On 11 July, José Adolfo Macías Villamar, known by the alias ‘Fito’, accepted the court’s request to be extradited to the US, where he is wanted by the US Justice Department on drug and weapons trafficking charges. Fito was arrested on 26 June in a 10-hour joint police and military operation after being tracked to an underground bunker beneath a luxury home in Manta. Fito is a founding member of Ecuador’s largest gang, Los Choneros, which was sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and has been its sole leader since 2020.

In 2011, the Fito was sentenced to 34 years in prison for various crimes, including murder and drug trafficking. During his sentence, he had access to mobile phones and the internet, which he used to continue to direct Los Choneros from his cell. In January 2024, Fito was found missing from his prison cell, shortly before he was due to be moved to a maximum-security prison. In response to his escape, the government declared a 60-day state of emergency, which triggered prison riots and reprisal gang violence, including kidnappings, and bombings. Currently, Ecuador is in a nationwide state of “internal armed conflict”, with several provinces under curfews from 2200 to 0500 local time, with President Daniel Noboa emulating hardline anti-crime policies similar to those observed elsewhere in Latin America, such as El Salvador.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Reprisal attacks from members of Los Choneros against security forces are highly likely. Los Choneros is one of Ecuador’s most violent gangs and has been a major perpetrator of drug trafficking since the 1990s. However, the gang has been progressively weakened by internal fragmentation and the deaths of hundreds of members in prison massacres and targeted killings in recent years. Ecuadorian gangs are largely run from inside prisons, which are used as command centres and recruitment hubs. By moving Fito to the US, this would almost certainly disrupt his ability to direct operations effectively, likely leaving Los Choneros without central direction.

Fito’s extradition almost certainly leaves Los Choneros with a leadership vacuum. Los Choneros has a personality-driven command structure, and there is a high likelihood that the removal of Fito, the only surviving founding member, will lead to splintering as subordinates attempt to gain control of the gang or break off into new factions. There is historical precedent for this; when Los Choneros’ previous leader, Jorge Luis Zambrano (‘Rasquiña’), was assassinated in December 2021, Los Choneros fragmented, with rival gangs, including Los Lobos, Los Águilas, and Los Fatales being established, which triggered a gang war. The likely fragmentation of Los Choneros will almost certainly accelerate the transfer of power from Los Choneros to their main rivals, Los Lobos, who have capitalised on Los Choneros’ fragmentation and member depletion since 2021.

Los Choneros’ growth has been facilitated by its ties to the Sinaloa cartel, which helped it gain control of key cocaine trafficking routes through Ecuador in exchange for security and logistical support. If the Sinaloa cartel judges Los Choneros to be further weakened by Fito’s extradition, it will likely reduce its reliance on Los Choneros and increase support to a more stable rival or offshoot gang, something that could trigger a period of intensified inter-gang violence as gangs vie for control over key trafficking routes. Sinaloa’s support is highly unlikely to go to Los Lobos, who are backed by Sinaloa’s rival Mexican cartel, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), but would more likely be for Los Choneros offshoots, Los Águilas or Los Fatales. This would almost certainly exacerbate Ecuador’s gang-driven violence, which has seen an August 2023 assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, a January 2024 armed attack on a local TV network, and an assassination of a prosecutor investigating that attack. This violence would almost certainly undermine President Noboa’s attempts to counter endemic violence and could result in the imposition of more hardline measures to restore law and order, which are likely to raise concerns over human rights and civil liberties.

Civil society groups reportedly fleeing from El Salvador amidst worsening government crackdown

International media have reported, on 17 July, that human rights organisation Cristosal has engaged in efforts to remove its personnel from El Salvador, pulling around 20 employees from the country in recent weeks. Cristosal was founded as an Anglican civil society organisation in 2001, and operates in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, focusing on human and political rights advocacy.

According to the reports, the organisation’s decision is in response to legal targeting of the group carried out by the government of Nayib Bukele. In May, the group’s leading anti-corruption lawyer was arrested on enrichment charges. Cristosal is the largest human rights organisation in the country and has played a key role in defending individuals who have been arrested during the government’s crackdown on gangs. Because of this, its self-imposed exile is likely to represent a significant blow to civil society networks in El Salvador. There is a realistic possibility that Cristosal’s departure will provoke a “domino effect”, prompting other organisations to limit or halt their in-country activities.

Informal miners temporarily suspend blockades of mines in Peru

On 15 July, informal miners in Peru temporarily suspended protests that had blocked major mining corridors for over two weeks. The protests began in late June and disrupted access to mines in the world’s third-largest producer of copper, in response to the government’s attempt to phase out a decade-old programme which permits informal mining. However, the protest leader has described the pause in protests as merely a truce and has promised to resume the blockade by 18 July should talks in Lima not result in a favourable outcome for the informal mining community.

UN extends Haiti mission for another six months

On 15 July, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted to adopt resolution 2785 to extend the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) until January 31, 2026. The decision follows escalating violence, with recent UN reporting indicating that over 4,000 Haitians have been killed in the first six months of 2025 and an additional 1.3 million people displaced by endemic gang violence. However, the extension is for less than a year, and no progress has been made regarding the commitment of additional foreign forces to the country.

The current Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission remains without formal UN backing or reliable funding, and Secretary-General António Guterres has repeatedly stated that a peacekeeping force is inappropriate, as “there is no peace to keep”, which has drawn criticism from Haiti and several member states.  Without substantial foreign intervention, it is highly unlikely that law and order will be restored, which will almost certainly jeopardise Haiti’s transitional roadmap and limit the ability to hold elections.

Colombian intelligence identifies FARC dissidents as responsible for assassination attempt on senator

Colombian intelligence agencies have identified the Segunda Marquetalia, a dissident faction of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) led by Iván Márquez, as responsible for the 7 June assassination attempt against Senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe.

