INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Violent civil unrest has increased significantly across Bangladesh in the aftermath of the July Revolution. Cases of large-scale mob violence, often led by local student political groups, have repeatedly coincided with important anniversaries of domestic and international events. Violence between opposing political parties, or even opposing factions within parties, is the most frequently reported. However, post-revolution violence has also disproportionately targeted local religious and ethnic minorities.

The ongoing unrest is highly likely to continue until the verdict is announced on 17 November and will highly likely continue in the immediate aftermath. The unrest will highly likely take the form of clashes between AL and other parties’ supporters – particularly those of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) – and between AL supporters and police. Opportunistic attacks on minority places of worship and other institutions remain likely during the unrest, as demonstrated by the recent firebombings on Catholic sites.

Focal points for protests will likely include universities, main public squares in large cities, and the vicinity of party headquarters. Protests in Bangladesh often coincide with road blockades, with protesters erecting improvised barricades and often attacking transiting vehicles. There is a realistic possibility of unrest near airports, which could cause flight delays or cancellations.

Bangladeshi police will likely respond to all unrest with violent crowd control methods. These include tear gas, baton charges, water cannons, and, in some cases, live ammunition. There is a realistic possibility that police actions will escalate unrest.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The attack comes a day after a vehicle explosion killed at least eight people near the Red Fort landmark in Delhi, India, although there is so far no evidence linking the two events.

Suicide bombings in Islamabad have been less common in recent years relative to other Pakistani urban centres. The city is Pakistan’s most securitised urban space, containing security checkpoints and fortified zones to prevent such attacks.

There is no official confirmation of the perpetrator’s affiliation. Pakistani media has accused “Fitna al-Khawarij”, a term often applied to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which primarily operates in regions next to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The group has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Pakistan’s major cities, including a 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, a 2017 suicide bombing in Lahore, and a 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Karachi. The group has previously targeted Islamabad, attempting a suicide bombing in Islamabad’s government district in December 2022. In August 2025, Pakistan’s intelligence agency announced that it foiled a planned TTP suicide car bombing. Early assessment suggests that the TTP are the most likely perpetrators of the Islamabad District Judicial Court bombing, although there are multiple other terrorist threat actors present in Pakistan.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has also claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the country. PBIEDs are often used by the group; however, most of ISKP’s attacks have taken place in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the group has not previously targeted Islamabad. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is also active in Balochistan, with typical targets including Pakistani security forces, infrastructure projects, and government installations in the Balochistan region.

The attack comes amid heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamabad has frequently accused the Afghan Taliban-led government of allowing TTP militants safe havens across the border, from which attacks are launched into Pakistan. Recent tensions escalated into airstrikes conducted by Pakistan on TTP targets in Kabul on 15 October, following TTP raids on Pakistani military posts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that killed 11 on 11 October.

If confirmed to be TTP, already high tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan will highly likely further increase. There is a realistic possibility that Pakistan will conduct further cross-border strikes into Afghanistan targeting TTP hideouts. Additionally, Islamabad may suspend ongoing diplomatic engagement, fully close partially open border crossings, and/or impose further travel restrictions on Afghan nationals.

Islamabad has also frequently blamed New Delhi for supporting the TTP as a proxy to destabilise Pakistan, and Pakistani media have accused the perpetrators of the attack of being “India-backed”. There is a realistic possibility that protests will occur close to the High Commission of India in Islamabad, although demonstrations are generally restricted inside the diplomatic zone and are likely to be met with a heavy security presence.

A heightened security presence across major cities in Pakistan is highly likely, with increased security checkpoints and road closures. Heightened security will highly likely lead to increased travel disruptions in the short term. Intensified security operations in the border regions, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and/or Balochistan, are highly likely.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Red Fort, also known as the Lal Qila, is a Mughal-era fort located in the old city and is a popular tourist destination with heavy foot traffic. The location of the blast in the area and near a traffic hub likely suggests that, if the explosion is terrorism-related, its perpetrators sought to maximise civilian casualties while also obtaining maximum visibility for their actions.

