On 14 December, President Bernardo Arévalo de León announced a 15-day state of emergency in two municipalities in western Guatemala: Nahuala and Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán, in the department of Sololá. The declaration comes after armed men dressed in military uniforms, wearing helmets and bulletproof vests and wielding high-calibre firearms, attacked an army post and police station, cut off several roads, and hijacked numerous buses, killing at least five people. According to Arévalo, the violence has targeted security forces to force them to withdraw from the region so they can expand their territory.

The state of emergency will limit the freedom to conduct open-air meetings or hold public demonstrations and restrict the right to carry weapons. This follows the announcement on 9 December that Guatemalan security forces will conduct joint security operations along the shared border with Mexico, after what Guatemala’s Ministry of Defence labelled “unidentified illegal armed groups” entered the country and attacked several soldiers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Guatemala has seen a recent spike in gang violence. Extortion has become one of the country’s most pervasive criminal markets, with cases increasing significantly since 2023, particularly targeting the food industry. These operations are largely orchestrated by organised gangs, including Mata Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18, as well as smaller local gangs. Guatemala is both a transit and a destination country for arms trafficking and has one of the highest violent crime rates in Latin America.

Much of the recent violence has been driven by turf wars between Guatemalan gangs and Mexican cartels along the border. Specifically, the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (CJNG) and Sinaloa Cartel have been attempting to extend their control of drugs, arms, and human trafficking routes along the border since 2021. On 8 December, a Sinaloa Cartel cell clashed with local Guatemalan gangs in the departments of Huehuetenango and San Marcos. Violence has been particularly acute since June 2025 due to Guatemalan criminal groups waging a war with the increasingly fragmented Sinaloa Cartel. This is likely driven by a June incursion by the Pakales, a Mexican Chiapas state elite police unit, which has disrupted local criminal control and killed several gang members, including Abdalmear Calderón Carrillo, the leader of the Cártel Chiapas-Guatemala. This likely provided an opportunity for other Mexican cartels to expand their influence.

This is Guatemala’s first state of emergency in response to gang violence, but follows a pattern set by other countries, including El Salvador, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru, and Ecuador, who have used states of emergencies to mobilise a militarised response to crack down on gangs responsible for escalating violence. These have involved mass incarceration campaigns and bans on public gatherings. The securitised state response has had mixed success. While El Salvador has been largely successful, with dramatically reduced homicide rates, securitised strategies have overall had mixed results across Latin America, with many failing to tackle multiple issues such as poverty, lack of educational and employment opportunities, or reintegration of former gang members into society. In Ecuador, for example, the militarised state response has fragmented criminal groups and intensified turf wars, driving homicide rates up. Should Guatemalan security forces engage in a severe crackdown on gangs in western regions, there is a realistic possibility that it will trigger an escalation in gang violence as gangs fragment.

The Honduran presidential election, which was held on 30 November, has yet to be formally resolved, with a partial vote recount ongoing. The preliminary vote count indicates that the conservative National Party candidate Nasry Asfura, who was publicly endorsed by US President Donald Trump, holds a narrow lead over centrist Liberal Party candidate Salvador Nasralla, of approximately 40,000 votes. However, a special manual recount of around 15 per cent of tally sheets flagged for inconsistencies is scheduled but has not begun due to protests blocking the electoral facilities.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There is a realistic possibility that 15 per cent of the tally sheets that are set to be recounted, which represent hundreds of thousands of ballots, could easily sway the election in favour of either of the two remaining presidential candidates. However, supporters of all three major parties have questioned aspects of the electoral process, and the final result will almost certainly be contested. The centrist and left-wing parties have also denounced foreign interference following President Trump’s endorsement of Asfura. This sentiment has likely been amplified following the US State Department’s demand on 17 December for the Honduras National Electoral Council to immediately start the recount.

Honduras has a long history of post-election unrest, and the convergence of alleged voting irregularities, the closeness of the presidential race, and accusations of foreign interference has almost certainly increased the risk of post-election unrest and instability. Large protests have so far been observed outside the main electoral facilities and in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula.  However, there is a realistic possibility that once final results are formally announced, large-scale and potentially violent demonstrations could expand in scale and geographic spread, with an increased risk of road blocks and disruption, particularly in urban centres and key transport corridors.

Following the 10 December seizure of the oil tanker SKIPPER by US forces in the Caribbean Sea, US President Donald Trump declared on 16 December that all sanctioned Venezuelan oil tankers would be treated as subject to US enforcement action. This move has widely been interpreted as a de facto blockade on Venezuelan crude and refined product exports, and follows expanded sanctions targeting Venezuela-linked vessels and shipping companies.

Tanker traffic in and out of Venezuela had already slowed to a near standstill following the seizure of the SKIPPER, with multiple vessel operators avoiding the area entirely. It is currently estimated that around 11 million barrels of crude oil and fuel are now stranded in Venezuelan waters, with shipowners, charterers, and insurers reassessing the increasing risk of seizure. Only tankers chartered by US oil company Chevron have left Venezuelan ports and sailed into international waters. President Maduro has denounced the de facto blockade as “warmongering.”

