On 5 October, two “narcomantas,” banners used by drug cartels to send public messages, were discovered in the popular tourist resort of Los Cabos in the state of Baja California Sur. One banner was discovered near the Las Veredas bridge in San José del Cabo, and the other on the toll bypass toward Cabo San Lucas. Local media reported that the banners purportedly threatened US citizens and officials visiting or residing in Mexico, as well as senior Mexican and US figures such as Kash Patel, the incumbent director of the FBI, Terry Cole, the administrator of the DEA, and current Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. The banners were reportedly signed by elements of the Los Chapitos faction of the now-fragmented Sinaloa Cartel. The banners have circulated on social media; however, the mayor of San Jose del Cabo, Christian Agúndez Gómez, has stated that the local authorities have investigated the matter and determined that the banners were never placed.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Mexican cartels have traditionally used narcomantas to send messages to intimidate and test the intended audience, and to shape public opinion. While the veracity and attribution of the banners have yet to be determined, the banners emerged after months of increased US pressure on Mexico to curb cartel activity and the flow of narcotics in the US. This has involved the designation of several Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs), expanded border enforcement, US intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions over Mexico, threats to conduct drone strikes on Mexican soil, and most recently, the imposition of US sanctions targeting a network of Mexican companies and their affiliates suspected of supplying pre-cursor chemicals to make fentanyl to the Los Chapitos faction. Mexico has also conducted hundreds of arrests and extradited several key figures within the Sinaloa Cartel to the US, including its former leader, whose arrest was widely assessed as being responsible for the fragmentation and subsequent increase in factional violence. These actions have significantly disrupted the Sinaloa Cartel’s operations. If the banners are legitimately linked to Los Chapitos, there is a realistic possibility that they are simply messaging and intimidation, rather than an immediate threat to tourists, given the Sinaloa Cartel’s financial stake in the tourist industry. However, if the threat is genuine, there are multiple courses of action Los Chapitos could pursue. Any direct threat to life would almost certainly result in a major crackdown by the Mexican security forces, a situation Los Chapitos would likely want to avoid given their weakened position from months of fighting, arrests, sanctions and internal fragmentation. The most likely courses of action could include the extortion of US-linked businesses, intimidation of staff and owners, short-duration or express kidnappings, acts of arson, and potentially increased violence targeting local officials rather than tourists.

The Military Forces of Colombia have intensified their operations in the Amazon region in southern Colombia, aimed at the killing or capture of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissident leader Iván Mordisco (real name Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández), commander of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC). Special forces units have conducted a five-day operation to identify and assault an EMC camp in the Amazonas Department. Mordisco evaded capture, but the operation resulted in the death of four of his bodyguards, the detention of several others and the seizure of arms. A reward of 5 billion pesos (approximately USD 1.25 million) has been offered for information leading to the capture of Mordisco.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In contrast to most of FARC’s senior leadership, Mordisco rejected the 2016 peace agreement and vowed that he would continue the armed struggle. Mordisco subsequently successfully unified several splinter factions under the new banner of the EMC or Central General Staff. The EMC is currently assessed to be operational in at least 16 of Colombia’s 32 departments and is widely suspected of being involved in illicit activities, such as narcotics trafficking, extortion and illegal mining. The group remains the most active and capable of FARC dissident groups, and has increased its attacks throughout Colombia since 2024, when the government suspended the bilateral ceasefire agreement with the EMC in the departments of Nariño, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca. EMC attacks have continued to increase throughout 2025, primarily in response to government offensives and efforts to capture Mordisco.

Most EMC attacks are characterised by the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes on security patrols, coercive roadblocks and kidnappings, which are predominantly confined to remote areas. However, in June 2025, the EMC conducted a series of at least 24 attacks targeting police stations and municipal buildings in the Cauca and Valle de Cauca departments, many of which were within urban or semi-urban areas, including in Cali, Colombia’s third-largest city. These attacks were then followed by the August truck bomb attack outside a military aviation school in Cali, which killed six and injured 60, all of whom were civilians. This attack was also later attributed to the EMC.

These attacks illustrate the EMC’s ability to conduct attacks outside of its main areas of operation in areas under government control and likely signal a willingness to accept a high rate of civilian casualties in pursuit of their objectives. Moreover, these attacks coincided with intensified government offensives and operations targeting Mordisco. The EMC will likely retaliate to the recent operations targeting Mordisco by increasing its attacks in areas adjacent to its strongholds, which may include attacks in major urban centres such as Cali, Buenaventura and other settlements within reach of EMC fronts and logistic corridors.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro claimed that security forces had disrupted a “false flag” plot to attack the US Embassy in Venezuela, which has been officially closed since 2019. The plot reportedly involved the detonation of improved explosive devices (IEDs) at the embassy site by “extremist sectors of the local right”. According to pro-regime sources, the plot was designed to increase tensions with the US and provide the Trump administration with a pretext for intervention. The incident follows a series of recent provocations between the US and Venezuela, including the alleged detection of US combat aircraft off Venezuela’s coast on 2 October, the Trump administration’s 3 October legal designation of its counter-narcotics campaign as a “non-international armed conflict”, and a string of US strikes on suspected narcotics vessels in the Caribbean, which have killed at least 21 people since August. Tensions further deteriorated on 8 October after the Trump administration reported that it was suspending diplomatic negotiations with the Maduro administration, following a meeting with senior military commanders.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Caracas has failed to provide any credible evidence of the reported “false flag” operation targeting the US Embassy. There is a realistic possibility that the regime has fabricated the incident in order to justify increased surveillance, security measures, repression of the opposition, and to pre-emptively control the narrative ahead of any potential US actions. This tactic could allow the regime to frame future developments as part of a broader US strategy aimed at destabilising Venezuela, and could be leveraged to bolster domestic support and justify tighter internal controls. The regime will likely increase the hostile monitoring or arbitrary detention of foreign nationals and foreign-linked businesses or organisations in Venezuela in response.

The Trump administration’s legal designation of its current counter-narcotics campaign as a “non-international armed conflict” (NIAC) has likely been done for several reasons. The wording of NIAC likely signals to the domestic audience that the current campaign is not aimed at Venezuela but rather at transnational criminal organisations, such as the Venezuelan drug cartels that have already been designated as foreign terrorist organisations. The NIAC designation also enables the US to operate outside of the constraints of domestic criminal law, expanding its permissions to use lethal force and has likely been used to justify the controversial strikes on narcotics smuggling vessels originating from Venezuela.