While a possible terrorist link has not been confirmed by authorities as of the time of reporting, the incident occurred only hours after two separate terror plots were reportedly thwarted by Indian authorities. On the night of 9-10 November, Indian police reported the arrest of seven individuals in Faridabad, part of the Delhi National Capital Region, who were reportedly found in possession of approximately 360 kilograms of explosive material and a “large cache of arms and ammunition”. Authorities reported that the suspects were linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a separatist-Islamist group based in Kashmir.

On 9 November, three individuals were arrested in Gujarat and found in possession of several firearms and approximately 4 kilograms of ricin precursors. Indian authorities have suggested that they had had links with an Afghanistan-based operative of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). In late October, Indian authorities had already arrested two suspected ISKP-linked operatives for planning attacks in New Delhi on Diwali.

If the Red Fort blast is confirmed as terrorism, there is a realistic possibility that the attack is linked to the reported foiled plots, with the perpetrators seeking to quickly conduct an attack due to the increased threat of discovery. Moreover, confirmation of an act of terrorism, particularly if linked to JeM, would highly likely increase tensions between India and Pakistan.

Transport disruptions are highly likely following the blast, with potential closures to the metro and likely road closures in the area. Furthermore, there is highly likely to be a heightened security presence in Delhi and other major cities, with increased checkpoints.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

While the organisers of the march to Novi Sad have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to peaceful protest, the possibility of political violence on 31 October and 1 November cannot be ruled out. The past twelve months of anti-government protests have significantly deepened divisions in Serbia’s political landscape, and there have been repeated cases of targeted attacks against anti-government protesters during past demonstrations. Moreover, the anniversary falls only days after a shooting occurred outside the Serbian parliament, in an area where supporters of the president had erected an improvised “encampment”. The shooting injured one, and Vučić described it as a “terrorist attack”.

Should the protests turn violent, Serbian police are likely to use heavy-handed crowd control measures such as pepper spray, tear gas, stun grenades and water cannons. These tactics have previously intensified unrest, with their use during past demonstrations often provoking larger turnouts, escalating clashes, and fuelling public anger over perceived police brutality.

While the main rallying point for the demonstrators will be the vicinity of the Novi Sad train station, the protests are likely to create disruptions throughout the city’s centre. In past demonstrations, protesters blocked the city’s main bridges over the Danube, as well as the main roadways leading to and from the city. Even in the absence of violent unrest, the protests are likely to result in traffic disruptions in and around Novi Sad.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Despite President Jerí announcing that the death of the protester would be “objectively investigated” and that they would face the “full force of the law”, the killing of Ruiz has almost certainly deepened anti-government sentiment and inflamed protests. This has been further exacerbated by President Jerí’s refusal to step down amid escalating pressure from Peru’s parliament.

The state of emergency will likely be imposed to quell civil unrest over the weekend. Previous bouts of civil unrest in the country, such as the December 2022 to March 2023 demonstrations against the removal of Former President Pedro Castillo from office, have led to the government imposing similar states of emergency.

Under the expanded powers, the government will highly likely deploy military forces, impose curfews, and conduct mass arrests. The state of emergency imposed in 2022 failed to deal with the civil unrest, instead resulting in alleged human rights abuses, such as the use of live ammunition against protesters and forced disappearances; protests continued for months, inflamed by the perceived excessive force used by security forces.

It is likely that a state of emergency resulting in harsher measures by security forces will exacerbate protests. Demonstrations are highly likely over the weekend and into next week.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The anniversary of the 7 October attack will likely result in an increased risk of civil unrest and terrorism, particularly in Western Europe. This will highly likely be particularly severe in the countries that have had recent large-scale ‘Global Sumud Flotilla’ protests, particularly Italy, France, Spain, Germany and the UK, as protest organisers seek to maximise pressure on their governments and capitalise on the large attendance during the previous demonstrations.

Civil unrest is highly likely to consist of both large-scale demonstrations and small-scale targeted direct actions meant to affect local transport and services. The former are highly likely to target high-visibility areas like the vicinity of Israeli diplomatic offices, local government buildings, and the headquarters of companies perceived to be supporting the Israeli war effort.

