07 – 14 August
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Geopolitical, Global Security & Environmental Events
Key Events This Week
America
The White House’s decision to deploy the National Guard to Washington, D.C. to combat crime, will highly likely drive anti-government protests in the short term.
The Trump administration’s authorisation of lethal force against the cartels is likely designed to exert increased pressure on Mexico rather than a signal of imminent US military action.
State of Emergency imposed in four provinces in Ecuador is unlikely to significantly reduce rising homicide levels following the extradition of the leader of Los Choneros, the country’s largest gang.
Europe, Middle East and Africa
The omission of Ukraine and Europe from US-Russia talks is unlikely to lead to an immediate ceasefire and will likely continue to challenge Western cohesion.
Several scheduled anti-government protests will highly likely result in transport and service disruptions in Tel Aviv, Israel, in the short term. The controversial Gaza City plan likely remains a major driver of unrest.
Security alerts issued by multiple Western governments regarding Israeli and Jewish-linked sites in the UAE are highly likely predicated on intelligence indicating a credible threat.
Further civil unrest is highly likely in Côte d’Ivoire following President Ouattara’s decision to seek re-election and the arrest of six opposition figures.
Asia Pacific
Typhoon Podul is highly likely to result in lingering disruptions after tracking through Taiwan and southeast China, with high winds and heavy rainfall triggering flight disruptions.
North, Central and South America
USA: White House deploys National Guard in Washington DC.
On 11 August, US President Donald Trump announced the deployment of approximately 800 National Guard troops to Washington DC and the temporary takeover of the city’s police department. It is the second time that the administration has deployed federal forces in a city, the first having taken place in June in Los Angeles, California. However, if the Los Angeles deployment was justified as a reaction to local civil unrest, the operation in Washington has been characterised as an effort to curb crime in the US capital. Washington DC had a spike in crimes after the COVID-19 pandemic, with murders peaking in 2023 at approximately 40 per 100,000 residents, the highest rate in 20 years, and declining since. The administration has warned that other cities, like Chicago, could have similar deployments in the future.
Solace Global Assessment:
Less than a week before the National Guard’s deployment, a 19-year-old staffer from the newly-established Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) was attacked and injured during an attempted robbery in Washington. The incident, which attracted significant media attention due to the profile of the agency, likely constituted the immediate political justification for the deployment of federal forces to the capital. However, more broadly, it is highly likely that the development reflects growing tensions between the Republican Party-held White House and Democrat-controlled municipal and state authorities. The National Guard’s deployment to Los Angeles triggered a conflict between the White House and California Governor Gavin Newsom, who is sometimes described as a likely candidate for the Democratic ticket at the 2028 presidential election.
The deployment of the National Guard will likely drive anti-government protests in Washington DC in the immediate term. Both large-scale protests and small-scale, symbolic actions, possibly intended to disrupt transport, are likely to occur in the city. There is a realistic possibility that this unrest will also be fuelled by other grievances targeting the current administration, including opposition to the deportation of undocumented migrants and to the ongoing war in Gaza.
Mexico: Trump reportedly authorises lethal force against drug cartels.
President Donald Trump has reportedly directed the Pentagon to prepare for the use of lethal force against drug cartels and organised crime groups in Latin America after secretly signing a directive that provides a legal basis for potential military operations at sea and on foreign soil. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also stated that the US needs to start treating such groups as armed terrorist organisations, not simply drug-dealing organisations. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has reiterated that US military personnel will not be allowed to operate on Mexican territory, stating that, while her government was informed of the order, it does not involve operations on Mexican soil. Sheinbaum has consistently rejected offers from President Trump for external military assistance and has repeatedly stated that any unilateral US military action would be a serious violation of Mexico’s sovereignty.
Solace Global Assessment:
The reported directive follows the Trump administration’s earlier designation of multiple cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) and months of both covert and overt US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations against the cartels. These operations have likely provided the US with a much greater understanding of cartel structures, high-value targets (HVTs), smuggling routes, logistics hubs, and leadership networks. This, combined with the legal permissions from the FTO designation, has almost certainly placed the US in a much stronger position to conduct operations against the cartels.
However, any unilateral military action would almost certainly be a violation of Mexican sovereignty, invite a severe diplomatic backlash, and undermine existing bilateral cooperation on counter-narcotic operations, migration, and security. The move is likely intended to appeal to the Trump administration’s political base while applying maximum pressure on the Sheinbaum government to intensify its own anti-cartel operations. On 13 August, Mexico extradited a further 26 high-profile suspected cartel members to the US, marking the second major transfer of 2025, and a move that likely suggests the Sheinbaum administration is responding to increased US pressure.
While the immediate likelihood of unilateral US military action remains low, it cannot be entirely discounted given the expanded permissions, intelligence collection, and political signalling involved. If such operations were to proceed without Mexican consent, they would almost certainly fuel strong anti-US sentiment within Mexico and risk retaliation from the cartels. This could include direct attacks on US personnel, facilities, and civilians both inside Mexico and potentially in the US.
Ecuador: State of Emergency declared in four provinces.
On 8 August, President Daniel Noboa declared a State of Emergency set to last 60 days in the provinces of El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos, and Manabí. The law significantly expands the powers of the Armed Forces and National Police, enabling them to conduct joint operations to reduce the crime rate. The State of Emergency comes after an escalation in the conflict between Los Choneros and Los Lobos organised crime groups following the extradition of Los Choneros leader José Adolfo Macías, known as “Fito”, to the US on 20 July.
