On 8 January, the US Senate advanced a war powers resolution that would restrict President Trump’s ability to conduct further military action against Venezuela without explicit Congressional approval, following the operation that led to the capture of President Maduro. The vote passed 52–47, with five Republicans joining all Democrats in support. The vote was only procedural and largely symbolic, but has widely been interpreted as an official rebuke of President Trump’s unilateral action. The passing of the procedural vote ensures that the Senate will hold a final vote on the resolution; however, even if the final vote passes in the Senate, it will require approval in the House of Representatives, which is controlled by the Republicans, and then would be presented to President Trump, who is expected to veto the resolution. Overriding the presidential veto would require a two-thirds majority in both the House and Senate.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The bipartisan vote in the Senate has likely served as an official reproach of President Trump and has messaged congressional disproval with the Trump administration’s unilateral military actions in Venezuela. However, the resolution’s likelihood of becoming law remains low, with the prospect of both houses securing a two-thirds majority to overturn a presidential veto highly unlikely. In the unlikely event that the resolution does pass, it is likely to have minimal effect on the current US strategy toward Venezuela, as the capture of President Maduro has likely significantly reduced the likelihood of further direct military action on Venezuelan soil, barring a major escalation.

The Trump administration’s current strategy is increasingly focusing on economic and maritime coercion. US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has continued targeting vessels alleged to be smuggling narcotics, and more importantly, has now seized eight oil tankers suspected of belonging to Venezuela’s “dark fleet”. This activity is likely to expand, with Washington recently filing for court warrants to seize dozens more tankers linked to the Venezuelan oil trade, with the exact number unclear as the filings and legal orders are not public. Moreover, the resolution is unlikely to affect US seizures of tankers or interdictions of narcotics-linked vessels in international waters, as these actions do not constitute hostilities against a sovereign state. Venezuelan-linked oil tankers have also operated under false flags and opaque ownership structures, further diluting formal attribution to Venezuela. Furthermore, neither the seizure of oil tankers nor operations targeting narcotics-smuggling vessels fall under war-powers authorities, but are conducted under different law-enforcement or sanctions frameworks. Sustained maritime pressure on Caracas is likely to force the new Venezuelan administration into making concessions aimed at securing economic relief. Caracas has already released hundreds of political prisoners, including US citizens, and has redirected sanctioned crude exports toward the US market, granted licensed access to US firms, and is allowing oil revenues to be handled under US oversight. This has already significantly decreased Venezuelan oil exports to China, with two Chinese-flagged supertankers en route to Venezuela to pick up debt-paying crude cargoes being forced to make U-turns due to the de facto US embargo. These developments likely indicate that Washington’s immediate strategy is rooted in negotiated compliance rather than full regime change.

On 11 January, President Paz agreed to repeal Decree 5503, which was introduced on 17 December 2025 and resulted in almost immediate nationwide protests due to its removal of government subsidies on fuel, effectively doubling the price of both petrol and diesel. Following the decision, the Bolivian Workers’ Centre (COB), the largest union in the country, announced an end to its national strike and protest mobilisation in response to the government’s decision to repeal the decree. On 12 January, the Unified Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) also instructed its members to lift all road blockades.

In place of Decree 5503, the government of President Rodrigo Paz Pereira has enacted Supreme Decree 5516, a 32-article transitional decree that replaces key elements of the previous economic package. The new decree includes expanded social protection, some economic support measures, wage increases and several other measures aimed at appeasing the unions. However, the new decree has not reversed the removal of fuel subsidies, with the revised fuel pricing regime remaining in force.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the repealing of Decree 5503 has been welcomed by several of the major trade union groups, roadblocks have continued in several parts of the country,especially in the Cochabamba Department, a traditional stronghold of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) party and home to a high concentration of Indigenous communities. This is likely in response to the refusal to reintroduce government fuel subsidies. This decision has exacerbated the cost-of-living crisis, particularly in rural areas where communities are more dependent on fuel for both transport and agriculture, and may influence transport unions to sustain protests. More radical unions and protest movements have already rejected the reforms, arguing that they do not offset the inflationary pressures caused by the suspension of fuel subsidies.

Sustained protests and roadblocks are likely to be most active in the Cochabamba Department, a traditional hub for unions and Indigenous groups. The department is also a longstanding stronghold for the Movement for Socialism (MAS), which originally introduced the fuel subsidies and is firmly opposed to the new right-leaning government. While this is only one department of Bolivia, the Cochabamba Department is a geographic chokepoint located at the centre of Bolivia’s road network, linking the political centre of La Paz and El Alto to the economic centre of Santa Cruz, as well as connecting the western highlands and eastern lowlands. Even if protests subside elsewhere, large-scale protests and roadblocks in the Cochabamba Department can disrupt national transport corridors, resulting in nationwide effects, potentially leading to shortages, supply chain disruption and inflationary pressures.

Bolivia has experienced at least four major waves of nationwide protests and roadblocks in the last five years, which have resulted in disruption, widespread violence and prolonged economic and political instability. The effectiveness of mass mobilisation and transport blockades in shaping government policy likely indicates that they will become an established tactic of both the opposition and unions. With President Paz on course to reverse many of the decisions of past left-wing governments and attempting to reduce the fiscal deficit, it is highly likely that similar large-scale protest movements will be used in response to future reform measures introduced by the new right-wing government.