The US has used the NIAC designation before in campaigns against non-state actors like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). However, the US force posture in the region has been greatly enhanced and is likely way beyond what would be required for a limited counter-narcotics or even counter-terrorism operation. The force, which includes naval destroyers, amphibious assault ships, marines and fighter jets, has likely deployed to deter Venezuela from retaliating against US strikes on narcotic smuggling. However, it is also likely large enough to achieve key objectives such as seizing and securing ports in the initial assault phase of a potential amphibious operation. The US force posture, combined with the recent suspension of diplomatic negotiations, will likely compel Venezuela to avoid direct military retaliation, especially as the US has the capability to rapidly reinforce its deployed forces in the region.

However, the NIAC designation may also provide the legal authorisation for US drone strikes on Venezuelan soil, a move that has reportedly been advanced by US military officials. The US has previously exploited the legal frameworks under NIAC to conduct drone strikes in several theatres without the explicit consent or cooperation of the host country, such as in Pakistan, Yemen and Libya. Should the Trump administration pursue this course of action, it would likely exceed Caracas’s current escalation threshold and force Venezuela into some form of direct or asymmetric retaliation.   

Second iteration of “No Kings” protests to occur in the US on 18 October.

The protests’ organisers, which include the 50501 Movement and the No Kings Organization, organised the first wave of protests on 14 June, which were attended by millions of participants across more than 2,100 cities and towns in the US and abroad. The 18 October protests were called in response to the administration’s decision to deploy the National Guard to several large US cities, which the organisers consider to be an abuse of the president’s executive power.

Protests are likely to be recorded across most state capitals in the US, and likely in major cities in Canada, Mexico, and possibly some European countries. While the past No Kings protests were peaceful, the new wave occurs at a time of greatly increased political tensions, with a series of clashes involving protesters and federal law enforcement, as well as targeted attacks on federal facilities, having been recorded since the beginning of the National Guard deployments. Due to this, cases of political violence, including terrorism and violent civil unrest, cannot be ruled out.  

US administration authorises National Guard deployment to Chicago, Illinois.

On 5 October, the White House announced that it would deploy 300 National Guard troops to Chicago. Chicago is the fourth major US city where a contingent of National Guard forces is deployed, following Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Portland. US President Donald Trump repeatedly defended the necessity of a federal law enforcement operation in Chicago, which he stated was necessary to combat crime and growing violence. On 4 October, the day before the announcement, vehicles operated by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers had been attacked and “rammed” by alleged protesters in Chicago’s Southwest Side. The deployment of National Guard troops will likely drive protests in Chicago, as it is almost certain to be perceived as a further escalation of tensions between the federal government and the local administration.

Pro-Palestine protests result in clashes in Mexico and Colombia.

On 8 October, large-scale pro-Palestine protests were recorded in both Mexico City and Bogotá. The protests resulted in several episodes of violence between protesters and police, as well as one case of a protester being severely injured after being struck by a vehicle in the centre of the Colombian capital. The protests coincided with similar demonstrations in Europe, which were staged in response to the detention of the activists of the Global Sumud Flotilla, and following the second anniversary of the 7 October Hamas attack in southern Israel, which resulted in the Israeli invasion of Gaza.

Major unrest continues in Ecuador in response to the removal of diesel subsidies.

Protests in response to the removal of diesel subsidies have continued in Ecuador and have involved several incidents of violence. On 4 October, the government declared a state of emergency in 10 Ecuadorian provinces, citing concerns over “serious internal unrest.” The measures primarily cover provinces with significant Indigenous populations, where protest activity has been most heavily concentrated. The state of emergency grants security forces expanded powers to disperse demonstrations, restrict movement, and conduct warrantless searches. Clashes between protesters and police have been reported in cities such as Quito, Cuenca, and Latacunga, with road blockades and attacks on infrastructure disrupting transport and commerce.

On 7 October, President Daniel Noboa’s motorcade was attacked when travelling in Cañar, with demonstrators allegedly throwing stones and other objects, resulting in damage to the vehicle. Five individuals have been arrested in connection with the attack. The incident also resulted in an official filing a complaint of attempted murder, after evidence of bullets was reportedly found. The attack on the president is likely to result in enhanced security measures, including increased military deployments and tighter controls on protest activity, which may further escalate tensions in the short term.

Possible arson attack targeting US judge in South Carolina.

On 6 October, US media reported that the house of a circuit-court judge in Edisto Beach, South Carolina, was destroyed in a fire, resulting in the injury of three of the occupants. US authorities have opened an investigation into the fire, which they claimed was caused by an unspecified “explosion”. In the weeks before the fire, the judge had reportedly received a high volume of death threats, likely linked to her September ruling that temporarily blocked the release of state voters’ files to the federal administration. There is a realistic possibility that the fire was the result of a targeted attack on the judge. It would thus follow on previous high-level attacks on US elected officials and political figures. These include at least one other attempted firebombing, in April 2025, which destroyed the residence of Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro.

Hurricane Priscilla causes significant disruptions in Mexico.

Tropical Storm Priscilla, which formed off the southwestern coast of Mexico, has been tracking northwest parallel to Mexico’s Pacific coast. The storm is currently located approximately 255 miles off the southern coast of Baja California Sur and continues to weaken. Despite its weakening, Priscilla poses a significant flooding risk to the southwestern United States in the coming days. Watches remain in effect from Cabo San Lucas to Cabo San Lazaro.

In Mexico, the storm has caused significant disruptions, with civil protection officials reporting 88 landslides, 24 mudslides, 77 flooding incidents, and 51 instances of downed trees across Hidalgo. In Baja California Sur, high surf and gusty winds have affected the Pacific coast, and schools in the La Paz and Cabo San Lucas areas were suspended in anticipation of the storm’s impact.

As Priscilla moves, it continues to bring large swells and heavy rains to the coasts of west-central Mexico and Baja California Sur. The storm has also led to the closure of beaches in Mazatlan due to strong waves and has caused flooding and strong winds in the Morelos area.

On 6 October, French Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu, who was appointed in September, announced that he would resign approximately 14 hours after announcing his new government. His resignation, which came as a surprise to political observers, followed an extremely negative reaction by all sides of the French political spectrum to his appointees, who were seen as too similar to the previous, and similarly unsuccessful, government of former Prime Minister François Bayrou. Lecornu is the seventh Prime Minister to have been in office since President Emmanuel Macron was elected in 2017, and his government is the fourth to collapse since the last French parliamentary elections in 2024.

