On 5 March, Nepalese citizens will vote to elect all 275 members of the House of Representatives (HR), the lower house of the Federal Parliament of Nepal. The elections were announced on 12 September 2025 by the President of Nepal on the recommendation of the government of Nepal, following widespread anti-government demonstrations, which resulted in the formal dissolution of the HR.

The election will take place under two ballots, one to elect 165 members from single-member constituencies via first-past-the-post, and another to elect the remaining 110 members via party-list proportional representation. A party, or coalition, must receive at least three per cent of the votes to be allocated a seat in the proportional vote. Nearly 19 million people are registered to vote, including 915,000 first-time voters, more than two-thirds of whom belong to Gen Z.

Approximately 3,500 candidates from 68 different parties, plus independents, are set to take part in the election. There have been no widely published and credible national opinion polls projecting party vote share. However, based on the previous election in 2022 and the seats held at the time of dissolution, there are five major contenders, representing the entire political spectrum, from communist parties to right-wing pro-monarchist parties.

ASSESSMENT

Nepal’s parliament was formally dissolved on 12 September following widespread youth-led anti-government protests, which began on 8 September. The Gen Z-led demonstrations were triggered by the government’s decision to restrict 26 social media and online platforms after they failed to register within a seven-day deadline. The protests quickly escalated into a broader anti-corruption movement, with mass demonstrations in Kathmandu and several other cities. The protests resulted in the burning down of Nepal’s parliament building and widespread clashes with police and security forces, who responded with live ammunition. In total, an estimated 76 people were killed, and over 2,000 injuries were recorded. In response to the unrest, the military imposed a curfew, ending the violence. The demonstrations triggered a lifting of the social media ban and the resignation of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli.

Following the dissolution of parliament, the military coordinated with youth representatives, who discussed the appointment of an interim prime minister on a Discord server with over 100,000 members. The members settled on former chief justice Sushila Karki, who became the first female prime minister of Nepal and was given the mandate to lead a transitional government, oversee the restoration of order after unrest, and organise fresh general elections by March 2026. Karki has agreed to step down following the vote.

The election will almost certainly represent a contest between older established parties, such as NC, CPN-UML, and NCP, and newer youth-oriented parties such as RSP. Among Nepal’s established parties, older candidates over 40 dominate nomination lists, which contrasts with Nepal’s electorate, 52 per cent of whom are aged between 18 and 40. The established parties largely retain support from rural voters, older citizens, longstanding party loyalists, public sector workers, and patronage-dependent constituencies. The established parties have attempted to expand their appeal to Nepal’s youth through social media engagement, having historically failed to resonate with young voters, who perceive the parties as mired in entrenched corruption, dynastic politics, unrepresentative of younger voters, and having limited internal democracy.

Despite the attraction of less-established parties and the power of the youth vote, NC and CPN-UML are the likeliest parties to win the most seats. Firstly, they are the only two parties fielding candidates in nearly all 165 constituencies. Secondly, an alliance of NC and CPN-UML won convincingly in the National Assembly election on 25 January 2026, with NC winning nine seats and CPN-UML winning eight, out of the total 18 contested seats. Moreover, the fact that 68 total parties are contesting the election means seat fragmentation is the likeliest outcome, which typically benefits parties with the broadest base.

RSP is positioned as a key challenger, appealing to Nepal’s large youth base, but its vote share in the 2022 election was 10.7 per cent, compared to NC and CPN-UML’s 25.7 and 27 per cent, respectively, meaning it would need more than double its vote share to realistically compete. The monarchist RPP won 5.6 per cent of the vote and is unlikely to be a major challenger; however, recent pro-monarchy protests may indicate that it will increase its vote share.

It is highly unlikely that any single party will secure the 138 seats required for a majority in the 275-member HR, suggesting that a hung parliament is the most probable outcome. Consequently, some form of coalition-building will be required, potentially involving ideologically incongruous parties and controversial nominations. Such coalition-building is unlikely to have broad public appeal, especially given long-standing frustration with elite power-sharing arrangements, opportunistic alliances, and the role of patronage politics.

Sporadic violence is highly likely around the election. On 9 February, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) issued a warning declaring that “[t]here is a risk of protests, political violence and travel disruption ahead of the general election scheduled for 5 March 2026.” Extra security forces have been drafted to ensure order, with around 300,000 officers and temporary election police deployed as campaigning began on 16 February.

In Nepal’s 2022 elections, clashes occurred around polling centres across the country. In one instance, police opened fire during fighting at a polling station, killing one person. Explosions also occurred near polling stations in numerous districts, although no one was injured, suggesting the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were intended for disruption and intimidation purposes. Similar incidents are highly likely in the upcoming elections, given the highly fragmented political landscape in Nepal and the long history of localised electoral violence.

The government has grouped polling centres based on risk level, classifying 3,680 as “highly sensitive”, 4,442 as “sensitive”, and 2,845 as “normal”. No “highly sensitive” polling stations are in Kathmandu and Bhaktapur; many are, instead, in more geographically remote areas, with Madhesh Province having the highest number. Three police officers and ten election police members will be deployed to the “highly sensitive” polling stations; three police officers and six election police will be deployed at “sensitive” polling stations; and two police officers and five election police will be deployed at “normal” polling stations.

One of the major lines of tension is between monarchists and republicans. On 18 February, former king Gyanendra Shah called for the election to be postponed, warning that the ongoing nationwide dissatisfaction could deepen political instability. Nepal experienced clashes between monarchist and republican protesters during large-scale pro-monarchy demonstrations in both 2023 and 2025. In both protests, mass arrests were made, and many people were injured, resulting in the security forces deploying tear gas and water cannon, as well as imposing curfews.

In November, over twenty youth-led monarchist groups submitted a memorandum calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Karki. Monarchist groups also engaged in demonstrations on 13 February, when thousands of monarchists rallied to greet Gyanendra Shah on his return from holiday, ignoring prohibitory orders around the airport. The calls from Gyanendra Shah to postpone the elections, alongside the recent history of violence between monarchists and republicans, almost certainly increase the risk of clashes around polling stations on 5 March.

There is also a realistic possibility of civil unrest following the publishing of election results. Former Prime Minister Oli of the CPN-UML, who was ousted in the youth-led unrest in September 2025, could be elected again due to the party’s historical dominance and broad voter base. If CPN-UML fail to appeal to Nepal’s youth, they will likely perceive Oli’s potential return to office as a reversal of the September uprising. Furthermore, many remain dissatisfied with the lack of accountability for the excessive force used by security forces, the perceived impunity for political elites, and unfulfilled reform expectations, and some groups oppose the election itself, arguing that the interim government has “betrayed” the September revolt.

On 12 February, over 127 million Bangladeshi citizens will be eligible to cast their votes for the first time since the 2024 July Revolution, which toppled the 15-year government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League (AL) party. Voters will elect 300 members of the Jatiya Sangsad, the 350-member national parliament. The remaining 50 parliament seats are reserved for women and are assigned proportionally by the other MPs. Voters will also decide on the July Charter, a constitutional reform framework agreed upon by 30 parties following the uprising.

Dozens of parties have fielded more than 1,900 candidates to contest the 300 seats. However, the electoral campaign has evolved into a two-sided contest. On one side, the big-tent Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is leading the polls. Before the revolution, BNP was the main opposition party in Bangladesh. Since AL was banned in May 2025, BNP has managed to attract large swathes of supporters of the previous government.

Opposing it is a coalition, known as the “Like-minded 11 Parties” or “United Bangladesh”, founded in October 2025. The group is led by the other two major players in Bangladesh’s post-revolution political scene: the long-established Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which has emerged as a leading force on the right after years of marginalisation under Hasina, and the new, student-led National Citizen Party (NCP).

NCP, which was founded after the uprising, initially emerged as a reformist, progressive force. However, it has struggled to translate street support into electoral momentum. Its alliance with JI, which places it within a de facto right-wing Islamist coalition, has led to significant infighting, further weakening the party. In January 2026, 15 NCP party leaders resigned over the coalition deal.

Reflecting the high levels of insecurity, on 5 February the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) updated its Bangladesh travel advisory to recommend “against all but essential travel” to the country.

ASSESSMENT

The two votes are likely to be very differently contested. The referendum will highly likely return a resounding victory for the “Yes” vote, as the July Charter remains backed by all the major parties as well as the incumbent interim government. However, the parliamentary vote will likely be deeply competitive.

The failure of the NCP to organise effectively and to build a significant base of support has made it likely that the elections will be a contest between the BNP and JI. This dynamic is likely to be conducive to growing ideological polarisation and street violence. Throughout January 2026, several episodes of violent clashes between BNP, JI, and other parties’ canvassers have occurred across the country, injuring dozens of people.

A key test for the stability of post-electoral Bangladesh will be whether there is a general acceptance of the outcome of the 12 February vote. Several factors are likely to hinder such a scenario. First, current polls indicate a close contest between BNP and JI. There is a realistic possibility that polls will return a close or uncertain result, which could prolong the vote-counting period and delay the release of final tallies.

Second, several leaders have publicly warned of “plots” to doctor the results. These statements could constitute attempts to lay the foundations for a rejection of the vote as invalid. Finally, local media have reported on a growing spread of online disinformation targeting the election, often leveraging Artificial Intelligence-generated content. The spread of fake or misleading stories online has become a key driver of mob violence in Bangladesh and is likely to intensify during and after the vote.

Deep political polarisation and the spread of online disinformation have a realistic possibility of inciting “vigilante” violence by political activists targeting poll workers or voters during and after voting procedures. In the days immediately following the vote, further cases of mob violence targeting officials, candidates, and elected representatives, as well as inter-party clashes, remain likely. Attacks on foreigners, minorities, or foreign-owned businesses are also possible, particularly if claims of “foreign involvement” in the election were to spread online. For example, previous cases of mob violence have targeted American-owned businesses or businesses perceived to be pro-American or pro-Israeli.

In the medium term, instability and violence are likely to remain pervasive. The likelihood of further insecurity will largely depend on the parties’ acceptance of the election outcome. In a scenario where this occurs, possibly via a commitment by the parties to respect the electoral results, Bangladesh could reach a level of greater political stability. Pre-election commitments, however, would need to be paired with assurances that the new opposition will not be marginalised from the policymaking process. These dynamics would need to involve at least the three major parties, but could be extended to other key political players. This, of course, would not eliminate other pre-existing issues, such as the economic and labour-related challenges faced by Bangladesh, but would likely reduce the short-term threat of political violence.

A more likely scenario involves the elections resulting in protracted political instability. In this scenario, competition for control of the patronage networks left behind by AL’s collapse prevents the parties from reaching a meaningful agreement. Even if the central leadership acquiesces to a deal, local and student chapters, who are more dependent on local patronage networks, are likely to continue violently competing. Smaller groups marginalised under Hasina are expected to exploit the opportunities created by the revolution, but are likely to react negatively to any indication that they will continue to be excluded from any form of political influence.

In any scenario involving long-term political instability, economic instability is likely to deteriorate. Foreign direct investment (FDI) would likely decrease, especially in key industrial sectors, as investors delay commitments or reallocate capital to more stable markets and political environments in the region, such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam or Cambodia. In the fiscal quarter following the July Revolution in 2024, FDI inflows to Bangladesh dropped by 71 per cent, as investors avoided the country due to deadly political unrest, labour agitation and high degrees of political and economic uncertainty.

Failure to achieve any meaningful form of political stability or cohesion in Bangladesh is likely to reinforce the country’s economic and security issues. In turn, prolonged instability is conducive to worsening recurrent cycles of economic disruption, labour unrest, political violence, deteriorating crime rates and sectarian tensions, many of which remain unresolved.

On 8 February, Thai citizens will vote to elect members of the House of Representatives, the lower house of the National Assembly, following its dissolution in December 2025. 500 seats are up for election, with 400 chosen by constituency and the remaining 100 allocated to political parties in proportion to their nationwide vote share. 251 parliamentary votes are required to elect a prime minister, which is typically achieved through post-election coalition negotiations between multiple parties. The election must be certified within 60 days, by 9 April, and the parliament must convene within 15 days of election results being confirmed.

A referendum is also scheduled for the same day to determine whether to replace the current constitution, which was only enacted in 2017. Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled in September 2025 that drafting a new constitution requires three referendums. The first would approve the initiation of the drafting process; the second would focus on the draft’s key principles and approach; the third would constitute final approval of the draft.

57 parties have registered to take part in the election, but three main parties will be the primary contenders: the ruling conservative Bhumjaithai Party (BJT), the progressive reformist People’s Party (PP), and the populist Pheu Thai Party (PTP). Incumbent Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul is representing BJT. PP and PTP are the third incarnations of previous parties dissolved by the Thai courts for legal or technical breaches.

ASSESSMENT

Thailand’s current constitution was adopted in 2017 following a political crisis, which led to the removal of Yingluck Shinawatra in a military coup in 2014. As it was drafted under a military junta, the current constitution was approved in a tightly controlled referendum and is viewed as granting excessive power to the Senate, which has the authority to approve the prime minister and members of numerous independent bodies, including the Thai Constitutional Court. Many Thais view the constitution as imposed rather than chosen and have demanded reforms.

The election is taking place amid a broader political crisis. The border dispute with Cambodia, which led to direct fighting in July and December 2025, triggered the expulsion of former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra (niece of Yingluck and daughter of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, both members of PTP or one of its predecessors) after she expressed deference to the Cambodian former leader Hun Sen and criticised the Thai military in a leaked phone call.

Her successor, Anutin Charnvirakul, who took power in September, has faced heavy criticism over his minority government’s handling of the flooding in southern Thailand in November, which left at least 176 people dead. Adding to this was PP’s pulling of support from the BJP and its looming vote of no confidence over its alleged failure to honour promises to reform the constitution, compelling Anutin to dissolve parliament and call a general election in December.

A coalition government is the expected outcome of the election, with no party likely to win an outright majority. According to recent polling by Suan Dusit, respondents to a 28 January poll backed BJP by 21.14 per cent, PP by 21.11 per cent, and PTP by 17.56 per cent. 23.85 per cent of respondents were “still undecided”, suggesting that there could be a large disparity in electoral results from the polling. In a 6-9 January poll, PP leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut was the top choice for prime minister for 31.99 per cent, with PTP leader Yodchanan Wongsawat second on 17.45 per cent, and the incumbent Anutin third on 15.14 per cent. However, BJP’s polling has likely been inflated by a surge in nationalism linked to the ongoing Thailand-Cambodia border dispute and could diminish in the lead-up to the election, should the current ceasefire continue to hold.

Despite its popularity in the polls, PP faces potential legal action from the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) that could bar dozens of its members from running for attempting to amend Article 112 of the Criminal Code, Thailand’s royal insult (lèse-majesté) law, in 2021. The amendment sought to reduce penalties, narrow who could file complaints, and limit what constitutes an offence. While procedurally lawful within parliament, the proposal was later characterised by opponents as an abuse of office and an act undermining the constitutional order.

In the 2023 election, PP’s progenitor party, Move Forward, which openly campaigned on amending Article 112, won 151 seats in parliament, the most votes of any party, but was blocked from power by lawmakers tied to the royalist military due to its support for the amendment. Its prime ministerial candidate, Pita Limjaroenrat, was subsequently suspended from parliament and later barred from politics after Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled that his candidacy violated electoral law, effectively preventing him from assuming office.

Since then, PP has moderated its position during this electoral campaign, dropping the call to change Article 112 and softening its stance on the military, which it previously wanted to drive out of politics. Even so, PP’s historical backing of the amendment almost certainly exposes the party to political pressure and, in extremis, potential bans from candidacy.

Should PP receive the most votes but be barred from candidacy, widespread protests are highly likely, as was observed in 2023. These would highly likely be led by the Thai youth, who make up a large part of the reformist parties’ support base. Previous bouts of major unrest mixed with institutional paralysis have triggered coups from Thailand’s powerful military on numerous occasions. This is unlikely to occur again in the short-term due to independent mechanisms typically now being preferred tools for managing political crises in Thailand in an effort to increase democratic legitimacy. However, if protests become widespread, violent, and sustained, with a political deadlock over the election winner, this would highly likely increase the risk of a coup.