Anti-ICE protests continue across the United States after Minneapolis killing.

In the week since the 7 January killing of Renee Good by a federal agent, protests against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents have continued across several US states, with up to 1,000 separate demonstrations recorded. Unrest turned violent at several locations, with police deploying pepper spray, tear gas, and rubber bullets. In Minneapolis, which has remained the epicentre of the unrest, 29 people were arrested on 8 January, and a further eight people were detained on 13 January. On 8 January, a protester was reportedly blinded in one eye after being hit by a rubber bullet during a demonstration in Santa Ana, California.  On 9 January, large-scale protests occurred in Los Angeles, which resulted in road blockades and “several arrests”, as per local authorities. On 14 January, ICE agents reportedly shot and injured a Venezuelan national during an attempted arrest. Protests are highly likely to continue over the 15-17 January period. Following the weekend, there is a realistic possibility that the protests will enter a “cycle”, increasing in intensity during the weekends and decreasing during the rest of the week.

Venezuelan interim government begins releasing political prisoners, process criticised by NGOs.

In a policy initially announced on 8 January, the Venezuelan interim government has released dozens of imprisoned political prisoners. On 13 January, a US State Department official welcomed the release of detained Americans in Venezuela. Although the number of released American detainees has not been confirmed, the number is estimated to be at least four. At least five Spanish citizens have been confirmed to have been freed. Overall, the interim government claimed on 12 January that 116 prisoners had been released, in contrast to Venezuelan human rights groups who have confirmed only 56 and have criticised the lack of government transparency over the releases. There are estimated to be over 800 political prisoners in Venezuela.

Venezuela’s new acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, almost certainly seeks to ward off further military action by the US Trump administration. Rodríguez has vowed to continue the releases, but has criticised NGOs for “lying” and “trying to sell falsehoods”. It is likely that the interim government will prioritise the release of foreign and dual nationals, and continue to obfuscate the release of Venezuelan political prisoners. While the interim government will highly likely act to avoid triggering further US military action, the threat environment in Venezuela for foreign nationals should still be considered severe due to the remaining widespread presence of far-left paramilitary groups called colectivos.

Two-day public transport strike in Peru over extortion levels.

Transport unions in Peru announced a two-day strike on 13 and 14 January in protest of a recent surge in violence and extortion against drivers of public transport. According to Union leaders, over 22,000 public transport vehicles were set to cease operations in Lima and Callao during the strike. The spike in violence against public transport workers has been largely driven by local gangs, who demand regular payments from transport companies, drivers, and crews, resorting to violence if they refuse.

According to the Peruvian Public Prosecutor’s Observatorio de Criminalidad (Crime Observatory), at least 65 transport workers had been killed between August 2024 and October 2025 in Lima and Callao alone. The recently appointed President José Jerí implemented a 30-day state of emergency on 22 October, which has been extended multiple times, to deal with the rising extortion and homicide levels. While officials from the Peruvian National Police (PNP) have reported short-term victories such as more detentions and increased seizures of weapons and illegal items, independent reporting shows continued high levels of violence, with a failure to reduce the levels of homicides or attacks on transport workers. Further transport strikes are highly likely.

Honduras lawmaker injured in grenade attack.

On 8 January, Gladis Aurora Lopez, the vice president of the National Congress of Honduras, was injured after an improvised explosive device (IED) was thrown at her as she answered journalists’ questions outside parliament. Despite the attack occurring in one of the most heavily policed parts of Tegucigalpa and being filmed by television crews at the scene, the perpetrator was able to escape and has not been identified as of 15 January.

Five severed heads found on Ecuador tourist beach.

On 11 January, local residents discovered five severed heads displayed on ropes attached to a wooden structure on the Puerto López beachfront, a popular tourist location. A sign had been placed next to the heads threatening the same fate for anyone stealing from and extorting fishermen, stating “[t]he town belongs to us. Keep robbing fishermen and demanding vaccine cards, we already have you identified.” Police identified the heads as having belonged to five men reported missing days earlier. Puerto López is part of Manabi province, which is one of the nine out of 24 provinces subjected to an ongoing state of emergency imposed due to rising levels of gang violence.

A massacre two weeks prior had taken place in Puerto López, prompting increased levels of security in the village. It is highly likely that the village comprises part of a turf war between two rival gangs battling for control of drug-trafficking routes, and the heads were placed there by one of the gangs. A reprisal attack is likely. 2025 was Ecuador’s deadliest year in the country’s history, with a 47 per cent increase in homicides between January and June compared to the same period in 2024. The state of emergency has done little to slow the violence, and it will highly likely continue at an elevated pace in 2026.

Wildfires in Argentina’s Patagonia burn nearly 15,000 hectares.

Large wildfires in the Patagonia region of Argentina have continued, with authorities on 14 January declaring a state of catastrophe in Epuyén after wildfires burned more than half of the municipality. Overall, the wildfires have burned nearly 15,000 hectares, 12,000 being in Chubut Province. Multiple claims of the sources of the fires, which have included an indigenous Mapuche incendiary attack, and an Israeli M26 grenade, have been refuted by authorities and fact-checking platforms.

