The flash floods in Central Texas have resulted in a death toll of at least 120 people, with 161 still missing. The flooding has severely impacted several counties, primarily Kerr County, where at least 96 fatalities have been confirmed. The flood has also severely impacted Williamson, Kendall, Travis, Burnet, and Tom Green Counties.

The severity of the flooding has led to significant disruptions, with flash flood warnings affecting over 1.2 million people in central Texas, including areas such as Austin, Pflugerville, and Wells Branch. Search and rescue operations continue, with many people still unaccounted for, including several girls and one councillor from Camp Mystic along the Guadalupe River. Camp Mystic has confirmed that 27 campers and staff members are confirmed to have died in the flooding.

In response to the disaster, President Donald Trump signed a major disaster declaration for Kerr County to facilitate federal assistance for recovery efforts. The National Weather Service (NWS) issued numerous flash flood warnings. Additionally, a boil water notice has been issued for customers of the Texas Water Company, including those in the city of Blanco, due to concerns over water safety.

Efforts to support the affected communities have been bolstered by companies such as Starlink, which have provided “Mini kits” for search and rescue operations and are offering one month of free service to thousands of customers in the region. The rivers in New Braunfels, Texas, such as the Comal and Guadalupe, are receding, but residents are urged to remain cautious and avoid travelling close to rivers or bodies of water.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Texas officials have questioned the actions of the NWS, accusing it of failing to provide accurate forecasts ahead of the flooding. According to Texas Emergency Management Chief W. Nim Kidd, “The original forecast that we received Wednesday from the National Weather Service predicted three to six inches of rain in the Concho Valley and 4-8 inches in the Hill Country”. Conversely, there was as much as six inches in one hour in Concho Valley and at least 18 inches within 24 hours in Mason County.

The NWS has responded by stating that it issued a ‘life-threatening flash flooding’ warning in Kerrville at 0114 local time on 4 July, at least three hours before the first reports of flooding. According to NWS spokesperson Erica Grow Cei, “Flash Flood Warnings were issued on the night of July 3 and in the early morning of July 4, giving preliminary lead times of more than three hours before warning criteria were met.” Furthermore, meteorologists have defended the agency, emphasising that predicting the amount of rain from a thunderstorm is “the hardest thing a meteorologist can do.”

County officials have come under fire for failing to issue evacuation warnings to camps near the Guadalupe River. Kerrville City Manager Dalton Rice has defended the decision, emphasising that it would have created chaotic traffic, causing people to get stuck on the road and that the plan in camps is often to shelter in place. Given the multitude of perceived failings, protests are likely to occur across Texas in the coming weeks, once the flooding recedes, with protests likely occurring near NWS and government buildings in Texas.

On 4 July, hundreds of protesters marched through the centre of the Mexican capital to protest against the influx of tourists and remote workers, whom they accuse of driving up rental prices and replacing local culture. The protests were largely concentrated in popular areas like Condesa and Roma, where many foreign residents have moved. Mexico City has had a considerable influx of “expats”, particularly from the US, since the COVID-19 pandemic.

This has been driven by the combined effects of the increased availability of remote working arrangements and the growing cost-of-living gap between the two countries. President Claudia Sheinbaum, who is navigating a precarious relationship with Washington, called the protesters “xenophobic”.

While the protests were largely peaceful, there were isolated cases of violence. Protesters smashed the windows of several local businesses, particularly those perceived to have a foreign clientele or influences, such as cafes, restaurants and banks. Some US nationals were also reportedly threatened by the protesters.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The claims that US citizens moving to Mexico are contributing to making life less affordable for local residents are longstanding, but have accelerated significantly following the COVID-19 pandemic, after which the number of US residents in Mexico rose by approximately 70 per cent. The protest organisers’ choice of 4 July, US Independence Day, as the date for the protest strongly suggests it was primarily directed at Americans. The protests were also likely heavily influenced by the growing anti-tourism movement in Europe, which has received global publicity.

This movement has been driven by largely similar concerns about the scarcity of long-term rental properties at affordable prices and the growing costs of living. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that the protests have also been influenced by the growing tensions between Washington and Mexico City regarding immigration, drug trafficking and growing local perceptions of US “encroachment” on Mexican sovereignty.

While the Mexico City protests have been relatively small in scale, the movement shares many of the same underlying drivers as those observed in Europe, primarily economic grievances, a lack of affordable housing, and increasing localised resentment towards foreign nationals. The anti-tourism movement in Europe started with only a few small-scale protests but has evolved into a broader, more coordinated movement that is attracting much greater participation.

There is a realistic possibility that the protests in Mexico could gain momentum if the underlying issues are not addressed and if US-Mexican relations deteriorate. This could plausibly involve the spread of protests to other Mexican cities suffering from the same underlying conditions linked to an increase in remote workers, such as Tijuana or Oaxaca.

Suriname elects first female president

On 6 July, the National Assembly of Suriname appointed Jennifer Geerlings-Simons as the new president of the country. Geerlings-Simmons’ National Democratic Party formed a coalition in May with five other parties after inconclusive parliamentary elections, which grants her a narrow majority. Suriname has had several significant offshore oil discoveries between 2019 and 2023, but large-scale extraction, which could aid the country’s unstable financial situation, has not yet started but is expected by 2028.

In the meantime, there is a realistic possibility that the new government will have to introduce further measures to boost tax revenue and reduce public spending. However, the implementation of similar reforms, particularly the end of state subsidies for fuel, resulted in violent protests in 2023. These elements and the fragmented state of the country’s legislature mean that Suriname is likely to remain politically unstable in the medium term.

Four Canadians arrested in extremist plot

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have arrested four individuals, including two active members of the Canadian Armed Forces, for planning to forcibly seize land in Quebec and attempting to form an anti-government militia. Three of the suspects face charges related to facilitating terrorist activity, and a fourth suspect was charged with weapons- and explosives-related offences. A large cache of weapons and equipment, including 83 firearms, 16 explosive devices, 11,000 rounds of ammunition, tactical gear, and night vision goggles, was also seized by the RCMP. Most of the equipment was reportedly stolen from military camps.

