE since early May. It is likely that this is related to increased backchannel diplomatic contacts between the UAE and Iran seeking to de-escalate, which is alleged to have included the payment of funds, in a marked shift from the UAE’s earlier hawkishness against Iran.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 12 and 16 June, excluding US attacks in Omani waters against Iran-linked vessels as part of efforts to enforce the blockade.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 16 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

Following the announced end of the Israel-Iran confrontation on 8 June, a US AH-64 Apache helicopter crashed in the Strait of Hormuz following an incident with an Iranian attack drone, with two crew members being subsequently rescued. CENTCOM stated that the crash is under investigation, and some US officials have stated that it remains unclear whether the collision was intentional, but US President Donald Trump has stated that it was an intentional attack, with the attack drone failing to detonate.

US forces subsequently conducted strikes against around 20 targets in southern Iran, with Iranian forces then launching strikes against US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. On 10 June, US forces conducted further strikes against southern Iran, which were reportedly “calibrated to avoid casualties and leave open the possibility of a deal”. Iranian forces then again conducted strikes against US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain.

On 11 June, President Trump threatened on social media that the US “will be hitting Iran VERY HARD TONIGHT”, and that “[a]t some point in the not too distant future, we will be taking Kharg Island”. However, later on 11 June, President Trump announced that he had cancelled planned strikes against Iran and claimed that Iranian leadership had “approved” a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU). Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media denied that Iran has confirmed the agreement yet, but there was a “possibility” it will be approved as the US has accepted “Iran’s proposed text”.

On 11 June, Israeli military officials stated that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had moved armour and troops into position in southern Lebanon in preparation for a potential offensive on Nabatieh. Nabatieh is one of the largest urban centres in southern Lebanon and a known Hezbollah stronghold.

As of 12 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Early 11 June, Kuwait announced the temporary closure of its airspace, which was reopened shortly afterwards.  

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 9 and 12 June.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 12 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

On 10 June, Kuwait’s armed forces stated that air defence systems were “intercepting hostile aerial targets”. The IRGC stated that the attack was conducted in retaliation for the US strikes against southern Iran, targeting the Ali Al Salem and Ahmad Al-Jaber airbases. On 11 June, Kuwait’s air defences were again activated due to another Iranian attack. During this attack, Kuwait’s civil aviation authority said that radar facilities and equipment linked to air traffic management were seriously damaged at Kuwait International Airport, with injuries reported. Kuwait’s armed forces later announced on 11 June that in the previous 48 hours, 24 attack drones had been intercepted.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 11 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open. During the 11 June attack, which involved an attack against Kuwait International Airport, Kuwait’s civil aviation authority announced the temporary closure of Kuwait’s airspace starting 04:50 local time. Around two hours later, authorities announced” the return of air traffic in Kuwaiti airspace to normal.”

On 10 June, the Bahraini air defences were activated due to incoming Iranian attacks. The IRGC stated that the attack was conducted in retaliation for the US strikes against southern Iran, targeting Sheikh Isa airbase. Bahrain’s Ministry of the Interior stated that the attacks resulted in a minor injury and damage to homes and vehicles in Hamad City and Manama due to debris from intercepted Iranian drones. On 11 June, Bahrain was attacked again, with the foreign minister stating that Bahrain was targeted by 36 attack drones. IRGC-affiliated media claimed to have struck the AR-327 early warning radar site located in Bahrain’s Mount Dukhan.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 12 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 9 and 12 June.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 9 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 9 and 12 June.

Notably, Iranian retaliation strikes have not recently been conducted against the UAE, which is likely related to reportedly increasing backchannel diplomatic contacts between the UAE and Iran seeking to de-escalate.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 12 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 9 and 12 June, excluding US attacks in Omani waters against Iran-linked vessels as part of efforts to enforce the blockade.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 12 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Large-scale, disruptive and coordinated protests have almost certainly been staged by the CNTE to maximise pressure on the central government ahead of and during the 2026 FIFA World Cup, and have likely been designed to provide minimal time for President Sheinbaum to concede to their demands. The deliberate targeting of World Cup symbols, such as player statues, and the establishment of an encampment near the capital’s fan zone have almost certainly been intended to signal the CNTE’s intent to disrupt the tournament and to increase the political and reputational cost of failing to resolve the dispute before the tournament begins.

With the World Cup beginning on 11 June, and Mexico hosting the opening match at the Estadio Azteca, it is increasingly unlikely that the government will concede to CNTE demands in the near term. The CNTE is likely to continue using the tournament as leverage by targeting high-visibility locations and key transport routes, which is likely to result in major disruption on the international stage and sustain pressure on the federal government throughout the early stages of the tournament.

The CNTE has successfully organised large-scale and coordinated protests across Mexico on multiple occasions. Moreover, several smaller protest movements, such as farmers’ and transport unions, have threatened to disrupt the tournament. The likelihood of protests continuing throughout the tournament is high, with protesters likely to target fan zones, World Cup venues, transport hubs, airports, border crossings, government buildings and major roads in order to cause significant disruption and achieve maximum visibility.