Large-scale unrest is not the only potential physical risk likely to increase in Thailand during the electoral campaign. Thailand has been experiencing an ongoing separatist insurgency since 2004 in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla. Insurgents have traditionally increased attacks during electoral cycles to undermine the central government and achieve maximum publicity for their cause. In 2023, insurgents set fire to cell phone towers and tyres across Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces. During the election periods in 2011 and 2014, insurgent activity increased around polling and campaigning phases, marked by attacks on infrastructure, local officials, and security forces.

On 11 January 2026, a series of coordinated bomb and arson attacks targeted PTT petrol stations across Thailand’s Deep South, injuring at least four. A member of the largest insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), has since declared that the group is “likely to conduct attacks like arson, shootings and bombings to remind political parties of their demands” around the general election. Further attacks in the run-up to the election are likely, with incidents likely to be contained to the southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla, and designed to generate publicity and exert political pressure, rather than cause mass casualties. However, attacks on Thai Buddhists, state officials, military personnel, police officers, and local Muslims perceived as cooperating with the authorities have increased in recent years, and there is a realistic possibility that more hardline elements of the insurgency will conduct more deadly attacks during the electoral period.

Costa Rica will hold general elections on 1 February to elect the president, the two vice presidents, and the 57 members of the Legislative Assembly. To be elected president, a candidate must secure at least 40 per cent of the vote in the first round. If that does not occur, the two candidates who received the most votes will compete in a run-off election on 5 April. If multiple candidates cross the 40 per cent threshold, the one who receives the most votes is elected president in the first round. Legislative Assembly seats are assigned via proportional representation across the country’s seven electoral districts.

Current polls indicate that Minister of National Planning and Economic Policy Laura Fernández Delgado is a clear favourite to win the first round. Polling from 21 January suggests she is approaching the critical 40 per cent mark, providing her with a realistic possibility of securing an outright first-round victory if current support levels are maintained. Fernández is running for the right-wing populist Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO), which was only founded in 2022. She also has the backing of incumbent President Rodrigo Chaves, who is currently an independent and barred from running for re-election.

Several candidates are competing for a possible second spot in the runoff, although they are all polling below double digits. They include: Álvaro Ramos Chaves, of the centrist National Liberation Party (PLN), Fabricio Alvarado, an Evangelical singer who heads the conservative New Republic Party (PNR), Claudia Dobles Camargo, the former first lady of Costa Rica who is supported by the centre-left National Democratic Agenda (AND) coalition, and Ariel Robles Barrantes, of the democratic socialist Broad Front (FA).

ASSESSMENT

The elections occur at a time of increasing political turmoil in Costa Rica. President Chaves is currently involved in a conflict with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and has survived two attempts to strip his electoral immunity over suspected electoral violations. This instability was highlighted on 19 January, when the head of Costa Rica’s intelligence agency reported that it had received information about a plot to assassinate Chaves ahead of the vote, although the activist who was accused has denied the allegations and suggested they were politically motivated.  

Moreover, the crime rate has increased significantly, which has largely been attributed to the spread of transnational organised criminal groups since the late 2010s. In 2023, the murder rate reached 17.2 per 100,000, around 40 per cent higher than its previous peak in 2017. Increasing crime rates have resulted in growing public scepticism towards the political class. According to polls, large sections of the electorate have become disillusioned with the existing parties, with up to half of voters still undecided regarding their preferred candidate.

Law and order and the fight against corruption are highly likely to be the main issues during the electoral campaign, mirroring patterns observed in other Latin American states. In countries like Chile, Honduras, and Ecuador, leaders have increasingly responded to these concerns with promises to implement Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) policies. Such policies have been characterised by mass detentions, increased police powers, and the curtailing of civil liberties. Mano Dura’s application by the government of El Salvador, which resulted in a sharp decrease in the violent crime rate, has become a model for other Latin American nations seeking to combat organised crime.

Fernández, expanding on Chaves’s positions, has pledged to implement Mano Dura in Costa Rica, vowing to build a “maxi-prison” like El Salvador’s CECOT facility, curtail civil rights in high-crime areas, and extradite Costa Ricans involved in organised crime to other countries, especially the US. These hardline stances, combined with Chaves’s enduring popularity (likely bolstered by the president’s clash with the legal “establishment”, have likely solidified Fernández’s primacy in the polls.

Still, Fernández’s victory, while highly likely due to the significant divisions within the opposition, is not certain. If the vote goes to a runoff, her competitor will almost certainly have an opportunity to unify at least part of this fragmented vote. However, the low levels of disillusionment within the electorate may make a significant swing in support between the two rounds unlikely.

Costa Rica has a long history of stable and peaceful political transitions. However, the country has had occasional waves of large-scale unrest, which have at times turned violent. The latest occurred in 2018, when labour unions staged a three-month strike over a proposed tax reform. The strike was marked by widespread and sometimes violent clashes between authorities and the protesters, as well as multiple incidents of vandalism.

It is unlikely that the upcoming vote itself will trigger large-scale violent unrest in Costa Rica. However, persistent political tensions, particularly the unresolved dispute between the executive and the TSE, could become catalysts for broader instability depending on the policies adopted by the incoming administration in its early months. The potential and controversial implementation of Mano Dura–style security measures is likely to result in significant division. While rising crime rates and the threats associated with transnational organised crime groups will almost certainly be leveraged to justify their implementation, for many, such draconian policies will likely be interpreted as a state overreach in a country that has traditionally championed democratic institutions and civil liberties, and which has historically been less affected by violent crime than many of its Central American neighbours.

On 18 January, Portuguese citizens will vote to elect their new President for a five-year term. The winning candidate needs to obtain a majority of 50 per cent of votes plus one. If that fails to occur, then the two leading candidates will compete in a run-off vote on 8 February. The incumbent President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, in office since 2016, is constitutionally barred from seeking a third consecutive term.

Portugal is a semi-presidential republic, and the president, while mostly holding ceremonial responsibilities, has some tangible political power (unlike, for example, the heads of state of Italy and Germany). For example, the president has the authority to veto laws and appoints not only the prime minister, but also other members of government.

Eleven official candidates are contesting for the presidency. A first-round victory seems highly unlikely, and current polls indicate that only five of the candidates have a realistic possibility of progressing to the second round. André Ventura, the founder of the far-right nationalist party Chega! (CH) leads the polls with approximately 19.5 per cent support. Marques Mendes, the candidate of the governing centre-right Social Democrat Party (PSD), polls at 19 per cent. António José Seguro, of the Socialist Party (PS), has around 17.5 per cent support, as does Henrique Gouveia e Melo, an “outsider candidate” and former Chief of the Naval Staff who is running as an independent and has significant centre-right support. Finally, João Cotrim de Figueiredo, president of the Liberal Initiative (IL), polls at around 16.5 per cent.

ASSESSMENT

The elections are likely to be a crucial test for Chega that could accelerate the party’s political momentum. In May’s parliamentary elections, Chega won 22.8 per cent of the vote, improving on its 2024 result and becoming the main opposition force in parliament. On the other hand, Chega was generally seen as having underperformed at the October 2025 local elections, only winning in three municipalities.

Securing the presidency would almost certainly grant Chega significant leverage over the governing PSD-led coalition. A Chega president could threaten to weaponise presidential veto powers to extract significant legislative concessions and shift the parliament to the right, encouraging PSD to work more often with Chega.

Holding the presidential office for five years is also an important political asset at a time of extreme parliamentary instability in Portugal. The 2025 vote was the third in three years, and the current governing coalition only retains a parliamentary minority. Finally, Chega’s position is further reinforced by Portugal’s lack of a developed cordon sanitaire system; the informal agreement that, in the parliaments of other European countries, such as France and Germany, centrist parties unite to keep the far-right out of power.

Current polls indicate that Ventura is likely to reach the second round. In other European head-to-head electoral contests involving a far-right candidate (such as, for instance, the second round of the 2022 French presidential elections), supporters of rival parties have typically coalesced around the leading alternative candidate to deny a far-right victory. However, several of the presidential candidates are from the right of the political spectrum, and if the choice is between Chega and the Socialist Party, Ventura’s chances will likely markedly increase, with right-leaning voters, not affected by a cordon sanitaire, potentially opting for Chega to block the left. On the other hand, a centre-right candidate may have a greater chance of winning centre-left voters by positioning themselves as a “lesser of two evils” against the far-right.

While presidential elections in Portugal seldom result in protests, a (likely) second round involving Ventura, which raises the possibility of a Chega head of state, would likely become an important cause of public opposition. Chega’s growth in the polls has meant that party rallies have increasingly been met by large counterprotests. Occasionally, as during the April 2025 Revolution Day celebrations in Lisbon, these demonstrations have escalated into clashes between opposing groups.

Furthermore, the likelihood of civil unrest after the first round of the elections is further increased by recent political developments in Portugal. In December, Portugal experienced its largest general strike in a decade, which forced the government to amend a labour reform package that opponents said reduced workers’ rights. Before the protests, the reform, proposed by the PSD coalition, was widely expected to be approved by parliament with Chega’s support. Chega representatives later backtracked and called on the government to amend the legislation as protests gained significant traction. Emboldened by their recent success, labour unions may stage further demonstrations, particularly if the runoff appears to be “tilted to the right”, for example, in a Ventura-Mendes scenario.

While large-scale protests cannot be ruled out, especially in Lisbon, protests after the first round are likely to be mostly peaceful and smaller-scale. On the other hand, direct action by groups opposing Chega is likely. This may include vandalism, particularly targeting party premises and police and government offices, and possibly small-scale political violence, such as clashes involving opposing political activists.

On 15 January, Ugandans will take part in general elections to elect the president and members of parliament. The president will be elected in a two-round system, with candidates requiring at least 50 per cent of the vote to be elected in the first round. The 529 members of the Ugandan Parliament will be elected via a first-past-the-post system. 146 seats are reserved for women, with one seat per district, and 30 seats are indirectly filled via special electoral colleges. 

Uganda’s Electoral Commission has cleared 27 parties to participate. Eight presidential candidates are competing. The 81-year-old Incumbent President Yoweri Museveni was declared the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party’s candidate and is seeking to extend his rule, which has been ongoing since 1986, to a seventh term. Opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi, popularly known as Bobi Wine of the National Unity Platform (NUP) is the primary opposition candidate.  

The lead-up to the elections has been characterised by intimidation, violence, and arrests targeting the opposition. Over 300 opposition supporters have been detained, with rallies being met by the police with tear gas, roadblocks, and arbitrary arrests. On 5 January 2026, Wine shared social media footage of security forces arresting and manhandling a journalist. This was the latest in a series of incidents involving heavy-handed tactics by security forces, typically against Wine supporters at his political rallies. Wine has claimed at least three deaths at his rallies at the hands of security forces, including one instance of a supporter being shot and another being hit by a military truck. In May 2025, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s son, who is likely being groomed as the next in line for the presidency, boasted of torturing Wine’s chief bodyguard. 

ASSESSMENT

Previous Ugandan elections have resulted in significant levels of violence. In November 2020, in the lead-up to the January 2021 general election, security forces arrested Wine, citing violations of COVID-19 protocols. Widespread protests erupted across Uganda, particularly in Kampala and other urban areas. Security forces cracked down on protests, deploying tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, and detaining approximately 3,000 people over the election period. 

In July 2024, young Ugandans engaged in anti-government protests in Kampala, largely inspired by similar youth-led movements in Kenya. Security forces quickly cracked down on demonstrations, detaining at least 100 protesters. Museveni, Africa’s third-longest-running leader, has cracked down on opposition in recent years, arresting and trying numerous opposition figures in military courts. Wine himself has been arrested multiple times since campaigning for the presidency, most recently in October 2023. 

A rising cost of living crisis, primarily driven by rising fuel and food costs, combined with perceptions of government corruption, has fuelled significant frustration among Uganda’s youth. If the election is perceived as unfree and unfair, or if the security forces use excessive or unwarranted force against the opposition, there is a realistic possibility that widespread unrest could break out. Security forces have historically cracked down on protesters with severe force and are highly likely to respond similarly to any unrest during the upcoming election. While the security crackdown acted as a deterrence to protesters in July 2024, Wine could act as a figurehead for post-election protests, potentially helping to sustain demonstrations despite the high likelihood of security force crackdowns. 

Despite the head of the Uganda Communications Commission’s (UCC) reassurance that reports of potential internet blackouts were “mere rumours”, internet blackouts are likely in the lead-up to the election. The government has already banned the sharing of live footage of riots, “unlawful processions”, and other violent incidents ahead of the election. Youth-led protests are generally heavily reliant on real-time updates, viral content, and livestreamed evidence of police brutality to sustain demonstrations. By cutting the internet, the government can disrupt protester coordination, prevent the documentation of abuses by security forces, isolate activists, and limit the spread of anti-government sentiment. During the 2021 election, during which widespread protests took place in Kampala, the internet was cut for four days.  

If civil unrest breaks out, demonstrations are likely around the Central Business District and near government buildings; during the July 2024 anti-corruption protests, groups marched through Kampala towards the parliament building but were blocked by the security forces. Large anti-government protests would highly likely result in travel disruptions, with security forces likely to use roadblocks to prevent protesters from accessing government buildings and diplomatic zones.  

Demonstrations and clashes with security forces broke out on 25 June in multiple cities in Kenya. The protests, which initially began in Nairobi, have now expanded to other cities including Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Nyahururu. According to Citizen TV, protests are also taking place in Eldoret, Kakamega, Narok, Busia, Makueni, Nyeri, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Machakos, Homa Bay, and Kirinyaga. Demonstrations are reportedly taking place in at least 20 of the country’s 47 counties. While precise numbers are unconfirmed, thousands of demonstrators have taken to the streets.

In Nairobi, large crowds have occupied parts of the Thika Road highway, and protesters have blocked streets in the Zimmerman area. Demonstrators are reportedly heading towards the city centre, highly likely aiming to reach the parliament. Security forces have deployed tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowds, particularly in the central business district and outside the city hall. One protester in the capital city was reported to be injured after being struck on the head by a tear gas canister and at least eight people have been shot, according to local news.

Reports from Matuu in Machakos County and Molo in Nakuru County indicate that police have opened fire on protesters, resulting in at least two deaths and several injuries in both locations. Eyewitnesses in Matuu claim that the violence occurred when protesters attempted to enter a police station.

The unrest has led to significant disruptions. Kenya Railways announced the suspension of commuter trains in Nairobi due to the ongoing protests. Additionally, the Kenyan government has taken steps to control the flow of information, with the Communications Authority ordering TV and radio stations to cease live broadcasts of the demonstrations.

Local NTV and KTN stations report that security forces raided their transmission centres and turned off their signals. NetBlocks has reported disruptions to the Telegram messaging service across Kenya, following a government ban on media platforms covering the protests live. Multi-media organisation The Standard Group has declared that it will continue to broadcast despite the attempted ‘news blackout’.

Opposition leaders Kalonzo Musyoka and Eugene Wamalwa have joined demonstrators in Nairobi, laying wreaths outside parliament in honour of those killed during demonstrations last year which killed an assessed 60 people. Former Chief Justice David Maraga is also taking part in the protests. They have called on police to exercise restraint and have condemned police brutality.

Major anti-gang protests in Haiti likely reflect a deteriorating humanitarian situation, which the gangs are likely attempting to exploit to increase the population’s dependence on them.

The Colombian government’s unilateral end to peace talks with the ELN almost certainly indicates an end to “total peace” and marks a significant shift in its policy towards rebel and criminal groups.  

The sentencing of far-right leader Marine Le Pen almost certainly deepens political tensions in France and is likely to increase the risk of political violence and unrest.

It is highly likely that Russia is exploiting poorly defined ceasefire terms and is delaying negotiations to pursue further territorial advances in Ukraine.

There is a realistic possibility that an Israeli strike on a Hezbollah external attack planner in Lebanon indicates a shift in Hezbollah’s strategy to target Israeli and Jewish interests abroad.

