On 4 August, Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes ordered that former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro be placed under house arrest for his violation of judicial restrictions. Bolsonaro’s alleged violations include the use of social media to coordinate protests and the soliciting of foreign interference. Bolsonaro will now be confined to his home, will be forced to wear an electronic ankle monitor, surrender his phone and is now barred from receiving visitors except for legal counsel.

The US President Donald Trump’s administration condemned the measures, referring to them as political suppression. In retaliation, the US imposed a 50 per cent tariff on Brazilian exports to the US and has sanctioned Judge de Moraes under the Magnitsky Act. Pro-Bolsonaro protests have been organised across major cities in Brazil, with many protestors carrying both Brazilian and US flags, as well as banners featuring Bolsonaro and Trump. On 5 August, Bolsonaro supporters held a large-scale motorcade protest in the capital, Brasília, demanding an amnesty for the former president and demanding the impeachment of Judge de Moraes and the ousting of incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Solace Global Assessment: 

US President Trump is a staunch supporter of Bolsonaro and has denounced recent developments as a “witch hunt.” Both leaders have been accused of inciting violent uprisings in their respective countries following the 6 January 2021 US Capitol riots and the 8 January 2023 storming of Brazil’s Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace. Bolsonaro has also been implicated in a coup attempt, which allegedly involved the planned assassination of President Lula and other senior officials, combined with the dissemination of fraudulent documents to justify military intervention.

However, Brazil remains deeply polarised over Bolsonaro, with recent polling indicating that only 53 per cent support the court’s decision to place him under house arrest. Previous legal and judicial moves against Bolsonaro have consistently been denounced as politically motivated and have triggered mass protests, often mobilised quickly through online networks. While more recent protests have failed to attract as much participation, perceived US interference in Brazil’s domestic politics is likely to further polarise the country, gain publicity and intensify the protests.

Trump’s vocal support for Bolsonaro, open disdain for President Lula and his imposition of 50 per cent tariffs have significantly escalated diplomatic tensions between the US and Brazil. This growing rift is likely to influence future protest movements, especially if President Lula refuses to back down. If Bolsonaro faces additional charges or if US tariffs begin to impact the Brazilian economy, demonstrations could increase in scale and intensity, increasing the likelihood of disruption or violent clashes with the security forces, especially if supporters attempt to breach key government buildings.

Argentine President Javier Milei vetoes pension raise.

On 4 July, President Milei vetoed a bill, passed by parliament in July, which would have increased pension payments and strengthened protections for people with disabilities. Milei justified the decision by referring to his broader political project centred on the implementation of widespread austerity policies to address the fiscal budget. The veto is highly likely to drive significant opposition from civil society, and will likely provoke protests in Buenos Aires, with retirees already staging weekly protests, demanding improved benefits and the protection of acquired rights.

Argentina is scheduled to hold mid-term elections in October 2025, and Milei’s party La Libertad Avanza (LLA) is looking to increase its presence in parliament, where it currently represents a small minority. LLA’s tenuous parliamentary position has forced Milei to rely on alliances and negotiations to pass his widespread reforms, which have likely contributed to stifling some of the more radical proposals, like full “dollarisation” of the Argentine economy. Consequently, the mid-term vote is highly likely to be a crucial test for Milei’s government, and may either significantly increase its momentum or threaten to derail it.

Mass shooting at US Army base

On 6 August, an individual carried out a mass shooting at Fort Stewart, an army base located in Georgia, injuring five soldiers. Authorities identified the alleged perpetrator, who was arrested, as a sergeant assigned to the base, and stated that he used his handgun to carry out the shooting. The motive for the shooting is unclear, although some circumstantial evidence, including texts allegedly sent by the shooter to family members ahead of the attack, likely points to a planned attack. Due to the target’s high profile, there is a remote possibility of copycat actions in the short term.

Ongoing fighting in Bolívar state, Colombia

More than 5,000 people are under “lockdown” conditions in the southern areas of Bolívar due to ongoing violence involving Colombian forces, the Gulf Clan, and the Central General Staff (ELN). The clashes started after the ELN reportedly imposed an “armed strike” on the local population as part of an effort to increase its presence in the area, which is otherwise a Gulf Clan stronghold. The clashes between the two groups, in turn, prompted the Colombian government to intervene.

According to local media, criminal armed groups are leveraging illegal miners to detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on local roadways and infrastructure, to isolate communities in remote areas. Several attacks on government troops using first-person view (FPV) drones have also been recorded, and have killed at least one soldier. The rugged terrain in the area, combined with the hold that armed groups have on local communities, is almost certainly rendering government advances more costly and difficult, and, on the other hand, likely favours armed groups’ ability to disengage from costly fights with security forces.

