On the evening of 21 May, an individual shot and killed two Israeli embassy staffers outside the Capital Jewish Museum, located in the centre of the US capital and just north of the Capitol building. The suspect reportedly waited for individuals leaving the museum, where an event was being held, and, after opening fire, walked inside where he shouted slogans commonly associated with the pro-Palestine movement. A video taken by event attendees as the alleged perpetrator was detained shows him shouting “free, free Palestine”.

According to information released by authorities, the perpetrator of the shooting is a US national with no known criminal history, and there are no indications that he has been previously associated with an extremist organisation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Washington shooter was almost certainly motivated by recent developments in the conflict in Gaza, which restarted on 18 March following the breakdown of a ceasefire between Israel and various Palestinian militant groups. The attack coincides with recent developments in the conflict, most importantly, a shift in Tel Aviv’s strategy in Gaza towards the establishment of long-term territorial control, and occurred just days after Nakba Day (15 May).

The target of the attack is likewise high visibility: the museum is in the centre of Washington, only a few hundred metres from the White House and the Capitol, and the event the shooter targeted was a “Young Diplomats” gathering, thus likely to be attended by individuals working in areas adjacent to policymaking. These elements, as well as the shooter’s shouting of pro-Palestine slogans and his alleged wearing of a keffiyeh, a typically Palestinian scarf that is a long-standing symbol of the movement, make it almost certain that his goal was to maximise his actions’ visibility and to link them to the pro-Palestine movement.

The attacker’s interest in achieving maximum visibility, his espousing of “symbols” clearly linked with the pro-Palestine movement, his use of a low sophistication method (a light firearm), and his lack of ties to any specific extremist group, make this attack resemblant of other lone wolf terrorist attacks in the US and Western Europe. Although so far unverified, posts circulating online claiming to show the perpetrator’s digital footprint may point towards a dynamic of self-radicalisation, which would again be consistent with other cases of lone wolf terrorism.

Due to the profile of the victims and the dynamic of the incident, the shooting is likely to have an important political impact in the United States, where the current government has taken a more confrontational approach that is likely aimed at quashing pro-Palestine activism and unrest. The ongoing conflict in Gaza has almost certainly contributed to a rise in political violence (not only in the US, but also in Oceania and Europe) aimed at high-visibility targets.

On 20 May, the private secretary and the advisor of Mexico City mayor Clara Brugada, of President Claudia Sheinbaum’s MORENA party, were shot and killed in the capital’s downtown area. According to local media, the pair were killed while stopped on the side of a busy roadway on their way to work, as they were ambushed by one gunman who approached them and later escaped on a motorcycle.

While dozens of policymakers and other public figures have been killed in Mexico in recent years, Mexico City, where the country’s main public institutions are located, is far less directly affected by cartel violence compared to many other Mexican urban centres. As of the time of writing, authorities have not identified the actor(s) responsible for the shooting. However, police stated that at least four people were involved in the shooting, and stated that, after switching vehicles several times, the suspected gunmen escaped to neighbouring Mexico State.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The shooting was almost certainly targeted, and one of Mexico’s powerful criminal organisations was likely responsible for it. While Mexico State is a stronghold of the La Familia cartel, which was initially formed in Michoacán, several other groups, including the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and the Sinaloa Cartel, have a presence in the area and almost certainly retain the capability to stage targeted killings in the capital.

The individuals killed in the attack are highly likely to have been considered high visibility, being close to the capital’s mayor, who is in turn a member of the party of Mexico’s president. The Sheinbaum administration, which inherited a “soft” approach to addressing cartel violence (the “hugs not bullets” policies that were sponsored by the former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador), has increasingly shifted towards a more openly confrontational approach.

Moreover, Mexico City is facing threats of economic coercion from the current US administration over its failure to curb cartel activity. There is a realistic possibility that the attack in Mexico City, which has been typically more insulated from direct cartel violence, was a symbolic message aimed at the ruling administration. While much of the cartels’ violence has been concentrated in high-risk areas of the country, the groups retain the ability to threaten not only Mexico City but also other areas that have long been considered to have a lower threat of violence, including resort cities.

If the cartels begin to feel more threatened by Mexico City, there is a realistic possibility that they may increasingly target these locations, damaging Mexico’s economic and political stability.

Protests almost certain in the USA and other countries on the fifth anniversary of George Floyd’s death

George Floyd was killed by a police officer on 25 May 2020 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The death sparked the largest protests in American history, which expanded to Canada, Mexico, as well as much of Europe and several other countries.

Protests are highly likely to occur in connection with the anniversary, across large US and Canadian urban centres. It is likely that protests will start on 22 May and continue throughout the following week. As the protests are extremely high visibility, there is a realistic possibility of political violence, and possibly terrorist action targeting the protesters or responding police.

As protests may entail localised road blockades, there is a realistic possibility of vehicle ramming attacks targeting protesters (during the George Floyd protests, more than 100 incidents of this type were recorded, around half of which are considered to have involved malicious intent).