Intelligence reports suggest that the dissident group planned and coordinated the attack from Venezuela, using a local criminal group to conduct the attack. The objective was reportedly to destabilise Colombia ahead of the 2026 presidential election. The attack illustrates how dissident groups, which are primarily based in rural areas or abroad, can leverage proxy groups to conduct attacks in Colombian urban centres, a trend which is likely to increase in the build-up to the election and to avoid direct confrontation with the Colombian armed forces.

Colombian pipeline suspends operations after bomb attack

Colombia’s Cano Limon-Covenas Oil Pipeline suspended pumping after it was bombed by unknown militants on 14 July. The pipeline can transport over 200,000 barrels of oil per day and runs from Colombia’s northern border with Venezuela to the Caribbean coast and is frequently targeted in attacks. No group has claimed responsibility, but the attack occurred in a rural area of Saravena, in the Arauca region, according to its operator, Cenit.

However, the militant group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), which is highly active in the area, is currently fighting government forces and has conducted multiple attacks on oil infrastructure in the past, suggesting the ELN was likely behind the attack. The group almost certainly targets oil infrastructure to disrupt the Colombian economy, weaken the state, and improve its leverage during negotiations, indicating that further attacks are highly likely.

Hundreds of buses vandalised in São Paulo, Brazil

Since 12 June, authorities in São Paulo have recorded attacks or cases of vandalism against more than 800 buses across the city, and particularly in its southern and western parts, and neighbouring areas. Only 11 people have been arrested so far, with the sheer scale of the number of cases, with more than 50 attacks on a single day at times, making it almost certain that the attacks have been carried out by dozens of perpetrators. Authorities have not yet clarified what the motives for the attacks are, or if the perpetrators are part of an organised group. However, some local media have suggested that the case could be linked to the recent closure of a bus company in the city, which allegedly had links with organised crime. Others have instead suggested that competition between various bus companies is driving the attacks (although this appears unlikely, as the sudden start of the incidents likely suggests a trigger). The attacks, which often consist of buses being pelted with rocks on their routes, pose a high threat to bystanders, and there are some reports of injuries linked to flying glass fragments.

Flooding in New York and New Jersey triggers a state of emergency in the northeastern US

The US Northeast continues to grapple with severe flooding following heavy rainfall. A state of emergency has been declared in Petersburg, Virginia, as several individuals have been displaced due to overnight flooding. Flash flood warnings remain in effect for over 125,000 people across southeastern Virginia, including Lynchburg, and for nearly 500,000 people in southeastern and east-central Virginia, encompassing areas like Newport News and Hampton. In New Jersey, two deaths were reported after a vehicle was swept away by floodwaters in Plainfield. Amtrak has warned of delays on the Northeast Corridor line due to weather-related impacts. In New York, a person was hospitalised after being hit by a fallen branch during the storm in Harlem, and flooding has been observed on the Saw Mill River Parkway in Yonkers. First responders in Petersburg have conducted multiple water rescues amid the ongoing crisis.

Landslide disrupts water delivery to around 400,00o in Ecuador

A landslide on 9 July in La Mica, southeast of the Ecuadorian capital, Quito, severely damaged a key potable water pipeline, cutting supply to six parishes and affecting approximately 400,000 people. Emergency measures, including tanker trucks and portable water stations, were deployed to prioritise the delivery of clean water to hospitals, schools, and vulnerable communities. However, thousands remain without access to clean drinking water, and many people are being forced to take water from untreated sources such as springs and rivers, increasing the risk of disease outbreaks.

On 11 July, several cases of mob violence targeting ethnic minority communities were recorded in Torre Pacheco, Murcia. The violence started following reports of three individuals of Moroccan origin, who have since been arrested by police, attacking a 68-year-old. News of the attack, including a (now disproved) video, gained significant traction online and was promoted by several far-right organisations. The 12 July clashes, which resulted in several injuries and at least nine arrests, reportedly started after a “migrant hunt” was promoted by a group known as “Deport Them Now” (whose leader has since been arrested), targeting neighbourhoods of Torre Pacheco with large migrant populations.

Clashes and protests were recorded over five days, with the unrest largely quelled by the morning of July 15. On 12 July, a mosque in the town of Piera, near Barcelona, was destroyed in a fire on the day before its scheduled opening. Spanish authorities are investigating the fire as a possible intentional firebombing connected with the clashes in Murcia.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The sectarian violence in Murcia is the latest in a series of similar cases of violence targeting migrant and ethnic minority communities in Europe. As in previous cases, such as Southport, England, and Ballymena, Northern Ireland, the violence was triggered by a high-profile incident or attack which gained significant traction online. As in the case of Southport, where disinformation regarding the identity of the attacker was spread within minutes of initial reports, false and misleading material almost certainly played a significant role in amplifying the reach and impact of the news in Murcia. In this case, a reported video of the attack was shared on social media hours after the first news report and was widely spread by both Spanish- and English-language accounts, accruing millions of views even after it was confirmed to be unrelated to the incident.

The fire at the new mosque near Barcelona, if shown to be connected to the violence in Murcia, would almost certainly illustrate growing threats to symbolic targets, including places of worship and community centres, in mob violence in Europe. There is a realistic possibility that the sectarian violence and possible mosque firebombing will further drive copycat or retaliatory attacks in Spain, and possibly in other European countries.

On 14 July, US President Donald Trump announced that the US will dramatically increase weapon sales to European allies, who will then send the arms to Ukraine. There are currently only limited details regarding the specifics of which weapon systems and what quantities will be purchased. However, sources have indicated the first wave could include approximately USD 10 billion worth of arms. Trump stated that much of the weapons will be transferred rapidly, including the critically important Patriot air defence system.

Trump’s statement that “17 Patriots” are ready to be shipped drew confusion from senior Ukrainian military officials, as it is unclear whether the US President is referring to launchers, batteries, or interceptor munitions. Trump later added that “a full complement with the batteries” will be sent. According to anonymous sources, Trump additionally asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a phone call whether Ukraine could strike Moscow if provided with long-range Tomahawk missiles.

