On 6 and 7 November, protests against data centres are scheduled to take place across Europe. At least 80 organisations are supporting the protests under the “Stop Dirty Data Centres” campaign, with unrest planned in countries including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Poland, and Austria. The movement describes itself as a citizen-led initiative aiming to pause data centre construction across Europe over environmental, socioeconomic, democracy- and privacy-related concerns.

The dedicated campaign website indicates that protests on 6-7 November will take different forms, including gatherings near university campuses, symbolic demonstrations in city centres, and marches from city centres to nearby data centres.

With the US midterm elections taking place on 3 November, a key political constraint on renewed US military operations against Iran is highly likely to be removed. The indicators and warnings (I&W) observed in recent weeks, including reported US-Israeli strike planning, the withdrawal of US military personnel from regional bases, diplomatic drawdowns and reported US warnings to Gulf governments on possible strikes from 4 November, almost certainly indicate that preparations for renewed operations are at an advanced stage.

With diplomacy highly likely to remain deadlocked, observed I&W suggest that renewed US strikes against Iran are highly likely in the coming weeks and could be authorised imminently. However, the timing remains uncertain, and Washington may instead opt to maintain pressure through its blockade without immediately resorting to major military operations.

Negotiations have continued to encounter difficulties, with neither party appearing willing to make the concessions required to reach a substantive agreement. Tehran likely considers another round of conflict preferable to making the demanded concessions, while IRGC hardliners are highly unlikely to accept any terms that could be perceived as surrender. Conversely, accepting Iran’s offer to reopen the SoH in exchange for sanctions relief and the lifting of the blockade would require Washington to relinquish its primary leverage without securing the nuclear concessions used to justify the war. Pezeshkian’s confirmation that Khamenei has authorised negotiations is likely partly intended to signal flexibility and ward off potential strikes, but is ultimately unlikely to result in Tehran making demanded concessions.

The US strikes against Qeshm Island, conducted without public announcement and described as defensive, are consistent with a pattern of limited US strikes against Iranian capabilities around the SoH, and do not appear to have triggered significant Iranian retaliation. However, with preparations for renewed major military operations highly likely to be at an advanced stage, and Iran having threatened pre-emptive action in response to indications of an imminent attack, even limited engagements could significantly increase the risk of miscalculation.

Renewed major operations would almost certainly result in severe Iranian retaliation across the region. Iranian officials have explicitly threatened US military installations and personnel, regional energy infrastructure, shipping, undersea cables, telecommunications infrastructure, data centres and other strategic infrastructure associated with US interests. Iran has also almost certainly exploited the cessation of major conflict to reconstitute its long-range strike capabilities, likely enabling high-volume, layered missile and drone attacks capable of overstretching or saturating regional air defences, which have likely been depleted by previous Iranian strikes, with Saudi air defences facing additional pressure from the ongoing Houthi campaign.

Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued at a high intensity, with a notable concentration of drone attacks against Riyadh and the Eastern Province during the reporting period. The Houthis’ claimed targeting of an early-warning radar and a military transport aircraft in Jazan, following previous claimed attacks against military aviation at Najran Airport and King Khalid Air Base, likely indicates an emerging effort to degrade Saudi air defence and military aviation capabilities supporting operations in Yemen, which may be enabled by previously reported Houthi use of Russian satellite imagery. However, the Houthi claims have not been verified.

Repeated interceptions over the Mecca and Medina regions are likely associated with the Houthis targeting strategic locations, including energy infrastructure in Yanbu and Rabigh. There are no confirmed indications that the Houthis have deliberately targeted the two holy cities of Mecca or Medina.

The Saudi-led coalition’s operation against Houthi logistics infrastructure, including strikes against Ras Isa port and oil facilities in Hodeidah Governorate, was likely intended to disrupt Houthi fuel supplies and degrade logistics networks. However, strikes against Hodeidah’s port infrastructure and other high-value targets (HVTs) in locations such as Sanaa are highly likely to result in Houthi retaliation against Saudi energy infrastructure and airports, and the conflict is likely to continue escalating in the short term.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Indicators and warnings (I&W) of renewed US or joint US-Israeli strikes against Iran have increased materially in the last few weeks and almost certainly indicate that renewed operations against Iran are at an advanced stage. Ongoing Qatari-led mediation is unlikely to produce a lasting resolution in the near term. Reports indicate that preparations for a series of high-intensity strikes against Iran have been finalised, with any resumption of attacks almost certain to trigger a severe Iranian response.

Further I&W of imminent US-Israeli operations could include the following, although these indicators would not necessarily need to be observed ahead of renewed strikes:

Negotiations have continued to stall, with neither party appearing willing to make the concessions required to reach a substantive agreement. Tehran likely considers another round of conflict preferable to making demanded concessions, while IRGC hardliners are highly unlikely to accept any terms that could be perceived as surrender. Conversely, accepting Iran’s offer to reopen the SoH in exchange for sanctions relief and the lifting of the blockade would require Washington to relinquish its primary leverage without securing the nuclear concessions used to justify the war. Reverting to the more favourable June MoU terms remains a possible off-ramp, but is unlikely given Washington’s strengthened negotiating position, achieved through its blockade of Iranian maritime trade and expanded sanctions.

Moreover, the observed I&W almost certainly indicates that preparations for renewed operations against Iran are at a highly advanced stage. The withdrawal of military personnel and diplomatic staff is likely intended to reduce their exposure to any Iranian retaliation following the resumption of offensive operations. Comparable withdrawals were ordered prior to US strikes against Iran in June 2025 and February 2026.

The US currently has two aircraft carriers deployed to the CENTCOM AoR, alongside additional naval combat power and land-based combat aircraft, providing substantial capability to conduct sustained, high-intensity strikes against Iran with limited advanced warning.

The arrival of the Roosevelt CSG would provide additional combat power and operational freedom. However, a third CSG is not a prerequisite for renewed strikes against Iran, and strategic bombers are not required to conduct sustained high-intensity strikes against the majority of Iranian targets.

Moreover, the likely involvement of Israeli combat aircraft, supported by US aerial refuelling assets, would significantly increase the combined force’s available strike capacity. A reported 200 Israeli fighter jets participated in Operation Roaring Lion, with a CSG typically embarking approximately 40–50 fighter jets. Recent Israeli sorties close to Iran may have been an attempt to probe Iranian air defences and assess response times.

While further I&W could be observed, the combined force already has sufficient combat power in the region to initiate sustained, high-intensity strikes against Iran with limited additional preparation or warning. The observed I&W indicate that renewed strikes are highly likely in the coming weeks, and could be authorised imminently. However, the final political decision and precise timing remain unconfirmed.

Iran has threatened multiple times that any strikes would provoke a major escalation. Iranian officials have explicitly threatened to target US military installations and personnel across the Middle East, as well as regional energy infrastructure, airports, ports, desalination plants, shipping, undersea cables, telecommunications infrastructure, data centres and other strategic infrastructure associated with US interests.

Iran’s response would highly likely involve attacks in Israel, Jordan and the Gulf States. Given the ongoing Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia and the expansion of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, there is a realistic possibility that Tehran could concentrate its direct retaliation against other Gulf states to avoid a Turkish or Pakistani response, while relying on the Houthis and Iran-aligned Iraqi militias to sustain attacks on Saudi Arabia. However, the extent to which either country would intervene remains uncertain, and Saudi Arabia cannot be excluded from Iran’s potential target set.

Iran has also warned that retaliation will have no limits and has threatened to expand the geographical scope and target set of its response. Previous escalation cycles have involved reported Iranian attacks in Turkey, Azerbaijan and Cyprus, likely demonstrating the potential for hostilities to extend beyond the Middle East.

US intelligence has warned of Iranian plots to target US government officials and personnel across the Middle East, indicating that Tehran may pursue asymmetric operations alongside conventional military retaliation. Iran has previously been implicated in assassinations and attacks far beyond the Middle East.

Iran has also established a pattern of reciprocal targeting, whereby its forces conduct attacks against infrastructure similar to that targeted by US or Israeli strikes. The nature of US-Israeli joint strikes against Iran, with Iranian energy infrastructure reportedly included in strike planning, would likely indicate the types of targets Iran may select for retaliation across the region; however, Iranian threats suggest a potential expansion of its target set.

Reports indicate that Iran has exploited the cessation of direct hostilities to regroup, reorganise and reconstitute its long-range strike capabilities, and has increased the production of several weapon systems. This would likely enable Iran to conduct high-volume, layered missile and UAV attacks over a sustained period, increasing the likelihood of overstretching or saturating regional air defences, especially if attacks are coordinated with regional allies, including the Houthis and Iraqi militias, from multiple axes.

Despite the degradation of its military capabilities, Hezbollah likely retains a limited ability to conduct attacks against Israel. Israel’s new defence doctrine states that Hezbollah attacks will result in Israeli strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs and further territorial advances into southern Lebanon, likely reflecting Israeli concerns over Hezbollah’s involvement and an attempt to deter its participation.

Previous high-intensity Iranian strikes, Houthi attacks in Saudi Arabia, combined with prolonged production timeframes and increased global demand, have likely resulted in shortages in regional air defences. There is a realistic possibility that reduced interceptor availability, combined with an expanded Iranian target set and the use of large, coordinated missile and UAV salvos, could result in increased penetration rates and more successful strikes. However, successful interceptions also pose a major threat to civilians. Falling debris has resulted in multiple fatalities and injuries across the region.

Israel maintains a highly advanced and generally reliable early-warning system, combining air-raid sirens with location-specific mobile alerts. However, early-warning and alerting systems across the Gulf vary considerably in coverage and reliability. Previous attacks have resulted in warnings being issued too late or not being issued at all.

