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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:00 GMT 06 FEBRUARY 2026
During Friday prayers on 6 February, at approximately 13:30 Pakistan Standard Time, a bomb exploded at the Shiite Khadijatul Kubra Mosque in the Tarlai Kalan area on the outskirts of Islamabad. The blast killed at least 31 people and wounded 169 others. Some of the wounded are in critical condition, and the death toll is highly likely to rise. Police and eyewitness accounts confirm that the attack was a suicide bombing.
The defence minister stated that security guards had challenged the attacker when he was trying to enter, and he opened fire in response. The attacker then “blew himself up, standing in the last row of worshippers.” According to a witness statement, one other attacker was present but fled before the detonation.
Authorities have cordoned off the area and have launched an investigation into the attack. President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif condemned the attack and declared that all possible medical assistance would be provided for the wounded. 25 ambulances have been sent to Islamabad from the bordering Punjab region to assist. An emergency has been declared across major hospitals in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
No group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has alluded that Afghanistan and India were responsible for the attack, declaring on X that “it has been proved the terrorist involved in the attack travelled to and from Afghanistan. The collusion between India and Afghanistan is being revealed.”
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Multiple militant groups operate in Pakistan, but the attack was highly likely conducted by either the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).
The TTP has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Pakistan’s major cities, including a 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, a 2017 suicide bombing in Lahore, and a 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Karachi. The TTP has previously targeted Islamabad, attempting a suicide bombing in Islamabad’s government district in December 2022. In August 2025, Pakistan’s intelligence agency announced that it foiled a planned TTP suicide car bombing. In November 2025, the TTP detonated a bomb outside Islamabad’s District Judicial Court complex.
ISKP has also claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the country. Person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) are often used by the group; however, most of ISKP’s attacks in Pakistan have taken place in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the group is not thought to have conducted any attacks in Islamabad in recent years.
Both the TTP and ISKP have conducted attacks against Shia Muslims in Pakistan before. Moreover, both militant groups have absorbed fighters from Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), a now-dissolved militant group with a long history of anti-Shia violence.
The attack comes amid heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamabad has frequently accused the Afghan Taliban-led government of allowing militant safe havens across the border, from which attacks are launched into Pakistan. Recent tensions escalated into airstrikes conducted by Pakistan on TTP targets in Kabul on 15 October 2025, following TTP raids on Pakistani military posts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that killed 11 on 11 October.
There is a realistic possibility that Pakistan will conduct further cross-border strikes into Afghanistan targeting militant hideouts. Additionally, Islamabad may suspend ongoing diplomatic engagement, fully close partially open border crossings, and/or impose further travel restrictions on Afghan nationals.
A heightened security presence across major cities in Pakistan is highly likely, with increased security checkpoints, road closures, and military deployments. Heightened security will likely lead to increased travel disruptions in the short term, particularly around major hospitals. Intensified security operations in the border regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and/or Balochistan are also likely.
Given that the attack targeted Shia Muslims, the terror attack is likely to inflame sectarian tensions. Shias make up approximately 10 to 15 per cent of Pakistan’s population and have been targeted in numerous acts of terrorism in recent years, including the 2019 Quetta market bombing. Shia political and religious leaders are highly likely to call for stronger security measures, and there is a realistic possibility of protests from Shia groups.
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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 14:30 GMT 06 FEBRUARY 2026
Israeli President Isaac Herzog is scheduled to visit Australia between 8 and 12 February. Herzog will land in Sydney and then visit Canberra and Melbourne. He will meet several members of the local Jewish community and Australian political figures.
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese invited Herzog to Australia in the aftermath of the December 2025 Bondi Beach terror attack in Sydney, when two Islamic State (IS)-inspired attackers opened fire on a Hanukkah celebration on the beach, killing 15 people and wounding more than 40.
Following the announcement of the visit, several protests were held in Australia, including a large rally in central Sydney on 2 February.
Several protests are scheduled to take place during Herzog’s visit, as part of a “National Day of Action” organised by Australian pro-Palestine groups and promoted by international organisations such as Amnesty International. In Sydney, a protest is planned for 9 February, starting at 17:30 (local time). Protesters are planning to march in the Central Business District (CBD), from the Town Hall to the New South Wales (NSW) Parliament House. Further protests are scheduled to occur between Hyde Park and Belmore Park.
Protests on the same day will also be held in other cities, including:
NSW police have issued a Public Assembly Restriction Declaration (PARD) for the CBD (excluding Hyde Park) and parts of eastern Sydney. The PARD framework excludes protests from being protected under the Summary Offences Act, meaning that police have increased powers to detain attendees.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Following the October 2025 ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, large-scale pro-Palestine protests have continued to occur regularly in Australia, often coinciding with events involving Israeli figures or companies.
Several of these protests have been characterised by clashes. For instance, in early November 2025, pro-Palestine protesters clashed with police outside the Sydney International Convention Centre, which was hosting an expo attended by weapons manufacturers. In September 2024, protesters and police clashed during a similar expo in Melbourne, with the protests resulting in more than 110 arrests.
It is highly likely that the protests scheduled to occur during Herzog’s visit will attract thousands of attendees, particularly in Sydney. In Sydney, the planned protest route passes through the CBD and will therefore be subject to PARD. Consequently, there is a higher likelihood of police carrying out mass arrests, which would likely lead to clashes.
If significant clashes break out, police may deploy pepper spray, tear gas, stun grenades and rubber bullets. Protests are highly likely to disrupt traffic in Sydney, possibly blockading key roadways like Anzac Bridge, Sydney Harbour Bridge (as during previous pro-Palestine protests), A4, Park Street, King Street, William Street, and Druitt Street.
While the 9 February protests in Sydney are likely to be the largest, it is highly likely that smaller protests will be held throughout Herzog’s visit throughout the country. Moreover, previous pro-Palestine protests in Australia have been attended by counterprotests, and there is a realistic possibility of clashes between opposing protester groups.
Extremist violence targeting protest attendees, possible counter-protesters, or Jewish individuals and places of worship cannot be ruled out. In late January, police detained a 19-year-old Sydney resident for allegedly threatening to assassinate Herzog. Moreover, several calls for violence against Herzog have appeared on social media, including appeals to extremist groups to join the protests.
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Election Guide
On 8 February, Thai citizens will vote to elect members of the House of Representatives, the lower house of the National Assembly, following its dissolution in December 2025. 500 seats are up for election, with 400 chosen by constituency and the remaining 100 allocated to political parties in proportion to their nationwide vote share. 251 parliamentary votes are required to elect a prime minister, which is typically achieved through post-election coalition negotiations between multiple parties. The election must be certified within 60 days, by 9 April, and the parliament must convene within 15 days of election results being confirmed.
A referendum is also scheduled for the same day to determine whether to replace the current constitution, which was only enacted in 2017. Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled in September 2025 that drafting a new constitution requires three referendums. The first would approve the initiation of the drafting process; the second would focus on the draft’s key principles and approach; the third would constitute final approval of the draft.
57 parties have registered to take part in the election, but three main parties will be the primary contenders: the ruling conservative Bhumjaithai Party (BJT), the progressive reformist People’s Party (PP), and the populist Pheu Thai Party (PTP). Incumbent Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul is representing BJT. PP and PTP are the third incarnations of previous parties dissolved by the Thai courts for legal or technical breaches.
