Hurricane Erin is currently impacting the East Coast of the United States, with significant effects observed in North Carolina. As of 21 August, the hurricane is approximately 300 kilometres off the coast of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, with tropical storm conditions already affecting the Outer Banks. The National Hurricane Center (NHC) has reported that these conditions are expected to worsen as high tide approaches. The hurricane’s outer bands are brushing the coast, causing the North Carolina Department of Transportation to close Highway 12 between Oregon Inlet and Hatteras Village due to storm surge.

The NHC has also issued warnings for tropical storm conditions along the Virginia coast and noted the possibility of similar conditions in Bermuda on 21 and 22 August. Dangerous rip currents continue to pose a threat along many US East Coast beaches.

Previously, Hurricane Erin caused power outages in Puerto Rico, with over 45,000 residents affected in areas such as Arecibo, Caguas, and San Juan. The storm’s progression over the western Atlantic is expected to continue to influence weather conditions along the US East Coast, with the potential for further strengthening.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hurricane Erin is the first Atlantic hurricane of 2025. According to forecasts, the storm is set to skirt past the Caribbean islands and remain offshore the US East Coast as it moves north, gradually steering away from the US coast. Despite it not directly hitting the US, coastal areas will almost certainly be affected, with highly likely rip currents and waves of three to six metres). In the Outer Banks, there is a high likelihood of strong winds accompanying the rip tides and high waves. Hurricane conditions are forecast to last for most of the week.

The Atlantic hurricane season spans from 1 June to 30 November, typically peaking between mid-August and late September. According to assessments by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), there is a 60 per cent chance of an above-average season, a 30 per cent chance of a near-normal season, and a 10 per cent chance of a below-average season in 2025. NOAA also predicts that there will likely be between 13 and 19 named storms (with winds of at least 62 km/h) and six to ten hurricanes.

On 17 August, Bolivians went to the polls to elect a new president. Preliminary results indicate that centrist candidate Rodrigo Paz Pereira and right-wing former President Jorge Quiroga are the leading candidates. This outcome sets the stage for a runoff election scheduled for 19 October, as neither candidate secured the majority to win outright. This development marks a potential end to more than two decades of left-wing rule in Bolivia, as the ruling Movement for Socialism (MAS) party failed to garner more than 4 per cent of the vote. 19.4 per cent of the ballots were void, significantly above the average in Bolivian elections of approximately 5 per cent. The court is required to release the full results by 24 August.

The election day proceeded without major unrest despite a few incidents. An explosive device was detonated near a polling station in Entre Ríos, near where presidential candidate for the left-wing Popular Alliance, Andrónico Rodríguez, was scheduled to cast his vote. Authorities reported that there was “no material or personal damage” and voting continued as normal.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Before the election, there were concerns about potential unrest, particularly among supporters of former President Evo Morales. The perception that Morales’ disqualification has been politically motivated, and the state’s deployment of security forces and heavy-handed tactics against largely Indigenous demonstrators, has likely increased tensions and alienated communities aligned with the former president.  Morales, who was disqualified from running by the constitutional court, had urged his followers to protest the vote and issue null ballots, leading to warnings from government officials about attempts to generate unrest. Morales’ calls for protest votes almost certainly led to the higher-than-average percentage of void ballots.

The collapse of MAS as a dominant force in Bolivian politics will almost certainly mark a major political realignment in the country. However, the erosion of MAS should not be interpreted as a loss of support for Morales, especially among his traditional base in rural and low-income areas. Despite being barred from running in the presidential election, Morales retains significant personal popularity, with some unofficial polls suggesting he is still the most popular hypothetical candidate. This is especially the case in the Chapare region and among Indigenous communities, Morales’ strongest support bases.

Following the election run-off on 19 October, there is a high capacity for sustained unrest regardless of the results. Bolivia’s political landscape remains deeply divided, not only between rival parties but within them. No candidate currently commands broad-based national support, and the election is unlikely to deliver a clear or widely accepted mandate. Whatever party or coalition wins the election, it is likely to be perceived as illegitimate by a large section of Bolivian society. This is likely to drive civil unrest, which has typically been characterised by the establishment of roadblocks and violent confrontations with security forces.

Air Canada flight attendants end strike action.

On 18 August, Air Canada flight attendants ended their strike after reaching a tentative agreement with the airline. This strike, which began on 16 August, resulted in the cancellation of 623 flights and affected approximately 500,000 passengers. The decision to end the strike follows a ruling by the Canadian labour relations board that declared the strike illegal and ordered the union to instruct its members to return to work. Despite initial defiance from the union, all flights had been suspended during the strike, causing significant disruptions. The union announced that it reached a potential deal with the airline after continuing talks on 18 August. While further strikes are unlikely, lingering disruptions are likely over the next week.

Brazilian Supreme Court to deliver Bolsonaro verdict in early September.

The Brazilian Supreme Court has announced that it will deliver a verdict and sentence in former President Jair Bolsonaro’s coup trial between 2 and 12 September. The case has deeply polarised Brazilian society and has resulted in periodic unrest, recently spiking in response to President Trump’s support for the former president. Bolsonaro is accused of leading a criminal organisation that sought to overturn the results of the 2022 election, which he lost to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and has been implicated in plans to assassinate both Lula and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who is presiding over the trial. While more than half of Brazilians support Bolsonaro’s current house arrest, the public remains deeply divided over his treatment, and there is a high likelihood that any verdict could act as a catalyst for significant unrest.

