It is likely that Iran, potentially supported by the Yemen-based Houthis, will attempt to conduct attacks against US naval assets operating in the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, or Red Sea, particularly the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG). The threat environment for maritime transit through these areas is likely to be severe in the event of active hostilities between the US and Iran.  

Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that a US attack would result in retaliatory strikes against US bases and facilities across the region. There is a realistic possibility that Iran will launch ballistic missiles towards US bases in Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, or Qatar. Following the US intervention in the 12-Day War, Iran launched 14 ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, Qatar. Despite resulting in no casualties, the attack caused notable air travel disruption.  

Iranian retaliation strikes against US regional bases would likely lead to significant air travel disruption in the targeted country, a threat of debris from successful interceptions, and the imposition of shelter-in-place orders. Moreover, while strikes in these countries are highly likely to prioritise US military bases, such as Al Dhafra Air Base outside Abu Dhabi, UAE, the targeting of civilian areas cannot be discounted.  

Tehran is likely to leverage the capabilities of its proxy forces to retaliate. The Houthis have threatened to restart their anti-shipping campaign and will likely launch long-range attacks against Israel, particularly Eilat, Tel Aviv, and Ben Gurion International Airport. If the conflict escalates, there is also a realistic possibility of the Houthis launching attacks against US bases in the Arabian Peninsula. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), the loose network of Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq, are likely to launch its own attacks against Israel and US military bases in the region.  

Lebanese Hezbollah did not intervene during the 12-Day War due to their severe degradation and continued Israeli military pressure. However, particularly if the Iranian regime is existentially threatened, there is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah will conduct attacks targeting northern Israel. This would highly likely lead to major IDF operations in Lebanon, including strikes in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and in Beirut targeting Hezbollah senior leadership.  Tehran is likely to leverage the capabilities of its proxy forces to retaliate. The Houthis have threatened to restart their anti-shipping campaign and will likely launch long-range attacks against Israel, particularly Eilat, Tel Aviv, and Ben Gurion International Airport. If the conflict escalates, there is also a realistic possibility of the Houthis launching attacks against US bases in the Arabian Peninsula. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), the loose network of Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq, are likely to launch its own attacks against Israel and US military bases in the region.  

Lebanese Hezbollah did not intervene during the 12-Day War due to their severe degradation and continued Israeli military pressure. However, particularly if the Iranian regime is existentially threatened, there is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah will conduct attacks targeting northern Israel. This would highly likely lead to major IDF operations in Lebanon, including strikes in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and in Beirut targeting Hezbollah senior leadership.  

Tehran is likely to leverage the capabilities of its proxy forces to retaliate. The Houthis have threatened to restart their anti-shipping campaign and will likely launch long-range attacks against Israel, particularly Eilat, Tel Aviv, and Ben Gurion International Airport. If the conflict escalates, there is also a realistic possibility of the Houthis launching attacks against US bases in the Arabian Peninsula. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), the loose network of Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq, are likely to launch its own attacks against Israel and US military bases in the region.  

Lebanese Hezbollah did not intervene during the 12-Day War due to their severe degradation and continued Israeli military pressure. However, particularly if the Iranian regime is existentially threatened, there is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah will conduct attacks targeting northern Israel. This would highly likely lead to major IDF operations in Lebanon, including strikes in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and in Beirut targeting Hezbollah senior leadership.  Tehran is likely to leverage the capabilities of its proxy forces to retaliate. The Houthis have threatened to restart their anti-shipping campaign and will likely launch long-range attacks against Israel, particularly Eilat, Tel Aviv, and Ben Gurion International Airport. If the conflict escalates, there is also a realistic possibility of the Houthis launching attacks against US bases in the Arabian Peninsula. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), the loose network of Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq, are likely to launch its own attacks against Israel and US military bases in the region.  

Lebanese Hezbollah did not intervene during the 12-Day War due to their severe degradation and continued Israeli military pressure. However, particularly if the Iranian regime is existentially threatened, there is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah will conduct attacks targeting northern Israel. This would highly likely lead to major IDF operations in Lebanon, including strikes in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and in Beirut targeting Hezbollah senior leadership.  