A common tactic seen in previous protests is the blockade of main roadways, such as the ring roads that surround most large European cities. In terms of direct action, protesters may seek to carry out targeted acts of vandalism against private and public assets, and particularly company offices, or blockades of public transport hubs, such as train and metro stations and airports. While lower, the threat of more sophisticated acts aimed at causing disruptions, such as the targeting of electrical infrastructure or the use of drones to disrupt airport operations, cannot be ruled out.

The increased likelihood of terrorism on 7 October is driven by the date’s symbolic importance. In addition to the thwarted plot in Germany in early October 2025, there have been several foiled or successful terrorist attacks in Europe and North America, which have coincided with notable dates associated with Judaism or Israeli history. This most recently occurred with the 2 October Manchester synagogue stabbing attack on Yom Kippur, which killed two people and was perpetrated by a highly likely self-radicalised “lone wolf” inspired by extremist Islamist ideology.

While 7 October 2025 remains the most high-risk date for both civil unrest and terrorism, the threat is likely to remain elevated in the short term following the attack anniversary. Protests are highly likely to occur on the 10-13 October period, the first weekend following the anniversary and the second anniversary of the beginning of the Israeli invasion of Gaza. Moreover, ongoing significant developments in negotiations between Hamas and Israel are highly likely to serve as triggers for demonstrations.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The protests, Morocco’s largest in years, come amid widespread youth frustrations with unemployment, education, and healthcare. According to the national statistics agency, Morocco has an unemployment rate of 12.8 per cent, with youth unemployment standing at 35.8 per cent, and 19 per cent among graduates. The protests have targeted the government, which is perceived as neglecting public services while investing billions of dollars into football infrastructure ahead of hosting the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations and co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

The catalyst for the public anger was the deaths of eight pregnant women in the maternity ward of a public hospital in Agadir following caesarean operations in September, which had initially sparked smaller-scale protests. According to the World Health Organisation, Morocco has fewer than eight doctors per 10,000 people, far below the recommended 25.

The government’s appeal for dialogue is unlikely to appease protesters in the short term. The civil unrest likely constitutes a culmination of public anger after years of neglect in public services, a state of affairs unlikely to be quickly remedied. The government statement defended the security forces’ crackdown, praising the “balanced reaction of security authorities in line with relevant legal procedures”. This will highly likely further inflame the unrest, with the van ramming being widely shared across social media. The further deaths of protesters on 1 October will almost certainly add to protester anger, likely sustaining the civil unrest.

The Gen Z 212 movement, which emerged in the weeks prior, has rapidly gained traction across social media. The “212” almost certainly refers to Morocco’s country code, suggesting that organisers view themselves as part of a broader youth-driven movement. The demonstrations share key traits with other Gen Z-led protests in the region: mobilisation through online platforms, an explicitly leaderless structure, and a lack of formal ties to political parties.

These protests are highly likely inspired by similar youth movements, including the recent Nepalese unrest that overthrew the government, as well as ongoing mobilisation across Africa, notably in Kenya and, most recently, Madagascar. It is highly likely that the global surge in youth protests will lead to further civil unrest across many other African countries, where economic frustrations, such as unemployment and a rising cost of living, are similarly felt among the population, particularly Gen Z.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The two planned events will likely exacerbate security threats and result in disruption during the day. The marches are scheduled to begin on opposite sides of the Thames and converge in Whitehall. While the Metropolitan Police will likely be able to secure the two marches’ route and prevent the two sides from coming into contact in Whitehall, there is a realistic possibility of occasional clashes between dispersed groups of protesters throughout the day, and particularly near public transport hubs that both marches’ attendees will likely have to use to reach the assembly points.

Note that several major football games will be held in London on 13 September. This will likely further stretch the resources of the Metropolitan Police and is likely to further exacerbate the threat of dispersed violence and clashes during the day, with public transport hubs again being particularly at risk.

The threat of clashes is likely to be highest before 11:00 local time and in the late afternoon, after the end of the rallies and the football games.

