The Atlantic hurricane season spans from 1 June to 30 November, typically peaking between mid-August and late September. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), there is a 60 per cent chance of an above-average season, a 30 per cent chance of a near-normal season, and a 10 per cent chance of a below-average season. NOAA also predicts that there will likely be between 13 and 19 named storms (with winds of at least 62 km/h) and six to ten hurricanes.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Several factors have impacted NOAA’s assessment. Firstly, there are continuing El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) conditions forecast, which increase vertical wind shear, allowing hurricanes to develop more freely. Secondly, the warmer-than-average ocean temperatures enable hurricanes to draw energy from warmer waters, which increases storm moisture and instability. Thirdly, there are weak wind shear forecasts, which means that wind speeds or direction are less likely to change with height, allowing hurricanes to strengthen. Finally, there is a potential for increased activity from the West African Monsoon, which is a primary starting point for hurricanes in the Atlantic.

The 2024 hurricane season was the third-costliest on record, causing approximately USD 133 billion in damage. Hurricane Helen was particularly devastating, killing at least 250 people across the southeastern United States. Hurricane Beryl, which formed in late June, became the earliest recorded Category 5 hurricane, setting a new early-season hurricane benchmark. There were 18 named storms, a 3.6 increase from the 1991 to 2020 average of 14.4. In total, at least 437 people were killed across the Atlantic Basin mostly due to flooding, building collapses, and falling debris.

NOAA has recently seen funding cuts, with nearly 900 employees (at least 7 per cent of the NOAA workforce) cut by the Trump administration. Critics have pointed towards concerns that the National Weather Service may be unable to launch weather balloons and monitor local conditions before storms make impact. Statements from the US National Hurricane Center (NHC) have countered this, claiming to be fully staffed and not solely reliant on weather balloons to forecast hurricanes.

Mexico is set to hold its first-ever judicial elections by popular vote on 1 June, following a controversial reform passed in 2024 by former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), of the National Regeneration Movement or “Morena” party.

Citizens will elect nearly 900 judicial officials, including Supreme Court justices, electoral magistrates, and lower court judges. The reform represents a major departure from the previous system, where judicial appointments were made through a combination of executive nomination, Senate approval, or a competitive merit-based selection.

The reform was purportedly introduced to democratise the judiciary, reduce elite influence, and increase accountability. However, the reform was met with widespread opposition, with critics citing concerns over the politicisation of the judiciary and the undermining of judicial independence.

Public backlash was significant, resulting in months of protests, student demonstrations, a national strike among judicial workers and the resignation of multiple justices.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The majority of the opposition towards the judicial reform bill has likely related to fears over the politicisation of the judiciary, with critics stating that it will disproportionately favour the incumbent Morena party and dilute checks and balances on the government.

Electoral rules state that candidates are barred from using campaign materials that link them to a political party, from participating in events organised by political parties or accepting donations of any kind. However, Mexico’s electoral authority is already investigating numerous complaints made over political parties attempting to sway voters, with many linked to the Morena party.

There is a realistic possibility that public perceptions of voter manipulation, coupled with broader concerns over democratic backsliding or judicial erosion, could provoke further incidents of protest and are also likely to contribute to a low voter turnout during the judicial elections.

Major concerns have also been raised over how the new system could be exploited by Mexico’s powerful cartels. The judicial elections present the cartels with an unprecedented opportunity to influence the future course of the country’s judiciary.

This dynamic has become increasingly important following the increased direct and indirect pressure placed on the cartels since the inauguration of incumbent President Claudia Sheinbaum and the onset of the second Trump administration, which has designated several cartels as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs), expanded intelligence operations against the cartels and even threatened to conduct direct action against the cartels if the Mexican government fails to increase its anti-cartel operations.

This has involved a substantial increase in seizures, raids, arrests and extraditions, as well as expanded military deployments. This has reportedly forced some of the cartels to scale back operations, adapt their strategies and turn to other, generally less lucrative forms of illicit income, such as extortion.

Electoral processes in Mexico have been a vehicle for organised crime groups to impose their interests. The cartels’ most likely strategy is to back candidates who will protect their interests once in office by obstructing investigations, influencing judicial outcomes, and ensuring impunity. The candidacy of Silvia Delgado García, best known as the Sinaloa Cartel boss Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán’s former defence lawyer, is a clear illustration of this strategy.

Moreover, as candidates are prohibited from accepting public or private funding, many may turn to the cartels to secure illicit funding. However, many other candidates are against the cartels or are likely associated with rival ones.

There is a realistic possibility that cartels will interpret the elections as an opportunity to eliminate candidates hostile to their operations and replace them with candidates more sympathetic to their interests. Several candidates have already withdrawn due to threats, and several judges have refused to campaign at all in areas controlled by cartels.

The recent 2024 general elections were the most violent in Mexico’s modern history, with over 60 political figures assassinated. Current indications suggest that the judicial elections are unlikely to be marred by the same degree of violence. However, there is a realistic possibility that the cartels will target judicial candidates they perceive as a threat or who are aligned with rival groups, particularly in contested areas and areas where cartel control is most consolidated.

A national strike was organised across Colombia on 28-29 May, after President Gustavo Petro called on his supporters to strike following multiple failed attempts to pass his social reform agenda.

The strike follows a major political setback for Petro after the Senate rejected his initial referendum proposal, which would have allowed citizens to directly vote on major policy changes affecting Colombia’s labour laws and public healthcare. Protests were organised by the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), Colombia’s largest trade union; however, multiple other trade unions and social organisations participated in the demonstrations.