The fires began on 5 January near the tourist area of  Puerto Patriada, and have resulted in preventative evacuations, the destruction of homes, and considerable disruptions to power and water services in affected areas. Due to the high degree of misinformation being shared regarding the cause of the fires, there is a realistic possibility of the fires resulting in ‘retaliatory’ violence against Jewish or Indigenous communities.

Overnight 8-9 January, Russian forces conducted large-scale strikes against Ukraine, primarily targeting Kyiv Oblast. The combined strike package involved 36 missiles and 242 one-way attack drones and decoys. Notably, the attack also used an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), with footage suggesting that it targeted the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant in Lviv City, and most likely carried “dummy warheads” that nonetheless reached hypersonic speed and released significant kinetic energy. In Kyiv City, the strikes resulted in at least four deaths and mass energy outages, with Ukraine’s largest private energy company DTEK stating that 417,000 households were disconnected from electricity. Kyiv’s mayor, Vitali Klitschko, said that nearly half of Kyiv’s apartment buildings were left without heating.  Some of the worst-hit neighbourhoods of Kyiv were reportedly left without power for three days in a row.

Overnight 12-13 January, Russian forces launched the largest combined strike package in the New Year thus far, with approximately 300 attack/drones and 25 missiles targeting eight Ukrainian regions. The main targets were energy-generation facilities and substations. Emergency power cuts occurred in Kyiv, as well as in the Chernihiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions. DTEK reported that the attack heavily damaged equipment at a thermal power plant (TPP) in Odesa City, leaving 46,000 households without power. The CEO of the state-owned transmission system operator Ukrenergo stated that about 70 per cent of Kyiv City was left without power.

Overnight 13-14 January, Russian forces conducted another set of strikes with three missiles and 113 attack drones/decoys, particularly against Kryvyi Rih. Local authorities reported that 45,000 customers were temporarily cut from power, and 700 buildings were disconnected from heating.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Russian Ministry of Defence claims that the use of Oreshnik was carried out in response to the alleged attempt by Ukrainian forces to attack Russian President Vladimir Putin’s presidential residence on 29 December. There has been no verified evidence that such an attack took place. The highly likely falsely alleged attack against Putin’s residence was almost certainly used by the Kremlin to attempt to disrupt progress in Ukraine’s negotiations with its allies, which included the strongest security guarantees yet proposed for Ukraine.

The Oreshnik IRBM, in service since 2024, carries multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). It is exceptionally challenging to intercept as it travels through the upper atmosphere, and the MIRVs can each reach hypersonic speeds after Oreshnik re-enters the Earth’s atmosphere. While other Russian missiles regularly used against Ukraine can be nuclear-armed, such as the Iskander-M and Kh-101, the Oreshnik almost certainly has a far higher symbolically implied nuclear threat, with MIRVs having been developed specifically for nuclear deterrence.

The first use of Oreshnik occurred in November 2024, also using dummy warheads, with Putin claiming that the strike was carried out in response to Ukraine being permitted to use Western-provided ATACMS and Storm Shadow against targets inside Russian territory. The use of Oreshnik with dummy warheads very expensively provides only a limited kinetic effect. However, the Kremlin almost certainly uses Oreshnik as a means of symbolic deterrence with an implied nuclear threat, without having to resort to a tactical nuclear strike. The recent use not only follows the Coalition of the Willing Paris summit, but also the seizure of a Venezuela-linked and Russian-flagged oil tanker by the US, and the Oreshnik’s deployment is likely linked to these events. Moreover, the targeting of Lviv in western Ukraine, only 50km from the NATO-member Poland’s border, was likely strategically chosen to send the strongest message of deterrence against Ukraine’s allies.

On the ground in Ukraine, the most critical effect of the large-scale Russian strikes over the past week has been the sheer impact of strikes against energy infrastructure, coinciding with a cold snap that has seen temperatures drop to as low as -19 degrees Celsius at night. Ukrainian air defence is almost certainly struggling to comprehensively intercept the combined strike packages, particularly ballistic missiles. For example, the 12-13 January attack involved 18 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 air defence missiles, and seven Iskander-K cruise missiles, with only two of the Iskander-M/S-300s intercepted compared to five of the Iskander-Ks. Many Ukrainians are resorting to backup generators and portable gas stoves for heating.

However, while Russian forces have always increased strikes against Ukrainian energy in the run-up to and during winter since 2022, the currently sustained campaign almost certainly poses the greatest challenge yet. Freezing temperatures and a lack of heating for several days in a row threaten a humanitarian catastrophe in cities like Kyiv, and Klitschko urged residents in Kyiv who can temporarily leave the city for places with alternative sources of power and heat to do so. The Russian campaign against Ukrainian energy is highly likely aimed at crushing the morale of the civilian population and an attempt to create an exodus from Kyiv.

On 14 January, US officials announced the beginning of “phase two” of the peace deal between Israel and the Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip. During the first phase of the deal, Hamas released the last remaining living hostages, as well as the remains of those who died in captivity, while Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units withdrew from some positions in Gaza, and allowed for a sharp surge in the entry of aid. The second stage of the plan aims to demilitarise the Gaza Strip, disarm Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups, and begin the transition towards a civilian administration, coordinated via the Civil Military Coordination Center (CMCC).