The case is being treated as an example of anti-government extremism, which, while still rare in Canada, has increased since the pandemic. The movement is often linked to white supremacy movements and has involved a shift to smaller, more decentralised cells in response to successful law enforcement operations disrupting larger, more centralised organisations.

Man killed after opening fire on Texas border patrol station

The shooting occurred on 7 July in McAllen, near the US-Mexico border. The shooter was killed by officers, who returned fire after he had wounded three people. According to available information, the attacker had spray-painted his vehicle with a slogan taken from a first-person shooter (FPS) videogame, where it is used by an anarchist revolutionary movement. The incident is likely a case of lone wolf terrorism perpetrated by a single, self-radicalised individual, and the choice of target is likely associated with the ongoing mass deportation of undocumented migrants in the US.

UN warns Haitian gangs are in near-total control of the capital

Recent reporting from the UN indicates that around 90 per cent of the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, is now under the control of the gangs. Since consolidating control in the capital, gangs have also expanded their attacks into the areas that immediately surround it and also into areas of southern and central Haiti that were largely peaceful.

In the east of the country, the gangs have concentrated on cities like Belladere and Malpasse, which are located on the border with the Dominican Republic or on main supply routes between the border and Port-au-Prince. This pattern of expansion likely indicates that the gangs are pursuing a deliberate strategy aimed at isolating the capital from external assistance and humanitarian aid, while also denying freedom of movement to Haitian police and the Kenyan-led international security mission.

Consequently, the already severe humanitarian situation in Port-au-Prince and adjacent areas is likely to deteriorate further in the immediate future. In addition, rates of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are likely to increase in Haiti. This is likely to exert increased pressure on critical services in the affected areas, and many IDPs in the eastern parts of the country are likely to move towards the Dominican Republic border to seek shelter in the country.

However, the Dominican Republic has already taken in hundreds of thousands of Haitian refugees and has increased its deportation of Haitian refugees, including vulnerable people, such as pregnant women, new mothers and children.

Armed groups in Colombia have continued to grow under President Petro

Recent reporting indicates that illegal armed groups, including guerrilla groups and organised crime groups, have grown significantly under President Gustavo Petro’s government.  Groups have likely exploited Petro’s ‘total peace’ initiative to regroup and consolidate power, with assessments suggesting that they have grown by approximately 45 per cent in the last three years.

Many of the groups are procuring funds through illicit activities such as drug trafficking and illegal mining, which have enabled them to recruit extensively, including thousands of minors, under ceasefire conditions. This sustained expansion will likely increase the threat to Colombia’s urban centres, with increasingly powerful armed groups seeking to extend their influence beyond their traditional rural strongholds.

Wildfires in Madre, California reach at least 80,000 acres

Since 2 July, over 600 emergency personnel have been battling to contain a wildfire in San Luis Obispo County. The fire spread rapidly, consuming at least 28,300 hectares in 24 hours. The wildfire erupted in Los Padres National Forest, spurring authorities to issue widespread evacuation orders and close the Los Padres National Forest.

By 11 July, the fire had spread to at least 80,786 acres but was approximately 67 per cent contained, causing evacuation warnings to be downgraded. The Madre blaze is California’s largest wildfire of 2025, even bigger than the Eaton and Palisades fires in Los Angeles in January. The cause of the fire remains under investigation.

Strong earthquakes kill two people in Guatemala

On 8 July, a series of strong earthquakes, including one with a magnitude of 5.6, struck Guatemala, causing significant damage and disruptions. The earthquakes led to structural damage in multiple areas, including Guatemala City, Sacatepequez, and Escuintla, with reports of buildings partially collapsing. Two people were rescued in Palin and San Cristóbal El Alto, with response efforts continuing in other affected areas.

The Guatemalan government issued a yellow alert for seismic activity and has suspended in-person school classes in affected departments, urging remote work where possible. Hospitals in Guatemala City have suspended outpatient visits, although emergency services remain operational. Additionally, private universities in the region have switched to remote learning for 9 July. Despite the disruptions, air operations at La Aurora International Airport are proceeding normally.

Overnight 8–9 July, Russian forces launched 728 Shahed one-way attack drones (and decoys) and 13 missiles (seven Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles and six Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal” ballistic missiles), primarily targeting the city of Lutsk in northwestern Ukraine.  Ukrainian air defence intercepted or disrupted the vast majority of incoming threats, including all seven cruise missiles. No casualties were reported in Lutsk; however, fires and damage were reported at multiple locations. Smaller drone strikes were also launched against targets in Donetsk Oblast, with prosecutors reporting five civilians killed in Rodynske and three in Kostiantynivka.

Overnight 9–10 July, Russia conducted another large-scale and layered aerial attack, primarily targeting Kyiv. The strike involved 397 attack drones and decoys, and 18 missiles (eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles, six Kh-101 cruise missiles, and four S-300 anti-aircraft missiles repurposed to be surface-to-surface missiles). Strikes damaged buildings in eight of Kyiv’s ten districts. Russian drones and missiles also struck surrounding regions (officials reported hits in Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad and Kharkiv Oblasts).  At least two civilians were killed and 16 were injured in Kyiv. 

The previous suspension of US-provided military aid reported on 3 July, which included Patriot PAC-3 and other interceptor munitions, has been partly reversed. US President Donald Trump distanced himself from the previous decision, and sources have indicated that US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth had authorised the pause without informing the White House.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The 8-9 July attack is now the largest combined aerial strike package of the war against Ukraine, surpassing the 4-5 July attacks in terms of scale. Russian forces continue to escalate the size of aerial assaults, in a phase of intense strikes that has highly likely made the risk environment in Ukrainian urban centres the most severe since the initial phase of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The mass concentration of attack against Lutsk, which led to the scrambling of Polish and allied aircraft due to the proximity to the Polish border, is notable.