The Israeli establishment of a new operational corridor in Gaza is highly likely meant to isolate the remaining Hamas units. There is a realistic possibility of a growing consensus in Tel Aviv regarding annexing parts of Gaza.

It is likely that, due to its vulnerable position, Tehran will pursue a relatively cautious approach after Trump’s threats to bomb Iran. However, military escalation would likely force retaliation, threatening a regional conflict.

There is a realistic possibility that Uganda will support the newly formed Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR) in the DRC’s Ituri province, highly likely exacerbating humanitarian issues in the region.

Worst-case scenarios for an anticipated Nankai Trough megaquake in Japan predict mass casualties and the loss of almost half the country’s total GDP, almost certainly reaffirming the need for disaster planning.

Large-scale Chinese military drills around Taiwan are highly likely rehearsing a blockade of the island and almost certainly demonstrate the coordination of multiple PLA branches to conduct multi-domain operations.

On 2 April, thousands of Haitians protested in the capital, Port-au-Prince, to denounce a surge in gang violence. Protestors demonstrated outside of government buildings and demanded that the government do more to keep them safe.  Gunfire was exchanged between armed protesters and the police outside the offices of the prime minister and the transitional presidential council, resulting in many protestors fleeing the area.

The protests follow an increase in gang activity, which has involved gangs like the Viv Ansanm gang coalition attempting to move into new parts of the capital, where gangs are estimated to control 85 per cent. Recent gang activity has forced more than 60,000 people to flee their homes in one month alone, according to the UN’s International Organization for Migration.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Recent developments indicate that the gangs are attempting to expand their control and move out of their traditional areas of operations.  Increased attacks in the capital likely suggest that the gangs are attempting to secure the remaining 15 per cent of Port-au-Prince and isolate the government to just a few areas of the city.

The 2 April protests followed a gang attack on the central Haitian commune of Mirebalais on 31 March. During the Mirebalais attack, which has been linked to the Viv Ansanm gang coalition, a prison was targeted, and over 500 inmates were released, many of whom were likely immediately recruited by the gangs.

The attack in Mirebalais, approximately 60 kilometres northeast of the capital, may indicate that the gangs are attempting to assert control and expand their territory outside of Port-au-Prince. This strategy would likely provide several benefits for the gangs.

Attacks outside of the capital will almost certainly help to further undermine both the government and the Kenyan-led international task force, which is already reporting increased casualties. Significant attacks outside the capital will likely act as a demonstration of strength for the gangs, bolstering their recruitment efforts.

If sustained, such actions could also pressure the government and international forces to divert resources from the capital, further overstretching their forces to the advantage of the gangs. Most importantly, if the gangs take control and expand their influence in central Haiti, this will likely enable them to assert greater influence in the capital.

The gangs have systematically targeted key elements of Haiti’s infrastructure, including aid distribution points and convoys, hospitals and healthcare facilities, and vital infrastructure such as the international airport, roads, and transport hubs. They have also attacked educational institutions and other critical services. These attacks have likely been conducted to disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid, increase the population’s dependency on the gangs, and undermine the government’s inability to provide essential services.

Control of central Haiti will likely exacerbate these trends. Mirebalias is on the intersection of Route 305 and National Road 3 (Route Nationale 3), the main supply route that connects the capital to Cap-Haïtien. Gang attacks on Toussaint Louverture International Airport (PAP) and on aircraft have effectively rendered the airport non-operational, and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has banned flights to the airport until September 2025. This has led to Cap-Haïtien becoming an increasingly critical hub for both humanitarian aid and international support.

The gangs will likely continue to attack and attempt to assert control in central Haiti to cut off Port-au-Prince from humanitarian aid and international relief. As their territorial expansion increases, the humanitarian situation will almost certainly continue to deteriorate, likely further entrenching gang dominance, increasing internal displacement and migration flows, increasing unrest, and increasing the need for a coordinated international intervention.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro has announced the unilateral termination of peace talks with the left-wing guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), following sustained fighting, which has primarily affected regions like Arauca and Norte de Santander on the Venezuelan border. President Petro also denounced the ELN as an “occupying army of foreign origin.”

Petro’s comments were reinforced by incumbent Colombian Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez, who condemned the ELN, labelling it as a “purely criminal group” responsible for a wide range of human rights abuses, including the mass displacement of 56,000 people, the forced confinement of 23,000, murder and kidnap.

Recent government operations have neutralised hundreds of ELN fighters, and awards amounting to approximately USD 400,000 have been offered that lead to the arrest of ELN leaders. ELN leaders have responded by declaring Petro’s “total peace” policy a failure and betrayal of the Colombian people. The group also justified the killing of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, accusing them of collaboration with the government.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Recent government statements and operations indicate a complete shift in the Petro administration’s strategy towards the ELN and other guerilla and criminal groups, which will highly likely result in a worsening of the conflict near the border with Venezuela and the humanitarian situation.

However, the effective dismantling of the ELN will likely prove to be a significant challenge. The group maintains a decentralised structure and is well entrenched in the rural and border regions of Colombia. The ELN has traditionally survived the killing or capturing of its leadership by quickly replacing them and operating through a network of decentralised cells.

Petro’s comments that the ELN is an occupying army of foreign origin is almost certainly a reference to how the group has developed ties with Venezuela, with widespread reports that the Maduro administration is directly profiting from the ELN’s illicit activities. These ties will help ELN sustain itself militarily and enable it to establish safe havens outside of Colombia.

Moreover, cross-border operations will complicate Colombian counter-insurgency efforts, limiting its ability to target ELN high-value targets within Venezuela without risking a diplomatic crisis or broader conflict.  These challenges likely indicate that the conflict will last for the foreseeable future following the mutual acceptance of the failure of “total peace”.

It is estimated that the ELN operates in at least 231 municipalities across 19 departments in Colombia and in eight of Venezuela’s 24 states. In Colombia, the ELN’s main strongholds are in the departments of Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Arauca. However, the group also has a strategic presence in the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, and Vichada, where it engages in illicit activities such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion to sustain its operations.

The ELN’s widespread territorial control and illicit networks likely make it highly resilient to military pressure. This also puts the group in an advantageous position to escalate violence across the country, and there is a realistic possibility that sustained government operations against the ELN near the Venezuelan border will result in a migration of violence to other parts of Colombia.

US administration announces “Liberation Day” tariffs

On 2 April, Washington highlighted the Trump administration’s plans to impose sweeping tariffs on its international trade partners. President Trump has held a long-standing belief that a comprehensive tariff regime will bolster the American economy by reducing the impact of “unfair” international trade practices.

The move is likely to drive anti-American sentiment abroad, particularly in the most severely hit states or regions, including the European Union, China, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In Europe, there is a realistic possibility that an increase in the perceived hostility of the US administration will contribute to drive further cases of vandalism of American assets and businesses.

Violent unrest in the Dominican Republic during anti-Haitian protests

On 30 March, an anti-Haitian protest in the Dominican Republic turned violent as the nationalist group Antigua Orden Dominicana (AOD) called for the expulsion of Haitian migrants. Violent unrest resulted in the police using tear gas and water cannons, and several arrests were made.

Protestors claimed that Haitians are responsible for an increase in crime in the country, demanded that mass deportations be conducted, and broke past barricades to enter Haitian communities in Hoyo de Friusa, Bavaro, close to the tourist resort of Punta Cana.

Due to the endemic violence and continued destabilisation in Haiti and its associated migrant flow into the Dominican Republic, future protests and unrest are likely to continue, with the AOD attempting to organise further demonstrations in April.

New Mexico Republican HQ firebombed

On 30 March, the Republican Party state offices were set on fire, and slogans like “ICE=KKK” were spray-painted on the building. The damage to the premises was reportedly contained by responding firefighters, and as the attack occurred overnight, no injuries were reported.

The firebombing is almost certainly in response to the Trump administration’s drive to carry out mass deportation of undocumented migrants in the US. While available data suggests that the actual number of expulsions is similar to that recorded during the Democrat Biden administration, the Trump White House has strongly invested in public messaging on its migration policies, often highlighting and glorifying their most controversial aspects, such as the deportation of alleged gang members to prisons in El Salvador.

The high-visibility of the current administration’s policies is likely to drive further acts of vandalism, and possibly political violence, in the medium term.

Floods result in evacuations in northeast Paraguay

Severe floods have affected the Alto Paraguay region since 1 April, following severe precipitation. The severe weather events have resulted in the evacuation of local towns and major traffic disruptions, and authorities have issued a state of emergency for the area. The Alto Paraguay department is sparsely populated and lacks comprehensive infrastructure, with few key roadways, like the PY16. Consequently, even localised floods can result in smaller towns being effectively cut off from receiving emergency help.

On 1 April, a French court sentenced Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right National Rally (RN) and favourite in early polls for the 2027 presidential race, to four years in prison (two suspended, two on house arrest) over charges of embezzlement of EU funds. The court, which also sentenced other prominent RN officials, also barred Le Pen from running for office for five years, meaning that the sentence prevents her from partaking in the 2027 vote.

The sentence was met by the opposition of prominent international right-wing figures, including in Italy, Hungary, and the US. Jordan Bardella, RN’s party president, and other leaders called for a peaceful mobilisation in support of Le Pen, including a rally at 15:00 local time in Paris on 6 April.

Le Pen has appealed the verdict, and, on 2 April, court officials stated they plan to hold the appeal trial before the 2027 electoral campaign.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The verdict is almost certainly a severe blow to RN. The party’s political appeal has been tied to the Le Pen family for generations, and if Marine Le Pen was unable to run, there is a realistic possibility that it would struggle to gain traction by fielding Bardella or another alternative candidate.

It is highly likely that RN supporters will stage demonstrations following the verdict, particularly on 4-6 April. Counterdemonstrations by anti-RN activists will highly likely take place in response, with a realistic possibility of violent clashes and police intervention.

There is likewise a realistic possibility that the sentencing will embolden radical groups and movements that share some ideological affiliation with RM’s platform to increase recruitment and messaging to RN’s voter base. It may be notable that RN won around 30 per cent of the youth vote at the last elections, matching a shift also seen elsewhere in Europe.

Finally, the judicial closing of a political path for RN to take power is likely to be exploited by extremists to increase calls to violence against public officials and left-wing politicians in France, possibly increasing the risk of lone wolf terrorism.

Officials within the Trump administration have acknowledged that securing a peace deal in Ukraine within the next few months is unlikely. The officials stated that while the original intent was to secure a full ceasefire by April-May, both Ukrainian and Russian resistance to key elements proposed by the Trump administration are delaying efforts, leading to increasing frustration within the White House over President Putin’s refusal to compromise on his maximalist demands.

Washington has discussed renewed measures to coerce Moscow into accepting its proposals, which include secondary tariffs of 25-50 per cent on Russian oil buyers.

President Putin has continued to criticise US peace proposals through his chief negotiator Sergei Ryabkov, demanding several core demands that the Kremlin insists must be met to secure any potential ceasefire agreement.

These include Ukrainian recognition of the annexation of Crimea and the four partially occupied regions in southeastern Ukraine of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson; a Ukrainian pledge to never join NATO or any other Western military alliance; a demilitarisation of Ukraine; the removal of President Volodymyr Zelensky; a suspension of US lethal aid and intelligence; and an easing of European sanctions, which the EU has rejected.

Solace Global Assessment: 

By refusing to accept current ceasefire proposals advanced by the US or renege on its maximalist demands, it is highly likely that the Kremlin is delaying the ceasefire proposal in order to seize further Ukrainian territory, which will ultimately improve its bargaining power in future negotiation talks.

Moreover, Russia is unlikely to accept any meaningful ceasefire agreement while Ukraine retains forces in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. Ukraine’s Kursk offensive was a symbolic and operational success that buoyed Ukrainian morale, forced Russia to divert resources from other sectors of the line of contact and most importantly, placed Ukraine in a more advantageous position for future negotiations.

Recent reporting indicates that Russian ground forces are close to reclaiming the entirety of the Kursk Oblast after seizing the city of Sudzha in mid-March, Ukraine’s main defensive position. However, Moscow is unlikely to pursue ceasefire negotiations once it has fully reclaimed Kursk, as it has seized the momentum on multiple fronts.

Once the Kursk Oblast has been recaptured, Russia will likely stabilise its lines on this axis and laterally redeploy forces to parts of eastern Ukraine, in order to further consolidate territorial gains, improve its leverage, and maximise its chances of securing concessions from both Ukraine and the West.

Moscow is highly likely to accept poorly defined steps towards a ceasefire or limited ceasefires in order to project a willingness to pursue overall peace, a strategy that will continue to delay the conflict and may help to placate the Trump administration, which is under pressure to secure a resolution to the conflict.

By agreeing to vague, poorly defined or incomplete ceasefire proposals, Moscow can claim it is acting in good faith while exploiting the lack of clarity to continue military operations or adapt them to appear as if it is complying.

One example of this strategy currently in place is Russia’s interpretation of the moratorium on attacks on Ukraine’s energy-related critical national infrastructure (CNI). Russia has refrained from attacking these targets with long-range missiles and drones in accordance with the vaguely defined terms of the ceasefire. However, it has increased its targeting of energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery, as it is unclear as to whether this is covered in the yet-to-be formalised ceasefire terms, which may only apply to long-range fires.

One of the objectives of this strategy is likely to provoke Ukraine into retaliatory actions, then exploit the ambiguity of the ceasefire terms to shift blame onto Kyiv for violating the ceasefire. Ultimately, this strategy will help Russia control the narrative, undermine Ukraine’s commitment to ongoing peace negotiations, help extend the conflict whilst Russia maintains the upper hand on the battlefield, and most importantly, help to foster division within the West, one of Russia’s primary strategic objectives.

On 1 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in the Hezbollah stronghold of the Dahieh area in southern Beirut, targeting Hassan Ali Mahmoud Bdeir. Israeli intelligence claims that Bdier was a senior Hezbollah commander who served in the militant group’s Unit 3900, which is responsible for external operations beyond Lebanon’s borders.

Bdeir was also responsible for the coordination between Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran’s Quds Force. According to Israeli sources, Bdier was planning a major attack on Jewish and Israeli targets overseas and had been monitored for months by the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), working in conjunction with Israel’s military intelligence and cyber surveillance units.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Israeli defence sources claim that Bdeir was overseeing the recruitment of suicide operatives, logistic chains for weapons and explosives, the funnelling of funds through covert Iranian channels, and was responsible for target selection against Israeli diplomatic missions, Jewish community centres and other potential civilian targets.

If the foiled attack was credible, it may indicate a shift in Hezbollah’s strategy against Israel. Hezbollash has established a network of operatives across the globe and has previously demonstrated its ability to attack Israeli and Jewish interests outside of the Middle East. For example, in 1994, 85 people were killed after a vehicle-borne improved explosive device (VBIED) detonated outside of the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires, an attack that has been linked to Hezbollah with Iranian backing.

There is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah may be seeking to adopt a strategy of external attacks to increase pressure on Israel and the US while achieving a high degree of plausible deniability. Such a strategy would also enable Hezbollah to target Israeli interests without directly engaging Israeli forces, with any Israeli response in Lebanon likely to provoke international condemnation.

However, the strike follows a series of expanded Israeli strikes in Lebanon, which have not been confined to the southern parts of Lebanon. Hezbollah is in a weakened position after Israel’s ground offensive and strikes on the group, and it has lost its critical supply lines from Iran through Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. However, the group still maintains thousands of fighters and a credible arsenal of missiles and rockets.

While Hezbollah likely has some tolerance for attacks on rank-and-file fighters and military equipment, Israeli strikes on senior leadership and within Beirut could force Hezbollah into resuming hostilities if sustained. Any major kinetic response from Hezbollah will likely result in a definitive end to the increasingly fragile ceasefire agreement and would likely lead to increased Israeli strikes in Lebanon and potentially a renewed ground offensive in southern Lebanon.