On the eve of the announcement, international media reported that Hamas has begun debates to elect a new political chairman, the first after Yahya Sinwar was killed in Rafah in October 2024. According to observers, the two leading candidates, Khalil Al-Hayya and Khaled Meshaal, are both based in Qatar.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The second stage of the ceasefire is likely to encounter significant difficulties. Hamas has been almost certainly severely weakened by more than two years of conflict. It has, however, carried out efforts to rearm and to replenish its manpower with new recruits from the civilian population. Moreover, despite the group’s stated openness to the peace plan, Hamas almost certainly retains a fundamental interest in remaining the premier power in the Gaza Strip. Recent incidents, such as the 12 January ambush of a Hamas police chief in the southern Gaza Strip, which was reportedly carried out by a rival clan, are likely to reinforce the group’s reluctance to completely disarm.

Moreover, despite the ceasefire, Israeli forces continue to carry out strikes on suspected militant infrastructure, and both sides frequently report ceasefire violations leading to casualties. According to the Gaza Health Ministry, at least 450 people have been killed during military operations since the ceasefire, and more than 1200 have been wounded.

The choice of the group’s next chairman is likely to be an important signal of Hamas’ strategic priorities. Meshaal is considered to be a “pragmatist”, with deep ties to regional Sunni powers. Moreover, he is not a native of Gaza, having never lived in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Hayya has positive relations with the other Palestinian factions and with Iran.

Widespread anti-government protests in Iran, which began in late December 2025, have escalated into one of the deadliest nationwide crackdowns in years, with activist groups reporting thousands of protesters killed and over 18,000 detained.  Current death tolls range from over 2,000 to 12,000, with the accurate flow of information out of Iran significantly restrained by the regime’s suspension of internet access, jamming of satellite communications, and strict controls on foreign media.

US President Donald Trump has issued multiple warnings to Iran in response to the killing or potential execution of protestors, indicating that the US is “locked and loaded and ready to go”, although has refrained from stating what action would be taken. On 15 January, the Pentagon ordered the redeployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the Middle East from the South China Sea, and both the US and UK have conducted a limited withdrawal of personnel from the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Tehran has threatened retaliation against US and Israeli interests if it is attacked and has warned of pre-emptive strikes on US regional bases.

Solace Global Assessment: 

President Trump has warned Iran multiple times against the killing or execution of protesters and has signalled his intent on using direct military action. However, the US likely does not have the military assets in theatre as of 15 January to ensure it has both an effective large-scale strike capability and credible deterrence. While the US has multiple air bases located throughout the Middle East, these installations are fixed, vulnerable targets that would likely be exposed to Iranian missile, drone and proxy attacks in the event of escalation. Most importantly, the US relies on permission from its Arab partners to operate from regional bases in an offensive capacity. While many Arab partners would likely want to see regime change in Iran, it is unlikely that they would authorise their territory to be used for direct strikes against Iran in response to an internal issue, due to the risk of retaliation and domestic reactions.

During the June 2025 12-day war between Iran and Israel, where the US bombed Iran’s nuclear programme, it had three CSGs in range of Iran. The US currently has no CSGs in theatre, with the closest deployed CSG being the USS Abraham Lincoln CSG in the South China Sea. The redeployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln CSG, which involves three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers armed with a range of offensive and defensive systems, including Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (LACMS), will almost certainly increase Washington’s strike and deterrence capability, while increasing the credibility and likelihood of US military action. However, the redeployment of the CSG is likely to take several days, and Washington may want to have at least two CSGs in theatre before it commits to direct military action. The future movements of additional US CSGs to the region would likely be a stronger indicator and warning of impending US military action and substantially increase the credibility of US threats.

Moreover, an attack on the Iranian regime itself rather than the nuclear programme would likely be interpreted in Tehran as an existential threat and would likely provoke a major retaliation and risk a regional escalation. An escalation may also affect the success of the current Gaza peace plan, which is one of President Trump’s key foreign policy priorities. President Trump has publicly stated that the violence has stopped in Iran and that Iranian sources have stated that the execution of protestors will not take place. This may be an early indication that the Trump administration is attempting to de-escalate and avoid immediate military action in favour of non-kinetic options.

In Iran, the protests have almost certainly been interpreted as a genuine threat to the regime. The scale of the crackdown, marked by unprecedented levels of lethal force and mass arrests, has resulted in death tolls surpassing those of the 2019 and 2022-23 protests in a much shorter time frame. Internal sources suggest that this has resulted in a restoration of regime control in major urban areas and a decrease in large-scale street protests. There is a realistic possibility that protest activity will shift toward more decentralised, low-visibility forms of resistance with lower death tolls and a reduced likelihood of US intervention.

On 13 January, two days before the 15 January general election, Uganda’s communications authority ordered all service providers to suspend internet access. The decision was justified in terms of public safety, to prevent “online misinformation, disinformation [and] electoral fraud… as well as preventing [the] incitement of violence”. The move comes after the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) announced that speculation regarding the suspension of the internet was “mere rumours”.