ASSESSMENT
Thailand’s current constitution was adopted in 2017 following a political crisis, which led to the removal of Yingluck Shinawatra in a military coup in 2014. As it was drafted under a military junta, the current constitution was approved in a tightly controlled referendum and is viewed as granting excessive power to the Senate, which has the authority to approve the prime minister and members of numerous independent bodies, including the Thai Constitutional Court. Many Thais view the constitution as imposed rather than chosen and have demanded reforms.
The election is taking place amid a broader political crisis. The border dispute with Cambodia, which led to direct fighting in July and December 2025, triggered the expulsion of former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra (niece of Yingluck and daughter of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, both members of PTP or one of its predecessors) after she expressed deference to the Cambodian former leader Hun Sen and criticised the Thai military in a leaked phone call.
Her successor, Anutin Charnvirakul, who took power in September, has faced heavy criticism over his minority government’s handling of the flooding in southern Thailand in November, which left at least 176 people dead. Adding to this was PP’s pulling of support from the BJP and its looming vote of no confidence over its alleged failure to honour promises to reform the constitution, compelling Anutin to dissolve parliament and call a general election in December.
A coalition government is the expected outcome of the election, with no party likely to win an outright majority. According to recent polling by Suan Dusit, respondents to a 28 January poll backed BJP by 21.14 per cent, PP by 21.11 per cent, and PTP by 17.56 per cent. 23.85 per cent of respondents were “still undecided”, suggesting that there could be a large disparity in electoral results from the polling. In a 6-9 January poll, PP leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut was the top choice for prime minister for 31.99 per cent, with PTP leader Yodchanan Wongsawat second on 17.45 per cent, and the incumbent Anutin third on 15.14 per cent. However, BJP’s polling has likely been inflated by a surge in nationalism linked to the ongoing Thailand-Cambodia border dispute and could diminish in the lead-up to the election, should the current ceasefire continue to hold.
Despite its popularity in the polls, PP faces potential legal action from the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) that could bar dozens of its members from running for attempting to amend Article 112 of the Criminal Code, Thailand’s royal insult (lèse-majesté) law, in 2021. The amendment sought to reduce penalties, narrow who could file complaints, and limit what constitutes an offence. While procedurally lawful within parliament, the proposal was later characterised by opponents as an abuse of office and an act undermining the constitutional order.
In the 2023 election, PP’s progenitor party, Move Forward, which openly campaigned on amending Article 112, won 151 seats in parliament, the most votes of any party, but was blocked from power by lawmakers tied to the royalist military due to its support for the amendment. Its prime ministerial candidate, Pita Limjaroenrat, was subsequently suspended from parliament and later barred from politics after Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled that his candidacy violated electoral law, effectively preventing him from assuming office.
Since then, PP has moderated its position during this electoral campaign, dropping the call to change Article 112 and softening its stance on the military, which it previously wanted to drive out of politics. Even so, PP’s historical backing of the amendment almost certainly exposes the party to political pressure and, in extremis, potential bans from candidacy.
Should PP receive the most votes but be barred from candidacy, widespread protests are highly likely, as was observed in 2023. These would highly likely be led by the Thai youth, who make up a large part of the reformist parties’ support base. Previous bouts of major unrest mixed with institutional paralysis have triggered coups from Thailand’s powerful military on numerous occasions. This is unlikely to occur again in the short-term due to independent mechanisms typically now being preferred tools for managing political crises in Thailand in an effort to increase democratic legitimacy. However, if protests become widespread, violent, and sustained, with a political deadlock over the election winner, this would highly likely increase the risk of a coup.
Large-scale unrest is not the only potential physical risk likely to increase in Thailand during the electoral campaign. Thailand has been experiencing an ongoing separatist insurgency since 2004 in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla. Insurgents have traditionally increased attacks during electoral cycles to undermine the central government and achieve maximum publicity for their cause. In 2023, insurgents set fire to cell phone towers and tyres across Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces. During the election periods in 2011 and 2014, insurgent activity increased around polling and campaigning phases, marked by attacks on infrastructure, local officials, and security forces.
On 11 January 2026, a series of coordinated bomb and arson attacks targeted PTT petrol stations across Thailand’s Deep South, injuring at least four. A member of the largest insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), has since declared that the group is “likely to conduct attacks like arson, shootings and bombings to remind political parties of their demands” around the general election. Further attacks in the run-up to the election are likely, with incidents likely to be contained to the southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla, and designed to generate publicity and exert political pressure, rather than cause mass casualties. However, attacks on Thai Buddhists, state officials, military personnel, police officers, and local Muslims perceived as cooperating with the authorities have increased in recent years, and there is a realistic possibility that more hardline elements of the insurgency will conduct more deadly attacks during the electoral period.
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Election Guide
Costa Rica will hold general elections on 1 February to elect the president, the two vice presidents, and the 57 members of the Legislative Assembly. To be elected president, a candidate must secure at least 40 per cent of the vote in the first round. If that does not occur, the two candidates who received the most votes will compete in a run-off election on 5 April. If multiple candidates cross the 40 per cent threshold, the one who receives the most votes is elected president in the first round. Legislative Assembly seats are assigned via proportional representation across the country’s seven electoral districts.
Current polls indicate that Minister of National Planning and Economic Policy Laura Fernández Delgado is a clear favourite to win the first round. Polling from 21 January suggests she is approaching the critical 40 per cent mark, providing her with a realistic possibility of securing an outright first-round victory if current support levels are maintained. Fernández is running for the right-wing populist Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO), which was only founded in 2022. She also has the backing of incumbent President Rodrigo Chaves, who is currently an independent and barred from running for re-election.
Several candidates are competing for a possible second spot in the runoff, although they are all polling below double digits. They include: Álvaro Ramos Chaves, of the centrist National Liberation Party (PLN), Fabricio Alvarado, an Evangelical singer who heads the conservative New Republic Party (PNR), Claudia Dobles Camargo, the former first lady of Costa Rica who is supported by the centre-left National Democratic Agenda (AND) coalition, and Ariel Robles Barrantes, of the democratic socialist Broad Front (FA).
ASSESSMENT
The elections occur at a time of increasing political turmoil in Costa Rica. President Chaves is currently involved in a conflict with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and has survived two attempts to strip his electoral immunity over suspected electoral violations. This instability was highlighted on 19 January, when the head of Costa Rica’s intelligence agency reported that it had received information about a plot to assassinate Chaves ahead of the vote, although the activist who was accused has denied the allegations and suggested they were politically motivated.
Moreover, the crime rate has increased significantly, which has largely been attributed to the spread of transnational organised criminal groups since the late 2010s. In 2023, the murder rate reached 17.2 per 100,000, around 40 per cent higher than its previous peak in 2017. Increasing crime rates have resulted in growing public scepticism towards the political class. According to polls, large sections of the electorate have become disillusioned with the existing parties, with up to half of voters still undecided regarding their preferred candidate.
