Ongoing Mexican teachers’ union protests led by the National Coordinator of Education Workers (CNTE), which began on 15 May, have continued to cause widespread disruption across Mexico.

Protest tactics have recently escalated, resulting in major transport disruptions. On 2 June, protestors blocked the southbound lanes of the Tijuana-San Diego border crossing on the I-5 highway, disrupting cross-border traffic into Mexico.

This follows the organisation of multiple protests outside of Mexico City International Airport in mid-May, which resulted in the suspension of flight operations, delays and road blocks denying access to the facility. Protestors have also blocked the main thoroughfare in Acapulco’s tourist zone and have staged several roadblocks in central Mexico City.

Localised protests have also been observed across the country, with some involving violent clashes with the police. The worst-affected areas include Oaxaca, Chiapas, Zacatecas, Guerrero, Chihuahua, Baja California Sur, and Yucatán. Initial assessments are that the protests have resulted in over MXN 25 billion in economic losses in the historic centre of Mexico City alone, with approximately 30,000 businesses affected, primarily due to suspended commercial activity and logistical blockades caused by the protests.

The CNTE’s primary demands include the repeal of the 2007 ISSSTE pension reform and a 100 per cent salary increase for public school teachers. The pension reform replaced a state-guaranteed system with private individual accounts, which the CNTE has argued severely undermines retirement security. In response, the Mexican government has offered a ten per cent pay rise and an additional week of holiday. As of 4 June, the CNTE has rejected the government’s proposal following a meeting involving union leaders and the Secretaries of the Interior and Education.

Solace Global Assessment: 

With the protests now in their third week, and negotiations between the government and the CNTE failing to reach a resolution, protests are likely to continue until the government makes more substantial concessions.

However, the government is unlikely to capitulate to the protestors’ comprehensive demands, especially with the Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs resulting in major economic uncertainty. Moreover, President Claudia Sheinbaum has publicly stated that there is no fiscal space for reinstating the old pension system, and the government has begun to prioritise corporate incentives and low taxes to counter poor economic growth, further constraining available public funds.

The majority of protests have involved localised demonstrations targeting local, state, and federal government buildings. However, there has been a discernible trend in protestors increasingly targeting transport infrastructure. These tactics, most notably the protests at Mexico City International Airport and the I-5 border crossing, have almost certainly been adopted to maximise the visibility of the protests and increase economic pressure on the government.

While major disruptive protests have only been observed at a few locations, the teachers’ union protest, although decentralised, is a nationwide protest with widespread participation and appeal.

Consequently, similarly disruptive protests will likely be emulated across the country to exert maximum pressure on the central government, particularly as previous protests targeting transport infrastructure have attracted significant media attention.

Should the protests continue to escalate, sites likely to be targeted include international airports, access roads to major transport hubs, tourist zones, and major border crossings, particularly those with high volumes of commercial or cross-border traffic such as Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and Laredo.

On 3 June, supporters of former Bolivian President Evo Morales staged coordinated protests across Bolivia, establishing at least 13 roadblocks, primarily concentrated in the Cochabamba department, a major source of Morales’ support. The roadblocks severely disrupted internal transport corridors, including the major highways between Santa Cruz and La Paz, reportedly delaying the transit of over 800 fuel trucks. The roadblocks follow a series of protests staged across Bolivian cities, including a several-kilometre march in La Paz in January 2025.

Protestors establishing roadblocks are demanding the validation of Morales’ candidacy for the 2025 presidential elections, despite a Plurinational Constitutional Court ruling barring Morales from what would be his fourth term. The ruling reaffirms that the Bolivian Constitution permits only one consecutive re-election, limiting presidents to two terms. Protests held in La Paz have attracted participation from a wide cross-section of society, including street vendors, farmers, neighbourhood groups, and small business owners, who are protesting over persistent fuel shortages, the scarcity of US dollars, and repeated increases in the prices of essential goods.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While much smaller in scale than the 2024 Morales-aligned blockades that involved more than 100 roadblocks and widespread fuel and food shortages, the current protests mark the most significant escalation since then and likely indicate the early stages of a renewed protest campaign. Moreover, Morales supporters have threatened to initiate a nationwide blockade should the Constitutional Court refuse to reverse its ruling, a move it is unlikely to do after its explicit rejection of indefinite terms.