Due to the ongoing conflict in Yemen, which has involved multiple attacks on Saudi airports, air travel to and from the Kingdom has been severely disrupted. Renewed Iranian strikes will likely result in regional airspace closures and flight cancellations. Iran has previously targeted regional airports during previous escalation cycles and is likely to do so in response to renewed US-Israeli strikes. With Saudi airports already experiencing significant operational disruption, a major escalation is likely to severely disrupt regional air travel and limit opportunities to evacuate the region.

Increased demand, border congestion and potential restrictions on cross-border movement may further limit opportunities. Attacks and airspace closures in Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE would almost certainly disrupt key alternative routes into and out of Saudi Arabia, particularly where travellers rely on neighbouring airports for onward international flights.

The reported US warning to Gulf governments to prepare for a campaign after the midterms, reported arrival of US military transport aircraft in-region, the reductions of US diplomatic staffing across the region, continued withdrawals of US troops from regional installations exposed to Iranian strikes, and increased warnings from national travel advisories almost certainly continue to represent a significant increase in indicators and warnings (I&W) of renewed large-scale conflict. The force protection measures are consistent with previous actions undertaken by the US before launching operations against Iran, and military transport flights were used extensively to deliver air defences across the region. These developments indicate that renewed US strikes against Iran are highly likely in the coming weeks, with the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) also expected to arrive in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AoR) by late November.

The increase in diplomatic outreach, including Vance’s letter to Rezaei and continued Qatari and regional mediation, is unlikely to achieve a lasting resolution. Tehran likely calculates that it is better placed to survive a further round of conflict than to make the concessions demanded by Washington, particularly regarding its nuclear programme and longer-term control over the SoH. Furthermore, IRGC hardliners now wield significant power in Tehran and are highly unlikely to accept concessions that could be perceived as surrender, despite the enormous economic costs being imposed by the US blockade and expanded sanctions regime.

Iran’s offer to reopen the SoH remains conditional on sanctions relief and the lifting of the US blockade, but does not address the nuclear file. Accepting these terms would require Washington to relinquish its primary leverage over Tehran without securing the demanded concessions it has used to justify its military campaign. A potential off-ramp to avoid renewed full-scale conflict would be the Trump administration reverting to the terms of the June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which were relatively favourable to Tehran. However, this is unlikely, as Washington almost certainly assesses that the blockade has given it greater leverage over Iran than it held in June.

Renewed operations against Iran would almost certainly result in severe Iranian retaliation across the region, including against US military installations, energy infrastructure and US-linked technology facilities, with Washington reportedly already warning Gulf governments to prepare for such attacks. Iranian threats against US diplomats and personnel, and intelligence warnings of advanced plots against US officials, likely indicate that the threat to US-linked individuals and facilities in the region extends beyond missile and drone attacks to asymmetric and deniable operations, with such threats likely to persist even in the absence of renewed military strikes.

The reported strike on Ras Tanura, one of the world’s largest oil export terminals and refining complexes, almost certainly marks one of the most significant Houthi attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure during the current conflict. It also highly likely demonstrates the Houthis’ ability to penetrate air defences in the Eastern Province, the kingdom’s principal oil-producing region, more than 1,000km from Houthi-controlled territory. The attack likely reflects a deliberate effort to impose economic costs on Riyadh, and further attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, including in the Eastern Province and on the Red Sea coast, are highly likely.

If confirmed as accurate, reported Russian satellite support would almost certainly increase the effectiveness of Houthi strikes against Saudi high-value targets (HVTs), given the Houthis’ limited independent over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Access to Russian-derived intelligence is likely to improve the Houthis’ ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in Saudi and foreign-deployed air defence coverage, prioritise less well-defended targets and identify stationary HVTs such as aircraft on a runway, which could result in a further geographical expansion of attacks or broadening of the Houthis’ target selection.

The IRG offensive near the Bab al-Mandeb and Houthi strikes against Aden International Airport indicate a continued escalation of the conflict in Yemen, with no clear diplomatic pathway towards de-escalation. Further Saudi-backed territorial advances or airstrikes against Houthi HVTs in locations such as Sanaa and Hodeidah Port are highly likely to trigger an intensification of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, and short-notice airspace restrictions and flight disruption at Saudi airports are highly likely to continue.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

On 3 November, approximately 250 million US citizens will be eligible to vote in the country’s midterm elections, which will determine the composition of both chambers of Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives or “House”. Voters will elect all 435 members of the House, 35 of the Senate’s 100 seats (33 regular contests plus special elections in Ohio and Florida), 39 state and territorial governors, and 33 attorneys general, as well as numerous state and local officials.

Members of the House of Representatives serve two-year terms and are elected by direct popular vote in single-member congressional districts. Each state is allocated seats proportionate to its population. Senators serve six-year terms and are elected by direct popular vote in a single statewide constituency, with two per state regardless of population.

The United States has a de facto two-party political system. Apart from two independent senators and one independent member of the House, every seat in Congress is held by either the Republican or the Democratic Party. The Republican Party currently holds narrow majorities in both chambers: 53 of 100 seats in the Senate, and 218 of 435 in the House, where two seats are vacant. The midterm elections could therefore result in a change of control in either or both chambers of Congress.

Midterm elections are widely treated as a barometer of public support for the sitting president and governing party. Historically, the president’s party has lost seats in the House in almost every midterm election, although this pattern is less consistent in the Senate.

As of 27 October, President Donald Trump has an approval rating as low as 31 per cent according to some polls, the lowest figure recorded across both of his presidential terms. In the November 2025 off-year elections, Democrats gained the Virginia governorship, retained control in New Jersey and secured victories in several other state-level races.

Recent polling and election forecasts indicate that the Democratic Party is well positioned to regain control of the House, with many projecting a net gain of 10–20 seats, significantly above the three seats required to secure a majority. In the Senate, polls suggest a narrower result, with the Democratic Party’s chances of winning a majority depending on key races in Texas, Ohio, Michigan, and Iowa.

Unlike proportional representation systems, where seats are allocated according to parties’ share of the vote, House elections are contested in individual congressional districts, while Senate elections are decided at the state level. Consequently, nationwide polling figures do not necessarily translate into a proportional distribution of congressional seats. Most House and Senate seats are typically considered “safe”; the party that holds them is likely to retain control. “Swing seats”, which could flip from one party to the other, constitute the minority. Ahead of the 3 November midterms, election forecasters have identified between seven and 14 competitive races in the Senate and 40-46 in the House.

The relatively small number of competitive seats reflects established voting patterns, the geographic distribution of party support and gerrymandering, the deliberate redrawing of congressional district boundaries to favour one political party over another. As a result, a relatively small number of competitive swing seats will be critical in determining which party controls Congress.

US elections typically hinge on domestic policy issues. However, the 2026 midterms will take place amid several international crises, with global policy issues occupying a central position in campaigns. A Pew Research Center poll from October indicates that a majority of both Republican and Democratic registered voters see foreign policy as a “very important” issue, ranking it ahead of topics such as violent crime.

The vote will occur at a time of growing tensions between the US and Iran. The conflict has contributed to rising prices for fuel and essential goods in the US and worldwide. According to a Pew Research poll from early October, 65 per cent of Americans disapproved of the White House’s handling of the conflict. While most Republicans are in favour of the conflict, the study found that “Republicans and Republican-leaning independents have grown more negative about [it]”.

Voters also link the Iran war with the economy and the increased cost of living. In May, a poll by the Institute of Global Affairs at Eurasia Group found that almost 80 per cent of US adults thought that the Iran war had affected the cost of living to some extent (with 45 per cent assessing that the war had affected it “a great deal”). With fuel prices and the cost of other essential goods rising in the second half of 2026, the economic impact of the conflict will likely undermine Republican electoral prospects.

In the past two years, the US has also become more directly involved in influencing the politics of Latin America. This strategy has included the controversial capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the imposition of a fuel blockade on Cuba that has pushed the government to the brink of collapse. While less prominent overall than the Iran war, assessments of US policy in LATAM are likely to be major political factors in US states that have large Latin American (particularly Cuban and Venezuelan) diaspora communities, such as Florida, Texas, New York, and California.

US relations with Israel are almost certainly the most divisive foreign policy issue shaping the vote, particularly within the Democratic Party. Since the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip, repeated waves of protests have taken place in the US. In early 2026, a Gallup poll found that, for the first time, Americans were no longer more sympathetic towards Israelis than Palestinians, reflecting declining sympathy for Israel among Democrats and younger Americans, particularly those aged 18–34.

Within the Democratic Party, growing criticism of Israel has almost certainly contributed to the victory of several Israel-sceptic candidates at the pre-midterm primaries. These include seven House candidates and the party’s Senate nominee in Florida, all aligned with the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), a grassroots democratic socialist organisation that operates independently of the Democratic Party but endorses candidates competing in its primaries. With DSA candidates mostly running in “safe” Democratic seats, the upcoming midterms will highly likely result in a larger Israel-critical contingent entering Congress.

Despite the prominence of international issues in the election campaign, the midterms are unlikely to fundamentally alter US foreign policy, given the president’s extensive executive powers over foreign affairs. Even if Democrats gain control of Congress, their ability to constrain the White House’s actions abroad will remain limited. Congress has substantial constitutional powers over federal spending, military authorisations and arms transfers. However, the president can veto legislation, requiring a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override. This makes it difficult for a narrowly divided Congress to impose restrictions opposed by the White House. Instead, Democrats would likely use congressional oversight and budgetary powers to pressure the administration into policy concessions over the medium to long term, while strengthening their position ahead of the 2028 presidential election.

The US midterms occur at a time of high polarisation in the US. Over the last decade, US elections have been affected by notable levels of unrest and occasional political violence. A case of US election-linked violence was the 6 January 2021 storming of the Capitol building by supporters of President Trump. Between 2016 and 2025, there were reported incidents of voter intimidation near polling stations, as well as separate plots and attempts to kidnap or assassinate political figures. The 2024 presidential campaign saw several high-profile incidents of political violence, including two assassination attempts against Republican candidate Donald Trump, linked arson attacks targeting ballot drop boxes in Washington and Oregon, and a separate arson incident in Arizona.