Finally, there is a remote possibility of more serious political violence occurring in connection with the event. While not directly linked with it, the march is scheduled to take place only days after the assassination of a prominent American right-wing political commentator. The killing has resulted in a surge in calls for political violence on English-speaking social media, targeting prominent right-wing and left-wing figures, as well as activists.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The protests follow a period of worsening relations between Israel and the United Kingdom, linked with the ongoing war in Gaza. Recent developments in both Gaza and the United Kingdom are likely to exacerbate the protests. First, on 6 September, UK police carried out around 900 arrests at a pro-Palestine demonstration in central London, with the majority of the arrested being accused of supporting a proscribed terror group, Palestine Action. Second, on 9 September, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) issued evacuation orders for the entirety of Gaza City, in preparation for a large-scale offensive meant to occupy the city. Third, Israel launched a series of high-profile airstrikes in Doha on 9 September targeting Hamas’ exiled leadership, a move that has been widely condemned by the international community.

The Metropolitan Police will likely be able to secure the areas of Whitehall and St James’s Square during the scheduled meeting, and the protests are likely to remain peaceful. However, the unrest is highly likely to result in transport disruptions in the nearby areas, particularly affecting the nearby public transport system. Cases of sporadic violence and vandalism, particularly targeting large multinational companies linked to Israel, cannot be discounted. Direct action-style protests, including road and public transport blockades, remain likely during the 10-11 September period.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The attack is unprecedented and almost certainly a significant escalation with ramifications across the Arabian Peninsula. The most immediate ramifications are highly likely to be a dramatic breakdown in ceasefire negotiations, condemnation from the Gulf States, and increased civil unrest in urban centres globally.

Since 2012, Qatar has hosted the Hamas political leadership in exile. It has been this external leadership that has engaged in ceasefire negotiations with Israel, facilitated by international mediators, which have included Qatar. It is almost certain that the attack marks an end to this arrangement. The impact of this is twofold: first, the previously ongoing ceasefire negotiations are likely to completely collapse, given that the Hamas negotiating team has reportedly been largely killed. Second, power within Hamas will likely further concentrate within on-the-ground militants in the Gaza Strip, who have been more hardline and less amenable to any potential diplomacy.

Qatar is a major non-NATO ally of the US, hosting the Al-Udeid Air Base, which is currently the largest US military installation in the Middle East. According to a senior Israeli official talking to Israeli media, US President Donald Trump gave the green light for the Israeli strike in Qatar. Just days prior, on 7 September, Trump issued a “last warning” to Hamas to accept a deal to release all the hostages. If Washington’s approval of the strike is confirmed, the attack almost certainly follows the previous ultimatum, and it is likely that there will be major diplomatic ramifications among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While Qatar’s relations with other GCC states have previously experienced significant strain, it is almost certain that GCC states will strongly condemn the attack.

It is highly likely that civil unrest will result from the attack. Pro-Palestine protests will likely be organised outside Israeli and US embassies across the Middle East, and protests will also highly likely be organised in major European and US cities.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The general strike will almost certainly result in severe transport and service disruptions across France. Rail travel, particularly services transiting through Paris, is highly likely to be affected by severe delays. Travel to and from the country’s main airports, including Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG/LFPG), Paris Orly (ORY/LFPO), Lyon Saint Exupéry (LYS/LFLL), and Nice-Côte d’Azur (NCE/LFMN), is also likely to be affected.

Flight operations at the main international airports are almost certainly to be impacted by the strike. According to available projections from local media, flight cancellations on the two strike days will total between 25 and 40 per cent of all flights, with average delays of around 90 minutes. A drop in operations at the key international flight hubs will highly likely impact smaller airports, further disrupting domestic flights.

While the organisers have pledged to carry out the strike despite the collapse of the Bayrou government, the scope and intensity of the strike action will highly likely be heavily influenced by President Emmanuel Macron’s decision on how to respond to the government crisis. LFI has called for new elections, as have several other left parties and the far-right National Rally (RN). However, such a move would likely be damaging for the already-weakened centre coalition that supports Macron, who may therefore opt to instead appoint a new prime minister. Such a move would almost certainly result in violent anti-government unrest in the short term, particularly in Paris.