Wildfires continue in Canada, causing cross-border impacts

Currently, Canadian authorities estimate that at least 740 wildfires are ongoing in Canada, more than half of which are considered to be out of control. The 2025 wildfire season in Canada is, according to some estimates, the second-worst on record. More than 6.8 million hectares of land have been damaged or destroyed by fires this year, with the Manitoba region being the most affected. Wildfires in Canada also have an impact cross-border: US officials have noted protracted drops in air quality at border regions near areas recording fires, and, on 4 August, operations at Logan International Airport in Boston were briefly interrupted due to “low visibility”, reportedly from the smoke.

Tropical Storm IVO to bring heavy rains to Southwestern Mexico

Tropical Storm Ivo, which formed on 6 August south-southeast of Acapulco, is currently impacting southwestern Mexico with intense rainfall and hazardous surf conditions. While the storm is not projected to make landfall, its outer bands are already affecting Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero states, including the coastal city of Acapulco. Mexico’s National Hurricane Center (NHC) has issued storm warnings for the affected areas. Forecasts indicate that Ivo may continue to intensify and could approach near-hurricane strength by the end of the week (9–10 August).

On 5 August, Evghenia Guțul, the governor of the Moldovan region of Gaguzia, was sentenced to seven years in prison by a Moldovan court over channelling Russian funds to establish a pro-Moscow party in the region. According to prosecutors, between 2019 and 2022, Guțul was financed by exiled oligarch Ilan Șor to the eponymous Șor Party, a group that, in 2023, was disbanded for allegedly seeking to destabilise Moldova and push it inside Moscow’s sphere of influence.

Following the sentencing, some small-scale protests were recorded in Chișinău. Ahead of the sentencing, Șor had appeared virtually at a rally in Gagauzia, where he threatened the use of “force” against the government.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The arrest is notable as it comes a few weeks before Moldova is scheduled to hold extremely important parliamentary elections, which will likely be crucial for the government’s efforts to pursue EU membership. During past votes, including the 2024 elections that led to Maia Sandu becoming the country’s president, Moscow almost certainly deployed several information operations and hybrid efforts trying to influence the results. These included the spread of disinformation seeking to prevent Moldovan diaspora members from voting at polling stations in the EU, and even offering voters cash to back pro-Russian parties.

Moscow almost certainly seeks to leverage Gagauzia, which has a sizable pro-Russian electorate, as an instrument to pressure Chișinău into maintaining a greater distance from Brussels, a feature that is particularly important in the context of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. In a possible escalation in tensions with Chișinău, Gagauzia could be pushed by Moscow towards becoming a breakaway region similar to Transnistria, although the region almost certainly lacks the economic and political resilience to seriously threaten a split with Chișinău (up to 70 per cent of Gagauzia’s budget is subsidised by Moldova, and a sizeable minority of its exports enter the EU; moreover, thousands of Gagauzians have dual Romanian citizenship and work in Europe, providing the region with a high volume of capital in the form of remittances).

In the short term, Guțul’s sentencing is highly likely to drive protests in Gagauzia. Moscow will likely increase the tempo of hybrid efforts to destabilise Moldova ahead of the elections. In addition to the information operations discussed above, Russian officials can leverage their “gig economy” intelligence model, financing cheap operatives to carry out destabilisation efforts in Moldova or targeting Moldovans in the EU, including sabotage, civil unrest, and vandalism.

US President Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff met Russian President Vladimir Putin on 6 August, two days before Trump’s 8 August deadline for a ceasefire under threat of secondary sanctions targeting countries that continue to purchase Russian oil, such as India and China. Trump claimed that “great progress was made” and is planning to meet Putin as soon as next week, with a follow-up meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

This followed cautious and vague signalling regarding the potential for peace negotiations from Moscow, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stating that Putin does not rule out a direct meeting with Zelensky, but only after unspecified “necessary work” is completed. Sources close to the Kremlin briefed the press that Putin is “unlikely” to concede to Trump’s ultimatum, due to Putin’s belief that Russia is winning the war and his scepticism regarding the impact of threatened sanctions. Moreover, one of the sources claimed that Putin’s goal is the full occupation of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts before peace could be meaningfully discussed.