The latest incident of violence involved a shooting at a nightclub in Santa Lucía, which killed eight people and injured three. This follows similar incidents of violence on 27 July, where 17 were killed in La Clínica bar in El Empalme, and 19 July, where nine people were killed in a pool hall in Playas.
Solace Global Assessment:
The extradition of Fito has almost certainly dismantled the leadership structure of Ecuador’s largest gang. While Fito was previously locked up in an Ecuadorian prison, he was able to effectively run Los Choneros from his cell, something almost certainly prevented by his move to the US. Los Lobos has almost certainly attempted to expand its control in Manabí province, previously a Los Choneros stronghold, by exploiting the leadership vacuum, which has led to a spike in fatalities in the region. Almost 80 per cent of violence is reportedly concentrated in coastal provinces, which constitute transit points for drug shipments, and make up three of the four provinces where Noboa has declared a State of Emergency.
President Daniel Noboa, re-elected in May 2025, has attempted to emulate the tactics of El Salvador’s President Bukele of cracking down on gangs through the Declaration of Internal Armed Conflict in January 2024, following Fito’s prison escape. The Declaration suspended many civil liberties and enabled the military and police to operate more forcefully, particularly within prisons. While the measures initially repressed violence, the increased pressure on the gangs’ leadership triggered intra-gang disputes and fragmentation, which subsequently caused violence to spike, reaching its highest rate in 2025. While the government measures will almost certainly lead to an increase in arrests, it is unlikely to prevent the spike in violence. Given the likely vying for leadership in Los Choneros, the increased activity from security forces is likely to exacerbate the internal conflicts and could facilitate further splits within the gang.
Ecuador has grown increasingly attractive to drug traffickers and money launderers, thanks to its location between major cocaine producers Colombia and Peru, its strategic ports, and its dollarised economy. Gangs from other countries, particularly Mexico, Albania, and Italy, have increased their presence in the country in recent years, strengthening the Ecuadorian criminal organisations, which have assimilated local street gangs. While Los Choneros emerged as the largest gang, Los Lobos, which split from Los Choneros in 2020 following the assassination of Los Choneros leader Jorge Luis Zambrano, has become Ecuador’s second-largest gang and their biggest rival. This has been exacerbated by the fact that the Sinaloa Cartel are aligned with Los Choneros, while their rivals, Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), have aligned with Los Lobos, intensifying the conflict and sustaining local gangs with funds, arms and other resources. This has resulted in the gangs becoming far more powerful and organised, a development that is likely to undermine President Noboa’s attempt to emulate El Salvador’s success.
AMER Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Haiti’s transitional council appoints new president.
On 7 August, Laurent Saint-Cyr, a businessman who previously served as the head of the country’s Chamber of Commerce, was appointed Haiti’s new president by the transitional council. The council, which is based in Port-au-Prince, exercises little control over the country’s territory. Approximately 90 per cent of the capital is assessed to be under the control of armed gangs. Ahead of the council’s announcement, Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, the leader of the gang coalition Viv Ansanm, threatened to overthrow the government. Viv Ansnanm, was founded via the merger of rival gangs and is now the most powerful armed group in the country, has repeatedly sought to style itself as a “revolutionary” force, even declaring itself a party in January 2025. However, the group is unlikely to seek a genuine administrative role, which would hinder its involvement in international weapons and human trafficking networks. More plausibly, Viv Ansanm will likely pursue a status quo arrangement with the government, exchanging reduced violence for de facto recognition of their authority and tolerance of their criminal enterprises. However, in the short term, gangs are likely to continue their campaign of attacks against the government, civil society actors, and civilians in order to exert increased pressure on the new government.
Air Canada to begin cancelling flights ahead of expected strike action.
Air Canada is set to begin cancelling flights starting 14 August, ahead of three days of planned strike action from 16 to 18 August. According to an airline spokesperson, Air Canada will gradually suspend flights to enable an orderly shutdown. The decision comes after a 72-hour strike notice was issued by a labour union representing approximately 10,000 Air Canada flight attendants. The notice was issued after the union failed to achieve an agreement over pay for its members during boarding, rather than just when the aircraft is in motion. Members voted 99.7 per cent in favour of the strike. The strikes are set to ground approximately 700 flights per day. Further strike action is likely if employees fail to achieve major concessions from Air Canada.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Lone wolf attack at US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) headquarters.
On 8 August, an individual opened fire at the CDC headquarters building in Atlanta, Georgia. The shooting resulted in the death of one police officer, but no CDC staff were injured. The shooter, identified as a 30-year-old man, was killed by responding police. Local media have reported that the perpetrator had allegedly espoused vaccine-related conspiracy theories and that he blamed the COVID-19 vaccine for an unspecified “illness”. Conspiracy theories targeting medical researchers and workers have gained significant traction in extremist spaces following the COVID-19 pandemic. These narratives have likely contributed to a heightened threat environment for medical staff, researchers, and health agencies, with incidents ranging from harassment and targeted protests to violent threats and physical attacks.
Costa Rica plans to build El Salvador-style prison.
