Global Intelligence Summary

On 16 March, a nationwide power outage occurred in Cuba. The Ministry of Energy stated that the country’s electrical grid had recorded a “complete disconnection”. The outage is the second to occur in little more than a week, as Cuba continues to face a severe fuel shortage. Prior to the two outages in March, Cuba last had a nationwide loss of power in December 2025. On 13 and 14 March, rare protests were recorded in major cities in Cuba, which were caused by the first blackout. On the night of 14 March, protesters attacked a Communist Party office in the city of Moron. Further protests, this time related to water shortages, were recorded in Havana on 16 March.

On 16 March, coinciding with the power outage, Cuban officials announced their intention to carry out reforms aimed at “opening” the economy. Specific measures include allowing Cubans residing abroad and foreign citizens to invest in private businesses on the island. While Cuba has allowed private businesses to be opened and operated since 2021, the new measures expand their access beyond the country’s borders.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Cuba is currently almost certainly undergoing its worst economic and political crisis since at least the Special Period, which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. President Miguel Díaz-Canel stated, on 13 March, that the island had received no fuel for three months, since the January US raid that led to the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. It is likely that the support of socialist Venezuela was critical in helping the Cuban regime to survive the Special Period, support which has ceased following the US intervention against Maduro. International media reported only two oil tankers arriving in Cuba so far in 2026. The lack of fuel has forced energy operators to rely on domestically produced crude, which is “heavy” and has a high sulphur and metal content. The use of this fuel can accelerate the erosion of power generation infrastructure, which is already largely obsolete, and therefore increase the likelihood of additional failures.

Cuban authorities’ announcement of plans to carry out economic reforms almost certainly follows the start of negotiations with the US. Cuban officials will likely prioritise regime survival and assess that an increase in fuel supplies is crucial to prevent initial cases of violent unrest evolving into a nationwide wave of protests, which would almost certainly be supported by Washington. US officials, conversely, will likely seek to maximise short-term pressures on the Cuban government in order to extract maximum concessions.

On 16 March, US President Donald Trump stated that he would “[take] Cuba in some form”, while US media reported that US channels have demanded Díaz-Canel’s resignation and that of other officials who are perceived to be ideological “hardliners” and resistant to reform. Reportedly, two members of the Castro family, Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, a key figure in the ongoing US-Cuba negotiations, and Deputy Prime Minister Oscar Pérez-Oliva Frago, are being considered as more “pragmatic” potential successors to Díaz-Canel.

Failure to appease Washington and reverse the fuel blockade is likely to result in a prolonged and exacerbated economic crisis, which has already resulted in sustained blackouts, the suspension of multiple flights to Cuba, a major drop in tourism, water shortages, food insecurity, and severe disruption to essential services, including healthcare, sanitation, and public transport. If the crisis continues, political instability and the scale and frequency of anti-government protests are likely to increase, exerting added pressure on the regime. In addition, as living conditions deteriorate and shortages of electricity, food, and water persist, crime rates, illicit activity and public health crises are likely to increase.