On 28 May, Colombia’s National Police reported 47 active demonstrations in 33 municipalities, including protests, marches, and road blockades. In Bogotá, the TransMilenio transport system was severely affected, with multiple lines suspended and stations closed, and riot police were deployed to disperse violent protestors.

Major protests were also observed in Medellín, Cali, Cartagena, Barranquilla and multiple other urban centres. Unrest continued in Bogotá on 29 May, forcing the city centre to close down. Localised protests continued in Bogotá on 30 May, particularly in close proximity to the National University of Colombia, with incidents of looting and clashes with the police.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

The scale and geographical scope of the two-day national strike, with residual unrest extending into 30 May, indicate that Petro’s proposed social reforms are popular with a wide section of Colombian society, including labour unions, indigenous groups, rural collectives, students, and Afro-Colombian communities. Despite publicly denying organising the protests, Petro’s repeated warnings of “indefinite protest” in response to congressional resistance and his public endorsement of demonstrations, almost certainly indicate tacit support from the executive branch, support that will likely help sustain the protest movement unless Congress passes the proposed referendum.

Further protests and disruption across Colombia are highly likely, with an additional national strike being organised for 11 June. Petro and his base have framed the protests as reflective of a broader struggle between the working class and the elite, a strategy that has resonated with disaffected sections of society and the trade unions. This strategy has also likely served to shift public focus away from Petro’s failure to restore peace in conflict-affected regions under his flawed “Total Peace” initiative, which has resulted in major increases in violence in several regions.

Petro will likely continue to use protest mobilisation as a political tool to apply pressure on Congress, distract from other issues and consolidate support ahead of the 2026 legislative and presidential elections.

Politically, this is a relatively low-risk strategy for Petro. Should Congress pass the referendum, Petro can claim a major legislative victory and fulfil a key promise to his base. Conversely, if Congress refuses, Petro can portray opposition parties as obstructionist and indifferent to popular demands.

However, Petro has also stated that he may issue a presidential decree on 1 June to authorise the referendum without congressional approval. Colombia’s Constitutional Court has already ruled that Petro cannot bypass Congress through presidential decree, suggesting that Congress will likely challenge the decree in court, which would likely lead to its nullification. Such a move would almost certainly exacerbate tensions between Congress and Petro’s base, likely triggering renewed, disruptive and potentially violent unrest.

US Foreign Ministry targets international student visas.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a series of new visa restrictions targeting international students, particularly those from China, in higher education.

On 27 May, the White House reportedly ordered its embassies to stop scheduling new visa interview appointments for students. On the following day, Rubio stated that US authorities would begin to “aggressively revoke” visas granted to students from China and Hong Kong.

The developments are highly likely to deepen the rift between the current administration and elite US universities. There is a high likelihood of localised civil unrest on university campuses in response to the development.

Maduro regime claims landslide victory at the Venezuelan parliamentary and local elections

The vote was boycotted by the opposition, whose leaders have either been arrested or forced into hiding or exile following the July 2024 presidential vote.

President Nicolás Maduro’s governing coalition claimed to have won around 82 per cent of the parliamentary vote, and to have secured 23 out of 24 state governor seats.

The vote is likely to be leveraged by the Maduro regime as proof of its political legitimacy and further sidelines the opposition. There is a realistic possibility that the government will use the political capital accrued via the political results to further attack remaining civil society and opposition groups.

Mexican government kills one of the leaders of Sinaloa Cartel faction “Los Chapitos”

On 25 May, Mexican forces killed Jorge Figueroa Benítez, known as “El Perris”, during a search-and-seizure raid in Navolato, Sinaloa state.

El Perris was a key high-ranking member of the Los Chapitos faction of the Sinaloa Cartel, named after its leaders, the sons of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, and was in charge of providing security for them. El Perris was also considered responsible for the wave of violence in Culiacán (the so-called Culiacanazo) in 2019, which was prompted by the arrest of Ovidio Guzmán and successfully led to his release.

The killing is likely to be another blow to Los Chapitos, who are facing increased pressure from Mexican authorities and from rival cartels, including powerful entities like the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), as well as simultaneously fighting an internal war with another Sinaloa Cartel splinter, Los Mayitos.

It is highly likely that a confluence of cartel fragmentation, increased US counter-cartel support, and an increasingly hardline approach from the Claudia Sheinbaum administration will continue to apply significant pressure against the cartels. This, in turn, has likely conditioned an increase in cartel violence, including in more heavily touristed areas of Mexico, which had previously been more insulated from violence, such as Baja California Sur.

Haitian gangs carry out further massacres of civilians, government calls on PMCs

Local news channels published information on a series of gang attacks on 23 May, which targeted civilians in the town of Preval, in the centre of the country.

At least 50 civilians were killed in the attack, which was, according to available reports, carried out by a group calling itself the “Self-Defence Coalition” (also known as “Bwa Kale”, a gang that was founded in 2023 and initially styled itself as a civilian force opposing other criminal groups) and gangs also raided the local church.

The area of the attack is likely indicative of the gangs’ successful push to expand their territorial control outside of Port-au-Prince. The government remains almost certainly unable to undermine gangs’ freedom of operation throughout Haitian territory, including approximately 90 per cent of the capital.

On 28 May, international media reported that the country’s government signed a deal with a US private military contractor (PMC) to provide personnel and arms to bolster its anti-gang efforts.