On 13 August, Costa Rican government representatives stated that this year, the state will undertake the construction of a maximum-security prison, resembling El Salvador’s “Terrorism Confinement Centre” (CECOT). CECOT is one of the key flagship policies of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, and it is where tens of thousands of suspected gang members have been detained under the country’s state of emergency. While Costa Rica has a lower presence of organised crime groups compared to other neighbouring countries, it has had a recent increase in cartel-related crime. The new facility, which will reportedly be constructed with El Salvadoran assistance, will likely significantly boost the country’s prison capacity. However, it is highly likely that the adoption of the “CECOT model”, which has received condemnation following reports of severe abuses of inmates, will drive significant domestic opposition and possibly civil unrest.
Colombian presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay dies months after assassination attempt.
Uribe died on 11 July, two months after having been shot at a campaign event in Bogotá. The senator and presidential candidate for the Democratic Centre party had been in the hospital since the shooting. Local media and some opposition politicians have claimed that the assassination was carried out at the orders of the Central General Staff (EMC), a splinter of the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC). President Gustavo Petro, instead, accused a transnational cartel that has allegedly been involved in other assassinations and attempted assassinations of politicians. The targeting of an acting senator, presidential candidate and member of a high-profile political family in Bogotá has almost certainly raised questions over the capability of armed groups and organised criminal networks to operate in the capital with relative impunity. It has also likely underscored failures to protect political figures in areas deemed lower risk and ahead of major elections. The assassination will likely intensify public pressure on the government to improve security in major cities, and with multiple armed groups currently at war with the government, it has almost certainly increased fears of further assassinations and attacks ahead of the 2026 election.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Mexico City flooding causes airport disruption
On 11-12 August, Mexico City’s Benito Juárez International Airport recorded severe flight delays and cancellations, affecting more than 20,000 passengers, due to severe rain and flooding. The heavy precipitation has also caused protracted travel and service disruptions across the city. Local media have noted that the rain’s severe impact is highly likely due to the lack of adequately maintained drainage infrastructure. Available weather forecasts indicate that rain will continue on 14-15 August, and resume on 19 August. Consequently, further travel disruptions in Mexico City remain likely.
Europe, Middle East & Africa
Ukraine: Ukraine and Europe omitted from US-Russia negotiations.
On 15 August, US President Trump is scheduled to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, which will mark their first face-to-face engagement since 2019. The Trump administration has referred to the meeting as a “listening exercise”, but has warned that there will be “very severe consequences” if Russia fails to agree to some form of negotiated ceasefire. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will not be involved in the talks and has categorically rejected any deal brokered without Ukraine’s participation. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that President Putin is demanding that Ukraine cede its “fortress belt”, a 50 km-long defensive line which includes the key Donbass cities of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka, as well as several smaller fortified towns.
On 13 August, European leaders, including Germany, France, the UK, Poland, and the European Union, conducted a virtual meeting with Presidents Trump and Zelensky to reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty. European leaders stressed that any ceasefire negotiation or future peace agreement must include Ukraine, safeguard its internationally recognised borders, and be supported with tangible security guarantees.
Concurrently, Russian ground forces have intensified their operations in eastern Ukraine by launching an offensive near Dobropillia in the Donetsk Oblast on 11 August. Russian forces reportedly captured several small villages in the immediate area, advanced up to 10km beyond established defensive lines, and severed the main supply route (MSR) linking Dobropillia to Kramatorsk. The offensive has placed additional pressure on Ukraine’s undermanned forces in the area and has strengthened Russia’s ability to envelop Pokrovsk, a vital defensive and logistical node referred to as the “gateway to Donetsk”.
On 11 August, the Dobropillia offensive commenced in Donetsk Oblast, with Russian units capturing several villages east and southeast of Dobropillia. This advance cut the highway connecting Dobropillia to Kramatorsk and placed pressure on Pokrovsk and surrounding areas. Analysts assess that this military push was timed to strengthen Russia’s position prior to the Alaska meeting.
Solace Global Assessment:
The scheduling of high-level talks between Washington and Moscow without Ukrainian or European participation will almost certainly be viewed as a win for Russia. The talks have effectively allowed Putin to bypass the recent deadline imposed by President Trump and have enabled Russia to gain additional time to consolidate recent territorial gains on the battlefield and strengthen its bargaining position ahead of any future substantive negotiations.
Russia’s recent advances are likely tactically limited but strategically timed to coincide with high-level diplomatic engagements with the US. Russia’s current territorial gains have exploited Ukraine’s manpower shortage and have almost certainly exerted increased pressure on the Zelensky administration ahead of any future negotiations that involve Ukraine. Russia’s demand that Ukraine cede the fortress belt will almost certainly be rejected by Ukraine. The area has been significantly fortified since 2014 and serves as Kyiv’s primary layered defensive position in eastern Ukraine. Russian forces currently have no immediate means of enveloping or penetrating the area, and its ceding would provide Russia with direct access to the remaining Ukrainian-held urban and logistical hubs in Donetsk Oblast, including Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Ukraine would then have limited time and means to establish new fortified defensive positions, and Russia would almost certainly be placed in an advantageous position should hostilities resume in the future.