The current midterm electoral campaign has also been the subject of disinformation campaigns, including operations linked to foreign state actors. Researchers have identified a new phase of “Operation Matryoshka”, a Russian-linked disinformation campaign active since at least 2023. The operation has increasingly targeted US politics, using AI-generated videos and fabricated news reports to discredit Democratic candidates. Separately, in October, the social media platform X announced the suspension of more than 13,000 accounts suspected of involvement in foreign influence operations linked to Russia, Iran and China.

Additional research has identified numerous false narratives circulating across social media and other online platforms ahead of the midterms, including allegations of electoral fraud, candidate misconduct and misleading claims about political policies. There has also been an increase in so-called “pink slime” websites, which present partisan political content as independent news reporting or impartial information.

High levels of political polarisation, the spread of disinformation and previous incidents of election-related violence are likely to increase the risk of civil unrest surrounding the vote. The midterms are taking place against a backdrop of sustained protest activity across the US in recent years. This has included large nationwide demonstrations, notably the “No Kings” protests, which have attracted millions of participants; widespread protests against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operations; demonstrations against the war in Gaza, particularly across university campuses; and numerous smaller, localised protest movements.

There are several potential flashpoints for protests during the election. US federal law bars armed federal agents or troops from being present at polling stations, and, in February, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) official told state election officials that ICE would not be deployed during the vote. However, President Trump has declined to rule out deploying ICE or the National Guard, stating that he would do “anything necessary” to guarantee fair elections, and has called on Republicans to “nationalise the voting”. Any visible deployment of federal agents or troops near polling stations or vote-counting centres has the potential to trigger protests, particularly in cities such as Los Angeles and Minneapolis that have experienced large-scale immigration enforcement operations, and could lead to confrontations between demonstrators, federal personnel and counter-protesters.

Campaign events represent a further potential flashpoint ahead of the vote. President Trump is undertaking a month-long rally tour in support of Republican candidates, with several events already disrupted by protesters. Further demonstrations and disruptions are likely in the final days of campaigning, particularly in states with competitive races, while confrontations between protesters, counter-protesters and security personnel remain possible.

The risk of unrest will likely peak after polls close rather than on election day itself. With control of the Senate expected to hinge on a handful of close races, and with some states counting ballots for days after the vote, final results in some of the key races may not be disclosed for several days. In multiple states, including California, New York, Nevada and Washington, postal ballots can be counted if received after election day, provided they meet the relevant postmark requirements.

Previous elections have demonstrated how prolonged vote counts result in protests being staged outside counting centres. In 2020, demonstrators gathered at Detroit’s main absentee ballot counting centre demanding officials “stop the count”, while armed protesters assembled outside an election centre in Phoenix, Arizona. Closely contested results, particularly if accompanied by allegations of electoral fraud, would likely trigger protests outside of locations associated with vote counting and election administration.

Washington, D.C., is likely to be a focal point for national-level demonstrations following the vote, particularly if the results are disputed. The city has maintained a National Guard deployment since August 2025, which the administration has extended until January 2029, with the continued presence of armed troops in public spaces likely to increase tensions during demonstrations.

Most large-scale protests in the US remain peaceful, although they can cause traffic disruption and other localised impacts. However, heightened political tensions, disinformation and other developments could contribute to an escalation in unrest, increasing the risk of isolated violence and confrontations between demonstrators, counter-protesters and security forces.

In a September 2026 study, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted that “[t]errorists have attacked or plotted against candidates, the people who run and certify the vote, or the crowds an election draws in each of the past several election cycles in the United States.” However, CSIS data suggest that such incidents have become more frequent in recent years, with ten of the 11 recorded cases taking place since 2021. Only one incident was specifically planned for election day, while none is confirmed to have targeted a polling station. Most incidents targeted political candidates during campaigns or election officials involved in certifying results, likely indicating that the threat is likely to persist throughout the electoral cycle, including during the post-election counting and certification period.

The campaign has already been subject to possible targeted violence and intimidation. On 6 September 2026, a man was arrested after a reported attempted assault targeting the Democratic candidate for Ohio governor during a campaign stop, injuring several people before being stopped by state troopers. In October, the FBI opened an investigation into a wave of suspicious letters, some containing an unidentified powder, sent to election offices in at least 32 states and to congressional offices, forcing evacuations only weeks before the vote.

Incidents during previous electoral cycles and broader terrorism trends in the US suggest that the primary threat will come from “lone actors”, individuals who become radicalised independently and operate without direct involvement in organised terrorist groups. Individuals motivated by far-right or far-left extremism are among the most likely to conduct election-related attacks, potentially targeting political candidates, supporters or events, or attempting to disrupt voting proceedings.

Unlike the UK, the US does not maintain a publicly available, tiered national terrorism threat level. Instead, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issues periodic advisories and alerts through its National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) in response to specific threats or changes in the security environment. No terrorism advisory has been issued specifically for the midterms, although the FBI has separately warned of potential threats and intimidation targeting election workers and polling locations, without identifying a specific terrorist threat.

The 3 November US midterms will likely be characterised by heightened political tensions across the US, with a higher risk of protests, isolated violent incidents, and localised disruptions in the days surrounding the vote. While most demonstrations are likely to remain peaceful, contested results and delays in vote counting could trigger further mobilisation, particularly near election offices, government buildings and other politically significant locations. Travellers to the US are unlikely to face significant disruptions outside areas directly affected by election-related events. However, protests could cause localised disruption, particularly in Washington, D.C., and major cities in states with closely contested races. There is also a risk of isolated incidents of political violence or terrorism, particularly around campaign events and electoral facilities.

Travellers are advised to monitor local developments, avoid political gatherings and large-scale demonstrations, and allow additional time for journeys through affected areas.

The reported reduction of US diplomatic staffing in Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar and the UAE, alongside the previously publicly ordered departure from Saudi Arabia and the withdrawals of US troops from regional installations, almost certainly continue to represent a significant increase in indicators and warnings (I&W) of renewed large-scale conflict. Although US officials have publicly linked the reductions in part to Iranian plots against US personnel rather than strike preparations, such force protection measures would highly likely be expected to precede renewed operations, and are consistent with previous actions undertaken by the US before launching operations against Iran. These developments, particularly the measures taken to mitigate Iranian retaliation, suggest that renewed military operations against Iran are highly likely in the coming weeks.

A resumption of large-scale US operations remains more likely after the 3 November US midterms. Washington’s reported request for Israel to delay strikes until it is ready, Trump’s public stepping back from strikes on 25 October and the briefed US-Israeli planning for a post-midterms campaign support this assessed timeframe, while the expected arrival of the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) by late November would further increase US capacity to sustain a prolonged campaign and potentially also conduct simultaneous operations against the Houthis.

However, Israeli-initiated escalation before the midterms cannot be ruled out. The reported disagreement between Netanyahu and the IDF leadership over potentially escalatory orders, although denied, potentially indicates that elements of the current Israeli political leadership are willing to accept a higher risk of confrontation with Iran, likely driven in part by domestic political considerations.

The Saudi-led delegation to Tehran, alongside its Mecca Joint Defence Agreement partners Pakistan and Turkey, likely reflects Riyadh’s efforts to insulate itself from Iranian retaliation in the event of renewed US-Israeli strikes and to press Tehran to restrain the Houthis. The talks likely increase the probability that Iran will seek to limit direct strikes against Saudi Arabia in a renewed conflict, instead concentrating retaliation against US-linked targets in other regional states, particularly Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Jordan. However, there is no indication that the talks will halt Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia in the short term, and direct Iranian strikes against Saudi Arabia cannot be ruled out, alongside attacks originating from Iraq.

Renewed operations against Iran would almost certainly result in severe Iranian retaliation across the region, including against US military installations, energy infrastructure and US-linked technology facilities. Reports that Iran has identified US diplomats and personnel as potential targets, and intelligence warnings of advanced Iranian plots against US officials, likely indicate that the threat to US-linked individuals and facilities in the region extends beyond missile and drone attacks to asymmetric operations, which are likely to persist regardless of the timing of renewed strikes.

Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued at a high tempo, including a reported salvo of ten ballistic missiles targeting southern Saudi Arabia on 25 October, highly likely intended to saturate and overstretch Saudi air defences. King Khalid International Airport is likely to remain vulnerable to disruption following its partial reopening, with the Houthis explicitly reiterating that the airport remains a target, and further attacks against Saudi airports, energy infrastructure and population centres are highly likely. The postponement of major international conferences and the relocation of the Dakar Rally likely reflect a growing assessment that the security environment in Saudi Arabia will not improve in the near term.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

On 23 October, at approximately 10:30 local time, an individual carried out a series of shooting attacks across several locations in Trappes and La Verriére, in the department of Yvelines, located west of Paris. According to police reports, the individual opened fire with an automatic firearm from a moving vehicle.

One person was killed in the attack, and at least four more were injured, some seriously. A 12-year-old girl is among the injured and was shot eight times, although she is reportedly in a stable condition.

Police detained the individual in the nearby town of Coigniéres. The Mayor of Trappes, Ali Rabeh, told French media that the shooter “was firing at random and wanted to cause carnage” and stated that “it’s a miracle there aren’t more victims”.

France’s Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office has opened an investigation into the shooting as a potential terrorist attack. Some channels and political figures, including the French head of The Left in the European Parliament, have suggested that the attack was motivated by racial hatred, with the shooter targeting individuals of African origin. As of the time of writing, the motive of the shooter has not been confirmed by authorities.