Canada’s Manitoba province issues wildfire state of emergency

The government of Manitoba declared a province-wide state of emergency on 28 May due to an elevated threat of wildfires. Currently, fires are ongoing in the north of the province, many of which are spreading rapidly and are considered out of control. Approximately 17,000 people are expected to be evacuated due to the fires. Canada’s wildfire season began earlier than usual this year and will likely continue to intensify during the summer. In total, authorities assessed that more than 130 fires were ongoing nationwide on 28 May.

Several people injured by tornadoes in Chile

Tornadoes struck the town of Puerto Varas, in Chile’s southern Lake District, on 25 May, injuring at least 19 people and damaging hundreds of structures. Winds of 178 km per hour were recorded during the severe weather event, which was classified as an EF-1 phenomenon (the second level of a six-grade scale). Tornadoes are rare in Chile and seldom cause damage.

On the evening of 26 May, an individual drove a vehicle into football supporters at a parade in Water Street, in central Liverpool, injuring more than 50 people.

The incident was not terror-related, and reportedly occurred after a confrontation between the driver, who had entered the parade area after it was reopened, and the supporters. In addition to attempted murder, the driver was initially arrested on suspicion of driving while under the influence of drugs, before later being charged with dangerous driving and five other counts related to causing or attempting to cause grievous bodily harm.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, several disinformation narratives started appearing online, falsely identifying the attacker as Muslim and motivated by religious extremism. UK police released information about the suspect, atypically including his ethnic background and origin, shortly after the incident.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The case is notable as it almost certainly showcases increased concerns from authorities on the potential security impact of disinformation, following the July 2024 Southport attack.

Following the mass stabbing, the rapid spread of disinformation on online platforms contributed to driving several attacks against Muslim and South Asian minority communities in several British cities, leading to dozens of injuries. Despite the release of information disproving these early narratives, the post-Southport mob violence continued for six days, spreading to various large urban centres.

As in the Southport case, disinformation narratives after the Liverpool car ramming were almost certainly spread in efforts to provoke sectarian violence targeting British religious and ethnic minority groups. The authorities’ choice to immediately release information regarding the suspect was thus almost certainly meant to quash these narratives before they could translate to mob violence, an effort that has so far proved successful.

At the same time, however, the decision has attracted criticism, with analysts and observers warning that this case of early identification is likely to set a “precedent”, and that possible future deviation from this policy could backfire and be weaponised by channels and individuals spreading disinformation, particularly online.

Throughout three nights between 23 and 26 May, Russia launched record-breaking layered aerial strikes against Ukraine.

Overnight 24-25 May, 298 drones and 69 missiles were launched primarily against targets in Kyiv and Chernihiv Oblasts, and also in Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Sumy, Odesa, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy Oblasts. At least 12 people were killed, including three children, in Zhytomyr, and up to 60 people were injured, according to Ukrainian officials. These were the largest combined strikes conducted by Russia since the start of the war in 2014.

Overnight 25-26 May, Russia then launched 355 drones and nine missiles, targeting Kyiv, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, and Odesa Oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that there were six people killed and 24 injured in these strikes, which were the second-largest combined Russian strikes of the war thus far. In both instances, a significant majority of the incoming aerial threats were reported to be successfully intercepted.

In the aftermath, US President Donald Trump stated on social media that Russian President Vladimir Putin had ‘gone absolutely CRAZY!’, and later warned that Putin that without him, ‘lots of really bad things would have already happened to Russia, and I mean REALLY BAD’, and that Putin is ‘playing with fire’. Trump then implicitly set a two-week deadline for Putin to find out if Moscow is ‘tapping [the US] along or not’. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev warned of ‘World War III’ in response. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

Russian forces have considerably intensified the scale of long-range aerial strikes against Ukraine since January 2025, with seven of the largest layered aerial strikes occurring since the start of the year.

Whilst it is likely that the start of Trump’s second administration has been a key factor in this, given an almost certain perception in Moscow that Trump would be less willing than his counterparts to escalate punitive measures and support for Ukraine in response,  it is also likely that the intensification follows a trend identifiable since winter 2024.  The risk for the Kremlin, however, is that its hyperaggressive actions compel the Trump administration to dramatically change its approach to the war in Ukraine.

Previously, Russian long-range strikes against Ukrainian urban centres, particularly against critical national infrastructure (CNI), considerably intensified every winter as conditions slowed potential progress in Russian ground offensives on the front lines. In the winter of 2023-2024, this trend was observable as in the previous year, however, Russian long-range strike intensity notably continued into at least the end of April 2024. In addition to ground condition concerns, with the rasputitsa (mud season) that begins as the frozen ground thaws in spring, typically ending between mid-April and mid-May, Russian forces almost certainly also sought to exploit delays in US-provided aid (held up by Congress) as the depletion of Patriot interceptor munitions, in particular, had left Ukrainian CNI vulnerable. The current phase of strikes, particularly since January 2025, however, almost certainly stands out for both its scale and duration.

The Kremlin’s objectives for this are almost certainly multifactorial, likely including both a desire to domestically project strength and success in the war despite a lack of recent major ground victories against Ukraine (excluding the retaking of Kursk, Moscow’s 2025 Victory Day Parade in May was the first since the start of the full-scale invasion that did not celebrate major battlefield victories such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka), and to increase as far as possible leverage over Ukraine to gain maximalist concessions in any possible negotiations.

Furthermore, production is almost certainly an essential consideration – it is estimated that Russia can now produce 100 Shahed drones every three days, which is approximately four to five times higher than in late 2024 and ten times higher than the same time last year. Ukrainian military intelligence has indicated that Moscow intends to increase the drone production rate to 500 a day, which would enable mass swarms of over 1,000 drones regularly attacking Ukrainian urban centres. It is likely that intensified Russian attacks against Ukrainian urban centres will continue in the coming weeks, posing significant risks to civilians and travellers due to indiscriminate targeting patterns and the threat posed by debris from interceptions.