To support military operations in the Caribbean region, the US has expanded military, logistics and intelligence capabilities in the area. Trinidad and Tobago has opened its airports to US aircraft, thereby enhancing US reach, logistics, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage, as well as interdiction capability in the region. However, increased US military operations have likely resulted in heightened safety risks for civilian aviation. On 12 December, a JetBlue commercial passenger aircraft operating a New York–Curaçao route was forced to conduct evasive manoeuvres during its ascent to avoid a mid-air collision with a US Air Force aircraft flying without an active transponder. The following day, a private business jet reported a near-miss incident with a US military airframe while flying from Aruba to Miami.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The US has now engaged in months of aggressive rhetoric, posturing and significant shaping activity since August. This has included the designation of Venezuelan-linked actors and networks as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs), the deployment of a US Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the wider region, and sustained messaging regarding potential military operations in Venezuela. However, it is highly likely that the US has now transitioned to a secondary phase of operations, which is prioritising economic coercion through the interdiction of oil exports. This transition will enable the US to exert increased pressure on Maduro to step down and will likely increasingly isolate the regime from both its internal and external backers, with both Russia and China currently providing only limited financial and diplomatic support.

This long-term strategy is almost certainly aimed at forcing Maduro to relinquish power without committing to direct state-on-state military conflict by degrading the regime’s primary source of revenue. However, for the US to achieve a de facto blockade of Venezuela while simultaneously sustaining operations against vessels trafficking narcotics, it will likely demand a significant uplift in deployed military assets and a higher tempo of maritime and air operations in the Caribbean region.

As the US conducts an increasing volume of operations in the region and operates in a progressively less overt manner, such as flying military aircraft without active transponders, the risk of miscalculation and escalation will likely significantly increase. Moreover, as demonstrated by the two recent near-miss incidents, expanded US air operations in the area will likely increase the risk to commercial and business aviation across Aruba, Curaçao, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Lesser Antilles.

Nationwide protests in Brazil against bill which could reduce prison sentence of Jair Bolsonaro.

On 14 December, tens of thousands attended nationwide protests in Brazil against a controversial bill that could significantly reduce former president Jair Bolsonaro’s 27-year prison sentence. Demonstrations took place in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Brasília, Florianópolis, Salvador, Recife, Porto Velho, and Manaus. The protests were predominantly peaceful. The trigger for the demonstrations was the passage of the PL da Dosimetria (Coup Leniency Bill) through Brazil’s lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, on 10 December, which would reduce prison sentences for people convicted of crimes related to the 8 January 2023 Brasília attacks, including Bolsonaro.

The bill will now be approved by the Senate. If approved, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is expected to veto the bill, which could then be overridden by Congress, which in turn could lead to challenges in the Supreme Court. It is highly likely that further demonstrations will be triggered by multiple stages in this potential process, from both pro- and anti-Bolsonaro demonstrators.

Chile elects far-right president on law-and-order platform.  

On 16 December, Chile announced that José Antonio Kast had been elected as the new president after 99 per cent of votes had been counted, with Kast securing approximately 58 per cent. The ultra-conservative former congressman and admirer of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, centred his campaign around security and has promised to expel tens of thousands of undocumented migrants from the country, many of whom are from Venezuela. Security issues were cited as the main concern for the majority of voters, with murder rates and violent crime rates significantly increasing in recent years.

Kast will formally assume the Chilean presidency on 11 March 2026 and has advocated for a myriad of tougher security measures, including immigration and border controls, harsher sentencing, expanded police powers, the deployment of the military and the construction of maximum-security facilities. Kast’s electoral victory fits a broader and growing regional trend across Latin America, where rising violent crime, organised crime, and irregular migration have resulted in electoral wins for hardline, security-focused candidates, such as El Bukele in El Salvador and Daniel Noboa in Ecuador.

Alleged far-left extremist plot to bomb at least five locations in Los Angeles, US, on New Year’s Eve foiled.

On 15 December, the FBI and LA law enforcement stated that an alleged terrorist plot by members of a far-left extremist group called the Turtle Island Liberation Front (TILF) had been disrupted with the arrest of four suspects. Officials stated that the suspects were arrested on 12 December in Lucerne Valley, California, while travelling to the Mojave Desert with “precursor chemicals” to allegedly create and test improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The foiled plot reportedly involved planting IEDs in at least five locations in Los Angeles, targeting two “Amazon-type” logistics centres operated by US companies on New Year’s Eve. Two of the suspects are also alleged to have discussed plans to target United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents and vehicles.

Historically, far-left extremist groups in the US, such as the Weather Underground, conducted numerous bombing attacks in the 1970s. US Terrorism by far-left actors declined following the end of the Vietnam War and later, the end of the Cold War. The alleged TILF plot is likely indicative of a reemerging threat of far-left terrorism in the US, with a Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) study published in September 2025 finding that the number of left-wing terrorism ‘incidents’ in the US is on track to reach the highest level in the last 30 years. Left-wing groups have traditionally targeted symbols of state authority and capitalism, including government buildings, banks, multi-national corporations and critical infrastructure.

Mass shooting at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island in the US.

On 13 December, a mass shooting occurred at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island in the US. The perpetrator opened fire in a classroom, killing two students and wounding nine others. The university and Providence authorities issued an active shooter alert, placing the campus and surrounding neighbourhoods under lockdown or shelter-in-place orders. As of 18 December, the suspect remains at large. Law enforcement conducted a large manhunt, and temporarily detained a “person of interest” on 14 December, who was later released without charge.

ELN conduct 72-hour armed strike throughout Colombia due to US military operations.

On 14-17 December, the Colombian leftist guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), conducted a 72-hour “armed strike” in response to US military operations in Latin America, during which it conducted several attacks on government forces. The ELN is most active in northeastern Colombia (Arauca and Norte de Santander/Catatumbo), the western Pacific region (Chocó), and the southwest (Cauca and Nariño), with established strongholds along the Venezuela border and a wider operational presence extending into Antioquia, Bolívar, and Valle del Cauca.