Active conflict in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, and adjacent waters is likely to disrupt international shipping and trade. It is estimated that 20 per cent of global daily oil consumption passes through the Strait of Hormuz. 

There is an elevated global risk of large-scale and potentially violent civil unrest in response to any potential conflict.  Large-scale protests may be staged in major US cities, other Western cities and across the Islamic world. Protests outside of US and Israeli embassies are likely. 

On 12 February, over 127 million Bangladeshi citizens will be eligible to cast their votes for the first time since the 2024 July Revolution, which toppled the 15-year government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League (AL) party. Voters will elect 300 members of the Jatiya Sangsad, the 350-member national parliament. The remaining 50 parliament seats are reserved for women and are assigned proportionally by the other MPs. Voters will also decide on the July Charter, a constitutional reform framework agreed upon by 30 parties following the uprising.

Dozens of parties have fielded more than 1,900 candidates to contest the 300 seats. However, the electoral campaign has evolved into a two-sided contest. On one side, the big-tent Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is leading the polls. Before the revolution, BNP was the main opposition party in Bangladesh. Since AL was banned in May 2025, BNP has managed to attract large swathes of supporters of the previous government.

Opposing it is a coalition, known as the “Like-minded 11 Parties” or “United Bangladesh”, founded in October 2025. The group is led by the other two major players in Bangladesh’s post-revolution political scene: the long-established Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which has emerged as a leading force on the right after years of marginalisation under Hasina, and the new, student-led National Citizen Party (NCP).

NCP, which was founded after the uprising, initially emerged as a reformist, progressive force. However, it has struggled to translate street support into electoral momentum. Its alliance with JI, which places it within a de facto right-wing Islamist coalition, has led to significant infighting, further weakening the party. In January 2026, 15 NCP party leaders resigned over the coalition deal.

Reflecting the high levels of insecurity, on 5 February the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) updated its Bangladesh travel advisory to recommend “against all but essential travel” to the country.

ASSESSMENT

The two votes are likely to be very differently contested. The referendum will highly likely return a resounding victory for the “Yes” vote, as the July Charter remains backed by all the major parties as well as the incumbent interim government. However, the parliamentary vote will likely be deeply competitive.

The failure of the NCP to organise effectively and to build a significant base of support has made it likely that the elections will be a contest between the BNP and JI. This dynamic is likely to be conducive to growing ideological polarisation and street violence. Throughout January 2026, several episodes of violent clashes between BNP, JI, and other parties’ canvassers have occurred across the country, injuring dozens of people.

A key test for the stability of post-electoral Bangladesh will be whether there is a general acceptance of the outcome of the 12 February vote. Several factors are likely to hinder such a scenario. First, current polls indicate a close contest between BNP and JI. There is a realistic possibility that polls will return a close or uncertain result, which could prolong the vote-counting period and delay the release of final tallies.

Second, several leaders have publicly warned of “plots” to doctor the results. These statements could constitute attempts to lay the foundations for a rejection of the vote as invalid. Finally, local media have reported on a growing spread of online disinformation targeting the election, often leveraging Artificial Intelligence-generated content. The spread of fake or misleading stories online has become a key driver of mob violence in Bangladesh and is likely to intensify during and after the vote.

Deep political polarisation and the spread of online disinformation have a realistic possibility of inciting “vigilante” violence by political activists targeting poll workers or voters during and after voting procedures. In the days immediately following the vote, further cases of mob violence targeting officials, candidates, and elected representatives, as well as inter-party clashes, remain likely. Attacks on foreigners, minorities, or foreign-owned businesses are also possible, particularly if claims of “foreign involvement” in the election were to spread online. For example, previous cases of mob violence have targeted American-owned businesses or businesses perceived to be pro-American or pro-Israeli.