On 30 May, Hamas channels told the BBC that the group would reject the ceasefire deal proposed by US Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff. This notably conflicts with previous reports from Arab media that argued the contrary. The proposed agreement reportedly sketched out a framework for a 60-day truce during which half of the remaining hostages, both dead and alive, would be released in exchange for an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners. After the truce, the deal reportedly had no clear provision for a transition to a permanent settlement.

On 27 May, the new system for the distribution of humanitarian aid came into effect. Bypassing UN organisations and other aid groups, it gives the responsibility to distribute aid to a newly-formed group, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), operating out of four distribution points (three in south Gaza and one north of Deir-al al-Balah) that are guarded by Israeli troops and run by American volunteers. On 27 May, crowds reportedly broke through the security perimeter at a distribution point, prompting Israel Defence Forces (IDF) guards to fire warning shots. The resulting crowd rush resulted in several deaths. On the following day, a World Food Program warehouse was stormed by civilians in Deir al-Balah, resulting in two deaths.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hamas reportedly rejected the ceasefire deal as the group perceived it as being too favourable to Israel. Hamas likely assessed that the lack of provisions for a prolonged ceasefire following the 60 days would be an incentive for Israeli forces to resume hostilities.

The group, whose latest leader, Mohammad Sinwar was reportedly killed earlier in May, highly likely faces disproportionate pressure, and has almost certainly lost considerable leverage over the Palestinian civilian population, with local gangs, armed groups, and criminals taking advantage of the resulting security vacuum.

Having lost this leverage, Hamas officials have almost certainly a heightened interest in retaining control over the few remaining hostages, who are their major bargaining tool in any negotiation with Washington and Tel Aviv. However, the rejection of the ceasefire deal by Hamas will likely embolden far-right forces in the Israeli government, who have called for a further increase in the intensity of operations in the Gaza Strip as a prelude to the establishment of territorial control.

The humanitarian situation in Gaza remains extremely severe, and it is highly likely that the new aid mechanism is inferior compared to the previous aid distribution system operated by the UN and various aid groups.

First, while the previous operators ran hundreds of distribution points across Gaza, GHF operates only four, forcing Gaza’s civilians to cover large distances on foot to receive aid, a factor that poses significant risks to vulnerable demographics. The lack of a distribution point north of the Netzarim Corridor is likely to drive a further displacement of the population of the north Gaza Strip.

Second, the presence of IDF troops at aid distribution points is likely to entail a security threat, with the 27 May incident likely showcasing severe vulnerabilities in this regard.

Finally, aid organisations, which have released statements against GHF, have argued that the system “politicises” the distribution of aid by assigning responsibility for it to a group aligned with the US and Israel.

Champions League final likely to drive civil unrest, security threats in multiple countries

The match between Inter Milan and Paris Saint-Germain will be played on the evening of 31 May in Munich, Germany. The match will likely drive several security threats in Munich, as well as in Milan and Paris. These will include a high threat of civil unrest, including violence between rival supporters near stadium premises or near areas where the match will be broadcast. In addition, there is a realistic possibility of terrorist actors and lone wolves targeting supporters on the day of the match. In all three cities, the match will highly likely cause travel disruptions starting in the afternoon. Due to high alcohol consumption, there will likely be an increased risk of road traffic accidents (RTAs) in all three cities on 31 May- 1 June.

Unrest in Warsaw before second round of presidential election

The first round of voting on 18 May saw Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski, an ally of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and Karol Nawrocki, of the right-wing Law and Justice Party (PiS), win the most votes, with less than two percentage points between them. Several opposing demonstrations were held in Warsaw on 25 May in support of the two candidates, with no notable cases of violence or disruption reported. The runoff is scheduled to take place on 1 June. There is a realistic possibility of further unrest ahead of the vote and immediately following the release of the results.

EU Commission asks Hungary to withdraw transparency law

The law, named “Transparency of Public Life”, allows the government to list and possibly freeze funding for NGOs receiving funds from abroad. The government of Viktor Orbán has proposed the bill as part of a “Spring clean” campaign, and has stated that it is meant to target opposition parties and civil society organisations. The EU Commission claims that the bill infringes on EU law and has sought to direct the case to the European Court of Justice, which has the power to block it. The law is likely to trigger a diplomatic spat between Budapest and Brussels. This, in turn, is likely to cause further civil unrest in Hungary, where protests against the bill have been held in the past weeks. 

Protests in Madrid regarding healthcare policies

Around 30,000 people protested in the capital of Spain on 25 May to protest shortfalls in the local healthcare system, with organisers citing the lack of available doctors, long waiting lists, and efforts to privatise healthcare. The protests were attended by several union leaders as well as representatives of left-wing parties. No notable cases of violence were recorded during the unrest, although the protests caused travel delays in some parts of Madrid’s city centre.

Clashes in central Rome over security bill

Protesters clashed with responding police in central Rome, near the Italian parliament, during a march to oppose a controversial security reform, which opponents say grants excessive power to the government to quash civil unrest. The protests occurred as the government forced a successful vote of confidence over the measure. The clashes have been condemned by the Italian left. There is a realistic possibility of further unrest in the short term, focused in Rome and other large Italian cities like Milan, Bologna and Naples.