The group has traditionally used armed strikes to undermine the government, intimidate the civilian population and reinforce its territorial control. However, it has previously exploited external developments to justify armed strikes within Colombia, suggesting that the ELN may repeat these tactics in response to future US military activity targeting drug trafficking networks, which the ELN is heavily involved in. Armed strikes typically involve curfews on the civilian population, restrictions on movement, the emplacement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on transport corridors, attacks on the security forces and road and river blockades, widely assessed as measures that enable the ELN to traffic narcotics and other illicit goods.

Flash flooding in Bolivia kills at least 20 people.

On 15 December, flooding in Bolivia’s Santa Cruz department prompted a state of emergency. Authorities declared that at least 20 people had been killed and approximately 10 others were missing in the flooding, which followed days of heavy rain. The flooding began after overnight rains on 13 December caused a river to overflow in El Torno, flooding four communities. Evacuations were carried out as floodwaters entered homes, including at a juvenile detention centre near Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

Several bridges collapsed near Santa Cruz de la Sierra on 13 December, including one near Entre Ríos and another close to the Cochabamba–Santa Cruz departmental border, leaving multiple communities isolated. On 14 December, officials said at least seven people had died across Santa Cruz, and the departmental governor moved to declare a disaster. The city of Porongo declared a state of disaster and reported one flood-related death, while authorities in Warnes set up shelters in case evacuations were needed due to potential flooding of the Piraí River. Lingering disruptions are highly likely.

On 14 December, German police arrested five individuals in Bavaria suspected of plotting a terror attack targeting a Christmas market. The exact Christmas market has not been disclosed; however, the authorities stated that the suspects were motivated by a radical Islamist ideology and that a vehicle would have been used to ram into crowds of civilians. One Egyptian national, one Syrian and three Moroccans have been arrested. The Egyptian national was reportedly an Imam at a local mosque and is suspected of having played a leading role in encouraging or coordinating the plot.

In neighbouring Poland, a 19-year-old Polish student from the Catholic University of Lublin was arrested on 16 December after the security services thwarted a similar plot targeting Christmas markets. The suspect allegedly had sought contact with members of the Islamic State (IS) and wanted to use explosives to commit an attack, and had planned to join the terrorist organisation. The authorities have not disclosed which city the attack was to be conducted in order not to cause panic, but have conducted searches in both Łódź and Lublin provinces, seizing data storage devices and other items that may serve as evidence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Germany has been on high alert to protect Christmas markets from terrorism since the beginning of the festive season. Christmas markets have likely become symbolic targets following the Berlin attack in 2016 and the Magdeburg attack in 2024, with the ongoing trial of the Magdeburg attacker potentially reinforcing public attention and inspiring extremist actors. This has resulted in many Christmas markets being ringed with concrete blocks, armed police and vehicle barriers to prevent attacks. However, with an estimated 3,000 Christmas markets in Germany, many smaller ones almost certainly remain highly vulnerable to attack, with limited security measures in place.

A successful IS-inspired attack in Poland would have likely been a watershed moment for the country. Poland has previously foiled Islamist extremist attacks and conducted arrests; however, it has never experienced a successful, large-scale jihadist terrorist attack. Such an attack would likely result in heightened security measures and would have likely had significant political repercussions in a country which has experienced multiple large-scale anti-immigration protests and where citizen patrols are currently policing the Western border to prevent migrants from entering from Germany.

The disrupted plots in Europe overlap with the Bondi attack in Australia on a Hanukkah celebration, illustrating the heightened threat during major religious festivals, where crowded public spaces present coveted targets for extremists wanting to conduct mass casualty attacks and achieve media publicity. Two of the attacks have also been linked to IS, indicating that despite counterterrorism pressure and territorial losses, the group still retains the ability to influence or coordinate attacks in areas well beyond its primary area of operations.

Delegations from Ukraine, the US and European allies met for two days of negotiations in Berlin, Germany, on 14-15 December. With previous negotiations over the past weeks highlighting two key issues, territorial concessions and security guarantees, the US delegation reportedly wishes to find a resolution to these for a proposal that can then be presented to Moscow.

On security guarantees, the latest talks revolved around the US and European allies offering a guarantee similar to NATO’s Article 5, which considers an attack on one member as an attack on all. On 14 December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that he is prepared to give up demands for NATO membership in exchange for legally-binding and robust guarantees.

On territorial concessions, the US delegation reportedly proposed a Ukrainian withdrawal from the remaining unoccupied parts of the Donbas, which would then become a demilitarised “free economic zone.” Territory in other parts of Ukraine, such as in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, would be frozen at the current lines of control. Zelensky said he wanted a clearer understanding of how the security guarantees would work before making any decisions on territory.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The link between security guarantees and potential territorial concessions is significant, as illustrated by Zelensky wishing for clarity on guarantees before decisions on territory. The remaining unoccupied portions of the Donbas in Donetsk Oblast include the so-called ‘fortress belt’, a line of highly defensible fortified cities and towns which Russian forces have had to expend enormous manpower to make only slow and limited advances. Due to the threat of Russian reinvasion, Kyiv would highly likely only be willing to withdraw Ukrainian forces here if the security guarantees are credible enough to deter Russia.