Concurrently, nuclear brinkmanship escalated between Washington and Moscow. On 1 August, Trump announced the redeployment of two US “nuclear submarines” to “appropriate regions” near Russia. This was in response to the “highly provocative” statements of Dmitry Medvedev, the former President of Russia and now deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council. The Kremlin responded by announcing on 4 August that Russia would withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a moratorium on deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

Solace Global Assessment: 

After the Witkoff meeting, the public messaging from the Trump administration suggests that it will not follow through in full on the threatened secondary sanctions on 8 August. After the previous July reversal in the Trump administration’s Ukraine policy, the messaging from Trump is almost certainly the most optimistic towards the prospect of negotiations since. However, on the same day, Trump did sign an order which doubled tariffs on India to 50 per cent due to its purchases of Russian oil. It remains to be seen whether China, Russia’s biggest trading partner, will face similar sanctions, with Trump stating that it “could happen”.

The change in tone has occurred despite the nuclear brinkmanship, which was likely intended as posturing. Medvedev, who repeatedly issues inflammatory statements threatening World War 3 on social media, highly likely effectively serves as an ‘attack dog’ for Kremlin messaging.  It is almost certain that the Kremlin would censure Medvedev if his commentary did not serve a purpose, but Medvedev enables Moscow to leverage threats of nuclear warfare to dissuade increased support for Ukraine, while maintaining some degree of plausible deniability.

It is highly unlikely that Moscow will countenance any full cessation of military operations against Ukraine.  The Kremlin’s confidence in achieving its war objectives has almost certainly been increased by recent developments on the ground. Russian pressure on the strategically vital Pokrovsk axis has considerably intensified in the past few weeks, and there are early indications that Russia is expanding its operations in Kherson Oblast. Moscow will likely pursue a dual-track strategy of protracted diplomatic engagement and continued military pressure, as it did during the previous periods of limited diplomacy in early 2025. The Kremlin could offer partial measures, such as the previous month-long mutual moratorium on aerial strikes against energy infrastructure in March. However, these would highly likely only be a means of warding off increased US pressure while Russian forces continue to pursue the Kremlin’s maximalist objectives on the battlefield.

The Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev are scheduled to meet in Washington DC on 8 August, hosted by US President Donald Trump. According to regional sources, the two leaders are poised to sign a memorandum of understanding committing to the pursuit of a comprehensive peace deal. The meeting follows the agreement of a draft peace agreement in March and in-person talks in June.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is almost certain that such a memorandum would only constitute a letter of intent. Nonetheless, it would highly likely be treated as a major diplomatic breakthrough by the Trump administration, given its efforts to cultivate an image as a peacemaker.

Following the Azerbaijani military offensives in both 2020 and 2023, in which Armenia suffered decisive defeats, and which left Nagorno-Karabakh firmly under Baku’s authority, several key issues have stalled the signing of a peace agreement. First, Baku’s demands that Armenia amend its constitution to remove references to Nagorno-Karabakh would require a politically fraught national referendum in Armenia. The military defeats of Armenia and Pashinyan’s efforts to pursue an unpopular peace deal have led to significant political backlash, with mass protests against Pashinyan in 2024, a major confrontation between the Armenian Apostolic Church and the government, and even recent allegations in June of a coup plot by two Archbishops associated with the “Sacred Struggle” opposition group. A national referendum would therefore be almost certainly marked by extreme polarisation, highly likely to be used by the opposition as an opportunity to bring down the government and derail the peace process.

Second, the status of the so-called Zangezur Corridor, which connects Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan across Armenia’s Syunik province, would need to be resolved. A recent US-backed proposal suggested leasing and operating the route via a private American company for 100 years, but this was rejected by Yerevan, which stated it would not lease sovereign territory to any third country. Moreover, some of the proposed routes for the corridor directly border Iran, a key Armenian partner, and it is highly likely that Tehran will staunchly oppose any US involvement in the area.  Nonetheless, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration will force through a US-brokered resolution to the issue.

The US involvement in the process is itself almost certainly a remarkable geopolitical realignment in the South Caucasus, reflecting the declining influence of the region’s historically primary mediator, Russia. Frustration in Yerevan at the failure of Russian peacekeepers to fulfil security guarantees, and a major ongoing diplomatic crisis between Baku and Moscow, which dramatically escalated in June, has left a power vacuum that Washington is almost certainly seeking to fill.

Israeli media reported on 5 August that the top figures of the Israeli cabinet and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) are currently engaging in highly internally divisive debates over the possibility of expanding the war in Gaza. In particular, the leaders are reportedly discussing a plan to take over the entirety of the Gaza Strip, which would place the highly overcrowded al-Mawasi humanitarian zone, in western Khan Yunis, under IDF control. According to available reports, the far-right figures within the cabinet of Benjamin Netanyahu, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, are supportive of the plan, while IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir reportedly opposed it, citing “lack of strategic clarity”. Both Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz seem to also be in favour of the war’s expansion, although the latter defended Zamir after some “hawkish” Israeli media channels attacked him following reports of his opposition.