Violent cases of unrest are likely. These will likely include sabotage and vandalism, particularly aimed at government offices and properties operated by multinational companies. Direct action groups may also target public infrastructure, as observed on the eve of the 2024 Paris Olympics. French police often respond violently to large protests, deploying pepper spray, tear gas, water cannons, and other crowd control tools. It is highly likely that clashes between the police and protesters will occur during the strike days, particularly in Paris and other large urban centres.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The protests occur amid broader frustration with a lack of access to basic healthcare, food insecurity, and shortages of essential medications. The population’s economic insecurity has been exacerbated by frequent flash flooding in recent months. In July and August, heavy floods impacted Nepal, disrupting trade and damaging hydropower plants. Members of the government, in contrast, are perceived to be living in luxury. Nepal is ranked 107 out of 180 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, with frequent corruption scandals and legal retaliation against journalists.

The government’s decision to ban 26 major social media and online platforms has almost certainly been perceived as government overreach and an attempt to introduce censorship. Approximately half of Nepal’s population uses these platforms, and usage is disproportionate among Gen-Z. Communication apps like WhatsApp are also heavily relied on to communicate both within Nepal and to diaspora communities abroad. Unless repealed, these restrictions will almost certainly continue to fuel resentment towards the government.

VPN usage in Nepal has increased markedly since the 4 September ban on online platforms. This has enabled a partial circumvention of the ban. The government has warned against the indiscriminate use of VPNs and has hinted at restricting VPN usage. Should the government impose restrictions on VPN usage, it is highly likely that protest movements will intensify.

Restrictions on social media and online platforms will likely reduce the spread of disinformation and limit the ability of protest groups to coordinate online. However, the move will also likely obfuscate the true scale, size, and nature of the protests, restricting independent reporting and situational awareness for anyone in-country. Potential information gaps will likely increase reliance on state narratives, with limited opportunities for independent verification.

The use of rubber bullets against journalists will almost certainly portray security forces as using excessive force to quell dissent. The death of a protester will highly likely further exacerbate protests. The endorsement of the protests by prominent people, including key political figures, is likely to provide the protest with a degree of legitimacy and could provide the movement with some form of leadership, dynamics that could sustain the momentum of current protests.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Afghanistan is prone to large earthquakes, particularly in the Hindu Kush mountain range, where the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates meet. Aftershocks are highly likely in the next days to weeks. While most will likely be small-to-moderate (magnitude 3.0 to 4.0), further magnitude 5.0 or above earthquakes remain a realistic possibility and could result in significant damage.

Afghanistan is one of the least disaster-resilient countries in the world, and given the prevalence of unreinforced, non-earthquake-resilient buildings, even moderate aftershocks could trigger secondary collapses, complicate rescue operations, and result in further casualties.

Topography in the affected regions and adjoining Pakistani districts (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Lower Dir) makes landslides and rockfall a significant risk, particularly along river valleys and cut slopes. Slope failures could block roads, isolate impacted communities, and cause flooding if river channels are dammed.

Damage to water and sanitation networks will likely increase the likelihood of waterborne diseases, adding further strain on hospitals and clinics. Access constraints, including debris, landslides, damaged bridges, and the presence of non-state armed actors in parts of eastern Afghanistan, will almost certainly complicate the provision of humanitarian aid and disaster relief.

In Pakistan, while no significant damage has been recorded, localised infrastructure disruption in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, particularly temporary road closures and communications outages, is highly likely. An elevated landslide risk in hill districts following aftershocks or rainfall could further exacerbate the humanitarian situation following monsoon flooding. Furthermore, there will likely be congestion at the Torkham border crossing if humanitarian flows and medical referrals increase.

Access will likely be constrained in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, with debris-blocked roads, infrastructural damage, and continuing aftershocks and slope failures impeding ground movement on both sides of the border.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The current protests form part of a broader wave of anti-government sentiment in 2025, which has triggered sporadic civil unrest. Notably, student-led civil unrest targeting government austerity erupted on 17 February under the slogan #IndonesiaGelap (Dark Indonesia). Beginning on 25 August, the most recent demonstrations started following the publication of reports regarding a new monthly housing allowance for politicians, which is worth approximately 20 times Indonesia’s minimum wage. The publication has acted as a catalyst for broader anti-government sentiment centring on low wages, cuts to government funding, job cuts in the textile industry, government corruption, and the growing role of the military in civilian life, which have been sources of growing frustration among much of Indonesia’s population.