The Kremlin has so far given no indication that it is even willing to accept the original 28-point peace plan proposed in mid-November, drafted by Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev, which included multiple concessions deemed unacceptable by Kyiv. The subsequent negotiations between the US, Ukraine and European allies have sought to resolve the issues which made the 28-point so contentious for Kyiv.

However, following the Berlin talks, the Kremlin has further indicated intransigence on these issues. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergei Ryabkov, stated this most clearly on 15 December in an interview. On security guarantees, Ryabkov reiterated that Russia is completely unwilling to accept the deployment of any NATO forces in Ukraine. Ukraine’s European allies have proposed the deployment of forces from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ as a means to guarantee Ukraine’s security. However, it is highly unlikely that the Kremlin would ever be able to countenance such an arrangement, with most coalition members being NATO states or NATO partner states, such as Australia and Japan.

On territory, Ryabkov reiterated that Russia is completely unwilling to accept a proposal that compromises on Russia’s control of the five Ukrainian regions Moscow claims it has annexed. In addition to Crimea, which was declared annexed in 2014, Russia unilaterally declared the annexation of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts in September 2022. Because of these remaining fundamental divides, it is unlikely that Moscow will accept any imminent peace deal from the US, even if Washington is able to shortly reach a finalised proposal with Kyiv.

On 13 December, two US soldiers and a US civilian interpreter were killed by a lone Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) gunman near Palmyra, Homs Governorate in Syria, with three additional service members and two Syrian Internal Security forces personnel wounded. The US personnel were deployed as part of an anti-ISIS mission, with the gunman attacking the patrol after it left a government security headquarters south of Palmyra before being killed by “Syrian partner forces”.

On 14 December, the Syrian Interior Ministry announced the arrest of five suspects linked to the attack. Moreover, a Syrian official told international media that the perpetrator had joined Syria’s Internal Security forces as a base security guard two months earlier, having been recently reassigned due to suspicions of ISIS affiliation. US President Donald Trump vowed retaliation, stating in a social media post that “great harm will come to those who attacked US forces in Syria”. On 16 December, the Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab chaired an expanded security meeting to assess the regional security situation following the Palmyra attack, attended by senior Syrian military officials and commanders.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Following the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, ISIS has almost certainly sought to exploit the dynamic security conditions and continues to use the Syrian desert (Badia, where Palmyra is located) as its primary haven in Syria. ISIS are estimated to maintain up to 3,000 fighters across Iraq and Syria, although some estimates are double this. Furthermore, some observers have noted the reported agreement of Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) to redeploy a number of fighters to Syria and efforts by ISIS to recruit disaffected fighters and jihadist foreign fighters that were previously aligned with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the former Islamist rebel group which now leads Syria’s transitional government.

The ISIS attack against US personnel in Syria is rare, being the first since 2019. It follows the Syrian transitional government formally joining the US-led anti-ISIS coalition in November, after which high-profile Islamic State (IS) supporters called for attacks to be conducted against the government wherever possible. Syrian security forces have needed to rapidly expand recruitment, and this has almost certainly increased the infiltration risk from ISIS or ISIS supporters. The Palmyra attack is likely in part intended to foster distrust between the US and Syrian authorities, with joint anti-ISIS operations between US Central Command (CENTCOM) and Syrian security forces being regularly conducted and likely to increase following Syria’s joining of the coalition.

Globally, the IS provinces with the highest number of fighters and operational freedom are now in Sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Naba, a key IS propaganda outlet which is published weekly, will frequently report on IS attacks in Africa, which account for roughly 90 per cent of IS attacks globally in 2025. However, editorials in the publication remain fixated on developments in Syria, which almost certainly reflects IS’s fundamental continued prioritisation of its long-term goals of expanding operations and re-establishing a Caliphate in the Levant.

Syria is attracting growing interest from international investors as US sanctions ease, with foreign business travellers and organisations increasingly conducting travel as its economy opens up. However, ISIS almost certainly maintains a desire to target foreign nationals in Syria, with IS-affiliated channels specifically calling on supporters to kill foreigners who are now travelling to Syria, with minimal security given the relatively improved security environment. This threat almost certainly highlights the continued need for comprehensive security measures for all travel to Syria.

Since 10 December, mass protests have taken place in Bucharest and other major cities, including Cluj-Napoca, Iași, Timișoara, Craiova, Brașov, Sibiu, Constanța, and Galați, against judicial corruption. Demonstrations were concentrated around central public squares and key government buildings. Starting with several hundred people on the first day, by 14 December, at least 10,000 people gathered in Bucharest. After a lull on 15 and 16 December, protests again resumed on 17 December.

The protests began after a documentary, “Captured Justice”, aired on 9 December, which exposed alleged deep-seated corruption, abuses of power, and political influence in Romania’s judiciary. According to the filmmaker, senior judges and judicial institutions were operating with undue influence and shielding powerful interests, undermining judicial independence.

Protesters have demanded reforms to the justice system to ensure independence from political influence. The requested reforms include amending justice laws, eliminating procedural loopholes that enable delays to high-profile cases, and strengthening safeguards against political interference. They also called for the removal of key judicial figures perceived to be responsible for alleged abuses, including Lia Savonea, the President of the High Court of Cassation and Justice.

At least 500 magistrates, judges, and prosecutors have signed an open letter expressing solidarity with judges Laurențiu Beșu and Raluca Moroșanu, who have raised concerns over problems within the justice system.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Judicial corruption has been a persistent problem in Romania. Although the European Commission placed the country’s justice system under enhanced monitoring under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) from 2007 to 2023, the momentum of anti-corruption investigations has weakened since that oversight was removed. Criminal networks embedded within state institutions have facilitated the unhindered operation of organised crime, with investigations revealing cases in which senior officials obstructed law-enforcement efforts and were implicated in steering public contracts to companies linked to organised criminal groups.