In the medium term, instability and violence are likely to remain pervasive. The likelihood of further insecurity will largely depend on the parties’ acceptance of the election outcome. In a scenario where this occurs, possibly via a commitment by the parties to respect the electoral results, Bangladesh could reach a level of greater political stability. Pre-election commitments, however, would need to be paired with assurances that the new opposition will not be marginalised from the policymaking process. These dynamics would need to involve at least the three major parties, but could be extended to other key political players. This, of course, would not eliminate other pre-existing issues, such as the economic and labour-related challenges faced by Bangladesh, but would likely reduce the short-term threat of political violence.

A more likely scenario involves the elections resulting in protracted political instability. In this scenario, competition for control of the patronage networks left behind by AL’s collapse prevents the parties from reaching a meaningful agreement. Even if the central leadership acquiesces to a deal, local and student chapters, who are more dependent on local patronage networks, are likely to continue violently competing. Smaller groups marginalised under Hasina are expected to exploit the opportunities created by the revolution, but are likely to react negatively to any indication that they will continue to be excluded from any form of political influence.

In any scenario involving long-term political instability, economic instability is likely to deteriorate. Foreign direct investment (FDI) would likely decrease, especially in key industrial sectors, as investors delay commitments or reallocate capital to more stable markets and political environments in the region, such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam or Cambodia. In the fiscal quarter following the July Revolution in 2024, FDI inflows to Bangladesh dropped by 71 per cent, as investors avoided the country due to deadly political unrest, labour agitation and high degrees of political and economic uncertainty.

Failure to achieve any meaningful form of political stability or cohesion in Bangladesh is likely to reinforce the country’s economic and security issues. In turn, prolonged instability is conducive to worsening recurrent cycles of economic disruption, labour unrest, political violence, deteriorating crime rates and sectarian tensions, many of which remain unresolved.

On 8 February, Thai citizens will vote to elect members of the House of Representatives, the lower house of the National Assembly, following its dissolution in December 2025. 500 seats are up for election, with 400 chosen by constituency and the remaining 100 allocated to political parties in proportion to their nationwide vote share. 251 parliamentary votes are required to elect a prime minister, which is typically achieved through post-election coalition negotiations between multiple parties. The election must be certified within 60 days, by 9 April, and the parliament must convene within 15 days of election results being confirmed.

A referendum is also scheduled for the same day to determine whether to replace the current constitution, which was only enacted in 2017. Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled in September 2025 that drafting a new constitution requires three referendums. The first would approve the initiation of the drafting process; the second would focus on the draft’s key principles and approach; the third would constitute final approval of the draft.

57 parties have registered to take part in the election, but three main parties will be the primary contenders: the ruling conservative Bhumjaithai Party (BJT), the progressive reformist People’s Party (PP), and the populist Pheu Thai Party (PTP). Incumbent Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul is representing BJT. PP and PTP are the third incarnations of previous parties dissolved by the Thai courts for legal or technical breaches.

ASSESSMENT

Thailand’s current constitution was adopted in 2017 following a political crisis, which led to the removal of Yingluck Shinawatra in a military coup in 2014. As it was drafted under a military junta, the current constitution was approved in a tightly controlled referendum and is viewed as granting excessive power to the Senate, which has the authority to approve the prime minister and members of numerous independent bodies, including the Thai Constitutional Court. Many Thais view the constitution as imposed rather than chosen and have demanded reforms.

The election is taking place amid a broader political crisis. The border dispute with Cambodia, which led to direct fighting in July and December 2025, triggered the expulsion of former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra (niece of Yingluck and daughter of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, both members of PTP or one of its predecessors) after she expressed deference to the Cambodian former leader Hun Sen and criticised the Thai military in a leaked phone call.

Her successor, Anutin Charnvirakul, who took power in September, has faced heavy criticism over his minority government’s handling of the flooding in southern Thailand in November, which left at least 176 people dead. Adding to this was PP’s pulling of support from the BJP and its looming vote of no confidence over its alleged failure to honour promises to reform the constitution, compelling Anutin to dissolve parliament and call a general election in December.