While Lecornu, after announcing his resignation, has continued to carry out last-minute negotiations in the hope of reaching an agreement for a budget for 2026, Macron has stated that he will not, for now, call elections. Instead, the president stated on 8 October that he will pick a new prime minister “within 48 hours”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The collapse of the Lecornu government will highly likely drive further public dissatisfaction with the French administration and will likely result in civil unrest led by the left-wing opposition. Macron’s choice to pick a successor, rather than call for new National Assembly elections, will further increase parliamentary opposition, particularly if the appointee is seen as a “continuity” pick or as a Macron loyalist, unlikely to bargain with the left. Conversely, a centre-left pick may disappoint Macron’s allies on the right, especially due to the threat it would pose to key policies like the 2023 pension reform law.

A further extension of the French political crisis would increase the likelihood of new parliamentary elections. However, these may not prove decisive. Despite repeated government collapses, the “balance of power” in terms of public support has remained largely unchanged since the last National Assembly vote. The right-wing populist National Rally (RN) remains the leading party, with an estimated 32-35 per cent support, but its likely seat total appears constrained by the cordon sanitaire voting agreement between the centre and left, aimed at keeping RN candidates out of contested seats during the runoff votes. The left-wing coalition, the National Popular Front (NFP), trails with 23-25 per cent. While Macron’s centrist Ensemble (ENS) has declined to 15 per cent support, its losses have mostly benefitted the centre-right Republicans (LRLC), who, after undergoing a split, now oppose allying with RN and thus remain “at home” in a centrist bloc with around 23-27 per cent of the total vote. In general, this means that, if elections were held today, they would likely return a similar result to the 2024 elections, resulting in three blocs that have little mutual interest in cooperating.

As in 2024, the key variable remains a possible split within NFP, with the centre-left Socialists (PS) breaking from the populist left France Unbowed (LFI) to join a centrist government with ENS, LRLC and various independent/regionalist MPs. However, such an agreement might be politically counterproductive for PS, which would then risk haemorrhaging voters from its left flank to LFI. Overall, it is highly likely that such an electoral result would prolong France’s political instability and drive significant unrest.

Overnight, 5 to 6 October, Russian forces launched the largest aerial attack against Lviv Oblast in Ukraine since the start of the war in 2014. In total, Russian forces launched 53 missiles and 496 long-range attack drones or decoys against Ukraine, with 140 drones/decoys and 23 cruise missiles targeting Lviv Oblast. At least four civilians were killed and 18 others wounded in Lviv Oblast. In the city of Lviv, civilian and energy infrastructure were struck, leading to parts of the city losing power. Targets struck included warehouses in the Sparrow Industrial Park, including a warehouse which was storing goods for the Polish clothing firm LPP Group. A spokesperson for the company stated that only a small quantity of their goods were stored in the warehouse, and the attack would not have a significant effect on their ability to service the Ukrainian market.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Since the scale of Russian aerial attacks against Ukraine significantly escalated in May 2025, Russian forces have almost certainly increased attacks against areas in western Ukraine. Previously, for example, on 9 July, Russia launched a large-scale attack against Lutsk, and on 20 July, Ivano-Frankivsk. Western Ukraine, particularly cities such as Lviv, Lutsk and Ivano-Frankivsk, was largely deemed a relative ‘safe haven’ from Russian long-range fires earlier in the war. This made the region a desirable location for Western businesses and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to continue or start operations in Ukraine.

Western Ukraine, which retains an open border with four NATO member states, is also the primary entry point and logistics hub for the facilitation of lethal aid into Ukraine, especially from Poland, which is around 60 kilometres from Lviv. Lviv has also emerged as the epicentre of Ukraine’s bourgeoning defence industry, where multiple weapon systems, including long-range systems that target Russian territory, are produced. By launching large-scale attacks against western Ukraine, the Kremlin is almost certainly seeking to challenge the relative sanctuary status of the region, increasing the risk profile for foreign operations and aid in Ukraine. The attack, in close proximity to NATO borders, follows several other incidents that have tested NATO’s resolve, such as drone incursions into Poland, multiple airspace violations across Europe and even the aiming of Russian weapons at Danish military assets in the Danish Straits, and was likely partially aimed at signalling escalation risks for NATO’s sustained support for Ukraine.

The targeting of critical national infrastructure (CNI), particularly energy infrastructure, has been a standard feature of Russian strike doctrine. However, in previous years since 2022, Russian strikes against Ukrainian CNI have intensified towards the end of the year. As the autumn rasputitsa mud season begins from roughly mid-October, shortly followed by the freezing winter, conditions for ground offensives deteriorate. This highly likely is an important factor for Russian military planners seeking to maintain kinetic pressure against Ukraine despite more limited opportunities for breakthroughs on the frontlines. Moreover, by successfully striking energy infrastructure prior to the onset of winter, Russian forces are able to influence the morale of the civilian population by depriving it of heating and energy. Given the considerable success so far of Ukraine’s own ongoing long-range campaign against Russian energy infrastructure, particularly oil refineries, the Kremlin is likely to escalate its attacks against Ukrainian CNI as a means of retaliation during the winter of 2025-26.

On 4 October, between 7,000 to 20,000 anti-government protesters assembled in front of the Tbilisi parliament building,  on the same day as the Georgian local elections.  The opera singer and protest organiser Paata Burchuladze read out a declaration to the rally, declaring that the protest was a ‘National Assembly’ which declares a “transitional period” which “will ensure the peaceful assumption of power”.

A group of protesters then attempted to enter the presidential palace, the Orbeliani Palace, clashing with security forces who deployed water cannon and tear gas, and tearing down part of a security fence. Authorities reported 21 security personnel injured, with local media reporting six injured protesters and five detentions made at the scene.

On 5 and 6 October, prosecutors charged five opposition figures with attempting to conduct a coup,  and  Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze pledged to “completely neutralise foreign agents”, who he blamed for instigating an attempt to “overthrow the constitutional order”, particularly blaming the EU Ambassador Pawel Hercynzski.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is almost certain that the civil unrest will be further used by the Georgian Dream government to further crack down on the already highly fragmented opposition. The anti-government and pro-European protest movement escalated into large-scale nationwide demonstrations following the contested election in late October 2024, and further escalated in November 2024 after the suspension of the EU accession process. Since then, small-scale protests have been occurring on an almost daily basis in Tbilisi.

The 4 October demonstration stands out as being one of the largest and violent in months. Moreover, the implicitly stated desire of the protest speaker Burchuladze to overthrow the government, which was followed by an apparent attempted storming of the presidential palace by a splinter group of protesters, is indicative of the desire among certain elements of the opposition movement to oust the government by force.

Georgian Dream leaders and officials have already accused ‘foreign agents’ of backing the unrest. It is highly likely that the threat of arbitrary detention, increased scrutiny, and bureaucratic friction for Western travellers, businesses, and organisations operating in Georgia will further increase in the aftermath of 4 October. Furthermore, it is highly likely that small-scale protests will continue in Tbilisi, particularly around Rustaveli Avenue, and security forces are likely to deploy an even more forceful response against protesters.