The failure to achieve any beneficial outcomes in Alaska will almost certainly influence Russia to intensify operations in Ukraine, both through continued ground offensives and sustained long-range strike campaigns on Ukrainian population centres. Ukrainian intelligence is also stating that there are early indications that Russia is preparing new major offensives, including in Sumy. These will likely further capitalise on Ukraine’s current limitations by overstretching its increasingly strained resources and exploiting any diplomatic impasses, with Russia likely calculating it can weather any increased sanctions or punitive measures from the Trump administration in the short term.
While costly on the battlefield and economically, Russia’s approach is now likely increasingly serving one of its primary strategic objectives, the fracturing of Western and NATO unity. The Ukraine war is increasingly straining US and European cohesion by exposing differences over the scale of military aid, the terms of a settlement and the prioritisation of Ukraine over other strategic considerations like China. European leaders have even warned President Trump not to strike a unilateral peace deal with Russia, likely suggesting fears that such an agreement could set a dangerous precedent, that force can be used successfully to alter internationally recognised borders and undermine the rules-based international order that reinforces European security. Putin is therefore likely to continue delaying substantive negotiations in order to achieve maximalist objectives in Ukraine, but also Russia’s broader strategic aims.
Israel: Several large-scale protests scheduled to occur in Tel Aviv.
Families of the Israeli hostages currently held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip have organised a large-scale protest on 17 August. The demonstration is being conducted in opposition to the Israeli government’s plan to militarily occupy Gaza City, which would expand the area controlled by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Several universities, opposition parties, and local authorities have backed the protest, which will take the form of a general strike and street demonstrations. A large-scale demonstration was already held in Tel Aviv on 10 August, with approximately 100,000 people in attendance, according to local media.
The Haredi group known as “Jerusalem Faction” has also reportedly planned a large demonstration, to take place at an unspecified date “next week”, which will include an attempt to deny access to Ben Gurion Airport. Haredi groups are protesting government inaction regarding the controversial Haredi draft bill, which has reportedly resulted in a series of arrests of ultra-Orthodox citizens who refused to serve in the IDF. Another protest is scheduled to be held on 14 August, outside of the Beit Lid military prison, where several of the arrested are being held.
Solace Global Assessment:
The two protest movements underscore growing dissatisfaction with the current Israeli government’s handling of the war. The offensive on Gaza City is strongly opposed by the hostages’ families as they believe that it will significantly increase the likelihood of the captives being injured or killed by Hamas or during rescue operations. The administration of Prime Minister Netanyahu has long held the release of all the hostages as the fundamental purpose of the war in Gaza; however, it has also faced increased pressure from far-right coalition members, who have called for the annexation of large parts of the Gaza Strip and its settlement by Israeli citizens.
At the same time, the Netanyahu government is undergoing a significant split with its ultra-Orthodox coalition allies. Last month, the two Haredi parties, United Torah Judaism and Shas, quit the coalition, reducing it to a minority force in parliament. While the Knesset is currently in recess, making a vote of no-confidence highly unlikely in the immediate term, the two parties’ exit has almost certainly significantly weakened the government.
It is highly likely that the large-scale unrest planned for the 14-21 August period (and particularly between 14 and 18 August) will result in notable travel and service disruptions in Tel Aviv and possibly other large Israeli cities. Protesters are likely to block the Ayalon Highway, which is the main roadway to the city, and possibly the roads leading to Ben Gurion Airport.
UAE: US and UK warn of attacks on locations associated with Israel.
Several Western governments, including the US and UK, have issued security alerts for the UAE warning of the threat of attacks on places associated with Israel or the Jewish community. On 8 August, the US Embassy in the UAE warned of information indicating threats towards the Jewish and Israeli communities and warned its citizens to avoid such locations. The UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a similar security alert, warning that “terrorists are very likely to try to carry out attacks in the UAE.” The governments of Canada and Australia have also published similar alerts.
Solace Global Assessment:
Security alerts issued by Western governments follow an advisory published by Israel’s National Security Council (NSC) on 31 July, in which it warned Israeli citizens to avoid all non-essential travel to the UAE. The NSC warned that Iran and its proxy forces, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas and other militant groups, are planning attacks on Israeli and Jewish interests in the UAE in response to Israel’s strikes in Iran and for the war in Gaza. It also warned of an increased threat on Jewish holidays and the Shabbat.
The issuing of security alerts from several Western governments likely suggests that the alert is predicated on verified but sensitive intelligence that cannot be publicly disseminated and may be followed by alerts from additional countries, including the Gulf States. The UAE is likely considered a high-profile and legitimate target by extremist groups due to its growing Jewish community, its close diplomatic and economic relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, and its position as a symbol of Western alignment and influence in the Middle East. The Jewish community in the UAE has grown to an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 people, and hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens visit the country each year.
Iran is likely exploring non-attributable means of retaliation against Israel following the attacks on its nuclear programme and conventional military capabilities. A proxy-conducted attack against Israeli or Jewish targets in the UAE or other third parties would allow Tehran to strike a high-visibility target while preserving plausible deniability. Such an attack would also highly likely be perceived as sub-threshold and would unlikely warrant a direct military retaliation from Israel. Iran has leveraged this option before, with successful and failed attacks recorded in Bulgaria, Argentina, Cyprus, Thailand, and India.