A coalition government is the expected outcome of the election, with no party likely to win an outright majority. According to recent polling by Suan Dusit, respondents to a 28 January poll backed BJP by 21.14 per cent, PP by 21.11 per cent, and PTP by 17.56 per cent. 23.85 per cent of respondents were “still undecided”, suggesting that there could be a large disparity in electoral results from the polling. In a 6-9 January poll, PP leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut was the top choice for prime minister for 31.99 per cent, with PTP leader Yodchanan Wongsawat second on 17.45 per cent, and the incumbent Anutin third on 15.14 per cent. However, BJP’s polling has likely been inflated by a surge in nationalism linked to the ongoing Thailand-Cambodia border dispute and could diminish in the lead-up to the election, should the current ceasefire continue to hold.

Despite its popularity in the polls, PP faces potential legal action from the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) that could bar dozens of its members from running for attempting to amend Article 112 of the Criminal Code, Thailand’s royal insult (lèse-majesté) law, in 2021. The amendment sought to reduce penalties, narrow who could file complaints, and limit what constitutes an offence. While procedurally lawful within parliament, the proposal was later characterised by opponents as an abuse of office and an act undermining the constitutional order.

In the 2023 election, PP’s progenitor party, Move Forward, which openly campaigned on amending Article 112, won 151 seats in parliament, the most votes of any party, but was blocked from power by lawmakers tied to the royalist military due to its support for the amendment. Its prime ministerial candidate, Pita Limjaroenrat, was subsequently suspended from parliament and later barred from politics after Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled that his candidacy violated electoral law, effectively preventing him from assuming office.

Since then, PP has moderated its position during this electoral campaign, dropping the call to change Article 112 and softening its stance on the military, which it previously wanted to drive out of politics. Even so, PP’s historical backing of the amendment almost certainly exposes the party to political pressure and, in extremis, potential bans from candidacy.

Should PP receive the most votes but be barred from candidacy, widespread protests are highly likely, as was observed in 2023. These would highly likely be led by the Thai youth, who make up a large part of the reformist parties’ support base. Previous bouts of major unrest mixed with institutional paralysis have triggered coups from Thailand’s powerful military on numerous occasions. This is unlikely to occur again in the short-term due to independent mechanisms typically now being preferred tools for managing political crises in Thailand in an effort to increase democratic legitimacy. However, if protests become widespread, violent, and sustained, with a political deadlock over the election winner, this would highly likely increase the risk of a coup.

Large-scale unrest is not the only potential physical risk likely to increase in Thailand during the electoral campaign. Thailand has been experiencing an ongoing separatist insurgency since 2004 in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla. Insurgents have traditionally increased attacks during electoral cycles to undermine the central government and achieve maximum publicity for their cause. In 2023, insurgents set fire to cell phone towers and tyres across Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces. During the election periods in 2011 and 2014, insurgent activity increased around polling and campaigning phases, marked by attacks on infrastructure, local officials, and security forces.

On 11 January 2026, a series of coordinated bomb and arson attacks targeted PTT petrol stations across Thailand’s Deep South, injuring at least four. A member of the largest insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), has since declared that the group is “likely to conduct attacks like arson, shootings and bombings to remind political parties of their demands” around the general election. Further attacks in the run-up to the election are likely, with incidents likely to be contained to the southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla, and designed to generate publicity and exert political pressure, rather than cause mass casualties. However, attacks on Thai Buddhists, state officials, military personnel, police officers, and local Muslims perceived as cooperating with the authorities have increased in recent years, and there is a realistic possibility that more hardline elements of the insurgency will conduct more deadly attacks during the electoral period.

Costa Rica will hold general elections on 1 February to elect the president, the two vice presidents, and the 57 members of the Legislative Assembly. To be elected president, a candidate must secure at least 40 per cent of the vote in the first round. If that does not occur, the two candidates who received the most votes will compete in a run-off election on 5 April. If multiple candidates cross the 40 per cent threshold, the one who receives the most votes is elected president in the first round. Legislative Assembly seats are assigned via proportional representation across the country’s seven electoral districts.