It is highly likely that Russian military planners seek to challenge the relative ‘sanctuary’ status of urban centres in western Ukraine, with western regions serving as crucial logistical hubs for receiving and distributing foreign military aid. If sustained, this diversification of targets could overstretch Ukrainian air defence and complicate operational planning.

As a significant proportion of the US-provided air defence interceptors promised to Ukraine were already in Poland when their shipment was suspended, they could be rapidly transferred to Ukraine. These are almost certainly considered critical by Kyiv, as it is likely that Ukrainian anti-ballistic missile capabilities in particular (with the Patriot system being Ukraine’s only means of consistently intercepting ballistic missiles, excluding the almost certainly less effective and less numerous SAMP/T) are suffering from depleted interceptor stockpiles, given observable increased penetration rates of Ukraine’s air defences.

However, reports indicate that Ukraine will be immediately sent only ten Patriot interceptors, fewer than previously allocated. With at least two to three interceptors needed to effectively intercept a single ballistic missile, ten interceptors could be insufficient for the 8-9 July attack alone, highlighting their scarcity and significance. A severe shortage of these interceptors would almost certainly result in increased penetration of Ukrainian air defences and substantially increase the threat to major population centres and other high-value targets.

Furthermore, the sheer scale of the Shahed attack drone swarms now regularly being launched into Ukraine, facilitated by dramatically increased Russian production rates since late 2024, poses a significant and worsening threat to civilians and expatriates operating in Ukraine. While the vast majority are intercepted, the few that penetrate Ukrainian air defence can cause considerable damage and successfully intercepted drones have consistently resulted in damage and injuries  due to the threat of falling debris.

On 10 July, the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev held substantive peace talks in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). This was their first formal bilateral meeting since the agreement of a draft peace treaty in March, focused on finalising a comprehensive peace agreement to end the nearly four decades of conflict over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

While both sides described the talks as constructive, no immediate breakthrough was reached, with several key issues left unresolved, such as the opening of a land corridor to Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave, which would need to pass through Armenia’s Syunik region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There is a realistic possibility that the acquiescence of the Pashinyan government on key issues will trigger further civil unrest and political instability in Armenia. In 2024, there were significant protests against the transfer of several villages to Azerbaijani control that called for Pashinyan’s resignation, and recently, two Archbishops who are leaders in the Sacred Struggle opposition group were arrested for allegedly plotting a coup.

The total exclusion of Russia from the negotiations is almost certainly a reflection of Moscow’s declining influence in the region. Yerevan has distanced itself from Moscow and is now pursuing EU integration, a dramatic change which was highly likely catalysed by Russia’s failure to fulfil its long-standing security guarantees.

Moreover, Baku and Moscow are currently in the midst of a diplomatic crisis, characterised by tit-for-tat arrests and the torture of detainees. Declining Russian influence, partly linked to Moscow’s military preoccupation with Ukraine, has created a regional power vacuum and is highly likely reflective of a fundamental shift in South Caucasus geopolitics.

On 6 July, the Liberia-flagged Greek-owned dry bulk carrier MAGIC SEAS (IMO: 9736169) was attacked by the Houthis 51NM southwest of Al Hudaydah, Yemen. The vessel initially reported being engaged by multiple small vessels (eight to nine skiffs), which opened fire on MAGIC SEAS with automatic firearms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The vessel’s Armed Security Team (AST) returned fire. Following engagement with the skiffs, the vessel was attacked by four Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs), two of which impacted the port side of the vessel and two of which were “intercepted and destroyed by the AST”.

The vessel was also targeted by anti-ship missiles, which caused onboard fires. The crew abandoned ship and were rescued by a passing merchant vessel. The Houthis later published footage showing the abandoned vessel being boarded and then sunk with explosive charges.

On 7 July, the Liberia-flagged Greek-owned dry-bulk carrier ETERNITY C (IMO: 9588249) was attacked 51NM west of Al Hudaydah, Yemen. The vessel first reported being approached by at least four skiffs whose occupants opened fire with automatic weapons and RPGs, before being attacked with USVs and missiles.

The attack was persistent, continuing on 8 July, and the vessel sustained significant damage and lost all propulsion. Efforts to abandon ship were complicated by damage to the lifeboats, with at least four seafarers confirmed dead and two seriously injured. At least 11 crewmembers remain missing at the time of writing, with the US Mission in Yemen stating that several crewmembers have been kidnapped by the Houthis.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The US and Houthi ceasefire agreement, signed on 6 May, included an agreement that the Houthis would halt attacks against all but directly Israeli-linked shipping. However, the Houthis had not conducted an attack against merchant shipping since December 2024, despite the Gaza ceasefire ending in March. The two attacks mark a dramatic resurgence in the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign and will likely be followed by further attacks in the coming weeks.

Following US involvement in strikes against the Houthis’ primary external backer, Iran, in Operation Midnight Hammer, a member of the Houthi politburo stated that the ceasefire with the US was over. However, no official statement or clear revision of conditions for vessel targeting has been made by the Houthis. Both the MAGIC SEAS and ETERNITY C were part of commercial fleets whose affiliated vessels have called at Israeli ports in the past year, and the Houthis claimed that the MAGIC SEAS met “Yemeni criteria for targeting ships” and that the ETERNITY C was “en route to the Israeli port of [Eilat]”.

Given the ambiguity of Houthi statements and the previously indiscriminate nature of Houthi targeting, the threat of Houthi attacks likely applies to all merchant vessels transiting past Houthi-controlled Yemen. Furthermore, the risk of more indiscriminate Houthi targeting has likely increased following the degradation of their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, due to the destruction of coastal radar systems by US-led strikes, combined with most vessels suspending the transmission of Automatic Identification System (AIS) broadcasts when transiting the region.

Operation Aspides, the European Union’s naval deployment to protect merchant shipping against the Houthis, did not deploy any assets to protect or rescue crew from the MAGIC SEAS or ETERNITY C. However, the US currently has two Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) deployed to the Arabian Sea, with the USS Nimitz joining the USS Carl Vinson following the regional escalation with Iran. The US is therefore well placed to resume strikes against Yemen, and the US State Department has stated that the US will “continue to take necessary action to protect freedom of navigation and commercial shipping from Houthi terrorist attacks”. 