Morales typically draws a lot of support from farmers, rural and indigenous communities, trade unions, social movements and working-class voters. There is a realistic possibility of a convergence between pro-Morales protest movements and those against economic conditions in Bolivia. Bolivia faces increasing fiscal pressure, which has been exacerbated by falling gas revenues and dwindling foreign currency reserves. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently demanded that the Bolivian government make urgent economic adjustments, likely referring to the imposition of austerity measures. This will likely involve a reduction in fuel subsidies and increased taxation, steps that will almost certainly exacerbate tensions between the public and the government.

With the Bolivian presidential election approaching in August, there is a high likelihood of periodic and often violent unrest as both political and economic grievances fuel public discontent. Protests and roadblocks will likely become more frequent and disruptive in the coming months, particularly in areas with strong support for Morales. These will likely escalate further should the government implement IMF-advised austerity measures.

As suggested by historical precedence, transport infrastructure, including fuel routes, interdepartmental highways, and primary routes into urban centres, will likely remain high-visibility targets for protests seeking to exert maximum pressure on the current administration and the courts. The 2024 protests resulted in fuel shortages, inflation, and supply chain disruption and were estimated to have cost the Bolivian economy almost USD2 billion. Multiple incidents of violent clashes between protesters, counter-protesters, and the police were also observed, including in major urban centres.

High-profile protest in Minneapolis, MN, highlights growing deportation-related threats in US

On 3 June, hundreds of protesters gathered in Lake Street, Minneapolis, as a reaction to a rumoured raid by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents at a nearby restaurant.

Footage from the incident shows protesters hurling objects at officers, who responded with pepper spray. The protest occurred only days after ICE agents detained more than 100 people in Tallahassee, Florida, in one of the largest single-day raids by the agency.

US authorities stated that the Minneapolis operation was not immigration-related and that the response had therefore been driven by misinformation.

Nevertheless, the case almost certainly showcases a growing threat linked to the current US administration’s strict immigration and deportation policies, which has the potential to drive further unrest and possibly violence, particularly in large urban centres.

Trump administration bans citizens from 12 countries from entering the US

Citizens from 12 countries, primarily in Africa and the Middle East will now be barred from entering the US after an order was signed by President Trump. The ban applies to nationals from Afghanistan, Myanmar, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.

Partial restrictions will also be placed on citizens from Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. Trump cited the recent terrorist attack in Colorado as partial justification for the sweeping ban, despite the perpetrator originating from Egypt, a country not affected by the new rules.

Trump’s previous 2017 travel ban, which was colloquially referred to as the ‘Muslim ban’, sparked mass protests across the US, especially at major airports where affected foreign nationals were detained. Renewed protests are highly likely, especially as the new ban affects countries with a large diaspora in the US, such as Haiti and Cuba.

Terror attack on pro-Israel march in Boulder CO, USA

On 1 June, an individual attacked an event in support of Israel in Pearl Street, Boulder, using Molotov cocktails and an improvised flamethrower. The attack injured 12 people, and the perpetrator was arrested by responding police. The suspect, an Egyptian national, reportedly yelled slogans associated with the pro-Palestine movement during and after the attack.

The attack was likely inspired by previous cases of targeted sectarian violence associated with the war in Gaza, including the shooting of two Israeli embassy staffers at a museum in Washington, D.C., in late May. Further violence at pro-Israel and pro-Palestine events remains likely, especially following the recent intensification of the conflict in Gaza.

Haiti report underlines extent of gang violence and control

A report released on 1 June by the Centre for Analysis and Research in Human Rights (CARDH) to mark the fourth anniversary of gangs seizing the first neighbourhood in Port-au-Prince, estimates that 25 of 28 listed localities are now under the control of the gangs.

The report also states that over 100 public institutions have been damaged or destroyed, and over one million people have been internally displaced. The violence has continued unabated in 2025, with over 1,600 homicides recorded in the first quarter of the year.

The gangs’ consolidation of power and use of violence suggest that Haiti is on the brink of institutional collapse unless the country receives major international intervention.

Wildfires trigger multiple air alerts in Canada and US

Ongoing wildfires in the Canadian provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan have led to the declaration of multiple states of emergency, with several in place until at least 27–28 June.