Iran’s increased threat to commercial shipping, high-level security consultations, Israeli shaping activity, US diplomatic drawdowns and the reported withdrawal of US personnel from sites located within the core strike zone of Iranian ballistic missiles almost certainly indicate that joint US-Israeli preparations for renewed military operations against Iran are at an advanced stage.  These developments, particularly the measures taken to mitigate Iranian retaliation, suggest that renewed military operations against Iran are highly likely in the coming weeks.

The reported US-Israeli plans for renewed strikes following the midterms, alongside the reported suspension of US strikes against Iranian launchers despite continued maritime attacks, indicate that a resumption of large-scale US military operations against Iran remains more likely after the 3 November midterms.

With the Roosevelt CSG expected to arrive in theatre by late November, its deployment could temporarily establish a three-CSG posture alongside two MEUs, provided it reinforces rather than relieves an existing carrier. This would significantly increase CENTCOM’s available combat power, improve its ability to sustain a prolonged campaign, provide greater operational flexibility around the Strait of Hormuz and potentially enable simultaneous operations against the Houthis in Yemen.

However, the US already has sufficient combat power deployed to the CENTCOM AoR to conduct a major military campaign against Iran. The launching of operations ahead of the midterms to achieve strategic surprise and to demonstrate to Tehran that the White House is willing to concede domestic political considerations in pursuit of its military and foreign policy objectives cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, initial strikes conducted solely by Israel could enable Washington to distance itself from the operations, limiting the immediate domestic political consequences while Israel assumes the majority of the initial military risks.

The potential involvement of Israeli combat aircraft, supported by US aerial refuelling assets, would significantly increase the combined force’s available strike capacity, likely providing a greater contribution to offensive operations than an additional CSG. A reported 200 Israeli fighter jets were used during Operation Roaring Lion, with a CSG typically embarking approximately 40–50 strike fighters. Recent Israeli long-range sorties near Iran, potentially intended to test Iranian responses and probe air defences, also indicate that preparations for joint operations may already be underway.

Other potential indicators and warnings (I&W) of renewed US military action against Iran would likely include the forward deployment of strategic bombers to regional staging bases, an increased deployment of air-to-air refuellers, electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, the dispersal of forward-deployed assets and increased diplomatic drawdowns.

Renewed major US-Israeli operations against Iran would almost certainly result in severe retaliation across the region. Reported strike options against Kharg and Qeshm islands and Iranian energy infrastructure would highly likely trigger reciprocal Iranian retaliation against regional energy infrastructure. However, Iran has also threatened US-linked technology facilities and internet cables, while US military installations, airports and other critical infrastructure would highly likely remain potential targets. Hossein Mohebbi, a senior spokesperson for the IRGC, has also indicated that Iran is shifting from retaliation alone towards a doctrine incorporating sustained offensive operations against its adversaries following an initial attack. This may indicate that Iranian retaliation could extend beyond retaliatory strikes to a more sustained military campaign.

The fatal attacks in Saudi Arabia against Dammam’s airport and the Shaybah oil field on 21 October highly likely demonstrate that the Houthis retain the capability to inflict casualties across the entirety of Saudi Arabia, including in the Eastern Province, the kingdom’s principal oil-producing region. The Houthis are increasingly layering drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles into single strike packages and targeting areas with limited air defence coverage, which is highly likely to increase the effectiveness of attacks, particularly if air defence stocks are depleted. The Shaybah fatalities, reportedly caused by debris following an interception, continue to highlight the risks posed by falling debris associated with interceptions. Further Houthi attacks against Saudi airports, energy infrastructure and military bases are highly likely and are likely to be increasingly geographically dispersed to exploit gaps in air defence coverage.

The Houthi claim to have struck the Ministry of Defence headquarters in Riyadh remains unverified, and it may relate to the ballistic missile that Saudi forces reported intercepting over Riyadh on 20 October. However, the claimed targeting of a central government and military command site marks a notable expansion of the declared Houthi target set in Riyadh beyond King Khalid International Airport and energy infrastructure. This highly likely increases the risk to central Riyadh, including government districts and surrounding commercial and residential areas, from both direct strikes and interception debris. Further attempted attacks against government and military sites in central Riyadh are likely, particularly in response to continued Saudi strikes in Houthi-controlled Yemen against targets in locations such as Sanaa.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Continued attacks against commercial shipping, including off Jubail and Khor Fakkan, likely indicate that Iran is sustaining and continuing to geographically expand its maritime campaign beyond the SoH into the wider Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The GCC’s collective rejection of Iranian navigation restrictions likely indicates that the Gulf states remain unwilling to legitimise Iranian control of the strait. The IRGC’s threat against undersea telecommunications cables in the SoH likely indicates a further broadening of the potential target set should full-scale conflict resume.

The reported suspension of US strikes against Iranian launchers ahead of the midterms, alongside the estimated earliest arrival of the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR) from mid-November if it continues to participate in exercises off Japan, likely supports the assessment that a resumption of large-scale US combat operations against Iran is more likely after the 3 November elections. However, Hegseth’s unannounced visit to Israel, Trump’s continued threats, and the Pentagon’s reported preparations for renewed major combat operations indicate that strikes ahead of the elections cannot be ruled out. While the Roosevelt CSG’s arrival would provide additional combat power and the capacity to sustain a prolonged campaign, forces already deployed in the region are likely sufficient to conduct major operations against Iran with limited advance warning. Any renewed US strikes would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against US military facilities and critical infrastructure in regional states, with Iranian threats against energy infrastructure in regional states and against US-linked technology facilities likely indicating an intent to further broaden its target set.

The Houthis are increasingly layering drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles into single strike packages, saturating air defence sensors and complicating target tracking and prioritisation, while also targeting areas of Saudi Arabia with limited air defence coverage. This is highly likely to increase the effectiveness of attacks against Saudi Arabia, particularly if air defence stocks are significantly depleted, and is likely to increase the risk posed by falling debris in populated areas where interceptions occur at shorter ranges and lower altitudes. Further Houthi attacks against Saudi airports, energy infrastructure and military bases are highly likely.

The postponement of the Future Investment Initiative, the cancellation of a significant proportion of scheduled flights and the indefinite remote working ordered at Riyadh’s Kingdom Centre highlight the growing impact of the Houthi campaign on business operations in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom Centre closure was likely predicated on the increased risk posed by attacks against Riyadh rather than a specific threat, and there is a realistic possibility that other high-profile commercial buildings will introduce similar measures. King Khalid International Airport remains largely closed, excluding a limited number of flights given special permission, with no confirmed reopening date. Even once reopened, normal operations are unlikely to resume in the short term, with many international airlines maintaining suspensions and further closures likely following renewed attacks.

The widening of external support for Saudi Arabia, with Egypt pledging military support, the GCC reaffirming its collective defence commitments, and the deployment of agreed forces under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, highly likely reflects Riyadh’s efforts to bolster its air defences and border security as Houthi attacks continue. However, external support remains largely defensive, and there is no indication that external partners are prepared to commit ground forces to offensive operations in Yemen.

The reported resumption of Emirati financial support for anti-Houthi forces would mark a significant shift. The UAE was previously one of the most critical members of the anti-Houthi coalition, deploying ground forces in 2015 that led the recapture of Aden, and subsequently building, funding and training multiple armed groups, including the Giants Brigades, the Security Belt and Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance Forces, which spearheaded the 2018 offensive towards Hodeidah. Although the UAE withdrew most of its ground forces in 2019, it retained significant influence through these partners, particularly the Southern Transitional Council (STC). However, Emirati influence in Yemen was largely curtailed following the failed STC offensive and its subsequent capitulation to Saudi-backed forces in January 2026.

Riyadh’s apparent willingness to allow renewed Emirati involvement, under a reported arrangement exchanging Emirati payments to the Southern Giants Brigades for Saudi air support for UAE-backed forces, likely reflects the severity of the pressure imposed by the Houthi campaign and the stalled counteroffensive, with Riyadh likely calculating that Emirati funding and influence over key ground forces are necessary to restore momentum on the Red Sea coast and around the Bab al-Mandab. However, renewed Emirati influence is likely to be limited and closely managed by Riyadh, and risks reviving Saudi-Emirati competition over southern Yemen in the medium term.

Renewed Emirati involvement is likely to increase the risk of Houthi retaliation against the UAE, particularly if it evolves into direct military intervention. In January 2022, the Houthis conducted missile and drone attacks against Abu Dhabi following advances by the UAE-backed Giants Brigades in Shabwa, demonstrating both the capability and the intent to target the UAE in response to Emirati support for anti-Houthi forces. The 19 October attack against the al-Alam camp in Shabwa, previously operated by UAE-aligned forces, likely also signals Houthi intent to impose costs on forces set to benefit from renewed Emirati funding. Houthi attacks against the UAE would almost certainly compound existing disruption to regional aviation, with Emirati airports increasingly used as alternatives to Saudi airports.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The escalation of attacks against shipping in the SoH, including the first confirmed vessel sinkings since March, likely indicates that Iran has reconstituted some of its maritime strike capabilities or adapted its tactics to compensate for previously degraded capabilities, enabling Tehran to sustain disruption to commercial shipping and regional energy exports. This has almost certainly strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, and with diplomatic efforts continuing to stall, the likelihood of high-intensity US strikes aimed at degrading Iran’s offensive capabilities and restoring freedom of navigation in the SoH is highly likely rapidly increasing.

The USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) reportedly arrived at Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan on 16 October, where it will resupply before participating in the US-Japan Keen Sword exercise between 19 and 29 October, after which it is expected to deploy to the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR). The CSG is therefore unlikely to arrive in the region before mid-November, after the 3 November US midterm elections, unless it does not participate in the joint exercises with Japan. The USS George Washington and USS George H.W. Bush CSGs remain in the region, with the Bush having returned to the Arabian Sea following a brief port visit to Thailand. The Roosevelt’s arrival could temporarily increase the US presence to three CSGs, depending on whether an existing CSG withdraws.