One of the key elements of alleged judicial corruption is the political influence over the judiciary, with political actors exerting influence over senior judicial appointments, prosecutorial priorities, and disciplinary proceedings against magistrates. This has enabled selective law enforcement, with politics influencing whether corruption cases are pursued or stalled. The airing of the documentary has almost certainly further degraded already low trust in the judicial system. Should reforms and resignations fail to materialise, further protests are highly likely.

French farmers vow to escalate protests due to EU trade deal and cattle culls.

French farmers protesting a proposed EU trade deal with the Mercosur bloc since early December have called for further protests due to the government-backed slaughter of cattle herds affected by the so-called Lumpy Skin Disease (LSD), a highly contagious bovine disease transmitted primarily by fly bites. Recent farmer protests have involved shutting down the Biriatou border with Spain on 16 December, blocking sections of major motorways in southwestern and central France, conducting tractor convoys and slow-moving blockades on key freight routes, and staging demonstrations outside prefectures and agricultural authorities. Negotiations remain ongoing but unresolved. The French government has opened talks with major farmer unions and reiterated its position that the cattle culls are necessary, while offering compensation payments and expanded vaccination programmes. However, farmer groups continue to reject these measures, demanding an end to systemic herd culls and improved protections against the proposed Mercosur trade deal, which they argue will undercut French farmers.

Greek farmers maintain nationwide protest.

Greek farmers have maintained their protests across the country and continue to block roads and ports in several parts of Greece. Tractors are blocking several national highways in Thessaly, Greece’s most important agricultural region, and farmers in Central Macedonia are blocking key access points near Thessaloniki and intermittently restricting traffic on routes leading to the Promachonas border crossing with Bulgaria. Symbolic protests have also been staged near Athens; however, the disruption has been limited. Access to several ports has been intermittently affected, including the ports of Thessaloniki, Volos, and Patras. The government has responded by increasing financial aid commitments, but this has been deemed insufficient by the farmers, who have promised to sustain protests until their demands for the full and accelerated payment of delayed EU subsidies, reductions in fuel and energy costs, and broader structural support for agricultural incomes are met.

General elections set to take place in Guinea on 28 December.

Presidential elections have been rescheduled for 28 December 2025 after the military junta failed to hold promised presidential and legislative elections in December 2024. They will be the first in the country since the 2021 coup, which installed Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya into power in place of Guinea’s first democratically elected president, Alpha Condé. Periodic protests have been held by opposition parties and civil society organisations, despite the junta’s ban on demonstrations that was imposed in 2022. After the Guinean military junta postponed the elections in December 2024, for example, demonstrations erupted, resulting in a crackdown by security forces that killed a protester during clashes, and resulted in the arrest of hundreds of mostly young people.

The transition process has been marred by a lack of transparency, despite the junta’s 10-point transition roadmap that was negotiated with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Should Doumbouya claim victory amid an election lacking transparency and facing broad condemnation from both domestic opposition and international actors, there is a realistic possibility of widespread unrest erupting. Previous cycles of unrest have included large marches and “ville morte” (stay-at-home) strikes, but have also featured road barricades, the burning of tyres and violent clashes with the security forces. The 2019-2020 protests resulted in at least 50 deaths and 200 injuries, with a further estimated 27 deaths following post-election unrest in October 2020.

General elections scheduled to take place in CAR on 28 December.

The Central African Republic (CAR) will hold a general election on 28 December to elect a president, members of the National Assembly, and local and municipal officials. The elections are the first to be held following the 2023 referendum that abolished the Senate and removed term limits, allowing incumbent President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to run for re-election for a second time. The presidential vote was originally scheduled for October 2024 but was postponed multiple times due to ongoing security issues. The elections are highly unlikely to be transparent or fair. Several opposition leaders and civil society activists have been imprisoned, with the government leveraging “anti-banditry” institutions to quash dissent. The ruling party, United Hearts Movement (MCU), operates youth militias that attack perceived critics with almost total impunity. In April 2025, thousands of people demonstrated in Bangui against Touadéra’s plan to run for a third term and his reliance on the Russian Wagner Group. If Touadéra wins an election perceived as neither transparent nor fair, protests are highly likely, with security forces likely to respond forcefully.

Eritrea leaves regional bloc over tensions with Ethiopia.

On 12 December, Eritrea’s foreign ministry released a statement announcing its withdrawal from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and stating that it had strayed from its founding principles and did not contribute to regional stability. Eritrea has historically criticised IGAD for siding with Ethiopia during regional disputes, and left the bloc in 2007, rejoining in 2023. The move comes amid rising diplomatic friction between Eritrea and Ethiopia, particularly over Ethiopia’s push for access to Eritrean Red Sea ports, which are viewed as a threat to Eritrea’s sovereignty.

Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia in 1993 left Ethiopia landlocked. Since 2023, Ethiopia has consistently declared that access to the Red Sea was an existential matter. Tensions particularly escalated on 1 September, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali declared that Ethiopia’s “mistake” of losing access to the Red Sea would be “corrected tomorrow”; army chief Field Marshal Birhanu Jula added on 21 September that “[w]e will strengthen our defence forces, speed up our development and secure a sea outlet”. A statement from Eritrea’s army responded, stating “[t]he fate of anyone crossing the red line is plunging into an abyss from which they will never have a second chance to learn.” Eritrea’s withdrawal from IGAD almost certainly raises the risk of escalation with Ethiopia.