Given the current geopolitical climate, there is a realistic possibility that Israel may be seeking to capitalise on Hezbollah’s degradation, a weakened Iran, and the support of an increasingly pro-Israel, anti-Iran Trump administration to further its strategic goals.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have continued offensive operations in the Gaza Strip, with the aim of maximising pressure on Hamas and securing the release of the remaining Israeli hostages still in captivity. On 2-3 April, IDF channels issued evacuation orders for much of the southern city of Rafah, while Israel Katz, the minister of defence, stated that IDF operations are aimed at seizing territory for long-term occupation. This echoed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements on 30 March that Israel is now seeking to implement Trump’s plan for the “voluntary migration” of Gazans from the Gaza Strip.

On 3 April, Netanyahu announced that IDF units have established the Morag Corridor, named after a former Israeli settlement in Gaza, between Rafah and Khan Yunis, calling it a “second Philadelphi”. Over 1,150 Palestinians are estimated to have been killed since hostilities resumed on 18 March.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The establishment of the Morag Corridor almost certainly seeks to isolate Rafah from the rest of Gaza. The southern city was considered to be the key stronghold from Hamas forces and benefited from the proximity of the Gaza-Egypt corridor, through which the armed group received most of its equipment and resources.

IDF operations are likely aimed at “strangling” the remaining Hamas units by sectioning Gaza. It is highly likely that IDF units in the Morag area will immediately seek to identify and destroy the remaining tunnels linking Rafah and Khan Yunis, aiming to sever Hamas’ ground lines of communications and forcing it into more direct and costly confrontations.

The establishment of the new corridor, combined with the evacuation orders for Rafah, highly likely shows that the aid blockade will continue, which will in turn almost certainly worsen the humanitarian situation in southern Gaza.

Katz and Netanyahu’s statements are highly likely the clearest indications of a growing interest in the Israeli annexation of parts of the Gaza Strip. The far-right parties that support Netanyahu’s government have long considered the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 a historic mistake and are likely interested in returning to some of the previous settlements in the area.

A more tangible set of measures to expel Gazans from the area would almost certainly precipitate tensions in the region, bringing both Tel Aviv and Washington at odds with regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who see the removal of Gazans as an unacceptable “red line”.

Moreover, it would almost certainly result in severe civil unrest in Jordan and, especially, Egypt, who would be the likeliest destinations for displaced Gazans.

While likely still the main political force in Gaza, there are notable indications that Hamas has lost much of its administrative capacity and support. In the past month, there have been multiple cases of protests against the war in Gaza, some openly criticising Hamas’ policies in the war.

In addition, on 2 April, members of the Abu Samra clan, based in Deir al-Balah, carried out a public execution of a Hamas member who had allegedly killed one of their relatives. The execution, which was filmed and posted online, is almost certainly an open act of defiance against Hamas, and highly likely reflects a wider belief in Hamas’ relative weakness.

On 30 March, US President Donald Trump stated that if Iran does not agree to a deal on their nuclear program, ‘there will be bombing’, ‘the likes of which they have never seen before’. Trump additionally threatened secondary tariffs on countries that trade with Iran, giving an approximate timeline of ‘a couple of weeks’ for progress in nuclear talks until the tariffs would be imposed.

On 31 March, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded, stating that he did not believe the threats but that the US would ‘certainly receive a heavy blow in return’. A senior Iranian adviser also stated that US or Israeli strikes would ‘force’ Tehran to develop nuclear weapons, and Iranian media and senior military commanders threatened retaliation against US military facilities across the region (including a direct threat against the US base on Diego Garcia Island south of the Maldives) and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Furthermore, on 3 April, the Telegraph reported that a senior Iranian official source briefed that Tehran had ordered a withdrawal of military personnel from Yemen, as part of a reorientation away from a strategy of supporting its network of regional proxies, the “axis of resistance”, to focus instead on direct threats from the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The increase in rhetoric comes amidst a return to Trump’s “maximum pressure” approach to Iran, with Trump’s threats following Tehran formally responding to a 5 March letter Trump sent to Khamenei. In the letter, Trump set a two-month deadline to reach a nuclear deal, although it is unclear whether this countdown begins from the letter’s delivery or when negotiations hypothetically begin. Tehran’s rejection of Trump’s demands for direct negotiations, instead proposing indirect talks mediated by Oman, highly likely conditioned Trump’s direct threats of military force.

Iran has been classified as a “nuclear threshold state”, with estimates suggesting that it could take less than a week for Iran to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium to produce a nuclear weapon. Following the severe degradation of Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the October 2024 aerial strikes by Israel that highly likely heavily degraded Iran’s air defence network, Iranian deterrence in the region has almost certainly been significantly diminished.

Tehran, therefore, is highly likely to have far more incentive to develop a nuclear deterrent. There is likely considerable internal debate within the Iranian establishment, with a clear split between President Masoud Pezeshkian, who was elected on a mandate of reopening nuclear negotiations to enable the removal of sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy, and hardliners who reject the possibility of any concessions to Washington.

Whilst the briefed withdrawal from Houthi-controlled Yemen may indicate a substantial shift in Tehran’s strategy, it is unlikely that they will fully abandon the Houthis, as the Yemeni group remains one of Iran’s most powerful and strategically positioned proxy forces.

Considerable escalation to open conflict between Iran and the US (with almost certain Israeli support), would highly likely increase the threat to US-aligned states across the region, notably Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, with Iranian-backed proxy forces having previously threatened attacks against US energy interests during periods of increased tensions.

It is likely that Tehran, due to Iran’s assessed highly vulnerable position, will pursue a cautious approach and is likely particularly susceptible currently to Trump’s coercive rhetoric. Nonetheless, Khamenei will likely be highly reluctant to overtly concede to US pressure and military escalation by Washington would likely force retaliation by Tehran.

On 31 March, Ituri native Thomas Lubanga announced the creation of the Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR), which aims to topple the government in the Ituri province. Lubanga, currently based in Uganda, claims that the group has political and military wings, with armed forces present in three areas of Ituri.

Lubanga was sentenced to 14 years in prison by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2012 for ‘enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities.’ Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi appointed him after his release in 2020 as part of a task force to restore peace in Ituri. However, after being taken hostage for two months by a rebel group in 2022, he blamed the government, severing ties with Tshisekedi.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The CPR is the second rebel movement led by Lubanga, following the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), a rebel group involved in the Ituri conflict. While the conflict mainly occurred between 1999 and 2003 following the Second Congo War, it has continued at a lower intensity between the agriculturalist Lendu and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups.

The UPC, under the command of Lubanga, primarily supported the Hema ethnic group, and will almost certainly continue to do so under the new banner of CPR. Given that rebels under Lubanga’s command have previously been accused of human rights violations including ethnic massacres, murder, torture, rape, mutilation, and the forcible conscription of child soldiers, it is highly likely that CPR will engage in similar tactics, exacerbating humanitarian issues in the region, which has seen over 50,000 killed and 500,000 displaced. It is likely that aid workers will not be targeted, with Lubanga previously pledging security for humanitarian workers.

The UPC operated with the support of Ugandan forces, who are currently active in the Ituri region under Operation Shujaa, a joint offensive against insurgent forces in the Ituri province. In August 2002, the UPC captured Bunia with the assistance of the Ugandan military and subsequently began to receive support from Rwanda.

Uganda currently has a military presence in Bunia due to counterinsurgency efforts against the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Uganda also has an active interest in exploiting the abundant mineral resources in eastern DRC; in 2019, 95 per cent of its gold exports were highly likely sourced from the DRC.

There is a realistic possibility that Uganda will renew its ties with Lubanga, which would highly likely expand Ugandan access to mineral wealth attained by the rebel group, likely in exchange for military support from the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). Forming an alliance with CPR would also likely expand Ugandan influence in the region, counterbalancing Rwanda’s expanding influence in Kivu through AFC/M23.

The formation of the CPR will highly likely further stretch the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), who are currently attempting to prevent an ongoing offensive by the AFC/M23 militia. This will likely also indirectly increase pressure on Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi, who is currently facing significant opposition regarding his perceived handling of the conflicts in eastern DRC.

Lubanga has an indirect link to the AFC/M23 through Bosco Ntaganda, founding member of M23 and former Chief of Military Operations in the UPC. The UN accused Lubanga last year of mobilising fighters to support AFC/M23. AFC/M23 are currently approaching the Ituri province in an ongoing offensive in North Kivu; currently in Lubero, they almost certainly aim to continue north into Ituri. The formation of CPR will highly likely facilitate this northern expansion.

Workers at London Heathrow Airport (LHR) to strike from 5 to 9 April

The strikes have been announced by Unite the Union and will be conducted by approximately 500 Heathrow workers who assist passengers with limited mobility. The dispute stems from the wage difference between staff performing the same role at London Gatwick Airport (LGR), despite being employed by the same company, Wilson James.

Further strike dates will reportedly be announced if an agreement is not reached. Travel disruptions are likely over the Easter period, potentially disrupting holiday flights. The strike announcement comes amid increasing pressure from airlines over the temporary airport closure due to a power outage caused by a substation fire nearby, which affected approximately 200,000 passengers.

There is a realistic possibility that airline pressure, combined with threats of further strike action, will mean that the workers succeed in attaining a pay increase and call off strike action.

More than 250 migrants displaced for the second time in weeks in Paris

On 1 April, French police removed a migrant encampment in central Paris on the Seine quays. Many of the displaced individuals had reportedly previously occupied the Gaite Lyrique theatre, also in central Paris, which had been raided by authorities on 18 March following months of occupation. There is a realistic possibility of civil unrest by left-wing groups following the second displacement in two weeks.

General strike grounds flights in Belgium

On 31 March, a general strike among both public and private sector workers took place in Belgium in protest of planned government austerity measures. The strikes severely disrupted public services and transport, grounding 244 flights across the country. The national railway operated a minimal service of fewer than half its trains running and several schools and public services have stopped. Eurostar was unaffected.

This is the second such nationwide strike and reflects a growing discontent with the newly formed “Arizona coalition”. In February, tens of thousands of people engaged in a multi-day strike in protest against pension reforms. The government’s measures are set to cut funding for pensions, healthcare, unemployment support, and social services. Given the widespread hostility of the country’s unions towards these measures, further strikes and demonstrations are highly likely.

Germany tries to deport four pro-Palestine activists

Three of the four individuals reportedly hold EU citizenship, and the fourth is American. None have been convicted or charged for a criminal offence, although this is not technically needed for the issuing of a deportation order under German law. The four are, however, accused of  taking part in direct protest action in support of Palestine, including university and roadway blockades. The timing of the case will likely result in its association with similar efforts to deport pro-Palestine activists from the United States. It is highly likely that, if the planned deportations progress, these will result in anti-government protests in Berlin, particularly at local universities.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) dissolves youth wing

The termination of the “Young Alternative”, which had been classified as an extremist group in 2023, is likely meant to reduce the risk of legal challenges to the party, which is now the second strongest force in the German parliament. AfD has, at the latest elections, made some important gains in terms of the youth vote, so the party would be positioned to benefit from having a youth wing to capitalise on its new supporters. Likely, AfD will now launch a new formation to replace the Young Alternative. However, in the interval, there is a realistic possibility that other far-right youth groups who are not aligned with the party, such as the resurgent German chapter of Generation Identity (GI) will seek to recruit AfD supporters into their ranks.

Slovakia proposes draft of “anti-lobbyists” bill targeting NGOs

The law, which is supported by the Fico government, classifies NGOs that “directly or indirectly” influence politicians as “lobbies”, thus imposing more significant restrictions on their operations. As the definition of “influence” is vague, critics of the bill argue that it is effectively an attempt to curtail NGO operations in a manner similar to that seen in Russia or Georgia. Protests have occurred in Bratislava and other large cities in the aftermath of the law’s proposal. These protests are likely to continue next week, when the draft law is set to have its final vote.

Protests in Hungary over Pride ban

Large-scale demonstrations, resulting in widespread traffic disruptions, have erupted in Budapest following the Orban government’s new legislation, which bans Pride parades and authorises police to use facial recognition software to identify participants. The law is scheduled to come into effect in mid-April, in time for Pride month in June. Notably, 2025 is also the 30^th anniversary of the first Pride parade in Budapest. The unrest is likely to continue on 4-6 April, and there is a realistic possibility of its increase in the short term. If the ban remains in place, a further wave of unrest is highly likely to occur in June.

National strike planned in Greece for 9 April

Several public sector unions in Greece have announced that they will participate in a 24-hour general strike beginning on 9 April. The strike is expected to cause widespread disruption, especially within the transport sector. All flights in Greece will be cancelled due to the participation of air traffic controllers in the strike, severely affecting domestic and international travel. Maritime industry unions have also announced their intent to participate, which will halt all shipping in the country, which may impact the country’s supply chains, tourism, and commerce. There is a realistic possibility of strike-related protests in major cities like Athens and Thessaloniki resulting in violent interactions with the police force.

UK sanctions pro-Russian group over Moldovan election interference

On 2 April, the UK government imposed sanctions on the pro-Russian group Evrazia, linked to Russian oligarch Ilan Shor, for attempting to rig Moldova’s October 2024 presidential election and its referendum on joining the European Union. The sanctions, which include asset freezes and travel bans on the group’s leaders, are likely part of a broader UK effort to counter Russian influence, combat corruption and safeguard democratic institutions in Europe, and will likely expand in response to Russian efforts to influence upcoming European elections, such as the Romanian presidential election in May.

Guinea’s junta sets September as a date for constitutional referendum

On 2 April Guinea’s military junta announced 21 September 2025 as the date for a constitutional referendum. This marks a significant step in the transition towards democracy after Mamady Doumbouya took power in a coup in September 2021. The military has so far missed the deadlines it set for a transition to civilian rule, having initially proposed a two-year transition period, which lapsed after 31 December 2024. The junta has engaged in significant political repression since gaining power, allegedly disappearing two prominent opposition figures in July 2024 and a journalist in December. The proposed constitution would introduce a two five-year term presidential limit but may enable Doumbouya to run for office, something forbidden in the transitional charter. It is highly likely that the constitution is engineered to enable Doumbouya to attain power legitimately.

Burkina Faso accelerates media crackdown

On 1 April, the security minister of Burkina Faso released a list of individuals who are wanted for “criminal association” and “terrorism”. Many of the figures listed are the heads or high-ranking members of Islamist terror groups operating in the country. However, alongside them, the junta listed prominent journalists and civil society opposition figures, many of whom are currently in exile. The crackdown on media figures has likely intensified following the reported massacre of civilians by Burkinabe forces in Solenzo on 11 March, and the publication of the lists likely represents an effort to systematise the efforts to silence opposition voices. In addition to this recent development, there is a high likelihood that Burkinabe security forces have been deployed to “disappear” critics still present in the country. For instance, local sources have reported that, on 30 March, security forces arbitrarily arrested the head of a civil society group based in Ouagadougou. No reports about the detainee’s location or state have been released since the arrest.

Approximately 95 arrested in demonstrations against Zimbabwe President Emmerson Mnangagwa

On 31 March, a muted planned protest demanding Mnangagwa’s resignation took place amid heavy security presence. Few people participated in the protests, likely due to fears of potential violent unrest, opting to stay home. The fear led to widespread closures of businesses, offices, and schools in Harare and Bulawayo. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters, and the demonstrators, identified through social media posts, were arrested on charges of “promoting public violence” and “breaching the peace”. The demonstrations were organised by Blessed Geza, a member of the ruling Zanu-PF party and part of a faction calling for Vice-President Constantine Chiwenga to replace Mnangagwa.

Zimbabweans have been calling for Mnangagwa’s resignation since a Zanu-PF announcement in January, which declared that he would be in office until 2030, despite the constitutional limit of two five-year terms, which would limit his rule to 2028. The calls for protests come amid hyperinflation, high unemployment, and widespread corruption, despite Mnangagwa’s early promises of political and economic reforms. While the population is generally wary of destabilising an already fragile country, it is highly likely that calls for Mnangagwa’s resignation will increase over the coming weeks and embolden currently wary opponents, potentially sparking widespread nationwide unrest.