Six severed heads discovered on road near Mexico City.

On 19 August, local authorities discovered six severed male heads on a road linking Puebla and Tlaxcala, approximately 80 kilometres east of Mexico City. Police have not provided a motive for the killings, but a blanket left at the scene issued a warning to rival gangs. It was signed “La Barredora” (“the sweeper”), a small criminal group active in Guerrero state, southwest of Mexico City. The heads were discovered in an area of Mexico not typically afflicted by cartel violence, although the Tlaxcala region was associated with fuel smuggling. The killings come amid a broader crackdown by security forces on fentanyl trafficking following US President Donald Trump’s designation of cartels as terrorist organisations and increasing pressure on the Mexican government to deal with the increasing levels of violence. A heightened security posture in the region is highly likely following the discovery.

Guatemalan prison guards freed after being taken hostage by gangs.

On 16 August, nine prison guards were freed days after being taken hostage by gangs at a detention facility in Guatemala City. According to local media, members of two of the country’s largest gangs, Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha, started a prison riot after several leaders were moved to another facility and placed in solitary confinement. One prison officer was reportedly killed during the fighting.

As in the case of states like Ecuador, Guatemala’s gangs often operate vertically out of detention facilities, which allow leaders a degree of security while also maintaining contacts with outside groups. Attempts to relocate leaders are likely seen by the gangs as posing a vital threat to their chains of command, thus driving extremely violent responses and attempts to deter authorities via the kidnapping of prison staff.

El Salvador extends emergency detentions for two more years.

On 15 August, El Salvador’s parliament voted to extend the detention of approximately 80,000 individuals who have been jailed under the country’s state of emergency. Around 90 per cent of the people imprisoned during the state of emergency, since 2023, are still awaiting trial. The move continues to highlight El Salvador’s government’s commitment to its extremely harsh approach to tackling the country’s organised crime groups, which has proven effective at drastically reducing the country’s violent crime rate, while simultaneously attracting significant opposition from civil society groups over the mass incarcerations.

US deploys warships near Venezuela.

On 18 August, the US launched three Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided-missile destroyers to the coast of Venezuela to counter threats from South American drug cartels. This is part of a broader increase of military assets in the region, which now includes P-8 spy planes, three US Navy destroyers (USS Gravely, USS Jason Dunham, and USS Sampson), amphibious assault or transport ships, and at least one attack submarine. Drug trafficking routes through Venezuela and the wider Caribbean have constituted a long-standing US concern, and US President Donald Trump has designated many organised crime groups as terrorist organisations. Furthermore, this is almost certainly a continuation of Washington’s broader policy of pressure on Nicolás Maduro’s regime. US prosecutors have accused Maduro of turning Venezuela into a narco-state and of sponsoring the flow of narcotics into the US. The US has also increased the bounty for Maduro’s arrest to USD 50 million.

While the primary responsibility of these deployed assets is to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, they also provide Washington with the capability to launch precision strikes, interdict shipments, or deploy Marines ashore if directed. Maduro has responded by mobilising over 4.5 million militia members, framing the deployments as imperial aggression. Although a direct US intervention remains highly unlikely and the deployment serves largely as strategic messaging toward Caracas, the deployed force has likely increased the risk of miscalculation in the region. In response, Venezuela will likely adopt a more hostile posture towards Western citizens in the country, increasing the risk of harassment, arbitrary detention and other forms of coercive pressure.

Explosion in Northern Peru injures at least 10 people.

On 13 August, an explosion occurred on a street in Trujillo, Northern Peru, injuring at least 10 people and damaging 25 homes. This was the second bomb to go off that day, with another going off at a gym in Lima. According to Interior Minister Carlos Malaver, the blast is likely related to a dispute between criminal groups running extortion rackets. Extortion has seen a sharp increase since 2021, with reports increasing by approximately 370 per cent, from 4,761 to 22,396 cases between 2021 and 2023. This trend has continued into 2025, with 15,989 complaints recorded between January and July.

Extortion and criminal violence typically target small business owners and public transport operators, who are more vulnerable and have limited protection. While the government has attempted to prevent the rising threat of extortion, imposing a state of emergency in Lima and Callao in March 2025, criminal gangs have become increasingly violent. Further violence is highly likely

Wildfires could continue through September, according to Canadian government.

On 18 August, government officials declared that wildfires across Canada have burned approximately 7.8 million hectares, constituting Canada’s second-worst wildfire season on record. According to the statement, there is a high likelihood that fires will continue “well into autumn” due to the high temperatures forecast. At least 60 per cent of the affected areas are in the western provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, with Atlantic provinces Newfoundland and Nova Scotia also affected. The wildfires have triggered mass evacuations, with approximately 13,000 Indigenous people from First Nations not yet returned to their homes. Further disruptions and evacuations are highly likely over the coming weeks.