Currently, Israel controls around three-quarters of the territory of the Gaza Strip. The latest developments follow Israeli government meetings with US representatives headed by Special Envoy Steven Witkoff, and the latest collapse of indirect ceasefire talks with Hamas representatives.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is likely that the cabinet will decide in favour of the expansion of the war in Gaza, and that this decision will be announced on 7 – 8 August. It is highly likely that such a plan would present significant difficulties and would lead to a notable increase in the rate of both civilian and military casualties. After the bisection of Khan Yunis with the Magen Oz corridor, the quasi-totality of Gaza’s population (1,9 million people according to estimates) is concentrated in the al-Mawasi area. Here, the UN assesses that the population density is approximately 47,700 people per square kilometre.

Advancing through al-Mawasi, where it is highly likely that Hamas retains units, military assets, and several Israeli hostages, would almost certainly put tens of thousands of civilians under direct fire. It is also unlikely that a rapid displacement of the civilian population from al-Mawasi by the IDF could be achieved without both favouring the re-infiltration of Palestinian militants in areas previously cleared by the IDF, and further degrading the already highly damaged humanitarian aid infrastructure in the area. Finally, such an operation would entail a significant risk of provoking Hamas into killing several or all of the remaining hostages, thus being counterproductive for the key stated objective of Israel’s post-7 October 2023 intervention in Gaza.

It is almost certain that an attempt to occupy the entirety of Gaza would provoke significant political backlash at home and abroad. This would highly likely take the form of large-scale civil unrest in large European, North American, Middle Eastern and South Asian cities. There is likewise a high likelihood of significant civil unrest in Israeli cities like Tel Aviv, as the hostages’ family members, who retain significant political leverage domestically, have explicitly opposed the suggested plan for the complete occupation of Gaza due to the threats to the surviving Israeli captives. In third countries, a further escalation of the violence in Gaza would highly likely increase the threat of terrorism and sectarian violence targeting Israeli and Jewish individuals and assets.

According to a recently published UN report, 57,034 people, or 13,343 families, have been displaced in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province between 20 July and 3 August by insurgent attacks. Most of the displacement, affecting at least 46,667 people, occurred between 20 and 28 July in Chiúre, Ancuabe, and Muidumbe. Chiúre was the hardest hit in this period, with at least 42,000 people displaced, over half of them children. Refugees have largely been driven to Chiúre Sede, where they are sheltering in overcrowded conditions in Bairro Micone and Bairro Namicir. There is reportedly a high number of unaccompanied or separated children.

The displacements have coincided with a wave of violence in July from Islamic State Mozambique (ISM), which is formally affiliated with the Islamic State Central African Province (ISCAP). The most recent claims by ISM propaganda include four people captured and beheaded in a village in Chiúre on 1 August and another person captured and killed in Muidumbe on 3 July. Three further bodies were found on 6 August at an administrative post in Chiúre Velho, allegedly killed by ‘naparamas’, a community self-defence group formed to combat Islamist extremist groups in the region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Mozambique has been combating insurgencies in Cabo Delgado for nearly a decade. Al-Shabaab (formerly Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammah (ASWJ); unrelated to the al-Qaeda affiliated Somali al-Shabaab) has been highly active in Mozambique since October 2017 and was formally recognised by the Islamic State in 2019, becoming ISM. The insurgency has become increasingly deadly and has resulted in intervention from the Rwandan military since July 2021. ISM has been accused of beheading civilians, kidnapping children to use as child soldiers or labourers, and deliberately targeting hospitals and health centres, with over half fully damaged in Cabo Delgado. Approximately one million people have been displaced throughout the conflict.

The violence has increased in recent years, with at least 349 killed by Islamic extremist attacks in 2024, a 36 per cent increase from 2023. This increasing violence has almost certainly been fuelled by a lack of government-provided services, poverty, rising sectarian tensions, repeated damage from cyclones, and the 2024-25 wave of post-election civil unrest. ISM has also shifted its tactics since 2023, presenting itself as an alternative to the ruling party, FRELIMO, condemning it for endemic corruption and the perceived marginalisation of the majority Muslim population in Cabo Delgado.