Current polls indicate that Minister of National Planning and Economic Policy Laura Fernández Delgado is a clear favourite to win the first round. Polling from 21 January suggests she is approaching the critical 40 per cent mark, providing her with a realistic possibility of securing an outright first-round victory if current support levels are maintained. Fernández is running for the right-wing populist Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO), which was only founded in 2022. She also has the backing of incumbent President Rodrigo Chaves, who is currently an independent and barred from running for re-election.

Several candidates are competing for a possible second spot in the runoff, although they are all polling below double digits. They include: Álvaro Ramos Chaves, of the centrist National Liberation Party (PLN), Fabricio Alvarado, an Evangelical singer who heads the conservative New Republic Party (PNR), Claudia Dobles Camargo, the former first lady of Costa Rica who is supported by the centre-left National Democratic Agenda (AND) coalition, and Ariel Robles Barrantes, of the democratic socialist Broad Front (FA).

ASSESSMENT

The elections occur at a time of increasing political turmoil in Costa Rica. President Chaves is currently involved in a conflict with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and has survived two attempts to strip his electoral immunity over suspected electoral violations. This instability was highlighted on 19 January, when the head of Costa Rica’s intelligence agency reported that it had received information about a plot to assassinate Chaves ahead of the vote, although the activist who was accused has denied the allegations and suggested they were politically motivated.  

Moreover, the crime rate has increased significantly, which has largely been attributed to the spread of transnational organised criminal groups since the late 2010s. In 2023, the murder rate reached 17.2 per 100,000, around 40 per cent higher than its previous peak in 2017. Increasing crime rates have resulted in growing public scepticism towards the political class. According to polls, large sections of the electorate have become disillusioned with the existing parties, with up to half of voters still undecided regarding their preferred candidate.

Law and order and the fight against corruption are highly likely to be the main issues during the electoral campaign, mirroring patterns observed in other Latin American states. In countries like Chile, Honduras, and Ecuador, leaders have increasingly responded to these concerns with promises to implement Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) policies. Such policies have been characterised by mass detentions, increased police powers, and the curtailing of civil liberties. Mano Dura’s application by the government of El Salvador, which resulted in a sharp decrease in the violent crime rate, has become a model for other Latin American nations seeking to combat organised crime.

Fernández, expanding on Chaves’s positions, has pledged to implement Mano Dura in Costa Rica, vowing to build a “maxi-prison” like El Salvador’s CECOT facility, curtail civil rights in high-crime areas, and extradite Costa Ricans involved in organised crime to other countries, especially the US. These hardline stances, combined with Chaves’s enduring popularity (likely bolstered by the president’s clash with the legal “establishment”, have likely solidified Fernández’s primacy in the polls.

Still, Fernández’s victory, while highly likely due to the significant divisions within the opposition, is not certain. If the vote goes to a runoff, her competitor will almost certainly have an opportunity to unify at least part of this fragmented vote. However, the low levels of disillusionment within the electorate may make a significant swing in support between the two rounds unlikely.

Costa Rica has a long history of stable and peaceful political transitions. However, the country has had occasional waves of large-scale unrest, which have at times turned violent. The latest occurred in 2018, when labour unions staged a three-month strike over a proposed tax reform. The strike was marked by widespread and sometimes violent clashes between authorities and the protesters, as well as multiple incidents of vandalism.

It is unlikely that the upcoming vote itself will trigger large-scale violent unrest in Costa Rica. However, persistent political tensions, particularly the unresolved dispute between the executive and the TSE, could become catalysts for broader instability depending on the policies adopted by the incoming administration in its early months. The potential and controversial implementation of Mano Dura–style security measures is likely to result in significant division. While rising crime rates and the threats associated with transnational organised crime groups will almost certainly be leveraged to justify their implementation, for many, such draconian policies will likely be interpreted as a state overreach in a country that has traditionally championed democratic institutions and civil liberties, and which has historically been less affected by violent crime than many of its Central American neighbours.