Due to the fragmentation of the opposition, the breadth and depth of the crackdown since late 2024 against opposition forces, and the increasing lack of political mechanisms for the opposition to challenge the government, the radicalism of anti-government protesters will likely further increase in lieu of other means of change. However, these same factors will also likely reduce the scale of further protests compared to the major demonstrations of late 2024, with authorities having deployed a high degree of force and severe punitive measures against protest organisers and participants.

On 5 October, the first parliamentary elections since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime were held in Syria. Citing the mass displacement of Syrian citizens, incomplete civil records, and ongoing security concerns, the transitional government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa did not use direct popular voting for the election. Only 121 of the total 210 members of the People’s Assembly of Syria legislature were due to be elected, and the elections were postponed in several governorates, including in the Kurdish-held north and northeast, and the Druze-held province of Sweida.

Instead of universal suffrage, the election was conducted using indirect voting via electoral colleges, with sub-committees selecting members for local electoral colleges, which then chose pre-screened candidates with the aim of 70 per cent of lawmakers being technocrats and academics, and 30 per cent notable community figures. The results of the election were overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim and male, with only limited representation for Syria’s large ethno-religious minorities. A spokesman for the higher electoral committee stated that he believed these “significant shortcomings” would be addressed by Sharaa in the upcoming presidential appointment of 70 assembly members.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Although not a popular vote, the relatively peaceful conduct of the election will almost certainly be treated as a success by Sharaa’s transitional government. The relative lack of violence was highly likely conditioned by the tight controls and postponement of the elections in the areas of the country where transitional government forces do not exercise full control. However, it is precisely these areas where some of the largest fault lines in Syria’s fragile post-Assad transition are. Moreover, critics have argued that the electoral processes were top-down and opaque, merely providing a façade of pluralism while Sharaa consolidates control. Nonetheless, the elections are a landmark in the country’s transition, despite not being a true exercise in popular democracy.

Sharaa’s next appointments will highly likely be a key potential trigger for discontentment. Sharaa could appoint genuinely popular representatives from Syria’s minorities, ‘token’ minority figures who are unlikely to fundamentally challenge his objectives, or loyalists who will provide zero friction against Sharaa’s objectives. However, it is ultimately the case that Syria’s new legislature has only limited powers to challenge the executive under Syria’s interim constitution, with the People’s Assembly only being able to overturn presidential decrees with a two-thirds majority. With one-third of the parliament to be appointed by Sharaa, he is capable of totally undermining the authority of the legislature should he appoint loyalists.

On the one hand, the transitional government highly likely requires extensive executive power to rapidly respond to Syria’s multiple critical issues. On the other hand, a lack of genuine representation and participation in the political process from Syria’s wide-ranging ethno-religious minorities and ideologies will likely condition the use of violent force to achieve political objectives in lieu of peaceful institutional options.

The position of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains a key issue. Just in the past week, low-level clashes using small arms and mortars occurred in Aleppo between SDF and government-aligned forces, with a truce being reported on 7 October. The US-brokered deal in March to ultimately integrate the SDF into Syrian state institutions, and in particular, the military, remains precarious. US envoys met with SDF and transitional government officials on 6 October, with several issues arising, such as the fate of the nearly 10,000 Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) female Kurdish fighters in the Syrian state’s military,  which the Sharaa government almost certainly opposes. It is highly likely that the status of the Kurds, as well as the Druze and other minorities, will continue to be a critical obstacle to long-term stability in Syria.

On 9 October, US President Donald Trump stated that Hamas and Israeli representatives, coordinated with the mediation of Qatar, Turkey and Egypt, have agreed to a phased ceasefire deal. Preliminary information suggests that Hamas will release the 20 surviving Israeli hostages during the 9-13 October period, while Israel Defence Forces (IDF) will, in exchange, withdraw from approximately 70 per cent of the territory of the Gaza Strip that they currently control. Israel has agreed to release an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the hostages. The phased ceasefire leaves several unanswered questions, namely surrounding Hamas’ possible disarmament, the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to the administration of the Gaza Strip, and the future reconstruction of Gaza.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ceasefire agreement satisfies, for the most part, one of Israel’s key war objectives, the return of the hostages. However, it leaves the second stated war goal, the destruction of Hamas as a military and political actor in the Gaza Strip, unanswered. Hard-line factions within the Netanyahu government will likely seek to sway the administration towards considering the ceasefire temporary and maintaining extreme pressure on Hamas to extract more concessions. At the same time, the positive public response to the ceasefire announcement in Israel is likely to influence Tel Aviv’s decisions in the immediate term.

For Hamas, the ceasefire likely represents a compromise between the mostly Gaza-based, hardline leadership and the leaders based in Qatar, who have spearheaded negotiation efforts during the war. While by freeing the hostages, Hamas loses its main source of leverage, the concession is likely driven by the assessment that reducing Israeli pressure in Gaza City is immediately vital to ensure its short-term survival. Moreover, the phased implementation of the ceasefire, which is against the original framework of the US-backed plan, as well as Hamas’ temporary retention of the bodies of the deceased hostages, could allow the group to retain some flexibility in further negotiations. Ultimately, Hamas will likely have to agree to disarm to reach a lasting peace deal. Because of this, the group’s efforts in the short term will likely be aimed at making such a disarmament partial and obtaining strong international security guarantees.

Within the Gaza Strip, the ceasefire deal with Israel will likely create tensions among Palestinian militants, with some hardline factions, including elements within Hamas, likely preferring to continue a protracted war instead of agreeing to disarm. There is a realistic possibility that, if the ceasefire holds and progresses past its initial stage, splinter groups will emerge from Hamas and other groups engaged in the current conflict. Depending on their size, viability, and coordination, these groups could in turn endanger the peace deal in the long term.

On 4 October, the insurgent group al-Shabaab stormed the Godka Jilaow prison in Mogadishu, an underground prison complex holding numerous al-Shabaab fighters. The prison is located at a fortified site near the presidential palace, one of Mogadishu’s most secure areas. According to witness reports, the attack started with a suicide car bombing on the prison’s main gate, following which several al-Shabaab fighters entered the facility and attempted to free detained militants. The truck was disguised as a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) vehicle, and the militants were dressed as Somali security personnel. Security forces stopped the attack before it could succeed, killing all seven attackers, according to the Somali government. While it did not specify how many security officials were killed, a private ambulance owner reported transporting approximately 25 individuals from the scene.