Israel launches large-scale counterterrorism operations in Jenin area of the West Bank.

On 17 December, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) conducted large-scale operations in the Jenin area of the West Bank. The operations are part of a large-scale arrest campaign targeting Palestinian militant networks, with a focus on Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and affiliated armed cells operating in and around the Jenin refugee camp. The operation involved ground forces, special units, and aerial support, and resulted in arrests, weapons seizures, and clashes with armed militants. Previous IDF operations in the West Bank have prioritised dismantling militant networks in other parts of the West Bank, including Nablus, Tulkarm and Hebron; however, recent operations have  increasingly refocused on Jenin, likely reflecting Israeli assessments that the area has re-emerged as a key hub for militant activity and weapons production, after focusing on other parts of the West Bank.

Ivory Coast requests US spy planes to help tackle JNIM.

On 11 December, reports emerged that the Ivory Coast government had requested US spy planes in the north of the country to help tackle the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) presence near the border. A decision is reportedly expected next year, according to Ivorian security officials. US attention has increasingly pivoted towards West Africa, with US President Donald Trump threatening to intervene in Nigeria due to the alleged targeting of Christians by jihadist groups. Following the US’s withdrawal from Niger in August 2024, as well as France’s withdrawal from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, Western presence in West Africa has been severely diminished, allowing groups such as JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) more operational freedom to expand their presence. The US will highly likely accept Ivory Coast’s request for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assistance, which could act as a precursor to further counterinsurgency collaboration against JNIM and other violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the wider area.

AFC/M23 rebel group withdraws from Uvira in the DRC’s South Kivu region shortly after capturing it.

On 16 December, Rwanda-backed AFC/M23 forces announced their withdrawal from Uvira, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (FARDC) last remaining stronghold in South Kivu, after capturing it on 9 December. The announcement took place after the US urged the group to withdraw due to its threat to the Washington-mediated peace process. Cornielle Nangaa, leader of AFC, an alliance of which M23 are the principal member, declared that the withdrawal was a “unilateral trust-building measure to give the Doha peace process the maximum chance to succeed”. AFC/M23 has declared that it would withdraw five kilometres from Uvira to establish a buffer zone, with the withdrawal set to be completed on 18 December.

The threat of AFC/M23 recapturing Uvira will almost certainly be used as a bargaining tool during the peace talks with the DRC government. Should the FARDC or Burundian troops attempt to re-entrench themselves in Uvira, it is highly likely that AFC/M23 will attempt to retake the city. Following Uvira’s capture, the US embassy issued a warning of planned protests in Kinshasa on 15 December. Although the protests did not go ahead, AFC/M23’s recapture of Uvira would almost certainly heighten the risk of civil unrest in Kinshasa. In response to AFC/M23’s southward offensive, the governor of the Tanganyika province has announced new security measures, including the halting of all maritime and land traffic from South Kivu, airspace closures, and a curfew.

Weather warnings issued for large parts of southern England and Wales.

On 17 December, the UK’s Meteorological Office issued weather warnings covering much of the south of England and Wales due to dense fog and heavy rain, covering 17 to 18 December. Dense fog is forecast to significantly reduce visibility and is expected to result in flight cancellations and delays, increase the risk of road traffic accidents, and affect rail services. Alerts have been issued due to rain landing on already saturated ground, raising the risk of surface water flooding and rising river levels, with areas most at risk including parts of South Wales, southwest England, the southern Midlands, and the Thames Valley.

Flash flooding in Safi, Morocco, leads to at least 37 deaths.

At least 37 deaths have been reported in Safi, Morocco, following flash flooding triggered by heavy rainfall on 14 December. Approximately 70 homes and businesses were heavily impacted in Safi, with schools across Safi province being closed for three days. Flooding was also recorded in Tetouan and Tinghir. Large parts of North Africa have struggled with droughts in the past few years, which can harden soils and increase vulnerability to flash flooding. Moreover, the Moroccan “GenZ 212” protest movement, which began in September, has frequently criticised the deterioration of public services, including disaster resiliency initiatives, and there is a realistic possibility that the disaster will contribute towards further youth-led demonstrations.

Fighting has continued along the Thai-Cambodian border, with both sides reporting military and civilian casualties. Cambodian authorities declared on 16 December that the civilian death toll had reached 17, with nearly 440,000 people displaced. In Thailand, at least 21 people have been killed. Thai military sources reported several exchanges of fire, including airstrikes by F-16 fighter jets in Cambodia’s Pursat and Banteay Meanchey provinces, and exchanges of artillery along multiple border areas. Cambodian officials accused Thailand of targeting civilian infrastructure, including bridges and homes, and reported Thai airstrikes deep inside its territory, near refugee camps in Siem Reap province on 15 December. Cambodia’s Ministry of Defence has also claimed that the Thai military is using “toxic gas”, violating international humanitarian law (IHL).

On 18 December, Thai F-16s conducted airstrikes against targets in Poipet, Cambodia’s fourth-largest city, a major transport hub, and the main border crossing with Thailand that is also famous for its casinos. The same day, the Thai military declared that clashes occurred on several locations on the international border overnight and that they took territory in Ubon Ratchathani province and prevented a Cambodian incursion in Surin province.

