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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 31 Mar 2026 – 02 Apr 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 2 April.
  • On 31 March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that it would attack US companies in the region starting on 1 April in retaliation for attacks on Iran. The IRGC published a list of 19 companies with corporate offices in the region: Microsoft, Apple, Google (Alphabet), Nvidia, Intel, IBM, Amazon, Meta, Tesla, Boeing, Cisco, Dell, HP, Oracle, Palantir, JPMorgan, General Electric, G42, and Spire Solutions.
  • The IRGC’s threat was followed by an additional drone strike on an Amazon data centre in Bahrain, air defences being activated over Dubai, and “minor” damage being reported in the Khalifa Economic Zones Abu Dhabi (KEZAD), UAE, due to debris.
  • On 1 April, President Trump gave a televised address in which he said that he expects the war to last another two to three weeks, and reiterated serious threats against Iran if it does not open the Strait of Hormuz.
  • Air defences were activated in Bahrain on 1-2 April, with the IRGC Navy claiming to have targeted the “Al-Hidd Industrial City, Bahrain” and “Remaining aluminium infrastructure, Bahrain”.
  • In the UAE, one Bangladeshi national was killed on 1 April after debris from an intercepted drone reportedly fell in the Al-Rifaa area. Interceptions have been reported over Dubai and Abu Dhabi on 2 April, with Abu Dhabi authorities reporting “minor” damage in the Khalifa Economic Zones Abu Dhabi (KEZAD) following debris from a missile interception. The IRGC Navy claimed that attacks were launched against “Abu Dhabi American Steel Industries”.
  • The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drones and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 2 April, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatari airspace is mostly closed but a limited number of Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan’s airspaces are open.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 2 April.

On 31 March,  the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that it would attack US companies in ⁠the region beginning 1 April in retaliation ⁠for attacks on Iran. The IRGC published a list of 19 companies with corporate offices in the region: Microsoft, Apple, Google (Alphabet), Nvidia, Intel, IBM, Amazon, Meta, Tesla, Boeing, Cisco, Dell, HP, Oracle, Palantir, JPMorgan, General Electric, G42, and Spire Solutions. These are almost all US companies, excluding G42 and Spire Solutions, which are both Emirati companies.

All 19 companies maintain a regional presence across the Middle East, with offices, data centres or commercial operations primarily concentrated in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, alongside additional operations in Qatar, Bahrain and Israel.

On 1 April, President Trump gave a televised address in which he said that he expects the war to last another two to three weeks, and reiterated threats to send Iran “back to the Stone Ages” if it does not open the Strait of Hormuz.

As of 2 April, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahraini airspace is closed with very limited exceptions. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, while the airspace is closed to almost all commercial flights, Qatar Airways flights continue to operate with special permission. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’s airspace remain open.

Saudi forces intercepted at least seven attack drones over the Eastern Region on 1-2 April. Over the same period, Saudi authorities temporarily suspended flights at Dammam airport, and issued attack warnings for the Eastern Region. Falling debris following successful interceptions reportedly caused at least two injuries in the Al-Kharj area on 31 March.

At least two people have been killed and 22 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 07:00 UTC on 2 April.

As of 2 April, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

On 31 March, Kuwait’s military stated that five ballistic missiles and seven attack drones were detected in the country’s airspace over the past 24 hours. Early 1 April, Kuwaiti state media reported that an Iranian attack drone caused a large fire at the fuel tanks at Kuwait International Airport (KWI / OKKK). No injuries were immediately reported. Kuwait’s National Bank later stated that it will close its headquarters and one other branch. On 2 April, explosions were reported in Kuwait near US military assets.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 07:00 UTC on 2 April.

As of 2 April, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

On 1 April, Bahraini authorities stated that the fire at a commercial facility, which broke out the previous day following an attack, had been extinguished. Bahrain’s air defences were activated several times on 1 April, with authorities in the morning announcing the successful interception of four missiles and 19 attack drones. On 2 April, the Bahraini military released updated figures for total projectiles intercepted since 28 February: 188 missiles and 429 attack drones. Air defences were additionally activated in Bahrain on 2 April, with the IRGC Navy claiming on 2 April to have targeted the “Al-Hidd Industrial City, Bahrain” and “Remaining aluminum infrastructure, Bahrain”.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 07:00 UTC on 2 April.