Law and order and the fight against corruption are highly likely to be the main issues during the electoral campaign, mirroring patterns observed in other Latin American states. In countries like Chile, Honduras, and Ecuador, leaders have increasingly responded to these concerns with promises to implement Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) policies. Such policies have been characterised by mass detentions, increased police powers, and the curtailing of civil liberties. Mano Dura’s application by the government of El Salvador, which resulted in a sharp decrease in the violent crime rate, has become a model for other Latin American nations seeking to combat organised crime.
Fernández, expanding on Chaves’s positions, has pledged to implement Mano Dura in Costa Rica, vowing to build a “maxi-prison” like El Salvador’s CECOT facility, curtail civil rights in high-crime areas, and extradite Costa Ricans involved in organised crime to other countries, especially the US. These hardline stances, combined with Chaves’s enduring popularity (likely bolstered by the president’s clash with the legal “establishment”, have likely solidified Fernández’s primacy in the polls.
Still, Fernández’s victory, while highly likely due to the significant divisions within the opposition, is not certain. If the vote goes to a runoff, her competitor will almost certainly have an opportunity to unify at least part of this fragmented vote. However, the low levels of disillusionment within the electorate may make a significant swing in support between the two rounds unlikely.
Costa Rica has a long history of stable and peaceful political transitions. However, the country has had occasional waves of large-scale unrest, which have at times turned violent. The latest occurred in 2018, when labour unions staged a three-month strike over a proposed tax reform. The strike was marked by widespread and sometimes violent clashes between authorities and the protesters, as well as multiple incidents of vandalism.
It is unlikely that the upcoming vote itself will trigger large-scale violent unrest in Costa Rica. However, persistent political tensions, particularly the unresolved dispute between the executive and the TSE, could become catalysts for broader instability depending on the policies adopted by the incoming administration in its early months. The potential and controversial implementation of Mano Dura–style security measures is likely to result in significant division. While rising crime rates and the threats associated with transnational organised crime groups will almost certainly be leveraged to justify their implementation, for many, such draconian policies will likely be interpreted as a state overreach in a country that has traditionally championed democratic institutions and civil liberties, and which has historically been less affected by violent crime than many of its Central American neighbours.
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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:30 GMT 18 JANUARY 2026
On 15 January, voting took place for general elections to elect the president and members of parliament. While the initial stages of the voting process were peaceful, violence broke out overnight in Butambala, approximately 55 kilometres southwest of Kampala. According to Muwanga Kivumbi, a senior member of parliament for the National Unity Platform (NUP), security forces stormed his home and shot ten members of his campaign team after hundreds of his supporters had gathered there after voting ended. His supporters fled following the shooting. However, according to local police spokesperson Lydia Tumushabe, a group of “NUP goons” had planned to burn down local polling and police stations. 25 people were reportedly arrested.
In Luweero, 40 kilometres north of Kampala, protests occurred overnight on 15 to 16 January after security personnel blocked voters from accessing the Luweero Islamic Primary School polling station, where vote counting was underway. Security forces responded with tear gas and live ammunition, killing at least three people and arresting 34 as protesters mounted barricades and burned tyres along the Kampala-Gulu highway, disrupting traffic.
Voting occurred amid a nationwide internet blackout. On 13 January, Uganda’s communications authority pre-emptively ordered all service providers to suspend internet access. The decision was justified in terms of public safety, to prevent “online misinformation, disinformation [and] electoral fraud… as well as preventing [the] incitement of violence”. The move comes after the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) announced that speculation regarding the suspension of the internet was “mere rumours” days prior.
Vote counting is underway as of the time of reporting, with results due to be published within 48 hours of polling closing, before 17:00 local time on 17 January. According to preliminary leaked results, 60 per cent of votes have been counted, with Incumbent President Yoweri Museveni of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) winning around 75 per cent of the votes, and primary challenger Robert Ssentamu (Bobi Wine) of the National Unity Platform (NUP) receiving around 20 per cent.
Wine has accused the government of electoral fraud, posting on X that “[s]everal incidents of ballot stuffing have been recorded. The regime military and police is [sic] directly involved in repressing our agents at polling stations. On top of abductions, the regime forces are targeting our leaders across the country! #FreeUgandaNow”. Wine has also declared that he has been placed under house arrest, with the military having allegedly encircled his house.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Cutting the internet has been used in Uganda in recent years during elections or periods of heightened tension. The internet was almost certainly pre-emptively cut to prevent the spread of footage of security forces using excessive force, the spread of anti-government sentiment, and the organising of mass rallies on social media. Internet restrictions will highly likely remain in place over the coming days.
Major youth protests have erupted in recent years in neighbouring Tanzania and Kenya, as well as numerous other African countries, including Morocco, Madagascar, and Angola. In Uganda in November 2020, in the lead-up to the January 2021 general election, security forces arrested Wine, citing violations of COVID-19 protocols. Widespread protests erupted across Uganda, particularly in Kampala and other urban areas. Security forces cracked down on demonstrations, deploying tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, and detaining approximately 3,000 people over the election period.
Following reports of security force violence, electoral fraud, and the placing of Wine under house arrest, anti-government sentiment is almost certainly heightened, significantly raising the risk of widespread civil unrest. Following the publication of the electoral results on 17 January and the almost certain announcement of Museveni’s victory, Wine is highly likely to double down on claims of electoral fraud. Amid the tense political environment, this is likely to trigger demonstrations from many Wine supporters, which would almost highly likely escalate if security forces were to formally place Wine under arrest.
If civil unrest breaks out, demonstrations are likely to occur in Kampala and other major cities. In Kampala itself, protests will likely be particularly intense around the Central Business District and near government buildings. Large anti-government protests would highly likely result in travel disruptions, with security forces likely to use roadblocks to prevent protesters from accessing government buildings and diplomatic zones.
Civil unrest would almost certainly raise the risk of a potential coup. Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is expected to take over the presidency should the 81-year-old president fail to complete his term in office. Kainerugaba, who has threatened to behead wine and called for him to be hanged, is a four-star general and top military commander, in charge of Uganda’s most powerful institution. Critics of Museveni have previously called on Kainerugaba to conduct a military coup to seize power from his father. Kainerugaba’s control of the military almost certainly heightens the risk of a military coup should major nationwide civil unrest break out.
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Election Guide
On 18 January, Portuguese citizens will vote to elect their new President for a five-year term. The winning candidate needs to obtain a majority of 50 per cent of votes plus one. If that fails to occur, then the two leading candidates will compete in a run-off vote on 8 February. The incumbent President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, in office since 2016, is constitutionally barred from seeking a third consecutive term.
Portugal is a semi-presidential republic, and the president, while mostly holding ceremonial responsibilities, has some tangible political power (unlike, for example, the heads of state of Italy and Germany). For example, the president has the authority to veto laws and appoints not only the prime minister, but also other members of government.
Eleven official candidates are contesting for the presidency. A first-round victory seems highly unlikely, and current polls indicate that only five of the candidates have a realistic possibility of progressing to the second round. André Ventura, the founder of the far-right nationalist party Chega! (CH) leads the polls with approximately 19.5 per cent support. Marques Mendes, the candidate of the governing centre-right Social Democrat Party (PSD), polls at 19 per cent. António José Seguro, of the Socialist Party (PS), has around 17.5 per cent support, as does Henrique Gouveia e Melo, an “outsider candidate” and former Chief of the Naval Staff who is running as an independent and has significant centre-right support. Finally, João Cotrim de Figueiredo, president of the Liberal Initiative (IL), polls at around 16.5 per cent.