Polling is close between Incumbent President Yoweri Museveni of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and primary challenger Robert Ssentamu (Bobi Wine) of the National Unity Platform (NUP). A poll of 34,000 people conducted on 2 January placed Museveni as polling at 39.9 per cent, narrowly leading Wine, who stands at 39.8 per cent, by 0.1 percentage point. However, the elections have been criticised as unfree and unfair, with the odds weighted in favour of Museveni winning his seventh term in office.

As of the morning of 15 January, despite polling being due to open at 07:00 local time, many polling station openings have been delayed, which has been blamed on failures of biometric identification kits as well as internet outages. The issues are reportedly affecting both pro- and anti-government areas.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Cutting the internet has been used in Uganda in recent years during elections or periods of heightened tension. During the 2021 general elections, the internet was suspended for over a week amid widespread civil unrest. The internet has almost certainly been pre-emptively cut to prevent the spread of footage of security forces using excessive force, the spread of anti-government sentiment, and the organising of mass rallies on social media.

Major youth protests have erupted in recent years in the neighbouring Tanzania and Kenya, as well as numerous other African countries, including Morocco, Madagascar, and Angola. All have relied on the internet to varying degrees to organise widespread nationwide demonstrations against the government. Museveni’s government has almost certainly learned from these demonstrations and is highly likely hoping that preventing internet access will halt the spread of anti-government sentiment.

In the background of the election are expectations that Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is expected to take over the presidency should the 81-year-old president fail to complete his term in office. Kainerugaba is a four-star general and top military commander, in charge of Uganda’s most powerful institution. Critics of Museveni have called on Kainerugaba to conduct a military coup to seize power from his father. Kainerugaba has previously threatened to behead Wine and called for him to be hanged, and Wine has accused his army of having “largely taken over the election”, inflicting violence on Wine’s supporters. Kainerugaba’s control of the military almost certainly heightens the risk of a military coup should major nationwide civil unrest break out or in the unlikely scenario that Wine wins the presidency.

Widespread youth frustration persists in Uganda, and protests are likely should Museveni be re-elected or if footage of security forces using excessive force be widely shared on social media. If civil unrest breaks out, demonstrations are likely around the Central Business District and near government buildings; during the brief July 2024 anti-corruption protests, groups marched through Kampala towards the parliament building but were blocked by the security forces. Large anti-government protests would highly likely result in travel disruptions, with security forces likely to use roadblocks to prevent protesters from accessing government buildings and diplomatic zones.

Marine Le Pen’s appeal trial begins in Paris.

On 13 January, proceedings started in the appeal trial of Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right National Rally (RN). In 2025, Le Pen was found guilty, alongside other RN leaders, of embezzlement of EUR 4 million worth of EU funds and given a two-year suspended prison sentence and a ban on running for public office, which would make her unable to stand in the 2027 French presidential election. The trial is expected to deliver a verdict in the Summer. Marine Le Pen remains a controversial figure in French politics, but retains a strong base of support with her party now being the largest in parliament. The appeal verdict is likely to drive protests in France, particularly if it removes Le Pen’s ban on running for office.

Slovak journalist likely victim of targeted attack.

On 10 January, Peter Schutz, a well-known journalist of the Sme daily newspaper, was beaten by an unknown assailant in a shopping mall in the city of Košice. Schutz is one of the leading critics of the Slovak government, and several government figures reacted to the attack by hinting that he was partly “responsible” for it. If confirmed to be a targeted assault, the incident would likely be indicative of a growing threat of targeted political violence in Slovakia, matching a trend recorded in other European countries. Previous notable cases of targeted political violence in Slovakia include the 2018 murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée and the May 2024 assassination attempt that severely injured Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico.

Somali regional governments rejects Mogadishu’s cutting of ties with UAE.

On 12 January, Mogadishu annulled all agreements with the UAE after alleging that Abu Dhabi has undermined Somalia’s “national sovereignty, territorial unity, and the political independence of the country”, according to Somalia’s Council of Ministers. The annulled agreements include port deals and cooperation over defence and security. On 13 January, three self-governing regions of Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland, rejected the move, declaring that they would not recognise the decision.

The move comes after the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen accused the UAE of transporting Yemeni Southern Transitional Council (STC) leader Aidarus al-Zoubaidi out of Yemen via Somalia. While the semi-autonomous Somaliland has been alienated from the government for years, the refusal of Somalia’s regional governments to adhere to the cutting of ties to the UAE will almost certainly widen the rift between Mogadishu and Jubaland and Puntland. Tensions between Mogadishu and Jubaland in particular have threatened to reignite the Somali civil war and have almost certainly hindered counterinsurgency collaboration against Al Shabaab (AS).

US forces conduct large-scale strikes against ISIS targets in Syria.

On 10 January, US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces, in conjunction with local partner forces, conducted large-scale strikes against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) targets in Syria. Part of Operation Hawkeye Strike, launched in December 2025 following an attack by a lone ISIS gunman which killed three US personnel near Palmyra, the strikes reportedly involved over 90 precision munitions being launched at over 35 targets. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth stated that the strikes were “not the beginning of a war – it is a declaration of vengeance”, likely in an effort to assuage fears in US President Donald Trump’s base regarding any further prolonged involvement in the Middle East.