Anti-government protests have continued to escalate in Serbia as demonstrators clash with security forces. On 14 August, protesters targeted the offices of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in Novi Sad, the city where the railway canopy collapsed in November 2024, killing 16 people. Demonstrators reportedly smashed the windows of the party offices, threw out furniture, and splashed paint across the entrance. Riot police responded with crowd dispersal measures, including tear gas, and cordoned off several blocks in the city centre. Protests also occurred in Belgrade, where hundreds of anti-government protesters clashed with police and SNS supporters. Riot police charged protesters and used tear gas to disperse the crowds. Protests were also held across several towns.

Protests continued into 16 August, the fourth day of renewed unrest. A group of protesters wearing scarves and chanting anti-President Aleksandar Vučić slogans set fire to SNS offices in downtown Valjevo and caused considerable damage at the Valjevo court, prosecutor’s office, and municipal building. Police used tear gas and charged protesters, who threw bottles, rocks, and flares at them. One police officer was injured, and 18 protesters were arrested. Clashes also continued in Novi Sad and Belgrade, with police deploying tear gas after demonstrators set numerous bins alight. Dozens of people have been injured and hundreds arrested. Further protests spread into this week, with demonstrators vandalising the SNS office in the Cvijićeva neighbourhood of Belgrade on 18 August and protesters blocking the court entrance in Novi Sad on 20 August.

Vučić has responded to the demonstrations, stating, “You will see the full determination of the Serbian state. We will use everything at our disposal to restore law, peace, and order”. Russia’s foreign ministry issued a statement on 15 August stating that it might offer support to Vučić, emphasising that “Russia cannot remain unresponsive to what is happening in brotherly Serbia” and that the protests constituted “violent riots”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests, which began in November 2024 following the canopy collapse at a railway station in Novi Sad, have evolved into broader anti-corruption and anti-government demonstrations. They have been sustained by widespread public dissatisfaction with the government, drawing thousands of participants, including student groups, who continue to organise and participate in these movements across Serbia. While the demonstrations have been largely peaceful, they turned violent on 13 August, when pro-government loyalists staged counter-demonstrations and clashed with protesters.

The harsh response from security forces has exacerbated the demonstrations. An unverified video has circulated on social media of police officers beating a protester in Valjevo. Civil rights groups have criticised security forces, with Michael O’Flaherty, commissioner for human rights for the Council of Europe, condemning the “police’s disproportionate force” and urging security forces to “end arbitrary arrests and de-escalate the situation.” The police reaction, encouraged by Vučić’s statements condemning demonstrators as “terrorists”, is highly likely to spur further violent unrest as protesters demand early parliamentary elections.

On 15 August, US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Anchorage, Alaska. This was the first US-Russia presidential meeting since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the summit, Putin refused Trump’s call for an immediate ceasefire and instead demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from eastern Donetsk Oblast in exchange for an as-yet not fully defined freezing of hostilities. In the hours preceding the Alaska summit, Russian forces conducted aerial strikes against Ukraine, with 97 attack drones/decoys and two ballistic missiles. 

On 18 August, President Trump hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and a large delegation of major European leaders at the White House for a multilateral summit. In comparison to the previously disastrous meeting between Zelensky and Trump in February, the atmosphere was notably cordial. European leaders pushed for a full ceasefire as a prelude to peace negotiations, which, in contrast to Trump’s previous advocacy, was implicitly downplayed by the US president as now unfeasible.

All attending parties expressed support for direct negotiations between Zelensky and Putin in the near future, which could take place in a location such as Budapest or Istanbul. Subsequent Kremlin messaging indicated that this could only happen gradually, with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stating that it would have to be prepared “with the expert level and thereafter going through all the required steps”.  After the multilateral White House summit, Russian forces conducted the largest aerial attack against Ukraine of August 2025 so far, with 270 attack drones/decoys and 10 missiles, having also conducted mass aerial strikes the night before on 17 August.

Solace Global Assessment: 

First, the ceasefire prerequisite for comprehensive peace negotiations has likely been de facto abandoned by Trump following the Anchorage Summit. This was almost certainly the most key demand by the Trump administration, Kyiv, and European allies before this past week. Due to Washington’s critical role, it is highly unlikely that Kyiv’s European allies will be able to diplomatically coerce Moscow into a ceasefire without intensive US support for the strategy. The Kremlin is almost certainly heavily disincentivised to agree to a ceasefire militarily due to recently increasing pressure against Ukrainian positions on the front lines of Donetsk Oblast.

Second, Moscow’s demand for a full Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast likely poses an existential threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty if realised. Donetsk Oblast has seen the most intense fighting and largest battles of the war, with Ukrainian forces inflicting enormous casualties on Russian forces. Russia has taken 5,100 square kilometres and five fortified cities (defined here as urban centres with pre-war populations of over 15,000) in Donetsk Oblast since the Spring 2022 Ukraine counteroffensive. Eight fortified cities (which include the extensive Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration) and 6,500 square kilometres remain, in what has been termed the ‘fortress belt’. Most estimates suggest that it would take years for Russia to successfully seize all of this remaining territory with military force. If Ukraine cedes the fortress belt to Russia, Ukraine would essentially be forfeiting its most defensible line, exposing less fortified areas to any potential future Russian advances. Furthermore, without a ceasefire in place, withdrawing Ukrainian forces would be highly vulnerable to Russian attack. Therefore, it is highly likely that the only measures which could enable Kyiv to agree to such a withdrawal would be credible security guarantees against future Russian reinvasion and attacks against withdrawing forces.