ASSESSMENT
The elections are likely to be a crucial test for Chega that could accelerate the party’s political momentum. In May’s parliamentary elections, Chega won 22.8 per cent of the vote, improving on its 2024 result and becoming the main opposition force in parliament. On the other hand, Chega was generally seen as having underperformed at the October 2025 local elections, only winning in three municipalities.
Securing the presidency would almost certainly grant Chega significant leverage over the governing PSD-led coalition. A Chega president could threaten to weaponise presidential veto powers to extract significant legislative concessions and shift the parliament to the right, encouraging PSD to work more often with Chega.
Holding the presidential office for five years is also an important political asset at a time of extreme parliamentary instability in Portugal. The 2025 vote was the third in three years, and the current governing coalition only retains a parliamentary minority. Finally, Chega’s position is further reinforced by Portugal’s lack of a developed cordon sanitaire system; the informal agreement that, in the parliaments of other European countries, such as France and Germany, centrist parties unite to keep the far-right out of power.
Current polls indicate that Ventura is likely to reach the second round. In other European head-to-head electoral contests involving a far-right candidate (such as, for instance, the second round of the 2022 French presidential elections), supporters of rival parties have typically coalesced around the leading alternative candidate to deny a far-right victory. However, several of the presidential candidates are from the right of the political spectrum, and if the choice is between Chega and the Socialist Party, Ventura’s chances will likely markedly increase, with right-leaning voters, not affected by a cordon sanitaire, potentially opting for Chega to block the left. On the other hand, a centre-right candidate may have a greater chance of winning centre-left voters by positioning themselves as a “lesser of two evils” against the far-right.
While presidential elections in Portugal seldom result in protests, a (likely) second round involving Ventura, which raises the possibility of a Chega head of state, would likely become an important cause of public opposition. Chega’s growth in the polls has meant that party rallies have increasingly been met by large counterprotests. Occasionally, as during the April 2025 Revolution Day celebrations in Lisbon, these demonstrations have escalated into clashes between opposing groups.
Furthermore, the likelihood of civil unrest after the first round of the elections is further increased by recent political developments in Portugal. In December, Portugal experienced its largest general strike in a decade, which forced the government to amend a labour reform package that opponents said reduced workers’ rights. Before the protests, the reform, proposed by the PSD coalition, was widely expected to be approved by parliament with Chega’s support. Chega representatives later backtracked and called on the government to amend the legislation as protests gained significant traction. Emboldened by their recent success, labour unions may stage further demonstrations, particularly if the runoff appears to be “tilted to the right”, for example, in a Ventura-Mendes scenario.
While large-scale protests cannot be ruled out, especially in Lisbon, protests after the first round are likely to be mostly peaceful and smaller-scale. On the other hand, direct action by groups opposing Chega is likely. This may include vandalism, particularly targeting party premises and police and government offices, and possibly small-scale political violence, such as clashes involving opposing political activists.
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Election Guide
On 15 January, Ugandans will take part in general elections to elect the president and members of parliament. The president will be elected in a two-round system, with candidates requiring at least 50 per cent of the vote to be elected in the first round. The 529 members of the Ugandan Parliament will be elected via a first-past-the-post system. 146 seats are reserved for women, with one seat per district, and 30 seats are indirectly filled via special electoral colleges.
Uganda’s Electoral Commission has cleared 27 parties to participate. Eight presidential candidates are competing. The 81-year-old Incumbent President Yoweri Museveni was declared the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party’s candidate and is seeking to extend his rule, which has been ongoing since 1986, to a seventh term. Opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi, popularly known as Bobi Wine of the National Unity Platform (NUP) is the primary opposition candidate.
The lead-up to the elections has been characterised by intimidation, violence, and arrests targeting the opposition. Over 300 opposition supporters have been detained, with rallies being met by the police with tear gas, roadblocks, and arbitrary arrests. On 5 January 2026, Wine shared social media footage of security forces arresting and manhandling a journalist. This was the latest in a series of incidents involving heavy-handed tactics by security forces, typically against Wine supporters at his political rallies. Wine has claimed at least three deaths at his rallies at the hands of security forces, including one instance of a supporter being shot and another being hit by a military truck. In May 2025, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s son, who is likely being groomed as the next in line for the presidency, boasted of torturing Wine’s chief bodyguard.
ASSESSMENT
Previous Ugandan elections have resulted in significant levels of violence. In November 2020, in the lead-up to the January 2021 general election, security forces arrested Wine, citing violations of COVID-19 protocols. Widespread protests erupted across Uganda, particularly in Kampala and other urban areas. Security forces cracked down on protests, deploying tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, and detaining approximately 3,000 people over the election period.
In July 2024, young Ugandans engaged in anti-government protests in Kampala, largely inspired by similar youth-led movements in Kenya. Security forces quickly cracked down on demonstrations, detaining at least 100 protesters. Museveni, Africa’s third-longest-running leader, has cracked down on opposition in recent years, arresting and trying numerous opposition figures in military courts. Wine himself has been arrested multiple times since campaigning for the presidency, most recently in October 2023.
A rising cost of living crisis, primarily driven by rising fuel and food costs, combined with perceptions of government corruption, has fuelled significant frustration among Uganda’s youth. If the election is perceived as unfree and unfair, or if the security forces use excessive or unwarranted force against the opposition, there is a realistic possibility that widespread unrest could break out. Security forces have historically cracked down on protesters with severe force and are highly likely to respond similarly to any unrest during the upcoming election. While the security crackdown acted as a deterrence to protesters in July 2024, Wine could act as a figurehead for post-election protests, potentially helping to sustain demonstrations despite the high likelihood of security force crackdowns.
Despite the head of the Uganda Communications Commission’s (UCC) reassurance that reports of potential internet blackouts were “mere rumours”, internet blackouts are likely in the lead-up to the election. The government has already banned the sharing of live footage of riots, “unlawful processions”, and other violent incidents ahead of the election. Youth-led protests are generally heavily reliant on real-time updates, viral content, and livestreamed evidence of police brutality to sustain demonstrations. By cutting the internet, the government can disrupt protester coordination, prevent the documentation of abuses by security forces, isolate activists, and limit the spread of anti-government sentiment. During the 2021 election, during which widespread protests took place in Kampala, the internet was cut for four days.
If civil unrest breaks out, demonstrations are likely around the Central Business District and near government buildings; during the July 2024 anti-corruption protests, groups marched through Kampala towards the parliament building but were blocked by the security forces. Large anti-government protests would highly likely result in travel disruptions, with security forces likely to use roadblocks to prevent protesters from accessing government buildings and diplomatic zones.
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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 9:30 GMT 03 JANUARY 2026
At approximately 02:00 local time on 03 January 2026, multiple explosions were reported across Caracas, primarily near La Carlota Air Base and Fort Tiuna, which houses the Venezuelan Ministry of Defence. Witnesses reported multiple fighter jets over the capital preceding the blasts.