The Syrian transition government joined the US-led anti-ISIS coalition in November 2025, after which high-profile Islamic State (IS) supporters called for attacks to be conducted against the government wherever possible. Despite being significantly degraded since its peak, ISIS are estimated to maintain up to 3,000 fighters across Iraq and Syria, with some estimates being double this. Joint anti-ISIS operations between CENTCOM and Syrian security forces are highly likely to continue, and ISIS almost certainly maintain a desire to target foreign nationals in Syria.

UAE-backed secessionist STC in Yemen announce dissolution, refuted by STC spokesman.

On 9 January, the UAE-backed secessionist Southern Transition Council (STC)’s Secretary-General Abdulrahman Jalal al-Subaihi stated in a television broadcast that the group was disbanding. This followed talks in Saudi Arabia with an STC delegation, which had travelled to Riyadh following the early January Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) counteroffensive.

The announced dissolution, which in a full statement was claimed to be issued by the STC’s Presidency, Supreme Executive Leadership, General Secretariat, and the council’s affiliated bodies, was quickly dismissed by an STC spokesman in Abu Dhabi, UAE, as “ridiculous”. With the STC’s now potentially former leader, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, having fled to the UAE rather than joining the delegation to Riyadh, there is likely an emerging split within the STC. A fragmentation of what remains of the STC into splinter groups would almost certainly complicate Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)’s now stated intent to monopolise force under the newly formed Supreme Military Committee, with the fragmentation of the anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen increasing the risk of a resurgence in the civil war.

Nigerian military allegedly kills over 200 suspected bandits.

On 13 January, a Nigerian official reported that over 200 suspected bandits had been killed in an ongoing operation in Kogi state targeting several camps belonging to a criminal gang. Footage shot from a police helicopter showed one camp on fire in a forested area. While 200 is likely an exaggeration, the surprise nature of the attack may have led to many bandit casualties. The operation comes after a significant increase in abductions, primarily in the north and northwest. Kidnappings typically take the form of village raids, mass small abductions, and targeted attacks on civilians. Recently, gunmen abducted over 300 students and teachers in St. Mary’s Catholic School in Papiri in November 2025.

Given the international attention surrounding the kidnappings, it is highly likely that Nigerian security forces have been forced to increase operations to deal with the bandits. They have previously encountered difficulties targeting bandits due to the use of civilians as human shields, although there has been no mention of civilian casualties during the operation. There is a realistic possibility that US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) has assisted with locating the bandit camps, particularly given that the operation comes not long after the US has stepped up its assistance with Nigerian counterterrorism operations.

At least 20 killed in clashes between DRC forces and ADF.

On 12 January, reports emerged that the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the Islamic State (IS)-aligned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) engaged in armed clashes in the Mambasa territory of Ituri on 7 January. The clashes took place after the ADF staged an ambush in the village of Banju-Banju, killing 14 FARDC members and five civilians. The FARDC were reportedly in the middle of an operation against the ADF in the forest when the ambush took place.

Despite the high casualty numbers inflicted by the ADF over the past year, direct conflict between the group and government forces is rare, with the ADF typically avoiding DRC or Ugandan military forces where possible. There are three likely possibilities. The first is that the group is emboldened by its recent successes, so has begun to deliberately target the FARDC, which is supported by the recent targeting of the heavily fortified mining village of Manguredjipa on 28 October 2025 and again on 1 January 2026. The second is that IS leadership has ordered the ADF to increasingly target military forces, also supported by the attacks on Manguredjipa. The third is that the attack was opportunistic. Given the increasing pattern of attacks on security forces, further attacks are likely.

Landslide in DRC’s North Kivu region kills at least 19.

On 13 January, a landslide occurred in Burutsi village in the North Kivu region, killing at least 19 people dead and approximately 30 still missing. According to witnesses, the landslide followed several hours of intense rainfall. The landslide has cut off the main road between Goma and Walikale, two major cities in the region that have been captured by the AFC/M23 insurgent group. The lack of government control over the cities has highly likely complicated rescue efforts, with young people from Burutsi and surrounding villages being relied on to search for bodies under the rubble. The death count is highly likely to increase in the coming days.

On 11 January, the second phase of the three-phase Myanmar general elections took place across 100 of the country’s 330 townships, including parts of Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay, Bago, and Tanintharyi regions. Voting took place across schools and government, and religious buildings. The first phase took place on 28 December in 102 of the country’s townships. The final round is set to take place on 25 January. 65 townships will not be taking part due to ongoing clashes. Voter intimidation was reported, with a Kawmu Township local stating that security forces “were shouting with mics and shouting repeatedly until 12 noon to ask everyone who has a ballot list to come to the polling station without fail”. A resident of Pason Taung Township also reported similar calls to vote.