The siege lasted approximately six hours.  In a statement, al Shabaab stated that they aimed to “free all the Muslim prisoners the apostates had been holding and torturing there”, dubbing the operation “Support for the Oppressed”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The assault came hours after the Somali government lifted roadblocks from at least 50 roads around Mogadishu, which were erected to safeguard critical government sites, for the first time in over a decade. The decision to lift the roadblocks followed months of calm and residential complaints that the roadblocks obstructed traffic and commerce. The assault was likely timed with the lifting of the restrictions, which would have the added operational benefit of undermining claims of the government’s counterinsurgency progress amid recaptures of territory.

Prison breaks are frequent among Salafi jihadist groups and comprise part of the Islamic State’s (IS’s) “Breaking the Walls” policy; campaigns targeting prisons to free jailed fighters. In 2021, al Shabaab conducted a raid on Bosaso’s central prison in Somalia’s Puntland region, freeing at least 400 prisoners. Imprisoned al-Shabaab members also conducted two prison revolts in 2020 and 2024. Numerous other jihadist groups have conducted attacks on prisons, notably Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria in January 2022 and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Kuje prison near Abuja in July 2022. Prison assaults have high propaganda value, allow jihadist groups to regenerate their numbers, improve their capabilities by replenishing skilled group members, humiliate state security, and force security responses that could increase instability and accelerate the insurgency.

This attack constitutes the 22^nd suicide bombing in Somalia this year and the second notable attack involving disguises. Earlier in the year, a suicide bomber disguised himself as a recruit for the Somali military before detonating an explosive outside a military camp, killing at least 13. Disguises have been a relatively common tactic for al-Shabaab, with militants posing as security forces, civilians, or NGO workers to conduct suicide bombings. While tactically useful, allowing militants to get close to high-value or crowded targets such as recruitment centres or government facilities without arousing suspicion, it is highly likely that the use of disguises additionally aims to increase the impact of terror attacks by instilling a sense of paranoia into daily life. Further al-Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu are highly likely in the medium term, with Western nationals and international hotels almost certainly being high-value targets for attack.  

On 6 October, Madagascar President Andry Rajoelina appointed army General Ruphin Fortunat Zafisambo as prime minister. Zafisambo was previously the director of the military cabinet in the prime minister’s office. The appointment came amid ongoing Gen Z-led protests, which led Rajoelina to dissolve his government on 29 September, dismissing former Prime Minister Christian Ntsay. Rajoelina justified the appointment by claiming Madagascar needed a prime minister “capable of restoring order and the people’s trust”. Gen Z Madagascar, the protest organisers, rejected Zafisambo’s appointment and gave Rajoelina 48 hours to resign, stating “[a]s long as Rajoelina remains in power, we will continue the struggle”.

Demonstrations have been ongoing in major cities in Madagascar since 25 September. The latest figures from the United Nations report at least 22 deaths and over 100 injuries, but the actual figure is highly likely higher. The government has disputed these figures. Protests have occurred in multiple cities across the country, including Antananarivo, Toliara, Fenoarivo, Mahajanga, Antsirabe, Antsiranana, and Toamasina.

Despite calls for his resignation, Malagasy President Andry Rajoelina has refused to step down, claiming that some politicians were plotting to take advantage of the unrest and stage a coup in a speech shared on Facebook on 3 October. Gen Z organisers rejected the speech and promised to take “all necessary measures” if the president did not “respond favourably” to their demands within 24 hours. On the morning of 4 October, Rajoelina engaged in consultations with unions of major government bodies and representatives of entrepreneurs who were victims of looting on 25 September to discuss solutions to the ongoing crisis. Gen Z representatives refused to take part.

On 8 October, following the failure to meet protesters’ demands, Gen Z Madagascar rejected Rajoelina’s offer of dialogue and declared a “public strike”. The state-owned electric utility and water services company Jirama employees’ union has come out in support of the strike. On 9 October, Rajoelina requested one year to fix the power cuts in the capital, promising that if he is unable to, then he will resign.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The appointment of Zafisambo will highly likely inflame protests. Following the dismissal of parliament, protesters began calling for Rajoelina’s resignation. Opposition figures have come out in support of the protesters, with former President Marc Ravalomanana claiming that Rajoelina “doesn’t listen” and that Zafisambo’s appointment “won’t make a difference” due to previously being part of the government. There is a realistic possibility that Zafisambo’s appointment will be met with security forces using increasingly forceful tactics to deal with protesters. This is exacerbated by the fact that the appointment of a new prime minister, Rajoelina’s primary tactic to placate protesters, has almost certainly failed to appease the Gen Z Madagascar movement, highly likely forcing him to increase crackdowns to prevent further demonstrations. The initiation of a general strike on 8 October, if widely supported, will highly likely trigger further clashes between protesters and security forces.

The utility crisis has been exacerbated by drought-related challenges that have led to a shortfall in electricity production, causing widespread power outages in Antananarivo and surrounding suburbs. The government has attempted to address utility issues, including investing in a 105 MW thermal power plant to stabilise the country’s electricity grid. On 7 October, a large convoy of generator components was transported along Madagascar’s RN2 Highway. The government is highly likely attempting to speed up the project to appear to be placating protesters, who have repeatedly criticised the energy blackouts. This will highly likely be perceived as performative and fail to reduce the scale of the protest movement, with the end of Rajoelina’s presidency now being the primary demand.

Rajoelina’s declaration that he will resign after a year if he is unable to resolve the capital’s electricity shortages is the first indication that he has given of backing down. Notably, he has given himself the task of resolving the power shortages in the capital alone rather than countrywide. The largest protests are in Antananarivo, and by solving the power cuts there, there is a realistic possibility that this would reduce the scale of unrest in the capital, even if they persist in other cities.

Pro-Palestine protests in Spain result in eight arrests, dozens of injuries.

At least 20 people were injured and eight arrested during pro-Palestine protests in Barcelona on 5 October. The protests, which coincided with several other demonstrations in other large European cities, were a response to the detention of the activists of the Global Sumud Flotilla, which tried to deliver a symbolic shipment of aid to the Gaza Strip by sea. Some protesters vandalised several storefronts associated with large multinational companies, which they claim are responsible for supporting Israel. Further protests in Spain, as well as in France, Italy, Germany, and other European countries, remain likely on the 10-13 October period, with 13 October marking the anniversary of the beginning of Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip following the 7 October Hamas attack.

Populists win Czech elections.