The scheduling of the Roosevelt CSG’s deployment, which would align the temporary concentration of three CSGs with the period immediately following the midterms, likely supports the assessment that a resumption of full-scale US combat operations against Iran is more likely after the elections. However, there is a realistic possibility of US strikes ahead of the elections. The Pentagon has reportedly instructed CENTCOM to finalise preparations for renewed major combat operations against Iran, while the two CSGs currently in the region, supported by land-based aircraft, provide Washington with sufficient offensive capabilities to conduct limited strikes, particularly against Iranian maritime strike capabilities threatening shipping in the SoH. Long-range bombers could also deploy at short notice to target sites deeper within Iran. Alternatively, Washington could initiate strikes against the Houthis, aiming to degrade one of Iran’s most important regional allies while calculating that such strikes would be less likely to provoke direct Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

There are also emerging indications that Israel is preparing for potential renewed escalation, with the Israeli Air Force maintaining heightened readiness and the Military Intelligence Directorate reportedly developing an expanded target list within Iran. While the reported discussions between Trump and Netanyahu could reflect pre-election posturing, they could also indicate that Israel is actively preparing for potential renewed military escalation with Iran.

Iran has threatened to escalate beyond previously established targeting patterns in the event of renewed US strikes. This has included threats to escalate attacks on US military assets, potentially using cluster munitions as in the early-September attack against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, as well as strikes against regional energy infrastructure, explicitly naming Saudi oil facilities which the Houthis are currently attacking.

Tehran has also threatened to target US-linked digital infrastructure, including data centres, artificial intelligence facilities and undersea communications cables, particularly in the UAE. Additionally, Iranian officials have threatened the possibility of launching ground incursions into neighbouring countries, with Kuwait the most likely and most vulnerable country to an Iranian ground offensive.

With Saudi Arabia already engaged in an escalating conflict with the Houthis, and the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement strengthening its military cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will seek to limit strikes against Saudi Arabia to reduce the risk of provoking a wider regional conflict, instead concentrating retaliation against Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Jordan. With Saudi airports already compromised by Houthi strikes and regional airports increasingly used as alternatives, this would almost certainly compound disruption to regional aviation and restrict options for commercial travel and evacuation from the region.

The Saudi-led coalition strikes against Houthi oil facilities on 13 October, and the Houthi retaliation against Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran within hours, demonstrate a rapid tit-for-tat escalation dynamic and a further geographic expansion of Houthi targeting to Saudi Arabia’s Gulf coast. The strike on Aramco’s headquarters, adjacent to King Abdulaziz Air Base, likely indicates that even high-value targets (HVTs) are not reliably protected by air defences. Further Saudi strikes on Sanaa will highly likely be met with further Houthi attacks against Riyadh, Aramco facilities and airports across Saudi Arabia, with King Khalid International Airport likely to remain a priority target.

Saudi Arabia’s accusation that Iran is encouraging the Houthi escalation likely indicates that Riyadh does not regard Tehran as a credible intermediary, with Oman highly likely remaining the preferred channel. Al-Bukhaiti’s stated preference for a comprehensive settlement over a temporary ceasefire likely indicates that the Houthis seek to leverage their attacks to secure broader concessions, including an end to the blockade. However, the Yemeni IRG’s public rejection of negotiations and the continued escalation of Saudi strikes indicate that neither side is willing to make significant concessions, and a near-term de-escalation remains unlikely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

On 27 October, Israel will hold an election to appoint the 120 members of the Knesset, with the seats being allocated by national closed-list proportional representation. It will be the first Knesset election since the 7 October 2023 attacks, which were followed by the war in Gaza and significantly altered the security landscape in the Middle East. The vote occurs at a moment of high political instability for Israel. The country has been engaged in conflict in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, with none of these conflicts fully resolved.  

Domestically, Israel continues to record almost daily protests against the government over several major scandals, in addition to a protest movement led by ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis against the conscription of yeshiva students into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which has continued for more than two years.

Israel’s relations with key allies, including the US, have become strained. Only days after the Knesset vote, the US midterms on 3 November are likely to be marked by the victory of several candidates for Congress who have campaigned on platforms highly critical of Israel. Moreover, the recent emergence of the Mecca Pact, a mutual defence agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan on 7 August, has further threatened Israel’s geopolitical positioning by likely advancing an alternative regional security framework to that promoted by Washington with the US-brokered Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco.

The political environment in Israel is polarised and fragmented. Most available polls for the 27 October election indicate that no bloc will be able to secure a majority (61) of seats in the 120-member Knesset.

The bloc supporting the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which comprises Netanyahu’s party Likud, the far-right Otzma Yehudit, and the alliance between the Religious Zionism Party and the libertarian Zehut (RZP-Zehut), with the additional conditional support of the ultra-Orthodox parties United Torah Judaism (UTJ, largely Ashkenazi) and Shas (largely Sephardi/Mizrahi), is projected to win around 51-55 seats as of mid-October, after polls showed it gaining more support since September.

The opposition bloc, comprising the liberal Yashar party, the Together (B’Yachad) alliance, the social democratic Democrats Party, and the right-wing Yisrael Beitenu, has an estimated 50-54 seats.

The two Arab parties, Ra’am and the Joint List, are together projected to win 12-13 seats, and several smaller parties hover around the electoral threshold of 3.25 per cent of votes required to enter parliament, including the non-aligned alliance between the New Economic Party and the Reservists party, and the newly formed nationalist People of Israel (Amcha Yisrael) party, which is allied with Netanyahu. As clearing the threshold grants parties at least four seats, smaller parties succeeding in entering parliament could significantly alter the dynamics of possible alliances.

The blocs themselves are somewhat fragmented. While the pro-government and opposition camps are sharply differentiated by their support for or opposition to Netanyahu, they also disagree internally on key issues. Within the pro-government bloc, the ultra-Orthodox draft issue puts parties like UTJ and Shas, which broadly favour exempting yeshiva students from serving in the IDF and have stated that they will oppose future governments that will not grant the exemptions, against parts of Likud and the small Amcha Yisrael party, which has pledged to join future governments only if a law mandating ultra-Orthodox service is passed before that government is formed. The coalition is also divided over the ongoing crisis between the government and the Supreme Court, centred on legislation regarding the regulation of commercial television, with Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi calling on the government to disregard the court’s rulings, a position that worries centrist government supporters.

Inside the opposition, the differences are likely even more marked. On policy towards the Palestinians, parties like B’Yachad and Yisrael Beitenu are generally as hawkish as, if not more hawkish than, the current government, advocating for an expansion of the settlements alongside a hardline military posture in the West Bank and Gaza, whereas the Democrats are open to a two-state solution. While the Democrats and, to a lesser extent, Yashar have advocated for pragmatic engagement with the Arab parties, which could give the opposition a numerical majority in the Knesset, the rest of the coalition opposes such cooperation. In economic policy terms, the parties cover a vast range of positions, from the social democracy promoted by the Democrats to the economic liberalism of B’Yachad and Yisrael Beitenu.

Following the publication of official results, expected approximately eight days after the vote, President Isaac Herzog is scheduled to consult the parties and, within seven days, subsequently assign the mandate to the Member of Knesset (MK) judged most likely to form a government. That MK has 28 days, extendable by up to 14 days.  Should this fail, a second nominee is given 28 days, or the president can instead trigger the next stage. In this final phase, a 21-day window opens, during which 61 MKs can jointly nominate a candidate, who then has 14 days to form a government. If all stages fail, the Knesset dissolves automatically, and new elections follow, approximately 90 days later. The outgoing government would remain in office as a caretaker administration throughout.

The sharp disagreements both within the government and opposition coalitions indicate that the election will highly likely result in a protracted coalition formation process, likely to exceed the first 28+14 day cycle. This would entail Netanyahu remaining in power as a caretaker Prime Minister throughout the remainder of 2026 on procedural timelines alone, with the coalition-formation process likely to extend into early 2027. This scenario would highly likely contribute to protracted instability and civil unrest, with activist groups and protest movements seeking to influence the parties as they debate a possible policy agenda for the next government. The main drivers of unrest are likely to be the ultra-Orthodox draft issue, anti-government protests linked to the crisis between the executive and the judiciary, and, in the West Bank, settler violence.

In terms of government likelihood, polls have shifted in favour of the Netanyahu bloc since September, with most surveys now placing it level with or slightly ahead of the opposition. However, even in the case of a victory for the pro-Netanyahu bloc, government formation is likely to be complicated by the ultra-Orthodox draft issue. Amcha Yisrael’s precondition that a conscription law be passed before a government is formed is directly incompatible with the demand of Shas and UTJ for a permanent exemption. A Netanyahu-led coalition would therefore likely depend on one of the two sides conceding, or on ad hoc support from outside the bloc.

The most probable scenario following an opposition victory thus remains a broad coalition led by the Yashar party, with party leader Gadi Eisenkot being the most likely prime minister from the opposition bloc. This coalition would likely fall short of a majority, based on available polling, and would have to seek ad hoc support from the Arab parties, the Reservists, or members of the Netanyahu bloc. In all cases, negotiation processes are likely to become drivers of civil unrest, and could result in the next government remaining highly unstable throughout the early stages of its mandate.

ASSESSMENT

Since late 2023, Israel has engaged in several simultaneous conflicts. The upcoming vote will almost certainly influence their forward trajectories, although some theatres will likely be more exposed to change than others. The West Bank is the area where a change of government is most likely to translate into different policies, while Gaza is the least likely to be affected.