Third, the nature of potential long-term security guarantees for Kyiv has begun to take a more concrete form. The current indications are that the US and European allies have floated the idea of “Article 5”-style guarantees without actual membership of NATO. According to US special envoy Steve Witkoff, Putin agreed to the suggestion in a “game-changing” concession. However, it is likely that the Kremlin would obfuscate such guarantees with provisions, such as its previous proposal that China be a guarantor, and the guarantee requiring unanimous consensus. Moreover, Ukraine and its allies have pushed for a peacekeeping force to be deployed, with European allies prepared to deploy troops, although Trump has ruled out any US boots on the ground. The Kremlin has continued to flat-out reject any deployment of NATO-member forces to Ukraine as a red line. Fundamentally, it is highly unlikely that the Kremlin could countenance NATO-member peacekeepers given its consistently reiterated desire to address “root causes” for the conflict (including on multiple occasions over the past week), which in part has referred to NATO expansion to Russian borders.

Given these factors, it is overall unlikely that the currently unfolding diplomacy will lead to peace in the short term. There remains a fundamental contradiction between Kyiv’s desire for sovereignty, which necessarily requires credible security guarantees given Russian aggression, and Moscow’s maximalist objectives to address what it perceives as “root causes” for the conflict.

However, the Kremlin will almost certainly continue its attempts to ward off US pressure, with it already having successfully deflected Trump’s ultimatum and ceasefire demands with its current levels of engagement. Therefore, there is a realistic possibility that the Kremlin will be compelled into direct Putin-Zelensky talks, despite its current attempts to equivocate. As negotiations continue, it is highly likely that Russian forces will continue to apply maximum military pressure both at the frontlines and with aerial strikes, with the threat of strikes against Ukrainian cities typically increasing during major diplomatic meetings.

On 17 August, large-scale anti-government protests and a general strike calling for a ceasefire and the release of hostages in Gaza occurred nationwide across Israel, with hundreds of thousands attending demonstrations in Tel Aviv. Demonstrators blocked major highways and roads such as the Ayalon Freeway (in some instances erecting burning tyre barricades), and numerous businesses and universities were closed. The largest rally took place in “Hostages Square” in Tel Aviv. Security forces deployed water cannon to disperse crowds and made dozens of arrests, with the most violent clashes taking place outside the ruling Likud party’s headquarters.

Earlier, on 14 August, hundreds of ultra-Orthodox Haredim supporting the hardline “Jerusalem Faction” and other ultra-Orthodox groups protested at the Beit Lid military prison. These protests were against the enforcement of Israel’s expansion of the draft to the Haredi, with several Haredi students detained a week prior for draft evasion being held in the prison.

Concurrently, Hamas announced on 18 August that it had agreed to the terms of a ceasefire proposal mediated by Egypt and Qatar. The plan calls for an initial 60-day truce in Gaza, during which Hamas would release 10 living Israeli hostages in exchange for roughly 150 Palestinian prisoners, alongside the exchange of bodies, a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, and the allowing of large-scale humanitarian aid into Gaza.

As of 21 August, the Benjamin Netanyahu administration has not accepted the offer, with one anonymous senior official stating that the government’s position has not changed and that all conditions (including the release of all hostages) must be met to end the war. On 20 August, an estimated 60,000 IDF reserves were called up to help enact the proposed Gaza City takeover operation, although they will not report for duty until September.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protest organisers for the large-scale unrest included the Hostages and Missing Families Forum, several university student groups, and opposition parties, with the protests intending to pressure the Netanyahu administration into agreeing to a ceasefire deal in Gaza. While the release of all hostages is one of the Israeli government’s primary stated war goals, it is likely that Netanyahu’s perceived prioritisation of prosecuting a war of total defeat against Hamas (with the protests being triggered by the government’s announced plan to militarily seize Gaza City) would almost certainly endanger hostage lives.

The protests were likely the largest to occur in Israel since the Gaza war began in October 2023, with some higher-end estimates putting attendance in Tel Aviv at 500,000 and nationwide attendance at one million. Organisers have announced that a new round of protests will take place on 24 August, which will likely be marked by greater levels of direct action and disruptions. While the ceasefire proposal accepted by Hamas does not involve the release of all hostages, it is likely that significant elements of the Israeli opposition protest movement will be further incentivised to protest to apply pressure on the government to accept the ceasefire deal.

Moreover, according to social media posts by Jerusalem Faction supporters seen by Israeli police, Haredi protesters have allegedly planned a “massive protest” shutting down Ben Gurion International Airport, in response to the continued detention of draft-dodging Haredim. If successfully conducted, such a protest could cause considerable air travel disruption and economic damage, with previous protest movements having targeted Israel’s primary international airport.

The first preliminary stages of the proposed Gaza City takeover operation are almost certainly underway. There is a realistic possibility that Netanyahu’s war cabinet intends to use these first steps as strategic messaging to compel Hamas to agree to further conditions than the current proposal. However, it remains likely that the Israeli government intends to go ahead with the highly controversial Gaza City operation. This is due to its almost certain key objective of a total defeat of Hamas. If the operation goes ahead, the humanitarian impact would almost certainly be severe and trigger civil unrest globally. Moreover, it is likely that Israeli domestic civil unrest would escalate even further, characterised by increased use of direct action, such as blocking routes to Ben Gurion International Airport.