In 2025, the conflict has escalated, with May recording the highest number of attacks since June 2022, with intensified attacks on both security forces and civilians. Chiúre is strategically significant, serving as a major hosting area for internally displaced persons. The recent attacks are highly likely deliberately timed to coincide with the uptick in ISCAP attacks in the DRC, with the group killing at least 43 Christians in Komanda early 27 July. It also coincides with the French fossil fuel company Total Energies, which suspended its operations in Mozambique in 2021, declaring that it hoped to restart the USD 20 billion gas project in Mozambique by summer 2025.

The displacement of civilians is threatened by the significant underfunding of aid programs in the area. The UN’s 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan for Mozambique has reportedly received only 19 per cent of the requested pledges. The attacks are almost certainly designed to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, undermine the government’s ability to protect civilians in the region and deter foreign investment or influence. Further attacks on security forces and civilians in the region are highly likely in the coming weeks.

UK authorities threaten arrests at upcoming Palestine Action protest in London

Leaders of the group Palestine Action (PA) have called for a protest to be held in central London on 9 August. PA was recently proscribed as a terrorist organisation after some of its members vandalised a military aircraft at a Royal Air Force (RAF) base, making participation in a protest organised by the group an arrestable offence. The ban remains highly controversial, which has contributed to driving continued support for the group. Past PA protests have resulted in mass arrests, including at least 100 arrests recorded during a demonstration in mid-July. If the demonstration on 9 August is carried out, it will highly likely result in localised disruptions in central London.

Bosnia strips separatist leader of electoral mandate

On 6 August, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s election commission revoked the mandate of Milorad Dodik, president of the Republika Srpska (RS), after Dodik defied a court order sentencing him to one year in prison and banning him from office for six years for obstructing the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. Dodik has rejected the verdict, vowed to remain in office, and called for support from Russia, Serbia, Hungary, and US President Trump.

Dodik’s refusal to step down has likely deepened Bosnia’s political crisis and increased the chances of sectarian tensions. The enforcement of the ruling remains unclear, and Dodik maintains control over heavily armed RS police forces, which have received increased funding under his leadership. A return to widespread violence is unlikely in the near term, especially after the EU expanded its peacekeeping forces in March. However, there is likely an increased risk of localised unrest, institutional deadlock, and a further deterioration in inter-ethnic relations in response to the election commission’s decision and Dodik’s defiance.  

Israeli cabinet’s vote to dismiss Netanyahu prosecutor blocked by High Court

On 4 August, the High Court of Israel issued a temporary injunction blocking an order by the government to fire Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, the chief prosecutor in the corruption trial of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israeli Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi has vowed to ignore the injunction, calling it “invalid”. The case constitutes the latest instance of clashes between the Israeli executive and the country’s judicial and security apparatus and follows the push for the dismissal of Shin Bet head Ronen Bar, who had been responsible for a probe into ties between the prime minister and Qatar. As in the case of Bar, the attempted dismissal of Baharav-Miara is highly likely to drive significant pushback from the opposition and civil society groups. Further developments in the case will likely drive large-scale civil unrest in Tel Aviv.

Opposition members arrested in the Ivory Coast ahead of the October elections

On 4 August, six members of the opposition party, African Peoples’ Party–Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI), were arrested in a suburb of Abidjan. The arrests follow a recent bus torching and attack on a local police station, and the release of a video in which a man identifying himself as a PPA-CI member confessed to taking part in the incident and claimed to have acted on the party’s behalf. The opposition has denounced the arrests as arbitrary, denied any involvement in the attack and suggested that this is part of a broader crackdown ahead of the 12 October presidential election.  Key politicians, such as PPA-CI leader and former president, Laurent Gbagbo, have been barred from running, alongside other prominent rivals to incumbent President Alassane Ouattara.

These developments have almost certainly increased polarisation in the country and are likely to increase the chance of violent unrest. Post-election disputes in 2010-2011 triggered a brief civil war that killed over 3,000 people, while Ouattara’s contentious re-election in 2020 led to widespread protests and dozens of deaths after the security forces intervened.

JNIM fighters kill five Russians in Mali, kidnap four Chinese nationals

On 1 August, the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) carried out two attacks in Mali targeting foreign nationals. In Dougabougou, JNIM operatives attacked a Chinese-owned sugar factory, kidnapping four Chinese workers. In Tenenkou, JNIM reportedly ambushed a convoy comprising Malian army and Russian Africa Corps troops, killing at least five Russians. The recent attacks are likely indicative of JNIM’s changing strategic aspirations and growing operational strength. For example, contrary to the Islamic State, JNIM previously refrained from carrying out targeted kidnappings, a trend that has now clearly shifted. Attacking Russian and Chinese nationals serves JNIM’s ideological message, which portrays the group as a multi-ethnic force aiming to liberate Sahel countries from foreign rule and despotic junta control, while also spreading a monolithic religious framework. This combination of anti-ethnonationalist territorialism and religious purism sets JNIM apart from the Islamic State’s universalist caliphate ideology and likely contributes to the group’s growing appeal in diverse community settings in the Sahel.

