Israeli Airstrikes Target Iranian Nuclear Program

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The most immediate threat posed by the escalation is of Iranian retaliation strikes against Israel. Reports indicate that the first wave of Iranian UAVs was completely intercepted by Israel or regional forces. However, the first wave was likely an initial response and will almost certainly be followed by larger waves of layered attacks consisting of UAVs and ballistic missiles conducted by Iranian conventional forces.

Israeli attempts to degrade Iranian air defence likely indicate that further Israeli strikes on Iran are impending, which will almost certainly provoke further Iranian retaliation. Given the strategic importance of Iran’s nuclear program, it is likely that future Iranian attacks will be larger than those observed in April and October 2024.

Iranian proxy forces in the region will highly likely form part of Iran’s retaliation against Israel. The Houthi Movement in Yemen will likely conduct missile and drone attacks targeting southern and central Israel. Iranian proxies in Iraq will likely launch drones at Israel. Despite much of its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon having been dismantled, Hezbollah still maintains a credible arsenal of rockets, missiles, and drones, and is likely to conduct attacks primarily against northern Israel.

Whilst Israeli air defence is comprehensive and highly capable, previous Iranian strikes and proxy attacks have managed to successfully penetrate Israel’s defences. Furthermore, there is a high threat from falling debris caused by successful interceptions across Israel, Jordan and Iraq. The resumption of hostilities will almost certainly result in significant airspace closures, and air travel disruption will continue across the region, complicating evacuation.

So far, the US Trump administration has sought to distance itself from the Israeli operation. However, Iran’s foreign ministry has stated that the US will also be responsible for the “dangerous consequences” of Israel’s “adventurism”, and there are indications from Iranian television broadcasts that Iran will now not participate in the scheduled negotiations with the US on 15 June.

The most likely US targets to be attacked are the US military bases in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, it is likely that the Iraq-based Iranian proxies, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMFs), will engage in rocket attacks against these US bases. Such attacks would highly likely lead to retaliation from the US, threatening to further escalate the conflict.

Should Hezbollah resume direct conflict with Israel, this would almost certainly be met with Israeli airstrikes against Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, particularly in the Dahieh suburbs of southern Beirut, the Beqaa Valley, and south of the Litani River.

As the Royal Jordanian Air Force has already engaged in interceptions of Iranian aerial threats over Jordan’s airspace, this poses an immediate threat of debris in Jordan. Furthermore, Jordanian involvement has previously led to civil unrest in Amman, and this will likely occur again, particularly in the vicinity of the Israeli and US embassies.

It is unlikely but possible that retaliation from Tehran and its proxies will develop to involve strikes against US military bases in the Gulf states, particularly Kuwait and Bahrain, but also the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. Gulf state leaders have made distinct efforts to condemn the Israeli strikes, with Iranian officials having previously threatened attacks against US interests across the region in the event of escalation.

For the Gulf states, the highest impact potential outcome is the development of the conflict into a protracted regional conflict involving the US, characterised by the targeting of energy facilities across the region. Strikes against Gulf oil facilities are a key capability Iran can deploy against US interests in the region and threaten to disrupt the global economy.