The West Bank is the area where an opposition government is most likely to implement different policies from the current Netanyahu-led executive. Opposition leaders have decried the incumbent coalition’s hardline approach to the West Bank as damaging to Israeli security at home and abroad. While not advocating for a retrenchment of the settlements, opposition leaders have pledged to address the rising issue of settler violence in the West Bank. Naftali Bennett, former prime minister and leader of the B’Yachad alliance, called settler groups “violent gangs”, while Yair Lapid, the other senior B’Yachad figure and also a former prime minister, referred to settler violence as a form of “Jewish terrorism”.

Many opposition leaders have claimed a direct link between settler violence and a deterioration in Israel’s reputation in Europe and the US. An opposition government will likely seek to reduce settler violence in the short term through increased IDF deployments in at-risk areas, while not committing to reducing the number or extension of the settlements themselves.

Gaza is likely to be least impacted by the upcoming election. The situation in Gaza has recently remained relatively static, despite the lack of progress in the implementation of the US-brokered Gaza Peace Plan. Hamas has been severely degraded and is likely now unable to significantly threaten southern Israel. The IDF, which had expanded its control to approximately 70 per cent of the Gaza Strip by July, according to some reports, pulled back towards the original Yellow Line (around 53 per cent) in August, although other reports argue that the IDF still maintains control of 65-70 per cent.

The IDF has also maintained a policy of decapitation strikes on remaining Hamas leaders to prevent the group from coordinating and regrouping. Three Hamas brigade commanders have been killed since mid-September, while the IDF has sustained comparatively few casualties relative to earlier stages of the conflict. The opposition, which broadly agrees on the necessity to disarm Hamas as a prelude to the implementation of a lasting solution, is unlikely to order any major withdrawals from Gaza or make any significant policy changes, unless it succeeds in making more progress on other fronts. Eisenkot’s statement, on 15 October, that he will remove Hamas from ruling the Gaza Strip “within 18 months of [Eisenkot] taking office as a prime minister”, likely indicates that an opposition government would push the task of resolving the conflict in the Gaza Strip into 2027 and possibly even 2028.

Following Gaza, Lebanon is the front that is least likely to be affected by any potential change in government. Leaders of the opposition coalition share the Netanyahu government’s objective of preventing Hezbollah from re-infiltrating parts of southern Lebanon or reconstituting its capabilities, developments that would allow it to threaten northern Israel. Moreover, they are also sceptical of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) ability to implement the “pilot zones” programme and take over area control responsibilities from the IDF. The expiry of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mandate on 31 December 2026, followed by the mission’s withdrawal in 2027, could nevertheless present a challenge to a hypothetical new government, potentially creating a security vacuum that could be exploited by Hezbollah. Given the volatile security environment in Lebanon, significant changes on the ground could force a new government to reconsider its military posture and operational objectives, potentially resulting in a departure from the current government’s approach despite the broad alignment in their strategic objectives.

In Syria, a new Israeli government would inherit a very unstable position. After the fall of Assad, the Netanyahu government successfully degraded Syria’s conventional military strength and occupied strategically valuable positions in the country’s south, including Mount Hermon. As the new transitional government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa solidified its control over the country and bolstered relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Israel’s position in the south has likely become a growing source of friction with both Damascus and regional powers.

Any Israeli government will likely continue to oppose growing Turkish-Syrian cooperation. Israel is not only concerned about growing Turkish influence in Syria, but also the restoration of Syria’s military capabilities. The deployment of Turkish aircraft, air defence systems and surveillance radars could significantly restrict Israeli freedom of action over Syrian airspace, undermining its ability to target Iranian weapons transfers to Hezbollah and conduct operations against Iran. Consequently, any new government would likely continue efforts to prevent Syria’s military reconstitution and deter an expanded Turkish military presence.

However, some Israeli leaders likely believe that a post-Assad Syria could be leveraged to weaken Iran and Hezbollah’s footprint on the Mediterranean, and an opposition-led Israeli government may seek to reach an agreement with Syria, possibly by leveraging territorial concessions. In an interview published on 6 October 2026, Eisenkot stated that there is an “opportunity” for a new agreement with al-Sharaa’s Syria, noting that Israel could also seek to obtain “the complete expulsion of the Turks and Russians from the area”.

An Israeli government amenable to negotiations with Damascus could also tie territorial concessions to other demands, such as securing Israeli Air Force freedom of operations over Syrian airspace, or increased Syrian efforts to dismantle Hezbollah cross-border smuggling efforts. Eisenkot has also directly tied the necessity of improving relations with Syria to Washington’s own policy towards Damascus, which has significantly warmed since the fall of Assad.

An opposition-led government is unlikely to fundamentally alter Israel’s position on Iran. Opposition leaders publicly share Netanyahu’s view that Iran obtaining nuclear weapons poses an existential risk to Israel, and will continue to leave the option of using military force to prevent Tehran from developing a nuclear weapons capability.

In some aspects, the opposition has even advocated for more hawkish policies against Iran than the Netanyahu coalition. In September, Eisenkot reportedly proposed that the US create “kill zones” around areas where Iran’s remaining 60 per cent enriched uranium stockpile is believed to be located, backed by a public commitment to strike any attempt to move the nuclear material until a lasting agreement is reached. Furthermore, Eisenkot stated that he would intensify operations, including covert Mossad actions, against Iran’s missile infrastructure. An opposition-led government would likely continue to prioritise cooperation with the US against Iran, seeing joint action as presenting a more credible deterrent to Iranian military activity.

The above scenarios assume that a new government would assume power under conditions of stability. However, tensions with Iran remain high, a long-term de-escalation framework remains elusive and high-intensity fighting could resume with limited warning. Depending on the date of an escalation or whether it directly involves Israel, renewed hostilities could disrupt the election itself or complicate subsequent coalition negotiations and government formation. A resumption of major operations before the Knesset election involving Israel has the potential to postpone the election entirely.

Since the beginning of October, the likelihood of full-scale conflict resuming has increased. On 7 October, reports emerged that the Pentagon had instructed US Central Command (CENTCOM) to conclude preparations for a resumption of major combat operations against Iran. US and Israeli officials briefed that strikes, potentially targeting nuclear, infrastructure and energy sites and conducted jointly with Israel, could also take place before the 3 November US midterm elections and possibly even the Knesset election. On the following day, reporting indicated that the Pentagon had drawn up plans for an intense, three-day campaign targeting Iran’s missile and drone arsenals, and potentially also energy facilities and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command sites.

On 8 October, US President Donald Trump publicly stated that the US would not attack Iran before the midterm elections. However, Trump has previously leveraged deception and strategic ambiguity around potential military action, almost certainly reducing the reliability of this pledge, and the statement does not preclude escalation initiated by Israel, Iran or Iranian proxies.

CENTCOM’s preparations for renewed full-scale operations are highly likely to be genuine. The deployment of an additional carrier strike group (CSG), additional amphibious forces and thousands of personnel likely indicates that US military pressure on Iran will be sustained and potentially escalate. The weeks following the 3 November US midterm elections, which will coincide with coalition negotiations in Israel, remain the most likely window for renewed major military operations, given the potential political costs of escalation before the vote. However, even a short, intensive three-day campaign of the type reportedly under consideration would be unlikely to remain contained. Iranian retaliation would likely be substantial, with a greater emphasis on targeting regional energy infrastructure than in previous exchanges, particularly if Iranian oil, gas or other energy facilities were targeted.

If the conflict with Iran were to escalate before 27 October, this would almost certainly significantly impact the elections. IDF chief Eyal Zamir reportedly warned that a renewed joint US-Israeli campaign could postpone the elections, according to Israeli media reporting citing US officials. This would follow the precedent of 1973, when the Knesset elections were postponed from October to December due to the Yom Kippur War. Such a move would be unlikely to immediately spark protests in Israel, as the threat of Iranian strikes would deter large gatherings, but would likely be highly politically destabilising in the medium term.

Constitutionally, the Netanyahu government would need a two-thirds supermajority of 80 members of the Knesset to approve a postponement, which would require opposition support. If this fails to materialise and a hypothetical conflict remains ongoing, Israel could seek to hold wartime elections as it did for the local vote in February 2024, which was also held after two postponements. This could significantly disrupt campaigning and voting, particularly in areas exposed to missile attacks, while the mobilisation of reservists, displacement of civilians and restrictions on public gatherings could suppress voter turnout and raise questions over the legitimacy of the results.

However, the significantly higher threat from Iran compared to that from Hamas and Hezbollah in 2024 would almost certainly reduce the feasibility of holding such elections.  If the government fails to secure the required supermajority to postpone the vote, but the security environment makes holding elections unfeasible, Israel could face an unprecedented constitutional crisis, with significant implications for political stability and an increased risk of civil unrest.

If full-scale war restarts after the Knesset vote, it would likely significantly complicate or delay the government formation process, with a Netanyahu caretaker government likely being given wartime authority. In this scenario, there is a higher likelihood of Israeli President Isaac Herzog advocating for the creation of a broad national unity government, as after the 7 October attacks. Given Eisenkot’s rejection of a rotation government and his statement that Netanyahu is unfit to hold any leadership position, such pressure would likely deepen divisions within the opposition.

The Knesset election and the subsequent government formation process are likely to sustain an elevated risk of disruption for travellers and personnel in Israel throughout the remainder of 2026 and likely into early 2027.

In the short term, the main election-related threat to travellers is the disruption caused by protests either for or against the Netanyahu administration, driven by issues such as the draft of ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis. Protests are likely to result in road blockades, disrupting operations in cities like Tel Aviv, and could be marked by violent clashes with security forces. Protests may also disrupt access to Ben Gurion International Airport.

The election results are likely to significantly impact the security landscape in Israel and the wider region. A victory for the opposition could impact Israeli policy towards the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon. These developments, or the continuation of previous policies in case of a victory for the Netanyahu government, would almost certainly affect the risks posed by armed conflict, terrorism, and civil unrest in Israel.