El Salvador Congress passes Foreign Agents Bill

On 20 May, Congress passed the Foreign Agents Bill, which imposes a 30 per cent tax on transactions from foreign donors. Congress passed the law with 57 in favour and three against. While the law is defended for its improved transparency on local entities, human rights groups have criticised it for threatening non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs’) ability to freely operate in the country.

Alongside the reduced funding NGOs will receive, the bill restricts “foreign agents” from carrying out activities for political purposes with the objective of disturbing public order or threatening national security or political stability. The new laws will highly likely lead to NGOs being increasingly banned from operating in the country after being framed as hostile actors.

The passing of the bill comes shortly after a prominent human rights lawyer, Ruth Eleonora López was arrested on 18 May in San Salvador on charges of embezzlement. While President Nayib Bukele has significantly reduced organised crime rates, his government’s crackdown on human rights increasingly threatens NGOs who criticise his government’s actions. It is highly likely that the foreign agents bill will lead to reduced NGO funding and increased banning of NGOs from operating in El Salvador.

Suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack in Palm Springs, USA

On 17 May, an SVBIED detonated outside a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, injuring four. The perpetrator tried to livestream his attack and, prior to it, had published extensive material online, including a video manifesto explaining his motives. The available evidence makes it highly likely that the detonation was a lone wolf terror attack, and that its perpetrator espoused a niche ideology almost completely relegated to small online communities.

Called “Efilism” (from the backwards spelling of “life”), this is a radical version of antinatalism that sees it as a moral imperative to eliminate all forms of life. The attack is notably part of a growing trend in lone wolf terrorism in the Americas and Europe, whereby extremely small online ideological networks are increasingly able to inspire violent actions.

Outages in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, after protesters shut down power station

Protracted blackouts have been recorded in the capital of Haiti after the shutdown of the country’s largest hydroelectric power plant, located on the Péligre lake. The plant was shut down by local civil society organisations, who said they were protesting the government’s failure to protect the towns of Mirebalais and Saut d’Eau from the gangs who control much of the country’s territory.

Current estimates indicate that approximately 90 per cent of the capital’s territory is controlled by gangs. Currently, the joint force of local Haitian police officers and the Kenya-led international police mission is highly likely unable to significantly dislodge gangs from areas under their control in the capital and its surroundings. Nevertheless, government forces have adopted a strategy of targeted raids; for instance, on 20 May, police forces staged an operation targeting members of the Viv Ansanm gang coalition in Mirebalais, killing 12.

Second-in-command of Brazil’s largest crime syndicate jailed

On 19 May, Marcos Roberto de Almeida (Tuta), leader of Brazil’s largest and most powerful crime syndicate, Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), was imprisoned in a maximum-security prison in Brasília. The drug lord was arrested in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, on 17 May after he tried to renew his foreign registration with a false Brazilian document. Tuta is the de facto PCC leader outside prison walls, responsible for coordinating international drug trafficking and money laundering operations. He has been on Interpol’s Red Notice list and has been on the run for five years. Reprisal attacks by the PCC on security forces are highly likely.

Severe weather continues in the United States

Severe weather continues to impact the Midwest, Northeast, and Southeast regions of the United States. At least 25 people have died, with one tornado in St. Louis killing seven. A recent tornado warning has been issued for areas of Love County, Oklahoma, affecting towns such as Marietta and Thackerville.

In Kansas, a tornado classified as an EF-3 by the National Weather Service caused significant damage near Plevna, destroying three homes, although no injuries were reported. Meanwhile, in Alabama, over 10,000 people are without electricity due to storms, with the majority of outages in Calhoun County.

The aftermath of an EF-4 tornado in London, Kentucky, has resulted in over 100 people being treated for injuries, with one fatality reported. In St. Louis, an explosion near tornado-damaged buildings is under investigation by the bomb and arson squad.

Severe floods in Argentina’s farming region

On 17 May, at least 4,000 residents were forced to evacuate as heavy rains hit north of Buenos Aires province. Between 300 and 400 millimetres of rainfall fell in less than 72 hours, and the National Meteorological Service issued a red alert for the region on 16 May, warning that the storms were “constantly regenerating”. Buenos Aires is one of Argentina’s primary farming regions, and the heavy rainfall will highly likely trigger delays to the soybean harvest. Further heavy rain and wind are highly likely, and authorities have urged citizens of Zárate to remain indoors.

The demonstrations organised under the slogan Canarias Tiene un Límite (the Canary Islands have a limit) were recorded in the islands of Tenerife, La Gomera, Gran Canaria, El Hierro, Lanzarote, and La Palma. The protests were led by a network of several activist groups, including environmentalists and tenants’ rights groups, who justified them by citing the alleged inactivity of the local government concerning their demands to incentivise sustainable tourism and prevent overtourism.