The two attacks likely indicate evolving Houthi tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). The Houthis have previously used skiffs during attacks, almost certainly forward deployed to coordinate attacks and identify targets, which has become more necessary due to the degradation of Houthi ISR capabilities.  However, the number of skiffs used and the complexity of the attacks are a marked development. Given the concentration of force, the Houthis almost certainly intended to sink both vessels.

Before these attacks, the Houthis had only sunk two merchant vessels (the RUBYMAR and TUTOR) since the campaign began in 2023, and had killed a total of four seafarers. These totals have now been doubled in just two attacks. Therefore, the renewed Houthi anti-merchant shipping campaign has been characterised by increased lethality, further increasing the risk profile to vessels transiting waters adjacent to Yemen.

On 7 July, protests reignited in Kenya, coinciding with the anniversary of the historic pro-democracy demonstrations known as Saba Saba Day. According to the Police Reforms Working Group, protests occurred across at least 20 out of Kenya’s 47 counties, including Nairobi, Kajiado, Nyeri, Mombasa, Kisii, Embu, Kisumu, Kiambu, Meru, Nakuru, Nyandarua, Vihiga, Narok, Kirinyaga, Uasin Gishu, Tharaka Nithi, Makueni, Laikipia, and Kakamega. At least 31 people were killed and 567 were arrested. Security forces have, once again, been criticised for using excessive force, with incidents involving the use of live ammunition, tear gas, and water cannons to disperse protesters.

Local news has reported armed individuals, known locally as “goons” who have clashed with protesters and are almost certainly pro-government, stormed the Kitengela Sub-County Hospital in Kajiado County and assaulted nurses and patients and damaged some medical equipment. The Kenya Medical Association has called for the closure of the hospital.

Authorities had anticipated the protests and took pre-emptive measures by setting up roadblocks at several entry points to Nairobi’s Central Business District and blocking roads near the country’s parliament building with razor wire. Early morning commuters and overnight travellers were stuck at checkpoints, with security forces only letting some vehicles through. According to local media, Nairobi police forces deployed at least eight cars of plainclothes officers to arrest protesters.

Further localised protests occurred on 8 July, with demonstrators burning tyres in Embu, calling for the release of an MP who had been arrested on 7 July. The same day, residents of Nyamira set the Itobo Police Station alight after a student was reportedly fatally shot by a police officer. On 9 July, senior economic advisor Moses Kuria resigned from the cabinet, citing “personal interests” as the reason for his departure.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Continued cycles of protests are highly likely until there is some form of concrete “justice” in terms of police reforms or resignations. However, demonstrations have not yet reached a sustained level and are occurring sporadically in response to key incidents and dates. As with the 25 June protests, large-scale protests have eased in the days following the Saba Saba Day demonstrations. While there is no obvious next anniversary or national day, as with 25 June (anniversary of the storming of parliament) or 7 July (Saba Saba Day), 16 July marks a year since a renewed wave of anti-government protests occurred, which may be leveraged by demonstrators as a mobilisation date.

This wave resulted in the deaths of at least 50 people and led police forces to ban demonstrations in Nairobi. High protest activity has also been observed on the weekends, and there is a realistic possibility that there will be renewed protests from the evening of 11 July through 13 July.

The heavy-handed response by security forces is almost certainly intensifying the protests, especially as a key grievance among demonstrators is the state’s use of violence. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has stated that the deaths have occurred “amid reports that police and security forces used lethal force to quell violent demonstrations in Nairobi and across the country” and has called for the killings to be investigated. This adds further pressure to President William Ruto, who has weathered numerous waves of large-scale protests since becoming president in September 2022 on a platform of protecting the poor and ending police violence.

Ruto holds a significant parliamentary majority, and the largely Gen Z protesters lack a clear leader, which lowers the risk of him being removed from office. Kenya’s next presidential election is not until 2027, although Ruto will almost certainly be mindful of it as he attempts to placate protesters. It is likely that, as with last year’s protests, which saw Ruto backtrack from the controversial finance bill, continued violent unrest will pressure Ruto into enacting measures to rein in the security forces.

Resident doctors vote to strike in the United Kingdom

Resident doctors (previously called junior doctors) have announced that they will strike from 25 to 29 July. The strike action is being conducted over pay, with the British Medical Association (BMA) stating that the wages are around 20 per cent lower in real terms than in 2008. UK Health Secretary Wes Streeting has denounced the strikes, emphasising that they have received a 28.9 per cent pay increase over the last three years. Resident doctor committee co-chairs have emphasised that they had “made every attempt to avoid strike action by opening negotiations for pay restoration”. If the strike fails to result in a pay rise, further strikes are highly likely.

Offices of National Rally raided by French police

On the morning of 9 July, French police carried out a raid at the Parisian headquarters of the French far-right party National Rally (RN), led by Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella. The raids are connected to an ongoing investigation into RN’s finances, which involves the party’s upper echelons. Le Pen herself was found guilty of embezzlement of EU Parliament funds in early 2025 and was barred from running for public office for five years, possibly thwarting her hopes of challenging for the presidency in 2027. The raid is likely to provoke strong opposition from RN supporters, and there is a realistic possibility that it will drive civil unrest in Paris, although the extent of protests is highly likely to remain limited.