Over 25,000 people have been ordered to evacuate across Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia; however, the authorities have warned that the promulgation of disinformation or “fake news” is harming response efforts and causing unnecessary panic. The resulting smoke from the wildfires has triggered air quality alerts in multiple regions of Canada and the United States, resulting in warnings for people sensitive to pollution and other airborne particles.

Saharan dust cloud to affect Caribbean region and southern US states

A substantial Saharan dust plume remains present over the Caribbean region, currently spanning approximately 2,000 miles from Jamaica to Barbados and 750 miles from Turks and Caicos to Trinidad and Tobago.

The dust is causing widespread haze and has exacerbated respiratory issues in the region, particularly among vulnerable populations. Forecast models indicate that the plume will drift north-westward, and parts of the southern US, especially Florida and the Gulf Coast, are already affected.

The dust will almost certainly degrade air quality across affected areas, and there is a realistic possibility of reduced visibility affecting air and marine operations.

Karol Nawrocki won the tightly contested 1 June presidential election by a margin of 50.9 per cent to 49.1 per cent, narrowly beating the governing Civic Coalition party candidate Rafał Trzaskowski. Whilst an independent, Nawrocki was nominated and is supported by the Law and Justice (PiS) opposition party.

In Poland, the presidency is a largely ceremonial role. However, the president has key powers, including the veto of legislation passed by the lower house of Poland’s parliament, the Sejm. The Sejm can only override the presidential veto by a three-fifths majority vote of 60 per cent. Following the election result, Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced on 3 June that a parliamentary confidence vote will take place on 11 June.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The presidential election was functionally a referendum on the ruling Civic Coalition’s record over the past two years. Despite the highly narrow margin, it is almost certain Nawrocki and the PiS will try to use their victory to disrupt the government as much as possible.

Due to the president’s veto powers, the government will highly likely continue to struggle to reverse highly polarising policies implemented by the previous PiS government, such as strict anti-abortion laws. There is a realistic possibility that, ultimately, general elections will be called earlier than is constitutionally required by autumn 2027 if the Tusk administration is repeatedly stopped from enacting reforms by the presidential veto.

The parliamentary confidence vote called by Tusk is almost certainly an attempt to ward off a challenge to the government’s pro-EU and liberal mandate. The government is likely to win the vote, given that Tusk’s governing coalition has a majority in parliament with 242 MPs in the 460-seat Sejm. A collapse of the coalition, however, would also threaten to collapse the government. Poland remains deeply politically divided, as reflected by the narrow margin of the presidential election, and this polarisation will likely continue to drive demonstrations in urban centres, particularly Warsaw.

On 1 June, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) conducted what was almost certainly the most successful Ukrainian attack in Russian territory since the start of the war. In what has been called Operation Spider’s Web (Pavutyna), Kyiv claims 41 strategic aircraft were struck by 117 first-person view (FPV) drones, which were smuggled into Russia on trucks in prefabricated wooden structures with remotely opening doors, and then delivered next to five strategic airfields.

The aircraft that were hit included Tu-95 and Tu-22 strategic bombers, and at least one A-50 early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft. These are strategic assets that have not been built since the early 1990s, a component of Russia’s nuclear triad, and have been prolifically used to launch cruise missiles into Ukraine. The estimated losses could be as high as USD 7 billion, although so far only 13 of the strikes have been confirmed through satellite imagery available in open source.

Furthermore, on 31 May, two railway bridges collapsed in Russian border regions, and on 3 June, the Kerch bridge in Russian-occupied Crimea was attacked with underwater explosives.

Mass Russian long-range strikes against Ukraine have continued to intensify. Overnight 31 May-1 June, the Ukrainian Air Force reported that 472 attack drones (Shaheds and decoys) and seven missiles (both ballistic and cruise missiles) were launched at targets in Kharkiv, Sumy, Zhytomyr, Odesa, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Overnight 5-6 June, Russian forces then launched, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky, over 400 drones and more than 40 missiles across Ukraine, including in: Volyn, Lviv, Ternopil, Kyiv, Sumy, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy and Chernihiv regions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Operation Pavutyna coincided with the anniversary of the removal of the last nuclear warhead from Ukraine under the terms of the Budapest Memorandum on 1 June 1996, which guaranteed Ukrainian security in exchange for the return of nuclear weapons to Russia. It is likely that some of the strategic bombers struck by Ukraine were handed over to Russia in 1996.