The latest mobilisation was the third so far by the network and had a lower attendance than the first iteration of the unrest in April 2024, but more than the second in October 2024.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Canary Islands are likely to be the centre of the Spanish (and, by extension, South European) anti-tourism protest wave. The islands, which have a population of 2.2 million, had an influx of between 15 and 18 million tourists in 2024 alone, with figures in 2025 expected to match or surpass last year’s. In addition to short-term tourist arrivals, the island’s previously stable population has significantly grown, largely due to arrivals from the Spanish mainland and other European countries.

The protests on 20 May are likely to be followed by further large-scale gatherings. In addition to the Canary Islands, other tourist destinations in Spain, including Barcelona, Valencia, and Sevilla, are likely to have anti-tourism protests. The next notable date for protests is highly likely to be 15 June, as the transnational European Network Against Touristification (SET) has called for protests on the day. Demonstrations are also likely to occur in France, Italy, and Portugal on this day. Other protests are likely to occur as the tourist high season reaches its peak between June and August.

In addition to large-scale protests, one of the key possible developments in the protest movement in the Canary Islands would see a transition towards smaller episodes of direct action. One of the fundamental objectives of the protesters and their leading groups has been a halt to the construction of new tourism projects, which they claim will put further strain on residents and the local environment. These projects, as well as other assets like store locations owned by multinational companies or high-visibility private assets like residences or boats, may become increasingly desirable targets for anti-tourism activists, particularly if protests fail to reach satisfactory political outcomes.

On 18 May, US President Donald Trump held a conference call with the leaders of the UK, France, Germany and Italy. During the call, Kyiv’s European allies reportedly pressured Trump to intensify sanctions against Russia if there was no immediate and unconditional ceasefire.

On 19 May, Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke for approximately two hours during a call. Trump then announced that Moscow and Kyiv will ‘immediately start negotiations towards a ceasefire’. Notably, Trump indicated that the US will not play a direct mediating role in the talks.

Furthermore, Trump pointed towards the Vatican City as a potential location for such talks, with Pope Leo XIV being ‘very interested’ in this proposal. The Kremlin announced that Russia is ‘ready to work with Ukraine on a memorandum on a future peace treaty, which may also include a ceasefire’.

Alternative messaging from senior Kremlin officials, however, including former president Dmitry Medvedev, denied the legitimacy of Kyiv’s government to conduct negotiations. A senior Putin advisor further added that during the 19 May call, no timetable was discussed, but Trump wished for the proposals to happen ‘quickly’, and Trump threatened that the US Senate is preparing possible sanctions.

Following another call between Trump and European allies, European leaders were reportedly ‘shocked’ by Trump’s eagerness to withdraw the US from the process as soon as possible. Trump also reportedly stated that Putin is unwilling to end the war because the Russian president believes that Russia is winning.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The difference between the overt diplomatic messaging between Kyiv and its Western allies, and Moscow, can broadly be summarised as follows: Kyiv and its allies want an immediate and unconditional ceasefire as a prelude to comprehensive peace negotiations; Moscow wants negotiations for a ceasefire, with such negotiations involving concessions that address what the Kremlin perceives as the ‘root causes’ of the conflict.

Washington, while aligned with Kyiv and European partners in the desire for a ceasefire, crucially differs with allies in that it is highly likely that the Trump administration sees the removal of the US from the conflict and associated diplomacy as a strategic priority.

It is unclear who will mediate potential Ukraine-Russia talks, although it is likely that Moscow would have misgivings with the Vatican mediating, given that Pope Leo XIV has previously publicly espoused pro-Ukrainian views, criticising what he called Russia’s ‘imperialist’ invasion of Ukraine. 

The different stances indicate at least three possible scenarios:

On 18 May, the IDF announced the launch of a wide-scale ground offensive into the Gaza Strip. This represents the intensification of Operation Gideon’s Chariots, which began in early May. The day prior, IDF units began advancing towards Deir al-Balah and, on 19 May, the IDF issued evacuation orders for Khan Yunis, in southern Gaza.

Israeli authorities have stated that new offensive operations will be conducted with the aim of establishing stable control over a portion of Gaza, further displacing the civilian population. At the same time as the new ground operations, Israeli forces launched a wave of strikes, including decapitation strikes aimed at the surviving Hamas leadership. The new phase of the operation coincides with the end of US President Donald Trump’s visit to the Middle East.

The humanitarian situation in Gaza continues to be severe. Facing intense pressure from its international allies, Tel Aviv has allowed the limited entry of aid into the Gaza Strip following a two-month blockade. According to UN sources, approximately 90 trucks entered Gaza from Kerem Shalom carrying humanitarian aid by 22 May. The UN and multiple humanitarian agencies stated that the volume of aid entering Gaza, however, remains far too small to ameliorate the severe shortages of food, medicine, and other basic necessities.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The IDF’s main efforts are highly likely currently concentrated along two axes: in the Gaza Strip’s north and in the centre in Deir al-Balah. Israeli commanders almost certainly view the expansion of ground operations as fundamental to maximise pressure on Hamas and either achieve a significant erosion of the group’s remaining strength or compel it to release the last remaining hostages it holds.

