On 8 December, the US Customs and Border Protection agency (CBP) released a proposal that would force travellers, including tourists, from countries eligible under the visa waiver program, to submit to a review of up to five years of their social media histories. The proposal states that “CBP is adding social media as a mandatory data element for an ESTA application”. The Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) is the automated system that grants eligibility to travel to the US under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). 42 countries currently participate in the VWP, including EU states, the UK, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The proposal is almost certainly part of the current US administration’s efforts to curtail the entry into the US of individuals who espouse views that may be contrary to American national interest and to improve counter-terrorism screening. Plans may also include the submission of telephone numbers and emails covering the last decade, and family members’ names in a broader effort to establish travellers’ connections and patterns of life. However, those applying for an ESTA will essentially be consenting to the terms of the program, enabling the US to collect information that is often counted as personal data under domestic privacy laws.

The proposal follows a previous overhaul in entry vetting rules that applied to H-1B and H-4 visa applicants in December, and to F, M, and J visa applicants in June. Opponents of the move have warned that the new rules risk causing additional processing delays, and that the lack of clarity regarding grounds for entry denial may expose travellers to breaches of privacy or force them to disclose sensitive information. The move has likely been justified in response to the recent shooting of two National Guard soldiers by an Afghan migrant, and is likely planned ahead of the 2026 World Cup that will bring in over one million travellers to the US.

The new proposal, if implemented, would likely introduce additional travel risks for nationals from VWP countries who hold dual nationality or those whose passports do not reflect their travel histories as indicated by social media analysis. If social media analysis indicates travel to countries deemed to be at higher risk by the current US administration, like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Somalia, or suggests that applicants have not declared previous travel, affiliations, or online activity of interest to US authorities, there is a high risk of entry being denied.

On 9 December, US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornets and an EA-18G Growler flew extended orbits over the Gulf of Venezuela during a 40-minute sortie on the edge of Venezuelan airspace. The aircraft were visible on open-source flight tracking platforms and the F/A-18s approached to within 20 nautical miles of the Venezuelan coastline near Maracaibo. The EA-18G Growler, a specialist electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, conducted similar orbits to the north of the Gulf of Venezuela. All aircraft activated their transponders only when arriving near Venezuelan airspace, and their origin and destination were not displayed. On the following day, US Naval forces conducted an operation to seize the very large crude carrier (VLCC) SKIPPER (IMO: 9304667) in the Caribbean Sea off the coast of Venezuela. The vessel was reportedly falsely flying the Guyanese flag and was preparing to conduct a ship-to-ship (STS) transfer of Venezuelan crude to a Panamanian-flagged vessel for onward delivery to Cuba. The vessel had previously been sanctioned by the US for its alleged role in facilitating illicit oil shipments from Venezuela that generated funds for Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. President Maduro has denounced the seizure as “international piracy”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The sortie marks the closest air operation to Venezuelan airspace to date and was highly likely designed to exert pressure on the Maduro administration, demonstrate US capability and conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) before any military engagement. Flying without the responder on, but then activating it while near Venezuela, was likely intended to demonstrate the US’s ability to approach undetected, even with older, less stealthy aircraft, thereby signalling that more advanced platforms or weapon systems, such as F-35s, could penetrate far deeper into Venezuelan airspace with limited advanced warning.

The sorties were likely probing air defences, with the EA-18G Growler tasked with monitoring for Venezuela’s responses. The aircraft can be equipped with a suite of sensors and EW systems, capable of detecting radar emissions, intercepting encrypted communications, and assessing the broader make-up and readiness of Venezuelan air defences. While only a limited operation, it may have provided valuable intelligence regarding gaps in Venezuela’s detection capability, responses, potential targets and other vulnerabilities that could be exploited in a future conflict.

Also on 9 December, President Trump stated that President Maduro’s days are numbered and refused to rule out deployment trips on Venezuelan soil. While this remains highly unlikely in the immediate future, and US forces deployed to the Caribbean Basin are not large enough to support a ground invasion, overt intelligence gathering operations will likely become more common to maintain pressure on the Maduro administration. However, such operations will likely significantly increase the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation, particularly if Venezuelan air-defence units misinterpret US probing activity as preparation for imminent strikes.

The seizure of an oil tanker likely marks the greatest threat to the Maduro administration to date. Oil accounts for approximately 95 per cent of Venezuela’s exports, and illicit crude shipments have become a critical financial stream that has enabled Caracas to establish and maintain international allies. More importantly, oil revenues have allowed the Maduro administration to ensure regime stability by funding security and intelligence forces, bribing elites and subsidising domestic services to help mitigate the threat of internal unrest. If the US sustains operations on Venezuela’s tanker fleet, it will likely help to isolate Maduro diplomatically, undermine regime stability, and significantly increase pressure without having to commit to kinetic strikes on Venezuelan soil.

Multi-state anti-government protest planned for 14 December in Mexico.  

Mexican anti-government groups have planned several “Silence Marches” across multiple locations in the country, including Mexico City, and the states of Guadalajara, Jalisco, and Michoacan. The name of the protest echoes the 1968 Silent March, a large anti-government rally against the government of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz Bolaños that has become a landmark episode in contemporary Mexican history and has been reprised by several anti-government movements over the last decades. The 14 December protest will occur a month after the large-scale rally in Mexico City on 15 November, organised to protest the death of Uruapan Mayor Carlos Manzo, and they are also motivated by perceived government failures to combat organised crime. The 15 November rally coincided with violent clashes between protesters and security forces, with the former trying to break into the National Palace. While organisers of the 14 December protests have called for the rallies to remain peaceful, violent unrest cannot be ruled out.

Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Flavio, enters Brazil’s presidential race.            

On 5 December, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro announced on social media that his father, the former president who is currently imprisoned for plotting to stage a coup, had given him a “mission” to carry forward his political project at the next presidential elections, scheduled to take place in October 2026. The endorsement makes Flavio Bolsonaro the likeliest candidate to represent the Liberal Party (PL), and will likely reduce the political momentum behind São Paulo Governor Tarcisio de Freitas, who observers largely indicated to be the likely Bolsonaro-backed candidate for 2026. While Jair Bolsonaro retains a large cohort of committed supporters, his popularity has waned over the past two years. Current polling suggests that his son would lose a two-candidate race against the current President Lula.

Protests in Buenos Aires, Argentina, over 2026 budget and labour reforms.              

Protests occurred in the capital of Argentina on 9 December, with protesters staging road blockades and clashing with responding police. The protests are part of a general strike by public sector workers, which was triggered by the 2026 budget law and a new labour reform proposed by Argentina’s government, which furthers the libertarian agenda of President Javier Milei. Milei’s governing coalition scored a significant victory at the October 2025 elections, giving further momentum to the president’s controversial policy plans. Milei has pushed to immediately leverage the new parliamentary “balance of power”, and has called to extend parliamentary sessions during the usual Christmas holidays to quickly approve the budget bill. Further protests remain likely throughout the rest of December.

Two killed in likely botched militant attack at tollbooth near Medellín, Colombia.

On 10 December, an explosion occurred approximately 200 metres from a tollbooth of the Medellín-Bogotá Highway, located in the municipality of Copacabana. Two people were killed in the blast, which authorities stated was caused by a grenade, and two police officers were injured. Other explosives and firearms were found in the trunk of the vehicle where the explosion occurred. Authorities have suggested that the explosion could have been linked to a previous attack at a tollbooth in Antioquia, which was claimed by the National Liberation Army (ELN), one of Colombia’s most powerful armed militant groups. In 2025, ELN forces have staged several high-profile attacks on authorities and civilian infrastructure, including several attacks in the city of Cali.

13 killed after explosive device detonates outside Ecuadorian prison.            

On 7 December, an explosive device detonated approximately 100 metres from Machala Prison in Southwestern Ecuador, killing 13, apparently via asphyxiation. Violence at Machala Prison is common, with clashes between rival gangs killing at least 31 inmates in November. In this attack, Los Lobos, Ecuador’s second largest gang, was targeted by a splinter gang, Sao-Box, before Los Lobos carried out a reprisal attack. Los Lobos is Machala’s largest gang, responsible for most of the city’s major violent incidents. The gang has control or influence over prisons in Machala, and the latest violence was highly likely either perpetrated by or targeting their members.

Prisons in Ecuador often act as command centres for gangs, with dominance inside the facilities being leveraged to control outside operations, including drug trafficking, extortion, assassinations, and recruitment. Leaders often enjoy access to private rooms, mobile phones, the internet, and money. Given the operational freedom within prisons, the detonation was unlikely to be a prison break attempt but was likely a message or distraction to conceal internal violence, with one of the 13 dead potentially being the target. Ecuador has seen a significant rise in gang violence in recent years, with many gangs linked to Mexican cartels. Reprisal attacks are highly likely.

New contingent of Kenyan police arrives in Haiti to bolster anti-gang mission.         

On 8 November, a 230-officer-strong Kenyan police contingent arrived in Haiti. This represents the fifth and latest personnel increase since the mission was expanded in February and, importantly, since it was restructured into a “Gang Suppression Force” (GSF) in September. The police force, which brings the total number of Kenyan officers in Haiti to more than 700, still falls short of its objective of 5,500 officers. Despite the reinforcements, the humanitarian and security situation in Haiti has further worsened in 2025, with approximately 4,400 people, largely civilians, killed by the gangs that control much of the country between January and September. The insecurity also forced the postponement of general elections in Haiti, which were scheduled for 6 December. The GSF continues to face significant structural issues, including an evident inability to sever gangs’ control over civilian communities, which criminals have secured by systematically targeting and dismantling civic and administrative institutions.

US admin threatens extra tariffs over US-Mexico river treaty.             

On 8 December, US President Donald Trump published a social media post threatening to impose an extra five per cent tariff on goods entering the US from Mexico, claiming that Mexico “owes” the US approximately 986.8 million cubic metres of water. The claim is in reference to the 1944 Rio Grande Treaty, which delineates cross-border allocations of water from the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers. Currently, the allocation of dwindling water supplies is a politically salient issue in Mexico, with a recent controversial water concessions law provoking large-scale farmers’ protests across the country in early December. US demands for Mexico to “release” large quantities of water at a politically inflammatory time have an increased potential to drive anti-government protests and anti-US sentiment in Mexico. Conversely, if Mexico proceeds with releasing substantial volumes of water to the US, the move is likely to intensify domestic political pressure, heighten anti-government sentiment, and fuel further unrest among farmers.

Heavy rainfall in southern Brazil triggers flooding in Greater Florianópolis.