The perceived government failures are amid a background of economic uncertainty. Real wages have lagged behind inflation, contributing to shrinking real wages and a rising cost of living. This has been exacerbated by accelerating unemployment, with Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, which constituted 32 per cent of the country’s GDP in 2002, shrinking to just 19 per cent in 2024. In the first half of 2025, approximately 42,000 manufacturing workers were laid off. Furthermore, economic growth has slowed, dropping to 4.8 per cent in Q2 of 2025, the weakest pace in nearly four years and short of President Prabowo Subianto’s target of 8 per cent.

Social media has catalysed unrest, with footage of clashes spreading quickly and prompting further anti-government sentiment. The government has blamed online platforms for disinformation and has summoned representatives from several social media platforms, including Meta and TikTok. According to the deputy communications minister, the government will request that the platforms moderate their content. There is a realistic possibility that, should social media platforms refuse to impose strict content moderation measures, the government will impose social media blocks to prevent further anti-government sentiment from spreading. However, such measures would also likely significantly reduce situational awareness, limiting the ability to track the scale and location of protests in real-time.

Given the escalation in demonstrations, particularly since 28 August, it is highly likely that they will continue over the weekend. While there is a realistic possibility that this could subside in early September, the police’s continued use of force and any potential investigation into police brutality will likely trigger further unrest. There is a realistic possibility that the government will attempt to placate protesters by imposing policies centred on curbing corruption and austerity measures, although minor concessions are unlikely to quell current or prevent further demonstrations.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The earthquake is the joint sixth-largest recorded globally since 1900, and the strongest since Japanʼs 2011 magnitude 9.0 Tohoku earthquake. The Kamchatka Peninsula is situated along the seismically active Pacific Ring of Fire, a horseshoe-shaped tectonic belt which spans most of the coastal Pacific and is responsible for approximately 90 per cent of the worldʼs earthquakes.

The shallow depth of the earthquake is a key cause of the extensive tsunami threat. The effects of tsunamis will almost certainly depend on the disaster resilience of the countries affected. Hawaii and Japan, two locations anticipated to experience the greatest tsunami impact, both have comprehensive disaster preparedness measures which have highly likely mitigated the potential impact.

In Japan, the suspension of high-speed rail, mass evacuations, emergency broadcasting, and automated sea gates have all contributed towards a low risk to life as of the time of writing. In Hawaii, the rapid issuance of evacuation orders and pre-emptive measures to protect critical infrastructure, such as the shutting down of water supply valves, have likewise considerably reduced the risk to life. The effectiveness of the evacuation orders in Hawaii has been notable, particularly in contrast with the emergency communications system failures that exacerbated the impact of the 2023 Maui wildfires.

In multiple areas with issued tsunami warnings, the level of disruption is high, with significant air travel disruption, high levels of traffic congestion, and the sudden suspension of business activity.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

While the price increase was proposed on 1 July, which has triggered weekly protests, the taxi strike almost certainly acted as a catalyst for Angolan citizens to vent their broader frustrations against the government. The ruling party, People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), has been in power since 1975 and has been facing increasing opposition. Angola’s economy is heavily reliant on oil, which accounts for approximately 90 per cent of export revenues. Global price fluctuations in recent years have triggered high inflation, rising food and transport costs in a country where the average monthly wage is just USD 75.

Angola has a large youth population who are experiencing widespread unemployment and are driving the current wave of unrest. Approximately 65 per cent of Angola’s population is under the age of 24, and only 2 per cent of its population is aged over 65. Social media almost certainly constitutes a tool for organising demonstrations and could be blocked by the government in an attempt to quell the unrest.

Civil unrest will highly likely continue on 30 July, which will be the third and final day of the originally planned taxi driver strike. The forceful reaction from security forces almost certainly aims to deter further protests. However, this could have the adverse effect of further inflaming demonstrations, particularly if footage of violence perpetrated by security forces is widely shared on social media.