Protesting business owners cause traffic disruption in Kosovo

On 29 May, hundreds of business owners protested a regulatory mandate withdrawing government subsidies for all companies with over 50 workers or a turnover exceeding 10 million euros. Protesters have declared that the decision could almost triple electricity bills. Several roads in the capital, Pristina, were blocked by demonstrators in lorries and small trucks. At least 90 per cent of Kosovo’s electricity supply is produced from two coal-fired plants, and the country is reliant on imports to fulfil its energy requirements. Further protests are highly likely since Prime Minister Albin Kurti has so far appeared adamant that he will continue with the policy.

Turkish President Erdogan appoints legal team to draft new constitution

Per the current constitution, Erdogan, who has ruled Turkey since 2014, could not run at the next presidential elections in 2028, unless an early vote were to be called. A new constitution could remove term limits or alter the current provision, thus allowing him to run again. The appointment of the team comes a month after Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul and opposition candidate for the 2028 elections, was arrested. The timing of the latest development is likely not only driven by the approaching elections, but also by the ongoing warming in Ankara’s relations with the country’s Kurdish political representatives, which have followed a breakthrough in resolving the decades-long separatist movement.

Israeli authorities approve new West Bank settlements

Tel Aviv announced on 29 May that 22 new settlements have been approved for construction in parts of the West Bank occupied by Israeli forces. The development is the biggest single expansion of Israeli settlements in decades and follows an intensification of settler activity that has been ongoing since early 2024. Some of the new approved settlements have already been partly built by settler groups without government approval, and the move grants them political recognition.

The development is almost certainly demonstrative of the growing political clout of far-right groups inside the ruling Israeli coalition. Parties like Religious Zionism have long supported settler groups and called for the relocation of hundreds of thousands of Jewish Israelis to the West Bank as a prelude to complete territorial annexation.

The approval of new settlements, and particularly the recognition of those built by settler groups independently from Tel Aviv, will likely embolden settler activity, including sectarian violence, in the West Bank and will likely drive anti-Israel protest movements across the globe.

Protests in the southern and central provinces of Iraq

Protests in the southern and central provinces of Iraq, including Najaf and Diwaniyah, have intensified due to ongoing power cuts and a lack of basic services amidst a heatwave. On 27 May, protesters blocked the main road connecting Karbala and Najaf in the town of al-Hayderiyh, and eyewitness videos captured the use of tear gas by Iraqi security forces against demonstrators. In Diwaniyah, street barricades were set on fire as part of the protests. The unrest has led to clashes in multiple cities, with reports of arrests and the use of force by riot police. Despite some claims of Iranian involvement, these have not been substantiated by traditional media sources.

Ex-DRC president Joseph Kabila returns to AFC/M23-held Goma

On 25 May, former Congolese President Kabila arrived in Goma for talks with AFC/M23. The move comes after the Congolese Senate stripped him of immunity, enabling his prosecution for treason and war crimes due to his alleged links to the rebel group.

While Kabila claimed that this was a political ploy and ‘nothing more than an instrument of oppression’, government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya has accused Kabila of ‘positioning himself as rebel leader’. Kabila is likely attempting to forge a peace process to regain legitimacy as a potential leader of the DRC in a move to oust current President Félix Tshisekedi.

Kabila’s move will highly likely complicate the ongoing Qatar-mediated peace talks between the government and the AFC/M23 and US efforts to exchange minerals for support for the peace process. While there have been no significant protests in Kinshasa since clashes erupted on 28 January, there is a realistic possibility that developments regarding Kabila will trigger further unrest in the capital, particularly if it complicates peace efforts.

Zimbabwe’s president approves controversial car radio licence fee

On 27 May, Zimbabwe President Emmerson Mnangagwa approved a law stipulating that motorists must pay a radio levy before their vehicles can be licensed and insured. The licence costs approximately GBP 68 and will fund the state broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corp. (ZBC).

The move is controversial; not only has ZBC been accused of perpetrating pro-government propaganda, but it adds further economic pressure to the population amid high inflation, a devalued currency, and an unstable economy. Despite the dissatisfaction with the government and calls for public demonstrations by prominent political figures, the population has not yet engaged in significant unrest, largely due to fears of forceful suppression by security forces that the country could descend into civil war.

Protests have been previously triggered by economic hardship in Zimbabwe, with significant unrest in January 2019 after fuel prices increased by 130 per cent. There is a realistic possibility that the imposition of the radio levy could trigger localised unrest, which could spiral into more widespread demonstrations, particularly if clashes occur between protesters and security forces.

Gunfire at the opposition party’s headquarters in Maputo, Mozambique

On 28 May, police Rapid Intervention Unit officers fired live ammunition and tear gas at protesters outside the RENAMO headquarters in the Central Business District in Maputo. The protests were being conducted by former RENAMO guerrilla fighters, who are accusing the party leader, Ossufo Momade, of being incapable of leading the party.

The former guerrillas occupied the party headquarters and Momade’s office to demand the leader’s resignation. This constitutes the second time protesters have occupied the party headquarters this month, with followers spreading photographs and posters of the party’s founder, Afonso Dhlakama, during the previous occupation. Under Dhlakama and then Momade, RENAMO conducted an insurgency between 2013 and 2021, in the aftermath of the Mozambican Civil War.

Until the rise of Venâncio Mondlane and the widespread unrest following the 2024 presidential election, RENAMO constituted the primary opposition party. However, Mondlane surpassed RENAMO’s vote share, constituting the first time in decades that RENAMO was not the primary opposition party. Further localised protests around RENAMO offices in Maputo are highly likely if Momade refuses to resign.