Whilst Ukraine has grown increasingly capable of launching long-range attacks using drones against strategic targets in Russia’s depth, such as oil refineries and terminals, Pavutyna almost certainly stands out for its strategic impact. The strategic aircraft are essentially irreplaceable in any reasonable time frame, and their loss has highly likely degraded Russia’s capabilities to conduct long-range cruise missile strikes.

Furthermore, their role as ‘nuclear deterrent bombers’ is highly significant, especially in the context of heightened tensions with NATO. Russia regularly uses the Long Range Aviation (DA) component of its nuclear triad for nuclear posturing and deterrence, such as in January 2025 when two Tu-95s were used in flights over the  Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan.

Fundamentally, Russia’s nuclear deterrence has failed to prevent Ukraine from conducting major attacks deep within internationally recognised Russian territory. Earlier in the war, key Western allies such as the US enforced strict rules of engagement for Ukraine using Western-provided weapon systems such as ATACMS and HIMARS, which prevented Ukraine from using these systems against targets in internationally recognised Russian territory. However, Ukraine has invested significantly in domestic weapon production on drones in part to achieve an independent means of conducting strategic operations against Russia.

Due to the profound strategic impact of Pavutyna combined with a series of other operations in Russia, the Kremlin is almost certainly compelled to significantly retaliate, with Russian President Vladimir Putin warning US President Donald Trump that a response was forthcoming. The overnight 5-6 June mass attack is likely intended to be part of this retaliation, given the scale of the aerial assault, particularly the number of missiles used.

However, as Russian forces have been conducting a phase of record aerial attacks against Ukrainian urban centres since at least January 2025, it is likely that the attack does not have the requisite deterring impact or symbolic effect. There is a realistic possibility that Moscow may order atypical operations against Ukraine in the coming days, potentially including the use of the new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which President Putin has previously employed as a means of escalation deterrence.

On the night of 5-6 June, the eve of Eid Al Adha, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted several air strikes in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, in an operation reportedly aimed at destroying underground Hezbollah drone production facilities. Israel has carried out multiple strikes in southern and eastern Lebanon targeting Hezbollah’s military capabilities and supply routes. However, the latest strikes mark the first in Beirut in over a month and only the fourth in the capital since the US-brokered ceasefire agreement in November 2024.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The strikes almost certainly demonstrate Israel’s willingness to target Hezbollah weapon production facilities in Lebanon, despite the ceasefire. Since the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the Iranian-backed Shia militant group has lost access to much of its ground lines of communication, constraining its ability to replenish weapon stocks lost in its conflict with Israel.

This dynamic has been exacerbated by ongoing operations by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and new Syrian regime, which have interdicted multiple attempts to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon, with one operation on 5 June resulting in the seizure of multiple anti-tank guided missiles and 30mm calibre ammunition in the Syrian town of Al-Qusayr, a traditional staging ground and facilitation hub for Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s loss of traditional supply lines will almost certainly force the group to explore other ways to re-arm, especially as the LAF, with support from Israeli intelligence, is dismantling Hezbollah weapons and installations south of the Litani River in southern Lebanon. The most likely course of action for Hezbollah is to increase the domestic production of weapon systems, including drones, within Lebanon. However, there is also evidence suggesting that Hezbollah is using air and sea lines of communication to smuggle weapons into the country.

Containing a weakened Hezbollah, especially as Israel continues to conduct operations in Gaza and threatens to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, is almost certainly a key objective of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Consequently, Israel will almost certainly continue to strike high-value targets (HVTs) related to the sustainment of Hezbollah across Lebanon. HVTs will almost certainly include weapons production sites, logistics nodes, and Hezbollah senior leadership.

As demonstrated by the recent strikes in southern Beirut, Israel is willing to target HVTs in politically sensitive areas and during religious occasions, suggesting there are likely few targets off-limits to the IDF. Future strikes could extend to areas of Beirut outside of the southern suburbs and potentially include civilian infrastructure such as airports and seaports, if they are assessed to be involved in Hezbollah’s weapons procurement.