Should Iran or extremist groups not aligned with Iran pursue this course of action, the most likely form of attack would include improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against locations with a strong Israeli or Jewish association. These are likely to include the Israeli Embassy in the UAE, synagogues, kosher restaurants, Jewish community centres, or businesses linked to Israeli nationals, the majority of which are concentrated in Dubai. Softer targets with less security could also be targeted and could include shopping malls, hotels or event venues frequented by Israeli nationals or the Jewish community.
Côte d’Ivoire: Anti-government protests following opposition arrests.
On 9 August, thousands of Ivorians took to the streets of Abidjan with banners stating “Enough is enough”. The gathering was mainly in the densely populated suburb of Yopougon and remained peaceful. The protests follow the arrest, on 4 August, of six members of one of Côte d’Ivoire’s largest opposition parties, African Peoples’ Party–Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI). According to government statements, the arrests occurred after a bus was set on fire and police were assaulted in Yopougon, a suburb of Abidjan. The Interior Minister, Vagondo Diomandé, presented a video showing a self-identified PPA-CI member confessing to involvement in the attack and claiming that he acted on behalf of the party with 15 others. Opposition parties and civil society groups condemned the detentions as unconstitutional and a threat to political stability in the lead-up to the election on 25 October.
Solace Global Assessment:
Political tensions have been steadily increasing in recent months. On 29 July, 83-year-old President Alassane Ouattara announced that he would stand for a fourth term in the upcoming 25 October 2025 election. According to Ouattara, who came to power in 2011, a constitutional amendment signed in 2016 reset his presidential term limit. This significantly raises the possibility of widespread civil unrest around the election period in a country that has not had a peaceful transfer of power since the death of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. In 2010, a political crisis escalated into civil war, which resulted in the deaths of at least 3,000 civilians. While opposition figures and civilians will almost certainly be keen to avoid descending back into civil war, the perceived disregard of the country’s constitution significantly raises the risk of instability around the election.
There is precedent for electoral violence in recent years in Côte d’Ivoire. In 2020, Ouattara controversially decided to seek a third term after the sudden death of his successor, Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly. The decision sparked condemnation from opposition parties and triggered large-scale protests, which were met with security force crackdowns, resulting in the deaths of at least six people. Opposition parties boycotted the election, and Ouattara was elected with 95.31 per cent of the vote, with a very low turnout. Further widespread unrest is highly likely in the lead-up to, and immediately following, the election. Security forces are highly likely to respond with force, as with previous periods of unrest in Côte d’Ivoire.
EMEA Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Hundreds arrested at Palestine Action protest in London.
On 9 August, police carried out more than 500 arrests at a protest in support of the proscribed protest group Palestine Action in central London. Protest organisers have accused the UK government, which designated Palestine Action as a terrorist group in July following the vandalism of military aircraft at a Royal Air Force (RAF) base, of weaponising counterterrorism laws to suppress genuine protest. The incident constitutes the largest mass arrest in the UK in more than a decade. While local authorities have stated that they assess that most of those arrested are unlikely to face prosecution, the case will almost certainly drive further anti-government unrest. Moreover, the crackdown on Palestine Action is likely to push supporters towards smaller direct action groups, a scenario reminiscent of the transition from large-scale protests to smaller-scale actions already observed in the UK’s environmentalist movement.
Germany extends border checks.
Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt announced that the government will extend the period of enhanced border checks, originally established in May, past its September deadline. The checks, which were characterised as a measure to control irregular migration to Germany, allow government forces to deny entry to undocumented migrants. The policy has driven significant opposition in Poland, which is a key arrival point for migrants seeking to enter the EU from Belarus and looking to enter Western European countries like Germany. Dobrindt’s decision is almost certainly dictated by the continuing rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). After its best-ever performance in the February 2025 federal elections, where it established itself as the second party by number of representatives in the Bundestag, the AfD has further narrowed the gap with the centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), which, according to polls, it now trails by only two percentage points.
Clashes during anti-government protests in Serbia.
On 12 August, clashes erupted between anti-government protesters and pro-government counter-protesters. The violence began in Vrbas, northwest of Belgrade, with government supporters throwing objects, including flares, rocks, and bottles, at anti-government protesters, who threw various items back. The clashes continued on 13 August, spreading to Novi Sad, Belgrade, Kraljevo, Niš, Čačak, and Kragujevac, triggering the intervention of riot police. According to President Aleksandar Vučić, at least 60 people were injured. Vučić vowed to “establish public order and peace”. The clashes come after approximately nine months of demonstrations against perceived government corruption following the collapse of a canopy at a railway station which killed 16 people in Novi Sad in November 2024. Protesters, primarily led by students, have called for Vučić’s resignation and demanded that he call an early parliamentary election, which he has refused. This incident is highly likely to draw in more protesters and trigger further clashes across major cities in Serbia in the coming days.
Hezbollah supporters protest across Lebanon over disarmament plans.
Thousands of people have protested across Lebanon, including in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Tyre, and the Bekaa Valley, to protest the Lebanese government’s attempts to disarm the Shia militant group Hezbollah. The protests were triggered by a government-backed plan, supported by the US, to disarm Hezbollah by the end of the year and bring all of the group’s weapons under state control. The plan, which is linked to maintaining a ceasefire with Israel and securing an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, has drawn major opposition from Hezbollah and its political allies, such as the Shia political party, Amal. The disarmament of Hezbollah has likely been interpreted as an attack on the Shia community and has likely deepened sectarian divisions and galvanised support for Hezbollah. Hezbollah have denounced the plan and vowed to resist it, with any government attempt to enforce disarmament without a broad political consensus likely to trigger further unrest and potentially clashes between supporters and the security forces.