The scheduled elections will coincide with a period of growing tensions in the Middle East, which could rapidly trigger a full-scale restart of the Iran war. If renewed full-scale conflict with Iran forces the postponement of elections or significantly delays government formation, political instability and associated security risks are likely to persist well into 2027.

The UKMTO reporting six vessels struck on 11 October alone almost certainly reflects a further intensification of Iranian attacks against shipping. Continued maritime confrontation almost certainly sustains the risk of a wider escalation, with any further US strikes against reconstituted Iranian capabilities around the SoH highly likely to trigger Iranian retaliation against regional states hosting US military facilities. Rezaei’s warning regarding undersea cables, data centres and AI facilities likely indicates an intent to broaden Iran’s target set to include US-linked commercial and technology infrastructure in the Gulf, particularly in the UAE, which was directly threatened, should large-scale hostilities resume.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) is highly likely preparing for the option of renewed large-scale operations against Iran, potentially conducted jointly with Israel. The USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group (CSG) is expected to arrive in theatre from late October, and will almost certainly be prepared to commence combat operations shortly after arrival. CENTCOM conducted strikes against Iran within days of the USS George Washington CSG arriving into theatre. The US may also maintain a temporary three-carrier posture in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR), providing it with more strike capacity and operational flexibility to conduct high-intensity operations against Iran and potentially sustain simultaneous military operations against the Houthis in Yemen.

Renewed large-scale operations would almost certainly be less politically costly for the Trump administration following the 3 November midterms. However, strikes ahead of the elections would likely send a strategic message to Tehran that Washington is willing to prioritise its military and foreign policy objectives over domestic political considerations and would likely help achieve greater operational surprise.

Trump’s statement that the US may join Saudi strikes against the Houthis marks a notable shift in Washington’s position, following repeated US refusals of Saudi requests for direct military support. Washington may calculate that direct involvement will enable it to restore goodwill with Riyadh, while also indirectly weakening Iran by degrading the capabilities of one of its principal regional partners. Washington also likely calculates that operations against the Houthis will trigger a more limited Iranian response than direct strikes against Iran.

Direct US involvement would highly likely trigger Houthi attacks against US interests in the region. These would likely include US military facilities and diplomatic missions in Saudi Arabia and the wider region, and potentially US-linked commercial interests, alongside a likely resumption of Houthi attacks against US naval vessels and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

The Houthi attack against King Fahd International Airport in Dammam and claimed attacks against Aramco facilities in the Eastern Province mark a further geographic expansion of Houthi targeting. Houthi attacks. The Houthi declaration that all Saudi airports except those serving Mecca and Medina are legitimate targets indicates that further airport attacks across all of Saudi Arabia are highly likely. The FCDO has revised its advice against all but essential travel to all Saudi airports except Medina.

The 10 October attack was almost certainly the most lethal Houthi attack against Saudi Arabia during the current conflict and the most deadly attack in the Kingdom in over a decade, with the strike on a passenger terminal causing mass casualties among travellers and airport staff. Repeated successful strikes against King Khalid International Airport on consecutive days highly likely indicate that Saudi air defences in the area have been unable to reliably intercept Houthi ballistic missiles, consistent with reported interceptor shortages and the possible concentration of air defence batteries to protect other high-value targets (HVTs) such as energy infrastructure and palaces.

The casualty rate was likely exacerbated by the reported absence of public early warning alerts. Due to public early warning alerts and air raid sirens in Saudi Arabia having been inconsistently activated in recent weeks, travellers should not rely on receiving advance warning of an attack, particularly at airports. Although public alerts reportedly resumed on 12 October, their future reliability remains uncertain. Alerts may be deliberately suspended to limit disruption and maintain a sense of normality.

The coalition’s vow to respond decisively likely indicates that Riyadh will intensify strikes in Yemen, potentially including against Sanaa International Airport and other HVTs in Sanaa, which would highly likely trigger further escalatory Houthi attacks. The Houthis directly threatened on 13 October that strikes on Sanaa will be met with a “harsh and painful response” against Riyadh.

Yemeni IRG acknowledgement that the Bab al-Mandeb and Mayyun Island have not been recaptured highly likely confirms that the counteroffensive in Yemen has stalled. Advances will almost certainly require significant Saudi air support, which will almost certainly sustain Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi-Omani and Saudi-Iranian ministerial contacts are the first observable signs of diplomatic engagement on the Saudi-Houthi conflict since the escalation. The Houthi claim that Saudi Arabia accepted Iranian mediation and proposed one-month and two-week truces remains unconfirmed and is highly likely partly intended to portray Riyadh as weakened. If accurate, it would indicate that the attacks against Saudi airports and energy infrastructure are imposing considerable costs on Riyadh.

The publicly claimed Houthi rejection of the unverified proposals would almost certainly indicate that the group assesses it is able to fulfil its primary stated objective of reopening Houthi-controlled airspace while concurrently holding its recent territorial gains. However, conflicting claims that Riyadh is unwilling to accept a ceasefire until the territory lost to the Houthi offensive has been reclaimed likely indicate that neither side is willing to make significant concessions, and a near-term de-escalation remains unlikely.

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Hurricane Isaias, the first hurricane of the 2026 Atlantic Season, is expected to make landfall on 9 October or early 10 October near the Florida-Alabama border on the Gulf of Mexico. Isaias initially developed as a trough along the Mexican Gulf Coast on 5 October, strengthening into a tropical depression on 6 October and into a tropical storm on the following day.

On 9 October, Hurricane Isaias rapidly intensified into a Category 3 major hurricane, with maximum sustained winds reaching 120 mph 193 km/h). According to the National Hurricane Center NHC, the hurricane is located approximately 240 miles 386 kilometres) south of Pensacola, Florida, and is moving northeast towards the northern Gulf Coast.

US authorities have issued hurricane warnings across sections of the northern Gulf Coast, with forecasters warning of destructive winds, storm surges of up to 2.7 metres (nine feet), and rainfall accumulations potentially exceeding 380 mm 15 inches) in some areas.

Authorities have ordered evacuations across vulnerable coastal communities. Alabama Governor Kay Ivey ordered tourists and visitors to evacuate southern Baldwin County and Dauphin Island, while mandatory evacuation orders have been issued for non-residents in parts of Baldwin County and for Venice, Louisiana. Emergency declarations have been issued in parts of Alabama and Florida, with emergency shelters opened in Mississippi.

Authorities have also closed several state parks and government offices, while Gulf Shores International Airport was scheduled to suspend operations from midday on 9 October. Amtrak has suspended services between New Orleans and Mobile until 11 October and between New Orleans and Atlanta until 12 October. Offshore energy operations have also been significantly disrupted, with more than 60 per cent of Gulf oil production reportedly suspended, equivalent to approximately 1.3 million barrels per day.

While the hurricane’s impacts will be most pronounced on the coast, authorities have noted that it will likely bring wet weather further north, reaching the Tennessee Valley and the Carolinas.

Intensified attacks in the maritime domain almost certainly increase the risk of confrontation and subsequent Iranian retaliation against regional states. The uptick in Iranian attacks against vessels since late September likely increases the probability of a further round of US strikes against reconstituted Iranian capabilities around the SoH, previously referred to by US officials as “mowing the lawn”. Such attacks would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against regional states hosting US military facilities. Iranian retaliation is likely to be larger in scale than in previous exchanges, following the reported use of cluster munition warheads against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in September and public Iranian threats that future retaliation against US strikes will be more severe.

Trump’s statement that the US will not attack Iran before the midterms is likely to be of limited value in assessing the risk of renewed strikes. Trump has previously leveraged deception and strategic ambiguity around potential military action. Strikes ahead of the midterms could help achieve an element of surprise and demonstrate to Tehran that Trump is prepared to prioritise its Iran objectives over domestic political considerations.  CENTCOM’s preparations for renewed full-scale operations are highly likely to be genuine, with the deployment of an additional carrier strike group (CSG), additional amphibious forces and thousands of personnel indicating that US military pressure on Iran will be sustained.

A resumption of full-scale US combat operations remains more likely after the 3 November US midterms, due to the political costs of such a campaign. However, more limited operations could be ordered ahead of the elections, with recent comments made by Israeli officials lending greater credibility to the possibility of an earlier escalation.

A short, intensive three-day campaign of the type reportedly under consideration would be unlikely to remain contained. Iranian retaliation would likely be substantial and would likely involve a greater focus on regional energy infrastructure than in previous exchanges, particularly if Iranian oil, gas or other energy facilities were targeted.

Targeting Iran’s reconstituted missile and drone stockpiles, manufacturing facilities, associated support infrastructure, and nuclear facilities, much of which is held in hardened underground sites, would also likely require strategic bomber support. With B-1 bombers withdrawn from RAF Fairford, any renewed deployment of strategic bombers to RAF Fairford, Diego Garcia, or other forward operating locations would likely represent a notable indicator and warning of preparations for major operations against Iran. However, strikes limited to exposed missile launchers, air defence systems, command-and-control facilities and other above-ground military infrastructure would not necessarily require strategic bomber support and could be conducted by assets already in theatre.

The deployment of the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group (CSG) and Makin Island amphibious ready group (ARG), which are expected to reach the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR) from late October, will bolster US capability in the region, particularly if the Roosevelt CSG deploys in addition to, rather than in place of, an existing CSG.

A three-carrier posture would almost certainly increase US capacity to sustain its blockade, conduct high-intensity strikes against Iran and potentially also support offensive operations against the Houthis. The arrival of these forces from late October, and whether the USS George Washington withdraws from theatre, will likely be key indicators and warnings of the timing and scale of any renewed campaign. There is a realistic possibility that a temporary overlap of three CSGs could be used to support the short, high-intensity three-day strike campaign reportedly under consideration ahead of the US midterms, placing late October to early November as the most likely period for any such operation to be initiated, based on the assessed arrival of the Roosevelt CSG.