Trump furthermore threatened to impose 100 per cent secondary tariffs on Russia if Moscow does not agree to a ceasefire within 50 days. Reaction from Moscow has included the Deputy Foreign Minister stating that “any attempts to make demands, especially ultimatums, are unacceptable”, and former president Dmitry Medvedev stating that “Russia didn’t care” about Trump’s “theatrical ultimatum”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The dramatic escalation of Russian aerial attacks against Ukrainian urban centres in June and July 2025 has almost certainly posed a major challenge to Ukrainian air defence. The Patriot system is a critical component of Ukraine’s integrated air defence system (IADS), as it is Ukraine’s most effective means to intercept ballistic missiles. Given the observable high penetration rates of Russian ballistic missile attacks in recent months, it is likely that Ukraine’s Patriot batteries have struggled with depleting interceptor munition stockpiles.

The proposed rapid provision of Patriot is critical and highly likely to lower the immediate risk that continued escalated aerial attacks will lead to a critical shortage of interceptor munitions. However, it is unlikely that Trump’s stated “17 Patriots” refers to 17 batteries, with Ukraine currently believed to operate around six Patriot batteries. Moreover, it is unlikely that Ukraine will be immediately provided with long-range Tomahawk missiles capable of striking Moscow, as Ukraine does not have any systems capable of launching the missiles, and the US Army only operates two operational Typhon batteries, the only system capable of firing Tomahawks from land.

The threat of secondary tariffs is overall unlikely to be coercive enough to pressure Moscow into a ceasefire. The Russian rouble initially lost value against the US dollar in the run-up to Trump’s announcement, but recovered afterwards, highly likely due to the threatened sanctions being lower than anticipated. The Russian economy has proven to be resilient against the impact of sanctions, almost certainly aided by economic ties with countries such as China considerably expanded during the war. If implemented, however, secondary tariffs could have a major impact, as almost a third of Moscow’s state revenue is generated by oil and gas exports. Fundamentally, the newly adopted policies from the Trump administration mark a significant reversal of President Trump’s previous approach to Ukraine. It is highly likely that Moscow will nonetheless continue to pursue its maximalist objectives on the battlefield, and the phase of escalated aerial strikes will highly likely continue in the coming weeks, with Russia seeking to exploit current Ukrainian air defence vulnerabilities.

On 16 July, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) released images showing a new corridor bisecting the city of Khan Yunis. The “Magen Oz” corridor was established in recent weeks by the 36^th division by clearing buildings and ruins from the centre of Khan Yunis. It runs for approximately 15 kilometres from the Morag corridor (established in April and separating Khan Yunis from Rafah), and the Gaza-Israel border. The corridor divides east Khan Yunis, which has been largely depopulated, from the coast and west Khan Yunis, where the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone, housing around one million Palestinians, is located.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The development is highly likely to be understood as reflecting the “humanitarian city” plan, which the Israeli government has advanced in recent weeks. The plan, advanced by Defence Minister Israel Katz, calls for the gradual relocation of Gaza’s population to an area which largely overlaps Rafah, starting with 600,000 people from al-Mawasi and eventually encompassing the entirety of the Gaza Strip’s population. Bisecting Khan Yunis will likely allow Israeli troops to destroy all remaining militant infrastructure and presence in the east of Khan Yunis, rendering it extremely difficult for isolated pockets of Palestinian militants to mount organised attacks.

The corridor will also isolate al-Mawasi, which almost certainly remains the area of Gaza where Hamas and other groups still retain a considerable footprint. In doing so, it will allow Israeli forces to control the speed and volume of possible future movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the south of the Gaza Strip, making it more difficult for armed militant groups to reinfiltrate previously cleared areas. Additionally, the corridor may strengthen Israel’s negotiating position with Hamas, potentially using the reopening of eastern Khan Yunis to residents as leverage in ceasefire talks, even if the full “humanitarian city” framework is not implemented.

On 11 July, clashes between local Druze and Bedouin militia in the predominantly Druze area of Sweida in Syria resulted in the deployment of Syrian government forces on 15 July to contain the violence. However, reports indicate that elements within the Syrian government forces joined forces with Bedouin militias, resulting in intensified clashes and abuses, including extrajudicial killings, from both sides.

In response to the fighting, an estimated 1,000 Israeli Druze crossed the border into Syria. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that protecting the Druze community and the establishment of a demilitarised area in southwest Syria are two of Israel’s primary objectives in Syria, after Israel started conducting airstrikes across Syria. From 5-16 July, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted over 160 air strikes across Syria, including government forces in the Sweida region and symbols of the Syrian state in Damascus, including the Ministry of Defence (MoD) headquarters and the Presidential Palace.

The Israeli campaign reportedly caused significant casualties and led to the withdrawal of government forces from Sweida on 16 July and the imposition of a ceasefire. However, factions within the Druze community immediately rejected the ceasefire, resulting in Druze militias retaking territory and initiating retaliatory attacks against the Bedouin community. Bedouin fighters have mobilised across Syria, and on 17 July, Bedouin militias began entering Druze villages in Sweida province and reportedly entered the city of Sweida, leading to further Israeli strikes in southern Syria.