Multiple ceasefire violations have been reported in Syria’s southern Sweida province. According to local media, since 15 August, the Syrian Transitional Government (STG) forces reportedly opened fire with heavy weaponry in the vicinity of the villages of Al-Majdal, Al-Mazra’a, Najran, and Walgha. Additionally, gunfire from unspecified actors allegedly broke out in the villages of Dama, Jadl, Al-Shayah, and Ariqa. In one reported incident, two civilian vehicles were fired upon while passing through the Busra Al-Sham – Al-Kahil road, a key humanitarian evacuation route from Sweida towards Damascus, resulting in the death of one civilian.

Furthermore, protests occurred in Sweida city and surrounding towns on 16 August, with hundreds of local Druze demonstrators gathering in the largest rallies since heavy fighting broke out in July. In a notable development, many protesters called for self-determination, and some protesters were observed waving Israeli flags.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The July sectarian conflict between Druze militias and Sunni Bedouin tribal fighters resulted in over 1,600 deaths. The intervention by the STG was almost certainly characterised by government forces de facto siding with the Bedouins against the Druze, with multiple reported incidents of STG-affiliated forces conducting attacks against Druze civilians. This was almost certainly reflective of the lack of command-and-control Damascus exercises over much of its forces, which are largely composed of disparate militant formations with highly variable levels of integration into the new Syrian Armed Forces.

Moreover, the intervention by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), stated to be in support of the Druze, marked a significant regional escalation, with Israeli forces conducting strikes on the Syrian Ministry of Defence headquarters in Damascus. It is likely that the current protests and ongoing ceasefire violations will be used by Israeli government officials to justify any further strikes against STG forces in Syria.

In addition to domestic pressure from Israeli Druze, the Netanyahu administration is likely incentivised to continue periodic strikes against Syrian government forces due to its distinct efforts to encourage the fragmentation and destabilisation of the post-Assad Syria and prevent what it likely perceives as a potential future adversary. This assessment aligns more broadly with a commonly assessed post-October 2023 regional strategy from the Israeli government of strongly challenging all of its adversaries with military force. 

The US-brokered ceasefire in Sweida has been almost certainly precarious since its signing on 19 July, but it is highly likely currently in its most vulnerable state. As demonstrated by the reported ambush of a civilian vehicle on the highway leaving Sweida, evacuation efforts are almost certainly being compromised by the continued violence. Clashes will highly likely continue in the coming weeks, given the almost certain lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, it is likely that the clashes will escalate, given the emergence of separatist demands from sections of the Druze community, which is a direct challenge to the efforts of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government’s broader objective of a centralised unified Syrian state, as opposed to a decentralised federal system.

On 18 August, the Rwanda-backed AFC/M23 rebel group pulled out of scheduled peace talks with the DRC government, claiming that the government “doesn’t want peace”. AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka declared that AFC/M23 would not return unless the authorities adhered to the previous preliminary ceasefire deal, which was signed on 19 July. As part of the deal, both sides agreed to refrain from “hate propaganda” and “any attempt to seize by force new positions”. The final peace agreement was due to be signed on 18 August, but accusations of ceasefire violations on both sides over the past week have significantly deteriorated relations.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While accusations of ceasefire violations have constituted the stated trigger for AFC/M23 pulling out of peace talks, the agreement would highly likely have been marred by several factors. The Congolese government has maintained that any peace agreement would be contingent on AFC/M23 fully withdrawing from its occupied territory and has been unwilling to offer concessions to the group. Given the inability of the FARDC to uproot AFC/M23 from its captured territories in North and South Kivu, there remains little incentive for the rebel group to adhere to such demands.

Had the peace agreement been signed, the presence of the pro-government and difficult-to-control Wazalendo militias would have highly likely undermined its implementation. The Wazalendo militias would have highly likely ignored an agreement and continued their offensives against AFC/M23, which would almost certainly have led to accusations by AFC/M23 of government violations.

It is additionally unlikely that Rwanda would have withdrawn its forces from Kivu. Given the presence of regional rivals Uganda and Burundi in eastern DRC, as well as Hutu militias such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Rwanda almost certainly views its presence in the DRC as crucial for national security.

A proposed three-phase peace process by Qatar, which seeks to reinstate government control over AFC/M23-held areas, is reportedly considered unsatisfactory by DRC President Felix Tshisekedi. While the proposal is set to be discussed by both parties under Qatar’s mediation, a full collapse of the proposed peace agreement is likely. There is a realistic possibility that recent AFC/M23 advances were an attempt to gain more leverage before the expected 18 August signing of the peace deal. However, their withdrawal from the agreement suggests that the militant group was not serious about signing any peace agreement requiring serious concessions. Given the FARDC’s relative ineffectiveness against AFC/M23 and the likely non-adherence of the more effective Wazalendo militias to a peace deal, there is little incentive for AFC/M23 to sign a peace agreement. US President Donald Trump, who recently mediated a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda, will likely attempt to increase pressure on both parties to make concessions. Until then, renewed AFC/M23 offensives to capture more territory in North and South Kivu is likely.