By occupying areas it clears, the IDF will likely be able to prevent the re-infiltration of Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups, which have been a source of constant attrition throughout the conflict. At the same time, the combination of ground offensive operations with targeted strikes is almost certainly meant to deteriorate Hamas’ ability to project power inside the Gaza Strip, particularly among the displaced civilian population.

The intensification of the ground offensive is almost certain to cause a further deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Israeli strikes, including attempts to decapitate the remaining Hamas leadership, are almost certain to cause civilian casualties and to threaten humanitarian workers present in the area. For example, the 13 May airstrike on the European Hospital in Khan Yunis, which, according to some reports, killed the de facto Hamas leader, Mohammed Sinwar (brother of Yahya Sinwar), also resulted in the death of 28 people and wounded around 50, according to the Hamas-run civil defence agency.

Two senior Iranian officials briefed the press that Tehran had ‘not accepted’ Oman’s invitation for the fifth round of US-Iran nuclear talks, which were scheduled for 23 May in Rome, Italy. Tehran reportedly cited Washington’s insistence on “zero enrichment” as the cause for the de facto threat to collapse talks.

Ultimately, however, on 23 May, US and Iranian delegations travelled to Rome to resume talks. Earlier, on 19 May, the US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated that enrichment would not be allowed under any deal, with enrichment being the Trump administration’s ‘one very, very clear red line’.

Furthermore, Israeli sources have indicated that the Israeli intelligence community has altered their assessment from believing a nuclear deal was close to assessing that talks could soon break down. Israeli sources also indicated that Israel’s government is waiting for the talks to collapse so that it can give the go-ahead for a military campaign against Iran that would last for at least a week.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Tehran is almost certainly in a highly vulnerable and perilous position, with key proxies in the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ having been heavily degraded, air defences that were weakened by Israeli strikes last year, and a Trump administration in the White House that has repeatedly threatened military intervention. On the one hand, Tehran almost certainly treats a civilian nuclear program for energy purposes as a key priority and would therefore be remiss to concede to zero enrichment.

On the other hand, however, such a nuclear program would likely continue to be used in a manner whereby Iran could fairly rapidly transition enrichment capabilities towards the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Tehran is highly incentivised to have a nuclear deterrent, an incentive that has highly likely only grown due to the weakening of other components of Iranian deterrence, namely the severe degradation of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Fundamentally, it is highly likely that Iran’s diplomatic brinkmanship is a calculated manoeuvre to gain leverage. It was almost certainly highly risky, however, for Tehran to make threats of talks withdrawal to gain concessions of continued enrichment. The Benjamin Netanyahu administration may approve strikes against Iran regardless of whether the talks collapse. However, the talks collapsing would almost certainly considerably increase the likelihood that Israel’s government would go ahead, given that Washington would almost certainly be critical of Israel unilaterally taking such an action that would highly likely end any prospects of a nuclear deal being reached diplomatically.

Should conflict break out, this would almost certainly dramatically affect the risk profile of travel to, and operations in, most of the Middle East.

On 17 May, 57 bodies were recovered in Borno State in Nigeria’s northeast. The bodies stem from a militant attack two days earlier, on 15 May, on the villages of Mallam Karamti and Kwatandashi. The attack was reportedly conducted by Boko Haram, who a witness reports gathering at least 100 people from the villages and marching them into the forest. While 57 bodies were found, over 70 remain missing, although fear of ambush prevented the further enumeration of bodies.

The attack reportedly occurred after Boko Haram accused the villagers of being informants for the rival Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). This constitutes the latest incident in surging violence in Borno State. On 12 May, ISWAP conducted an attack on the Nigerian Army’s 50 Task Force Battalion in Marte, killing several soldiers. Approximately 20,000 people have fled Marte following increased attacks, according to Borno’s governor. On 17 May, a suspected ISWAP roadside bombing on the Maiduguri-Damboa Road killed four and injured 10.

These Boko Haram and ISWAP attacks constitute the latest in a broader escalation of attacks in northwest Nigeria.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Attacks in Borno State have significantly escalated in 2025. While Boko Haram attacks on rural communities and military personnel have increased in 2025, ISWAP is conducting its most successful offensive in years. Nigerian counterinsurgency efforts largely consisted of a strategy of concentrating soldiers in fortified “supercamps”, a tactic which ISWAP have circumvented by launching nighttime raids, targeting roads and bridges between the camps, and conducting diversionary attacks, preventing reinforcements.

ISWAP have also evolved their tactics in 2025, adding uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) to its arsenal; in an attack on the Forward Operating Base in the Wajikoro area of Borno on 25 March 2025, ISWAP used four weaponised commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) UAVs. This development is indicative of increased funding from Islamic State (IS) and will likely increase the effectiveness of the group’s tactics by enhancing its offensive capabilities while minimising risks to its members, enabling it to expand its operations.

The resurgence can also be attributed to a regional security vacuum. Weakening border security in the Sahel countries has enabled increased weapons and ammunition flow to insurgent groups, as counterterrorism cooperation between the countries has declined. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, and Benin has recently faced increasing challenges and fracturing.

