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22 – 19 January

Global Intelligence Summary

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Geopolitical, Global Security & Environmental Events

Mark Overington
Mark Overington
Head of Intelligence
Joshua George
Joshua George
Intelligence Analyst
Julian Kett
Julian Kett
Intelligence Analyst
Manfredi Pozzoli
Manfredi Pozzoli
Intelligence Analyst

Key Events This Week

America

AMER

Cuba

The scale and severity of blackouts are highly likely to increase in Cuba following a major decline in fuel imports, which are likely to increasingly affect the tourism sector and undermine the economy.


Europe, Middle East and Africa

EMEA

Ukraine

It is unlikely that the first trilateral Ukraine-Russia-US talks since the full-scale invasion will lead to an imminent peace agreement, particularly if claimed US signalling on the contingency of security guarantees is maintained.

EMEA

Azerbaijan

A thwarted attack plan by the Islamic State (IS) in Baku, Azerbaijan, in addition to a series of other disrupted plots, are likely early indicators that the country and wider Caucasus are emerging theatres of interest for IS.

EMEA

Iran

The continued buildup of US forces in the Middle East, combined with President Trump’s ultimatum, has almost certainly increased the risk of miscalculation and rapid escalation with Iran.

EMEA

South Sudan

The full collapse of the peace agreement and a return to full-scale civil war in South Sudan is increasingly likely as government forces prepare to launch a counteroffensive against the opposition military.


Asia Pacific

APAC

India

Increased Nipah virus screenings for passengers on flights exiting India will highly likely result in delays when transiting through Pakistan, Nepal, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Hong Kong airports.


Starting on 26 January, several parts of Cuba suffered protracted power outages due to acute fuel shortages and ongoing constraints within the national electricity grid. Some parts of the island reportedly lost power for more than 30 hours, with large areas of the capital, Havana, recording at least 15 hours without electricity. The blackouts coincided with the 27-28 January celebrations for the birth of José Martí, a nineteenth-century revolutionary and one of the leaders of Cuba’s war of independence from Spain. The blackouts disrupted essential services, telecommunications, transport and businesses, although most critical state facilities like hospitals and major hotels were not significantly affected.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

Cuba has experienced cyclical power outages since 2022, with the frequency and severity of blackouts increasing due to ageing infrastructure, increased demand and fuel shortages. However, this crisis has almost certainly been compounded since the US capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, interdictions of Venezuela’s dark tanker fleet, and reallocation of Venezuelan oil to other markets. This has led to a significant reduction in fuel imports to Cuba. On 28 January, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum announced a temporary pause in fuel shipments to Cuba, with Mexico being the primary supplier of oil since the end of Venezuelan shipments. This move was likely a major concession to Washington, which is effectively attempting to isolate Cuba, with President Trump commenting that the Cuban regime is very close to falling.

Cuba’s tourism sector, which accounts for approximately ten per cent of Cuban GDP, has declined dramatically in recent years due to blackouts, service disruptions, water shortages, antiquated infrastructure and economic instability. The continued isolation of Cuba is likely to result in a further decrease in tourist arrivals and foreign currency inflows, exacerbating the current economic crisis. While many major hotels and resorts with backup generators have largely been able to maintain basic services such as lighting, air conditioning, and running water, even during prolonged blackouts, the extent of the fuel crisis is likely to increasingly affect these areas and undermine confidence in Cuba’s tourism sector.

Despite the crisis, Cuba has had relatively little unrest in recent years. The two waves of protests in March and October 2024 remained relatively limited. Still, the Cuban government implemented several measures aimed at thwarting the unrest before it could increase its momentum. These included imposing internet access blocks and using large police deployments to deter further gatherings, while also using inducements – such as emergency subsidies of basic goods. The last wave of major protests in Cuba occurred in 2021 and was motivated by food and medicine shortages. Here, authorities implemented harsh measures, carrying out mass arrests and organising hundreds of trials of both participants and bystanders. These cases likely illustrate Havana’s possible reactions to further unrest, depending on its scale and intensity. Still, a “carrot-and-stick” approach is unlikely to work if fuel shipments continue to decline and sectors such as tourism continue to stagnate.


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