Several more opposition politicians detained in Turkey

On 5 July, Turkish police detained the mayors of Adana, Antalya and Adıyaman as part of three separate investigations for bribery. All three mayors are members of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition party in Turkey. Ankara is in the process of cracking down on CHP, the most notable arrest being that of Istanbul Mayor and presidential candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu in March. On 7 July, Turkish authorities also launched a probe into CHP party leader Özgür Özel, who is alleged to have insulted President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The ongoing crackdown is highly likely part of a protracted campaign meant to shape the political stage for an extension of Erdoğan’s rule, possibly via a change of the Turkish constitution. As İmamoğlu’s arrest prompted large-scale protests, it is likely that the latest developments will also drive unrest. Turkish police often respond violently to protests, carrying out hundreds of arbitrary arrests, including of journalists and bystanders.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) arrest high-ranking Islamic State operatives in al-Hol camp

On 10 July, SDF channels announced the arrests of the “military emir” and “Sharia authority” (likely the chief legal official) in the camp, which houses around 37,000 people, including a large proportion of ISIS members and their families. According to the SDF, the ‘military emir’ was also involved in efforts to smuggle ISIS fighters in and out of the camp. The arrests are likely reflective of SDF concerns regarding the future of the camp: as part of the process of integration into post-Assad Syria, the Kurdish authorities reached an agreement for the transfer of security responsibilities to Damascus, and the repatriation or relocation of Iraqi and Syrian inmates to their places of origin. However, the timeline for this process remains unclear. Moreover, the realistic possibility of US humanitarian aid cuts to the camp also threatens its viability.

Egypt urges a deal over Ethiopian Dam, which was completed last week

On 10 July, Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly urged Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to finalise an agreement over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that guarantees “no harm to Egypt”. The GERD was completed on 3 July and constitutes Africa’s biggest hydroelectric plant. Launched in 2011, Ethiopia views the project as crucial for its energy needs, with approximately 60 per cent of its population without electricity, but it has been a source of significant tension with Egypt, which views the dam as critically threatening its water supply. The GERD is situated on the Blue Nile tributary in northern Ethiopia, from where approximately 85 per cent of the Nile’s water flows. Egypt has stressed that as little as a two per cent drop in supply could result in the loss of 200,000 acres of irrigated land. Despite negotiations being conducted over 13 years, no agreement between the two countries has been reached.

Tensions over GERD have threatened to escalate into a conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia. While a full-scale interstate conflict remains undesirable to both parties, Egypt is highly likely to back Ethiopian insurgent groups, including the active Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the currently pacified Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). If this occurs, Ethiopia will highly likely harden its position over water flow to Egypt, threatening further escalation. The dam’s inauguration is being prepared for September, an event that will highly likely trigger widespread protests in Egypt.

DRC and AFC/M23 continue Qatar-mediated peace talks

On 10 July, a fifth round of peace talks between Congolese and AFC/M23 started in Doha. While Qatar has been pushing for a final agreement, the talks have been held up by counterproposals and maximalist demands from each side. According to US Africa envoy Massad Boulos, the US is participating in the talks, which they hope will be the “last and final round.” He also claimed that they had reached a final agreement that needs fine-tuning, a claim that the AFC/M23 denied. While a peace deal was signed between the DRC and Rwanda on 27 June, securing an end to the fighting with AFC/M23 is almost certainly contingent on this peace deal.

Any progress on peace talks threatens to be unravelled by continued fighting between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and AFC/M23, with clashes ongoing approximately 40 kilometres from Kiwanja in North Kivu on 10 July. In a further threat to the peace deal, the FARDC deployed reinforcements to Kivu, which the DRC’s Defence Minister Alexandre Luba Ntambo declared were warranted due to a potential AFC/M23 advance to within 32 kilometres of Uvira, a city close to the border with Burundi, on 4 July. AFC/M23 occupation of Uvira would almost certainly pose a threat to Burundi, which is battling an ongoing RED-Tabara insurgency in the adjacent province. Furthermore, it would almost certainly unravel the Qatar-mediated peace process and would likely undermine the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement.

Rwandan opposition leader appears in court on subversion charges

On 8 July, opposition figure Victoire Ingabire appeared in court, having been arrested on charges of plotting to incite public unrest on 19 June. Ingabire previously spent nearly eight years of a 15-year sentence in prison between 2010 and 2018 for conspiracy to undermine the established government and genocide denial. This has prevented her from running in subsequent elections, despite appeals to expunge her criminal record. Ingabire has been, at times, the sole opposition figure to consistently oppose the government while residing in Rwanda, something that carries a significant risk of arrest.

Despite President Paul Kagame’s suppression of opposition voices, large public demonstrations in support of Ingabire are highly unlikely. Kagame remains a popular figure in Rwanda, largely credited with bringing the 1994 genocide, which killed at least 800,000 people in approximately 100 days, to a halt and stabilising Rwanda in its aftermath. In the July 2024 presidential election, Kagame won over 99 per cent of the vote, although the election is generally considered fraudulent by international observers. While Rwanda’s courts are formally independent, judges are appointed by Kagame, and Ingabire’s trial is almost certain to be politically influenced.

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) begin disarmament process with symbolic ceremony

On 11 July, approximately 30 PKK militants took part in a symbolic disarmament ceremony in the mountains near Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan. This is the first concrete step that has been taken to end the four decades of insurgency with Turkey, following the May 2025 announcement of the PKK’s disbandment. On 9 July, the first public video message in 26 years from the Kurdish group’s long-imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was released, in which he called for a “voluntary transition from the phase of armed struggle to the phase of democratic politics and law”.

If successfully implemented, the disbandment of the group could be a stabilising factor in several other Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iraq and Syria. While the initial disarmament phases are likely to be successful, there is a realistic possibility that the process could be derailed by hardline Turkish nationalists, a lack of opportunity for Kurdish separatists to advance their agenda peacefully, or PKK dissidents and splinter groups. Moreover, the imprisonment of Öcalan is almost certainly a key issue, with Ankara stating his jail conditions could be reviewed as the process unfolds, and the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) umbrella group stating that the peace process cannot make progress without Öcalan’s release.

US revokes “foreign terrorist organisation” (FTO) status for Syrian group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

Washington announced the move on 7 July, removing HTS from the list after seven years. Although HTS officially disbanded in January, the move is notable as it removes further pressure from Syrian President, and former HTS leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. The US lifted sanctions on Syria in June, and this latest decision almost certainly reflects Washington’s determination, with the support of friendly Gulf states, to reorient post-Assad Syria into a geopolitically advantageous position. While the move is a clear victory for Damascus, it will almost certainly further embolden extremist wings of HTS and other groups who have been integrated within the new Syrian government, and who almost certainly prefer the adoption of a more hostile stance towards Washington.