French Anarchists claim responsibility for power outages

Starting on 23 May, several power outages were recorded in the Var and Alpes-Maritimes departments of France’s southern Côte d’Azur. On 25 May, a far-left website released a communique from ‘two Anarchist groups’, claiming responsibility for the sabotage of several power stations and pylons to target the Cannes Film Festival as well as local tech and defence businesses.

The incident highlights the increasing use of sabotage tactics by European anarchists and far-left activists to disrupt high-visibility events and businesses. These attacks are highly likely to appeal to the activists as they only indirectly attack their main targets, instead focusing on unprotected assets like electricity pylons or stations. The chances of identification are therefore minimised, while still potentially causing large-scale damage.

For instance, the March 2024 torching of an electricity pylon near Berlin by the anarchist Volcano Group resulted in the shutdown of the nearby Tesla “Gigafactory”, causing USD 1 billion in damages, by some estimates. Before the start of the 2024 Paris Summer Olympics, likely far-left activists targeted remote rail infrastructure assets, provoking severe transport delays that affected travel to the capital for the opening ceremony.

Syrian governments and Kurdish leaders reach an agreement on al-Hol camp

The camp, located in northeast Syria near the Iraqi border, was established in the 1990s but increased in size after the territorial collapse of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2019. Currently, it houses around 37,000 people, mostly family members of ISIS fighters, many of whom are foreign nationals, guarded by several hundred Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) militants.

The camp has long been a source of insecurity, with the collapse of the Assad regime and the clashes between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) threatening its stability. The latest deal aims to solve this issue and allows for the evacuation of Syrian nationals in the camp to parts of Syria that are not under Kurdish control (evacuation to the latter had been possible under a previous mechanism), as well as the repatriation of some foreign nationals.

The deal is likely to improve security at al-Hol by decreasing the overall number of residents, but it does not resolve the central question of repatriation, with several countries still rejecting proposals to take back “their” ISIS foreign fighters and their families.

ISIS claims first attack on new Syrian government forces

On 29 May, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claimed its first attack on Syria’s new government forces since the fall of former president Bashar al-Assad. In a statement released by the terrorist group, it claimed to have planted an improvised explosive device (IED) on a government forces’ vehicle in the southern province of Sweida, which killed one and injured three.

The attack likely indicates an emboldening of ISIS, which has reportedly increased activity in Syria in May after seizing weapon stocks since the fall of Assad and recruiting former regime members. ISIS announced in mid-May that its presence is growing in rural Syria and is also likely recruiting Salafi-jihadi dissidents within the new Syrian regime who have become disaffected with President al-Sharaa’s moderate approach to governance.

ISIS’s objective is likely to undermine and destabilise the new regime through increased attacks, with the new regime likely ill-equipped to effectively deal with a resurgence of ISIS, given the dynamic and complex threat environment within Syria.

Teenagers arrested over ISIS-inspired attack plot in Israel

The three suspects had allegedly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), had built and tested improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and had planned to carry out suicide bombings targeting civilians and police officers. This is the second case of extremely young individuals being arrested in Israel over ISIS-inspired plots in little more than a month: in late March, a 17-year-old was arrested over plans to carry out a suicide bombing.

In April, Israeli authorities indicted two teenagers from Hebron who had allegedly planned to carry out attacks on Synagogues and had contacted an ISIS “handler”. The recent cases likely highlight a growing ideological penetration by ISIS in Israel and Palestine, and the Islamist group has likely capitalised on the setbacks suffered by Hamas and other Palestinian militias in Gaza and the West Bank to increase recruitment and radicalisation in the area.

Possible lone wolf terror attack during protests in Tuyserkan, Iran

According to local media, a man began firing on passersby from the rooftop of his residence in the city, which is located in the western province of Hamadan. At least two people were killed and several more were injured in the shooting. The shooting occurred at the same time as protests in the city, which, like in other parts of Iran, are linked with the ongoing truck drivers’ strike. While Iranian authorities have significantly restricted coverage of the unrest, there are unverified reports that, in Tuyserkan, protesters clashed with local security forces, resulting in at least one death.

Burkinabe forces and volunteers reportedly massacre 100 civilians between Aribinda and Dori

The mass killings, which took place on 21 May, were reportedly carried out by a convoy of soldiers and volunteer militiamen (from the “Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland” units, or VDP), en route to Dori, in an area located near the country’s northern border.

The area is almost entirely populated by ethnic Fulanis, who have frequently been targeted by the regime in sectarian attacks due to their perceived links to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate. There is a realistic possibility of militant reprisal attacks against government forces or civilians in response to the massacre.

Explosion near military barracks in Abuja, Nigeria

On 26 May, there was an explosion at a bus stop opposite Mogadishu Cantonment in Nigeria’s capital city. One person was seriously injured, and the suspected attacker was killed when the explosive blew up, likely prematurely.

An investigation is underway to determine the exact nature of the explosion, but it is highly likely part of a targeted attack by Boko Haram to target the nearby military barracks. While most Boko Haram activity is limited to Nigeria’s northeastern Borno State, Abuja has been subject to previous bombings claimed by the group, including a suicide bombing in August 2011 which killed 18 people and another on Christmas Day in the same year which killed 35; two more attacks occurred in 2014, killing at least 109 people. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), the other prominent insurgent group in Borno State, claimed an attack on a prison outside Abuja in July 2022, which killed five and freed 879 inmates. While there have not been any Boko Haram attacks in Abuja since 2014, the likely attempted attack is highly likely indicative of a renewed confidence of the group amid a resurgence of activity in 2025.