On 9 December, an extratropical cyclone triggered heavy rainfall in southern Brazil, causing flooding in Florianópolis, São José, Palhoça, and Biguaçu. Palhoça in Greater Florianópolis declared a state of emergency after three people were killed by the flooding. The adverse weather has resulted in disruptions, with sections of the BR-101 being blocked in Palhoça and Biguaçu, nearly 3,800 homes in Greater Florianópolis losing power, and the suspension of classes. Brazil’s meteorological agency Metsul stated on 9 December that the atypical inclement weather in Santa Catarina State was the result of an “extremely deep low-pressure centre”. Multiple alerts have been issued in the wider area, warning of landslides and flooding.

Farmers in Greece protesting the delayed payment of European Union agricultural subsidies and government-administered farm aid have blocked several highways, border crossings and access to major ports and airports across the country. On 8 December, farmers staged demonstrations near the airports in Heraklion and Chania in Crete, where police forces used tear gas to disperse the protest. However, farmers stormed the runway at Heraklion’s main airport, forcing the temporary suspension of flights. Farmers also blocked access to the Port of Mytilini on the island of Lesbos on 8 December.

On 9 December, the Greek Supreme Court ordered prosecutors to intervene in farmers’ demonstrations when they blocked roads, ports or airports, stating that such actions could constitute crimes, including the disruption of road safety. However, further protests were recorded after this statement. On 10 December, farmers blocked access to the Port of Volos, one of the largest ports on mainland Greece, with fishermen joining the protest by blocking maritime access with their vessels. Demonstrations also blocked access to ports and airports in the Thessaloniki area in Central Macedonia, the Promachonas and Kipi border crossings with Bulgaria and Turkey, and are maintaining smaller protests on roads across the country.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The current round of Greek farmer protests marks one of the largest mobilisations in years, with an estimated 20,000-25,000 tractors involved in the movement. Farmers have argued that delays in payments amount to collective punishment, leaving honest farmers in debt and unable to plant their fields for next season. The subsidy scandals, which have also been linked to corruption among state employees, follow an outbreak of goat and sheep pox that has led to a mass cull of livestock in Greece, exacerbating the financial strain associated with delayed payments and increasing the frustrations among the farming community.

The scale and disruption of the protests have forced the Greek government into holding emergency meetings, with the blocking of the Port of Volos, the gateway to Greece’s agricultural heartland in Thessaly, reportedly being the primary trigger. With multiple roads, ports, airports and border crossings intermittently blocked, the protests are almost certainly beginning to have a cascading effect, disrupting supply chains, tourism, and regional trade flows, increasing pressure on the government to make concessions, despite the Supreme Court’s orders.

The government has pledged to accelerate the disbursement of EU aid and domestic compensation. However, farmers have signalled that this is not enough and that payments combined with structural reforms are required. Without immediate and improved payments and pledges of reform, further protests are highly likely and may extend into the Christmas period to maximise pressure and publicity. Moreover, Greece is also struggling with taxi driver protests, student demonstrations, and wider public-sector discontent. There is a realistic possibility that the scale and success of the farmers’ protest will embolden other factions to start or resume protests to increase pressure on the government.

Between 4 and 6 December, US and Ukrainian delegations met in Miami, Florida, for “marathon” peace talks. US negotiators reportedly pressed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to accept the key Russian demand to cede the entirety of Donbas (including currently unoccupied areas) over a phone call on 6 December, according to a Ukrainian official. Zelensky has indicated that the latest US proposal involves an exchange of control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) for unoccupied parts of Donetsk Oblast.

On 8 December, Zelensky met with the leaders of the UK, France, and Germany in London. The meeting concluded with a reiterated unified European position that no peace deal should compromise Ukraine’s territorial integrity or sovereignty, and that any agreement must include robust security guarantees and a full ceasefire. Zelensky stated on 9 December that Ukraine and its European allies will soon present to the US “refined” peace plan documents for review. Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated that the documents consist of three parts: a 20-point peace framework agreement, a set of security guarantees, and a post-war reconstruction plan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In mid-November, the 28-point peace plan drafted by Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev included multiple concessions deemed unacceptable by Kyiv. Then, following negotiations in late November and early December with European involvement, Kyiv gave provisional agreement to a 20-point peace plan, pending a few details. In the aftermath of the 2 December talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US envoys in Moscow, the latest diplomatic developments in Miami have highly likely failed to find a resolution to the two most fundamental issues in establishing peace: the Kremlin’s demands for Ukraine to cede the entire Donbas, including currently unoccupied sections of Donetsk, and Kyiv’s demands for credible security guarantees.

Moscow’s demand for a full Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast likely poses an existential threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty if realised. Donetsk Oblast has seen the most intense fighting and largest battles of the war, with Ukrainian forces inflicting enormous casualties on Russian forces. The seven fortified cities in Donetsk that remain under Ukrainian control (excluding Pokrovsk, which almost certainly still has Ukrainian defenders in the north but is highly likely to soon be fully captured), which include the extensive Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, have been termed the ‘fortress belt’. If Ukraine cedes the fortress belt to Russia, Ukraine would be forfeiting its most defensible line, exposing less fortified areas to any potential future Russian advances.

Furthermore, without a ceasefire in place, withdrawing Ukrainian forces would be highly vulnerable to Russian attack. In the 28-point plan, a ceasefire would only take effect after both sides withdraw to agreed points for the start of the agreement’s implementation. Therefore, it is highly likely that the only measures which could enable Kyiv to agree to such a withdrawal would be credible security guarantees against future Russian invasion and a credible ceasefire which would preclude attacks against withdrawing forces.

During the war and negotiations, several potential security guarantees for Ukraine have been proposed. Within the 28-point plan, there is the provision that “Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.” In exchange for the US receiving “compensation” for providing a guarantee, the draft plan states that if Russia invades Ukraine, all global sanctions will be reinstated, but more importantly, there will be a “decisive and coordinated military response”. However, the plan also stipulates that NATO members cannot station troops in Ukraine, and that European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland (which is already the case). Given the vague nature of the provisions, Kyiv will require far more ironclad guarantees. Despite the 1994 Budapest Memorandum providing security assurances for Ukraine in exchange for giving up its nuclear arsenal, these assurances proved worthless in both 2014 and 2022. Hence, Zelensky has stated a wish for the US guarantees to be enshrined in law through approval by Congress.

In response to the pressure on territorial concessions, Zelensky has maintained a hard line by referring to law – Ukraine is unable to cede territory due to its “Constitution, or international and moral law”. However, fundamentally, it is arguable that both key points of friction in negotiations (territory and security guarantees) relate to the likely central priority of Kyiv in peace negotiations: ensuring that Ukraine’s sovereignty is protected long-term. However, the Kremlin is unlikely to be willing to accept a now-hostile Ukraine with ironclad security guarantees on its border. As negotiations continue, Russian forces will highly likely continue to apply maximum military pressure both at the frontlines and with aerial strikes, particularly against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Through this pressure, Moscow will highly likely continue to pursue its maximalist objectives, under the threat that if Ukraine does not concede to demands, Russian forces will be ultimately able to forcefully achieve them with military force.

On 8 December, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed separatist group, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), stated that it had seized broad control over Yemen’s eight southern governorates. In an offensive initially launched on 2 December named “Operation Promising Future”, STC forces captured several key areas in Hadhramaut, including the cities of Seiyun and Tarim, and Marah governorates.

Having also conducted operations in Aden, where the Saudi Arabia-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) is located under the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the head of the PLC, Rashad al-Alimi and Prime Minister Salem Saleh Bin Braik both left Aden. Having been in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 7 December, al-Alimi released a statement on 8 December which said that the STC offensive has undermined the legitimacy of the IRG and violated the Saudi-mediated STC-IRG power-sharing agreement signed in 2019.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Yemen’s territory is now divided between the Houthi Movement, who control most of the pre-1990 unification North Yemen and 70-80 per cent of Yemen’s population, the STC, and the Saudi Arabia-backed internationally recognised government (IRG). Despite the 2019 Riyadh Agreement leading to power-sharing between the STC and IRG, STC forces have maintained autonomy, and it is almost certain that the Promising Future operation marks the most significant shift in power in Yemen since the 2022 UN-brokered ceasefire with the Houthis, which has de facto held since.

In a press briefing by senior STC official Amr Bidh on 4 December, Bidh stated that the STC was consulting both Yemeni and international partners on the potential pursuit of a ground offensive against the Houthis.  During the March-May 2025 campaign of US strikes against the Houthis, named Operation Rough Rider, the Wall Street Journal was briefed by Yemeni and US officials that UAE-backed Yemeni factions (almost certainly in reference to the STC) were planning a ground offensive against the Houthis, reportedly with the advice of private American security contractors.

It is currently unclear what the position is between the STC and IRG. Although Bidh has stated that “nothing has changed” in the PLC, that it is “business as usual”, the STC is a secessionist faction whose leader, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, called for as recently as October a new state called “South Arabia”. During an interview, al-Zoubaidi said that while the STC and IRG were in “federal transition phase, united by the need to confront the Houthis”, the “ultimate goal is a two-state solution: North and South”. There have been multiple reports of the flag of South Yemen (the pre-unification flag of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen) being erected in place of the IRG flag in seized areas, a key indicator that the STC is no longer recognising the authority of the IRG. There is a realistic possibility that the STC will soon announce the establishment of a new state of South Arabia.

The developments have highly likely increased tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi forces have withdrawn from multiple areas in southern Yemen, and the UAE-backed STC directly confronted Saudi-backed tribal forces in Hadhramaut, for example. The Saudi-led coalition’s involvement in the civil war in Yemen accrued considerable reputation and economic costs for Saudi Arabia, and Riyadh is likely very reluctant to re-engage in further conflict in Yemen. The sudden STC surge poses a major threat to the Houthis, with the STC having now potentially unified much of the south under one flag.

A reignition of the civil war would not only dramatically change Yemen’s security environment but also pose considerable risks of Houthi long-range attacks being conducted against Gulf states, particularly the UAE, due to their direct sponsorship of the STC. During the 2014-2022 civil war, the Houthis had launched multiple attacks against targets in the UAE, including an attack using long-range attack drones and ballistic missiles in January 2022, which struck fuel trucks near Abu Dhabi International Airport (AUH), killing three civilians.

On 7 December, a military faction, calling itself the Military Committee for Refoundation and led by Lieutenant Colonel Tigri Pascal, appeared on Benin’s state television and announced the dissolution of the government and national institutions, the suspension of the constitution, and the closure of land, air, and sea borders. Gunfire was also heard near the presidential residence in Cotonou. Shortly after  , President Patrice Talon declared that the situation was “totally under control”, with Interior Minister Alassane Seidou stating that “a small group of soldiers launched a mutiny to destabilise the state and its institutions” but that “[f]aced with this situation, the Beninese armed forces and their leadership, true to their oath, remained committed to the republic.” Foreign Minister Olushegun Adjadi Bakari added that the soldiers only had control of state television. 14 people were reported to have been arrested.

Talon issued two requests for assistance to Nigeria’s government, prompting its military to deploy fighter jets to take over Benin’s airspace and conduct airstrikes. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) condemned the coup attempt and pledged to support the government “by all means necessary”. It subsequently deployed part of its standby force to target the military faction. Calm had returned to Cotonou by 8 December, but a heavy security presence remained on the streets. Two senior military officers who had been taken hostage by the putschists were released.

Immediately following the coup attempt, the US Embassy in Benin urged residents to “[a]void the area, specifically Cotonou and areas near the presidential compound.” This advice was subsequently lifted.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Benin has not had a successful coup since 1972, which was the last of a sequence of nine coup attempts in the 15 years post its 1960 independence from France, making Benin one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most coup-prone countries. Despite this, in recent years, Benin has become a model case for democracy, with decades of rising living standards and high economic growth (its 2025 figure reached 7.5 per cent). However, Talon’s growing authoritarianism via constraints on opposition since taking office in 2016 and an alleged foiled coup plot in January 2024, have contributed to a growing sense of democratic backsliding. A presidential election is scheduled for April 2026 will take place under reduced levels of electoral competition and freedom of expression.

A growing sense of instability has been exacerbated by increasing jihadist violence in the northern regions, with Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) establishing a presence near the border. This was mentioned by the putschists as a key reason for conducting the coup, citing “the ignorance and neglect of the situation of our brothers in arms who have fallen at the front”. In April 2025, JNIM killed at least 54 soldiers stationed near the border with Burkina Faso. JNIM’s insurgency has been most active in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which have all had successful coups in recent years, with the group looking to expand its presence in Coastal West Africa. JNIM’s presence in the border regions of countries including Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Senegal almost certainly raises the risk of further coup attempts in the region.

This coup attempt comes shortly after a successful coup in Guinea-Bissau on 26 November and marks the latest in a series of coups along the “coup belt” in Africa, which includes Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Sudan. ECOWAS’s reaction to the attempt in Benin was almost certainly a reaction to the recent successful coup in Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS has highly likely learned from its mistakes following the Niger coup, where it threatened intervention but was too late to implement any preventive measures against the coup, which was completed swiftly. Benin will highly likely be used as a model for any further coup attempts in the region.

On the evening of 9 December, Rwanda-backed AFC/M23 rebels reportedly entered Uvira, with civilian and military authorities having fled earlier in the day. South Kivu Governor Jean-Jacques Purusi dismissed these reports as “completely unfounded rumours”. The group had swept through South Kivu quickly, claiming to have captured Sange along the N5 Highway two days prior, approximately 30 kilometres from Uvira, with fighting reported in Kiliba, just 15 kilometres from Uvira, on 9 December. Sange’s capture occurred shortly after the rebel group seized Luvungi on the same day. AFC/M23’s spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, announced on 10 December that the group has taken control of Uvira.

According to the UN, at least 200,000 people have fled their homes, with at least 74 killed. This marks a reignition of the AFC/M23 offensive south, with Burundi previously having warned that the group planned to take the city by 25 December before advancing along Lake Tanganyika towards Kalemie, 270 kilometres south.

The US, the European Union, and eight other European countries have called for a halt to the fighting and accused Rwanda of supporting the offensive. Following Uvira’s likely capture, the FCDO issued an update to its Burundi foreign travel advice, advising “against all but essential travel to the former Bujumbura Mairie Province, including the city of Bujumbura, and to the area of the former Bujumbura Rural Province east of the Rusizi river”

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the week-long offensive launched from Kamanyola, AFC/M23 have advanced approximately 50 kilometres in the Ruzizi Plain. Uvira has the second largest population in South Kivu and acts as a key transportation hub, with direct access to Burundi’s commercial capital, Bujumbura, across the border. AFC/M23’s likely capture of Uvira is highly likely to exacerbate the population displacement, with many citizens likely to flee into Burundi. Uvira’s capture will almost certainly cause significant concern in Burundi, with Burundian security forces stating that Burundi has closed its border with the DRC.

The renewed offensive is almost certainly indicative of the limitations of the US-mediated DRC-Rwanda peace agreement, which was signed in Washington on 4 December. The deal was largely symbolic, with peace in the DRC almost certainly dependent on the Qatar-mediated DRC-AFC/M23 peace talks. AFC/M23’s renewed offensive is highly likely designed as a land grab to consolidate more territory to increase the group’s leverage before engaging in further peace negotiations, despite signing a peace framework agreement in November. The renewed offensive almost certainly risks the collapse of the ongoing negotiations and likely deepens the mistrust between the two sides.

In January 2025, AFC/M23’s capture of Goma triggered a day of violent unrest in Kinshasa, with protesters targeting embassies belonging to France, the US, Rwanda, Belgium, the Netherlands, Kenya, and Uganda, with social media footage of demonstrators also attacking foreigners. There is a realistic possibility that AFC/M23’s capture of Uvira will trigger further unrest in Kinshasa over the government’s perceived ineffectiveness and foreign influence within the DRC. The offensive has taken place during the DRC and Rwanda’s signing of a US-mediated peace agreement, which is almost certainly indicative that peace in the DRC is more contingent on the Qatar-mediated DRC-AFC/M23 peace agreement.

General strike to cause severe disruptions in Portugal.

On 11 December, a general strike is planned to occur in Portugal. The strike was jointly called by the CGTP and UGT, the two largest unions in the country, which joined forces for the first time since 2013. The strike is in response to the government’s proposed labour reforms, which union representatives say will reduce workers’ rights. Key aspects of the reform include making it easier for employers to dismiss staff, loosening protections (especially for fixed-term contracts), expanding outsourcing, and increasing flexibility over working hours. Protests had already occurred in November and forced the government to backtrack on some issues.

The strike has resulted in notable disruptions. Local media reports that around two-thirds of trains in Lisbon have been cancelled, as well as roughly half of services in Porto and Coimbra. The country’s flagship carrier, TAP Air Portugal, is operating only 63 of nearly 300 scheduled flights. Lisbon’s metro system has also been shut down. Healthcare facilities and other essential services are operating at limited capacity. Disruptions from the strike are likely to be severe, and they will likely have knock-on effects during the 11-14 December period.

Andrej Babiš appointed as Czech Prime Minister, strengthening EU populist front.                 

On 9 December, Czech President Petr Pavel announced Andrej Babiš’s appointment as PM. Babiš, the leader of the populist ANO (literally, “yes”) party, had already held the office between 2017 and 2021. In October 2025, ANO received 34.5 per cent of the vote, beating then-incumbent PM Petr Fiala’s SPOLU coalition. The party then formed a coalition with the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party and the Motorists for Themselves (AUTO), an anti-environmentalist group.

Babiš’s appointment is likely to further strengthen the group of central European powers ruled by populist parties, which includes Slovakia and Hungary, possibly re-starting the Visegrad Four group, and will likely further embolden intra-EU opposition to some of the key policy frameworks supported by Brussels, like the EU Green Deal. Finally, Babiš has maintained a “colder” stance towards Kyiv compared to his predecessor, even threatening to suspend the ammunition procurement scheme that has supplied approximately 2.8 million artillery shells to Ukraine since 2024.

Large-scale protests in Athens, Greece, on anniversary of police killing of student.              

On 6 December, large-scale protests occurred in the Panepistimiou area of central Athens, with between 5,000 and 8,000 people in attendance according to local media. The protests marked the 17^th anniversary of the death of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, a 15-year-old student who was killed by a police officer in the nearby neighbourhood of Exarchia. Protesters clashed with police on the evening of 6 December, leading to more than 50 arrests. At least ten arrests were recorded in another demonstration in Thessaloniki. On 7 December, the day after the clashes, a police station in Kypseli, Athens, was hit with Molotov cocktails, in a possible retaliatory attack for the clashes.

Tunisia’s largest labour union calls general strike for 21 January.    

On 5 December, UGTT, Tunisia’s largest labour union, issued a nationwide strike announcement for 21 January 2026. The strike would be the first nationwide labour action since President Kais Saied carried out his so-called “self-coup”, in 2021, leading to a vast expansion of his powers. UGTT leaders have cited several reasons for the strike, including a worsening socioeconomic outlook, as well as the crackdown on opposition politicians and the erosion of civil liberties, with the likely trigger for the announcement being the sentencing of several opposition leaders to long prison sentences in late November. There is a realistic possibility that the announcement will result in a further crackdown on labour union leaders, and that Tunisian security forces will respond violently to the strike.

Somalia’s territory of Jubaland declares itself a “government”.        

On 7 December, Jubaland leaders announced that they had amended the region’s constitution to redefine it as a “government”, rather than as a member of Somalia’s federal government under the 2012 constitutional framework. The move is similar to that taken by the territory of Puntland in 2024, and it precedes a “national opposition conference”, which is scheduled to begin in Kismayo on 11 December and will also be attended by Puntland authorities.

Planned “mega protest” in Tanzania fails to go ahead.            

Opposition figures had called for a “mega protest” on 9 December, also known as “D9”, coinciding with Tanzania’s Independence Day. The government cancelled Independence Day celebrations in response and deployed a heavy security presence to the streets of major cities. Public transport in Dar es Salaam was halted due to the risk of vandalism.

The expected large-scale unrest, however, did not materialise. Many residents chose to stay indoors due to the threat of violence. Local media reported nearly empty streets across major cities, including Dar es Salaam, where the heaviest demonstrations occurred between 29 and 31 October, Dodoma, and Arusha. Police spokesperson David Misime urged citizens to ignore “videos from past events”. Human Rights Watch declared that security forces had arrested at least ten people since mid-November over posts about the planned protests on social media. The lack of unrest on 9 December is indicative that further election-related unrest is unlikely, with many Tanzanians almost certainly deterred from attending protests by security forces’ use of lethal force against demonstrators.

French forces intercept drones flying over submarine base.                

On 5 December, French military channels reported that troops had deployed jammers against at least five small drones spotted flying over the perimeter of the Île Longue submarine base, in Brittany, which houses France’s nuclear submarine fleet. French officials also reported that the incident occurred less than a month after drones were first spotted flying near the base, in mid-November. The incident is the latest in dozens of drone sightings over European critical military and civilian infrastructure, which are suspected to be linked to the Kremlin’s ongoing campaign of operations targeting Kyiv’s EU allies.

Three police officers wounded in shooting in Castres, France.           

On the night of 3-4 December, a firefight occurred in Castres, a town located in the Tarn department of the southern region of Occitanie. Three officers were wounded, reportedly after individuals opened fire on a police vehicle that was responding to an incident call. Local media have reported that drug-related violence has recently increased in Castres due to an ongoing rivalry between a criminal group known as DZ Mafia (likely the largest organised criminal group in southern France) and local smaller groups. On 1 December, a video surfaced on social media showing armed individuals discharging firearms into the air in the Lameilhé district, the same district where the later shooting occurred. It is highly likely that the shooting on 3-4 December is linked to drug trafficking in the area.

Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) expands offensive in Mali.           

Between 4 and 6 December, ISSP fighters reportedly carried out a series of attacks on positions held by the rival Islamist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) near Doro, in eastern Mali. The attack occurred in a region close to the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso tri-border area. Since November, ISSP has carried out an offensive targeting JNIM in northeast Burkina Faso, making important gains and forcing JNIM to redirect forces from elsewhere in the country. The attacks in Mali, which shift the fighting further north, likely reflect ISSP’s growing momentum. In Mali, as in Burkina Faso, ISSP’s advances have the potential to force JNIM to redeploy its forces to carry out containment operations. This, in turn, would likely benefit the Malian junta, which has been subjected to a nationwide fuel blockade by JNIM during much of the second half of 2025.

Ireland and UK impacted by Storm Bram, with nearly 100 flight cancellations at Dublin Airport.     

Storm Bram resulted in widespread disruption across Ireland and parts of the UK between 8 and 9 December. Being officially named by the Irish meteorological agency Met Éireann, in Ireland, the storm resulted in nearly 100 flights being cancelled at Dublin Airport (DUB/EIDW) and the loss of power to 54,000 homes. Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Kildare, Tipperary and Wexford were impacted. In the UK, flooding was recorded in multiple counties, with over 300 flood warnings or alerts issued across the country. While authorities have noted that the most severe phase of the storm has ended, warnings are likely to remain in place during the 11-13 December period. Disruptions, likewise, remain possible during this period.

Saudi authorities issue flood risk warnings for Makkah and Jeddah.               

On 8 December, the Saudi National Centre for Meteorology (NCM) issued flood risk alerts for the region of Makkah, which includes both Makkah and Jeddah, due to ongoing heavy rainfall. Thunderstorms and possible heavy precipitation also remain possible during the 11-14 December period across several of the country’s western regions. Saudi Arabia’s cities often lack adequate drainage infrastructure, meaning that periods of prolonged precipitation can result in severe travel disruptions and damage, as showcased during the disastrous 2022 floods.  

On 7 December, border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia resumed, resulting in significant casualties and mass evacuations. Both countries rejected responsibility for initiating the latest clashes, and each side accused the other of violating ceasefire agreements.

Cambodia’s defence ministry reported that nine civilians, including an infant, had been killed and 46 injured by Thai attacks. The Thai military said four of its soldiers had died and 68 were injured, while claiming 89 Cambodian soldiers were also killed. Both sides have traded accusations of targeting civilians and using heavy weaponry. Cambodian officials have accused the Thai military of firing “toxic gas” into residential areas in Ou Beichoan in Banteay Meanchey province.

Both militaries have conducted cross-border attacks, with Thailand employing F-16 fighter jets in response to Cambodian rocket artillery fire. The Thai military also announced plans to demolish the Stung Meteuk bridge in Cambodia’s Pursat province, alleging it was being used to transport artillery, and ordered civilians to evacuate the area.

Chanthaburi is reportedly the only Thai province that has not been directly affected by armed clashes. On 9 December, Thai Navy marines launched a counter-offensive in Trat province to reclaim territory seized by Cambodian forces. Aerial images had allegedly shown Cambodia reinforcing the area with troops and weaponry.

Thai authorities reported that more than 170,000 people had been evacuated to shelters in border provinces, with additional reports of nearly 430,000 residents displaced since the fighting resumed. Cambodian authorities have reported that 101,229 people have been evacuated across five provinces. Hospitals and schools on both sides of the border have faced closures due to the violence. The Thai military reported that Cambodian rockets landed near the Phanom Dong Rak Hospital in Surin on 10 December and accused Cambodia of deliberately targeting it.

Curfews and evacuation orders were imposed in Thailand’s Sa Kaeo, Surin, Sisaket, and Ubon Ratchathani provinces, with temporary shelters established for evacuees. The Thai government also heightened security and warned of suspected Cambodian spies in border areas. Land border crossings between the two countries have been suspended. China and Malaysia urged restraint, while Thailand’s prime minister ruled out negotiations, insisting that Cambodia comply with Thai demands. Cambodia announced its withdrawal from the 2025 Southeast Asia Games in Thailand due to the ongoing conflict. The US has asked the two sides to “cease hostilities immediately” and follow de-escalatory measures outlined in the US-brokered October peace accord.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The dispute originates from a 1904 colonial-era agreement between France and Siam using the watershed principle to define the border, but a later French map placed the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia. The ICJ ultimately ruled in Cambodia’s favour. Tensions over the disputed region have occasionally escalated, most notably in 2008 and 2011 following armed skirmishes between Cambodian and Thai troops.

Tensions again reignited on 24 July 2025, with violence erupting along multiple border sectors. The two sides exchanged artillery, rocket fire, heavy weaponry, and airstrikes. Overall, the conflict displaced over 300,000 civilians across Thailand and Cambodia. Many villages, schools, and civilian buildings were damaged. On 28 July, both sides agreed to a ceasefire following Malaysia-mediated peace talks with added pressure from the US and China.