Multiple ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), anti-junta militias aligned with the National Unity Government, have publicly opposed the election and threatened to disrupt polling. The groups conducted numerous attacks on the day of polling.  An explosion took place at two polling stations in Minhla township, while further explosions and exchanges of gunfire were reported in Ye District; neither resulted in reported injuries. A drone attack targeted an election administration office in Htantabin township in Bago region, killing one official and injuring another, resulting in the closure of the local polling station. A local administrator was shot and killed after inspecting polling stations in the Magway region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Tatmadaw reported a 52 per cent turnout in the first phase, although the actual figures are likely lower despite the ongoing voter intimidation, with most citizens almost certainly considering the election neither free nor fair. The pro-Tatmadaw Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has been declared the victor of the first phase, winning 89 out of 102 seats. They will highly likely be declared the overwhelming winners of the second phase.

The ongoing elections have been widely criticised by numerous bodies, including the UN and several human rights organisations, as a “sham” intended to bolster the ruling military junta’s image. The junta has cracked down on freedom of expression in the lead-up to the election, with over 200 people arrested under measures introduced to punish protests or criticism of the polls with jail sentences of up to 10 years. Numerous opposition parties have also been barred from competing in the election. Given the extent of the repression, the elections are highly unlikely to gain broad international recognition, and almost certainly constitute a mere formality.

The first round of voting similarly experienced attacks on polling stations by EAOs and PDFs. These attacks have highly likely intended to damage infrastructure or target local officials rather than citizens, limiting their scale. Elections have not been significantly disrupted by the attacks, although it is highly likely that many citizens have refused to travel to polling stations due to the risk of being caught up in conflict-related violence. Further attacks on the final day of polling are highly likely.

On 11 January, around midnight, a series of coordinated bomb and arson attacks targeted PTT petrol stations across Thailand’s Deep South, with five sites affected in Narathiwat Province, two in Pattani Province, and four in Yala Province. The explosions have injured at least four people, including a police officer, and caused significant property damage. Authorities have increased security, tightened patrols, and imposed a curfew in Narathiwat province in response to the attacks. Investigations are ongoing to determine who conducted the attacks, and the authorities have instructed the public to avoid high-risk areas and to closely follow official updates.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attacks were geographically dispersed within each affected province, likely indicating a deliberate effort to maximise disruption to fuel infrastructure, stretch the resources of the authorities, and increase publicity, while the timing of the attack likely suggests the intent to minimise civilian casualties. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the attacks; however, their scale, coordination, and target selection are consistent with the operational patterns of established insurgent groups like the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the principal Malay Muslim separatist insurgent group active in Thailand’s Deep South. Smaller and less established groups that may have splintered from the BRN are unlikely to have the logistical networks, command-and-control structures or regional reach required to execute near-simultaneous attacks across multiple provinces.

While attacks involving improved explosive devices (IEDs) or arson are relatively common in Thailand’s Deep South, the nature of these attacks targeting infrastructure at night likely suggests that they were intended to serve as strategic messaging and undermine public confidence, rather than result in mass casualties. Despite Thailand’s intermittent border conflict with Cambodia, there is no credible evidence indicating that the Thai military has diverted resources from the Deep South to the Cambodian border, nor has there been an escalatory increase in troop deployments to the region, developments that insurgent groups could in theory exploit.

Thailand is scheduled to hold general elections on 8 February following the dissolution of parliament in December. Insurgents in the Deep South have traditionally increased attacks during electoral cycles to undermine the central government and achieve maximum publicity. For example, in 2023, insurgents set fire to cell phone towers and tyres across Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces. During the election periods in 2011 and 2014, insurgent activity increased around polling and campaigning phases, marked by attacks on infrastructure, local officials, and security forces. Given the upcoming February election and historical pattern of increased militant activity, it is likely that further low-level and coordinated attacks will be conducted in the run-up. There is also a realistic possibility of more hardline elements of the insurgency conducting more deadly attacks on both civilian and security targets.

South Korea prosecution seeks death penalty for former president.

South Korea’s special prosecutor has requested the death penalty for former President Yoon Suk Yeol due to his alleged unconstitutional use of martial law to retain power in December 2024. The prosecution also stated that it had discovered evidence of a scheme dating back to 2023, which was designed to keep Yoon in power and was masterminded by the former president and his former defence minister. Yoon has denied the charges and maintains that the imposition of martial law was only done to protect liberal democracy. The court will rule on the case on 19 February.

South Korea has not ordered a death sentence for nearly 30 years and is unlikely to order one for a former president who still commands considerable support in the country. The case has already triggered rare and polarised street protests in Korea, both in support of and against Yoon. There is a realistic possibility that the court’s upcoming verdict, regardless of its outcome, will result in renewed demonstrations in the country and an increased deployment of security forces on the streets.

Japan likely to dissolve parliament, call snap election in February.

On 14 January, local media reported that Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who took office in October, will dissolve parliament and call for an election in early February. The move, which has not been confirmed by Takaichi as of 15 January, is likely meant to give her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) a strengthened mandate to pass key economic reforms. Japan is currently battling stubborn inflation, a sharp weakening of the Yen against the Dollar, and sluggish economic growth, combined with a growing cost of long-term debt, which makes borrowing costlier.

While Takaichi likely assesses that LDP will benefit from the recent diplomatic spat between Japan and China, which was sparked by the prime minister’s comments on Taiwan, and has provoked a “rally round the flag” effect in Japan. However, if the electoral gamble does not pay off and the LDP underperforms, the elections will likely worsen Japan’s political instability, with adverse economic effects.