On 3-4 October, Czech citizens voted to elect a new parliament. The populist party ANO 2011, led by former Prime Minister (2017-2021) Andrej Babiš, won 35 per cent of the total vote, the largest percentage ever recorded by a single party in a Czech election. The incumbent government coalition, Spolu, trailed ANO by approximately 12 points. Smaller parties achieved mixed results: while the right-wing and anti-environmentalist Motorists (AUTO) won 7 per cent of the vote, the left-wing, anti-EU and anti-NATO Stačilo! (“Enough!”) failed to reach the 5 per cent threshold required to enter parliament. Likewise, the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party underperformed, winning 8 per cent of the vote. While ANO will be the largest party in parliament during the next parliament, it falls short of the 101 seats necessary to have a majority and will therefore need to enter coalition negotiations.

The result has a realistic possibility of becoming a driver of civil unrest. This is partly due to Babiš’s conflict of interest and subsidy fraud case, which has been ongoing since 2017. The case, known as “Stork’s Nest”, hinges on whether Babiš illegally obtained EU subsidies for small businesses by concealing his ownership of a farm. It resulted in large-scale anti-government protests in 2018-2019, which were the largest recorded in the Czech Republic since the Velvet Revolution. Babiš was acquitted in 2023 and again in a 2024 retrial. However, in June 2025, the High Court of Prague ordered a second retrial for the case.

Second Gaza flotilla intercepted by Israeli Forces en route to Gaza.

In the early hours of 8 October, Israeli military vessels intercepted the nine boats of the Freedom Flotilla Coalition (FFC), only days after they had stopped the Global Sumud Flotilla. Like its predecessor, FFC was trying to reach the Gaza Strip with a symbolic amount of aid. While considerably smaller than the Global Sumud Flotilla and lacking the same number of high-profile passengers, the raid on FFC will likely further drive pro-Palestine protests in large European cities, including in Italy, France, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Tunisian man condemned to death, then pardoned, for insulting the president.

On 7 October, a Tunisian court ordered the release of a 51-year-old citizen, days after his 3 October sentencing to the death penalty. The individual had been convicted for writing posts critical of President Kais Saied on Facebook, which prosecutors claimed violated Tunisia’s 2022 cybercrime law and constituted an attempt to “overthrow the state”.

The death sentence, the first of its kind to be issued in Tunisia (which last carried out an execution in 1990), attracted significant domestic and international backlash, which almost certainly contributed to the detainee’s release. Since his 2021 “self-coup”, Saied has ruled Tunisia by decree and has de facto silenced much of the opposition, including via the weaponisation of “treason” and “sedition” charges. However, the latest sentencing had been unusually draconian, both due to the gravity of the penalty and the fact that its recipient is a “low-profile” citizen and not a prominent member of the opposition.

Burkina Faso junta detains NGO workers.

On 8 October, Burkina Faso’s military junta announced that it had arrested eight members of the Netherlands-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) on charges of spying and treason. According to Security Minister Mahamadou Sana, the NGO had collected and passed on “sensitive security information” to foreign powers. INSO’s country director and deputy were among those arrested. The country director had reportedly been detained in July, when the junta suspended INSO. The NGO has “categorically” rejected the accusations.

It is highly likely that the charges are fabricated, constituting part of a broader crackdown on NGOs in Burkina Faso, who have criticised the junta for human rights violations and war crimes. The crackdowns have followed directives requiring NGO authorisation to operate in the country, issued in February 2025, after which numerous NGOs have had their licences revoked. Further arrests of NGO members are highly likely as the junta almost certainly attempts to prevent condemnation for its counterinsurgency measures against the Islamist Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP).

Cameroon presidential election to be held on 12 October and could cause large-scale civil unrest.

Cameroon is set to hold presidential elections on 12 October 2025. Incumbent 92-year-old President Paul Biya has announced he will pursue an eighth seven-year term. While Biya has held presidential power since 1982, he has had considerable political power in Cameroon since at least 1968. The lead-up to the election has been characterised by an increase in arbitrary arrests and trials conducted by military courts for opposition figures, journalists, and civil society members.

Former justice minister Maurice Kamto, the primary challenger to Biya, has been banned from running by Cameroon’s Election Commission (ELECAM). Without Kamto, there is no alternative strong challenger to Biya, raising the likelihood of accusations of the elections being unfree and unfair.

The spread of Gen Z youth protests through Nepal, Madagascar, and Morocco in recent weeks significantly raises the risk of a similar movement emerging in Cameroon. The 2018 election resulted in protests across the country led by opposition figure Maurice Kamto, which the government responded to with a heavy crackdown and excessive force against demonstrators. Given the myriad youth frustrations in Cameroon, including high unemployment rates, a rising cost of living, and political disenfranchisement, a perceived rigged election could cause these frustrations to erupt into large-scale demonstrations.

Talks collapse between Somali government and regional Jubaland leadership.

On 5 October, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Kismayo to engage in talks with Jubaland leader Ahmed Mohamed Islam, alias Ahmed Madobe, in an attempt to resolve a year-long dispute. The talks were unproductive, ending in a deadlock, with both sides entrenched in their positions. The dispute revolves around Jubaland’s regional election held on 24 November 2024, which Mogadishu has refused to recognise due to its being held without the federal government’s endorsement. The dispute escalated, with Jubaland suspending relations with the federal government and Mogadishu issuing an arrest warrant for Madobe. In December 2024, the government launched a military offensive near Ras Kamboni; Jubaland forces resisted and claimed victory, retaining control over Ras Kamboi. The deadlock almost certainly weakens Somalia’s counterinsurgency efforts against the primarily Jubaland-based al-Shabaab. While there is a realistic possibility that the two sides will attempt to engage in further talks, reignited fighting between Somali federal forces and Jubaland forces is likely.

Tanzanian captain calls for coup in viral video ahead of election.

On 5 October, Tanzanian Air Force Command Captain John Charles Tesha livestreamed a video on social media criticising the country’s political trajectory and calling for a military intervention ahead of the 28 October general elections. He also criticised the government’s crackdown on opposition, use of abductions, and corruption, as well as calling for an investigation into the death of former President John Pombe Magufuli. The Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) has countered this by warning against attempts to involve the military in politics. The video has reached a wide audience and came just before opposition leader Tundu Lissu’s treason trial, which started on 6 September.

Since the 2015 election, the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has become increasingly authoritarian. Under President Hassan, the government has cracked down on civil society and journalists, passing laws such as the Cybercrimes Act (2015) and Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations (2020), which regulate cybercrime and online content, respectively, but have been used to arrest journalists and opposition figures and stifle dissent. The virality of Tesha’s video almost certainly increases pressure on the government in the lead-up to the election and significantly raises the risk of civil unrest. It is highly likely that the government will increase crackdowns on opposition and potentially restrict access to social media in the coming weeks.