Swiss village destroyed by glacier collapse

On 28 May, the Birch Glacier in the Swiss canton of Valais collapsed, resulting in three million cubic metres of rock cascading into the valley below. The village of Blatten was devastated, with most of the homes completely destroyed.

Local authorities had earlier ordered the evacuation of the village’s 300 inhabitants on 19 May due to warnings from geologists that the glacier was unstable. Whilst this almost certainly limited the threat to life, one person is reported missing. Residents in Gampel and Steg have been asked to additionally make preparations for evacuation.

Glaciologists and climate scientists warn that climate change is significantly increasing the rate of glacier thaw, with glaciers across Switzerland having dramatically shrunk since 2000. It is almost certain that accelerated glacier thaw increases the risks of glacier collapse and landslides for nearby settlements, including popular ski resorts that are situated near glaciers.

Severe cholera outbreak in Sudan

The local ministry of health reported more than 2,700 cases and approximately 172 deaths in the last week alone. Approximately 90 per cent of cases reported so far are concentrated in Khartoum state, the location of recent intense clashes between the government forces and the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The death toll in Khartoum state has almost certainly been worsened by the infrastructural damage caused by the clashes in recent weeks. Moreover, RSF forces have implemented a strategy of attacks on civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and power stations, which also affected local water treatment plants.

Saudi clerics announce Hajj to start on 4 June following crescent moon sighting

The annual Hajj pilgrimage to the city of Makkah is one of the five pillars of Islam, and all able-bodied Muslims are required to do it at least once in their life. In recent years, crowds of pilgrims to Makkah have increased significantly.

When it falls in the summer months, the pilgrimage entails significant health threats, particularly from extreme heat. In 2024, when Hajj was performed by more than 1.8 million people, temperatures in Makkah reached 51 degrees, and more than 1,300 deaths were reported.

While Saudi officials have sought to ameliorate conditions for pilgrims, it is highly likely that, with weather forecasts indicating daily average maximum temperatures of above 37 degrees during the pilgrimage days, the yearly event will still entail significant health risks.

On 3 June, South Koreans will vote to elect a new president to replace Yoon Suk Yeol following his removal from office after imposing martial law on 3 December 2024. Early voting began on 29 May, with a turnout rate of 8.7 per cent by midday, the highest yet in South Korean election history. The overseas voter turnout has also reached a record 1.97 million voters.

The snap election was announced after Yoon was impeached by parliament, which was upheld by a constitutional court on 4 April, paving the way for the legally required presidential election within 60 days. The election winner will take office immediately after the National Election Commission (NEC) confirms the results and serve a term of five years.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The current electoral frontrunner is the liberal Lee Jae-myung, leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, with 49 per cent of respondents to a Gallup poll considering him the best candidate. Lee lost to Yoon narrowly in 2022 and will highly likely be his replacement, promising jobs, development of the AI industry, and a shortening of the presidential term to four years but extending the term limit to two terms.

The second favourite is Kim Moon-Soo of Yoon’s former People Power Party, with 35 per cent of respondents favouring him. Kim has framed himself as the pro-business option, touting deregulation and support for small firms to promote growth, also promoting two four-year terms rather than one five-year term.

Outsider candidates are New Reform Party candidate Lee Jun-seok, Democratic Labor Party candidate Kwon Young-guk, and independent candidates Hwang Kyo-ahn and Song Jin-ho.

The controversy surrounding the election has almost certainly triggered the high voter turnout, with the restoration of leadership in South Korea being a popular issue. Economic uncertainty has also likely contributed to the elevated significance of the election, with the leadership vacuum exacerbated by the impact of the 25 per cent tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump to culminate in weak consumer and business confidence.

Recent data suggests that in the first 20 days of May, South Korean exports fell by 2.4 per cent, with shipments to the US dropping by 14.6 per cent. Access to affordable housing, job creation, and foreign policy are also important concerns for voters, who are increasingly concerned about North Korea’s advancing military capabilities.

Despite the perceived importance of the election, the debates have largely been overshadowed by personal attacks from each side. Kim has resorted to referencing Lee’s legal troubles and framing him as a hardline populist with unrealistic economic policies. The personal nature of the attacks exacerbates the risk of protests around the election date. However, given the generally peaceful nature of South Korean protests, clashes are unlikely.

Mongolian prime minister expected to call a vote of confidence amid pressure from protesters

On 28 May, Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai called a vote of confidence, with his office declaring that he will ‘address parliament at the earliest opportunity next week on the uncertainty surrounding the future of the governing coalition — inviting members of parliament to vote on a support motion of the coalition government.’ Since 14 May, peaceful demonstrations have been ongoing in Ulaanbaatar to denounce perceived government corruption after a social media video appeared to portray lavish spending by Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene son.

The ruling Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) currently holds a slim majority of 68 seats out of 126, having ejected the Democratic Party from the coalition amid growing government criticism. At least 64 votes are needed to expel the prime minister from office. While there is no obvious replacement, it is likely that if Oyun-Erdene fails the vote of confidence and is forced to resign, current parliamentary chairman Amarbayasgalan Dashzegve will take his place as interim leader.

There are concerns that President Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh and his supporters may use the vote to sideline parliament and take up a second term in office, beyond the constitutional one-six-year limit. If Oyun-Erdene passes the vote or if there is evidence of an attempt by MPP members to change the constitution to enable a term extension by Khürelsükh, further protests are highly likely.

Pro-monarchy protests in Kathmandu, Nepal

On 29 May, approximately 20,000 protesters gathered in the main circle in Kathmandu. The demonstrators demanded the return of the king and restoration of Hinduism as a state religion, stating ‘[b]ring king back to the throne and save the country. We love our king more than our lives’, claiming that they would continue protesting until the monarchy is restored.