On 1 June, al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) launched an attack on a base in Boulkessi, near the border with Burka Faso, with unconfirmed reports indicating that they killed at least 60 members of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and took an additional 220 soldiers hostage. JNIM media claimed that the assailants seized 174 Kalashnikovs and three vehicles.

On 2 June, JNIM launched an attack in Timbuktu on one of the junta’s main military bases, three checkpoints, and a military airport. The attackers arrived disguised in FAMa uniforms with a vehicle full of explosives, which detonated near the base, and launched mortar fire at the airport, where Russian Wagner private military personnel are stationed. The FAMa reported to have killed 14 JNIM members and arrested 31.

The following day, the junta imposed a 30-day curfew between 21:00 and 06:00 local time in the Segou administrative region, an area in central Mali that comprises roughly five per cent of the country, due to increased activity targeting government forces over the past two weeks. Two more JNIM attacks occurred on 4 and 5 June, on a military camp in Tessit and a security post in Mahou, respectively, both located near the border with Burkina Faso.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Timbuktu was previously captured by the Tuareg rebel group, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), and allied Islamist groups in April 2012 and retaken with the support of the French military in January 2013. The city has been under JNIM siege since August 2023, following the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

The last major JNIM attack on Timbuktu, repelled by MINUSMA, occurred in 2018, where JNIM dressed up as UN peacekeepers, similar tactics that were observed in the recent assault. Timbuktu is strategically important, hosting military bases and a regional airport and operates as a logistics hub for northern regions. Furthermore, control over the city provides access to the Niger River, which JNIM could use as a transportation route to increase its logistical capabilities across the region.

The recent surge of attacks reflects JNIM’s broader increase in operations in northern and central Mali. JNIM and other Malian insurgent groups have increasingly resorted to blockades to disrupt local economies and obstruct humanitarian aid. JNIM has encircled towns and cities in the north and centre of the country, cutting off main supply routes, which has driven up prices and led to shortages of food and medicine.

JNIM’s targeting of Timbuktu’s airport not only prevents military reinforcements but also exacerbates the impact of the blockades by preventing humanitarian aid from entering via air corridors. The continued targeting of the airport is likely to disrupt military reinforcements, facilitating further attacks on the city, and also create security conditions too dangerous for humanitarian groups to operate, thereby weakening the junta’s ability to provide protection and essential support to the local population.

The curfew in Segou will highly likely exacerbate popular dissatisfaction with the junta, which has failed to restore order following the 2020 coup. The imposition of a curfew likely reflects the junta’s growing concern over its inability to prevent militant attacks in contested areas bordering the Bamako region, the nation’s capital and the junta’s main seat of power.

This is likely exacerbated by the junta’s financial restraints and military equipment shortages, which JNIM are almost certainly taking advantage of, combined with porous borders and large areas of ungoverned space. JNIM will almost certainly exploit these recent developments by continuing to target government-held areas in Mali. If JNIM were to capture Timbuktu, it would be a significant symbolic and strategic blow to the military, which is already struggling to govern northern and central regions of the country.

On 30 May, at least six people were killed and 15 injured in a Rapid Support Forces (RSF) drone strike on Al-Dhaman Hospital in El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan State. Casualties included patients, staff, and attendants, and forced the hospital to suspend operations. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) reported that the bombardment also hit a second hospital in the city centre.

Three days later, on 2 June, an attack on a 15-truck United Nations (UN) aid convoy in the Darfur region killed five. The attack happened near the RSF-controlled town of Koma as the convoy was en route to El-Fasher. The perpetrator is unconfirmed, with the RSF sharing footage and blaming the SAF, and the SAF, alongside Resistance Committees in El-Fasher, blaming the RSF. On 4 June, further RSF shelling killed at least 14 people in the Abu Shouk displacement camp near El-Fasher.

Solace Global Assessment: 

This marks the second time hospitals have been hit in El-Obeid, with an RSF drone strike hitting the Military Medical Corps Hospital on 15 May. The city serves as a vital strategic hub, acting as a staging point on the SAF’s supply route to western Sudan, primarily to the SAF-held capital of North Darfur, El-Fasher, which has been under RSF siege since May 2024.