Niger left in March 2025 and Chad’s President Idris Deby threatened to withdraw in October 2024 and declared that Chad will limit its counterterrorism operations to its territory. The Nigerian military has also been forced to deploy soldiers to the northwestern regions of the country to combat banditry and kidnappings, which has reduced their presence in Borno.

The increased operating room has coincided with a lull in fighting between Boko Haram and ISWAP, which has also allowed them to increase attacks on civilians and security forces in 2025.

The rainy season, which spans from June to September, will almost certainly hamper insurgent group activities by flooding insurgent support zones around the Lake Chad Basin and the forests. This typically sees insurgent attacks decrease, enabling Boko Haram and ISWAP to recuperate from fighting and grow revenue from farming. In anticipation of a period of reduced activity, further large-scale insurgent attacks are highly likely in the coming weeks, climaxing before the onset of severe weather. Despite the general decrease in militant activity, ambushes on commuters will likely increase, with insurgents typically robbing commuters to increase revenue during this period.

Taxi drivers demonstrate across France

On 19 and 20 May, taxi drivers blocked roads across several cities in France. The demonstrations were in response to new hospital transport fees, as well as growing competition from ride-hailing apps such as Uber and Bolt.

The French government ordered reforms to health costs last week under increasing pressure to prevent steadily increasing prices, which are set to come into force in October. The demonstrations caused hundreds of kilometres of traffic jams, particularly in Paris, Marseille, and Toulon.

Approximately 1,000 taxis blocked roads in central Paris, where taxi drivers lit wooden pallets and tyres on fire, and security forces responded with tear gas. The demonstrations have been declared “reconductible”, meaning there is no fixed end date. As such, the protests are highly likely to continue over the coming days and weeks.

Month-long metro strike in Lisbon to begin on 23 May

According to the Federation of Transport and Communications Unions (FECTRANS), a network of sector-specific labour unions, the strike is to protest current rules regarding overtime work and “special events”, such as large-scale sports and cultural events that impact metro running time.

Due to its specific focus, the strike is highly likely to be supported by networks and movements outside of the transport sector, such as, for instance, anti-tourism groups.

The strike, if an agreement is not reached, will almost certainly impact travel in Lisbon during events such as the Women’s Champions League final game (24 May) and the Santos Populares folklore events in June.

Protests after Hungary’s parliament proposes “Transparency in Public Life” bill

On 14 May, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán proposed a “Transparency in Public Life” bill, which would enable the government to blacklist organisations perceived as ‘threatening the sovereignty’ of Hungary by influencing public life with foreign funding.

On 20 May, Hungarian lawmakers also approved a bill to quit the International Criminal Court (ICC). If passed, the transparency bill would bar groups critical of Hungary’s government from receiving donations through the one per cent income tax contribution scheme, which constitutes a major funding source for non-profit organisations (NGOs).

This bill constitutes the latest in a series of crackdowns on NGOs and independent media, including implementing oversight departments, such as the Sovereignty Protection Office in 2023, which investigates organisations deemed to exert foreign influence. It is similar to “Foreign Agents” bills passed in the parliaments of Georgia and Russia, which effectively strangles NGOs.

In response to the proposition, at least 10,000 people gathered in Kossuth Square in front of parliament on 18 May chanting ‘we’ve had enough’. Further protests are highly likely, particularly after the bill passes, which is almost certain given Fidesz’s control over Hungary’s parliament.

Sudan’s army chief appoints prime minister

On 19 May, Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appointed Kamil al-Taib Idris as Sudan’s first prime minister since the start of the civil war. The previous prime minister Abdalla Hamdok resigned in 2022 following widespread pro-democracy protests.

While the appointment of a prime minister constitutes a significant step in restoring civilian rule, the fracturing of Sudan into Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)- and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-controlled areas, as well as the intensity of the ongoing conflict, makes a full restoration highly unlikely.

The appointment of the prime minister highly likely constitutes a response to the RSF’s February charter, which established a parallel government in Sudan. By appointing a prime minister and performatively signalling an intent to transition to civilian-led rule, the SAF can counterpose itself to the RSF and, in turn, increase its legitimacy on both the domestic and international stage.

Several teenagers arrested in Germany for forming neo-Nazi terrorist cell

German counterterrorism forces arrested five minors for allegedly forming a group named “Last Wave of Defence” espousing neo-Nazi ideology and planning attacks against migrants and left-wing activists and politicians.

The five are also suspected of being responsible for committing arson at a community centre in Brandenburg in October 2024, and for launching fireworks into a migrant shelter in Saxony in January 2025.

The case highlights a growing trend of extremely young individuals becoming radicalised, which has become evident in Europe and North America and is shared across ideologies. However, the case is also likely notable as the group showcased a level of organisation that sets it apart from cases of lone wolf terrorism, as well as the ability to carry out attacks across multiple locations.