The government has already deployed security forces to prevent protesters from reaching World Cup venues and to clear or contain demonstrations, and is likely to deploy additional forces during the tournament. As a result, there is a high risk of violent clashes, arrests and the use of dispersal tactics at or near protest sites. If the protests continue to escalate, there is a realistic possibility that security resources will become overstretched, limiting the authorities’ ability to manage unrest while simultaneously protecting tournament sites and transport routes. This risk is likely further compounded in host cities such as Guadalajara, where security forces are also committed to countering organised crime threats. Any concurrent criminal or security incident could further reduce the resources available to manage protest activity.

Following Israeli strikes in Beirut, Iran and Israel engaged in retaliatory tit-for-tat strikes on 7 and 8 June. The exchange of strikes followed a rocket attack on northern Israel launched by Hezbollah in Lebanon on 7 June, which the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) responded to with strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh).

Late 7 June, the IDF stated that it had intercepted a wave of Iranian missiles in northern Israel, Iran’s first direct attack against Israel since the implementation of the 8 April ceasefire. This was followed by Israeli strikes against Iran overnight into 8 June (including against a petrochemical complex). Missiles were subsequently fired from Yemen, alongside another Iranian salvo, with the Houthis claiming that they conducted a joint strike with Iran. The Houthis also reiterated their total ban on Israeli vessels transiting the Red Sea.

US President Donald Trump reportedly made significant efforts to “restrain” the Israeli response against Iran to allow more time for diplomacy. At approximately 11:30 UTC, 8 June, the IRGC issued a statement that “the cessation of armed forces operations is hereby announced”, but that if attacks continue, “including in southern Lebanon”, Iran will respond “more severe and forceful than before”. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on 8 April that attacks against Iran will be halted “for now”, but that the fight with Tehran and Hezbollah is “not over”.

Overnight 5-6 June, further Iranian strikes were conducted against Kuwait and Bahrain following a confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz between the US and Iran. On 5 June, the IRGC claimed that four tankers under US military “guidance” attempted to bypass Iran’s imposed traffic separation scheme, with the IRGC attacking one of the vessels and claiming to have fired “warning shots” at US vessels. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it shot down four Iranian attack drones and conducted strikes against radar sites on Iran’s Qeshm Island and in Goruk. Iran then conducted attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain in retaliation.

As of 9 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Overnight 5-6 June, Kuwait announced the temporary closure of its airspace, which was reopened on 6 June.

The Al-Kharj governorate, southeast of Riyadh, issued a brief early warning in the early hours of 8 June “in anticipation of a possible danger”. The Prince Sultan Air Base, which hosts US personnel and was regularly attacked until the 8 April ceasefire, is located in Al-Kharj. Iranian officials denied reports that they launched an attack against Al-Kharj in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s defence ministry later stated that the alert was triggered by a ballistic missile launched from Yemen targeting a “regional state”, which malfunctioned and fell in an uninhabited area near the Saudi-Yemen border. The missile was almost certainly launched by the Yemen-based Houthis and was highly likely targeting Israel.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 9 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

On 6 June, the Kuwaiti military announced the interception of seven ballistic missiles overnight 5-6 June. This followed further confrontation between Iran and the US due to their competing maritime blockades. The interceptions occurred over several residential areas, with authorities stating that debris caused material damage but no injuries. The Kuwait Fire Force stated that they responded to two fire incidents resulting from debris.

At least eight people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 5 June.

As of 9 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open. During the overnight 5-6 June attack, the Kuwait Public Authority of Civil Aviation (PACA) announced the temporary closure of Kuwaiti airspace, which was reopened on 6 June.

On 6 June, the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) announced the interception of three missiles and “several drones” launched from Iran overnight 5-6 June. This followed further confrontation between Iran and the US due to their competing maritime blockades. The IRGC claimed that it successfully struck the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, with CENTCOM claiming that this is false.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 9 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 5 and 9 June.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 9 June, Qatar’s airspace is open. On 7 June, Qatar’s General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA) issued a statement denying reports on social media regarding the closure of Qatari airspace.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 5 and 9 June.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 9 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 5 and 9 June.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 9 June, Oman’s airspace is open.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Tehran had previously warned that strikes in Beirut “could derail the diplomatic track” and prompt retaliation, with Iranian officials consistently insisting that the ceasefire includes Lebanon. Continued conflict in Lebanon, which remains highly likely, will almost certainly continue to complicate the wider US-Iran negotiations and could again trigger further cycles of Israel-Iran strikes, which endanger the broader ceasefire.

Hezbollah have historically served as a key component of Iranian deterrence in the region, and its preservation is highly likely a strategic priority for Tehran. However, the regime’s focus on Lebanon and claimed suspension of negotiations also followed President Trump’s request for several amendments to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) being negotiated by the US and Iran.

It is highly likely that the Iranian regime, which is increasingly under the control of hardline IRGC commanders such as Major General Ahmad Vahidi, calculates that it is willing to accept the risk of a return to full-scale conflict or a continuation of the current status quo rather than be perceived as conceding to US demands. By increasingly linking the status of the ceasefire to Lebanon, the regime likely also seeks to divert attention from and gain leverage over the two principal points of contention in negotiations: control of the Strait of Hormuz and the nuclear file.