Armed men on motorcycles kill 11 and kidnap at least 115 in northwest Nigeria

On 2 August, an unknown number of armed individuals killed 11 and kidnapped at least 70 in Sabongarin Damri, a village in Zamfara State, northwest Nigeria. In a second mass kidnapping on 4 August, gunmen abducted at least 45 people in Sade, Tungar Tsalle, Tungar Sodangi and Tungar Musa Dogo. Security forces attempted to fight back and killed three, but were unable to prevent the kidnappings. Most of the civilians kidnapped were women and children. Armed groups, referred to as “bandits”, have been responsible for the kidnapping of thousands of people in northwest Nigeria in recent years. The perpetrators typically demand ransoms for the release of the captives. Given the proximity of the attacks, security forces will likely increase security in the region to prevent further kidnappings in the coming days.

AFC/M23 rebels killed over 319 people in the last month

According to UN human rights chief Volker Türk on 6 August, the Rwanda-backed AFC/M23 rebel group have killed at least 319 civilians between 9 and 21 July in four villages in Rutshuru, North Kivu. At least 48 women and 19 children were killed in the attacks. This constitutes the deadliest series of attacks since the group’s resurgence in 2022. Further attacks have been recorded over the past week, with at least four people killed and 50 homes destroyed during clashes between the AFC/M23 and the pro-government Wazalendo militias near Masisi, approximately 50 kilometres northwest of Goma, North Kivu. The ongoing violence follows the signing of a Qatar-mediated preliminary peace agreement between AFC/M23 and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) on 19 July. Part of the agreement was to de-escalate and observe a formal ceasefire, which the actions of the AFC/M23 are threatening. While the DRC government intends for AFC/M23 to withdraw from its captured territory, AFC/M23 has proposed an arrangement to legitimise its control of the Kivu territory, co-managing it with the central government while maintaining defence and economic autonomy. Given the ongoing violence and maximalist demands from each side regarding AFC/M23-held territory, the formal peace agreement due to be signed on 18 August is unlikely to hold.

Wildfires across Southern Europe and Turkey as heatwave continues

Wildfires are ongoing in Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, North Macedonia and Turkey. In the Aude department in southern France, the largest wildfire of the year has burned around 13,000 hectares, close to the total land across France burned in 2024 and over twice that in 2023. In Spain, wildfires occurred in Andalusia and Galicia, and in Portugal, authorities announced that wildfires in Vila Real had been brought under control after raging for five days.

As of the time of writing, this year’s wildfire season has already burned over twice the total area in Europe that was burned by the same date last year. Climate scientists have warned that climate change means that summers in Europe have become markedly hotter and drier, leading to more extreme wildfire conditions. Multiple European countries have struggled to implement appropriate early warning systems, evacuation plans, and other disaster resiliency measures in response to the almost certainly worsening environmental risk landscape. For example, in Cyprus, the recent failure of early warning systems and complaints of confusing and delayed evacuation plans have led to significant criticism of the government in the wake of the intense wildfires in July.

On 5 August, Pakistan’s primary opposition party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), launched nationwide protests to mark the second anniversary of former prime minister and PTI leader Imran Khan’s arrest. Despite calls for widespread mobilisation, the demonstrations were much smaller than anticipated, largely due to the pre-emptive measures employed by the government. Demonstrations were reported in major urban centres, including Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, Peshawar, Faisalabad, and Rawalpindi, where Khan is currently imprisoned. Protests were mostly peaceful; however, there were reported clashes with the security forces, including in Lahore and Karachi, where tear gas and baton charges were used to disperse crowds.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The government’s imposition of Section 144s, which prohibit public gatherings, the establishment of road blocks, and mass deployment of security forces almost certainly disrupted the PTI protests and denied mass mobilisation from occurring. Furthermore, the pre-emptive arrests of approximately 300 PTI members, including senior figures like Rehana Dar, likely disrupted the coordination of protests and deterred broader public participation.