Explosions were also reported at locations outside Caracas, including Higuerote Airport in Miranda State, the Libertador Air Base in Aragua State, and port infrastructure in La Guaira State. In response to the airstrikes, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a NOTAM restricting all civil and commercial aircraft from operating in Venezuelan airspace due to ongoing military operations.
At 03:29 local time, the Venezuelan government issued an official statement condemning what it described as military aggression by the United States in Caracas, Miranda, Aragua, and La Guaira States. Five minutes later, President Nicolas Maduro declared a nationwide state of emergency, calling for a general mobilisation of Venezuela’s Armed Forces in response to the “serious military aggression.”
The attacks prompted international reactions, including from Colombian President Gustavo Petro, who denounced the strikes on social media platform X and called for immediate intervention by the United Nations and the Organisation of American States (OAS).
The US Embassy in Venezuela has advised against all travel to Venezuela and has urged those presently in-country to shelter-in-place.
US President Donald Trump claimed via Truth Social at 04:20 Eastern Time, that President Maduro had been captured and flown out of the country amidst the strikes; however, this has yet to be officially confirmed.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
The reported targeting of military facilities and airports inside Venezuela represents a significant escalation in US–Venezuela tensions, which have steadily deteriorated since August 2025. The substantial buildup of US naval and air assets in the wider Caribbean has largely been interpreted as pressure aimed at undermining the Maduro government. This posture has coincided with multiple US strikes against suspected narcotics trafficking networks, resulting in over 100 fatalities, as well as the seizure of illicit oil tankers suspected of transporting Venezuelan oil in circumvention of sanctions.
The reported strikes on airports and military installations likely suggest an effort to degrade Venezuela’s ability to conduct retaliatory military operations, by limiting air and logistical capabilities. Sustained damage to multiple airfields and port facilities would achieve a clear tactical advantage for any potential follow-on operations and further constrain the operational freedom of Venezuela’s armed forces.
Reports of President Maduro’s capture are yet to be confirmed; however, if true, the United States has likely achieved one of its primary objectives, which may decrease the risk of further US strikes on Venezuela in the immediate term.
In response to foreign military activity within Venezuelan soil, authorities are likely to implement heightened travel restrictions, curfews, and border closures in the coming days to manage potential unrest and support military operations. Increased security patrols, checkpoints, and the deployment of the armed forces to key infrastructure are likely. The authorities may also restrict the right to assembly or limit access to the internet and telecommunications, limiting situational awareness within Venezuela. Foreign nationals, particularly US and other Western citizens, will likely face an elevated risk of detention due to perceptions or allegations of involvement in the recent military activity.
If US strikes are sustained, they are expected to cause significant disruptions to air travel in the Southern Caribbean Basin. The proximity of Trinidad and Tobago and the ABC Islands, Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao, to mainland Venezuela is expected to make travel to and from these areas highly difficult. The closure of Venezuelan airspace is also likely to extend flight times on routes connecting the United States and Canada with areas of South America.
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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 10:30 GMT 15 DECEMBER 2025
On the evening of 14 December, the first night of 2025’s Jewish Hanukkah festival, two gunmen opened fire at a large public Hanukkah celebration called “Hanukkah by the Sea” at Sydney’s Bondi Beach. Around 1,000 were attending the event, with at least 16 deaths (including one of the gunmen) and over 40 injuries reported. The incident has been declared by authorities as a terrorist attack.
The perpetrators have been identified as a father and son, Sajid Akram and Naveed Akram. The terrorist attack began with the perpetrators opening fire from a bridge towards Archer Park. One of the gunmen then descended into Archer Park, believed to be Sajid Akram, who was then disarmed by a member of the public before returning to the bridge. Following a firefight with responding police, the two terrorists were neutralised, with one dying at the scene. Authorities have stated that they are not currently searching for further perpetrators.
A total of six firearms and three improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been located both at the scene and at two homes in Bonnyrigg and Campsie, as of 15 December. The father, Sajid Akram, was a licensed gun owner through membership of a gun club, with all six firearms believed to have been legally acquired.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
The Bondi Beach mass shooting is the deadliest terrorist attack in Australian history and the deadliest mass shooting since the 1996 Port Arthur massacre.
Attribution for the attack has so far seen potentially conflicting reports. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reportedly “took interest” in one of the perpetrators, Naveed Akram, six years ago for ties to a Sydney-based Islamic State (IS) terrorist cell. This followed the July 2019 arrest of Isaac El Matari, the self-proclaimed head of IS in Australia, who wished to establish an “insurgency” in Australia.
Local media reports that investigators from the Australian Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) believe that the two perpetrators had pledged allegiance to IS, with two IS flags reportedly found in their vehicle at Bondi Beach. A senior JCTT official has briefed that Naveed Akram was “closely connected” to El Matari.
These findings, if confirmed, would strongly suggest at least a historical connection to an Australian IS cell. However, Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has stated that intelligence authorities have informed him that there was “no evidence of collusion” and “no evidence that these people were part of a cell”. Investigations by Australian authorities remain ongoing.
In apparent contrast to the attribution to IS, whether that be via coordination with a wider network or through inspiration as lone actors, Israeli intelligence sources have briefed that the attack may have been carried out with the support of Iran or Iran-backed actors such as Hezbollah.
In August 2025, Iran’s ambassador to Australia, Ahmad Sadeghi, was expelled due to “credible evidence” that antisemitic attacks, including an arson attack against a café in Sydney in October 2024 and a synagogue in Melbourne in December 2024, were orchestrated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The Bondi Beach terrorist attack highlights the continuing elevated risk of terrorism in Western countries, particularly against Jewish targets. Other attacks in 2025 include the October 2025 ramming and stabbing attack targeting Jewish worshipers at a synagogue in Manchester, UK, during Yom Kippur, and the May 2025 shooting near the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., USA.
In addition to the elevated risk of antisemitic terrorism against targets associated with Judaism, such as synagogues, Jewish schools, and events such as Hanukkah gatherings (14 December – 22 December 2025), the winter holiday season almost certainly entails an increased risk of terrorist attacks against ‘soft targets’. Symbolic and high-visibility events, such as Christmas markets, draw large crowds and are difficult to comprehensively protect against terrorist actors.
In the aftermath of the Bondi Beach attack, it is almost certain that security presence at Hanukkah events and synagogues will be elevated, as already reported in cities such as Berlin, London, and New York.
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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:00 GMT 10 DECEMBER 2025
On 7 December, border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia resumed, resulting in significant casualties and mass evacuations. Both countries dispute responsibility for initiating the latest clashes, with each side accusing the other of violating ceasefire agreements.
Cambodia’s defence ministry reported that nine civilians, including an infant, had been killed and 46 injured by Thai attacks. The Thai military said four of its soldiers had died and 68 were injured, while claiming dozens of Cambodian soldiers were also killed. Both sides have traded accusations of targeting civilians and using heavy weaponry. Cambodian officials have accused the Thai military of firing “toxic gas” into residential areas in Ou Beichoan in Banteay Meanchey province.
Both militaries have conducted cross-border attacks, with Thailand employing F-16 fighter jets in response to Cambodian rocket artillery fire. The Thai military also announced plans to demolish the Stung Meteuk bridge in Cambodia’s Pursat province, alleging it was being used to transport artillery, and ordered civilians to evacuate the area.