Man sets vehicle on fire in central Amsterdam, Netherlands, in possible failed car bomb attack

On 2 April, a man drove a vehicle to the centre of Dam Square and reportedly attempted to detonate it. This resulted in a fire that injured the driver but caused no casualties. As of the time of writing, the identity and motive of the individual remain unclear. However, there is a realistic possibility that the incident is linked to the recent lone wolf stabbing attack that occurred at the same location.

From the episode’s dynamic, it appears highly likely that the driver sought to achieve maximum visibility for his action, but it is still unclear whether the detonation was a failed terror attack attempt or whether it was carried out as a form of high-visibility suicide. Over the past year, there have been several cases of self-immolation carried out for political messaging. These included a man detonating a Tesla vehicle outside the Las Vegas Trump Hotel in January 2025, in an apparent protest of the incoming Trump administration.

Multiple Teslas torched in Rome

On 31 March, 17 vehicles manufactured by US billionaire Elon Musk’s company were burned at a dealership in the periphery of the Italian capital. The act of vandalism is highly likely the most severe incident targeting Tesla in Italy so far, and is highly likely linked to the string of attacks on the US automakers that have occurred in Europe in the last months. Tesla is a preferred target for anarchist groups, who retain a heavy presence in Italy, due to its high visibility and its association with the Trump administration.

In addition to Tesla, the is a realistic possibility that as US tensions with Europe increase, other high-visibility American companies could be targeted for vandalism. Moreover, the targeting of US assets in Italy could increase following the possible announcement of a visit by US Vice-President JD Vance to Rome for Easter, which appears likely to be announced following repeated contacts between the Italian government and the American embassy in Rome.

Israel intensifies strikes on Syria

On 2 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) escalated its strikes in Syria, targeting air bases and military infrastructure near Damascus and in several other parts of the country, resulting in the near-total destruction of Hama Air Base and the Tiyas (T4) Air Base near Homs.  The strikes also coincided with an IDF ground operation in southwestern Syria, where IDF forces clashed with militants.

The strikes were likely intended to send a strategic message to Syria’s new Islamist-led transitional government that Israel will not accept hostile forces establishing a presence on its borders. Israel also raised concerns over Turkey’s increasing influence in Syria, with Foreign Minister Gideon Saar accusing Ankara of attempting to turn Syria into a “Turkish protectorate.” Turkey has made attempts to secure the T4 Air Base, with reports circulating that it will deploy air defence to secure the base. Israel’s repeated targeting of T4 in recent weeks likely suggests a deliberate effort to degrade its operational capacity before Turkish forces can establish a presence.

Armed attack kills several dozen soldiers in Burkina Faso

On 31 March, “several dozen” soldiers and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) members were killed by suspected jihadists in a military camp in Diapaga, eastern Burkina Faso close to the borders with Niger and Benin. Approximately 30 wounded security personnel were evacuated to a hospital. During the attack, militants set fire to shops and homes. The military retaliated, launching a sweep of the area and killing several militants.

Burkinabe authorities have not released a statement regarding the attack. Burkina Faso’s security forces have been battling insurgencies, primarily by the al-Qaeda linked Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). Based on the respective operating and attack zones, it is likely that the attack was conducted by JNIM, who typically operate along the border regions with Niger and Benin.

Volcanic eruption in Iceland

On 1 April, a volcanic fissure opened north of Grindavik, causing the evacuation of the town and nearby Blue Lagoon. The fissure initially reached 500 metres; by midday, it had grown to 1,200 metres, moving southward toward Grindavik. Despite the dramatic initial activity, Icelandic authorities have recently observed a decrease in volcanic activity. On 2 April, local media reported no significant activity at the fissure site. An Icelandic meteorological official stated that the eruption is ‘more or less over,’ although they cautioned that future magma intrusions could occur. In the meantime, approximately six hundred earthquakes have been recorded in the magma chamber since April 3, but no new volcanic activity has been observed since the fissure opened.

Storm Nuria hits Iberian Peninsula

Storm Nuria continues to affect the Iberian Peninsula with heavy rain and winds, although no orange or red alerts have been issued in Spain as of the time of writing. In the Canary Islands, classes have resumed following the end of the wind alert. Previously, La Palma Airport remained closed, and flights at Tenerife North Airport were cancelled due to the storm. The storm had also caused landslides and road closures in Las Palmas, and injured individuals in Puerto de la Cruz. Additionally, a power outage affected 3,000 people in Fuencaliente, La Palma. The Spanish meteorology office had activated a yellow alert for Cádiz province due to forecasts of wind, rain, and storm surges.

Greek islands declare emergency due to flooding

Both Mykonos and Paros, two of the most visited islands in the Aegean Sea, announced a state of emergency following the storm that hit the Cyclades on 31 March. The weather system caused widespread flooding and severe traffic disruptions across the islands, with two months’ worth of rain falling on Paros in two hours on 31 March. The state of emergency will be in place for one month.

Nigeria warns of rising nationwide Lassa fever cases

According to the Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), at least 118 people have been killed in Nigeria in the first quarter of 2025 due to an outbreak of Lassa fever, with 645 confirmed cases recorded and a current fatality rate of 18.3 per cent. The disease, which is spread primarily by rodents, is most prevalent in rural areas due to poor sanitation, resulting in the contamination of food and living spaces. The outbreak has likely been exacerbated by inadequate healthcare facilities and staffing shortages in rural areas, as well as the overreliance on traditional medication. Symptoms of Lassa fever appear 6 to 21 days after exposure and typically include fever, weakness, headache, muscle pain, sore throat, chest pain, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhoea, with severe cases potentially leading to internal bleeding, facial swelling, low blood pressure, shock, and organ failure.

Japan’s Cabinet Office released a report on 31 March regarding the potential impact of a Nankai Trough “megaquake”, which typically refers to an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 and above, and the subsequent tsunami caused by such an earthquake. The megaquake is estimated to have an 80 per cent chance of occurring within the next 30 years, with the new estimates projecting potentially severe devastation.

In modelled worst-case scenarios, there could be approximately 300,000 fatalities, over 1.2 million evacuees, 2.35 million structures destroyed, and USD 1.81 trillion in economic losses, which is almost half of the country’s total gross domestic product (GDP). The worst-case scenarios involve a magnitude 9.0 and above earthquake occurring late at night in winter.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Nankai Trough, situated south of Japan, contains the prominent Nankai megathrust fault. Megathrust earthquakes, such as the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake (magnitude 9.1), which resulted in the Fukushima nuclear disaster, are the planet’s most powerful earthquakes. The most at-risk areas from a Nankai Trough megaquake are on Japan’s southern Pacific coast, particularly the prefectures of Miyazaki, Kochi, Tokushima, Wakayama, Mie, Aichi, and Shizuoka.

In August 2024, authorities issued a rare megaquake warning due to an assessment that the probability of a Nankai Trough megaquake was several times higher than usual following a magnitude 7.1 earthquake off the coast of Kyushu. Authorities then urged residents on Japan’s Pacific coast to reaffirm their preparedness and take precautions over the following week.

With Japan being so seismically active, the country has world-leading earthquake resiliency. The use of advanced earthquake-resistant technologies, infrastructure resilience, stringent building codes, and thorough disaster response plans all contribute towards making Japan highly resistant to the impact of earthquakes. However, extremely powerful earthquakes such as the 2011 earthquake are still capable of causing widespread damage and large numbers of fatalities.

A Nankai Trough megaquake would likely push Japan’s earthquake resilience to its absolute limits, and the latest projected figures will almost certainly reaffirm the need for companies and employees in at-risk areas to review business continuity plans, risk assessments, and crisis communications protocols and conduct drills.

On 1 and 2 April, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theatre Command conducted two days of large-scale military drills around Taiwan, including live-fire exercises. A PLA spokesperson stated that the drills were held as a ‘severe warning and forceful containment against Taiwan independence’, aimed at ‘testing the troops’ capabilities to carry out integrated operations, seizure of operational control and multi-directional precision strikes. 

Named ‘Strait Thunder-2025A’, the exercises involved personnel from the PLA, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and the China Coast Guard (CCG). Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) stated that on 1 April, 76 PLA aircraft, 15 PLAN vessels and 4 “official ships” were detected operating around Taiwan, with 37 sorties crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). On 2 April, they detected 53 PLA aircraft, 23 PLAN vessels and 8 official ships, with 31 sorties crossing the median line. The PLAN vessels detected included a CNS Shandong aircraft carrier group.

Additionally, the PLA conducted live-fire exercises, which included rocket strikes targeting a static object which resembles the Yongan Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Terminal in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. In propaganda released by the PLA to publicise the exercises, Taiwan’s staunchly pro-independence president, Lai Ching-te, was depicted as a parasite and labelled a separatist.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ by PLA forces are an almost daily occurrence, the Strait Thunder-2025A exercises are particularly large-scale and almost certainly demonstrate the coordination of multiple different branches of China’s military to conduct multi-domain operations. In May and October 2024, the Joint Sword-2024 exercises were similar in scale but did not involve live-fire exercises.

The Strait Thunder exercises were more coordinated than usual and were almost certainly designed to enhance interoperability between different military branches for joint operations. They also likely aimed to integrate operations across multiple domains, including unconventional elements like information warfare, as evidenced by the simultaneous PLA propaganda campaign.

The exercises were highly likely a rehearsal for a blockade of Taiwan, which is assessed to be more likely in the coming years than a full-scale amphibious invasion as a means to compel the unification of Taiwan with mainland China.

The scale, frequency, coordination and use of live fire in Chinese exercises are likely part of a deliberate effort to normalise large-scale military activity in the region. This will almost certainly make it more challenging to identify clear indicators and warnings of a genuine military operation. Such a strategy will likely complicate decision-making and delay response times for Taiwan and its allies, allowing China to achieve strategic surprise.

A full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan, however, would highly likely require an operation that would dwarf WWII’s Normandy landings in scale and complexity, with a highly observable military and logistical build-up. A blockade may nonetheless be accompanied by more limited operations to seize the Taiwan-controlled Kinmen islands that are just three kilometres away from mainland China, which could be achieved with far fewer observable indicators and warnings.

Any significant escalation by Beijing is likely to cause a considerable pan-regional impact, in addition to a global economic crisis, with the head of the Philippines’ military stating on 1 April that the country would ‘inevitably’ be involved.

In US defence circles, the “Davison window” refers to Admiral Phil Davison’s comments to the US Congress that China could be capable of pursuing the seizure of Taiwan by 2027, with US intelligence reportedly believing that China’s leader Xi Jinping has given the PLA a 2027 deadline to reach capability for a full-scale invasion.

Some analysts assess that as the US nears semiconductor sovereignty, likely around 2030, Taiwan will lose strategic importance (due to its monopoly on advanced semiconductor manufacturing) and, therefore, Beijing will be less incentivised to take the risks involved to invade or blockade Taiwan. Alternatively, it is likely that US semiconductor sovereignty would dramatically lower the incentives for Washington to provide defence guarantees for Taiwan and would, therefore, increase the likelihood of Chinese military aggression. PLA exercises around Taiwan are almost certain to continue, with large-scale drills likely to be prompted by international and political developments, as well as important dates such as anniversaries of President Lai’s inauguration on 20 May or Taiwan’s National Day on 10 October.

Indian land management bill likely to cause civil unrest

On 3 April, the Indian parliament passed a bill, presented by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) one day prior, which entails significant changes to the administration of “waqf” lands. The term refers to land which is donated by Muslims for religious and charitable uses by other Muslims. These lands are usually administered by all-Muslim funds or boards.

The law would allow non-Muslims to enter these and would increase the government’s authority to resolve disputes involving waqf lands. Opponents of the law have accused the BJP of encroaching on Muslim minority rights. It is likely that, as it begins to be implemented, the bill will drive significant unrest. Past disputes over land have caused notable cases of sectarian violence, including mob violence involving Muslim and Hindu communities.

Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) sabre-rattling showcases interim government’s fragility

The leaders of the (former) main opposition party in the country have warned that if the interim government fails to hold elections in 2025, this will result in “instability” and “strong resentment with the people”. Muhammed Yunus, who heads the government following the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, has maintained that, due to ongoing instability, the vote could instead be held in early 2026.

The BNP’s remarks likely amount to a thinly veiled threat: following Hasina’s removal, the political vacuum left by her party – the Awami League (AL) – has resulted in violent competition between smaller groups and opposition parties, with mob violence now a regular occurrence. With AL still reeling from its loss of power, BNP is now the strongest political force in Bangladesh and therefore seeks to capitalise on an early vote. There is a realistic possibility of the BNP increasingly adopting a more aggressive messaging in the medium term, driving unrest or political violence.

Thai court issues arrest warrant for US academic

A Thai court has issued an arrest warrant for American academic Paul Chambers, a lecturer at Naresuan University, on charges of insulting the monarchy and violating the Computer Crimes Act. The charges were filed by the Thai military and relate to an article Chambers posted online last year, although the specific details have not been disclosed. The charges fall under Thailand’s stringent “lese majeste” laws, which are often used arbitrarily to repress the opposition or supress dissent. The laws are some of the harshest anti-monarchy laws in the world and can carry prison sentences of up to 15 years. Since the 2020 pro-democracy protests, almost 300 individuals have been charged under the law, reflecting its increasing application against critics.

South Korean Constitutional Court ruling

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol was removed from office on 4 April after the Constitutional Court upheld his impeachment over his December 2024 martial law declaration. The court ruled unanimously that Yoon violated his constitutional powers, with Acting Chief Justice Moon Hyung-bae condemning his actions as a “serious challenge to democracy” that resulted in both domestic and foreign instability.

The trial has been incredibly divisive, leading to protests both in support of and against the former president. Protests in reaction to the verdict are likely; however, they have so far remained localised and non-violent, leading to minimal disruption despite increased security measures. A snap presidential election must now be held within 60 days, likely leading to a period of political uncertainty.

The deepening divide between Yoon’s supporters and opponents, coupled with the urgent need to restore stability, will likely complicate governance in the short term and impact South Korea’s economic and foreign policy decisions, especially as it attempts to adapt to the 25 per cent tariff rates imposed on them by the Trump administration.

Afghan anti-Taliban group releases overview of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) structure.

The National Mobilization Front (NMF) is a small anti-Taliban group that has claimed multiple attacks on Taliban officials and, notably, Chinese citizens in Afghanistan. On 3 April, NMF channels released information allegedly detailing major efforts by ISKP to restructure some key departments and purge the group from alleged “spies” or “moles”.

While it is currently difficult to assess the credibility of the claims made by NMF – which styles itself as a pro-Western and secular force opposed to both the Taliban and ISKP – the hypothesis of an internal reshuffle could provide an explanation for the recent lull in ISKP operations in Afghanistan and abroad.

Myanmar junta declares a ceasefire until 22 April

On 2 April, Myanmar’s ruling military junta declared a temporary ceasefire to enable relief efforts following the 28 March 7.7 magnitude earthquake, which killed at least 3,000. The decision followed unilateral ceasefires from rebel groups, including the People’s Defence Force and the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which are engaged in a civil war with the government.

While the ceasefire may provide an opportunity for further peace-making, it is unlikely to hold until 22 April. Despite the declaration, there were already reports of ceasefire violations on 3 April, with rebels accusing junta forces of conducting airstrikes in Bhamo and continuing attacks on Waingmaw and Indawgyi. Further reports list strikes in multiple villages of Homalin township on the same day and shootings in Shwegyin and Mone townships on 3 and 4 April.

For the ceasefire to contribute to broader peace efforts, it would likely require long-term measures, including safe zones and humanitarian corridors for aid, on top of a complete cessation of hostilities, something the military junta appears unwilling to accept.

7.1 magnitude earthquake off the coast of Tonga

A magnitude 7.1 earthquake was recorded off the east coast of Tonga in the South Pacific on 30 March, triggering a tsunami warning for the region. The US Geological Survey initially reported a preliminary magnitude of 7.3 before downgrading it to 7.1. Tsunami waves between 0.3 to 1 metre above tide level were considered possible on the coasts of Niue and Tonga.

