Escalation Risks Persist After US–Israel Strikes on Iran

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Current US and Israeli military operations mark a significant escalation from Operation Midnight Hammer, which involved preliminary strikes on Iranian conventional military capabilities to enable a US bombing run on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the scale of the US’s current force posture and forward positioning of military assets is the largest buildup in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

US and Israeli strikes follow three rounds of talks between the US and Iran aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear programme and preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, as well as imposing limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Despite diplomatic engagement, Washington likely assessed that Tehran’s commitment to talks and a potential new nuclear deal lacked credibility. Iran failed to commit to any substantive concessions, maintained its own red lines, and was likely using the negotiation process to delay, test US resolve and potentially to buy time to prepare for conflict. As further negotiations had been scheduled in Vienna for 2 March, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian senior leadership assessed the risk of imminent military action was temporarily reduced, relaxed operational security and provided the US and Israel with a rare window of opportunity to target senior regime figures.

Iran had likely expected limited strikes aimed at coercing substantive nuclear concessions as part of a broader pressure strategy tied to the ongoing negotiations, rather than an immediate transition from aggressive military posturing to large-scale and sustained strikes. However, Iranian officials had previously warned that even “limited strikes” would be met with a significant response. The scale, duration and depth of US-Israeli combined strikes and the immediate decapitation of Iranian senior leadership likely exceeded Tehran’s expectations, resulting in a significant escalation in Iran’s retaliatory strategy.

Iran’s current strategy is likely aimed not only at striking Israel and US military forces but also at generating widespread economic disruption, undermining US regional security guarantees and restoring deterrence by positioning itself as a resilient power capable of inflicting widespread damage and costs despite suffering major losses, evidenced by its attacks on Arab nations and attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s objective is likely to drag the US into a prolonged and costly war that drains US resources, provokes domestic and international condemnation, disrupts global energy supply and strains US relations with regional partners. Tehran has also likely calculated that if the US only commits to a military campaign defined by the use of stand-off capabilities like air and naval power, it remains unlikely that the current operations will be able to dislodge the regime. For this objective to be achieved, the US will likely need to deploy ground forces unless the regime is toppled by internal unrest. However, a ground invasion will likely require congressional approval and would likely be detrimental to the Trump administration, which has condemned previous administrations for protracted and costly wars.

Joint US-Israeli strikes have almost certainly been calibrated to degrade Iranian command and control (C2) structures, integrated air defence systems, long-range strike capabilities and Iranian intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In the opening stages of the conflict, strikes will likely prioritise high-value targets (HVTs), including Iranian senior leadership, to disrupt national‑level decision‑making and Iran’s ability to coordinate a sustained and coherent military response.

Conventional military HVTs will include systems such as Iranian radars, combat air power and air defences to achieve complete air superiority as quickly as possible, as well as Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, including transporter erector launchers (TELs), missile stockpiles, production sites, logistic networks and other supportive elements. Iran was estimated to have approximately 2,000-2,500 ballistic missiles remaining in its inventory before the start of the current conflict, and approximately 200 TELs, Iran’s primary delivery system for ballistic missiles, which constitute the greatest threat to Israel, US bases, critical infrastructure and civilian populations in the region.

Initial estimates suggest that joint strikes have rapidly degraded Iran’s TELs and missile stockpiles. However, TELs are highly mobile systems, and it is unlikely that all of Iran’s TELs will be destroyed in the opening stages. With some TELs remaining operational and Iran still likely capable of manufacturing some ballistic missiles under conflict conditions, it is unlikely that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities will be completely neutralised in the immediate term, despite high rates of degradation and interceptions. Smaller, less concentrated and less frequent Iranian ballistic missile attacks are likely to continue in the near term.

In addition to its ballistic missile capabilities, Iran was estimated to possess an arsenal of 80,000 operational one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs). These combined capabilities will likely enable Iran to target Israel, US military installations, economic interests, civilian centres and critical infrastructure, including oil and gas infrastructure, ports, and airports, especially in the Gulf States, that remain in range of even Iran’s shortest range ballistic missile systems, which constitute the largest proportion of Iran’s ballistic arsenal.

Failure to rapidly degrade Iran’s ballistic missile threat will almost certainly place enormous strain on regional air defence systems, with hundreds of expensive Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile interceptors already being expended to counter sustained Iranian ballistic missile salvos and also used to intercept low-cost UAVs. Iran’s ballistic missile salvos have decreased in volume, which is likely reflective of launcher attrition, stockpile conservation and Iranian dispersal tactics. However, even lower-volume salvos, especially when layered with UAVs and designed to exploit air defence vulnerabilities or gaps in coverage, can pose a credible threat, especially to the Gulf States, which are rapidly exhausting interceptor stocks and are located much closer to Iran, providing significantly reduced warning times and compressed engagement windows for air defence systems.

In addition to Iran’s long-range strike capabilities, Tehran may increasingly resort to asymmetric tactics to project strength, reach and resolve if the war is sustained for weeks, particularly if its ballistic missile and long-range strike capabilities are significantly degraded by sustained US and Israeli operations. Such tactics could include proxy attacks by Iran-aligned groups across the region, IRGC-backed terrorism against Israeli and Western diplomatic missions or the international Jewish community, and cyber operations targeting financial systems and critical infrastructure.