On 19 August, the US Embassy in Nairobi issued a security alert warning travellers that they should “exercise personal security and situational awareness”, particularly in “[h]igh traffic areas frequented by foreigners and tourists in Nairobi and elsewhere in Kenya” such as “hotels, embassies, restaurants, malls and markets, schools, police stations, [and] places of worship”. The alert warns that there is a heightened risk around anniversaries of prior attacks, listing 7 August, 11 September, 21 September, and 7 October as noteworthy dates.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is likely that there is credible intelligence to indicate that terrorist groups, highly likely al-Shabaab, are planning an attack in Kenya. The terror group has carried out several deadly attacks in Kenya, including a 2013 siege of Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, killing 67 people, and a 2019 assault on the DusitD2 hotel complex, killing 21 people. Al-Shabaab activity in Kenya is largely characterised by reprisal attacks for Kenyan military activity in Somalia, where 1,410 soldiers have been assigned to help the Somali government combat the group under the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).

Recently, on 17 June 2025, a 22-year-old man with extensive bomb making materials was arrested and handed over to the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). This individual was highly likely linked with al-Shabaab, reflecting the heightened threat level in the country. Alternatively, while Islamic State Somalia (ISS) has never carried out an attack in Kenya, the group has recently experienced significant strategic defeats, primarily in Somalia’s Puntland region, largely achieved with US backing. ISS almost certainly maintains strong ties to the Islamic State Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has enabled it to improve its capabilities and procure funds. While unlikely, ISS may be planning a reprisal attack in Kenya to boost its visibility and demonstrate its operational reach beyond Somalia.

Israeli officials pledge support for East Jerusalem settlement plan.

On 14 August, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, one of the key far-right figures supporting the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, stated that he would approve plans for the construction of 3,000 housing units within the “E1” settlement area. E1, which designates an area between East Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim, in the West Bank, is a controversial settlement project that has been frozen for 15 years due to international condemnation.

This is due to the fact that, if completed, E1 would divide East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, and would also cut off Palestinian movement between the north and south of the West Bank. Smotrich stated that E1 will “bury” the idea of a Palestinian state. The settlement’s approval is likely to drive further international condemnation and will likely further drive pro-Palestine civil unrest, particularly in Western Europe and North America.

Planned nationwide strike in Tunisia on 21 August.

On 21 August, nationwide demonstrations are set to take place to “defend the union and its values”. The protests are being organised by the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), a key opposition group, amid rising tensions with President Kais Saied. The union has called for the strike in the wake of perceived attempts by the government to crack down on the union, with arbitrary arrests, the suspension of collective bargaining, and the amendment of labour laws. Recently, a group of Saied supporters attacked the UGTT headquarters, calling for the union’s dissolution and attempting to storm the building after a video showed people gathered outside denouncing government corruption. Significant disruptions are highly likely, and there is a realistic possibility that demonstrators will clash with security forces.

Burkina Faso junta declares UN Resident Coordinator ‘persona non grata’.

On 18 August, the Burkinabe junta declared the UN Resident Coordinator Carol Flore-Smereczniak ‘persona non grata’ due to her contribution in a report by the UN Secretary General. The report, titled “Children and armed conflict in Burkina Faso”, details at least 2,000 incidents of child recruitment, killings, sexual violence, and abuse by government soldiers, civilian defence forces, and insurgent groups. Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who has ruled since the September 2022 coup, stated that he was not consulted by the UN and that the report contains unfounded allegations. Flore-Smereczniak’s expulsion is almost certainly representative of the Burkinabe junta’s crackdown on external scrutiny, having revoked the operational licences of four foreign NGOs in June 2024.

Protesters arrested in Kampala, Uganda.

On 20 August, traders demonstrated in downtown Kampala over high taxes on garments, rent, failure to regulate foreign competition in retail trade, and the enforcement of the Electronic Fiscal Receipting and Invoicing Solution (EFRIS). The demonstrations were quickly shut down by authorities, with at least 17 arrested on charges of inciting violence and business disruption, charges denied by the protesters. Protests in Uganda are relatively uncommon, with security forces typically rapidly cracking down on demonstrations with arrests and crowd dispersal measures.

With the upcoming election in January 2026, the government is almost certainly taking a hardline stance on demonstrations, particularly since smaller single-issue protests can be hijacked by a broader wave of anti-government sentiment. The main opposition, the National Unity Platform (NUP), led by Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, known by his stage name Bobi Wine, has faced ongoing suppression, with Wine being arrested several times since campaigning for the presidency. A rising cost of living crisis driven by fuel and food costs, as well as perceptions of government corruption, has led to significant youth frustration. Despite security forces’ crackdown on protests, there is a realistic possibility that youth demonstrations could erupt around the January election.

Senior ISIS member killed in likely US-Iraq-Syria joint operation in northwest Syria.

On 20 August, the senior Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leadership figure in charge of the group’s financing, Salah Numan Al Jubouri, was killed in a raid in the town of Atme in Idlib Governorate, Syria. Al Jubouri was considered to be a major candidate to be the next leader of ISIS. The operation is a notable example of collaboration between US forces and the Syrian Transitional Government (STG) in anti-ISIS operations, with a previous operation in July 2025 in al-Bab, Aleppo Governorate, also killing a senior ISIS member.