High ranking Islamist party member killed in likely targeted assassination in Bangladesh.

On 13 January, Anwar Ullah, a leader of Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), was killed in his home in Dhaka by unidentified assailants. The victim’s family members have stated that the killing was “planned and political”. Following the killing, JI supporters staged protests in Dhaka, accusing authorities of not doing enough to find the killers. JI is one of the key parties shaping Bangladesh’s political transition after the July-August 2024 revolution, which toppled the government of Sheikh Hasina.

On 12 February, Bangladesh is scheduled to hold the first elections after the revolution, as well as a constitutional referendum. JI currently polls second, behind the big-tent Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Political violence has become pervasive in Bangladesh since the revolution, including mob violence and targeted assassinations. It is highly likely that, as the vote approaches, further cases of political violence will occur in the country.

Cambodia accuses Thailand of occupying civilian areas amid fragile ceasefire.

On 13 January, Cambodian Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn declared that the Thai military is “still occupying territories well inside Cambodia” and that 4,000 families are still displaced. Thailand responded to the declaration by dismissing it as “baseless”, adding that “[t]he maintenance of current troop positions following the ceasefire constitutes direct compliance with agreed de-escalation measures” that “cannot be misconstrued as territorial occupation”.

According to the 27 December ceasefire agreement between the two sides, Thailand and Cambodia agreed to stop all active fighting and maintain current troop positions without advancing, reinforcing, or redeploying forces along the border. Cambodia has reportedly requested that Thailand partake in a meeting of the Joint Boundary Commission to attempt to demarcate the border, but Thailand has not yet responded to confirm its participation. Amid an almost certain lack of trust between the two sides, further accusations of ceasefire violations are highly likely.

North Korea accuses South Korea of drone incursion.

On 11 January, North Korea’s Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, requested that South Korea investigate recent drone incursions over North Korean airspace on 4 January. The drone originated from an island in Incheon, South Korea, and flew eight kilometres before being shot down inside North Korean airspace, according to North Korean state media. According to the media statement, the drone was equipped with surveillance cameras to record North Korean facilities and follows a similar incursion in September.

The accusations are highly likely timed with the upcoming Ninth Party Congress, which is expected to further solidify the hostile attitude towards South Korea. In October 2024, North Korea accused South Korea of flying drones over Pyongyang, claiming they carried propaganda leaflets. The accusations triggered heightened military readiness along the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), including orders for artillery units to prepare to open fire in response to future incursions. There is a realistic possibility that this incident will likewise increase tensions between the two sides, although South Korea has announced that it had no intention of provocation, which Kim Yo Jong welcomed.

Police warning issued after 11 pipe bombs found on the streets of Canberra.

On 14 and 15 January, Australian police found 11 “dangerous” pipe bombs on the streets of Canberra. The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been found near Lake Ginninderra between Joynton Smith Drive and Ginninderra Drive, primarily next to footpaths and on nature strips. According to Detective Inspector Anna Wronski, some of the devices had been detonated. No injuries or property damage had been reported.

At least 22 people killed by wild elephant in nine days in Jharkhand, India.

Between 1 and 9 January, a wild elephant has killed at least 22 people in the Chaibasa and Kolhan forest areas of West Singhbhum district, Jharkhand. Most of the deaths have been reported at night, largely affecting residents guarding paddy stores in fields and barns. A search by over 100 forest personnel is underway to locate the elephant. Elephants pose a significant threat to humans in the region due to a combination of shrinking forest cover, habitat fragmentation, and heightened human activity levels near elephant corridors. Further attacks are highly likely.

Train derailed in northeast Thailand after crane falls on multiple carriages.

On 14 January, a construction crane collapsed onto a passenger train in Sikhio district, Nakhon Ratchasima province in northeastern Thailand, causing the train to derail and catch fire. The incident occurred on a Bangkok-to-Ubon Ratchathani service as the train passed beneath a high-speed rail construction site, with early reports suggesting the train pulled on the crane’s exposed cable, causing it to fall onto three carriages. The accident has resulted in the killing of at least 32 people and has injured almost 100.

The disruption has led to the suspension of services on the affected line, with rescue and recovery efforts currently ongoing. The full restoration of services on the line, which connects Bangkok to major Isaan cities like Nakhon Ratchasima, Buriram, Surin, Sisaket and Ubon Ratchathani, is expected to take several days to weeks, due to the complications of debris clearance, track and signalling inspections, and ongoing investigations into safety failures and the cause of the accident.

Tropical Storm Ada forms off the east coast of the Philippines.

On 14 January, Tropical Depression Ada formed over the waters east of Davao in the Philippines. The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) issued an advisory on 15 January that Ada had reached the tropical storm category, carrying maximum sustained wind speeds of 65km/h. The storm system is expected to impact parts of the Visayas and Mindanao in the coming days. PAGASA has placed Northern Samar, Samar, Eastern Samar, the Dinagat Islands, Surigao del Norte and Surigao del Sur under Tropical Cyclone Wind Signal No. 1 (TCWS No. 1), indicating that these areas may experience strong winds of 39–61km/h in the coming days.

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