Chanthaburi is reportedly the only Thai province that has not been directly affected by armed clashes. On 9 December, Thai Navy marines launched a counter-offensive in Trat province to reclaim territory seized by Cambodian forces. Aerial images had allegedly shown Cambodia reinforcing the area with troops and weaponry.
Thai authorities reported that more than 170,000 people had been evacuated to shelters in border provinces, with additional reports of nearly 430,000 residents displaced since the fighting resumed. Cambodian authorities have reported that 101,229 people have been evacuated across five provinces.
Hospitals and schools on both sides of the border have faced closures due to the violence. The Thai military reported that Cambodian rockets landed near the Phanom Dong Rak Hospital in Surin on 10 December and accused Cambodia of deliberately targeting it.
Curfews and evacuation orders were imposed in Thailand’s Sa Kaeo, Surin, Sisaket, and Ubon Ratchathani provinces, with temporary shelters established for evacuees. The Thai government also heightened security and warned of suspected Cambodian spies in border areas. Land border crossings between the two countries have been suspended.
China and Malaysia urged restraint, while Thailand’s prime minister ruled out negotiations, insisting that Cambodia comply with Thai demands. Cambodia announced its withdrawal from the 2025 Southeast Asia Games in Thailand due to the ongoing conflict. The US has asked the two sides to “cease hostilities immediately” and follow de-escalatory measures outlined in the US-brokered October peace accord.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
The dispute originates from a 1904 colonial-era agreement between France and Siam using the watershed principle to define the border, but a later French map placed the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia. The ICJ ultimately ruled in Cambodia’s favour. Tensions over the disputed region have occasionally escalated, most notably in 2008 and 2011 following armed skirmishes between Cambodian and Thai troops.
Tensions again reignited on 24 July 2025, with violence erupting along multiple border sectors. The two sides exchanged artillery, rocket fire, heavy weaponry, and airstrikes. Overall, the conflict displaced over 300,000 civilians across Thailand and Cambodia. Many villages, schools, and civilian buildings were damaged. On 28 July, both sides agreed to a ceasefire following Malaysia-mediated peace talks with added pressure from the US and China.
The US-brokered Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord was signed by both sides in October. Under the agreement, both sides committed to refrain from the threat or use of force, and to settle disputes peacefully under international law, withdraw heavy weapons from border zones, establish a monitoring mechanism, and demine and clear unexploded ordnance (UXO).
Further clashes are highly likely over the coming days. While the conflict has largely been confined to the border areas, the accusations of civilian targeting on each side, as well as accusations of the use of “toxic gas”, almost certainly heighten the risk of towns and cities further from the border being targeted. Furthermore, accusations of civilian targeting may result in tit-for-tat measures, such as the deliberate targeting of hospitals.
US President Donald Trump has declared that he will “make a phone call” to stop the clashes. It is highly likely that he will threaten further tariffs, which would almost certainly impact the economies of both countries and could act as a diplomatic off-ramp to engage in negotiations. There is a realistic possibility that protests will take place in Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Martial law may be imposed if tensions continue to escalate.
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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 12:00 BST 28 NOVEMBER 2025
Honduras is scheduled to hold general elections on 30 November to elect the president, members of the National Congress and 20 members of the Central American Parliament.
The president will be determined by a one-round vote, in which the candidate with the most votes is elected to succeed incumbent President Xiomara Castro, who is constitutionally limited to a single term.
Current polling indicates that the presidency is a tightly contested race between Salvador Nasralla of the Liberal Party and Nasry Asfura of the National Party running neck-and-neck, while LIBRE’s Rixi Moncada trails in third place, suggesting no clear frontrunner.
Polling stations will open at 07:00 local time and close at 17:00. Voters who are still in line by closing time will be able to cast their ballots.
The vote-counting process can take weeks. In 2021, final vote tallies were published on 28 December, a month after the vote.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
The elections are likely to cause protests in Honduras in the short term. This is due to the extreme polarisation of the Honduran political system. In the lead-up to the vote, several main parties have levied accusations of fraud and warned of foreign interference. The Attorney General has alleged that the opposition will attempt to manipulate the results, releasing, in late October, an audio recording that seems to suggest an agreement between National Party officials and senior military figures to claim victory before the official vote count is complete. Military leaders have also demanded to run a “parallel” vote count, which has almost certainly increased fears of institutional interference.
Previous elections have also resulted in widespread protests. In 2017, the vote led to almost a month of violent street clashes, curfews, mass arrests and almost 40 deaths after the opposition claimed there was widespread election fraud. In 2009, following the military ousting of President Manuel Zelaya, large-scale mobilisations paralysed parts of Tegucigalpa and other cities for weeks.
Protests are likely to begin shortly after the vote count is completed and the results are announced. However, if any of the participating parties claim an “early” victory, this would highly likely increase the risk of large-scale unrest in the immediate term. Protests following the elections are likely to take place near government buildings and party offices. Large-scale unrest often coincides with road blockades on key highways, leading to severe traffic disruptions.
Honduras currently implements a “state of emergency”. It was issued in 2022 and is based on the “Mano Dura” anti-crime approach adopted by El Salvador. The state of emergency grants police significant powers to stop, search, and detain civilians. While aimed at combating organised crime, the state of emergency almost certainly increases the threat of a violent police response to all forms of unrest.
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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:45 BST 26 NOVEMBER 2025
On 26 November, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló announced that he had been placed under arrest at around noon while he was in his office at the presidential palace in the capital, Bissau. According to local media, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Biague Na Ntan and General Mamadou Touré, and the Minister of the Interior, Botché Candé, were also arrested.
The announcement came shortly after gunfire had been reported in Bissau, with reports stating that the gunshots originated from near the presidential palace. The gunfire lasted for approximately an hour, having stopped by 1400 local time. It is currently not clear who was involved in the gunfire, but an Embaló spokesperson has declared that the men were affiliated with opposition leader Fernando Dias da Costa. According to Embaló, no violence has been committed against him, and the army chief of staff had orchestrated the coup d’etat.
The arrest comes only a day before the results from the 23 November presidential election were set to be released. Tensions were high, with Embaló and leading challenger Dias both prematurely declaring victory on 24 November. Both parties stated that they exceeded the 50 per cent threshold required for victory, negating the requirement for a run-off vote. In a statement given in Bissau, Dias stated, “We have won the presidential race. We will not have a second round”. Campaign spokesperson for Embaló, Oscar Barbosa, announced only hours later that Embaló had won outright and called on challengers to avoid making claims that undermine the democratic process.
The situation in-country has been reported as calm following the earlier reports of gunfire. Several elements of the Presidential Guard are reportedly occupying strategic routes leading to the palace.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Guinea-Bissau has grappled with chronic instability since achieving independence from Portugal in 1973, marked by repeated coups and ongoing political power struggles. The country has experienced at least 10 successful or attempted coups, making it one of the most coup-prone countries in Africa.
Political instability has increased following the postponement of the elections, with the opposition regarding Embaló as an illegitimate president, claiming that his mandate expired on 27 February 2025. The two main opposition parties had been largely excluded from the elections, including the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which led Guinea-Bissau’s fight for independence.