Malema guilty verdict has the potential to drive protests in South Africa

On 1 October 2025, Julius Malema, the leader of the far-left opposition party the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), was found guilty of firing a firearm in public by a South African court. Malema was indicted after an Afrikaner lobby group, AfriForum, opened a case against him for a viral video dating back to 2018, which shows him firing a semiautomatic rifle into the air during an EFF rally.

Malema’s sentencing is expected to occur in January 2026, and the charges carry a potential penalty of up to 15 years. Any sentence longer than 12 months would automatically disqualify Malema from serving as a member of parliament. As Malema remains extremely popular in South Africa, there is a realistic possibility that the case will drive protests, particularly close to the sentencing period.

German security forces arrest three for alleged 7 October attack plot.

On 1 October, German security arrested three suspected members of the Palestinian militant group Hamas in Berlin, on suspicion of plotting attacks on locations associated with Jews or Israel on the anniversary of the 7 October 2023 attacks. The arrest is notable, as recent cases of terrorism in Germany have been perpetrated by self-radicalised lone wolves acting outside of a clear hierarchy, whereas the three suspects are alleged to be members of Hamas.

The Palestinian group, however, has denied that it had any connection to the three individuals and claimed that it sees attacking Germany as counter to its interests in Palestine. Regardless of the suspects’ affiliation, their interest in staging an attack on the anniversary of 7 October matches a trend seen in other recent cases of terrorist attacks that were either planned or carried out to coincide with particularly symbolic dates. Examples of this trend are the arrest of a Pakistani citizen in Canada, who had allegedly planned an attack on New York’s Jewish community on the 2024 anniversary of the Hamas attack, and the September 2024 attack in Munich, carried out by a self-radicalised supporter of the Islamic State (IS) to coincide with the anniversary of the 1972 Olympics massacre. 

In Syria, pro-Iran militia claims first attack on US base.

The Syrian Popular Resistance claimed an attack on a US base near Haskah City on 2 October. The attack, which was not confirmed by US sources, would be the first time that the group has targeted US forces. The Syrian Popular Resistance is a pro-Iran, Assadist group that formed after Assad was toppled in December 2024 and has since exclusively targeted Syrian transitional government forces. Groups like the Syrian Popular Resistance may stage attacks on US forces both to test their possible response, as well as due to such strikes’ high propaganda value.

Lebanese government accelerates efforts to disarm Hezbollah.

The Lebanese government has expedited its efforts to weaken the Shia militant group, Hezbollah, both militarily and politically. On 6 October, the Council of Ministers reviewed the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) first monthly progress report on its three-month disarmament plan south of the Litani River. The LAF commander, Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal, stated that the LAF is prioritising the seizure of weapons south of the Litani, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 and likely in a move to decrease the opportunity for Hezbollah to escalate with Israel, although he stated that sustained Israeli operations are complicating LAF efforts. Brigadier General Haykal also stated that the LAF is tightening its control of Palestinian refugee camps and increasing the seizure of weapons nationwide.

The Lebanese cabinet also suspended the license of Rissalat, a Hezbollah media and propaganda group, after it defied government orders by illuminating Beirut’s Raouche Rock during a rally. However, Hezbollah has repeatedly threatened to refuse to disarm, and attempts have resulted in major unrest, particularly in the predominantly Shia southern suburbs of Beirut. If the government proceeds with its proposed plans to disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River, it would almost certainly represent a significant escalation and would likely heighten the risk of internal unrest and armed conflict within Lebanon.

Flooding in Egypt and Sudan blamed on Ethiopian dam.

On 4 and 5 October, rising waters in the Nile triggered flooding in the Nile Delta village of Dalhamo, damaging housing and fields. Similarly, flooding in Sudan displaced approximately 1,200 families in Bahri, Khartoum state. Egypt’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation accused Ethiopia of causing a “man-made, late flood” by holding and releasing water from the recently inaugurated Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The ministry reported that discharges rose to about 485 million cubic metres on 10 September and reached roughly 780 million cubic metres by 27 September, straining Sudan’s Roseires Dam and forcing surplus water to flow into Egypt.

The GERD has been a significant point of contention between Egypt and Ethiopia, with Egypt arguing it constitutes an existential threat due to its potential to strangle the Nile’s water flow, which Egypt heavily relies on for its drinking water, irrigation, and industry. While Ethiopia has denied Egypt’s accusations, stating that it is “malicious and riddled with numerous baseless claims”, it is highly likely that any unexpected flooding in Egypt or Sudan will be blamed on the GERD, significantly raising the risk of an armed conflict.

Boko Haram displace over 5,000 people in attack on Nigeria border town.

On 3 October, Boko Haram launched an attack on the border town of Kirawa in Borno State. According to eyewitness accounts, the militants entered the town on motorcycles and “started shooting while gradually entering the village”. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) attempted to hold them off, exchanging gunfire. According to the accounts, once the CJTF withdrew, the insurgents overran the town, burning houses, killing one man, and kidnapping a child. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack, releasing a video of its fighters setting the barracks alight while chanting “victory belongs to God”.

This attack followed an attack on Banki, another border town, where Boko Haram militants overran a barracks and seized weaponry. Boko Haram previously took Kirawa in August 2014, forcing residents to flee to Cameroon. These residents were ultimately repatriated in 2022. Through 2025, multiple Boko Haram attacks on Kirawa have taken place, including in February, July, and August. The governor had reportedly informed the military of the risk of leaving the community without a military post. Given the high risk of the town, the lack of a military post is highly likely reflective of the Nigerian military’s strained resources. While residents reportedly plan to resettle in Kirawa, further attacks are highly likely.

IS Mozambique (ISM) enters district capital in show of force.

On 7 October, local media reported that IS Mozambique (ISM) fighters entered the town of Mocímboa da Praia on the coast of the Cabo Delgado Province, and preached at a local mosque. This is likely an important development as no clashes were recorded between ISM forces and local security, which highly likely demonstrates ISM’s growing sway in the area.

In late September, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) stated that they would pause operations near Mocímboa da Praia due to the increased threat of violence, with several “armed incursions” resulting in the indiscriminate killing of civilians. The town, which has more than 120,000 inhabitants, has already fallen under Islamic State control once: in 2020, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP, note that ISM split from ISCAP in 2022) carried out an offensive leading to them capturing and holding the town for approximately one year, until it was recaptured by a joint Mozambique-Rwandan offensive.

Storm Amy causes disruptions across Northern Europe.

Storm Amy has caused significant disruption and damage across parts of Northern Europe. In northern England, a flood warning was issued for areas including Derwent Water and the shores of Keswick due to flooding. In Northern Ireland, approximately 1,500 homes remain without power, and residents have been evacuated from Pump Street in Londonderry over concerns about an unsafe building.