As of 13:00 UTC, 8 June, it remains unconfirmed whether the current escalation cycle between Israel and Iran has fully ceased. If Israel conducts further strikes against either Iran or Beirut in the coming hours, this would almost certainly be met with further Iranian retaliation.

If further tit-for-tat strikes are sustained, or an Israel-Iran confrontation is again prompted by developments in Lebanon, there is a realistic possibility of Iranian retaliation strikes expanding to include attacks on the Gulf States. Iran’s chief negotiator and parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, threatened that the Israeli strikes against Iran, in addition to the ongoing US naval blockade, have made US bases and assets in the region “legitimate targets”. Moreover, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet Fars, citing a senior Iranian official, reported that if Iranian energy infrastructure is attacked again, Iran will carry out attacks against US oil and gas facilities in the region.

The involvement of the Yemen-based Houthis was almost certainly limited and primarily performative. However, their involvement highly likely serves Tehran as a key deterrence due to the Houthi capability to impact maritime traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The most critical leverage Iran has highly likely been able to impose against the US is the continued impact on the global economy and energy markets due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which remains severely disrupted. In the event of a full-scale escalation, it is likely that Iran would seek to additionally close the Bab al-Mandeb, as repeatedly threatened.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Philippines is almost certainly among the most vulnerable countries in the world to natural disasters. The archipelago is hit by approximately 20 typhoons and tropical storms a year, and its location in the Pacific ‘Ring of Fire’ means it is highly seismically active. In 2023, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake killed at least three people and injured 79, and in 2022, a magnitude 7 earthquake killed at least five people and injured 60. However, the 30 September 2025 Cebu earthquake, which killed at least 79 and injured 1,271, stands out as one of the deadliest earthquakes in the Philippines in years.

The Philippines has poor disaster resilience. A country’s disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, is a critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. Due to the confluence of the Philippines’ extreme exposure to natural hazards and its poor disaster resilience, the country is frequently cited as the most disaster-prone country in the world.

In late 2025, mass nationwide protests occurred in the Philippines due to public grievances regarding corruption in disaster resilience projects, particularly flood defences. While the movement had largely declined by early December, it is likely that the devastation of the earthquake may reinforce public perceptions that disaster-resilience funds and infrastructure governance are weak. There is a realistic possibility that this will trigger a resurgence in the protest movement in the coming weeks.

Following reports that a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) had been agreed by US and Iranian negotiators, US President Donald Trump convened a Situation Room meeting on 29 May to review the proposal. President Trump reportedly requested several amendments to the MOU regarding the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz. In a subsequent statement on social media, President Trump claimed that the US naval blockade “will now be lifted”, the US will access Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile in coordination with Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its destruction, and that “[n]o money will be exchanged, until further notice”.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media denied many of President Trump’s claims, instead claiming that no final decision has been made on the MOU, that Iran would reopen the strait following a lifting of the US blockade, but could continue “monitoring and inspection of ships, the provision of services, and security measures”, and that Iran would receive an  “immediate payment of $12 billion in frozen assets” with no further negotiations until this is paid.

On 30 and 31 May, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that it conducted “self -defense strikes on Iranian radar and command and control sites for drones in Goruk, Iran and Qeshm Island”. These followed “aggressive Iranian actions that included the shootdown of a U.S. MQ-1 drone that was operating over international waters.” The IRGC subsequently announced attempted retaliation strikes against a US air base in Kuwait, with Kuwaiti air defences being activated early 1 June.

The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon further escalated over 30-31 May, with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) crossing the Litani River in the deepest incursions into Lebanon in over 25 years. On 1 June, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly ordered strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh).

On 1 June, IRGC-affiliated media reported that due to the developments in Lebanon, “the Iranian negotiating team is suspending dialogues and exchange of texts through mediators”, and that “Iran and the Axis of Resistance have resolved to pursue the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz and activate other fronts, including the Bab al-Mandab Strait”.

Hours later on 1 June, President Trump reportedly held an expletive-laden telephone call with Prime Minister Netanyahu, after which President Trump announced a claimed fresh cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and that talks with Iran were “continuing, at a rapid pace.”

As of 2 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 29 May and 2 June.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 2 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

Early 1 June, the Kuwaiti military announced that air defences were “confronting hostile missile and drone attacks”. US CENTCOM stated that US forces intercepted two Iranian ballistic missiles targeting American forces based in Kuwait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that the missile launches targeting an “air base” in Kuwait were retaliation for the attack against a telecommunications tower in Sirik, Hormozgan Province, in Iran.

The 1 June attack against Kuwait follows another Iranian attack on 28 May against Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait, which also resulted from a cycle of escalatory but limited kinetic exchanges between the US and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz. These will likely continue to occur as long as the competing blockades of the strait by both the US and Iran are in place, with Iranian retaliation strikes currently prioritising targets in Kuwait.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 2 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 29 May and 2 June.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 2 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 29 May and 2 June.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 2 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 29 May and 2 June.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 2 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 29 May and 2 June.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.

As of 2 June, Oman’s airspace is open.