The arrest of Embaló is highly likely indicative of a falling out between the presidency and the military, which is likely due to Embaló’s attempts to centralise authority and reshape the country’s security services while marginalising his political opponents. This apparent coup attempt marks the second in recent months, coming not long after another alleged coup attempt took place on 31 October, resulting in the arrests of several senior army officers. It is highly likely that the military, which holds considerable political power in Guinea-Bissau, used Dias’ claim to victory as a pretext to conduct the arrest.
Former Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira has accused Embaló of simulating a coup so he could initiate a crackdown on the opposition. Dias’ claim of victory in the presidential election has highly likely provided Embaló with a pretext to portray him as attempting to forcefully take power. If simulated, Embaló will highly likely exploit the situation to arrest Dias and other opposition members.
Continued political instability is highly likely in the coming weeks. In the immediate days, the military will highly likely occupy key sites, including government buildings, media outlets, airports and border crossings, and critical infrastructure. It is highly likely that they will close the country’s borders and airspace, impose a curfew, and/or impose internet blocks while they attempt to re-establish order. Increased military checkpoints are highly likely on major routes and in the vicinity of government buildings and airports.
There will almost certainly be a heavy security presence in Bissau and other major cities in Guinea-Bissau over the coming days. The arrest of the Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces indicates that military factionalism is highly likely. Security forces will likely conduct further arrests of high-ranking individuals in the government and opposing factions within the military. There is a realistic possibility that military factions opposed to the army chief of staff will engage in armed resistance. A failed coup attempt in 1998, led by a dissident general, triggered a year-long civil war.
The apparent coup will almost certainly be perceived as exacerbating Guinea-Bissau’s political instability, and there is a realistic possibility that civil unrest breaks out in the coming weeks. After an alleged coup attempt in 2023 and the subsequent dissolution of parliament by Embaló, small-scale protests took place near the parliament building, with several people burning tyres. Guinea-Bissau’s security forces typically respond forcefully to protests, and the expected heavy security presence across the capital in the coming days will likely dissuade many from demonstrating. However, given the high tensions in the country following the dual victory claims, there is a realistic possibility that many will engage in rival protests.
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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 11:00 BST 13 NOVEMBER 2025
On 13 November, Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal announced that it will issue a verdict in the case against former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her top aides on 17 November. Hasina, who was ousted in the 2024 student-led July Revolution, is being tried in absentia (having escaped to India) for offences including crimes against humanity and murder, related to her conduct during the uprising.
Hasina’s party, the Awami League (AL), has called for a “lockdown” on 13 November, with marches in Dhaka and other major Bangladeshi cities. In response, authorities have significantly increased police presence across major cities, including by redirecting 14 border guard platoons to Dhaka and surrounding districts.
Several firebombings and detonations of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) occurred in the days leading up to the 13 November announcement. These included at least 17 IEDs being detonated at locations across Dhaka on 10 November, attacks targeting vehicles across the country on 12 November, and several firebombings targeting religious minority institutions, including the Catholic Cathedral in Dhaka and a Catholic-run school.
On 13 November, clashes broke out in Dhaka, where the AL office in the Gulistan area of the city was firebombed. Moreover, several attempted blockades of key roadways occurred on 13 November. At least one bus was set on fire on the Dhaka-Tangail highway. Authorities have stated that they have detained more than 50 AL supporters between 12 and 13 November.
Airports and other transport hubs have been placed on high alert. Several schools have switched to online teaching. Authorities have set up dozens of checkpoints across major roads and highways, particularly those leading to large cities.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Violent civil unrest has increased significantly across Bangladesh in the aftermath of the July Revolution. Cases of large-scale mob violence, often led by local student political groups, have repeatedly coincided with important anniversaries of domestic and international events. Violence between opposing political parties, or even opposing factions within parties, is the most frequently reported. However, post-revolution violence has also disproportionately targeted local religious and ethnic minorities.
The ongoing unrest is highly likely to continue until the verdict is announced on 17 November and will highly likely continue in the immediate aftermath. The unrest will highly likely take the form of clashes between AL and other parties’ supporters – particularly those of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) – and between AL supporters and police. Opportunistic attacks on minority places of worship and other institutions remain likely during the unrest, as demonstrated by the recent firebombings on Catholic sites.
Focal points for protests will likely include universities, main public squares in large cities, and the vicinity of party headquarters. Protests in Bangladesh often coincide with road blockades, with protesters erecting improvised barricades and often attacking transiting vehicles. There is a realistic possibility of unrest near airports, which could cause flight delays or cancellations.
Bangladeshi police will likely respond to all unrest with violent crowd control methods. These include tear gas, baton charges, water cannons, and, in some cases, live ammunition. There is a realistic possibility that police actions will escalate unrest.
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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 11:00 BST 11 NOVEMBER 2025
On 11 November, at approximately 12:39 local time (07:39 UTC), an explosion occurred outside the District Judicial Court complex in Islamabad, Pakistan, located adjacent to Srinagar Highway in the G-11 sector of the city. The Interior Ministry has confirmed that at least 12 people were killed and at least 27 were injured in the explosion.
Footage reportedly showing the aftermath of the explosion shows a vehicle on fire on the service road outside the complex’s gates, as well as possible victims near the location of the blast. Authorities have established a security perimeter near the incident location and appear to have halted traffic on the nearby section of the Srinagar Highway.
Pakistani authorities have stated that they assess that the explosion was a terrorist attack perpetrated by an individual equipped with a person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED, likely a suicide vest). Some unconfirmed testimonies state that the alleged attacker approached the complex on a motorcycle, while the Interior Ministry stated that he unsuccessfully attempted to enter the courthouse.
Law enforcement agencies have been placed on high alert to prevent or respond to any possible future attacks.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
The attack comes a day after a vehicle explosion killed at least eight people near the Red Fort landmark in Delhi, India, although there is so far no evidence linking the two events.
Suicide bombings in Islamabad have been less common in recent years relative to other Pakistani urban centres. The city is Pakistan’s most securitised urban space, containing security checkpoints and fortified zones to prevent such attacks.
There is no official confirmation of the perpetrator’s affiliation. Pakistani media has accused “Fitna al-Khawarij”, a term often applied to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which primarily operates in regions next to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The group has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Pakistan’s major cities, including a 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, a 2017 suicide bombing in Lahore, and a 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Karachi. The group has previously targeted Islamabad, attempting a suicide bombing in Islamabad’s government district in December 2022. In August 2025, Pakistan’s intelligence agency announced that it foiled a planned TTP suicide car bombing. Early assessment suggests that the TTP are the most likely perpetrators of the Islamabad District Judicial Court bombing, although there are multiple other terrorist threat actors present in Pakistan.
Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has also claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the country. PBIEDs are often used by the group; however, most of ISKP’s attacks have taken place in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the group has not previously targeted Islamabad. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is also active in Balochistan, with typical targets including Pakistani security forces, infrastructure projects, and government installations in the Balochistan region.
The attack comes amid heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamabad has frequently accused the Afghan Taliban-led government of allowing TTP militants safe havens across the border, from which attacks are launched into Pakistan. Recent tensions escalated into airstrikes conducted by Pakistan on TTP targets in Kabul on 15 October, following TTP raids on Pakistani military posts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that killed 11 on 11 October.