Republican protesters had gathered for Republic Day nearby, but riot police kept the groups apart to prevent clashes. Previous protests on March 28 resulted in the deaths of two people after protesters attacked offices linked to the Unified Socialists (CPN), looted commercial premises, and torched vehicles, with security forces responding with tear gas and live ammunition.

Royalist groups calling for the reinstatement of Guanendra Shah have become increasingly vocal in recent months, accusing the government of corruption and failed governance. Further protests are likely in the coming weeks, and there is a realistic possibility of clashes with republican counter-protesters or security forces.

Samoan prime minister calls early election after budget vote fails

Fiamē Naomi Mata’afa’s government failed to pass the budget for next year at a parliamentary vote on 27 May, which prompted the prime minister to call early elections. According to Samoan law, the vote will have to be held within 90 days. The government had already survived two no-confidence votes in recent months, and the country is currently undergoing a period of political instability. There is a remote possibility of civil unrest in the lead up to the vote, possibly driving localised disruptions in Apia.

Increasing tensions between Balochi militants and ISKP in Pakistan and Afghanistan

Baloch nationalist militant groups have claimed to have increased operations against the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). In March, Baloch militants carried out an attack on an ISKP base in Mastung, Pakistan, reportedly killing around 30 ISKP members. During the last reporting period, Baloch channels claimed that the Mastung attack eliminated ISKP in Pakistan, following the Taliban’s reported removal of the group from Afghanistan. Subsequently, they pledged future anti-ISKP operations in Tajikistan, a country that remains fundamental for ISKP’s recruitment efforts.

In response to the latest claims, pro-ISKP channels have released a series of threats to carry out attacks against Balochi civilians and during the militant groups’ assemblies. The developments highly likely demonstrate the growing tensions between the nationalist and jihadist groups. While the Balochi militants’ claims of having “wiped out” ISKP from Pakistan are, like the Taliban’s similar claims in Afghanistan, highly likely exaggerated, the Mastung offensive and other operations have highly likely dealt a significant blow to ISKP, which is also demonstrated by the drop in frequency of the group’s attacks.

ISKP will likely seek to retaliate against Balochi attacks, likely attacking “soft” civilian targets.

One killed after brief clashes along the Thailand and Cambodia border

On 28 May, brief clashes occurred between Thai and Cambodian soldiers along the disputed border, killing one Cambodian. According to a statement by the Cambodian military, Thai soldiers opened fire on Cambodian soldiers conducting a routine military patrol. According to the Thai military, however, the Cambodian side opened fire on the Thai soldiers after entering a disputed zone. Local commanders ordered a ceasefire after approximately 10 minutes, and army chiefs agreed to mutually withdraw from the disputed area on 29 May.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet also declared that troops and weapons have been sent to the border as reinforcements. The clashes happened in the disputed border region between Cambodia’s Preah Vihear province and Thailand’s Ubon Ratchathani province. The dispute stems from colonial-era mapping, with France and Siam (now Thailand) agreeing on the border in 1904 according to the watershed principle: the natural line dividing the river basins. A subsequent French map depicted the Preah Vihear Temple as being inside Cambodian territory, in contrast to where the watershed principle would place it. The ICJ later ruled in favour of Cambodia.

Occasional clashes have occurred between the two sides, particularly in 2008, after UNESCO listed the temple as a Cambodian World Heritage Site. Given the de-escalation between the two sides in the aftermath of the clashes, the situation is unlikely to escalate into wider military clashes.

Further attacks recorded in Thailand’s restless Deep South

On 28 May, militants disguised themselves as villagers and shot participants in an anti-drug sports competition in Tak Bai District, Narathiwat province, injuring two teachers and two volunteer defence corps members. On the same day, a police officer was killed and two others injured after a sniper opened fire at a flag-raising ceremony at a police station in Narathiwat province.

The twin attacks in the Deep South form part of a broader series of attacks, primarily targeting the local police and defence corps volunteers, who are accused of collaborating with the Thai central government. However, the primary militant group in the area, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), has pledged not to target civilians, and the attack at the police station has been linked to a smaller militant group which is known to operate in the mountainous areas in the region.

The nature of the attacks may indicate a splintering of the wider Malay/Muslim separatist movement in the Deep South, with more hardline factions attempting to increase violence to undermine ongoing peace initiatives and provoke a return to broader conflict.

Several deaths and dozens of injuries due to heavy rains and flooding in Punjab, Pakistan

Local authorities reported that at least 14 people had been killed in flood-related incidents, with an additional 100 reported to have been injured. The most severely affected area is that of Jhelum, but widespread disruptions have been recorded across Punjab and in nearby regions.

The floods occur earlier than the start of Pakistan’s usual monsoon season (late June to late September) and follow a period of extreme heat, with temperatures of 45 degrees Celsius recorded in parts of the country. Neighbouring India was also affected by the rains, with flooding reported in Mumbai on 26 May.

It is likely that the early monsoon will continue to impact South Asian countries, including India and Pakistan, in the short term, with forecasts indicating further severe precipitation in the 30 May – 1 June period.

Industrial explosion in Gaomi, China

On 27 May, an explosion occurred at a chemical plant in Gaomi, Shandong Province, China. The incident resulted in at least five fatalities, with 19 individuals injured, and six others reported missing. In response to the disaster, more than 200 emergency personnel were deployed to the site to manage the situation and aid in rescue operations. The cause of the explosion remains under investigation as officials continue to assess the damage and search for the missing individuals.

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