Shots fired at EU, Asian, Arab diplomats in West Bank likely to deteriorate Israel’s diplomatic position

On 21 May, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) soldiers reportedly fired shots towards a delegation of 25 diplomats from the EU, Arab and Asian countries in Jenin, travelling to the area’s refugee camp to assess its humanitarian situation. IDF channels claimed that the shots were fired as a “warning” after the delegation’s convoy strayed from its agreed-upon route.

Palestinian Authority (PA) channels released footage showing members of the delegation running for cover during the shooting. The incident is almost certainly a major violation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and is highly likely to accelerate the already strained relations between Tel Aviv and, particularly, European states.

Last week, France joined the UK and Canada in threatening to impose sanctions on Israeli entities over the failure of Tel Aviv to let aid into Gaza. The latest incident is highly likely to have an impact on those EU governments that have, so far, maintained an especially warm attitude towards Tel Aviv; among the delegates that came under fire were diplomats from Italy, Poland, Austria, and Romania, countries whose governments are largely considered friendly to Israel.

Houthi attacks against Israel continue and Houthis announce “maritime blockade” of Haifa

Attempted Houthi ballistic missile and long-range one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) attacks against Israel, launched from Yemen, have continued. These included two ballistic missiles, and one OWA-UAV launched on 17 May, and two ballistic missiles launched on 22 May.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) successfully intercepted the missiles. It is almost certain that the primary target was Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) in Tel Aviv as part of a strategy of disrupting air travel in Israel. In early May, following a missile attack that successfully penetrated Israeli air defence and landed next to an access road near TLV’s main terminal, the Houthis declared a “total air blockade” of Israel.

Furthermore, the Houthis declared on 19 May that they will now also be enforcing what they term as a “maritime blockade” by targeting the Port of Haifa, additionally threatening all vessels that call at the port with being added the group’s “sanctions list”, which is de facto a threat of attack. Having earlier agreed a ceasefire with the US, the Houthis will highly likely endeavour not to violate the terms of that agreement: a commitment to not attack any “US vessels”.

If the Houthis follow through on their threats to target vessels calling at Haifa, however, there is a realistic possibility that US President Donald Trump will be compelled to renew military action against the Houthis.

Fundamentally, however, long-range strikes and airpower alone are almost certainly incapable of dislodging the Houthis from Yemen, and Trump highly likely does not want to involve the US in a conflict which cannot be rapidly resolved and would require an extensive deployment of forces. It is almost certain that the Houthis will continue to launch attacks against Israel, particularly against TLV airport and now Haifa’s port, which will highly likely continue to cause significant disruption even if the IDF successfully intercepts all incoming long-range fires.

22 people found dead after being arrested by Malian security forces

On 20 May, Human Rights Watch called for an independent investigation into the execution of at least 22 Fulani men by the military. The men were arrested on 12 May in Diafarabé in central Mali; residents who saw the bodies three days later reported that the victims were in shallow graves with wounds consistent with execution methods. The men were reportedly rounded up by Malian soldiers while they were trading at a local cattle market.

On 16 May, the Malian armed forces’ chief of staff announced an investigation by the military into the executions, something Human Rights Watch has criticised for its almost certain partiality. The Fulani are a large semi-nomadic pastoralist ethnic group in the Sahel who are often caught in the middle of insurgent violence. While they are often courted by the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), some Fulani individuals have joined the rival Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), and some denounce jihadist entities. As such, the Fulani are often subjected to reprisal killings by JNIM, ISSP, and the military forces of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

Despite calls for an independent investigation, the Malian junta is unlikely to comply, and the military investigation will highly likely find just cause in the execution.

Suicide bombing outside military recruitment camp in Mogadishu kills 13

On 18 May, a suicide bombing outside a military recruitment camp killed at least 13 and wounded 21, as young recruits waited in line. The attacker reportedly disguised himself as a recruit before blowing up an IED. While no group immediately claimed responsibility, the attack was almost certainly carried out by the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab, who have recently made significant gains in the Shabelle offensive, which has been ongoing since February 2025.

On 20 May, at least five mortar rounds were fired near Aden Adde International Airport (MGQ). A similar attack was conducted by al-Shabaab on 6 April, whereby the group fired six mortar rounds at the airport, which landed inside the airport compound. The closeness of the two attacks indicates both a growing confidence and capability of the insurgent group.

By targeting a military recruitment centre, the suicide bombing almost certainly aims to dissuade individuals from signing up and demonstrates the vulnerability of Somalia’s military. Further attacks in Mogadishu are highly likely in the coming weeks.

Greece deploys thousands of firefighters and drones in anticipation of a bad wildfire season

Approximately 18,000 firefighters and 82 surveillance uncrewed aerial vehicles will be deployed this summer to combat wildfires, a record number for Greece. The decision to increase firefighting personnel comes as increasingly bad wildfires have occurred in recent years, and projections suggest that this year will be particularly bad due to high temperatures and low rainfall. In 2021, wildfires damaged at least 1,300 square kilometres and 1,745 in 2023, approximately three times the average from 2011 to 2020. An exercise is set to be held on 29 May to test firefighting capabilities, which will likely trigger transport disruptions across the country.