Preliminary reporting from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) indicates that around 600 people have now been killed by the intercommunal violence, and the UN has stated on 18 July that it has credible reports of human rights violations in Sweida. Reports from 18 July indicate that the violence has prompted the Syrian government to deploy security forces to Sweida, despite Israeli demands to withdraw from the area and threats that all state forces south of Damascus will be targeted.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The localised and primarily sectarian conflict in Sweida has likely evolved into a wider issue that could have regional implications. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has portrayed his forces’ failed attempt to impose control over Sweida Province as the result of Israeli attempts to fracture Syria and to foment internal conflict. However, while Israel may be attempting to pursue its own objectives in Syria, this is likely a partial attempt to deflect from internal issues relating to the new Syrian government’s inability to maintain authority in peripheral regions and to contain rising intercommunal tensions. As evidenced by previous cycles of violence against the Alawite community in March, it is highly likely that the new Syrian government has limited control over many of its rank-and-file soldiers. Many are foreign jihadists and ideologically opposed to President al-Sharaa’s conciliatory approach towards Syria’s religious minorities.Anecdotal reporting also suggests that elements of government forces have left conventional military units and joined Bedouin militias.

The redeployment of Syrian government forces to Sweida will almost certainly result in further Israeli air strikes in Syria. The majority of strikes will likely target government and Bedouin forces in Sweida or convoys heading to the area. However, there is a realistic possibility of further Israeli strikes on military and government installations in Damascus and other major Syrian cities outside of Sweida province, especially if reports of human rights abuses or collaboration between Syrian forces and Bedouin militias continue to emerge. Domestic political instability in Israel will also likely influence the extent of Israeli military operations in Syria. Ultra-Orthodox parties have quit over conscription reforms, and Netanyahu’s coalition government is at risk of collapse. There is a realistic possibility that Netanyahu will escalate in the short term to deflect attention and shore up internal support, despite US pressure to cease strikes in Syria. Israel has begun enhancing its force posture on the Syrian border, and if the situation continues to deteriorate, a limited ground offensive into Syria cannot be discounted.

Government abuses and support for Bedouin militias in Sweida are likely to severely undermine trust in Syria’s transitional government among other minority groups in Syria, including the Alawites, Christians, and the Kurds. The perceived inability to protect minority groups and repeated examples of religious persecution will likely threaten President al-Sharaa’s attempts to establish a new Syria based on pluralism and national reconciliation following years of war. In the long term, this will significantly increase the chances of intercommunal violence and will likely create conditions for sustained foreign intervention.

Starting 14 July, multiple attempted one-way attack drone attacks were conducted against targets in Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. The attacks were likely orchestrated by Iran-backed Shia militias, of which some are factions within the Iraqi state-backed militia network Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), due to the drones emanating from Shia militia-controlled territory. The primary targets were oil installations, with five being either directly hit or forced to shut down due to attacks in their vicinity. One drone was intercepted near Erbil International Airport, which hosts US forces. Furthermore, two of the attacked oil fields are operated by US-based private companies. US officials issued a strong condemnation of the attacks and urged Baghdad to exercise its authority to stop the attacks.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The drone attacks come within the context of domestic political developments and the aftermath of the 12-day war between Israel and Iran. In November 2025, Iraq is scheduled to hold a parliamentary election. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sadrist Movement won the most seats in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary election, but after a political crisis and a failed attempt by al-Sadr to call for snap elections in 2022, the prominent Shia cleric has boycotted the Iraqi political process.

However, on 13 July, al-Sadr held a meeting with close aides to discuss potential conditions for offering their endorsement to an electoral bloc in the upcoming election. Al-Sadr’s reformist platform critically includes the dissolution of the PMF, in which multiple Shia militias are part of the Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), such as Kataib Hezbollah. In 2022, rocket attacks were conducted against multiple Kurdish oil fields by Shia militias, almost certainly to apply pressure on Kurdish parties to remove support for al-Sadr in parliament during the political crisis. It is likely that this is also a factor within the current wave of attacks, given its direct coinciding with political developments. The PMF’s potential disbandment or integration into the conventional Iraqi military almost certainly poses an existential threat to the power of Iran-backed Shia militias, and it is almost certain that these militias will continue to leverage military force to counter this threat.

Following the commencement of the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June, IRI militias conducted multiple attempted drone attacks against US bases in Iraq. As a component within Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’, these militias frequently act as proxy forces for Tehran during periods of elevated regional tensions. Officials from militias in the IRI have threatened to escalate attacks against US bases if US-led coalition forces do not withdraw from Iraq by September 2025, although a full US withdrawal from Iraq isn’t scheduled until late 2026. There is a realistic possibility of all these factors culminating in increased instability and hostilities in Iraq during September and November 2025, the severity of which would dramatically increase if the PMF’s independence is threatened.

More than 70 arrested in UK protests in support of Palestine Action

The latest protests, which occurred in large UK cities including London, Manchester, Cardiff and Leeds during the 11-13 July period, follow weeks of unrest in support of the group. Palestine Action has been designated as a proscribed terrorist group by the UK government on 5 July, following a parliamentary vote. In June, activists from the group vandalised two Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft at the RAF Brize Norton base, which provoked the parliamentary vote. The protests are, so far, the largest in support of the group, and will likely be followed by further unrest on the 18-20 July period. Unrest is also likely to occur in London on 21 July, when a judicial review of Palestine Action’s proscription is scheduled. In addition to protests, unrest will likely take the form of direct action targeting public transport hubs, possibly including airports, and other critical infrastructure.

Haredi parties threaten Israeli government’s stability over draft law

Between 14 and 16 July, the two ultra-orthodox Jewish parties United Torah Judaism (UTJ) and Shas have quit the governing coalition of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This means that, currently, Netanyahu’s government is a minority one. The two parties are protesting the government’s commitment to a highly controversial law on the military draft, which allows for male Haredi students to be recruited for obligatory military service. The timing of the split is nevertheless favourable to the Netanyahu government, making the development less impactful in the immediate term: as the Knesset is scheduled to begin its three-month recess on 27 July, a government crisis triggered by a possible no-confidence vote is unlikely. However, the split is likely to further put pressure on Netanyahu, who is already balancing pressures from home and abroad to end the war in Gaza, with calls from the far-right parties backing his government to continue the conflict until Hamas’ complete elimination.