Houthi attacks against Saudi international airports are now causing civilian fatalities, including in Riyadh, marking a notable increase in the risk posed to travellers, aviation personnel and other passengers across the kingdom. Reiterated Houthi threats against international airlines highly likely indicate that further attacks against King Khalid International Airport and airports in southern Saudi Arabia will occur in the coming days. Further airline suspensions and short-notice disruption to civil aviation across Saudi Arabia are highly likely, with Abha, Jazan, Najran and Riyadh airports at the highest risk.

The Saudi-backed IRG counteroffensive in Yemen has so far failed to deliver verified major territorial gains, excluding a push along the coast up to Dhubab and potentially the Jabal Kahbub mountain area. Initial IRG claims regarding the recapture of Mocha were highly likely inaccurate. The offensive has reportedly stalled with heavy fighting ongoing on the southwestern Dhubab axis, while the Houthis continue efforts to isolate Taiz through a pincer movement.

IRG ground forces appear to have made limited territorial progress relative to the scale of their reported operations, likely reflecting their continued dependence on Saudi air support and difficulties in capturing and consolidating control over Houthi-held territory. Saudi air support will almost certainly remain critical to sustaining IRG offensive and defensive operations.

A stalled counteroffensive is likely to prolong high-intensity conflict rather than compel Houthi concessions, while incentivising Riyadh to deepen its involvement and activate further external support. This is likely to sustain the Houthi cross-border strike campaign against Saudi territory, with the Houthis highly likely to continue escalating attacks against Riyadh and high-value targets deeper into the kingdom, as previous escalation thresholds have almost certainly already been met.

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Continued reciprocal attacks in the maritime domain, including the 2 October strike against a Kuwait-flagged tanker, almost certainly sustain the risk of confrontation and subsequent Iranian retaliation against regional states. The uptick in Iranian attacks against vessels since late September likely increases the probability of a further round of US strikes against reconstituted Iranian capabilities around the SoH, previously referred to by US officials as “mowing the lawn”, which would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against US military facilities in regional states. Such retaliation is likely to remain limited in scope, but larger in scale than in previous exchanges, following the reported use of cluster munition warheads against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in September and the public warnings of a stronger response to US military operations.

The unannounced Camp David meeting, the last comparable instance of which preceded Israel’s war against Iran in June 2025, likely indicates that Washington is strongly weighing options for renewed military action against Iran and potential involvement in Yemen. However, a return to major sustained US combat operations remains most likely after the 3 November midterm elections, excluding more limited operations to degrade reconstituted Iranian capabilities that threaten transit through the SoH.

The withdrawal of US strategic bombers from RAF Fairford, publicly reported as reflecting force protection concerns, may also reflect a lack of intent by the Trump administration to imminently resume large-scale operations against Iran. The potential redeployment of strategic bombers to RAF Fairford or other key staging grounds for operations against Iran would likely serve as a key indicator and warning for a renewed and more sustained US air campaign.

Tehran’s hardened position and reported preparation of a broader retaliatory campaign involving allied groups likely indicate that any resumption of large-scale US strikes would be met with a multi-axis response, including from Iraqi militias and the Houthis. Such a response would highly likely include attacks against Gulf states hosting US forces and regional energy infrastructure. Pezeshkian’s public dismissal of negotiations likely indicates a further hardening of Tehran’s position, with Pezeshkian having broadly pursued a more open attitude to negotiations within the Iranian regime.

Operation Dawn of Yemen and the Yemeni internationally recognised government (IRG) counteroffensive almost certainly mark the most significant Saudi-backed military effort against the Houthis since 2022. The scale of the campaign highly likely indicates that Riyadh has calculated that a decisive escalation is less costly in the medium to long term than sustaining calibrated strikes while the Houthis hold the BaM coastline and continue limited attacks against Saudi territory, and that it is prepared to absorb significantly intensified Houthi strikes across the kingdom as a cost. Claimed gains around Dhubab and Mocha would, if confirmed, mark significant progress towards retaking the BaM coastline, although the seizure of Mocha remains unconfirmed. Any confirmed IRG successes, particularly around the BaM or towards Sanaa, would highly likely further increase the intensity of Houthi strikes against Saudi Arabia, as the Houthis seek to impose costs on Riyadh and deter further advances.

The claimed Houthi attack against Aramco’s refinery south of Riyadh on 3 October was almost certainly the most significant Houthi attack against the Riyadh region during the current conflict, and was followed on 5 October by a claimed attack against King Khalid International Airport. Both followed Saudi-backed strikes on Sanaa, which were previously a key indicator and warning of Houthi attacks against Riyadh. However, the broader escalation of the conflict in Yemen and intensification of strikes on Sanaa likely indicates that further Houthi attacks on Riyadh and other major targets deeper into Saudi Arabia are likely, as previous escalation thresholds have already been met.

The reissuing of Houthi threats against Saudi airspace, and the targeting of multiple airports and energy targets, highly likely indicate an intent to impose costs on Saudi civil aviation and energy infrastructure across the kingdom. Further escalatory Houthi attacks against Riyadh, Jeddah and other major targets, and short-notice disruption to civil aviation across Saudi Arabia are highly likely.

The agreement to rapidly deploy forces and capabilities under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement likely reflects Riyadh’s effort to bolster its air defence and border security ahead of an anticipated intensification of Houthi attacks. Pakistan’s reported arms deliveries to Aden and deployment of military advisers in support of Yemeni forces indicate that Islamabad’s involvement already extends beyond the defence of Saudi territory, although the size and remit of any new deployment remain unclear and Pakistan has not yet committed troops to combat operations in Yemen.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

UKMTO reporting of five tankers struck by unidentified projectiles in the SoH between 28 September and 1 October likely indicates an uptick in Iranian attacks against vessels using the US-escorted southern corridor, compared with the preceding week, during which comparatively few attacks were publicly reported. This likely reflects a gradual reconstitution of Iranian anti-shipping capabilities and maritime surveillance around the SoH since the large-scale US strikes of 1 September, which a US official stated had bought “at least a month” of reduced threat to shipping.

There is a realistic possibility that CENTCOM will conduct a further round of strikes against Iranian maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-shipping and mine warfare capabilities around the SoH in the coming weeks. On 1 September, CENTCOM conducted a large one-day wave of strikes against analogous targets, in what was described as “mowing the lawn” of Iranian reconstituted capabilities in the SoH. The USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is set to arrive in theatre around mid-October. CENTCOM’s previous large-scale strike package came shortly after a new carrier had entered the theatre.

US strikes would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against US military facilities in regional states. Iranian attacks may also extend to other strategic targets, including infrastructure used to circumvent the SoH, such as export terminals, pipelines and storage facilities. The most recent wave of Iranian retaliation strikes against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan on 8-9 September reportedly involved the use of cluster munition warheads, marking a notable escalation. Iranian retaliation following any further US strikes is likely to be more intense than has typically been observed in previous limited exchanges.

The deployment of additional Patriot batteries to protect Saudi and Qatari energy facilities (potentially Yanbu and Ras Laffan, respectively) is likely an additional indicator that Washington is preparing for the resumption of combat operations against Iran. Additional air defence in Saudi Arabia could also be used to defend against Houthi missiles and UAVs. However, the deployment to Qatar is almost certainly more indicative of concern over direct Iranian retaliation, with the Houthis having no established history of conducting attacks against Qatari territory.

The Houthi attack on the Medina electricity station, following the claimed attempted attack near Mecca earlier in September, almost certainly increases the political sensitivity of the Houthi campaign, with Saudi authorities framing both as attempts to target the Two Holy Mosques. Alongside attacks towards Riyadh, Tabuk and Yanbu, it highly likely demonstrates Houthi capability and intent to strike targets across western and central Saudi Arabia. Further short-notice disruption to civil aviation across a wider area of Saudi airspace is likely.

The reported strikes against high-value targets in the Houthi-controlled capital of Sanaa on 1 October mark a significant expansion of the air campaign. Strikes on Sanaa have been a key indicator and warning of escalated Houthi attacks against Riyadh, Jeddah and other targets beyond southern Saudi Arabia. While the Yemeni IRG military claimed the strikes, they were highly likely to have been conducted or enabled by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF).

The Houthis will highly likely attempt retaliatory attacks against Riyadh and other strategic targets in the coming days. Previous Houthi attacks targeting Riyadh in the current phase of conflict have been limited, likely in an effort to demonstrate capability and intent without triggering a major escalation. However, following the strikes on Sanaa, it is likely the Houthis will escalate attacks against Riyadh and other strategic locations in Saudi Arabia.

Reports of Houthis massing fighters near the border with Saudi Arabia, if confirmed, would indicate potential preparation for cross-border ground operations. During the previous phase of the Yemeni Civil War between 2015 and 2022, the Houthis conducted multiple cross-border ground incursions into Jazan and Najran provinces, primarily targeting Saudi military positions, border posts and patrols. However, Najran city was also repeatedly targeted by Houthi artillery, mortar and rocket attacks, resulting in civilian casualties.

Pakistan’s public commitment to defend Saudi Arabia by “whatever means” is its clearest signal yet of potential direct involvement in the conflict. Pakistan has already deployed 8,000 troops, two UAV squadrons, 16 fighter jets and air defence to Saudi Arabia. While no further deployments have been made, the existing force posture provides Islamabad with the capacity to transition from defensive support to offensive operations with minimal advance warning. Further attacks on the holy cities or a Houthi ground incursion may cross the threshold for a more direct Pakistani military response.  

The Yemeni IRG’s general mobilisation and the sustained intensity of fighting around Taiz and Lahj, alongside the expansion of the air campaign, highly likely indicate that the conflict in Yemen is entering a more intensive phase. With no observable diplomatic off-ramp, the conflict and its impact on Saudi Arabia are likely to intensify further in the coming weeks.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: