The Brazilian Supreme Federal Court is currently concluding the trial of former President Jair Bolsonaro, who is accused of instigating a coup d’état attempt following his loss of the 2022 election; membership of an armed criminal organisation; plotting the assassinations of key figures, including President Lula and Justice Alexandre de Moraes; damage to federal property; obstruction of justice and money laundering. If convicted on all counts, Bolsonaro could face up to 40 years in prison.

The case is being decided by a five-justice panel, and as of 11 September, three justices have voted, with the final two set to vote by 12 September. Justices Flávio Dino has voted to convict Bolsonaro, as has Justice Moraes, who is presiding over the case and is also one of the people who was allegedly targeted in attempts to overthrow the government, including alleged assassination plans. One justice, Luiz Fux, dissented, arguing that Bolsonaro should be acquitted and questioning the Court’s jurisdiction since he is no longer president.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The divided votes within the Supreme Court likely highlight the deep political polarisation surrounding Bolsonaro, with the wider population almost certainly more divided than the court. Bolsonaro still commands a lot of support throughout Brazil, especially among evangelicals, business elites, conservative middle classes, and segments of the military and police. Recent public demonstrations in support of the former president have been staged in Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo to coincide with the trial, and six portable toilets were set ablaze in suspected arson near the Supreme Court building in Brasília during the trial. Bolsonaro’s base has consistently alleged that the trial is politically motivated and that the five-member panel are biased. Moraes’ dual role as both presiding judge and alleged target of an assassination, Justice Fux’s annulment and comments, and President Trump’s accusation of a “witch hunt” will all likely be leveraged to reinforce this narrative.

The remaining justices are widely expected to vote against Bolsonaro, resulting in a guilty verdict and, highly likely, a long prison sentence. A guilty verdict will almost certainly result in major protests in support of the former president, with several previous demonstrations escalating to violence, including after the 2022 election and the 8 January 2023 riot. The Trump administration has already imposed 50 per cent tariffs on Brazil and sanctioned several key figures like Justice Moraes. There is a realistic possibility that a guilty verdict could result in increased pressure from the Trump administration, a move which will almost certainly be exploited by Bolsonaro’s base to fuel further unrest against the Brazilian government.

Buenos Aires province legislative elections deliver a defeat to Argentine President Javier Milei.

On 7 September, residents of Buenos Aires province voted in legislative elections. The province contains approximately 40 per cent of the Argentine electorate. The election was convincingly won by the country’s opposition parties, which received approximately 47 per cent of the vote, while Milei’s coalition partners received 34 per cent. While historically skewed towards the left, Buenos Aires’ provincial electorate is still an important “barometer” of the country’s overall political sentiment. As such, the vote is likely a notable setback for President Javier Milei, whose tenure in office has been marked by controversial structural economic reforms, which, while significantly reducing Argentina’s inflation rates and stabilising the currency, have also exacerbated poverty rates and slashed welfare structures.

Prominent US political commentator assassinated in Utah.

On 10 September, Charlie Kirk, a political commentator and internet personality associated with several Republican Party youth activist groups, was shot and killed during an event on the Utah Valley University (UVU) campus. As of the morning of 11 September, authorities have not confirmed having identified or detained the shooter. It is almost certain that the shooting was a targeted assassination, and highly likely that it was politically motivated.

It follows several other attempted assassinations targeting US politicians and political commentators since 2024, most notably including the two assassination attempts targeting US President Donald Trump in June and September 2024, the killing of two Democratic Party Minnesota state representatives in June 2025, and the torching of the home of the governor of Pennsylvania in April 2025.

While Kirk did not hold public office, he was among the most high-visibility figures in the Republican Party, with a particularly notable internet presence. The shooting is highly likely to have a significant political impact, and there is a realistic possibility that it will drive copycat attacks targeting other prominent political personalities, not only in the United States but also in other Western countries.

Dozens of Colombian soldiers kidnapped in Cauca.

On 8 September, the Colombian Ministry of Defence reported that 45 of its soldiers had been kidnapped in El Tambo, Cauca. Dozens more had reportedly been kidnapped on the previous day, when the army launched anti-cartel operations in the area. According to available reports, the soldiers were surrounded by hundreds of civilians and forced to surrender their weapons.

While the incident was carried out by civilians, Colombian authorities blamed the kidnappings on the Carlos Patiño Front, a subgroup of the Estadio Mayor Central (EMC), an armed faction that originally splintered from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The incident showcases a dynamic also observed in previous incidents: soldiers engaged in counter-cartel operations are confronted by civilians who, although not directly part of the armed groups, often partake in their irregular economic activities (such as resource extractions or coca farming and shipping) in a system of combined inducements and coercive measures. For the armed groups, this approach minimises the risk of casualties, while also effectively deterring cooperation between local communities and the authorities.

The location of the kidnapping is likewise notable. El Tambo is located between the Putumayo area and the Pacific Coast, and therefore is crucial for the cocaine smuggling routes in southern Colombia. The EMC is almost certainly the most powerful FARC splinter group and is often able to match government forces, particularly in contested rural regions.

President Trump threatens to shoot down Venezuelan jets that threaten US naval deployment.

On 6 September, President Trump warned that he would authorise the use of lethal force against Venezuelan fighter jets should they threaten the US naval forces deployed to the Caribbean region. The statement follows two incidents involving Venezuelan F-16s flying over US naval vessels in international waters after a US strike on a speedboat allegedly transporting narcotics from Venezuela bound for the US market. The vessel was associated with Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua gang, an organisation that was recently designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the Trump administration.

The US has also alleged that the Iranian-backed militant group, Hezbollah, is also involved in the smuggling of narcotics from Venezuela to the US, playing a pivotal role in laundering and logistics, with funds then used to sustain operations in the Middle East. The alleged involvement of Hezbollah will likely lead the US to sustain operations in the region, likely increasing the risk of miscalculation and escalation in the long term.

Ten people killed and 61 injured after train hits bus in Mexico.

On 8 September, a freight train hit a double-decker passenger bus, killing 10 and injuring at least 61. The collision occurred in an industrial zone between Atlacomulco and Maravatio. Mexico has seen an increase in accidents at grade-level crossings in recent years, with approximately 800 reported in 2024. Many of these collisions have been attributed to a lack of proper safety infrastructure, such as missing gates, faulty signals, and inadequate lighting, particularly in rural areas. Freight corridors have been identified as especially vulnerable given the volume of heavy cargo trains and the lack of barriers at many crossings.

Nationwide energy blackout in Cuba.

On 10 September, the Cuban Ministry of Energy announced that a nationwide blackout occurred after the National Electric System collapsed. Ten million people lost power, with efforts to restore power ongoing. This is the fifth nationwide blackout of the year and follows an earlier blackout on 7 September in eastern Cuba, which also affected millions of people. Cuba’s national electrical grid has experienced major issues for years, with the severe impact on the country resulting in anti-government demonstrations in 2021, 2022, and 2024. Cuba is currently in the middle of its worst economic crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the regular blackouts are almost certainly exacerbating the issue. There is a realistic possibility of protests in the coming days, including in Havana and Santiago de Cuba.

On 8 September, the government of Prime Minister François Bayrou collapsed after losing a confidence vote in parliament. Bayrou had called the vote in late August, in an attempt to gain some momentum for his austerity program aimed at reducing the government deficit. President Emmanuel Macron quickly replaced Bayrou with Sébastien Lecornu, considered a “loyalist” from Macron’s centrist-liberal camp.

On 10 September, several French unions in the transport, healthcare, and education sectors carried out a general strike. The strike, named “Bloquons Tout” (“Let’s shut everything down”), initially started as an online movement opposing Bayrou’s policies, but later obtained the support of several unions, as well as the far-left France Unbowed (LFI) party. The strike has resulted in severe transport and service disruptions, with several cases of road blockades, vandalism targeting public infrastructure, and clashes between police and protesters. More than 300 people were arrested between 10 and 11 September, and local media reports that “dozens” of protesters and police officers were injured.

The unions have called for further strike action on 18 September.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Civil unrest is highly likely to continue in the short term, and its severity will almost certainly be affected by the approach that President Macron and new Prime Minister Lecornu will take to handle the crisis. While LFI has already pledged a no-confidence vote against Lecornu, the other parties are likely to wait until the new cabinet is announced and Lecornu makes his position regarding his predecessor’s policies clear. Still, Lecornu is likely to face the same political deadlock as his predecessors, with a parliament split into three blocks determined not to cooperate with each other. In the medium term, the government’s failure to address the political crisis in a way that satisfies the two opposition groups is likely to drive violent episodes during the protests, including acts of vandalism targeting public and private assets in large cities.

As of 11 September, the Bloquons Tout protests have only partly achieved their stated goals, likely due to the effective police response coordinated by the government. The most notable disruptions have been those affecting rail and air travel, with police being more effective at clearing road blockades.  

While most likely to benefit large populist parties, the political crisis in France is likely to be leveraged by third actors seeking to benefit from the destabilisation of the French state. As shown by the likely anarchist-perpetrated sabotage of the public rail network ahead of the 2024 Olympics, several domestic actors retain the ability and interest in causing nationwide disruptions, particularly targeting infrastructure. Moreover, France has been targeted in several foreign-sponsored hybrid warfare operations, often aimed at maximising civil strife. These include, for instance, the defacing of a Holocaust memorial in Paris in 2024, which was likely perpetrated by individuals with ties to Russian intelligence. On 9 September, French media reported on an action that is likely reminiscent of this methodology: the discovery of several pig’s heads near multiple Parisian mosques. The incident was almost certainly orchestrated to inflame inter-religious tensions, further destabilising French society.  

Overnight 9-10 September, Russian forces conducted a large-scale layered aerial wave of attacks against Ukraine, involving a reported 415 attack drones and decoys, and 40 missiles. The strikes were primarily launched against targets in western Ukraine. During the attack, at least 19 drones entered Polish airspace. Polish F-16 fighters and Dutch F-35 fighters under NATO command were scrambled, with other NATO assets, including Italian AWACS surveillance planes and German Patriot batteries, also activated. Three to four of the drones were reportedly intercepted, while the others crashed without causing any casualties. In terms of direct impact, drone debris damaged the roof of a house in the village of Wyryki near the Ukrainian border. As a result of the incursion, operations at airports in Warsaw, Modlin, and Rzeszów were disrupted. Operations have now resumed, although Polish authorities have introduced flight restrictions along the eastern border with Belarus and Ukraine until 9 December.

The Polish military command called the incident an “act of aggression”, and the prime minister of Poland, Donald Tusk, told parliament that this was “the closest we have been to open conflict since World War Two”, but stressed that there was “no reason to believe we’re on the brink of war”. On 10 September, Warsaw invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which brings an urgent issue to the North Atlantic Council. Moscow denied responsibility for the incursion, claiming that, as the drones only have a maximum range of 700km, it would be impossible. Some of the drones reportedly entered from Belarus, with the Belarusian General Staff claiming in a statement that the drones had lost their track due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW). 

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly unlikely that NATO’s Article 5 will be invoked, which stipulates that NATO members will collectively respond to an armed attack on a NATO member. A NATO source briefed the press that NATO is not currently treating the incursion as an attack on one of its members. However, this is only the eighth time Article 4 has been invoked since NATO’s establishment in 1949. Most recently, Article 4 was invoked following the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine by several Eastern European nations, including Poland.

There have been at least six previous incursions of Polish airspace by Russian drones since the start of the full-scale invasion. These were typically blamed on Ukrainian EW, which has been effective at jamming and disrupting incoming drones and can lead to them going off course; however, the deviations are typically localised. In a recent incident on 20 August, an initially “unidentified object” fell and exploded near the village of Osiny in the Lublin Voivodeship. Photographic evidence from the incident suggested that an engine used in Russia’s Shahed drones was in the debris, and Polish authorities ultimately acknowledged that it was a Russian drone. Polish authorities previously likely sought to minimise the impact of these incidents. However, there are multiple factors that make the 9-10 September drone incursion different. First, in terms of scale, this is by far the largest incursion so far, roughly tripling the total projectiles that have fallen in Poland since 2022. Second, this is the first time Polish and NATO air defence efforts have directly intercepted a Russian aerial threat during the war.

It is highly unlikely that the incursion resulted simply from Ukrainian EW. Russian drones primarily rely on satellite-based navigation systems, such as GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou, and sometimes even the European Galileo, to follow pre-programmed flight paths to their intended target. As these drones can access multiple satellite navigation constellations, the chances of all of these signals being simultaneously jammed along a long flight corridor are low. Furthermore, drones typically have in-built inertial navigation systems (INS), which allow them to continue to target even when satellite signals are disrupted. INS becomes less precise over time due to the gradual accumulation of errors, which can result in significant deviations. However, this typically results in drones missing their targets by up to tens of kilometres, not veering hundreds of kilometres off-course.

The scale, coordination and origin of the drones all offer evidence of intentionality.  At least five of the drones’ flight paths appeared to be headed toward Rzeszów-Jasionka airport, a critical logistics hub for NATO’s military aid to Ukraine, according to a senior military source. Photographs of drone wreckages suggest that at least some of the drones were Gerbera decoy drones, which were not weaponised with explosive warheads or equipped with cameras for reconnaissance. If an intentional Russian operation, which is highly likely, Russian planners likely will have purposely used non-weaponised drones to mitigate against the risk of severe escalation.

There are likely multiple potential reasons for an intentional Russian drone incursion into Poland. First, it allows Moscow to test NATO’s resolve and reaction to Russian aggression. Second, it tests NATO’s defensive capabilities and response times against Russian military hardware. Third, it aims to deter support for Ukraine, with the targeting of Rzeszów-Jasionka airport, if confirmed, highly likely an intentional symbolic message.

In the immediate future, it is almost certain that NATO’s posture in Eastern Europe will harden. Moreover, the Zapad 2025 war games held by Russia and Belarus are set to run between 12-16 September, with manoeuvres expected to take place close to Poland and Lithuania. In response, NATO countries have already been conducting their own exercises, with Poland beginning its largest exercises of the year in early September with Iron Defender-25, and TARASSIS 25, which runs until the end of October, involving ten Northern European NATO countries. It is almost certain that tensions at the NATO border with Russia are currently at their highest since 2022, which increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation. The drone incursion highly likely marks an escalation in Moscow’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in its long-running campaign of operations against NATO member states, which have typically been designed to be sub-threshold. If NATO members react too forcefully, there is a significant risk of escalation, but if the reaction is too minimal, it will fail to deter future additional incursions. If such incursions become a sustained TTP, the risk of miscalculation and escalation will almost certainly increase, and such actions are likely to undermine the credibility of the military alliance.

Overnight 6-7 September, Russian forces conducted the largest combined aerial strike package against Ukraine of the war so far, launching a reported 810 one-way attack drones and decoys, and 13 missiles (nine cruise missiles and four ballistic missiles). While Ukrainian air defences intercepted the majority of the incoming drones, 54 attack drones and nine missiles hit 33 locations.

The cities of Kyiv, Sumy, Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia were all targeted, with Kyiv being the primary target. At least four people were killed, and 44 were injured, with a nine-storey residential building being partially destroyed in the Sviatoshynskyi district of Kyiv. Notably, a projectile struck Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers building in central Kyiv’s government district. Ukrainian officials claim the projectile was an Iskander-K cruise missile and that the warhead failed to detonate, although the missile fuel still caused a fire and damaged the building.

Russian forces conducted another major wave of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine overnight 9-10 September. The attack reportedly involved 415 attack drones and decoys, and 43 missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that 16 missiles and 21 attack drones hit their targets, which resulted in one death in the Zhytomyr Oblast and three injuries in Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Officials also stated that civilian industrial sites were struck in Vinnytsia Oblast. This attack was largely targeted at oblasts in the west of Ukraine, and at least 19 drones entered Polish airspace, as previously examined.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The scale of Russian long-range strike packages against Ukraine continues to escalate. Since the start of 2025, the scale of Russian aerial attacks has dramatically increased. Between June and August, Russian forces were consistently breaking previously established records in the size of combined strike packages, before a temporary lull in the run-up to the 15 August Alaska Summit between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. This relative lull was almost certainly intended to ward off pressure from Washington, with large-scale Russian strikes having been a key trigger of backlash from the Trump administration. However, following the Alaska Summit, Russian strikes have resumed their record-breaking intensity. The overnight 6-7 September attack further underscores that the risk profile of travel to Ukrainian urban centres far from the front lines is currently the highest since the initial stages of the full-scale invasion.

Several trends and a potential change in Russian tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) can be drawn out from the attacks. First, it is notable that the Ukrainian Air Force did not claim to have intercepted any of the four ballistic missiles launched overnight 6-7 September, and only four of the nine cruise missiles were neutralised. A long-running trend in Ukrainian air defence has been a particular vulnerability to ballistic missiles, with the Patriot air defence system being Ukraine’s main means of countering this threat, excluding the less numerous and less effective SAMP/T. This week, Western and Ukrainian officials briefed the media that Ukraine is at risk of shortages in air defence weapons due to slower deliveries, with shipments becoming more irregular and smaller in size after the June memo from the Pentagon, which raised concerns of Patriot interceptor scarcity for the US’ own defence needs. It is highly likely that a critical shortfall in interceptor munitions would effectively allow Russian forces to hit high-value targets at greater frequency, deep in Ukraine, further increasing the risks from Russian long-range fires in Ukraine’s urban centres.

Second, the targeting of Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers building, if intentional, likely marks a significant change in Russian targeting patterns. This is the first time a government building has been struck in Kyiv. While damage to the structure was relatively low, it is almost certainly a highly symbolic attack, and the damage would have been significant had the warhead detonated. The centre of Kyiv is heavily defended, and Russian forces have typically failed in striking this area. The informally termed ‘government’ and ‘hotel’ districts in central Kyiv have therefore been relative safe havens from Russian long-range fires, hosting international visitors and organisations. Debris from successful interceptions has nonetheless posed a threat across Kyiv, including in the centre, as shown in the recent damage done to the British Council and EU Delegation buildings.

A successful strike in central Kyiv may influence future Russian targeting behaviour. Due to Kyiv’s concentration of air defences, there is a realistic possibility that Russia refrained from prioritising strikes in central Kyiv. However, if Russia now assesses that Kyiv’s interceptor stocks have been critically depleted, it is likely to increase its strikes in central Kyiv. Without a major replenishment, attacks are likely to further increase during winter, when ground operations slow down and attacks on the civilian population have the greatest psychological impact.

At approximately 15:45, local time, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and Israel Security Agency (ISA) carried out a series of airstrikes in the Leqtaifa District of Doha under Operation “Summit of Fire”. Israeli officials stated that the attack targeted senior members of the Palestinian group Hamas.

Hamas channels stated that the attack killed five members of its negotiation team, which is currently involved in talks with the US regarding a plan to end hostilities in the Gaza Strip and release the remaining hostages. Early Israeli accounts claimed the attack killed, among others, Khalil al-Hayya, the chairman of Hamas’ Political Bureau, and Khaled Mashal, a former chairman. However, Hamas has stated that both men survived the strike, along with other senior leaders who were present at the meeting, including Zaher Jabarin, the head of Hamas in the West Bank, and Muhammad Darwish, the leader of Hamas’s Shura Council. Qatari foreign ministry spokesperson Majed al-Ansari has released a statement stating that Qatar “strongly condemns” the strike, calling it “cowardly”, and that the “criminal assault constitutes a blatant violation of all international laws and norms, and poses a serious threat to the security and safety of Qataris and residents in Qatar.” He added that Qatar “will not tolerate this reckless Israeli behaviour and the ongoing disruption of regional security, nor any act that targets its security and sovereignty

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack represents a significant escalation with likely ramifications across the Arabian Peninsula. In the immediate term, it will almost certainly suspend current Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations, receive condemnation from the Gulf States, and contribute to heightened civil unrest across major urban centres worldwide.

Qatar is a major non-NATO ally of the US, hosting the Al-Udeid Air Base, which is currently the largest US military installation in the Middle East. The strike, which Qatari officials almost certainly perceive as being backed and authorised by Washington, could jeopardise this relationship in the long term. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are likely to publicly support Qatar, despite their fragile ties with Doha, for its alleged support of terrorism and Iran.

For Hamas, the strike is likely to have important political ramifications. The survival of key leaders enables the group to preserve its leadership balance between Gaza and its external offices. However, the likely collapse of ceasefire negotiations could shift greater influence to Hamas’ Gaza-based leadership, which is under mounting pressure from intensified Israeli operations aimed at securing control of Gaza City and is less likely to engage in serious dialogue. The strike on Hamas’ senior leadership has also almost certainly jeopardised ongoing negotiations for the release of hostages, a development that the Netanyahu administration will likely exploit to justify sustaining and potentially intensifying its operations in the Gaza Strip.

Norwegian parliamentary elections won by Labour, Greens and the populist right score positive results.

On 8 September, Norway held parliamentary elections, with the centre-left coalition of the ruling Labour Party (Ap), led by Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, securing a slim parliamentary majority. The centre-right Conservative Party (H) suffered a notable setback, with a decrease of six percentage points compared to its results in the 2021 elections. Most of the lost Conservative votes almost certainly went to the populist right-wing Progress Party (FrP), which doubled its vote share and emerged as the second largest party, matching a trend observed in several other European countries. Of the smaller left-wing parties, the Greens (MDG) achieved a particularly positive result, winning their highest-ever vote share.

Large-scale far-right protest scheduled to occur in London on 13 September.

Several prominent far-right influencers and political leaders have planned a march and demonstration in central London on 13 September, starting in the late morning. The “Unite the Kingdom” march has been portrayed by its promoters as a “free speech” rally, but it occurs in the context of growing anti-immigration protests that have resulted in cases of violence and vandalism. The protest is likely to attract tens of thousands of participants, also due to its promotion by several US and European politicians. The protests will also almost certainly draw large crowds of counter-protesters, and are scheduled on the same day as several high-profile London football matches, which will likely further stretch police resources. While UK police likely has the ability to prevent violent clashes at the protest site itself (between Southwark and Whitehall), there is a high likelihood of sporadic clashes throughout the day between dispersed groups of protest attendees and counter-protesters. It is highly likely that the protest will result in severe traffic disruptions in central London, with public transport services likely to be affected.

Around 890 people arrested at Palestine Action protest in London.

On 6 September, London police arrested hundreds of participants in a protest organised by a group known as “Defend Our Juries”, which was carried out in support of Palestine Action, the pro-Palestine group that was proscribed as a terrorist organisation in July. The vast majority of the arrests were carried out for offences under the Terrorism Act, which prohibits showing support for a group under that designation. In August, another demonstration in support of Palestine Action resulted in more than 500 arrests.

London Underground staff go on strike.

On 7 September, thousands of London Underground staff began striking over pay conditions and a shorter working week of 32 hours. Strikes are set to continue until 12 September. While approximately 90 stations continue to operate, most routes through central London are closed. Transport for London (TfL) has declared that it offered a 3.4 per cent pay rise but was unable to adhere to shorter working hours, which would reportedly cost the network approximately GBP 200 million per year. Many businesses have reported reduced foot traffic, impacting business costs. With no resolution announced, there is a realistic possibility that it could continue beyond 12 September.

Violent clashes between protesters and riot police in central Athens after train disaster rally.

On 6 September, clashes broke out between protesters and riot police in central Athens. These followed a rally in Syntagma Square, which was called by the victims’ families association to demand accountability for the 2023 Tempi train disaster. Initially peaceful, the clashes broke out in the evening with protesters reportedly throwing Molotov cocktails and “sound bombs” at police forces near the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, with riot police deploying tear gas. Demonstrations were also planned in Thessaloniki, Patras, Volos, Serres and Alexandroupoli. In total, 23 people were arrested in Athens and at least three in Thessaloniki.

Ivory Coast formally bars leading opposition figure from presidential election.

On 8 September, Tidjane Thiam and former President Laurent Gbagbo were formally barred from running in the presidential election. Thiam, the leader of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), was the primary challenger to Ouattara. A court had previously excluded Thiam from running in April 2025, due to his being a French national when he registered, meaning the formal decision of his barring was expected. Overall, five candidacies out of 60 were validated, including the 83-year-old incumbent President Alassane Ouattara. Former First Lady and founder of the Movement of Capable Generations (MGC), Simone Gbagbo, was another cleared to run, and almost certainly constitutes the primary challenger to Ouattara now that Thiam is officially barred.

The Ivorian government has become increasingly repressive as the 25 October presidential elections approach. In August 2025, six members of one of the Ivory Coast’s largest opposition parties were arrested, sparking criticism from civil society groups. On 9 August, thousands of Ivorians took to the streets in Abidjan to protest the decision with banners, stating “Enough is enough”. While the recent ruling barring Thiam is unlikely to see similar-sized protests, localised protests among Thiam supporters are likely.

Ethiopia inaugurates the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

On 9 September, Ethiopia inaugurated Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam. First switched on in 2022, the inauguration marked the completion of its maximum 5,150 megawatts of power output. The dam is set to double Ethiopia’s energy capacity, with some estimates predicting an extra 1.5 per cent in real GDP growth, as Ethiopia aims to become a power exporter to neighbouring countries. The project has faced protestations from Egypt and Sudan, which rely heavily on water from the River Nile. On the day of the inauguration, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry wrote to the UN Security Council stating that the inauguration of the dam violated international law. According to Cairo, the dam violates water treaties dating back to the early 20^th century and poses an existential threat to Egypt. The completion of the dam has almost certainly elevated tensions between the two countries, with Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Tamim Khallaf stating that Egypt would “exercise its right to take all the appropriate measures to defend and protect the interests of the Egyptian people”. While direct armed conflict is highly unlikely in the near term, Egypt has allegedly begun sending weaponry to Fano militants in Ethiopia and has strengthened ties with Eritrea, moves almost certainly considered provocative by Addis Ababa.

Senior Ugandan opposition figure detained.

On 8 September, Ugandan police detained Alex Waiswa Mufumbiro, deputy spokesperson for the National Unity Platform (NUP), while he attended court in Kampala. Police spokesperson Kituuma Rusoke has not given a reason for the arrest. President Yoweri Museveni has increasingly clamped down on opposition in the lead-up to the presidential election in January. NUP leader Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, known by his musician stage name Bobi Wine, poses the greatest threat to Museveni’s rule. The NUP has been a particular focus of government crackdowns, with security forces kidnapping several party members last week, including a long-time member of Bobi Wine’s security team, as well as raiding the NUP headquarters in Kampala in May 2025 and using military courts to try civilians. While Museveni is likely avoiding a direct arrest of Bobi Wine, which could trigger widespread anti-government protests, security forces will highly likely continue to arrest other members of NUP’s leadership and crack down on the opposition ahead of the elections.

Belgian officials debate deploying soldiers in Brussels to combat drug-related crime.

On 6 September, Interior Minister Bernard Quintin announced a security plan for the country’s cities, calling for the deployment of soldiers alongside police officers. The announcement follows several high-profile shootings, particularly concentrated in Brussels (which had at least 60 in 2025), linked with Belgium’s organised crime groups. The plan, which is opposed by Brussels’ municipal government, would come into effect by the end of the year. It is unlikely that the deployment of soldiers to Brussels will deter or significantly influence the country’s criminal groups. Many of the plan’s key details, such as the number of soldiers to be deployed or their “rules of engagement” towards criminals, remain unclear. On the other hand, the plan is highly likely to become a driver of protests if implemented.

Six killed in shooting at bus stop in Jerusalem.

On 8 September, two gunmen opened fire on civilians waiting at a bus stop in the Ramot area on the outskirts of Jerusalem, killing six and injuring more than a dozen before being killed by responding police. The shooting, which was carried out by Palestinian residents of the West Bank, was condemned by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and praised by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), although neither group claimed responsibility for it. The shooting is the latest in a series of attacks on Israeli civilians, which have particularly targeted soft targets like public transport hubs. The Ramot area, which was occupied in 1967 and later annexed by Israel, is a politically important target that has been previously attacked.

Israeli forces issue evacuation orders for Gaza City.

On 9 September, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) issued evacuation orders for the entirety of Gaza City, calling on residents to relocate to the Al-Mawasi zone. The announcement follows weeks of preparations and debates regarding the offensive, which was opposed by several senior IDF officials and strongly supported by the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. IDF units had already started some offensive operations ahead of the announcement of the evacuation orders. These had mostly concentrated in the northern and eastern suburbs of the city. The orders highly likely underscore Tel Aviv’s intention to intensify operations in Gaza, aiming to degrade the final remaining elements of Hamas. It is almost certain that the offensive will further worsen the humanitarian situation in the Al-Mawasi zone, which is already plagued by extreme overcrowding and a lack of basic resources, including clean water, food, and drainage infrastructure.

JNIM starts blockading fuel shipments to Malian capital.

On 3 September, local media reported that several fuel trucks had been stopped by
Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) fighters between Soribougou and Neguela, in west Mali, and that the drivers had been kidnapped. A spokesperson for JNIM announced the start of the blockade and also said that it will restrict the movement of residents in western Mali near the border with Senegal and Mauritania. The militant group has continued to stop fuel trucks in the region, and there have been reports of JNIM setting fire to trucks, resulting in some transport companies suspending operations along the route from Dakar to Bamako. The blockade almost certainly forms part of JMIN’s wider objective to undermine the junta government by disrupting the capital’s critical supply lines, likely with the ultimate goal of imposing economic hardship on the local population, provoking unrest and weakening the government’s legitimacy. In response, the Malian government claims to have conducted airstrikes and expanded ground operations in western Mali to lift the blockade. However, these reports are yet to be confirmed, and JNIM forces have repeatedly overwhelmed government forces in contested areas.

ISSP escalates attacks on Niger civilians.

On 10 September, Human Rights Watch reported that Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) has escalated attacks on civilians since March 2025. Across at least five attacks, ISSP killed over 127 villagers and burned and looted numerous homes. While also present in Mali and Burkina Faso, ISSP is particularly active in western Niger, where the rival al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has a reduced presence.

The increased pace of attacks is likely reflective of ISSP’s enhanced territorial control in Niger. Furthermore, it has likely received increased weaponry and funding from IS, which has expanded its support for its African branches in 2025, which made up over two-thirds of its global activity in the first half of the year. It is also likely that the increased pace of JNIM attacks in recent months in Mali and Burkina Faso has prompted ISSP to similarly increase its activities to continue to portray itself as a regional contender for influence. Further civilian attacks are highly likely in the coming months.

RSF conduct series of drone attacks on Sudanese capital.

On 9 September, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conducted multiple drone strikes across the Sudanese capital Khartoum and wider area, which is now held by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). RSF drones targeted several strategic sites, including Sudan’s main oil refinery, a fuel depot, a weapons factory and local power stations, resulting in power outages. The RSF are likely trying to undermine the Sudanese government and disrupt the return of SAF-supported institutions in Khartoum, while also trying to limit the ability of the SAF to conduct future offensives into western parts of the country. The drone attacks highlight the absence of effective air defences in Khartoum, leaving critical infrastructure and military installations highly vulnerable to further attacks. The attacks will also likely deter displaced residents from Khartoum from returning, a development that is likely to exacerbate the humanitarian situation.

Boko Haram kill at least 60 in northeast Nigeria.

On 5 September, Boko Haram killed at least 60 people in Darul Jamal in the Bama Local Government Area of Borno State. According to local news, insurgents stormed the village and opened fire indiscriminately. After receiving reports of the raid, the Nigerian Air Force conducted airstrikes on the fleeing militants, killing 30. The Bama Local Government Area had recently been reclaimed by the Nigerian military after Boko Haram seized control of the region in September 2014. Residents had recently returned following years of displacement. This attack is the latest in an upsurge of Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) activity in Borno State in 2025, which has forced the often undermanned and under-resourced Nigerian military to divert increased resources to the region.

Chinese workers kidnapped in targeted attack in southern Nigeria.

On 6 September, gunmen attacked a convoy of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), a paramilitary force that works in tandem with the national police, which was transporting several Chinese nationals employed by a local cement company.  At least eight NSCDC members were killed in the attack, which occurred in the southern Edo state, while five Chinese nationals were kidnapped. Four of them were later rescued by the police. Cases of kidnapping and murder targeting Chinese nationals have significantly increased in West Africa and the Sahel in recent years, perpetrated by both armed criminal gangs and terrorist groups. Chinese nationals are likely perceived as having access to higher wealth, particularly due to their involvement in several high-revenue industries such as resource extraction and processing, making them attractive targets for kidnappings-for-ransom by militant and criminal groups. Beijing’s growing economic and geopolitical interests in Africa have also driven an increase in the spread of anti-Chinese sentiment, which has fuelled resentment and violence.

ADF kill at least 89 people in two attacks in the DRC.

Overnight 8-9 September, the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) conducted an attack on a funeral in Ntoyo, Lubero territory, North Kivu, killing at least 71 with machetes. A second attack occurred in Beni territory on 9 September, where ADF militants killed at least 18 people. These attacks constitute the latest in a series of high casualty massacres in 2025 that have increased in frequency since joint Operation Shujaa forces attacked and seized the Madina camp on 6 July, leaving only two camps remaining. Attacks since this incident include the killing of 66 civilians in Irumu on 10-11 July, 43 civilians in Komanda on 27 July, 30 people in Bapere on 15 August, and nine people in Oicha on 17 August. The increase in attacks is almost certainly attributed to the Congolese military’s diverted focus towards the AFC/M23 insurgency. The attack on Ntoyo was highly likely conducted under the command of Ahmad Mahmood Hassan (Abwakasi), a Tanzanian bomb maker, who operates from a camp in Lubero territory, which is responsible for over 40 per cent of civilian casualties by the ADF since mid-2024. The attack in Beni was highly likely conducted under the leadership of Seka Umaru, second-in-command to ADF leader Musa Baluku; Umaru operates from a camp northwest of Oicha. Further attacks are highly likely as the ADF continue to exploit the AFC/M23 insurgency, which has diverted Congolese forces.

Live ammunition used against protesters in Uvira, DRC.

On 8 September, hundreds of residents in Uvira in South Kivu took to the streets to protest the recent appointment of General Olivier Gasita Mukunda as Deputy Commander of the 33^rd military region of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), and his deployment to the city. Protesters accused Gasita of having collaborated with AFC/M23 rebels during the group’s seizure of Bukavu in February 2025. Civil society group leader Marafiki Masimango organised a march on Gasita’s hotel demanding his resignation, which was joined by members of the pro-government Wazalendo militia group. Security forces responded to the protesters with live ammunition, killing at least three and injuring five. The following day, local media reported the departure of Gasita, a move that will likely prevent further unrest. Amid the unravelling peace negotiations and renewed fighting between the government and AFC/M23, residents of Uvira are highly likely to be in a heightened state of anxiety over the threat of occupation by AFC/M23. Evidence currently suggests that AFC/M23 are consolidating control over their held territory through a systematic state-building project, suggesting that an imminent advance towards Uvira is unlikely. However, long-term, Uvira likely constitutes a target for AFC/M23, who may continue their advance south if peace negotiations do not yield positive results.

National grid collapses across Nigeria.

On 10 September, Nigeria’s national grid collapsed, resulting in a large-scale power outage. Power generation dropped sharply from close to 3,000 MW to just 1.5 MW within an hour, disrupting supply across multiple states. Nigeria’s national grid has experienced frequent collapses throughout 2025, causing nationwide blackouts and highlighting the fragility of the country’s power infrastructure. Major blackouts have often disrupted business operations, resulted in increased crime and have sometimes provoked major protests, especially in cities where electricity shortages are chronic.

Ebola outbreak recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The World Health Organisation (WHO) reported the first Ebola outbreak in three years, with the virus reportedly having killed at least 15 people, including four healthcare workers, in the central Kasai province. In the 2022 outbreak, six Ebola-related deaths were confirmed in North Kivu. In 2018-2020, a major outbreak of the illness killed around 2,000 people. While the WHO stated that the DRC has access to several thousand doses of vaccine that are effective against the Zaire strain of Ebola of the ongoing outbreak, severe difficulties in responding to it remain, with the DRC healthcare system continuing to suffer from understaffing and a lack of economic resources. Moreover, the Kasai province, where the affected communities are located, is poorly connected to the country’s key urban centres and lacks adequate infrastructure. This makes both monitoring and response operations extremely difficult.

On 8 September, Gen Z-led protests broke out targeting government corruption and its decision to restrict 26 unregistered social media and online platforms in Nepal. The social media platforms include X, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, YouTube, and Snapchat. The ban was imposed after the companies failed to register with the government within a seven-day deadline. In the lead-up to the protests, hashtags including “#NepoKid” and “#NepoBabies” trended online, gaining support for the protest movement. Several celebrities, journalists, members of the opposition, and other prominent figures, including the Mayor of Kathmandu, endorsed the protests.

Protests quickly escalated into clashes as protesters broke into a restricted area and entered the Federal Parliament premises. Security forces have used live ammunition and tear gas, and the government has imposed a curfew in several districts. Clashes continued to worsen on 9 September, with crowds setting fire to the parliament in Kathmandu and the Hilton Hotel in Naxal, Kathmandu, and attacking government buildings and houses of political leaders. Protests also spread to several other cities in Nepal, including Biratnagar, Butwal, Chitwan, and Pokhara.

Thousands of inmates have escaped from several prisons, with Nepali police estimates placing the number as over 13,500. Many leaders have taken refuge with security forces, and Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli has resigned, with no one yet replacing him, inducing a power vacuum in the country. Government attempts to placate protesters, including by rescinding the social media ban, failed to quell the civil unrest. Overall, at least 34 people have died and 1,368 have been injured.

On 10 September, the military established a nationwide prohibitory order until 1700 local time, followed by a curfew until 0600 local time, 11 September. The curfew has since been extended, with all major roads in the country blocked and only emergency service vehicles and flight passengers allowed to move. Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), Kathmandu’s primary international airport, was closed but reopened on 10 September. With the military taking control of Nepal’s internal security, the streets of Kathmandu remained calm on 10 and 11 September. While the military is effectively in charge, the president, Ram Chandra Poudel, and army chief, Ashok Raj Sigdel, are set to engage in talks with Gen Z representatives.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests occur amid broader frustration with a lack of access to basic healthcare, food insecurity, and shortages of essential medications. Nepal’s economic insecurity has been exacerbated by frequent flash flooding in recent months. In July and August, heavy floods disrupted trade and damaged hydropower plants. Members of the government, in contrast, are perceived to be living in luxury. Nepal is ranked 107 out of 180 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, with frequent corruption scandals and legal retaliation against journalists.

The government’s decision to ban 26 major social media and online platforms was almost certainly perceived as government overreach and an attempt to underhandedly introduce censorship. Approximately half of Nepal’s population uses these platforms, and usage is disproportionate among Gen Z. Communication apps like WhatsApp are also heavily relied on to communicate both within Nepal and to diaspora communities abroad.

It is currently unclear what Gen Z protesters will demand as part of negotiations. Potential demands include the dissolution of parliament, new elections, and the direct election and shortened term limits for prime ministers. Although the constitution requires the next, and likely interim, prime minister to be selected from the current members of parliament, protesters may reject such an appointment. Instead, former chief justices or populist youth figures could potentially serve. The most likely figure is Kathmandu’s mayor, Balendra “Balen” Shah, who endorsed the protests, while urging restraint, and is relatively popular among Gen Z.

While the protests have currently subsided, largely due to the deployment of the military and the imposition of strict curfews, the situation remains highly volatile. Failure by the government and military leadership to make meaningful concessions to Gen Z protesters could result in renewed unrest, with the potential for further violence and instability across Nepal’s urban centres.

More than 100 injured during clashes in Hathazari, Bangladesh.

Clashes erupted on 6 September in Hathazari, in Bangladesh’s region of Chattogram, between local madrasah students and residents. The clashes injured at least 100 people, with 15 people reportedly being seriously hurt. The clashes started after an individual posted a comment on Facebook with an anti-Islamic message. After the post went viral, local madrasah students attacked the religious procession that the post author had allegedly been part of, sparking clashes. The episode, which concluded with authorities imposing widespread movement restrictions in the area, highlights the key role played by social media in driving mob violence in Bangladesh, as well as the difficulties that authorities have in combating posts and online calls for violence that rapidly attain virality.

Prime Minister of Japan resigns after poor election results and an imminent threat of being ousted.

On 7 September, the Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba resigned after less than a year in office, also stepping down as the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The move followed intense pressure from within his party following two key election defeats and the potential for an imminent party leadership vote against him.

Having governed Japan for most of the post-WWII era, the LDP under Ishiba’s leadership lost its majority in both the lower and upper houses for the first time in 15 years. According to a senior LDP official, campaigning for Ishiba’s replacement will begin on 22 September, while the LDP leadership vote itself is expected on 4 October. Japan is effectively a one-party democracy, meaning the next LDP leader will almost certainly become prime minister. Being a de facto one-party democracy highly likely contributes towards the rapid turnover of prime ministers in Japanese political culture. In the past 20 years, Japan has had over ten prime ministers. Political instability will likely persist, with the loss of the LDP majorities in the legislature meaning cross-party negotiation is required to address many key issues for Japan, including the current trade dispute with the US.

Cabinet reshuffle in Indonesia following large protests.

On 8 September, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto replaced several economic and security ministers in a Cabinet reshuffle. The move comes after widespread protests over perceived lawmakers’ perks amid a rising cost of living, ignited across the country. Over the course of the demonstrations, at least 10 people were killed, with security forces utilising live ammunition against protesters. The cabinet reshuffle has been framed in terms of growing Indonesia’s faltering economy, with Subianto having promised to increase economic growth to eight per cent within five years, a three per cent increase on the current rate of growth. While the protests have subsided, Subianto will almost certainly have to demonstrate that his government is taking concrete measures to reduce the cost of living, or it is highly likely that protests will reignite.

Mumbai police in India placed on high alert after bomb threat.

On 5 September, Mumbai police were placed on high alert after a bomb threat was made to Mumbai Traffic Police helpline. The threat allegedly claimed that 14 terrorists had entered the city and planted bombs using RDX across Mumbai, with police claiming that the threat mentioned the name of an organisation called ‘Lakshar-e-Jihadi’. The threat came as authorities were conducting preparations for the Ganesh festival’s tenth day (called Anant Chaturthi) on 6 September, with enhanced security measures reportedly including the use of AI and drone technology this year.

The threat of terrorism across India remains elevated following April’s Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir and the brief armed conflict between India and Pakistan that followed. The threat, which was almost certainly a hoax, is part of a widespread phenomenon of bomb hoaxes in India, which have almost certainly contributed towards a climate of fear. The spread of misinformation following these incidents can be vast, and in more extreme cases, can act as triggers for communal violence.

Monsoon floods in Pakistan.

The 2025 monsoon season in Pakistan has led to severe flooding across multiple regions. In Multan, the area of Jalalpur Pirwala has been significantly impacted, with large areas submerged under floodwaters since early 11 September. Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city, has experienced widespread flooding, affecting both infrastructure and daily life. The mayor reported that at least 138 individuals were relocated due to rising water levels in the Lyari and Malir Rivers, the city’s primary drainage systems. Despite the heavy rains, roads have been cleared in some areas, although many parts of the city remain without power, complicating rescue and assessment efforts. The flooding has also disrupted traffic on major routes, including the M9 motorway, and led to the closure of the Karachi-Hyderabad highway.

Typhoon Peipah causes disruptions in Japan’s east coast.

Typhoon Peipah, which formed near Palau on 30 August, made landfall in Japan’s southern Pacific coast on 5 September, later moving northwards alongside the coast before decreasing in intensity. The typhoon caused moderate travel disruptions, forcing several major airports to temporarily halt operations. At least 660,000 people were placed under evacuation orders, with the most severely affected area being the Miyazaki province of Kyushu island. Japan’s highly resilient infrastructure almost certainly contributed to limiting the damage caused by the storm. As August and September constitute the peak season for typhoons in Japan, further severe weather events cannot be ruled out in the short term.

Copyright © 2025 Solace Global Risk Limited. All rights reserved. No part of this document or content may be reproduced, copied, translated, sold, or distributed, in whole or in part without the consent of Solace Global Risk Limited.