As a precaution, Tonga authorities activated tsunami sirens and advised coastal residents to move inland. However, the tsunami warning was lifted, and there are no immediate reports of injuries or damage in Tonga. There were also no tsunami threats to Japan, Chile, Guam, or Hawaii. No damage was caused by the earthquake. Several aftershocks have taken place and more are highly likely over the coming days and weeks.

Gas pipeline fire in Malaysia

A large fire broke out on 1 April at a gas pipeline in the Kampung Tengah Puchong area, south of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Authorities have reported that 145 people were injured, though all are in stable condition. The fire, which started at a pipeline owned by Petronas, significantly diminished as gas pressure decreased. The possibility of a second explosion is considered very low, as no gas leaks have been detected after the closure of pipeline valves. An investigation involving up to 20 agencies is set to take place to determine the cause of the fire.

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The Day of the Young Combatant, 29 March, is highly likely to be marked by protests and clashes in Santiago, and there is a realistic possibility of unrest in other Chilean urban centres.

The Brazilian Supreme Court’s decision to try former President Jair Bolsonaro for his alleged involvement in a coup will likely deepen political divisions and may result in large-scale demonstrations.

Limited Black Sea ceasefire proposal highly likely to be leveraged by Russia to gain concessions while continuing to pursue its maximalist objectives against Ukraine on the battlefield.

Protests are likely to continue in the short term in Turkey, and there is a realistic possibility of an intensification on 28-30 March. Further arrests of journalists and opposition figures are highly likely.

Israeli strikes in southern Beirut likely targeted Hezbollah senior leadership and will likely force Hezbollah into retaliatory attacks on northern Israel.

There is a realistic possibility of a return to civil war in Syria as the interim government struggles to control its disparate forces, a nascent insurgency likely accelerates, and Israel continues aerial strikes.

The new wave of Israeli strikes in Gaza will almost certainly further worsen the humanitarian situation in the territory. Hamas’ leadership is highly likely to reduce its visibility to avert the threat of decapitation.

It is likely that South Sudan will return to civil war following the arrest of Vice President Riek Machar, with the power-sharing terms of the 2018 peace agreement having been effectively dismantled by President Salva Kiir.

The approaching deadline for the forced deportation of Afghan migrants from Pakistan is likely to result in security implications in both countries, including increased radicalisation, unrest and militancy.  

Significant damage and casualties almost certain after 7.7 magnitude earthquake close to Mandalay, Myanmar’s second biggest city. Significant disruptions likely to persist in Thailand.

Further wildfires likely in South Korea due to particularly dry weather after the country experiences its largest wildfires on record.

On 26 March, Brazil’s Supreme Court unanimously ruled that former President Jair Bolsonaro will face trial for his alleged role in attempting to overthrow the government in a military coup following his electoral defeat in 2022.

The former president will face charges relating to his involvement in an armed criminal organisation, participating in a group formed to undermine democratic institutions, and attempting to violently abolish the democratic rule of law, alleging that he sought to overthrow Brazil’s democratic system through force. He is also charged with conspiring to execute a coup d’état to depose the legitimately elected government. Additionally, he faces accusations of causing damage to federal property during post-election unrest and making serious threats against the state that could “destabilise governmental functions”.

If convicted, Bolsonaro could face a substantial prison sentence. The trial is expected to take place in late 2025, but a specific date has yet to be announced.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The trial of Bolsonaro will almost certainly have major political implications as it threatens to fracture Brazil’s powerful right-wing movement and will permanently end the former president’s political career. Consequently, much of his substantial support base will likely interpret this as a politically motivated move against the right ahead of the 2026 presidential election.

As recently as 16 March, thousands of supporters gathered at Rio de Janeiro’s Copacabana Beach to express support for Bolsonaro and demand a pardon for those accused of ransacking government buildings. While these protests did not attract as many as originally forecasted, the confirmation of a trial likely has the capacity to reinvigorate his support base, leading to larger and more frequent demonstrations.

There is a realistic possibility that the confirmation of a trial may provoke immediate rallies in several Brazilian cities that may result in violent interactions with the police or transport disruptions.

On 29 March, Chile will observe the 40^th “Day of the Young Combatant” (Día del joven combatiente). The day commemorates the killing of the two Vergara Toledo brothers in Santiago in 1985 during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.

The two brothers were allegedly part of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), a radical left-wing group that was at the forefront of the struggle against the dictatorship. The commemoration also extends to the other activists who were killed or imprisoned during the dictatorship.

The anniversary has continued to be politically relevant, reflecting broader anti-government and anti-police sentiment.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Several protests are planned to occur in downtown Santiago on 29 March. Unrest is likely to start in the late morning of 29 March and continue throughout the day, highly likely intensifying in the evening when organised rallies and protests conclude.

Past demonstrations during the Day of the Young Combatants have consisted of protesters erecting makeshift barriers, burning tyres, vandalising private businesses (particularly banks and the offices of foreign companies), firing projectiles including fireworks, and throwing Molotov cocktails at the police and other targets. Some demonstrators will likely be armed and are likely to seek direct confrontation with police forces. Chilean police will almost certainly deploy violent crowd control measures in response to the unrest, including tear gas, pepper spray, water cannons, and possibly rubber bullets. Past demonstrations have resulted in dozens of arrests.

While Santiago will almost certainly be the epicentre of the protests, unrest is possible in the central areas of Valparaiso, Conception, Telmuco, and other Chilean cities. There is a realistic possibility that protests will be driven by other grievances disconnected from the commemoration. For instance, there are ongoing protests in Valparaiso over a controversial fishing sector law; local left-wing groups may seek to stage joint unrest during the Day of the Young Combatant to capitalise on visibility.

Canada’s new Prime Minister calls snap elections for 28 April 2025

Mark Carney succeeded Justin Trudeau after the latter resigned amidst extremely low polling numbers for his Liberal Party. In his short tenure, Carney has seen his party massively rising in the polls and matching the opposition, the Conservative Party. The unprecedented surge in Liberal support, which has almost certainly re-opened the electoral race, was highly likely driven by the trade war with the United States, with the Conservatives perceived as too “Trump-friendly” by parts of the centrist electorate. Carney highly likely called the vote to both benefit from the surge in popular support and to increase the political legitimacy of his leadership.

Peru to hold general elections in April 2026

On 26 March, Peruvian President Dina Boluarte announced that the country would hold general elections in April 2026 in an effort to resolve ongoing instability. A new president, 130 deputies and 60 senators will be up for election.

The current president has not stated whether she will stand, however, Boluarte’s approval rating has hit an all-time low, with 93 per cent of Peruvians stating that they disapprove of the president. Widespread dissatisfaction with the incumbent government has likely been influenced by a huge rise in violent crime across Peru. This has involved indiscriminate attacks on public transportation and businesses linked to extortion rackets controlled by powerful transnational gangs.

The violence has become so severe that a 30-day state of emergency covering the capital Lima, and the neighbouring province of Callao was imposed on 18 March. Similar measures are likely to be introduced to curb the rise of violent crime, with Boluarte recently replacing the Interior Minister with a retired police general, a move that likely indicates her government’s intention to take a more hardline approach to law enforcement.   

10 April general strike to be held in Argentina against President Milei’s policies

Argentina’s largest trade union federation, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), has announced a 24-hour general strike on 10 April to protest President Javier Milei’s austerity policies. This will be the third general strike since Milei took office in December 2023.

The CGT cited wage restrictions, declining purchasing power, job losses, and cuts to the public health system as reasons for the strike. The union also plans to participate in protests on 24 March to commemorate victims of Argentina’s last military dictatorship, as well as demonstrations on 9 April and International Workers’ Day on 1 May. Protests will likely result in disruption to key sectors such as transport, healthcare, banking, and public administration and could result in violent interactions with the police.

FBI establishes task force to investigate vandalism across the US

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has established a new task force to investigate escalating vandalism at Tesla dealerships and charging stations across the US. Some attacks have included incidents involving incendiary devices and assaults, leading the FBI to refer to some of the action as “domestic terrorism”.

The attacks are almost certainly linked to the divisive involvement of Tesla CEO Elon Musk within the Trump administration, which has led to budget cuts and the loss of thousands of federal jobs and will almost certainly continue in line with government policies.

Previous attacks on infrastructure powering Tesla-linked facilities have caused significant disruptions to other businesses that rely on the same infrastructure, affecting their operations and productivity, as demonstrated by the attack on energy infrastructure powering the Tesla Giga factory near Berlin, Germany.

Car driven into anti-Tesla protesters in Florida

On 22 March, a man reportedly drove his vehicle into a group of protesters gathered outside a Tesla dealership in Palm Beach. No serious injuries were recorded, and the man was arrested by police. It is highly likely that the incident was a targeted attack on the demonstrators. The episode is notable as it matches a trend, observed in the US as well as in some European countries, of car-ramming attacks against high-visibility protest crowds. For instance, during the 2020-2021 Black Lives Matter protests, more than 60 car-ramming attacks on crowds were recorded. As anti-Tesla protests are likely to remain highly visible, the threat of further attacks remains.

US mulls death penalty for notorious Mexican drug lord

The US is considering the death penalty for Mexican drug lord, Rafael Caro Quintero, following his extradition. Quintero, who has been linked to the killing of DEA agent Enrique Camarena, has been charged with continuing criminal enterprise and conspiracy to import cocaine, among other charges. The growing threat of extradition, long prison sentences, and the death penalty is likely to send a message to the Mexican cartels, who may adapt their operations or even respond with increased violence to shield themselves from this developing threat.

Severe flooding continues to impact US-Mexico border

Severe flooding continues to impact communities along the US- Mexico border, causing widespread disruptions on both sides. Authorities have issued flash flood warnings in affected areas, with emergency responders conducting rescues as rising waters trap residents.

Schools have been forced to close, and non-emergency communication lines are down in some locations, though emergency services remain operational. In Mexico, multiple neighbourhoods are inundated, prompting the opening of emergency shelters. Reports indicate at least one fatality due to drowning, while infrastructure damage includes a hospital roof collapse.

Power outages are affecting thousands as utility crews work to restore service. Low-lying areas are at high risk with further rain forecasted, which is likely to disrupt emergency efforts and delay border crossings.

Bilateral talks in Saudi Arabia between US-Russia and US-Ukraine have continued. On 25 March, the White House announced that an agreement had been reached with Russia to “eliminate the use of a force” and “prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea”. In exchange, the US will “help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertiliser exports”, including a reference to enhancing access to “ports and payment systems for such transactions.”

The Kremlin stated that the limited Black Sea ceasefire would only come into force if specific demands were met, particularly: the lifting of sanctions from the agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and its reconnection to the SWIFT international payment system.

Kyiv also agreed to a Black Sea ceasefire proposal but emphasised that any movement of Russian naval vessels outside of the “Eastern part of the Black Sea” would violate the agreement.

On 26 March, statements from both Kyiv and Moscow accused each other of breaching the earlier 18 March energy infrastructure ceasefire. Russian officials have accused Ukraine of striking energy infrastructure in Kursk Oblast, Crimea, and Bryansk Oblast between 25-26 March, while Ukrainian officials have accused Russia of conducting at least eight strikes on energy facilities since 18 March.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The nature of the bilateral talks and limited ceasefire agreements, which have excluded any direct Russia-Ukraine talks and have not produced any jointly signed agreements, highly likely make their conditions challenging to enforce. It is almost certain that cyclical accusations of ceasefire violations will continue, with differing understandings of the specific conditions or terms of the agreements.

The Black Sea ceasefire proposal will highly likely only have a small impact on the overall strategic picture of the war, with the Russian Black Sea Fleet being only minimally active since the emergence of the Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessel (USV) threat to Russian vessels. Ukraine has leveraged USVs, in addition to anti-ship missile systems, to effectively challenge Russia in the maritime domain and force its retrograde from its home port of Sevastopol.

The Black Sea ceasefire, therefore, likely provides tangible advantages to Russia as its maritime threat has been successfully challenged. Additionally, there is a plausible scenario in which the Black Sea Fleet could exploit the ambiguous terms to launch ship and submarine-launched missiles from the Black Sea at land-based targets in Ukraine, intentionally interpreting the terms as applying solely to attacks against targets within the Black Sea.

A cessation of Ukraine’s USV threat may also enable Russia to resume its maritime resupply from mainland Russia to Crimea, which could help Russia sustain operations in places like Kherson and Zaporizhia. Russia may honour a deal which includes refraining from attacking merchant shipping, as this would help ensure global food security, enabling it to secure its geopolitical influence, particularly in developing countries that rely heavily on Ukrainian grain.

The US President Donald Trump’s administration is likely motivated to further a narrative that they are furthering progress towards peace in Ukraine, even if the limited ceasefire agreements are largely symbolic and lacking in specifically enforceable conditions that are mutually ratified. The Kremlin will highly likely continue to leverage ceasefire talks and proposals to gain concessions while continuing to pursue their maximalist objectives on the battlefield.

The Black Sea agreement has been specifically leveraged by Putin, for example, to gain the potential removal of SWIFT sanctions for Rosselkhozbank. In 2022, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, major Russian banks were removed from the SWIFT network, which is critical to facilitating cross-border payments in the international financial system. However, it is likely that the Trump administration will face significant challenges in complying with demands to remove such key sanctions, as EU cooperation would be necessary.

Moscow is almost certainly incentivised to further a split between the US and Ukraine’s European partners and will likely intensify hybrid operations against European targets as the transatlantic rift widens.

Turkish authorities have arrested and deported BBC journalist Mark Lowen over “threats to public order” and have detained at least seven other journalists, including those from AFP, over their coverage of the unrest. Protests have continued in Istanbul and other large urban centres a week after the arrest of opposition leader Ekrem Imamoglu.

Approximately 2,000 people have been detained so far due to the unrest, and more than 150 police officers have been injured. The municipality council of Istanbul elected an interim mayor on 26 March, preventing the government from appointing a trustee to oversee the city’s administration.

Ankara has likewise imposed bans on reporting on opposition television and radio channels, threatening them with closure if they do not comply.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests have slightly decreased in intensity compared to the 19-21 March period but remain active, especially in Istanbul. There is a realistic possibility of another increase in intensity during the weekend of 29-30 March, with the Turkish opposition vowing that protests will continue in “every city.

The government of Turkey has sought to capitalise on its geopolitical successes to minimise the possibility of European pushback on its crackdown on the opposition, and, with Turkish financial assets plunging, Ankara likely assesses that Brussels will not take the politically risky choice of imposing sanctions.

It is likely that unrest will continue in the medium term and that Ankara will continue using the police to target the opposition and journalists covering the protests. Travellers are likewise at risk of arbitrary detention, and there is a high likelihood that authorities will use emergency powers, such as travel restrictions for participants in demonstrations, to quash voices perceived as dissenting.

There is a realistic possibility that Imamoglu’s arrest is just the initial step in a series of actions aimed at suppressing the opposition and securing the reform of the constitutional limit on presidential terms, ultimately paving the way for Erdogan’s victory at the polls. In such a case, Turkey is likely to experience episodic unrest in response to these moves until the run-up to the 2028 elections.

On 21 March, rockets were fired from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claim to have intercepted three rockets, and a further three landed in Lebanese territory. This marks the first rocket attack on northern Israel from Lebanon since early December.

The IDF responded with counter-battery fire and then conducted two waves of air strikes on 22-23 March against Hezbollah high-value targets across Lebanon, including weapons depots, headquarters, fighters, and rocket launchers. The attacks were confined to southern Lebanon and the Hezbollah stronghold of the Bekaa Valley near the Syrian border.

However, on 28 March, the IDF issued evacuation orders for residents of Hadath in southern Beirut to evacuate in the first such order for the Lebanese capital since the ceasefire was established.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The limited nature of the rocket attack may suggest that this was not an attack authorised by Hezbollah’s senior leadership, indicating the possibility of a rogue faction or lower-ranking operatives acting independently. However, the initial response from the IDF likely indicates that Israel is seeking to exploit the attack to further degrade the Shia militant group.

IDF strikes on this scale have likely undermined any prospects for de-escalation between Israel and Hezbollah and are likely to lead to a renewed threat in northern Israel. Hezbollah likely has some tolerance for attacks on rank-and-file fighters or rocket launch sites. However, the evacuation order for parts of southern Beirut, a known Hezbollah stronghold, likely indicates that the IDF has conducted a strike on a high-value target, most likely the senior leadership.