Senegal’s sovereign credit rating downgraded

Concerns over the country’s debt levels, which stood at 118 per cent of GDP at the end of 2024, 14 per cent higher than its previous forecast, caused S&P Global to downgrade the country’s credit rating to B-. The reason for the ‘negative outlook’ rating is due to the increased funding pressures on the government caused by the high debt, and constitutes the second credit downgrade in five months. The credit downgrade could have significant economic impacts on Senegal’s economy in the medium-long term, with investors likely demanding higher interest rates, currency sell-offs raising the price of imports and driving inflation, and reduced foreign direct investment. This will almost certainly increase pressure on Senegalese citizens, increasing the cost of living, and could constitute a primary driver of civil unrest over the coming months.

Burkina Faso junta disbands electoral commission

Officials have called the commission a “waste of money” and transferred its responsibilities to the Interior Ministry. The current Burkina Faso junta took power in 2022, pledging a two-year transition to democracy. The transition period was then extended to 2029, and the latest move further cements the current military leadership’s control over the political system. Abolishing the electoral commission is unlikely to have significant political repercussions on the government, but it may further alienate the opposition and civil society organisations. While Ouagadougou has sought to quash dissent, including via forced disappearances or forced enlistment of journalists and critics, the junta almost certainly lacks the instruments to suppress dissenting voices completely. At the same time, the threat from the civil opposition is greatly overshadowed by the one posed by Islamist militant groups, which control large parts of Burkinabe territory.

President Biya announces he will seek eighth consecutive presidential term in Cameroon election

On 14 July, 92-year-old President Paul Biya announced that he plans to run for an eighth consecutive seven-year term in the 12 October presidential election. The announcement comes after members of the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) called for Biya to seek another term. Opposition parties and civil society groups, on the other hand, claim that Biya’s rule has stifled economic development and that the country requires democratic change. While two former allies have quit Biya’s ruling coalition to oppose him in the election, they will almost certainly struggle to succeed against the CPDM’s increasingly authoritarian rule. The CPDM has used its control of state institutions to suppress opposition parties and civil society and manipulate elections through the arbitrary arrest of opposition members, journalists, and civil society leaders, ballot box stuffing, and clandestine vote counting. Furthermore, the government typically responds to demonstrations with severe crackdowns, including internet shutdowns, arbitrary arrests, and violent suppression. Cameroon is marred by rampant youth unemployment and dissatisfaction, with 89 per cent of youth surveyed claiming that the country is going in the “wrong direction”. Furthermore, it has failed to implement reforms addressing the concerns of the Anglophone minority, which has given rise to armed separatist groups. Widespread civil unrest around the election is highly likely if the country’s youth are not deterred by heavy-handed security crackdowns, with a realistic possibility that such unrest could evolve into a broader anti-corruption movement opposing Biya’s rule.

Two shootings in one night in Nimes, France.

On the night of 10-11 July, two shootings occurred in the French city of Nimes, killing one and injuring another. The dynamics of the shootings, with attackers approaching on vehicles and shooting individuals near known drug-dealing points, make it highly likely that they are related to competition between rival organised criminal groups. A further shooting was recorded on 14 July, resulting in one injury. The latest case occurred in the same quarter where, in late June, six people were wounded in a shooting. Nimes, located near the southern coast of France, is likely increasingly at the centre of the ongoing gang conflict, also affecting Nice and Marseille, which has intensified since late 2024.

Two Palestinians, one with dual US citizenship, killed by settlers in the West Bank.

The two individuals were reportedly shot and beaten to death after a confrontation which occurred on the evening of 11 July, in the West Bank town of Sinjil. The killings are part of growing violence involving settler groups in the West Bank, which has increased exponentially since October 2023. Due to the nationality of one of the two killed, the case has triggered diplomatic backlash from Washington. On 14 July, Catholic and Orthodox Christian leaders released a joint condemnation of settler violence, following a series of firebombings that occurred in the West Bank town of Taybeh, northeast of Ramallah, on 7 July.

France ends permanent troop presence in Senegal.

On 17 July, France handed its final military facility over to the Senegalese government, signalling the end of its military presence in the country. The withdrawal, due to be completed by the end of 2025, comes after Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced in November 2024 that France’s military presence was incompatible with Senegalese sovereignty. Senegal marks the fifth country in West Africa to expel the French military from its territory in recent years, behind Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad. The withdrawal of the French army comes shortly after al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) conducted a coordinated offensive along several axes in Western Mali, including Kayes city, in July. While the attack was largely a failure, it demonstrates JNIM’s ambition to expand its presence close to the border with Senegal. JNIM have previously attempted to penetrate Senegal, with a UN Security Council report in February 2021 confirming that JNIM had infiltrated northeastern, eastern, and central Senegal, likely exploiting the country as a logistical corridor and recruitment base. The withdrawal of the French military, who had played a significant role in Senegalese counterterrorism operations, will almost certainly make it easier for JNIM to increase its presence in eastern regions of Senegal, a development that will increasingly threaten Senegal but also western Mali.

Azawad forces threaten offensive on Malian army and Russian positions.

On 17 July, channels associated with the Tuareg Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) released a communique to the civilian population in contested areas of the country, including Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu, and Tessalit, advising them to avoid areas near Russian African Corps or Malian army bases. The notice is likely a prelude to FLA operations in the area, possibly including direct attacks on government forces and its Russian allies. Moreover, it follows several setbacks for the Russian-Malian allies, including various attempts at deploying armoured columns to the country’s north that have failed, with junta forces suffering from severe attrition and almost constant small-scale ambushes.

At least 27 killed in gun attack on village in Central Nigeria.