Protesters firebomb government office in Germiston, South Africa.
On 12 August, the office of the Department of Home Affairs in Germiston, Gauteng province, was partially destroyed after it was targeted with Molotov cocktails. According to local media and authorities, the firebombing was carried out by residents who were protesting over having been recently evicted from nearby flats, reportedly with no official prior notice from local authorities. Police responded to the protests by deploying tear gas and rubber bullets. At least two people were arrested in connection with the fire. Further protests remain possible in the short term.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Syrian government forces dismantle ISIS cell planning church attack in Tartous.
Security forces of the Syrian interim government claimed to have prevented a terror attack using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting a church in Tartous. Located on Syria’s coast, Tartous is mostly inhabited by Alawites, with sizable Sunni and Christian minorities. It had been previously targeted by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2016, when the group carried out coordinated attacks in the city and in Jableh, which killed a combined 184 people. It is likely that ISIS’ interest in targeting Tartous, and particularly its Christian community, is aimed at deepening sectarian divisions between the Alawite and Sunni communities in coastal parts of Syria, where tensions following the mass killings of Alawites in March-April remain extremely high. Some pro-government channels have even claimed that the latest plot was a “false flag” carried out by pro-Assad Alawites, and also aimed at increasing sectarianism in the area.
Several Al-Jazeera journalists killed in targeted strike in Gaza by Israeli forces.
On 10 August, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) carried out a strike on a tent near the al-Shifa hospital in Gaza City. The strike, which occurred after Israeli officials announced plans to take over Gaza City, killed five Al-Jazeera journalists. Israeli authorities stated that Anas Al-Sharif, one of the five casualties who had a significant social media following due to his reporting from the Gaza Strip, was a “Hamas operative”, and that the strike had been targeted to eliminate him. Due to the high visibility of the targets, it is likely that the strike will drive international condemnation, and will contribute to driving civil unrest in large cities in Western Europe and North America.
At least 30 soldiers and officers arrested by Malian government over alleged coup plot.
Overnight on 10-11 August, Malian security forces arrested at least 30 soldiers and military officials for allegedly plotting a coup. Mopti region governor General Abass Dembele and General Nema Sagara were reportedly among those arrested, although this has been denied by some sources. The arrests almost certainly indicate mounting pressure on Mali’s junta, as the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has intensified its insurgent operations in recent months. Historically, coups often follow sustained government setbacks against insurgencies, making it highly likely that the authorities are aware of the elevated coup risk driven by JNIM’s heightened activity. In the wake of successive coups in 2020 and 2021, the junta has further expanded its repression of dissent.
Niger government seizes control of industrial gold mine.
On 9 August, Niger’s junta announced the nationalisation of the Societe des Mines du Liptako (SML) gold mine, the country’s only industrial gold mine. The junta claimed that the decision was made “[i]n view of serious breaches” and “with a view to saving this highly strategic company”, accusing the Australian ownership of failing to implement a USD 10 million investment plan, triggering tax and wage arrears, employee layoffs, increased debt, and production stoppages. The nationalisation comes after similar moves by Malian and Burkinabè juntas, and almost certainly constitutes an attempt to shore up gold reserves to aid in combating the ongoing jihadist insurgency in western Niger, primarily conducted by Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP).
Nearly 600 people killed in Nigeria airstrikes in eight months.
On 13 August, Nigeria’s air force declared that its military killed 592 armed militia members and destroyed at least 200 technical vehicles and 166 logistics hubs in Borno State in the last eight months since increasing airstrikes in the region under Operation Hadin Kai (OPHK). These numbers are up from the same period in 2024. The airstrikes have targeted Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) members, who have killed over 2,000 people since 2023 and have increased their activity in 2025. While the high casualty rate indicates a degree of success, Boko Haram and ISWAP no longer rely on large, fixed bases and often hide among civilian populations, limiting the impact of airstrikes. Nigeria’s military has been accused of causing civilian casualties in these airstrikes, which a spokesperson has responded to by stating “we often abort operations to avoid civilian casualties”. Given the likely difficulty verifying the deaths from airstrikes, it is highly likely that the statistics of casualties from armed militia members include at least some civilian casualties. Given the straining of Nigeria’s security forces across the country, its military will highly likely increasingly rely on bombing campaigns as a key counterinsurgency tactic, which, given the high rates of collateral damage, could ultimately play into the hands of militant groups.
Fighting resumes between DRC forces and AFC/M23, despite ceasefire.