Israeli officials suggest “humanitarian city” plan for the Gaza Strip

On 8 July, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that he had issued instructions to the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to prepare plans to relocate all of Gaza’s residents, almost all of whom have been internally displaced several times since October 2023, to a “humanitarian city” to be built in Rafah. Katz suggested that the operation of relocating approximately 600,000 individuals would start if Israel and Hamas could negotiate a ceasefire. Several human rights advocates have stated that the plan would further worsen conditions for Gaza’s civilian population and that it would also create conditions to preclude the return of Gaza’s residents to their pre-war homes.

Currently, Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations are ongoing, but it is unclear if Israeli officials have discussed this latest plan. Hamas leaders have voiced support for an Egyptian-led reconstruction plan, which would be predicated on the premise of the civilian population remaining in the Gaza Strip. In addition to the lack of clarity regarding plans for a humanitarian city, the major obstacle in the way of a ceasefire agreement remains the status of the Philadelphi corridor, with Hamas officials calling for the removal of IDF forces following the deal.

Boko Haram kill at least nine people in Borno State, Nigeria

On 6 July, Boko Haram killed at least nine and injured four in Mallam Fatori in Borno State close to the border with Niger. The governor, Sugun Mai Mele, responded by emphasising that “anyone found collaborating with the insurgents to bring harm or attack to the people of Malam Fatori will be cursed” and that measures including the digging of trenches are being implemented to fortify the town. The heat and sandy terrain have made it difficult for security forces to defend it. This is the second attack in Mallam Fatori in 2025, with a Boko Haram rival Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) suicide bombing killing 27 Nigerian soldiers on 26 January.

Mallam Fatori’s location near the tri-state border, close to the Komadougou Yobe River and the shores of Lake Chad, makes it a strategic location for the insurgents. This week is likely to be the final week of hot, dry weather in Borno State before the onset of the rainy season, which will likely lead to a reduction in militant activity and a change in tactics, from more complex ground assaults and raids to smaller-scale attacks and suicide bombings.

Puntland forces claim the killing of several high-ranking Islamic State Somalia (ISS) members

On 7 July, Puntland media reported that the ongoing operations against ISS in the Cal Miskaad mountain range have resulted in the killing of at least seven high-ranking members of the group. On the day prior, a US African Command (AFRICOM) airstrike is reported to have targeted the local “governor” of the group, Abdurrahman Issa Fahiye, although it is not clear if Fahiye survived.

Abdul Qadir Mumin, one of the central figures in the  Islamic State’s increasingly decentralised network and Head of the General Directorate of Provinces (GDP), reportedly escaped the country during the offensive by Puntland forces. Some Puntland-linked channels have claimed that Mumin is in northern Mozambique, an area where IS forces are conducting an increased volume of operations, capitalising on domestic instability.

JNIM and ISSP forces clash in Northeast Burkina Faso

Local channels have reported a series of clashes between Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) militants between Gorgadji and Dori, in the country’s northeast. It is unclear how many clashes have occurred, as only ISSP made a brief comment on the incidents, with channels affiliated with the group claiming the deaths of 13 JNIM members, while JNIM only claimed to have “defeated” an ISSP attack. The area is a hotbed of JNIM activity and has been the location of several massacres, including one in late May when more than 100 civilians were killed, allegedly by a convoy of military and paramilitary forces.

Moreover, the town of Dori is assessed to be towards the “edge” of JNIM’s area of influence in the tri-border area, with ISSP influencing the rural areas to Dori’s northeast. The offensive, likely initiated by ISSP, may signal the beginning of a broader campaign aimed at expanding its territorial control.

Heavy al-Shabaab activity in Somalia following the killings of two senior commanders by the military

On 6 July, the Somali military killed two senior al-Shabaab (AS) commanders, Ali Xabad and Mohamed Adow, in Guulane in Middle Shabelle. The commanders were reportedly high-ranking members involved in coordinating attacks in the area. Several other fighters were also killed. In the Hiiraan region on 7 July, AS conducted a complex car bombing near Gumare, close to Moqokori. Shortly afterwards, the group claimed to have taken full control of Moqokori following days of heavy fighting. Moqokori is located at a crossroads connecting feeder roads to multiple towns, giving AS control over supply lines in central Hiiraan.

On 8 July, AS conducted a suicide bombing on the Jaale Siyaad military academy in Mogadishu. The explosion occurred at around 1120 local time in front of the academy. While numerous casualties have been reported, the exact number has not been confirmed. A similar attack occurred on 18 May 2025, when a suicide bomber struck a military recruitment base in Mogadishu. It is highly likely that AS are deliberately targeting the enlistment infrastructure to dissuade military recruitment and prevent the Somali military from replenishing its members. Further attacks in Middle Shabelle, Hiiraan, and Mogadishu are highly likely in the near term.

Large-scale operations against the ADF in Ituri, DRC

Since 6 July, a coalition of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has initiated shelling in the vicinity of Lolwa, approximately one hundred kilometres east of Bunia in Ituri province. This reportedly constitutes the first time the Islamic State-aligned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have been targeted in this area. This comes as the DRC and Uganda have agreed to expand counterinsurgency operations under Operation Shujaa, the joint military offensive against insurgent forces in Kivu and Ituri initiated in November 2021, signing a memorandum of understanding on 20 June 2025. While the operation has succeeded in pushing the ADF out of most of its strongholds near the DRC-Uganda border by early 2024, the ongoing Rwanda-backed AFC/M23 offensive has occupied the FARDC, creating a security vacuum in Ituri.