On 14 July, assailants armed with guns and machetes attacked Tahoss, a village in the Riyom Local Government Area of Plateau State, killing at least 27. While no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, the victims were mostly farmers, and the attackers were likely Fulani herders, who have been engaged in a protracted conflict with the farmers since the early 2000s. The conflict stems from tensions between farming communities and nomadic herders. Farmers accuse herders of allowing their livestock to destroy crops, while herders claim that farmers are illegally cultivating land along grazing routes that were legally designated in 1965. The last attack occurred on 14 June, when armed assailants attacked the Yelewata farming community in the Benue region, killing at least 200 people. The frequency and deadliness of the attacks has increased in 2025, and further high-casualty attacks on villages in central Nigeria are highly likely.

SAF gains in Kordofan region in Sudan.

On 13 July, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) pushed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) out of Um Sumeima hours after the RSF claimed full control. Um Sumeima is approximately 65 kilometres west of the SAF-held El Obeid and 138 kilometres east of the RSF-controlled state capital of West Kordofan, Nahud, and constitutes the SAF’s most westward position on the main east-west highway. The RSF has intensified its attempts to capture several SAF-held territories in Kordofan and Darfur in 2025 to consolidate control over western Sudan. Control over Kordofan constitutes a major strategic goal for each side, with SAF control enabling a springboard into the RSF stronghold of Darfur. The RSF has increased its attacks on civilians, with the paramilitary killing over 450 civilians since 12 July in villages near Bara in North Kordofan as it attempts to displace communities and increase pressure on government-held areas. Further attacks on civilians are highly likely as the RSF continues to attempt to prevent the SAF’s advance into western Sudanese regions.

Ethiopian militants conduct cross-border attacks into disputed region of Sudan.

On 13 July, Ethiopian ‘Shifta’ (‘bandit’ or ‘outlaw’) militias conducted armed attacks on several border villages, including Baraka Noreen, Wad Arod, and Wad Koli in the Al-Fashaga border region. The perpetrators were from the Amhara ethnic group and opened fire on civilians before looting cows, tractors, and sheep. They then withdrew back into Ethiopian territory, according to witnesses. The attacks coincided with the start of the rainy season, when residents begin planting crops. Al-Fashaga, bordering Ethiopia’s Tigray region, is one of Sudan’s most fertile agricultural regions and is subject to an ongoing dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia. Al-Fashaga has seen significant activity from Ethiopian militias, who in some cases have moved into the contested farmland, forcing out local farmers. Mubarak Al-Nour, Deputy Chairman of the Eastern Sudan Coordination Council, has accused the Ethiopian army of supporting militias to retake land that was previously retaken by Sudan’s military in 2020, following the onset of the Tigray conflict. However, this is unlikely given the ongoing conflict between Ethiopian security forces and Amhara militants. While the dispute over the border region had been set aside amid internal instability in both countries, the Sudanese government’s preoccupation with the civil war, as well as a fracturing of Tigray’s leadership in 2025, has almost certainly provided an opportunity for Amhara militants to claim territory along the border. Further cross-border attacks are highly likely and will almost certainly exacerbate Sudan’s food insecurity, which has already reached a level of over 25 million people suffering from acute hunger, according to UN reporting.

Ethiopia arrests almost 100 Islamic State militants

On 16 July, Ethiopia announced that it had arrested 82 suspected militants linked to the Islamic State Somalia (ISS) affiliate, which operates primarily in the Puntland region of Somalia. According to the National Intelligence Security Services (NISS), the suspects were trained and deployed to carry out attacks within Ethiopia and were attempting to establish sleeper cells across the country. The arrests are almost certainly indicative of ISS’ intent to expand cross-border operations and networks outside of its primary area of operations in Somalia.  The arrests may also be reflective of a long-term strategy to establish improved ground lines of communication from the Horn of Africa to other Islamic State affiliates on the African continent. ISS has significantly expanded in recent years, largely due to an influx of revenue and foreign fighters, many of whom come from the Middle East, potentially signalling a directive from the Islamic State’s central leadership to shift international focus and resources away from the Levant.  

ADF conduct multiple attacks in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

On 12 July, reports emerged of Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) assaults on several towns near the border between Irumu and Beni in North Kivu, killing at least 40 civilians. According to a survivor who fled to Oïcha, the attacks occurred between 6 and 9 July and targeted Katerain, Bayeyi, Matoko, Masia, and the surrounding areas. The attacks happened after a lull in ADF violence in the region, which had enabled residents to move deeper into the countryside primarily for agricultural reasons. According to survivor accounts, ADF fighters told locals in villages near Oïcha that it targeted civilians as a response to Operation Shujaa’s recent offensive and that survivors should “tell the security forces that they were ready to respond to any threat”. The attacks were almost certainly reprisal killings for the shelling of the largest ADF camp near Lolwa on 6 July by Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) and Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). According to a UPDF spokesperson, the offensive drove the ADF’s most important subgroup out of the camp. Despite the increased operations since 20 June, the security vacuum left by FARDC’s ongoing conflict with AFC/M23 in North and South Kivu has almost certainly been exploited by the ADF, suggesting further attacks are likely.

Three Kenyan soldiers killed by IED attack near Somali border

On 16 July, at least three Kenyan soldiers were killed by an improvised explosive device (IED) while on patrol near Kiunga, close to the Somali border, according to the Kenya Defence Forces. The al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist group, al-Shabaab (AS), operates in the area, and while it has not formally claimed responsibility for the attack, AS quickly reported on it, likely suggesting its involvement. AS controls large parts of southern and central Somalia, where there is limited state presence, and has been conducting an offensive against government forces since February 2025. The group has intensified its cross-border attacks into Kenya in recent months and is highly likely attempting to pressure the Kenyan government into withdrawing from peacekeeping operations in Somalia under the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) umbrella.

Wildfires ongoing in Toledo, Spain

A fire that broke out in the town of Méntrida in Toledo Province and spread towards the southwest of the community of Madrid has now been reported as “enclosed and under control,” with favourable progress being made by firefighting crews. Despite the containment, crews remain on site to ensure the situation remains stable. The fire had previously burned over 7,400 acres and led to the evacuation of up to 50 people. Earlier, the blaze had forced the closure of the A-5 highway and prompted lockdown and protective measures in the Calypo Fado residential area.