Severe water crisis in Damascus, Syria

The severe water shortage in Damascus comes after Syria’s driest winter in nearly 70 years. The spring that feeds the Barada River has run dry, threatening the five million people who rely on the river for 70 per cent of their water. People have resorted to buying water from private tanker trucks, and authorities have urged the population to reduce their water consumption. The issue is exacerbated by electricity cuts, which prevent the use of water pumps which supply drinkable water. If the water shortages are prolonged, there is a realistic possibility that it could trigger civil unrest in Damascus.

On 22 May, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim indicated that the stage is set for direct contact between the military junta and the ousted National Unity Government (NUG). The announcement, made on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional bloc, comes after separate talks between Anwar and the two sides, with the junta leader on 18 April and the NUG on 19 April. Both sides were reportedly aware that Anwar would be talking to the opposing side.

Malaysian officials have reportedly reached out to other ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). NUG spokesperson Nay Phone Latt declared that it would be open to talks if the junta agreed to six conditions, including forming a new federal democratic union under a new constitution with no military involvement, creating a new transitional justice framework, recognising the NUG’s legitimacy, and releasing political prisoners. The junta has not yet commented.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The junta is highly unlikely to accept the conditions proposed by the NUG, which would essentially be tantamount to surrender and hand over of power. However, the announcement marks a significant shift in the possibilities for peace talks.

The knowledge that Anwar would be meeting the opposing side signals a tentative mutual recognition between the two sides, which was previously unheard of and may pave the way to wider discussions. It also marks a shift in ASEAN’s approach to Myanmar. Previously, the “Five Point Consensus” peace plan barred the Tatmadaw from attending the summit, an approach which further isolated the junta.

By attempting to facilitate talks between the Tatmadaw and NUG, Anwar appears to be taking a far more active role in resolving the conflict. The Myanmar peace process is set to be high on the agenda for the upcoming ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur on 26 and 27 May, with two meetings specifically set to discuss the civil war.

It is highly likely that the shift in the junta’s approach, which also saw them agree to, and extend, a humanitarian ceasefire after the 28 March earthquake, reflects the growing pressure on the regime.

Latest figures place approximately 35 to 40 per cent of Myanmar’s territory under the control of the Tatmadaw. The earthquake struck numerous junta-held territories, including Mandalay, where insurgent forces are increasingly closing in, as well as the primary junta stronghold, Naypyidaw. By showing a tentative willingness to engage in peace talks, the Tatmadaw may be attempting to give itself some breathing room.

The potential willingness to engage in direct talks also highly likely reflects a need to legitimise the junta plan to hold a general election in December, something expected to be deeply unpopular due to the almost certain vote rigging that will be undertaken by the Tatmadaw.

Ultimately, while direct peace talks in the near future remain unlikely to happen and highly unlikely to be productive, the announcement reflects a potential shift in the Tatmadaw’s approach as it attempts to increase its legitimacy, something that may lay the foundations for future negotiations.

Peaceful demonstrations entered their ninth day on 22 May as mostly young protesters demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai. Demonstrators rallied in Ulaanbaatar’s Sukhbaatar Square (Genghis Khan Square) to denounce perceived government corruption after a social media video appeared to portray lavish spending from Oyun-Erdene’s son.

Counterprotests, primarily attended by older Mongolians, also took place in support of Oyun-Erdene. Counter protestors expressed the sentiment that resignation would be unlikely to change anything and that there are few obvious candidates for a replacement prime minister. Protest organiser O. Ulamsaikhan has vowed to continue the protests until Oyun-Erdene resigns.

In response to the protests, the largest member of the ruling coalition and Oyun-Erdene’s party, the Mongolian People’s Party, ejected the second-largest party, the Democratic Party, from the coalition, citing lawmakers backing calls for the prime minister’s resignation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the prime minister has constituted a focal point for the protests, the demonstrations have targeted broader corruption and inequality. Protesters claim that Mongolia, rich in mineral resources including coal, copper, gold, and rare earth elements, has been plundered by businesses and the wealthy.

The wealthy elite are accused of particularly benefiting from the coal mining boom, in particular, with ordinary Mongolians not party to the extensive profits from exports to countries such as China. This issue is exacerbated by the increasing cost of living in Mongolia, with inflation reaching 9 per cent in 2024, exacerbating the widespread poverty in the country.

This does not mark the first time Oyun-Erdene has been subjected to resignation calls. In December 2022, revelations that officials had embezzled billions of dollars from coal exports to China sparked a wave of protests, which ended when Oyun-Erdene initiated an investigation into the incident.

Since the late 2010s, Mongolia has dropped in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index from 93^rd in 2018 to 114^th in 2024. Protests were responsible for ousting the previous government, with mass demonstrations and a nationwide strike taking place against the government’s perceived response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In response, President Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh resigned in January 2021, citing protests as the reason.