Both countries reported significant military casualties. The Thai army said at least four soldiers were killed on 13 December in the Chong An Ma region, and additional deaths were reported in subsequent days. The Thai military also claimed to have taken control of disputed areas, including the Prasat Ta Kwai temple near the Surin-Oddar Meanchey border.

Evacuation orders were issued for residents in Thailand’s Khun Han district in Si Sa Ket province on 15 December, and curfews were imposed and later lifted in several districts in Trat province. Cambodia announced a full suspension of cross-border travel on 13 December. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Malaysian officials called for a ceasefire, which Thailand refused to accept, insisting it would continue military actions to defend its sovereignty.

On 14 December, Thailand’s military command declared a naval blockade on Cambodia to prevent Thai fishing boats, oil tankers, and other vessels from reaching the mainland. The Royal Thai Navy said that it would not be as severe as a full blockade and would not target vessels from other countries. The Ministry of Defence is set to compile a list of supplies that will be subject to the restrictions. On 15 December, Thailand’s military cut off fuel shipments transiting via Laos after receiving intelligence suggesting that supplies were being diverted to Cambodian forces.

Diplomatic efforts included calls from US President Donald Trump, who claimed on 12 December that a ceasefire had been agreed, although Thailand rejected this. ASEAN announced plans to deploy an observer team to monitor the situation, but reports of heavy fighting and airstrikes persisted throughout the week.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Several civilian areas have been targeted by both sides, significantly raising the risk of escalating tit-for-tat strikes. Cambodia’s interior ministry has declared that at least four casinos have been damaged by Thai strikes, but Thailand’s bombing of Poipet, a major city and casino hub popular with Thai and foreign gamblers, almost certainly marks an escalation. Thailand has claimed that the casinos constitute legitimate military targets as they are being used for military purposes, including staging troops, launching drones, and storing rockets for BM-21 multi-barrel rocket launchers. However, many of these casinos are also hubs for large-scale online scamming and human trafficking operations, and it is highly likely that Thailand is deliberately targeting these scam centres. The targeting of casinos almost certainly raises the risk of collateral civilian damage and increases the likelihood that Cambodia will increasingly target civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals or supermarkets.

The clashes have severely impacted hospitals along the border. Approximately 200 local Thai health facilities, including 10 hospitals, along the border have closed, according to the Thai military and public health officials, due to Cambodian rockets landing close to civilian areas. Routine medical services have been disrupted, and many displaced people are struggling to access healthcare, something that will almost certainly increase strain on open hospitals in the border regions. This strain is likely exacerbated by the fact that high civilian displacement levels have almost certainly resulted in overcrowded shelters, which will highly likely exacerbate the risk of communicable diseases. Furthermore, the border closures almost certainly hinder cross-border referral networks and supply chains for medicines and supplies.

Thailand’s naval blockade is likely to lead to sustained fuel shortages in Cambodia, which could trigger price increases and shortages, as well as power cuts. Neighbouring countries such as Laos are also likely to be indirectly impacted. This will highly likely exacerbate the cost of living for many and could trigger protests in major cities. This would almost certainly increase the pressure on Cambodia’s government to negotiate another ceasefire with Thailand.

President Trump’s claim of a ceasefire was almost certainly a potential off-ramp for both sides. However, Thailand’s rejection of Trump’s claimed ceasefire and pledges to protect Thai “sovereignty” demonstrates that it is highly likely that Thailand will not de-escalate without concrete mechanisms in place. It is likely that, without a long-term peace mechanism in place, renewed clashes will occur until at least the Thai election in February 2026.

On the evening of 14 December, the first night of 2025’s Jewish Hanukkah festival, two gunmen opened fire at a large public Hanukkah celebration called “Chanukah by the Sea” at Sydney’s Bondi Beach. Around 1,000 people were attending the event, with 16 deaths (including one of the gunmen) and over 40 injuries reported. The incident was declared by authorities as a terrorist attack.

The perpetrators have been identified as a father and son, Sajid Akram and Naveed Akram. The terrorist attack began with the perpetrators opening fire from a bridge towards Archer Park. One of the gunmen then descended into Archer Park, believed to be Sajid Akram, who was then disarmed by a member of the public before returning to the bridge. Following a firefight with responding police, the two terrorists were neutralised, with one dying at the scene. A total of six firearms and three improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were located both at the scene and at two homes in Bonnyrigg and Campsie. The father, Sajid Akram, was a licensed gun owner through membership of a gun club, with all six firearms believed to have been legally acquired.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Bondi Beach mass shooting is the deadliest terrorist attack in Australian history and the deadliest mass shooting since the 1996 Port Arthur massacre. The attack was almost certainly linked to the Islamic State (IS), either through inspiration or more direct coordination. Investigators from the Australian Joint Counter Terrorism Team (JCTT) believe that the two perpetrators had pledged allegiance to IS, and two IS flags were found in their vehicle at Bondi Beach.

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reportedly “took interest” in one of the perpetrators, Naveed Akram, six years ago for ties to a Sydney-based Islamic State (IS) terrorist cell. This followed the July 2019 arrest of Isaac El Matari, the self-proclaimed head of IS in Australia, who wished to establish an “insurgency” in Australia.  A senior JCTT official briefed that Naveed Akram was “closely connected” to El Matari. These findings strongly suggest at least a historical connection to an Australian IS cell. However, Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has stated that intelligence authorities have informed him that there was “no evidence of collusion” and “no evidence that these people were part of a cell”.