US forces reportedly conducted the raid while local Syrian forces set up a cordon in the neighbourhood, just as in the July operation. In contrast to the July operation, the STG has not heavily publicised its execution, which may be conditioned by the domestically controversial nature of US-Syria collaboration with more hardline elements of the STG’s support base. Furthermore, it is likely that Iraqi forces took part, with neighbours reporting hearing Arabic spoken in Iraqi accents. The US and Iraq are increasingly transitioning to a bilateral security partnership due to the scheduled US withdrawal from Iraq, with Iraqi forces playing a larger role in anti-ISIS operations.  ISIS have almost certainly been seeking to exploit the continuing instability and sectarian violence in the post-Assad Syria, and it is highly likely that the STG will continue to collaborate with the US to counter the jihadist group.

Two militant leaders arrested in Nigeria.

On 16 September, Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu, announced that security forces arrested two leaders of the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi-Biladis Sudan, also known as Ansaru. The arrested leaders are Mahmud Muhammad Usman and Mahmud al-Nigeri, who were on Nigeria’s most wanted list. The leaders are responsible for the attack on Kuje prison in 2022 that freed dozens of Boko Haram members, as well as an attack on the Niger uranium facility in 2013.

The arrests were the result of a “targeted operation” between May and July. Originally a faction of Boko Haram, Ansaru broke off in 2012, aligning itself with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). According to Ribadu, the arrests have effectively dismantled Ansaru’s central command, and caches of materials and digital evidence are undergoing forensic investigation, which will likely lead to further arrests. While reprisal attacks on security forces and civilians remain likely, this marks a significant victory for security forces, who have highly likely significantly disrupted Ansaru’s operations.

Gunmen kill at least 50 in northern Nigeria.

On 19 August, armed bandits stormed a mosque in Unguwan Mantau, Malumfashi, Katsina state and killed at least 50 worshippers during morning prayers. 60 others were abducted. According to witness accounts, armed assailants arrived on motorcycles and fired at the mosque before sweeping through the village. While no group immediately claimed responsibility, attacks have been increasingly common in Nigeria’s northern and northwestern regions. Gangs, known locally as “bandits”, have targeted villages and highways, conducting mass kidnappings for ransom. According to Katsina state’s commissioner for internal security, the attack was a reprisal attack for local residents having ambushed and killed several bandits on 17 August. In the wake of the attack, the Nigerian military and police force have deployed in the Unguwan Mantau area. Further instances of mass violence and abductions in the region are highly likely.

Heavy clashes between the DRC military and newly formed CPR.

On 15 August, heavy clashes erupted between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the newly formed Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR), resulting in the deaths of at least 19 civilians. Multiple attacks were reported near Bunia, the capital of the Ituri province. This marks the first reported case of violent activity from the group, which was formed by Thomas Lubanga, an Ituri native who was previously convicted at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the forcible conscription of child soldiers.

While it is unclear how large the CPR force is, the violence over the past week highly likely marks the beginning of a series of attacks. This will almost certainly exacerbate the Ituri conflict, with the Hema-aligned CPR almost certainly posing a threat to the Lendu-aligned Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO). Given the potential collapse of the FARDC-AFC/M23 peace agreement and likely renewal of the AFC/M23 offensive, the existence of CPR will highly likely stretch the FARDC and reduce their effectiveness in countering the DRC’s multiple insurgencies.

ADF kill at least 52 people in North Kivu, DRC.

Between 9 and 16 August, the Islamic State-linked Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) killed at least 52 people in Beni and Lubero territories, North Kivu. This constitutes the latest in a series of reprisal attacks after DRC and Ugandan forces shelled and captured the ADF’s largest camp in Apakwang, Ituri Province on 11 July under Operation Shujaa. The renewed fighting between AFC/M23 and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) has highly likely provided increased operational freedom for the ADF, which has conducted attacks at a significantly elevated rate over the past few weeks. Further attacks are highly likely in the coming weeks.

Wildfires continue across Spain and Portugal.

Spain has been facing multiple wildfires, with significant incidents reported in various regions. On 19 August, wildfires were burning in the Zamora region, with aerial efforts underway to extinguish the blaze in Barniedo de la Reina. In Madrid, a wildfire broke out to the east of Colmenar Viejo, deploying at least 18 firefighter crews. In Jarilla, Cáceres, the wildfire expanded to approximately 38,000 acres, spreading towards Jerte and Cabezuela del Valle.

Four firefighters suffered burn injuries while combating wildfires in Galicia. Portugal has also been dealing with wildfires since late July, with the EFFIS reporting that Portugal’s wildfires had burned approximately 216,000 hectares of land. Both countries have activated the European Civil Protection Mechanism, requesting emergency assistance. Further wildfire-related disruptions, including evacuations and flight disruptions, are highly likely over the coming weeks.

40 per cent change of cyclone near Cape Verde Islands, according to NHC.

On 20 August, the US National Hurricane Center (NHC) declared that a tropical wave southwest of Cape Verde has a 40 per cent likelihood of becoming a cyclone over the next 48 hours. There are typically only one to two hurricanes that originate near Cape Verde each year, and they are often among the most powerful and long-lived Atlantic storms. Approximately 85 per cent of hurricanes at a Category 3 or above originate near Cape Verde, including Hurricane Erin. However, fewer than 10 per cent of such storms make landfall in the US, with most weakening or curving away.