On 18 January, Portuguese citizens will vote to elect their new President for a five-year term. The winning candidate needs to obtain a majority of 50 per cent of votes plus one. If that fails to occur, then the two leading candidates will compete in a run-off vote on 8 February. The incumbent President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, in office since 2016, is constitutionally barred from seeking a third consecutive term.

Portugal is a semi-presidential republic, and the president, while mostly holding ceremonial responsibilities, has some tangible political power (unlike, for example, the heads of state of Italy and Germany). For example, the president has the authority to veto laws and appoints not only the prime minister, but also other members of government.

Eleven official candidates are contesting for the presidency. A first-round victory seems highly unlikely, and current polls indicate that only five of the candidates have a realistic possibility of progressing to the second round. André Ventura, the founder of the far-right nationalist party Chega! (CH) leads the polls with approximately 19.5 per cent support. Marques Mendes, the candidate of the governing centre-right Social Democrat Party (PSD), polls at 19 per cent. António José Seguro, of the Socialist Party (PS), has around 17.5 per cent support, as does Henrique Gouveia e Melo, an “outsider candidate” and former Chief of the Naval Staff who is running as an independent and has significant centre-right support. Finally, João Cotrim de Figueiredo, president of the Liberal Initiative (IL), polls at around 16.5 per cent.

ASSESSMENT

The elections are likely to be a crucial test for Chega that could accelerate the party’s political momentum. In May’s parliamentary elections, Chega won 22.8 per cent of the vote, improving on its 2024 result and becoming the main opposition force in parliament. On the other hand, Chega was generally seen as having underperformed at the October 2025 local elections, only winning in three municipalities.

Securing the presidency would almost certainly grant Chega significant leverage over the governing PSD-led coalition. A Chega president could threaten to weaponise presidential veto powers to extract significant legislative concessions and shift the parliament to the right, encouraging PSD to work more often with Chega.

Holding the presidential office for five years is also an important political asset at a time of extreme parliamentary instability in Portugal. The 2025 vote was the third in three years, and the current governing coalition only retains a parliamentary minority. Finally, Chega’s position is further reinforced by Portugal’s lack of a developed cordon sanitaire system; the informal agreement that, in the parliaments of other European countries, such as France and Germany, centrist parties unite to keep the far-right out of power.

Current polls indicate that Ventura is likely to reach the second round. In other European head-to-head electoral contests involving a far-right candidate (such as, for instance, the second round of the 2022 French presidential elections), supporters of rival parties have typically coalesced around the leading alternative candidate to deny a far-right victory. However, several of the presidential candidates are from the right of the political spectrum, and if the choice is between Chega and the Socialist Party, Ventura’s chances will likely markedly increase, with right-leaning voters, not affected by a cordon sanitaire, potentially opting for Chega to block the left. On the other hand, a centre-right candidate may have a greater chance of winning centre-left voters by positioning themselves as a “lesser of two evils” against the far-right.

While presidential elections in Portugal seldom result in protests, a (likely) second round involving Ventura, which raises the possibility of a Chega head of state, would likely become an important cause of public opposition. Chega’s growth in the polls has meant that party rallies have increasingly been met by large counterprotests. Occasionally, as during the April 2025 Revolution Day celebrations in Lisbon, these demonstrations have escalated into clashes between opposing groups.

Furthermore, the likelihood of civil unrest after the first round of the elections is further increased by recent political developments in Portugal. In December, Portugal experienced its largest general strike in a decade, which forced the government to amend a labour reform package that opponents said reduced workers’ rights. Before the protests, the reform, proposed by the PSD coalition, was widely expected to be approved by parliament with Chega’s support. Chega representatives later backtracked and called on the government to amend the legislation as protests gained significant traction. Emboldened by their recent success, labour unions may stage further demonstrations, particularly if the runoff appears to be “tilted to the right”, for example, in a Ventura-Mendes scenario.