The storm resulted in fatalities in France, with two people killed in Étretat and Aisne. Meanwhile, more than 60,000 houses in Scotland are without power, and there have been reports of widespread flooding and travel disruptions. Damage to structures and power outages have been reported in western Norway, affecting over 70,000 people. Additionally, flight delays and cancellations have occurred at airports in Copenhagen and Amsterdam due to the storm’s strong winds and heavy rain. Lingering disruptions are highly likely amid cleanup operations.

Flooding in Romania and Bulgaria.

Flooding has impacted Romania and Bulgaria following a red alert issued on 7 October. In Romania, firefighters have intervened in 110 localities across 22 counties. Authorities have issued flood warnings specifically for Mihail Kogalniceanu, Vulturul, Saraiu, and Gradina in the east, advising residents in flood-prone areas to seek shelter. The Constanta region remains under a red alert code until 18:00 local time on 8 October, with local media reporting that thousands of households are without power and multiple highways and roads are flooded, particularly in the southeast and Galati regions. The village of Silistea in Constanta has been completely isolated due to flooded roads. Emergency services have been actively conducting rescue operations across 17 counties, including Bucharest. In Bulgaria, a red alert for flooding is in place for seven northern districts, with rising water levels in the Rusenski Lom River causing flooding. Further disruptions are highly likely.

On 6 October, at least 24 people were killed and 47 were injured in Chaung U township in Myanmar’s central Sagaing region while attending a candlelight vigil marking the Buddhist Thadingyut festival in a protest against Myanmar’s junta. The killings reportedly resulted from a motorised paraglider likely dropping 120mm mortar rounds on the gathered crowds. Eyewitnesses report that the attack occurred in two waves, with Amnesty International highlighting the death of children and calling the use of motorised paragliders “a disturbing trend” that has been previously documented in the same area.

Solace Global Assessment: 

After four years of civil war in Myanmar, approximately 82,000 people have been killed and 3.2 million displaced. Ahead of a planned national election in late December 2025, junta forces have launched counteroffensives against rebel forces, including one recently launched in Karen State, which has reportedly breached the defences of Karen National Liberation Army-led forces. The peaceful protest in Chaung U township was held against the junta’s forced conscription and the national election, which is widely perceived to be a sham. Saigang, in addition to being highly contested between junta and rebel forces, was severely impacted by the March 2025 7.7 earthquake, which killed thousands.

The use of motorised paragliders by the junta is almost certain to be a relatively recent but now firmly established tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP). Their increased use has likely been conditioned by a lack of key resources, particularly jet fuel, for the junta’s more conventional aircraft, which are already limited in number. A UN report published in September highlighted that paramotor attacks are liable to be notably indiscriminate, although in this particular instance, it is highly likely that the crowd was intentionally attacked to deter unrest.

Following significant manpower shortages, junta forces suffered multiple defeats against rebel militias. The strict enforcement of conscription has likely facilitated the launching of recent junta counteroffensives but will almost certainly continue to provoke protests and resentment. While the use of such deadly force against peaceful demonstrations against conscription will likely deter to some extent further peaceful protests, it will almost certainly drive more recruitment into the armed resistance forces.

Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) appoints new leader.

On 4 October, the leadership contest of Japan’s largest party ended with the appointment of Sanae Takaichi as the new party head. Takaichi will likely be confirmed as prime minister later in October, succeeding Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who announced that he would step down following several electoral defeats. Takaichi, who would become Japan’s first female prime minister if confirmed, represents the right wing of LDP and has portrayed herself as a successor to Shinzo Abe, the former Japanese prime minister who was assassinated in 2022.

Takaichi’s appointment could help reclaim some votes from the increasingly popular hard-right Sanseitō party, but might simultaneously exacerbate LDP’s internal tensions and its already fraught relationship with the moderate Komeito party, its key coalition ally.

Pakistani Taliban kill at least 11 Pakistani soldiers in an ambush.

On 8 October, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for ambushing a military convoy near the Afghan border earlier that day, killing nine soldiers and two officers. According to Pakistani security officials, a roadside bomb detonated before a large number of militants began firing on the convoy. 19 militants were also reportedly killed. The soldiers had reportedly just conducted an intelligence operation in the neighbouring Orakzai overnight, 7 to 8 October. Further operations are reportedly being conducted in the area to eliminate any other TTP members.

This constitutes the latest in an escalating number of attacks by the TTP on Pakistani security forces, primarily in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, after the group called off its ceasefire with the government in November 2022. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the worst-hit region in Pakistan in 2025, suffering approximately 71 per cent of the total fatalities linked to militant violence. Further attacks are highly likely in the coming weeks.

Monsoon flooding in Nepal kills at least 61 people.

Heavy rains have triggered severe flooding and landslides in Nepal. The death toll from monsoon flooding across Nepal has risen to 61 people, with nine individuals still reported missing. The most severely affected areas include the eastern and southern regions of the country, particularly the Ilam district in Koshi Province, where landslides have buried several homes. The situation has been evolving rapidly, with the number of fatalities increasing from 39 to 61 within a day. The death toll is highly likely to rise in the coming days. The government of interim Prime Minister Shushila Karki was praised for its response to the floods, with government efforts reportedly minimising the impact.

Monsoon-related casualties reported in India.

Over the past week, several casualties have been recorded in India due to the ongoing monsoon season. On 8 October, at least 18 people were killed in Bilaspur, Himanchal Pradesh, after a landslide caused a bus crash. Days prior, at least 28 deaths occurred in the Darjeeling and Mirik areas of West Bengal due to flash flooding, with dozens more still missing. The severe weather has also led to infrastructure damage, including a bridge collapse in Jalpaiguri, Gujarat, although no injuries were reported there. The Indian Meteorological Department has warned that heavy rains are expected to continue across much of the country due to a delayed monsoon withdrawal, which is predicted to extend through October.

6.6 magnitude earthquake recorded near Papua New Guinea’s second largest city.

On 7 October, a magnitude 6.6 earthquake was recorded near Lae, Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) second-largest city, in the Morobe Province. The earthquake was approximately 26 kilometres from the city, but no immediate reports of significant damage or casualties were confirmed, and no tsunami warnings were issued. However, the area is highly seismic and prone to aftershocks. PNG’s northern and coastal provinces are currently in the Southwest Monsoon season, and when combined with loose soil, steep terrain, human activity and aftershocks, can significantly increase the risk of landslides and mudslides in a country with very poor disaster resilience. In 2024, the Enga landslide, primarily caused by prolonged heavy rainfall but likely exacerbated by preceding seismic activity, killed nearly 700 people.

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