This has given the ADF more operating room, which they have used to expand their offensive while avoiding major clashes with the FARDC or UPDF in 2025, with ACLED data recording only five clashes involving the ADF between January and March 2025, 25 per cent fewer than the quarterly average. Since 2024, the ADF has consolidated its core camps from six to three, moving them into more remote areas to defend against Operations Shujaa. Baluku, located near Lolwa, is the largest ADF camp and consists of approximately 1,000 members. The shelling targeting Lolwa is almost certainly targeting this ADF camp and marks a significant shift in tactics for the operation, which has failed to stop the escalating insurgency.

Wildfires cause airport shutdown in Marseille, France

On 8 July, French authorities issued a notice to halt operations at the Marseille airport, due to a wildfire at the city’s outskirts. The fire reportedly started in the town of Les Pennes-Mirabeau, north of Marseille, and rapidly spread south due to 70 km/h winds and dry conditions of the local vegetation. Authorities also warned residents to “remain confined”, closing all doors and windows to mitigate health risk from the fires. Flight operations have since resumed and no serious injuries have been recorded; however, the French authorities have warned of increased wildfires across the southern region, with much of the area classed as “high” or “very high” for the next few days, with temperatures forecast to rise even higher.

Wildfires ongoing in Latakia, Syria

Firefighting efforts have been ongoing in Latakia in three main active wildfire areas. No casualties have been reported so far. The wildfires have severely impacted the region, with approximately 34,000 acres affected. Efforts have been concentrated in areas such as Gassaniah, where multiple fires have been extinguished. However, firefighting efforts have been hindered by the presence of unexploded ordnance from Syria’s civil war and recent clashes. The village of Gassaniah has undergone evacuations as a precautionary measure due to the proximity of the fires. Approximately 5,000 people have been affected by the wildfires, with over 1,000 individuals displaced. Various claims have circulated indicating that rival factions, including the Islamist group Ansar al-Sunna, have deliberately started the wildfires to displace the Alawite community, which has heavily aligned to former Syria President Bashar al-Assad. There is a realistic possibility that the wildfires, whether accidental or deliberate, could reignite local tensions.

On 9 July, Indian workers across the country participated in a nationwide strike known as a ‘Bharat Bandh’ or ‘Indian shutdown’. The strike was organised by several major Indian trade unions and has major support from several farmers’ groups and workers from informal sectors. Claims prior to the strike suggested that 250 million (25 crore)  people were set to participate, representing sectors such as banking, insurance, postal services, coal mining, heavy industry, transport, construction, agriculture and several other sectors.

The strike was organised against a series of policies implemented by the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which unions and farmer groups have widely denounced as pro-corporate, anti-worker and anti-farmer. These included a 17-point charter of demands, which included the introduction of new labour codes, privatisation, outsourcing, unemployment, inflation, and cuts to public services.

There were multiple incidents of protestors blocking train stations and major roads across the country, and thousands of businesses were forced to suspend operations. Police were deployed across the country, and there were several high-profile incidents involving clashes with the protestors, leading to thousands of arrests across the country. Arrests included the detention of several of the protest leaders and union heads across the country.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Various sources challenge the claims that 250 million people participated in the strike. However, it is almost certain that millions did, with large-scale protests observed throughout India. This likely indicates strong coordination across sectors and regions, and widespread appeal across the country, likely suggesting that similar strikes could be mobilised at short notice in the near future. The arrest of union leaders and strike organisers is likely aimed at disrupting the protests; however, there is a realistic possibility that these arrests will further polarise the country and serve as a catalyst for further industrial action.  

Most of the underlying grievances that have caused the strike, such as inflation, wage stagnation, unemployment, and privatisation, remain unresolved and are likely to continue to fuel public discontent. Moreover, there are multiple state elections scheduled through late 2025 and 2026, including in politically significant states such as Delhi, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu. Further protest activity is highly likely as trade unions and opposition groups will seek to exert pressure on the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government should it fail to make any major concessions.

The November 2020 general strike was very similar in nature and also claimed to have involved 250 million people across multiple sectors and culminated in a farmers’ march to New Delhi. This resulted in widespread disruption, stoppages of work in multiple important sectors, supply chain disruption, several incidents of violence and hundreds of thousands of farmers surrounding the capital. While the general strike only lasted for one day, it triggered a much longer protest movement, characterised by smaller but significant parallel protest movements. Some of these movements lasted for almost a year. There is a realistic possibility that the recent Bharat Bandh may follow a similar trajectory, splintering into smaller yet still disruptive movements, organised by sector, particularly in key states and politically sensitive regions.

Anti-piracy group Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) recorded 95 piracy and armed robberies targeting vessels in Southeast Asia between January and June 2025, an 83 per cent rise from the same span in 2024. 80 of these incidents occurred in the eastbound lane of the Straits of Malacca, compared to 21 during the first half of 2024. Approximately 90 per cent of incidents were relatively minor, with no injuries to crewmembers. Furthermore, 90 per cent of incidents occurred after dark, typically between 0100 and 0600 local time in Indonesian waters.

In approximately half of the incidents in the Straits of Malacca, nothing was stolen; in 29 per cent, engine parts were stolen. Approximately half of the incidents targeted bulk carriers, and a quarter targeted tankers. Most boardings targeted vessels with low security, low freeboards, and moving at slow speeds in restricted areas.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Straits of Malacca is one of the world’s most important shipping lanes, with nearly half the world’s annual seaborne trade tonnage and 70 per cent of Asia’s oil imports transiting through. The strait constitutes part of the Maritime Silk Road, providing access from China’s coast to India’s southern tip. 30 per cent of global trade is estimated to travel through the channel. The waterway is only 2.8 kilometres wide at its narrowest point at the Phillip Channel and is one of the world’s most congested shipping choke points. Despite the importance of the waterway and the spike in incidents, robberies typically target easily accessible ship stores rather than cargo, and the impact on global trade has been minimal. If robberies continue at the current rate, it is highly likely that insurance premiums will increase, which will almost certainly be passed on to consumers.