On 8 August, fighting between the Rwanda-backed AFC/M23 and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), as well as the pro-government Wazalendo militia, was recorded near Mulamba, South Kivu. According to local reporting, the AFC/M23 pushed the FARDC and Wazalendo back after heavy clashes. On 10 August, both sides received reinforcements, and fighting continued into 11 August around Mulamba, approximately 80 kilometres southwest of Bukavu. AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka released a statement the same day claiming that “the Kinshasa regime continues its offensive military manoeuvres aimed at full-scale war” and has conducted “[s]ignificant troop movements and military equipment deployments” which “deliberately violate the ceasefire”. The following day, the FARDC responded with accusations that the AFC/M23 had violated the ceasefire and reserved the right to respond. While Kanyuka reaffirms AFC/M23’s commitment to “working toward a peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict”, these clashes almost certainly threaten to collapse the peace deal scheduled to be signed by 18 August before it has started. Notably, one of the axes Kanyuka claims the FARDC have moved troops is the Kalemi – Uvira axis. Should the conflict move close to Uvira, regional stability will almost certainly be threatened, as Burundi would highly likely intervene to prevent Uvira, situated next to the DRC-Burundi border, falling to AFC/M23.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
6.1 magnitude earthquake in western Turkey.
On 10 August, a magnitude 6.1 earthquake struck Balikesir, in the Marmara region of Turkey, resulting in significant damage and casualties. The earthquake led to the collapse of at least 16 buildings across 68 villages in the Sindirgi area, with emergency services establishing a joint task centre to coordinate rescue efforts. At least one person was killed and 29 others were injured. Rescue operations are ongoing, with at least four individuals rescued from collapsed structures. Over 250 aftershocks have been recorded, complicating recovery efforts. In response to the earthquake, schools in the province were closed on 11 August. No damage was reported to highways or bridges in the region. Communication issues, including mobile service outages, have been reported in some areas.
Iraq records nationwide power outages.
On 11 August, Iraq recorded widespread power outages following the collapse of several electrical systems. The outages affected the entire country, with the exception of the Kurdistan region. Initial reports indicate that the electrical system in Basrah collapsed, leading to a significant power outage, although the specific nature of the incident has yet to be determined. Subsequent failures were reported at power stations in other parts of the country. The Iraqi Ministry of Electricity attributed the outages to damage to key transmission lines, compounded by excessive demand during the pilgrimage in Karbala and extreme summer temperatures. Until power is fully restored, critical services like water pumping, healthcare, and communications are likely to experience major disruptions and the widespread use of diesel generators is likely to lead to a deterioration in air quality. There is a realistic possibility that prolonged outages could trigger localised protests, particularly in southern governorates where previous electricity shortages have sparked demonstrations against perceived government inefficiency and corruption.
Tropical Storm Erin prompts flash floods across Cape Verde
On 11 August, Cape Verde experienced flash floods following the impact of Tropical Storm Erin. Damages were primarily recorded on the island of São Vicente, where over 200 millimetres of precipitation were documented over a five-hour period. The latest tolls report that the floodwaters have led to eight deaths, and thousands injured or displaced. The government has declared a State of Disaster for both São Vincente and the neighbouring island of Santo Antão, with continued thunderstorms expected to exacerbate flooding in the coming days. The casualty toll will likely rise, with Cape Verde largely unequipped to deal with natural disasters and resulting damage.
Asia–Pacific
Taiwan and China: Typhoon Podul makes landfall, triggering disruptions.
Typhoon Podul made landfall near Taimali in southeastern Taiwan’s Taitung County, causing power outages for approximately 28,000 households in Taitung and affecting around 4,900 households in Kaohsiung. The storm resulted in one person missing and over 100 injuries in Taiwan. In China, the typhoon made landfall along the coast in China’s southeastern province of Fujian, leading to heavy rain and emergency responses and evacuations. Over 18,000 people were evacuated in Guangdong as preparations were made for the storm’s arrival. Airports across the region reported numerous flight cancellations, with over a third of flights to Quanzhou cancelled.
As of 14 August, Hong Kong has downgraded its rainstorm warning to the second-highest level, although heavy rain is still anticipated to cause flooding and disrupt traffic. In Taiwan, Penghu County has resumed normal travel operations after being affected by the typhoon, with only minor damage reported. Taiwan has lifted its land and sea warnings as the storm moves away, though heavy rain is still expected in certain areas. Previously, Hong Kong had issued its highest-level black rainstorm warning multiple times in response to the storm.
Solace Global Assessment:
This is the third large storm to hit Taiwan in recent weeks, with Typhoon Danas and Tropical Storm Co-may making landfall in July. Typhoon Podul is the strongest storm to affect Taiwan this year, reaching sustained wind speeds of 155 kilometres (96) per hour, equivalent to a category 2 typhoon or hurricane. Despite the intensity of the cyclone, Taiwan has developed a robust infrastructure to withstand typhoons. This includes sea walls and breakwaters, extensive drainage systems in cities, building codes requiring reinforced concrete structures and wind-resistant designs, advanced warning systems, tiered evacuation protocols, and pre-positioned utility crews. This allows minimal disruption and rapid recovery after storms have passed through. The storm passed significantly south of Taipei, missing the capital. While main metropolitan areas have been relatively unaffected, the typhoon has likely damaged crops, negatively impacting Taiwan’s economy. Lingering disruptions are highly likely as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and coastal areas of China recover from the typhoon’s passage.
APAC Summary and Forecast
Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest
Hundreds gather in anti-government protests in Bihar, India.