In November, the two perpetrators travelled to Mindanao in the Philippines, returning to Australia just over two weeks before the attack. The trip’s purpose remains under investigation, but a senior Australian counterterrorism official briefed that Naveed and Sajid Akram received “military-style training” during the trip. IS-affiliated cells remain active in Mindanao, despite having been considerably degraded since the 2017 siege of Marawi. In 2025, a reported 75 IS-affiliated Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) militants were arrested by Philippine security forces, highlighting their continued presence, in addition to several other jihadist groups which pledged allegiance to IS to form the Islamic State – Philippines Province (ISPP). The Philippine police have attempted to dismiss claims that the suspects received training in Mindanao, stating that they rarely left their hotel except for an hour or so at a time. The Philippine police are almost certainly incentivised to downplay the continued presence of IS-affiliated cells in Mindanao.

In apparent contrast to the attribution to IS, Israeli intelligence sources briefed that the attack may have been carried out with the support of Iran or Iran-backed actors such as Hezbollah. In August 2025, Iran’s ambassador to Australia, Ahmad Sadeghi, was expelled due to “credible evidence” that antisemitic attacks, including an arson attack against a café in Sydney in October 2024 and a synagogue in Melbourne in December 2024, were orchestrated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Overall, the number of antisemitic attacks in Australia has considerably increased in the past two years, with the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) recording the number of antisemitic incidents at “almost five times the average annual number before” October 2023.

The Bondi Beach terrorist attack highlights the almost certainly continuing elevated risk of terrorism in Western countries, particularly against targets associated with Judaism. Other attacks in 2025 include the October 2025 ramming and stabbing attack targeting Jewish worshipers at a synagogue in Manchester, UK, during Yom Kippur, and the May 2025 shooting near the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., USA.

In addition to the elevated risk of antisemitic terrorism against targets such as synagogues, Jewish schools, and events such as Hanukkah gatherings (14 December – 22 December 2025), the winter holiday season almost certainly entails an increased risk of terrorist attacks against ‘soft targets’. Symbolic and high-visibility events, such as Christmas markets, draw large crowds and are difficult to comprehensively protect against terrorist actors. In the aftermath of the Bondi Beach attack, it is almost certain that security presence at Hanukkah events and synagogues will be elevated, as already reported in cities such as Berlin, London, and New York.

Myanmar elections scheduled for 28 December.

On 28 December, the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military junta, is set to begin the general election process to elect representatives for the bicameral Assembly of the Union. Voting is scheduled to be conducted in phases, primarily because the junta cannot guarantee security nationwide. The first phase, on 28 December, will be held in 102 townships, largely under the Tatmadaw’s control. Subsequent phases are scheduled for 11 January and 25 January. Since the coup, Myanmar has been governed by the junta’s extraconstitutional bodies.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the junta leader, initially promised a new election by 2023, but repeatedly delayed it amid escalating civil war. Most opposition parties are unable to take part in the election. In January 2023, the Tatmadaw enacted a Political Parties Registration Law requiring any political party to register within 60 days, have at least 100,000 members, and open offices in over half of all townships in Myanmar. As a result of the law, 40 parties were disbanded, including the NLD and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD). All credible opposition parties have either been sidelined or are boycotting the election, denouncing it as illegitimate.

The general elections will highly likely result in a victory for the Tatmadaw and Tatmadaw-aligned parties. The period around the election will highly likely be characterised by increased armed clashes and state repression. Anti-junta groups have vowed to disrupt the election. There is a realistic possibility that ethnic armed opposition (EAO) groups could attack polling stations, election officials, and party candidates. Such moves would almost certainly provoke a junta retaliation and be exploited to justify both increased military operations and the limitations of the election process. Despite the martial law imposition, there is a realistic possibility that the election could become a catalyst for widespread anti-junta civil unrest.

Militants attack polio vaccination team in northwest Pakistan in the last immunisation drive of 2025.

On 16 December, suspected militants opened fire on a police unit escorting a polio vaccination team in the Bajaur district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in northwest Pakistan, killing an officer and a civilian. The attack occurred the day after Pakistan launched its final nationwide anti-polio vaccination campaign of the year, which aims to immunise about 45 million children against the disease.

Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan remain the only countries where wild poliovirus is still endemic, with vaccination teams often attacked due to extremist beliefs and conspiracies that allege the vaccinations are Western plots or intelligence gathering operations. The recent vaccination drive is scheduled to last around one week, culminating on 21 December. The campaign has mobilised over 400,000 frontline healthcare workers, supported by thousands of security personnel. Efforts will be spread across Pakistan; however, attempts will be made to vaccinate millions of children in high-risk areas like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, likely resulting in further attacks on vaccination teams.

Severe smog in New Delhi causes health hazards and major travel disruptions.

On 15 December, at least 40 flights were cancelled, and 50 trains were delayed following severe pollution levels caused by dense smog in New Delhi. The city’s air quality index (AQI), which measures the concentration of airborne pollutants, exceeded the World Health Organization’s recommended limit by more than 30 times. India’s Commission for Air Quality Management (CAQM) increased their response to Level 4, the highest stage, imposing restrictions on construction operations, generators, diesel trucks, and heavy goods vehicles in response. Local hospitals also reported an influx of patients with breathing difficulties and eye irritation. New Delhi is one of the most polluted cities in the world, and periodically sees spikes in pollution levels. In the winter months, particularly after farmers burn the remains of their crops, smoke and pollution get trapped around the city, exacerbating pollutant levels. Toxic smog and elevated pollution levels are expected to persist throughout the winter months, likely causing further disruptions to flights and public transport.

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