Wildfires ongoing in Macedonia and Thrace in Greece

Greece is currently battling multiple wildfires across the Macedonia and Thrace region. A new forest fire has emerged in Kato Scholari, Thessaloniki. Emergency services are also addressing a wildfire near Kallifitos, where residential buildings are reportedly not under threat. Meanwhile, a rescue operation is ongoing for an injured woman on Mount Olympus. In Pefkochori, firefighters have successfully extinguished a wildfire near a hotel. Efforts continue in Paliampela and Mesaio, where fires have broken out in low vegetation areas, though no residential properties are at risk. Earlier, a wildfire on Thasos island was contained after causing power outages and road closures.

Fire at supermarket in al-Kut, Iraq kills at least 77

An overnight fire at a supermarket in al-Kut, Iraq, has resulted in a significant loss of life. Initial reports indicated that around 50 people were killed, but the death toll has since risen. The latest updates suggest that at least 77 people have died due to the fire, with most fatalities attributed to suffocation from smoke. Additionally, 40 individuals have been reported injured. Efforts by local authorities and firefighters have led to the rescue of approximately 45 people from the building. The governor has been quoted as stating that they have “filed lawsuits against the owner of the building and the mall”. It is highly likely that poor building standards have significantly exacerbated the fire. The government has launched an investigation into the cause of the fire and has announced three days of mourning.

On 14 July, Pakistan’s State Minister for the Interior, Talal Chaudhry, announced that a new paramilitary force would be created. The new force will convert the Frontier Constabulary, an existing paramilitary force that is largely deployed to the tribal northwest and Afghan border, into a new force named the Federal Constabulary. The Federal Constabulary’s remit will be to maintain law and order, counter-terrorism, riot control, to supplement law enforcement agencies, and carry out a range of other duties that are yet to be fully clarified. The government is also considering giving the new force full policing powers to be used at its discretion.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The creation of the Federal Constabulary has resulted in widespread concern from opposition parties and human rights groups in Pakistan. Many have expressed fears that the new paramilitary force, created without parliamentary approval, will be used as a tool to target political opponents of the incumbent government led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and dominated by elements of Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment. The Federal Constabulary’s broad and ambiguously defined mandate likely suggests it may be used by the central government to target political rivals under the official guise of maintaining order.

The force’s formation follows two years of state-led repression against the main opposition party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by imprisoned former prime minister Imran Khan. The timing of the force’s creation precedes PTI-led protests by only a matter of days. There is a realistic possibility that the new force’s first major deployment will be to counter the current 90-day PTI-led protests, which are demanding the release of Khan and are set to culminate on 5 August. Moreover, the Federal Constabulary is derived from a paramilitary force most experienced in quelling unrest in Pakistan’s tribal northwest and along the Afghan border, areas historically associated with militancy or terrorism rather than civilian protest. The new force is unlikely to be well-trained or experienced in de-escalation or crowd control, or have robust protocols for dealing with political protests. This will likely increase the likelihood of violence during political demonstrations in Pakistan’s urban centres, especially if protest activity escalates or if the Federal Constabulary uses excessive force.

There is also a realistic possibility that the reconstitution of the Frontier Constabulary into the Federal Constabulary will force a reallocation of critical resources and experience away from Pakistan’s restless tribal areas and border regions. This would likely provide militant groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Balochi separatist groups with more operational freedom and could weaken Pakistan’s counterterrorism posture in these regions. In the long term, this could overstretch Pakistan’s internal security and result in an escalation of attacks in these regions.

From 9 to 11 July, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) conducted a province-wide offensive in Pakistan’s restless Balochistan province, referred to as Operation Baam. According to senior figures within the BLF, the highly coordinated offensive included 84 attacks across multiple districts, targeting Pakistani military installations, intelligence assets, checkpoints, and economic infrastructure, including convoys associated with Pakistan’s extractive industries and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The BLF claims that the operation resulted in the deaths of over 50 government troops or paramilitary forces and over 50 injuries, and damaged government infrastructure, surveillance capabilities and other symbols of state control. The Pakistani government responded by imposing curfews, conducting mass arrests, implementing internet shutdowns, and heightened security measures, especially in urban centres such as Quetta.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The scale and coordination of the offensive likely suggest a marked increase in the BLF’s operational capabilities, and that the government has limited control in large parts of Balochistan. BLF militants reportedly engaged government forces in broad daylight, were able to establish 22 temporary checkpoints, and received significant support from the civilian community, suggesting the BLF is deeply embedded within local communities. The BLF also claims to have killed at least nine intelligence operatives linked to Military Intelligence (MI) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which may indicate that the group has penetrated state security organisations or is receiving actionable intelligence from the local community, a development that would represent a major state intelligence failure, and one that would likely improve the BLF’s targeting of high-value targets in future operations.

The BLF is framing the offensive as a symbolic victory against what it perceives as colonial rule, as well as an expansion of its military capabilities. The success of the operation will likely increase BLF recruitment and embolden both the local population and other Baloch separatist groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). The name of the operation, Baam, a term that refers to the first light of dawn in the Balochi language, has likely been chosen to portray the offensive as a new phase in BLF resistance, characterised by increased coordination, operational reach and popular legitimacy. This likely indicates that further large-scale attacks are being planned and that the BLF are more confident in their ability to challenge the state, which could embolden the group to conduct more attacks outside of their traditional area of operations in Balochistan. The targeting of CPEC assets is likely reflective of the BLF’s opposition to Beijing’s economic projects in Balochistan and will likely increase calls in China to increase security in the region, which has consistently signalled its intent to deploy private military contractors or even conventional armed forces to the area to protect its interests.

Compromise agreement to establish a State of New Caledonia within the French Republic.