The current government has a slim majority, winning the previous election with 68 seats in the 126-member parliament. The ejection of the Democratic Party, who hold 42 seats, makes the People’s Party’s hold on power increasingly tenuous, threatening government deadlock. There is a realistic possibility that protests and political pressure will culminate in Oyun-Erdene’s resignation, forcing an interim prime minister and snap elections.

Clashes in Sindh, Pakistan, over Indus River canal project

Protests and clashes broke out in Moro City on 20 May, with footage shared online showing firefights and local government offices being torched by crowds. Unverified reports claim that at least two people have been killed so far.

The clashes reportedly started following the announcement of the central government’s plans to build a series of canals, which protesters claim would unfairly benefit the Punjab region at a time when Pakistan continues to struggle with severe water shortages. Some reports indicate that the unrest is being spearheaded by separatist groups associated with the Sindhudesh movement.

While comparatively less capable than other regionalist and nationalist groups in Pakistan, militant networks like the Sindhudesh Liberation Army (SLA) likely retain an interest in capitalising on the unrest to advance their political objectives.

Bangladeshi interim Prime Minister contemplating stepping down

Nobel Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus has led the interim government since Sheikh Hasina was overthrown in the student-led revolution of July-August 2024. Nahid Islam, the leader of the National Citizen Party (NCP), formed by the student leaders of the revolution, stated that Yunus told him that he is contemplating whether to resign over ongoing failures to carry out socioeconomic and political reforms during the transition period and over growing political tensions.

Yunus (alongside the NCP) sees the implementation of widespread reforms as a fundamental prerequisite for new elections. On the other hand, groups like the powerful Bangladesh National Party (BNP) continue to pressure the government for early elections. Although “stuck” between several political forces, who are (sometimes violently) competing to increase their clout in the country post-Hasina, Yunus remains a unifying and widely respected figure.

His resignation would highly likely destabilise the interim government, and possibly increase domestic political tensions between the parties and movements that support it.

Five killed in attack on school bus in Balochistan, Pakistan

On 21 May, a bus carrying approximately 40 school children exploded in Khuzdar in the restive Balochistan region. Five people were killed, including three children, and dozens were injured. While no group has claimed responsibility, the attack was highly likely perpetrated by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which is waging an insurgency in the region.

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has blamed India for the attack, claiming that the ‘attack on a school bus by terrorists backed by India is clear proof of their hostility toward education in Balochistan’, claiming that it was carried out by Indian ‘proxies’ in Balochistan. While this is reflective of the continuing tensions between the two countries, Pakistan has blamed BLA activity on India for years.

Pakistan is unlikely to renew skirmishes along the Line of Control in the Kashmir region, however, since escalation would risk war, something that would be devastating for the Pakistani economy and would highly likely destabilise the government. Further BLA activity is highly likely in the coming weeks, with the renewal of Pakistan-India tensions seeing increased operations as the insurgent group takes advantage of the Pakistani military’s distraction.

One killed in a rare shooting in Wuhan, China

On 19 May, one person was killed in a shooting at an outdoor restaurant in Wuhan, which reportedly resulted from a dispute. Authorities downplayed the incident, refusing to state that a gun was used. A video of the aftermath of the incident has been taken down from social media platforms.

On 21 May, a public security conference was held in Beijing, which emphasised the need to combat illegal activities involving, among several other things, firearms and explosives. This meeting was likely a demonstration of state strength in response to the rare instance of gun crime in China, reflecting the Chinese state power as the antithesis to the US’s perceived complacency over gun crime.

Security will likely be tightened in Wuhan and other urban areas in the coming days and weeks, with security forces conducting enhanced patrols and searches.

Indonesia raises Lewotobi Laki-laki volcano to the highest alert level

On 18 May, the alert level was raised from level three (alert) to four (warning). The change in alert level comes after the volcano erupted eight times over the 17 and 18 May, before erupting again on 19 May. A six-kilometre radius around the volcano, located on Flores Island, was cleared as a precautionary measure, and authorities warned residents of the risk of cold lava flow when heavy rains occur. While evacuations have not yet taken place, this could change at short notice.

Severe floods in Australia’s New South Wales region

Flooding continued to severely impact New South Wales, Australia, with authorities issuing multiple evacuation orders and advisories across the region. Four people have died, and one other is missing.

People living in low-lying properties near the Nambucca River have been told to evacuate immediately due to the forecast of major flooding. In Bowraville, residents are advised to shelter in place as it is now deemed too late to evacuate. The Australian State Emergency Service reports that over 50,000 people are currently isolated due to the flooding. Disaster assistance has been activated for communities in 16 areas of New South Wales.

In Port Macquarie, more residents are being advised to prepare for evacuation as the Hastings River experiences severe flooding. Evacuation orders have also been issued for areas along the Belmore and Kinchela Rivers. Additionally, flights out of Port Macquarie Airport (PQQ) have been cancelled due to road access being cut off by the flooding.

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