On 11 August, hundreds of opposition lawmakers gathered in Bihar to denounce sweeping revisions to voter registration. The protests, held in light of upcoming state legislative elections in November, saw clashes with police forces, resulting in the detention and eventual release of dozens of protesters, including Rahul Gandhi, the leader of India’s opposition party, Lok Sabha. The revisions to voter registration, set to require the use of birth certificates, passports, and matriculation documents to verify voter eligibility, have been enacted to remove ‘dead votes’ or cases in which voters have relocated to other states. Criticisms of this policy have largely stemmed from its likely impact to disenfranchise poorer demographics and ethnic minorities; an alleged attempt by the leading Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to gain control over crucial ‘swing states’ like Bihar. The BJP’s favourable policies to India’s Hindu majority have meant success in swing states like Bihar, which has over 17 million Muslims, is difficult. The recent revisions are likely to pave the way for a more consolidated victory in November, contrasting the narrow defeat faced in the 2020 state elections. As a result, there is a realistic possibility that opposition groups will organise future protests over the reforms, especially in the lead up to the November elections.
Bangladesh student party opposes elections in February 2026.
On 12 August, during a rally to commemorate the August 2024 revolution, representatives of the National Citizen Party (NCP) stated that the country’s next elections “cannot happen” in February. This is due to the reported failures of the interim government to implement the necessary structural reforms to ensure a democratic transition of power. The NCP was founded by several of the prominent student leaders of the 2024 revolution and has emerged as an important political force. Conversely, early elections are supported by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). The BNP played a key role in pressuring the interim government to anticipate the vote, first to April and then to February 2026. BNP leaders have accused their NCP counterparts of threatening to “stop the election” and creating a “mob culture”. The exchange is likely indicative of growing tensions between the parties, which is a key driver of mob violence and targeted attacks.
South Korean president announces Washington visit
On 12 August, South Korea’s president Lee Jae Myung announced a planned visit to Washington DC on 25 August. The meeting with Myung’s US counterpart is likely to focus on increased cooperation between the two states on technology and shipbuilding sectors, and will follow agreements made in July, within which South Korea announced investments into the US energy sector in return for cuts to US tariffs. Beyond economic agreements, discussions are likely to extend to the presence of US forces on the peninsula, with recent comments by American defence officials over the costs of such ventures causing growing concern in Seoul. Proposals by US military officials have suggested a reduction in personnel and an emphasis on improved capabilities to counter the growing threat of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. While the meeting is unlikely to produce drastic changes to the status quo, resistance from Seoul to proposed US force reductions could still heighten tensions, particularly in the run-up to joint military exercises beginning on 18 August.
Protests erupt in Pati, Indonesia.
On 13 August, protests in Pati, Central Java, turned violent, resulting in multiple injuries to both demonstrators and the police. The police deployed tear gas and water cannons to control the crowd after protesters breached the gate of the local council. The protests began after Regent Sudewo increased land and building taxes by 250 per cent, which resulted in over 100,000 people amassing in Pati’s town square demanding his resignation. Initially peaceful, it quickly grew into one of the largest mass protests in Pati’s history. Presidential Spokesperson Prasetyo Hadi has declared that the government is monitoring the situation and has urged all parties to exercise restraint. He added that he has communicated with the Governor of Central Java and the Regent of Pati to seek a solution, emphasising that local government policies will be evaluated if they are detrimental. There is a realistic possibility that the tax increases will be reversed amid the government intervention. If they are not, further protests are highly likely and will likely involve clashes with the security forces.
Security, Armed Conflict and Terror
Balochi groups designated as FTOs by US.
On 7-8 August, Pakistani security forces intercepted a group of militants trying to cross the Durand Line in the Zhob District of Balochistan, which forms part of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. At least 33 militants were killed in the ensuing clashes, while it is unclear if Pakistani forces suffered casualties. Pakistani government channels referred to the militants as being part of the “Indian proxy Fitna al-Khwaraj”. This name, alongside the interchangeable Fitna al-Hindustani, has been adopted by Islamabad over the last 12 months to refer to groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which it accuses of being funded by India.
On 12, BLA channels claimed credit for an ambush on Pakistani government forces in the Washuk District of Balochistan. The attack resulted in the deaths of nine soldiers and around a dozen injuries. On the day prior, Washington announced that the BLA would be designated as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO), a development on its previous designation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) group, dating to 2019.
Thai Armed Forces warn of renewed hostilities after a Thai soldier was injured on the border.
On 12 August, spokespersons of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) warned that it may have to exercise the right of self-defence in response to increasing incidents on the Cambodian border. The warning was issued in the aftermath of an incident which saw a Cambodian landmine leave a Thai soldier severely injured. The incident is the second of its kind since the signing of a tentative ceasefire on 28 July, which brought about the end of five days of fighting which left over 30 killed and dozens injured. Continued tensions surrounding the border dispute that instigated the conflict mean there is a realistic possibility of renewed border skirmishes and incidents in the coming days. However, it is unlikely either side will seek to restart direct hostilities due to fears of international condemnation and repercussions, especially from China and the U.S., who helped mediate the 28 July agreement.
Environment, Health and Miscellaneous
Dengue Fever outbreak recorded in Bangladesh.
Local authorities have recorded at least 101 deaths from the vector-borne disease in 2025, with a total of more than 24,000 cases recorded since January. The highest death tolls were recorded in July and August, likely as hot and humid conditions are conducive to larger mosquito populations. Cities that have extremely high population density, such as Dhaka, are also particularly at risk. It is likely that the protracted state vulnerabilities that have been worsened by last year’s revolution will result in increased difficulties for authorities’ efforts to reduce transmission rates.
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