Despite the limited turnout, PTI-led protests are likely to continue and challenge the central government. Senior PTI leader and former National Assembly Speaker Asad Qaiser has announced that PTI will launch a second phase of protests, which are set to coincide with Pakistan’s Independence Day on 14 August. Smaller, more localised daily protests have also been announced in several cities, particularly in PTI strongholds across Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The symbolic importance of Pakistan’s Independence Day could increase the potential for a higher turnout. However, the government’s anticipated response, involving expanded security measures, legal restrictions, and targeted detentions, combined with PTI’s current internal divisions and the dispersed nature of its current protest strategy, is likely to deter sustained, large-scale mobilisation.

Should PTI alter its current strategy away from nationwide, dispersed protests toward more concentrated, coordinated demonstrations in politically significant urban centres, particularly Islamabad and Lahore, this will likely significantly increase the visibility of the protests. It would also increase the likelihood of major disruption and violent clashes, particularly in politically sensitive areas like central Islamabad.

On 7 August, Thailand and Cambodia officially signed a 13-point ceasefire agreement during the final day of peace talks in Malaysia to end the border clashes. As part of the ceasefire, they have agreed to maintain current troop positions and refrain from further reinforcements. Tensions have remained high during the talks, with a reported incursion into Cambodian territory on 5 August. On 6 August, Wasawat Puangpornsri, a member of Thailand’s parliament, visited the Chong Anma border crossing in Nam Yuen and stated that Thai and Cambodian troops were stationed approximately 50 metres apart, emphasising the fragility of the ceasefire that had been in place. Defence officials agreed to allow Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) observers to inspect the disputed border region to ensure clashes do not reignite. The two countries are set to hold further talks in two weeks and another round in a month and have agreed to consult through bilateral mechanisms should conflict reignite.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Despite the high tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, the ceasefire is likely to hold. Most of the border skirmishes between troops that have led to increased tensions have been blamed on the other party for initiating them. The ASEAN observer deployment significantly reduces this possibility. Furthermore, both countries’ economies have experienced a downturn in 2025, which has been accelerated by the border conflict. The threat of tariffs from US President Donald Trump, should the ceasefire fall apart, threatens to further impact the economy, which could add significant political pressure to Cambodia and exacerbate the political crisis in Thailand. The borders between the two countries remain closed, and approximately 20,000 Thai people have been displaced in Ubon Ratchathani province. It is likely that, should the ceasefire hold over the coming days, people displaced from the border regions will begin to return to their homes and Thailand and Cambodia will begin efforts to reopen the shared border.

Pakistan to begin formal deporting of Afghans on 1 September

Pakistan’s Interior Ministry has announced that on 1 September, it will begin the formal deportation of Afghan nationals holding Proof of Registration (PoR) cards, under the ongoing Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan (IFRP). The move follows the expiry of an extension period on 30 June and is being justified on the grounds of national security and economic strain. Since the plan’s launch in late 2023, around 1.3 million Afghans have already been repatriated, but it is estimated that 1.6 million remain in Pakistan, with many owning assets or businesses.

The policy has been strongly condemned by the UN, international human rights groups, and aid agencies, who argue that the mass deportations risk violating international law by returning individuals to a country where they face persecution, detention, or torture. There are also concerns that the large-scale forced relocation could destabilise Afghanistan, exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, increase cross-border tensions and play to the advantage of extremist groups by increasing their recruitment of returnees.

Protests in Pakistan and India-administered Kashmir over the revocation of special status

On 5 August, anti-India protests were held in Muzaffarabad and other cities in Pakistan-administered Kashmir to mark the sixth anniversary of India’s revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status (Article 370) in 2019. Smaller protests were also observed in other parts of Pakistan and parts of Indian‑administered Kashmir. Protestors demanded the reinstatement of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, a demand that Pakistan’s government has backed. The protests have occurred amid heightened tensions following the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, which triggered a brief cross-border conflict between India and Pakistan. While the protests have largely been peaceful, they raise the likelihood of sectarian violence, security crackdowns or militant activity.

Large-scale pro-Palestine protests in Sydney, Australia

On 3 August, around 90,000 people marched through central Sydney calling for an end to the conflict in Gaza. The protest was organised by the Palestine Action Group Sydney, a group that is part of the Australian Palestine Advocacy Network (APAN) (and is therefore not a direct affiliate of the UK-based Palestine Action). The protests remained peaceful, and there were no reports of arrests or injuries. It is likely that further developments in the Gaza war, especially Israeli plans to completely occupy the area, will drive and intensify protests in Australia, including in cities like Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, and Canberra.