If this is the case, this will almost certainly be beyond Hezbollah’s threshold for attacks and will highly likely result in retaliatory attacks that will undermine the already fragile ceasefire agreement.

The Syrian interim-government controlled Ministry of Information reported on 24 March that a cyberattack had targeted official government platforms and private social media accounts. The Ministry claims that the attack was an organised effort conducted by Assad-regime remnants.

On early 25 March starting at 02:40 local time, a nationwide total internet outage occurred, lasting for approximately 12 hours. Authorities stated that the outage was the result of sabotage, with two fibre optic cables being cut near Homs and Damascus.

Concurrently, on early 25 March, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted aerial strikes on a former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) airbase near Palmyra. This was followed on 27 March by multiple IAF strikes against an ammunition warehouse in the White Harbour area of Latakia, with no casualties yet to be reported.

On 26 March, the former Grand Mufti of Syria, Sheikh Ahmed Badr al-Din Hassoun, who served in the official Sunni religious leadership post between 2005 and 2021, was arrested by Syrian security forces. Hassoun was arrested at Damascus International Airport (DAM) whilst attempting to depart Syria to Amman, Jordan for a surgical operation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Transitional President of Syria and former Emir of the now officially dissolved Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ahmed al-Sharaa, has to contend with a myriad of threats to Syria’s security. The Israeli strikes are indicative of a continuing strategic objective for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to degrade the future potential of Syria’s new armed forces, with the HTS-led interim government almost certainly perceived as a threat to Israel’s security.

It is estimated that al-Sharaa’s HTS group is comprised of only 20,000 fighters, including a notable contingent of jihadist foreign fighters, who now serve as the core of Syria’s new national armed forces. This relatively small size has almost certainly forced al-Sharaa to rely on fighters from other groups officially integrating into the Syrian Army for Syria’s defence, such as the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).

As demonstrated by the retribution massacres conducted against Syrian Alawites in early March, it is highly likely that Damascus exercises minimal command and control over the disparate groupings of fighters that act on behalf of the new Syrian state.

The arrest of Hassoun follows an arrest warrant being issued, with Hassoun having been a firm supporter of the Assad regime. Whilst al-Sharaa has promised amnesty for surrendering SAA soldiers and lower-level officials, he has also promised to bring justice to leading regime figures and SAA commanders responsible for crimes against humanity.

In February, protesters stormed Hassoun’s home in Aleppo following sightings of the former Grand Mufti being publicised on social media, with anger being further catalysed by videos depicting him as the “Mufti of Barrels”, almost certainly in reference to the barrel bombs deployed by the regime against urban centres during the civil war.

Syrian security forces had protected Hassoun’s home and dispersed the protesters during the February protests, however, his arrest now is likely indicative of increasing efforts by Damascus to prosecute regime remnants with the threat of a nascent insurgency and likely increasing dissatisfaction from hardliners against al-Sharaa.

Although it is likely that both the past week’s cyberattacks and sabotage against critical telecommunications infrastructure were conducted by individuals associated with Assad-regime remnants, there is a realistic possibility that Israeli covert operations have also played a supporting role to further undermine the burgeoning but highly fragile post-Assad Syrian state. It is likely that in the pursuit of their objectives, leading Israeli military and intelligence figures are incentivised to support the fracturing of the new Syrian state.

There is a realistic possibility of a return to civil war in Syria if the interim government remains unable to control the latent extremist elements in its de facto irregular armed forces and regime remnant insurgent groups grow in popularity amongst the under-threat Alawite minority. A renewed civil war is likely to draw in both Hezbollah and Iran, a development that would benefit Israel by diverting the attention and resources of these hostile actors away from its borders.

Ten days after the collapse of the ceasefire, Israeli forces have continued to carry out airstrikes in the Gaza Strip with the aim of decapitating the remaining Hamas leadership and forcing the group to release the remaining hostages. More than 800 Palestinians have been reportedly killed since the resumption of hostilities.

On 23-24 March, Salah al-Bardawil, a senior member of Hamas’ political bureau, was killed in a strike in the al-Mawasi zone in Khan Yunis. Another member of the political bureau, Ismail Barhoum, was killed in a strike on Nasser Hospital. Since 2 March, the Gaza Strip has been under an aid blockade, causing food prices to surge, according to reports from the World Food Programme (WFP) and other humanitarian agencies.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the blockade, strikes, and evacuation orders (which reportedly have displaced over 130,000 since 18 March) will result in a sharp short-term increase in the severity of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Militarily, it is highly likely that Israeli forces’ sudden and coordinated wave of attacks starting on 18 March took advantage of Hamas’ operational security vulnerabilities. This likely enabled successful decapitation strikes against the group’s leadership. Furthermore, it is likely that Israel used the ceasefire period to conduct increased intelligence gathering, refining target lists and exploiting Hamas’ weaknesses to enhance the effectiveness of these strikes.

Israeli and Hamas officials have resumed truce talks in Qatar indirectly via an Egyptian delegation. On 27 March, Egyptian officials reported a series of further ceasefire terms being discussed by the two sides. There is a realistic possibility that the high intensity of Israeli strikes in Gaza is aimed at forcing Hamas officials into granting further concessions, such as a more expedited release of the remaining hostages. Hamas almost certainly retains a fundamental interest in remaining the key political force capable of exercising administrative functions in Gaza. Israeli strikes may put pressure on the group by forcing it to become less visible, thus threatening its political viability.

Late on 26 March, a heavily armed convoy comprising high-ranking security officials, including the defence minister, stormed the Juba residence of South Sudan’s First Vice President Riek Machar, disarmed his security personnel, and placed him under house arrest. The arrest follows a marked escalation in South Sudanese tensions since late February. These tensions have triggered fears of a return to civil war following heavy fighting between the national army and White Army militias in Nasir, Upper Nile State.

Clashes have continued, with a spokesman from Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) claiming on 24 March that South Sudanese military airstrikes struck an SPLM-IO base near Wun Aliet, Unity State. This followed an incident where SPLM-IO and government Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) forces almost opened fire on one another near Wun Aliet following perceived hostile manoeuvring.

Both the UK Foreign Office and US State Department have advised their nationals to leave South Sudan immediately if safe to do so.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The risk of a return to civil war has almost certainly significantly increased following Machar’s detention, with the SPLM-IO stating that his arrest has invalidated the 2018 peace deal. The fundamental power-sharing basis for the 2018 peace agreement has almost certainly been effectively dismantled by President Salvar Kiir in recent weeks.

It is likely that armed confrontations between SPLM and SPLM-IO ground forces will break out as troops continue to engage in brinkmanship, which would, in turn, likely lead to further nationwide escalation. It is highly likely that if the civil war resumes, fighting will break out in similar patterns to the 2013-2018 conflict, resulting in significant civilian casualties and displacement, including gun battles in the capital, Juba.

There is also a risk of regional escalation, with the deployment of Ugandan forces to Juba to support Kiir leading to significant condemnation from SPLM-IO figures.

UK-based environmentalist group announces end to direct action

On 27 March, Just Stop Oil (JSO), an environmentalist group that has carried out multiple high-visibility protests in London and other large UK cities, announced it would cease direct action following a protest on 26 April. The group justified the move by stating that their demands had been satisfied by government policy. JSO is an important direct-action group, and the decision to end protests will likely create more opportunities for smaller movements to recruit and stage actions.

General strike to be held in Belgium on 31 March

A general strike is scheduled to take place in Belgium on 31 March, organised by the socialist trade union FGTB/ABVV and the Christian union CSC/ACV in response to cuts in the new Federal Government’s budget. The strike will almost certainly result in significant nationwide disruptions and coincide with widespread protests.

Key sectors, including education and public services, will be affected as workers take to the streets to protest what they consider anti-social measures, such as cuts to pensions and benefits. All passenger flights from Brussels Airport and Charleroi Airport will be cancelled, with Brussels Airlines set to suspend all its operations. Rail services will also face disruptions, and public transport across Brussels will be significantly affected.

German far right march in Berlin

Around 40 people were detained by police on 22 March during a march by far-right groups, including neo-Nazi formations, in the Friedrichshain area of Berlin. The march consisted of around 850 individuals and is assessed as being the largest neo-Nazi demonstration in Berlin in recent months. According to local media, at least 2,000 counterprotesters blocked the march’s path, resulting in its early end. 

Austria uncovers large-scale information operations in German-speaking countries

According to Austrian authorities, shortly following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a cell run by a Bulgarian national began spreading large quantities of disinformation with the goal of influencing popular opinion in Austria and Germany. The cell, which posed as a pro-Ukraine group, reportedly had ties to Jan Marsalek, the COO of the insolvent payment processing firm Wirecard, who is currently a fugitive and is alleged to be an asset for Russian intelligence.

The Austrian group reportedly used low-cost and low-sophistication tactics, both online and offline, such as vandalism. The case further highlights how Russia is exploiting internal divisions in Europe to sponsor highly deniable and low-cost acts of sabotage and violence to deter, disrupt and divide its adversaries, a trend that will likely increase if Europe increases its support for Ukraine in response to US disengagement.

Thousands continue to protest in Hungary over Pride parade banning

On 25 March, thousands of protestors in Budapest blocked major roads and bridges in response to the government’s decision to ban Pride events and restrict the right to assembly. The protest was the second in two weeks since the ruling Fidesz party used its two-thirds parliamentary majority to expedite the law. The authorities will now also be authorised to use facial recognition software to identify those who attend the prohibited event. Further protests will highly likely be organised in central Budapest in the run-up to the city’s 30^th Pride parade anniversary, scheduled for 28 June. Any attempt to hold a parade will almost certainly to be met with police opposition.

Protests in North Macedonia over nightclub fire

On 24 March, thousands of protestors gathered in the North Macedonian capital of Skopje to demand greater accountability for those responsible for the 16 March nightclub fire that killed 59 people. The government has arrested at least 13 people, including a former finance minister and seven police officers, as part of a corruption investigation linked to the fire. However, public outrage remains high and over 100 victims of the fire remain in care in multiple European hospitals. Further deaths and he failure to hold those responsible to account will likely trigger further protests, which may evolve into a wider movement against perceived corruption in the country.

Niger’s junta government outlines a five-year transition to constitutional rule

On 26 March, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, who came to power in a military coup in July 2023, was sworn in under a new charter which replaced Niger’s old constitution. Under the new charter, Tchiani is set to be president for a transition period of five years, rejecting attempts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to hasten the return to democracy after Niger proposed a three-year transition period. The new charter allows flexibility on the five-year term, depending on the status of the insurgencies.

The move comes after Niger’s government left ECOWAS alongside Mali and Burkina Faso to form a trilateral Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which enables the conflict-ridden countries greater sovereignty and independence. Burkina Faso’s military junta has already extended the transition period to July 2029, while Mali postponed elections scheduled for February 2024 with no new date set.

Zimbabwean president dismisses army chief

On 26 March, Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa fired the country’s head of the armed forces, General Anselem Sanyatwe, amid rising concerns about a potential coup from former allies. President Mnangagwa is facing increasing pressure from members of his ZANU-PF party and from war veterans, who accuse him of worsening the nation’s economic crisis and trying to extend his rule beyond 2028. The dismissal follows the reshuffling of the military, police, and intelligence positions, moves that have likely been conducted to help Mnangagwa consolidate his power and send a message to those demanding he is replaced.

Several influential veterans of the country’s war of independence have called for nationwide demonstrations to be organised on 31 March, demanding that Mnangagwa step down. If the protests materialise, there is a strong likelihood that the government will respond with violence, given that Zimbabwean security forces have previously used excessive force, including live ammunition, to suppress protests, as seen after the 2018 elections.

Five wounded after knife attack in central Amsterdam, the Netherlands

On 27 March, a man reportedly carried out a knife attack in Dam Square in central Amsterdam, wounding five people, including a child. No deaths have been reported as of the time of writing, and the attacker was subdued by bystanders on the scene before being arrested. The attacker’s identity has not officially been confirmed as of the time of writing. There is a realistic possibility that the attack was an ideologically motivated case of lone wolf terrorism, due to both its dynamics and the attacker’s choice of a high-visibility area of Amsterdam’s centre.

US continue unilateral strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen

The US’ Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to conduct unilateral strikes on a series of targets across Houthi-controlled Yemen. Yemeni media report that at least 44 US strikes were conducted on the night of 27-28 March, with targets hit across Sana’a, Amran, Sa’dah, Al Hudaydah and Al Jawf regions, purportedly including residential neighbourhoods in the capital Sana’a and the port city of Hodeida. This marks a major shift in strategy under President Trump, moving to targeting senior leadership and even rank-and-file personnel in major population centres, rather than strictly targeting military facilities in sparsely populated areas.

The strikes are likely a direct response to escalating Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and US military assets in the region, as well as renewed attacks on Israel. However, the strikes are likely to increase international condemnation, strengthen anti-US sentiment in the region and could provoke Iran into providing more support to the militant group. The Houthis’ immediate response will likely be to escalate attacks on merchant shipping, US military assets, and Israel in a show of defiance.

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) take Khartoum, ending a two-year-long battle

On 26 March, SAF officials claimed they had taken control of the entirety of the Sudanese capital after expelling the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from their final strongholds in the city’s south. The capture of Khartoum concludes a two-month-long offensive and, more broadly, almost two years of fighting over control of the city. RSF leaders have pledged that they will continue to fight; they will highly likely concentrate most of their efforts in the country’s west, with the goal of establishing a viable political entity.

Taking Khartoum is not only a political victory but is likely also a strategic one. Establishing control over the city will allow the SAF to solidify its positions on the eastern banks of the Nile and subsequently concentrate their forces for a westward offensive into RSF-controlled territory.

Islamists kill over 40 in Niger mosque attack

On 21 March, Islamist militants surrounded the Fambita Mosque in Niger’s southwest Tillabéri Region and randomly shot at worshippers, killing 44 and injuring a further 11. The militants then reportedly set fire to a market and several homes in the area. The attack occurred during Friday prayers in the last ten days of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

Local sources have attributed the attack to the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP), formerly the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). The intent of the attackers was almost certainly to cause as many civilian deaths as possible to instil fear and could have been retaliation for supporting rival groups or the government.

The attack is a further indication of the destabilisation of the Sahel region and demonstrates how extremist groups are continuing to exploit the Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso tri-border area as a safe haven due to its porous borders and lack of effective governance.

Islamists attack separate army facilities in Nigeria’s Borno State

On 24-25 March, Islamist militants launched coordinated attacks on an army base and a military outpost in Nigeria’s northeastern Borno State, killing at least 16 soldiers. The militants are expected to have belonged to both Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), according to Nigerian military sources.

In a potential sign of growing sophistication, the militants reportedly reconnoitred the positions with drones before conducting a ground assault and successfully looted a stockpile of weapons. The attacks will likely embolden militants in the area, especially if there is developing coordination between Boko Haram and ISWAP, who have previously fought against one another.

The attack may indicate a temporal alliance between the rival Islamist groups, with both likely attempting to exploit Nigerian military defences or seize an opportunity to overstretch its forces.

Al-Shabab kill Kenyan police officers in cross-border attack

On 23 March, suspected al-Shabaab militants launched an attack on a police camp in Garissa County, Kenya, near the Somalia border. The assault resulted in six police officers being killed and four others injured. The attackers used a variety of weapons to overpower the camp housing police reservists. The US embassy in Kenya has issued a travel alert, warning citizens to avoid parts of Kenya, including Garissa, due to the threat of militancy. The attack demonstrates al-Shabab’s ability to cross porous borders to conduct attacks, which it likely uses to obtain international publicity, recruit from within Kenya and to deter Kenyan counter-insurgency efforts.

AFC/M23 backtrack from agreement to relinquish control of Walikale in the DRC’s North Kivu region

On 20 March, AFC/M23 captured the mining hub town of Walikale in North Kivu, which is the furthest west the group has advanced since their conception in 2012. However, in a reported peace gesture, they announced that they would withdraw their forces on 22 March. In exchange for the withdrawal, they requested that Walikale and its surrounding area remain demilitarised, stating that hostilities would resume if the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) returned.