Heavy rains and flash floods have impacted multiple regions in northwest Pakistan, resulting in the deaths of at least 365 people. At least 180 people were additionally reported injured, and rescue efforts are ongoing. The majority of the deaths were caused by flash flooding, with some caused by houses collapsing, lightning and landslides. The number of deaths in India has reached at least 70, with at least 41 killed in Nepal, bringing the estimated combined death toll to at least 476.

In Pakistan, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has been most severely affected, particularly in the district of Buner, but also in Swat, Bajaur, Battagram, Mansehra, Shangla, Lower Dir, and Abbottabad. Flooding has also affected Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, and Azad Kashmir.

Parts of India and Nepal have also been hit hard by heavy rains and flooding. In India: Jammu & Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Telangana, Maharashtra, Mumbai, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra have been affected by heavy rain and flash flooding. In Mumbai alone, at least 21 people have died, with many parts of the city flooded.

Heavy rainfall is expected to continue through 21 August, with further flash flooding likely in regions including northern Punjab and Azad Kashmir. Rescue operations are ongoing in affected areas, with authorities attempting to locate missing persons and provide relief to impacted communities. Efforts are underway to restore power, with Pakistan having restored 70 per cent of its electricity supply, and major highways are reportedly being drained and reopened. Authorities have warned that further storms are likely this monsoon season.

Solace Global Assessment: 

South Asia is experiencing its monsoon season, which typically runs between June and September, peaking in July and August. During these months, the region experiences approximately three-quarters of its annual rainfall. Since the start of 2025’s monsoon season, at least 600 people have died, and at least 700 have been injured.

The recent flooding has largely been triggered by cloudbursts, which are when an extreme amount of rain falls in a small area in a short amount of time. The rainfall has caused extensive damage, and authorities have emphasised that it will take weeks to clear streets and begin repair work. Further flooding is highly likely in the coming days, with forecasts having warned that heavy rainfall is expected to continue until 21 August in northwest Pakistan, which will almost certainly exacerbate the damage and casualty figures, as well as further hampering disaster response operations.

Some residents in northwest Pakistan have criticised the government for not providing enough support. Accusations have emerged in Buner, the district most severely impacted by the flooding, regarding an alleged government failure to issue an evacuation warning. This reportedly meant that many fled their homes at the last moment and were unable to move to safe locations. The government has responded by claiming that the sudden downpour in Buner was so intense that it struck before the alert could be issued. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is a stronghold for opposition figure Imran Khan. Civil unrest will likely develop in the affected regions and major cities in Pakistan over the coming weeks, in response to any perceived failures by authorities.

First phase of Myanmar general election set for 28 December.

On 18 August, Myanmar’s state television announced that it will hold the initial phase of its general election on 28 December. Dates for subsequent phases will reportedly be announced later. According to state media, 55 parties have registered, and nine plan to compete. Anti-junta opposition groups have either been banned or are refusing to take part, meaning that the election will highly likely result in a Tatmadaw proxy party attaining victory. There is a realistic possibility that the election could act as a catalyst for widespread anti-junta unrest to erupt, as with after the Tatmadaw gained power in the 2021 coup. However, the junta has cracked down on civil unrest with mass arrests, crowd dispersal measures, and live ammunition, lowering the likelihood of protests gaining momentum.

Taliban force raid Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) camp, killing senior leaders.

On 13 August, Taliban forces carried out a successful raid on an ISKP camp in Nangarhar, reportedly killing one of the group’s senior leaders as well as several associates. ISKP has faced significant setbacks in 2025, with several increasingly successful Taliban attacks as well as growing pressure from Baluch nationalist groups at the Afghan-Pakistan border. For the Taliban government, which continues to court foreign investment and greater engagement, particularly in Central Asia, Russia, and China, counterterrorism efforts have a clear diplomatic benefit. Moreover, four years after taking power, Taliban officials continue to assess that ISKP’s universal caliphate message, which directly calls for attacks on neighbouring countries, poses a significant ideological threat to their rule. Further operations by Taliban security forces are highly likely.

Magnitude 6.0 earthquake hits Indonesia’s Central Sulawesi region.

On 16 August, a magnitude 6.0 earthquake struck the Poso Regency in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. The earthquake resulted in one fatality and injured at least 29 people. The tremors affected 433 individuals and caused damage to several buildings, including at least one church. Indonesian disaster officials and local media have been actively reporting on the aftermath of this natural disaster as recovery efforts continue. Aftershocks are highly likely over the coming days.

Flash flooding in northern China leaves at least eight dead.

On 17 August, a flash flood hit a campsite in northern China, killing eight and leaving four missing. The flood occurred in the mountainous area in Inner Mongolia, Urad Rea Bannar. Search and rescue efforts are underway for the four missing people. This is the latest incident of flash flooding in Northern China, which has seen several cases in recent weeks. The Northwestern Gansu province, for example, saw flooding which killed at least 10 people on 8 August. Heavy rainfall has been ongoing, and further flooding in the region is likely.

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