Pakistan suspends mobile internet in Balochistan due to security concerns

In response to heightened terrorism threats in Balochistan, mobile internet services will be suspended across the region, including the provincial capital, Quetta. The suspension, which started on 7 August, is set to last until 31 August. The government has also imposed Section 144s until 15 August, which will ban public gatherings of more than five people, displaying firearms, face coverings in public spaces and riding pillion on motorcycles.

These security measures have been justified as preventive actions against coordinated militant attacks, which have historically intensified during August. The measures have also likely been imposed following a series of coordinated attacks from both the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), which have resulted in dozens of civilian deaths and significant casualties among Pakistan’s security forces.

India issues a nationwide security alert for all airports

On 4 August, India’s Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) directed all airports across the country to enhance security in response to intelligence regarding a potential threat from an unnamed terror group, between 22 September and 2 October. The alert will cover all aviation installations, including airports, airstrips, airfields, air force bases and helipads. Insider sources have stated that the advisory is based on a specific threat from a Pakistani-linked terror group, but refrained from identifying the exact group or why the alert corresponds with a specific date range, although the end date marks the birth of Mahatma Gandhi on 2 October, one of India’s three official national holidays. The advisory will almost certainly lead to increased security measures, surveillance, and checks at airports, which may result in longer wait times at security checkpoints.

Attacks on foreign citizens in Japan and China highlight sectarian tensions

On 31 July, two Chinese nationals were injured in a likely targeted attack in Tokyo. Hours later on the same day, a Japanese national was attacked at a train station in Suzhou. The attacks follow other similar cases of violence. In September 2024, a Japanese child was stabbed and killed near a Japanese school in Shenzhen; in June 2024, a Japanese woman and her child were injured in an attack in Suzhou, and a Chinese citizen who tried to protect them was killed by the attacker. The violence has increased diplomatic tensions between China and Japan and is likely reflective of a growing threat in both countries. In Japan, parties like Senseito, a far-right group that performed extremely well at the latest upper chamber elections, have adopted a rhetoric that singles out Chinese migrants as responsible for the growing costs of living, and as being a politically dangerous “fifth column”. On the other hand, there is a history of anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, particularly in the early 2000s.

South Korea begins dismantling its loudspeakers from the North Korean border

South Korea’s defence ministry announced on 4 August that the dismantling of loudspeakers installed along the border with North Korea had begun. The loudspeakers, which broadcast propaganda and K-pop music, were reactivated in June 2024 for the first time since the 2018 peace accord. This followed a significant rise in tensions on the Korean peninsula (with tensions almost certainly at their highest since the 2017-18 crisis), characterised by North Korea sending detritus-laden balloons and South Korean activist organisations sending drones into each other’s territories.

In June 2025, the liberal Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung was sworn in as president, after the hardline conservative Yoon Suk Yeol was removed from office following a failed attempt to impose martial law in December 2024. The new president almost certainly prefers to de-escalate tensions with Pyongyang, compared to his predecessor’s more hardline approach. As indicated by the defence ministry’s statement, the removal of loudspeakers is almost certainly an easy way for the South Korean government to attempt to reduce tensions with Pyongyang without affecting the military’s readiness posture.

Heavy rainfall causes widespread disruption in southern China and Hong Kong

Heavy rainfall has resulted in widespread flooding and disruption across Hong Kong and China’s southern Guangdong province. Hong Kong has experienced its heaviest rainfall since 1884, with over 350 millimetres of rainfall recorded on 5 August and four Black Rainstorm Warnings issued in just eight days. Flooding in Hong Kong has resulted in the closure of schools, clinics, and courts, and flight cancellations reached around 20 per cent. In Guangzhou, landslides triggered by the rainfall killed two people and injured seven, with five individuals still missing. The provincial government raised its flood emergency response to Level II, as rising river levels, blocked highways, and widespread infrastructure damage prompted clearance and search operations. Further rainfall is expected in the region, and several other areas, such as Shenzhen, have issued warnings due to the threat of flash flooding and landslides.

Severe rains cause at least five deaths and displaced thousands in Taiwan

According to local authorities, parts of Southern Taiwan received approximately one year’s worth of rainfall in a week due to a depression system that developed in late July. At least five people have been reported dead due to the severe flooding and landslides caused by the rains, and approximately 5,900 have been internally displaced. Mountainous areas, such as the southern Kaohsiung and Pingtung areas, have been particularly severely affected, as the combination of rough terrain, smaller roadways, and landslides significantly complicated rescue and relief efforts. Although the rains largely subsided by 4 August, the wet season in Taiwan is likely to continue until September, meaning that further cases of severe precipitation remain possible.

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