As of 2 April, the Bahraini airspace is closed with very limited exceptions. Passengers wishing to depart the region have been able to depart via King Fahd International Airport (DMM) in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, depending on the operational status of the airport (with operations being frequently temporarily suspended for short periods of time), the King Fahd Causeway, and shelter-in-place advisories.

On 1 April, a tanker was damaged by an attack drone off the coast of Doha; two other attack drones were intercepted. No oil spill or injuries were reported. On 2 April, reporting indicated that some Qatari exports had been rerouted by land through Saudi Arabia to the port of Jeddah.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 07:00 UTC on 2 April.

As of 2 April, while the airspace is closed to almost all commercial flights, Qatar Airways flights continue to operate several international routes with special permission.

On 1 April, Emirati authorities stated that air defences intercepted five ballistic missiles and 35 attack drones and later stated that air defences were engaging additional Iranian projectiles. One Bangladeshi national was killed on 1 April after debris from an intercepted drone reportedly fell in the Al-Rifaa area. An injury was also reported in Umm Al Quwain due to drone debris in an industrial area.

Authorities stated in the early afternoon of 2 April that 19 missiles and 26 attack drones had been launched into the UAE so far on 2 April. Interceptions have been reported over Dubai and Abu Dhabi, with authorities urging the public to shelter. In Abu Dhabi, authorities reported damage in the Khalifa Economic Zones Abu Dhabi (KEZAD) following debris from a missile interception, with authorities claiming this resulted in “minor” damage and no injuries. The IRGC Navy claimed that attacks were launched against “Abu Dhabi American Steel Industries”.

At least 12 people have been killed and 190 injured in the UAE, as of 07:00 UTC on 2 April.

As of 2 April, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

At least three people have been killed and 15 injured in Oman, as of 07:00 UTC on 2 April.

As of 2 April, the airspace remains open in Oman.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the short term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has continued strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, including oil and gas infrastructure, desalination facilities, and airports. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to carry out further attacks on US and Israeli-linked companies across the region.

Following the IRGC’s threat to target US companies in the region, an additional attack drone struck an Amazon data centre in Bahrain, air defences were activated over Dubai, and damage was reported at Khalifa Economic Zones Abu Dhabi (KEZAD) in the UAE. These strikes were highly likely linked to the threat issued the day before, with multiple US offices in Dubai and an additional Amazon site in the KEZAD. The targeting of US offices is likely to impose economic costs on both the US and host nations and undermine confidence in the regional business environment without directly striking host nation facilities

The US now likely has only limited options to coerce the Iranian regime into a peace deal involving the major concessions desired by both Washington and, now, the Gulf States, and it is unlikely that the Strait of Hormuz blockade is militarily solvable in the short term with the US’s current force posture. This increases the likelihood of continued conflict over the next few weeks.

There is a realistic possibility of the US and/or Israel launching ground operations, such as the seizure of Iran’s Kharg Island, to apply further pressure against Tehran for concessions. However, such actions would highly likely result in escalated Iranian retaliation across the region.

US and/or Israeli targeting of Iranian oil and gas infrastructure, power plants, and economic interests such as banks, in addition to the killing of senior Iranian military or political officials, will each likely trigger increased rates of Iranian strikes in retaliation, as has occurred earlier in the conflict. Iranian strikes targeting regional desalination plants are likely to escalate in response to escalated US and/or Israeli strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure, with the Gulf States being highly dependent on desalination for water security. Furthermore, the potential involvement of US and/or Israeli ground forces to conduct operations in Iran’s Kharg Island against Iran’s buried enriched uranium at Isfahan and Natanz, or the Iranian coastline around the Strait of Hormuz, would also likely trigger intensified Iranian retaliation strikes.

Interception rates across the region remain high, although they have notably decreased since the start of the conflict, with numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. Reporting indicates that the volume of both Iranian ballistic missiles and attack drones launched at the Gulf states has significantly diminished since 28 February, almost certainly due to expended stockpiles and the destruction of transporter erector launchers (TELs) by US/Israeli strikes. However, attack drone use has remained high enough to conduct daily attacks, and Iran continues to be capable of launching lower-volume ballistic missile attacks, particularly at high-value targets (HVTs) such as oil and gas infrastructure.

Sustained Iranian attack drone and missile strikes are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.” In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, with around 70 British nationals reported to have been arrested for filming drones and missiles, for example. In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.