They then changed their mind, stating that they would not pull out unless the FARDC pulled out first. Fighting has resumed in the territory; three people were reportedly killed following a shootout between AFC/M23 near Walikale on 27 March. The attempt to withdraw from Walikale while preventing a FARDC takeover of the city is highly likely indicative that AFC/M23 are overstretched and cannot hold Walikale while continuing to also advance north and south. Therefore, the withdrawal of troops from the town likely indicates that they will redeploy the forces to support an advance either north towards Butembo, south towards Uvira, or potentially both.

Evacuations underway in Campania, Italy, over volcanic risk

At least 350 people have been evacuated so far from the area of Pozzuoli, near Naples, following tremors. The town is located on the Phlegraean Fields, a caldera volcano which is assessed as one of Europe’s major volcanoes. On 13 March, a 4.6 earthquake was recorded in the area, the strongest in 40 years and between 17 and 23 March, 42 localised earthquakes were recorded.

On 22 March, small-scale clashes were recorded between police forces and members of a local citizens’ group who were demonstrating to request government intervention to address the risks of growing seismic activity. An eruption at the Phlegraean Fields site could be extremely disruptive and endanger much of the resident populations of Naples and nearby areas. However, even smaller-scale seismic activity could affect the operations of the port of Pozzuoli and nearby infrastructure. Importantly, much of the residential infrastructure in the Campania region is not earthquake-proof, meaning that even intermediate-strength tremors can cause major damage.

All “illegal foreigners” currently residing in Pakistan will be expected to exit the country by 31 March or face deportation, which is scheduled to start from 1 April. The order, which comes from Pakistan’s Interior Ministry, will extend to Afghan nationals holding Afghan Citizen Cards and is set to affect nearly 900,000 individuals. There are also approximately 1.3 million Afghan migrants legally residing in Pakistan with a proof of residence permit, and it is unclear as to how the directive will impact them.

The deportation order comes shortly after the reopening of the main border crossing between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which had been closed following border clashes in February 2023. Human rights groups like Amnesty International have condemned the deportation programme, labelling it a violation of international human rights law and the principle of non-refoulement.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The deportation programme is part of a wider campaign against Afghans residing in Pakistan. This has involved widespread harassment, arbitrary detentions, deportations, human rights violations, and the bulldozing of Afghan homes and businesses. The Pakistani government has also engaged in the scapegoating of Afghans, blaming them for crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and civil unrest, enabling it to achieve significant support for the deportations. However, the deportation programme is likely to have security implications in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, the mass return of deported individuals will almost certainly place incredible strain on an already fragile state struggling with economic hardship and a dire humanitarian situation. The influx of returnees, many without support networks or a means of livelihood, will likely exacerbate poverty, fuel instability, and fuel radicalisation, especially as many originally fled from the Taliban. Militant groups, such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), will likely capitalise on this to expand recruitment, increasing the risks of terror attacks in Afghanistan and cross-border attacks into Pakistan.

In Pakistan, the removal of Afghans is unlikely to produce the security benefits the government claims. The directive is likely to risk exacerbating tensions with the Taliban, who are likely to interpret it as persecution of the Afghan diaspora. There is a realistic possibility that the Taliban will respond with increased attacks on Pakistani security services on the border or by supporting cross-border attacks in Pakistan by groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

The targeting of Afghan nationals may also deepen sectarian and ethnic divides, increasing the likelihood of civil unrest. Moreover, Pakistan’s security forces are likely ill-equipped to deal with the logistical challenges of forcibly relocating hundreds of thousands of people. With ongoing sectarian violence and a surge in militancy across Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and other regions, Pakistani forces are likely overstretched, a scenario militant groups may seek to exploit to further undermine the central government.

At 12:50 local time (06:20 UTC) on 28 March, a magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck the Sagaing Region of central Myanmar. The epicentre was located approximately 16 kilometres north-northwest of Sagaing City in Mandalay’s outskirts, at a depth of ten kilometres. The main tremor was followed by several aftershocks of above 5.0 magnitude. The earthquake caused widespread damage across the cities of Sagaing and Mandalay, with multiple high-rise buildings and bridges destroyed. Tremors have also been felt in neighbouring countries, including Vietnam, Bangladesh, China, and Thailand.

The impacts of the earthquake were felt strongly in Thailand, where shaking caused buildings to collapse in Bangkok. The Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra declared a state of emergency within the first hours of the earthquake being felt and also ordered the evacuation of tall buildings in Bangkok, at least one of which collapsed while under construction. Communications were disrupted in Bangkok, and the Transport Ministry temporarily suspended flights nationwide for approximately 20 minutes; flights have since resumed. Train services were also suspended in the capital until further notice.

Official casualty figures are currently unclear. Myanmar’s military junta controls most radio, television, print, and online media; internet use is restricted; and communication lines are currently down. According to the US Geological Survey, thousands are likely dead as a result of the shaking, stating that ‘high casualties and extensive damage are probable, and the disaster is likely widespread.’ Myanmar’s national disaster management committee has declared a state of emergency in Sagaing, Mandalay, Magway, northeastern Shan State, Naypyitaw Council Area, and Bago.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The earthquake is the strongest in Myanmar in over 150 years. The last comparable tremor occurred in 2012 when a magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck near Shwebo, 120 kilometres north of Mandalay. The 2012 earthquake resulted in 26 fatalities: a toll almost certain to be considerably exceeded by the latest quake. North-central, south-central, and central Myanmar frequently experiences seismic activity due to their location within the convergence zone of the Indian and Sunda Plates, where tectonic stress is periodically released as earthquakes.

Several aftershocks have already been felt in Myanmar; further aftershocks are highly likely in the coming days. While the aftershocks are unlikely to reach a similar magnitude to the initial earthquake, further aftershocks of over 5.0 magnitude may still occur. This could further damage structures that have already been weakened by the initial tremor and hinder relief efforts.

A humanitarian crisis has been ongoing in the country since the military conducted a coup in February 2021, deposing the democratically elected government. Several resistance groups formed in the aftermath, triggering a civil war. Significant civilian casualties and widespread displacement have occurred as a result of the conflict, and the nation faces a worsening humanitarian crisis. The earthquake will almost certainly exacerbate the ongoing humanitarian crisis by disrupting power and water infrastructure, trade routes, and agriculture, which accounts for between 25 and 30 per cent of Myanmar’s GDP.

The likely limited assistance will almost certainly be exacerbated by the presence of rebel groups in Mandalay. These groups include Mandalay People’s Defence Force (PDF), Ta’ang National Liberation Front (TNLF), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA).  On 14 March, at least 27 people were killed and at least 30 injured after Myanmar’s military junta conducted an airstrike on Singu Township, Mandalay. It is likely that rebel groups will take advantage of the damaged infrastructure and communications networks in the region to capture government-held territory near Mandalay.

Wildfires which have been burning since 21 March have destroyed at least 118,000 acres. The fires originated in Uiseong and have moved rapidly eastward, fuelled by dry conditions, high winds, and an abundance of sap-filled pine trees. The counties of Uiseong, Andong, Sancheong and the city of Ulsan have been hit the hardest. At least 28 people have been killed so far, 37 injured, and thousands displaced. The fires have destroyed hundreds of structures, including houses, factories, and cultural properties, including a centuries-old Buddhist temple, and have led to the evacuation of around 38,000 residents, including in Andong, Uiseong, Sancheong, and Ulsan. Approximately 26,000 people remain displaced.

Firefighters are utilising approximately 120 helicopters to battle the fires across South Korea’s mountainous topography. One pilot crashed while attempting to contain a fire, and four other firefighters died after being trapped by flames. Efforts to combat the fires are being bolstered by the deployment of US Army helicopters to the North and South Gyeongsang regions. Overnight rainfall on 27 and 28 March has provided better visibility and cooler temperatures, enabling improved firefighting conditions, allowing firefighters to extinguish fires in Yeongdeok, Uiseong, Andong, Cheongsong, and Yeongyang. The latest figures show that wildfires in Uiseong and Andong are 98 per cent and 90 per cent extinguished, respectively.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There are currently no reports indicating airport operations have been affected; Incheon International Airport (ICN) and Gimpo International Airport (GMP) are operating as normal. Human activities, including a lighter left on the ground at a funeral, waste burning, and sparks during welding work, are believed to be the root cause of multiple fires. Lee Han-kyung, the disaster and safety division chief, has pointed to climate change for exacerbating the situation.

In South Korea, unusually warm spring temperatures dried out the landscape and, when combined with strong winds, created optimal conditions for fast-moving fires to tear through the region’s dense forests; half the average rainfall has occurred in the affected areas. As the climate crisis worsens, it is driving hotter, drier conditions that cause fires to spread more rapidly and burn with greater intensity. So far this year, South Korea has reported 244 wildfires, 2.4 times more than during the same period last year, according to Prime Minister Han Duck-soo. Given the particularly dry weather, further wildfires are likely.

Royalist protesters set fire to the Unified Socialist Party office in Kathmandu, Nepal

On 28 March, royalist protesters entered the headquarters of the Unified Socialist Party in Aloknagar, strewing documents across the streets and setting fire to the office. The act comes amid planned rival republican and royalist protests on the same day. The republican demonstrators are largely affiliated with The Socialist Front, which comprises opposition parties including the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)-Maoist Centre and CPN-Unified Socialist; the royalist protesters are led by Durga Prasai, a political activist who frequently calls for the overthrow of the current federal democratic government system.

The District Administration Office has attempted to keep the groups separate, designating the Exhibition Road-Bhrikutimandap for republican protesters and Tinkune for royalist protesters. Approximately 3,500 security personnel were deployed in preparation for the demonstrations. These measures almost certainly indicate the high potential for violence between the rival groups.

The burning of the Unified Socialist Party offices significantly increases the likelihood of clashes between royalists and republicans as demonstrations develop throughout the day. If clashes erupt, it is likely that they will continue into the weekend, given the animosity between the rival groups.

Protests against law expanding military control continue in Indonesia

Protests against the introduction of a new law that enables the military to have more control within the Indonesian government have continued to be organised in multiple cities, including Jakarta, Surabaya in East Java, Aceh, and South Kalimantan. Multiple protests, including ones held outside the parliament building in Jakarta, have escalated to violence, with security forces responding with tear gas, water cannons, and other crowd dispersal measures.

In Surabaya, at least 14 journalists were attacked while covering the anti-government protests, resulting in condemnation from international NGOs. As a result of the police’s response and the fears of Indonesia reverting to its authoritarian past, protests are likely to continue throughout the weekend of 29-30 March.

Australia to hold federal elections on 3 May

On 28 March, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced that the country would hold federal elections on 3 May. The vote will select all 150 members of the House of Representatives and a majority of the 76 Senators. Currently, the Labor Party, which is in government, is polling slightly behind the centre-right Coalition. The primary concern continues to be the cost of living crisis, which, as seen in other Western nations, has gained significant political traction in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. While Australian elections are typically peaceful and well-organised, there remains a potential for civil unrest, particularly in response to major domestic or international political developments.

Militants conduct wave of attacks in Pakistan’s restive Balochistan

Militants belonging to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) have conducted a wave of attacks throughout Balochistan against both Pakistani security services and civilians. On 26 March, Baloch militants reportedly killed five passengers on the N10 highway near Ormara after checking their IDs and targeting those from the Punjab region. On 27 March, an explosion targeting a police van in Quetta killed at least three and injured 21. Earlier, on the same day, another explosion near a police vehicle in Quetta injured four officers.

The attacks likely demonstrate an emboldened BLA since the hijacking of the Jaffar Express on 11 March and indicate that the militant group is likely seeking to exploit a consistently overstretched and underprepared Pakistani military. There are also early indications that the BLA has increased its recruitment of women, which it has used to conduct suicide attacks, a development that will almost certainly increase the BLA’s ability to instil terror and evade security measures.

Taiwanese warship collides with Chinese fishing vessel off central Taiwan

On early 27 March, a Taiwanese Republic of China Navy (ROCN) vessel collided with a Chinese fishing vessel off central Taiwan, with no injuries reported. The naval vessel, a Chung-Ho-class tank landing ship (hull number LST-232), sustained some unspecified damage, which did not compromise its navigational safety, according to the ROCN. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) dispatched two patrol vessels to the scene at the Navy’s request.

The incident has occurred in the context of continued regular military exercises conducted by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and navy (PLAN) that cross the median line in Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). For example, on 26 March, a sortie of 27 PLA aircraft, 6 PLAN vessels and 2 “official ships” were identified by Taiwanese forces. These intrusions occur several times a week. There is a realistic possibility that the vessel collision was the result of aggressive action from either or both the Chinese fishing vessel and the Taiwanese warship.

Chinese fishing vessels, in addition to China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels, are regularly used by Beijing to assert maritime control as part of People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), and are often equipped with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment and other military hardware. While the vessel collision has passed with minimal diplomatic impact or media coverage, almost certainly due to the lack of injuries, it reaffirms the risk of escalation posed by small-scale maritime incidents should casualties result.

Thousands on standby in expectation of more flooding in Malaysia

Over a thousand members of the Johor Civil Defence Force remain on standby due to the ongoing monsoon transition, which has already resulted in widespread flooding in southern Malaysia, the evacuation of thousands, and disruption on the Malaysia-Singapore border. Despite the official end of the northeast monsoon, forecasts indicate that unpredictable weather during the southwest monsoon transition could lead to flash floods, especially in low-lying areas and landslides in the more mountainous areas. Less severe flooding has also been reported in Malaysian Borneo, in both Sabah and Sarawak states.

6.8 earthquake registered off the coast of New Zealand

On 25 March, a magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck off the coast of New Zealand’s South Island, near Fiordland National Park, at a depth of 33 kilometres. In response, the National Emergency Management Agency issued a tsunami advisory and advised people to avoid beaches due to the risk of strong currents. While no tsunami followed, the depth of the earthquake and historical seismic activity in the region indicate a moderate likelihood of aftershocks, which could persist for several weeks.

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At approximately 10:30 (local time), a car ramming occurred in the centre of the Bavarian city of Munich, at the intersection of Dachauer Strasse and Seidlstrasse.

According to witnesses, an individual drove a vehicle into a crowd of members of the Verdi labour union, who had gathered for a rally in the Königsplatz area. Other witnesses reportedly stated they heard some gunshots, but these testimonies could not be corroborated by authorities at the time of writing.

At least 28 people were injured in the attack, with “several” in critical condition. No deaths have been reported as of the time of writing.

The police arrested the perpetrator on the scene. According to local German media, the suspect is a 24-year-old Afghan national, who was known to local police for previous non-terror-related offences. Available information suggests that the perpetrator of the attack acted alone.

While the police blocked traffic in the area immediately adjacent to the site of the ramming, no reports of widespread traffic closures or disruptions were identified as of the time of writing. The Munich Security Conference, which will be attended by numerous world leaders and high-profile figures, is scheduled to be held in the centre of the city between 14 and 16 February

On the morning of 5 February at approximately 06:15 local time, at least two individuals armed with Kalashnikov-style rifles opened fire at the entrance of the Clémenceau Metro station, located to the southwest of Brussels’ city centre. No injuries were reported during the shooting as of the time of writing, and suspects then reportedly fled inside the metro tunnel network. CCTV images captured the shooting, showing two people firing multiple bursts at an unidentified target.

As of the time of writing, the suspects remain at large. Belgian authorities have shut down Clémenceau station, as well as the nearby Brussels-Midi station, which serves as the terminal for the Eurostar train. Metro lines 2 and 6 have been shut down between Troon and Weststation, tram lines 4 and 10 have been interrupted between Noordstation and Churchill, and trams 51 and 82 have been interrupted between Anderlechtsepoort and Zuidstation.

Authorities have advised commuters to use alternative metro lines but have so far ruled out a complete shutdown of the metro system. Authorities have likewise created a response post at the Anderlecht town hall, located west of Brussels.