If confirmed to be TTP, already high tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan will highly likely further increase. There is a realistic possibility that Pakistan will conduct further cross-border strikes into Afghanistan targeting TTP hideouts. Additionally, Islamabad may suspend ongoing diplomatic engagement, fully close partially open border crossings, and/or impose further travel restrictions on Afghan nationals.
Islamabad has also frequently blamed New Delhi for supporting the TTP as a proxy to destabilise Pakistan, and Pakistani media have accused the perpetrators of the attack of being “India-backed”. There is a realistic possibility that protests will occur close to the High Commission of India in Islamabad, although demonstrations are generally restricted inside the diplomatic zone and are likely to be met with a heavy security presence.
A heightened security presence across major cities in Pakistan is highly likely, with increased security checkpoints and road closures. Heightened security will highly likely lead to increased travel disruptions in the short term. Intensified security operations in the border regions, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and/or Balochistan, are highly likely.
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SITUATION SUMMARY | Intelligence cut off: 15:30 BST 10 NOVEMBER 2025
At approximately 19:05 local time, 10 November, an explosion occurred near the Red Fort in a densely populated area of Delhi. At least eight people were killed and 12 others injured, according to hospital officials. Multiple casualties were brought to Lok Nayak (LNJP) Hospital.
The explosion appeared to take place inside a vehicle and set multiple other vehicles alight. Videos on social media show a large fire on a congested street close to the Red Fort metro station gate number one.
Delhi has been placed on high alert following the blast. An investigation is underway into the cause of the explosion. Police cordoned off the area, and several firefighting vehicles and ambulances were dispatched to the scene. The National Security Guard (NSG), the National Investigation Agency (NIA), formed after the 26/11 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the forensic department were also dispatched.
The Uttar Pradesh region bordering Delhi and Mumbai in the Maharashtra region have been placed on high alert. Instructions have reportedly been issued to all senior officials to increase security and patrols at sensitive religious sites, sensitive districts, and border areas. Security agencies have also been alerted, and the police have been put on alert.
The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Reserve Police Force (DIG CRPF) has stated that it is “too early to say anything” regarding the cause of the explosion.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
The Red Fort, also known as the Lal Qila, is a Mughal-era fort located in the old city and is a popular tourist destination with heavy foot traffic. The location of the blast in the area and near a traffic hub likely suggests that, if the explosion is terrorism-related, its perpetrators sought to maximise civilian casualties while also obtaining maximum visibility for their actions.
While a possible terrorist link has not been confirmed by authorities as of the time of reporting, the incident occurred only hours after two separate terror plots were reportedly thwarted by Indian authorities. On the night of 9-10 November, Indian police reported the arrest of seven individuals in Faridabad, part of the Delhi National Capital Region, who were reportedly found in possession of approximately 360 kilograms of explosive material and a “large cache of arms and ammunition”. Authorities reported that the suspects were linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a separatist-Islamist group based in Kashmir.
On 9 November, three individuals were arrested in Gujarat and found in possession of several firearms and approximately 4 kilograms of ricin precursors. Indian authorities have suggested that they had had links with an Afghanistan-based operative of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). In late October, Indian authorities had already arrested two suspected ISKP-linked operatives for planning attacks in New Delhi on Diwali.
If the Red Fort blast is confirmed as terrorism, there is a realistic possibility that the attack is linked to the reported foiled plots, with the perpetrators seeking to quickly conduct an attack due to the increased threat of discovery. Moreover, confirmation of an act of terrorism, particularly if linked to JeM, would highly likely increase tensions between India and Pakistan.
Transport disruptions are highly likely following the blast, with potential closures to the metro and likely road closures in the area. Furthermore, there is highly likely to be a heightened security presence in Delhi and other major cities, with increased checkpoints.
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Solace Global Risk has been acquired by Global Guardian, a United States-based international security and risk management firm. This acquisition marks a major step forward in our shared mission to protect people and organisations with the most trusted and comprehensive risk management solutions.
About Global Guardian
Founded in 2012 by a former U.S. Green Beret Commander, Global Guardian is a recognised leader in travel risk management, operational support, and crisis response – serving Fortune 1000 companies, family offices, and organisations around the world. Like Solace Global, the company is built on a foundation of integrity, operational excellence and commitment to safeguarding people, assets, and operations worldwide.
This acquisition represents an exciting milestone for Solace Global. By uniting Global Guardian’s proven operational capabilities and global reach with the deep expertise of the Solace Global team and its advanced travel risk management technology, we are creating the industry’s most comprehensive and responsive solution, strengthening our shared commitment to protecting clients wherever they operate.
From left: Dave Peach (Solace Global), Emily Roberts (Solace Global), and Dale Buckner (Global Guardian)
What This Means for Our Clients
Our clients remain our top priority. You will continue to work with the same trusted team and your day-to-day service, support, and communication channels will not change.
Our leadership team is unchanged. Emily Roberts continues as Managing Director, Martin Veale as Chief Operating Officer, and David Peach transitions into an interim advisory role. The strength and expertise of our leadership team is a core reason for this acquisition – ensuring continuity for clients is paramount.
Solace Global Risk will continue to operate under its existing brand, with the same service, contracts and technology in place. Over time, we intend to unify under the Global Guardian name. This will be a considered process, with clear and transparent communication every step of the way.
Solace Global Maritime and Solace Communications will continue to operate within the Solace Global Group with the same trusted teams and services.
Looking Ahead
The shared values of Solace Global and Global Guardian allow us to enhance our offering further. Clients will benefit from expanded GSOC services, video surveillance, and access control solutions, adding even greater strength to our existing services.
We’re proud of how far Solace Global has come and confident that, together with Global Guardian, we can go even further in supporting you with the highest level of care, capability, and resources.
We are here to answer any questions you may have about the acquisition, please don’t hesitate to reach out.
Global Guardian acquired Solace Global Risk to strengthen its travel risk management platform, leverage the expertise and proven capabilities of the Solace Global team, and expand its international footprint. By combining Global Guardian’s 24/7 global operations with Solace Global’s advanced Travel Risk Management (TRM) technology, we are creating the industry’s most comprehensive risk management solution.
There will be no immediate changes to your service, support, or points of contact. You will continue to work with the same trusted Solace Global team, using your existing communication channels and technology platform.
No. Emily Roberts will continue as Managing Director of Solace Global Risk, Martin Veale as Chief Operating Officer and David Peach will move into an interim advisory role. One of the key reasons Global Guardian acquired Solace Global is the strength and expertise of our leadership and staff—the team you know and trust remains firmly in place.
For now, Solace Global Risk will continue to operate under its existing brand while Global Guardian focuses on migrating clients to the Solace Global platform. Within 12–18 months, the two brands will fully unify under the Global Guardian name. This process will be carefully managed and will not disrupt your service. You can expect clear, transparent communication every step of the way.
This partnership enhances Solace Global Risk’s ability to support clients globally by combining leading technology and operational excellence. Clients will benefit from:
Ultimately, this acquisition strengthens Solace Global’s ability to support clients globally, providing broader coverage, faster response, and even higher levels of service and security.