The US-brokered Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord was signed by both sides in October. Under the agreement, both sides committed to refrain from the threat or use of force, and to settle disputes peacefully under international law, withdraw heavy weapons from border zones, establish a monitoring mechanism, and demine and clear unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Further clashes are highly likely in the short term. While the conflict has largely been confined to the border areas, the accusations of civilian targeting on each side, as well as accusations of the use of “toxic gas”, almost certainly heighten the risk of towns and cities further from the border being targeted. Furthermore, accusations of civilian targeting may result in tit-for-tat measures, such as the deliberate targeting of hospitals or other civilian infrastructure.

US President Donald Trump has declared that he will “make a phone call” to stop the clashes. The US could threaten to impose sanctions on the belligerents, which would almost certainly impact the economies of both countries and could act as a diplomatic off-ramp to engage in negotiations. There is a realistic possibility that protests will take place in Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Martial law may be imposed if tensions continue to escalate.

Electoral campaign drives inter- and intra-party clashes in Bangladesh.      

On 4 December, Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP) activists staged a protest in Munshinganj, south of Dhaka, staging road blockades and deploying fireworks. The protest was triggered by the central BNP leadership’s announcement of the party’s candidate list for the Munshinganj constituency, which activists stated excluded their preferred leaders. The incident was part of a growing number of cases of violence and unrest linked with the electoral campaign for the February 2026 elections, the first to be held since the uprising in July 2025, which toppled the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

Furthermore, on 8 December, 15 members of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) were injured in clashes with BNP supporters in Kazipur, Sirajganj District, during a campaign rally.  Political violence occurs frequently in Bangladesh. The civic society group Human Rights Support Society (HRSS) has catalogued around 1,050 cases of political violence in the 12 months to September 2025, causing approximately 160 deaths and 8,000 injuries. The 2026 elections are crucial for Bangladesh’s political future, and as such are almost certain to remain key drivers of violent political competitions over the next three months, and likely after the vote.

On 9 December, the interim government stated that any illegal and unauthorised public gathering or movement that causes public suffering will be strictly controlled from the announcement of the election schedule (11 December) until polling day, in a move almost certainly designed to curb political violence.

National Resistance Front forces claim killing 17 Taliban in Panjshir, Afghanistan. 

On 7 December, National Resistance Front (NRF) forces reportedly attacked a Taliban base in the Darah district of Panjshir, using firearms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The attack is one of the largest operations conducted by NRF in recent months. The NRF is an anti-Taliban, nationalist group that is mainly comprised of former Afghan armed forces personnel, and has its main strongholds in central and northern Afghanistan. In the initial stages of the Taliban government, NRF sought to establish a redoubt in Panjshir. However, the group has gradually shifted towards a more typical guerrilla approach, de-emphasising the importance of administrative control over parts of Afghan territory. Expanded counter-insurgency operations are likely in the area in response to the attack, and the Taliban may order the suspension of internet and telecommunication services throughout Panjshir province to disrupt NRF communications and prevent the coordination of further attacks.

Russia and US “take sides” in China-Japan tensions

On 9 December, the US State Department released a statement to Japanese media indicating that “China’s actions are not conducive to regional peace and stability”. This referred to an incident on 7 December, where Chinese fighter planes twice illuminated Japanese fighters with radar, during a reported airspace violation southeast of the Japanese island of Okinawa. “Locking-on” to a target can be a prelude to a weapons release, such as firing an air-to-air missile, and is therefore considered an escalatory move.

On 8 December, the day after the “lock-on” incident, Japanese jets were again scrambled to meet Russian-Chinese combat aircraft joint patrols between the Sea of Japan near the coast of Shikoku and subsequently Okinawa. The developments follow a steady increase in tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, which have marked the early stages of the government of new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

Magnitude 7.6 earthquake triggers tsunami warnings in Japan.        

On 8 December, a 7.6 tremor struck off the coast of Aomori Prefecture, prompting authorities to issue tsunami warnings for Japan’s northeastern coast, forcing the evacuation of tens of thousands of residents to higher ground. Waves of 20–70 cm (around 1–2 feet) were later observed at Kuji Port in Iwate Prefecture, with waves also reported in Urakawa in Hokkaido and Ogawara in Aomori, and a roughly 17cm (7inches) tsunami recorded at Sendai Port in Ishinomaki. The earthquake caused some infrastructural damage, with approximately 800 people suffering power losses in Aomori and Iwate. At least 30 people reported injuries, with no deaths recorded. Japanese authorities have stated that further tremors remain possible in the short term. While tsunami warnings are no longer in place, the authorities have warned of aftershocks (a 5.9 magnitude aftershock was recorded on 10 December) or even larger earthquakes in the immediate future.

Wildfires spread in Australia, kill one firefighter.        

On 8 December, Australian authorities reported that one firefighter had died while combating wildfires in New South Wales. More than 50 wildfires were recorded during the 6-8 December period, with the most affected states being New South Wales and Tasmania. In central and southern Australia, the yearly wildfire season falls between December and March, when higher temperatures and lower precipitation favour the accumulation of dry vegetation. Current meteorological forecasts indicate persistently hot, dry and windy conditions, conducive to the spread of wildfires. This has resulted in some officials warning that the coming weeks may result in the worst wildfire season in Australia’s recent history.

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