While large-scale protests cannot be ruled out, especially in Lisbon, protests after the first round are likely to be mostly peaceful and smaller-scale. On the other hand, direct action by groups opposing Chega is likely. This may include vandalism, particularly targeting party premises and police and government offices, and possibly small-scale political violence, such as clashes involving opposing political activists.

On 15 January, Ugandans will take part in general elections to elect the president and members of parliament. The president will be elected in a two-round system, with candidates requiring at least 50 per cent of the vote to be elected in the first round. The 529 members of the Ugandan Parliament will be elected via a first-past-the-post system. 146 seats are reserved for women, with one seat per district, and 30 seats are indirectly filled via special electoral colleges. 

Uganda’s Electoral Commission has cleared 27 parties to participate. Eight presidential candidates are competing. The 81-year-old Incumbent President Yoweri Museveni was declared the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party’s candidate and is seeking to extend his rule, which has been ongoing since 1986, to a seventh term. Opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi, popularly known as Bobi Wine of the National Unity Platform (NUP) is the primary opposition candidate.  

The lead-up to the elections has been characterised by intimidation, violence, and arrests targeting the opposition. Over 300 opposition supporters have been detained, with rallies being met by the police with tear gas, roadblocks, and arbitrary arrests. On 5 January 2026, Wine shared social media footage of security forces arresting and manhandling a journalist. This was the latest in a series of incidents involving heavy-handed tactics by security forces, typically against Wine supporters at his political rallies. Wine has claimed at least three deaths at his rallies at the hands of security forces, including one instance of a supporter being shot and another being hit by a military truck. In May 2025, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s son, who is likely being groomed as the next in line for the presidency, boasted of torturing Wine’s chief bodyguard. 

ASSESSMENT

Previous Ugandan elections have resulted in significant levels of violence. In November 2020, in the lead-up to the January 2021 general election, security forces arrested Wine, citing violations of COVID-19 protocols. Widespread protests erupted across Uganda, particularly in Kampala and other urban areas. Security forces cracked down on protests, deploying tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, and detaining approximately 3,000 people over the election period. 

In July 2024, young Ugandans engaged in anti-government protests in Kampala, largely inspired by similar youth-led movements in Kenya. Security forces quickly cracked down on demonstrations, detaining at least 100 protesters. Museveni, Africa’s third-longest-running leader, has cracked down on opposition in recent years, arresting and trying numerous opposition figures in military courts. Wine himself has been arrested multiple times since campaigning for the presidency, most recently in October 2023. 

A rising cost of living crisis, primarily driven by rising fuel and food costs, combined with perceptions of government corruption, has fuelled significant frustration among Uganda’s youth. If the election is perceived as unfree and unfair, or if the security forces use excessive or unwarranted force against the opposition, there is a realistic possibility that widespread unrest could break out. Security forces have historically cracked down on protesters with severe force and are highly likely to respond similarly to any unrest during the upcoming election. While the security crackdown acted as a deterrence to protesters in July 2024, Wine could act as a figurehead for post-election protests, potentially helping to sustain demonstrations despite the high likelihood of security force crackdowns. 

Despite the head of the Uganda Communications Commission’s (UCC) reassurance that reports of potential internet blackouts were “mere rumours”, internet blackouts are likely in the lead-up to the election. The government has already banned the sharing of live footage of riots, “unlawful processions”, and other violent incidents ahead of the election. Youth-led protests are generally heavily reliant on real-time updates, viral content, and livestreamed evidence of police brutality to sustain demonstrations. By cutting the internet, the government can disrupt protester coordination, prevent the documentation of abuses by security forces, isolate activists, and limit the spread of anti-government sentiment. During the 2021 election, during which widespread protests took place in Kampala, the internet was cut for four days.  

If civil unrest breaks out, demonstrations are likely around the Central Business District and near government buildings; during the July 2024 anti-corruption protests, groups marched through Kampala towards the parliament building but were blocked by the security forces. Large anti-government protests would highly likely result in travel disruptions, with security forces likely to use roadblocks to prevent protesters from accessing government buildings and diplomatic zones.