The President of France, Emmanuel Macron, announced on 12 July that an agreement had been reached to establish a “State of New Caledonia” within the French Republic, pending a referendum scheduled for February 2026. In what has been called the Bougival Accord, the proposal will create an unprecedented political entity that grants New Caledonia significant autonomy while maintaining ties to France.

The Bougival Accord, which required significant concessions from all the negotiating parties, followed severe civil unrest in May 2024, which resulted in at least 14 deaths, EUR 2 billion in damages, and the stranding of hundreds of foreign nationals whose evacuation efforts were complicated by the closure of the international airport. While some prominent pro-independence leaders and the Kanak and Socialist Liberation Front (FLNKS) have expressed cautious optimism, there has been condemnation of the agreement from some civil society activist leaders from within New Caledonia. Fundamentally, the agreement is a promising development for reducing the risk of civil unrest in New Caledonia.

However, there remain several hurdles to its successful implementation, including France’s own polarised domestic politics and the need for the endorsement of the National Assembly, the February 2026 referendum, and the need for both pro-independence and loyalist leaders to convince their bases of the compromises made. Opponents have also suggested that this will set a precedent for other overseas French departments, warning that violent civil unrest will now likely be seen as a way to achieve more independence.

Cambodian prime minister declares introduction of mandatory conscription in 2026.

On 14 July, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet declared that mandatory military conscription would be implemented in 2026. The law, which was passed in 2006 but never activated, will be compulsory for men aged between 18 and 30, but voluntary for women. The statement comes amid heightened tensions between Cambodia and neighbouring Thailand following a border skirmish in the disputed Emerald Triangle region that killed one Cambodian soldier on 28 May. The dispute has since escalated, triggering a closure of the shared border and leading to a political crisis in Thailand, whose prime minister has been suspended. Hun Manet has also called for an increase in the military budget as well as for Thailand to reopen all border crossings without conditions. There is a realistic possibility that this will trigger protests in Phnom Penh, although the majority of the population will likely perceive the move as an acceptable policy in the face of Thai aggression.

Killing of trader in Dhaka, Bangladesh, sparks protests, highlights mob violence dynamics.

Lal “Sohag” Chand was beaten to death in broad daylight on 9 July by a mob of up to 20 people, with a video of his killing being shared on social media. Local media reported that members of “Jubo Dal”, the youth wing of the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP), were responsible for the killing, their motive being the group’s interest in taking control of the scrap trade in the Mitford area of Old Dhaka. Several student groups in Dhaka have held protests accusing the BNP of failing to prevent the attack, and of sponsoring mob violence since the August Revolution. After the fall of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League (AL) party, opposition parties and groups likely were granted an important window of opportunity. The development is likely not only political, as AL controlled several local businesses, from public transport to commerce, via systems of bribes and clientelism. The party’s fall created an economic vacuum, which these groups are almost certainly seeking to fill, and the recent killing likely forms part of this dynamic. Further cases of mob violence driven by this type of competition remain highly likely, and will likely trigger unrest or retaliatory violence.

Attack on monastery in Myanmar’s Sagaing kills at least 23.

On 11 July, a junta strike on a monastery in Lintalu in Myanmar’s Sagaing region killed at least 23 people, including four children, and injured at least 30. The monastery acted as a haven for approximately 200 people displaced by nearby fighting between the Tatmadaw (junta forces) and pro-democracy militias, and is situated 35 kilometres northwest of Mandalay. The primary areas that were damaged in the 28 March earthquake that struck near Mandalay were government-held, providing an opportunity for rebel forces to exploit this. The junta has almost certainly tried to counter this weakness, increasing its security presence in Mandalay and conducting offensives in the broader region to uproot ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). Critics have accused the junta of deliberately targeting buildings used to shelter civilians. The targeting of the monastery was highly likely a deliberate attempt to increase pressure on EAOs in the region by cutting off safe havens and punishing civilian support.

At least 60 killed and 300 injured in monsoon-related incidents in Pakistan.

Authorities issued an emergency notice in Punjab after more than 60 people were killed and nearly 300 others injured in monsoon-related incidents over 24 hours between 16 and 17 July. The Pakistani authorities have issued evacuation warnings for residents in low-lying areas along the Lai Nullah River in Rawalpindi due to heavy flooding. Additionally, there are reports of major flooding in Chakwal, where several cars were trapped in floodwaters, and rescue operations are underway. The disaster management agency has reported a nationwide death toll of at least 111 people since the onset of the monsoon rains on 25 June. The meteorological department had previously issued a flood threat for Rawalpindi until 31 August due to predicted heavy rainfall. The situation remains critical, with further warnings of potential flooding, landslides, and rising river levels across various regions, including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Balochistan.

Heavy rains in South Korea’s central and southern regions.

Heavy rains have severely impacted South Korea’s central and southern regions, with authorities issuing multiple advisories and evacuation orders. In North Gyeongsang Province, precautionary evacuations have been ordered in Andong City due to landslide risks. A heavy rain advisory has been issued for six additional areas in Gyeonggi Province, including Bucheon, and all of Seoul, with forecasts predicting up to 110 millimetres of rainfall over the next 12 hours. Sancheong County in South Gyeongsang Province and several areas near Ablyang bridge in Gyeongsang City have also seen evacuations due to flooding. In South Chungcheong, landslides have caused injuries to at least five people and have resulted in fatalities in Cheongyang, Jeongan, Sejong, and Daejeon. The government has issued a level 3 alert amid ongoing flooding, with approximately 1,000 people evacuated from affected areas. In Busan, a heavy rain advisory is in place, and warnings have been issued for 13 cities in Gyeongnam Province. The rising water levels of the Jungnangcheon river have led to evacuations in Gwangju, and flood warnings are active in Gongju and Omokcheon. Rescue operations are ongoing, with two people recently rescued from a landslide in Cheongyang.

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