While the jump in incidents this year has been notable, there has been a steady increase in maritime security incidents in Asia in recent years, with 55 in 2022, 58 in 2023, and 61 in 2024. There are multiple reasons for the increase. Most robberies emanate from Indonesia, where several organised criminal gangs operate, particularly around the Riau Islands. Poor socioeconomic conditions have been a major driving factor, with locals being driven to crime by poverty and a lack of economic opportunities. Approximately 7.2 million people were recorded as unemployed in Indonesia in 2024, increasing by 83,000 to 7.28 million by February 2025. The current unemployment rate sits at 4.76 per cent of the population and is expected to reach 5 per cent by 2030. Poverty rates are also generally higher in Indonesia’s coastal regions. This has been exacerbated by the northeastern monsoon season from December to March, which has significantly affected fishing yields this year, increasing the financial burden on Indonesian fishermen.

Endemic corruption within shipping companies and law enforcement agencies, as well as a reluctance to crack down on criminal gangs, have also contributed to the issue. The lack of ‘hot pursuit rights’ means that failures with Indonesian policing cannot easily be alleviated by Singaporean or Malaysian efforts. Furthermore, increased maritime traffic, with a record high of 3.11 billion gross tonnes of shipping arriving into the Port of Singapore in 2024, has increased congestion and the number of available targets. Without significant efforts to alleviate the economic plight of Indonesians living along coastal areas and a concerted effort to crack down on criminal gangs, the number of incidents will highly likely continue at elevated rates.

Preliminary report into Air India crash set to be published

On 11 July, the preliminary report into Air India flight 171, which crashed on 12 June, killing 241 out of 242 passengers and at least 30 people on the ground, is set to be published. The report will almost certainly contain basic information about the flight, as well as findings from the crash site and progress of the investigation so far. Both black boxes were recovered from the crash, which will reveal information from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR).

According to reports, the investigation has increasingly focused on the movement of the engine fuel control switches, which are cockpit toggles used to start or cut fuel to the aircraft’s engines. According to leaks, one or both fuel switches may have been in, or moved to, the ‘cut’ position, which would instantly starve the engines of fuel and cause a rapid loss of thrust. This may have been pilot error or a mechanical fault, although no fleet-wide faults have reportedly been found among Boeing 787-8 Dreamliners.

Very few details have been revealed by authorities so far, which has fuelled speculation and misinformation, with fictional AI-generated accident reports spreading on social media. There is a realistic possibility that the publishing of the report could trigger demonstrations over the weekend, particularly if any blame falls on the airline.

Thailand’s cabinet withdraws controversial legalisation of the casinos bill

On 8 July, Thailand’s Cabinet withdrew a controversial ‘entertainment complexes bill’ which would legalise casinos following the suspension of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra. The bill was approved in January and was awaiting a lawmaker’s review. If the bill passed, casinos would be able to operate in complexes housing other businesses such as hotels or malls. According to the ruling Pheu Thai Party, the bill would help attract investment and tourism and crack down on illegal gambling.

It has faced significant opposition, however, including from the former coalition partner Bhumjaithai Party. According to Deputy Finance Minister Julapun Amornvivat, the government “accept it’s not the appropriate time”. The party currently has a slim majority and is facing mounting criticism following the suspension of Paetongtarn following a leaked phone call, and the controversial bill would likely have sparked further unrest, exacerbating the political crisis.

Islamic State (IS) network dismantled in Malaysia

Malaysian authorities claimed to have dismantled a network of IS supporters that was engaged in recruitment and fundraising efforts on social media, and which comprised between 100 and 150 people. At least 36 people have been detained since April, all of whom are Bangladeshi nationals working in Malaysia. According to authorities, the network primarily targeted Bangladeshis, likely in an attempt to radicalise and solicit funds from migrant workers on higher Malaysian wages. The operation is notable as it is likely indicative of growing IS efforts to capitalise on the political disorders in Bangladesh to advance its ideology. While an Islamic State Bengal Province (ISBP) exists, its last major attack occurred in 2017.

Arson attempt at synagogue and restaurant attacked on the same night in Melbourne, Australia

On the night of 4 July, a man reportedly set fire to the front door of a synagogue in East Melbourne during a Sabbath event, prompting around 20 people to evacuate the building. Police arrested the alleged perpetrator on the following day. On the same night, an Israeli restaurant in the city was ransacked after being allegedly targeted by pro-Palestine protesters, leading to at least three arrests.

Australia has had a severe rise in anti-Semitic attacks since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, with local civic society groups identifying more than 2,000 cases in the first year of the war alone. The frequency of attacks in Victoria has resulted in the government establishing a anti-hate task force as part of its action plan. The Melbourne synagogue is the third to be targeted in an arson attempt since December 2024. Attack perpetrators are likely to see synagogues as desirable targets due to their symbolic value, high visibility, and often lack of adequate security.

At least nine dead and 30 missing during monsoon flooding in Nepal and China

Early 8 July, severe flooding occurred in Nepal’s Bhotekoshi and Trishuli rivers, significantly impacting the Rasuwagadhi border area with China. The flooding, triggered by heavy rains in Tibet, has resulted in at least nine confirmed deaths. The number of missing persons stands at 19 in Nepal and 11 in China. The flooding also caused major damage to infrastructure, destroying the Nepal-China Miteri bridge and damaging the Rasuwagadhi hydropower plant, leaving employees stranded. Roads in Rasuwa and Timure areas have been cut off in nine to 10 locations, complicating rescue and relief operations. Chinese state media has reported a landslide in Gyirong, which borders Nepal’s Rasuwa, with at least 11 people missing. Rescue efforts are ongoing as authorities continue to search for the missing and assess the damage.

Volcano on Flores, Indonesia, erupts again in less than a month

Mount Lewotobi Laki Laki erupted on 7 July, only weeks after its last eruption on 17 June, resulting in an 11-kilometre-high ash cloud above the island of Flores, southeast Indonesia. The alert-level status remains the highest possible due to the increased volcanic activity, and tourists and residents have been warned to maintain a six-kilometre radius of separation from the volcano. Notable airport disruptions were recorded in Bali, which is a key hub for transport in Indonesia and across the region.

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