The attacks on hospitals, aid convoys, and displacement camps likely reflect intensified RSF efforts to take El-Fasher since mid-April, almost certainly motivated by being pushed out of Khartoum by the SAF in late March. The seizure of El-Fasher would enable the RSF to entrench control over North Darfur and hugely deny the SAF from conducting ground operations in the wider region.

The attack on the aid convoy was almost certainly conducted by the RSF. By targeting the aid convoy on its way to El-Fasher, as well as Abu Shouk displacement camp, the RSF almost certainly aims to weaken government control over the city by worsening the humanitarian situation.

Disrupting aid delivery, particularly in contested regions, has emerged as a common RSF tactic, with aid groups and medical workers in and around El-Fasher being targeted numerous times. The RSF’s ultimate objectives are likely to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by disrupting essential services and displacing populations, undermining SAF governance and control over key regions, limiting international monitoring and humanitarian access, and gradually consolidating RSF authority through a protracted war of attrition.

The aid convoy attack constitutes the second attack in a week on aid groups in El-Fasher, with the RSF bombing a UN World Food Programme premises in the city last week, damaging a workshop, an office building, and a clinic. The scale of violence and displacement in Darfur has reportedly reached its highest level since the Darfur genocide of 2003 to 2005. With deliberate attacks on aid organisations, NGOs and civilian infrastructure almost certain to continue, the violence in Darfur will continue to cause mass displacement, exacerbate the humanitarian situation and provide fertile ground for the spread of disease, with Sudan already struggling to contain a cholera epidemic.

On 3 June, an explosion killed two suspected militants, including one man and one female suicide bomber. No other people were injured or killed. The blast occurred near the Roman Catholic Munyonyo Martyrs’ Shrine in the south of Kampala. Ugandan Christians were gathered at the church to observe Martyrs’ Day, commemorating the execution of a group of Christian martyrs between 1885 and 1887. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was gathered for mass in a different location nearby.

The Ugandan military declared that they ‘intercepted and neutralised two armed terrorists’ before they could perpetrate the attack. The two perpetrators were on a passenger motorcycle heading towards the church and exploded as security forces drew closer, before they could reach those gathered for mass. The military statement emphasised that the operation was intelligence-led and part of increased security around public events in recent years in response to a growing militant threat.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the attack was perpetrated by the DRC-based Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), sometimes referred to as Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). The ADF originated in Uganda and claimed responsibility for previous terrorist attacks in the country, as well as numerous attacks on Christian communities in the DRC. This would constitute the first attempted ADF attack since four separate bombings claimed by the group killed at least 11 in Kampala in October and November 2021.

The reduced activity can almost certainly be attributed to Ugandan forces successfully pushing the ADF back from the border in the ongoing Operation Shuja, a joint military offensive conducted in the Kivu and Ituri regions of eastern DRC. However, with the renewed AFC/M23 offensives in 2025, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) have been forced to divert attention to combating the rebel group, almost certainly giving the ADF increased operational freedom.

The attack comes after ADF militants entered Uganda from the DRC in March 2024, with the military declaring that they were planning attacks in urban areas, places of worship, schools, and public events. According to the statement, the group was suspected to be ‘under the command’ of ADF commander Ahmed Mahmood Hassan, also known as Abu Waqas, a Tanzanian-born bomb expert.

According to the UN Security Council, Abu Waqas was directly involved in the planning of the June 2023 attack on the Lhubiriha Secondary School in Uganda and is one of the main sponsors of attacks on Ugandan territory. Abu Waqas has likely enhanced the ADF’s ability to conduct attacks with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and was likely involved in the planning of the latest bombing.

Given that the attack failed, it is likely that the group will attempt another attack in Kampala in 2025, likely resulting in an increased security posture in Kampala and other parts of Uganda.

Two deaths in France during Champions League celebrations

Large-scale disorders were recorded in Paris and other large French urban centres on 31 May and 1 June, following the victory of the local team, Paris Saint-Germain, at the Champions League final against Inter Milan. According to French police, one teenager was stabbed and killed in the town of Dax, while a man was killed in a road traffic accident in central Paris. Moreover, around 200 people were injured and 559 arrested, the vast majority in Paris.

The disorders have driven considerable criticism of the government from both the left and right opposition, with both accusing the Interior Ministry of being unprepared to meet the scale of the violence.

Party for Freedom (PVV) quits Dutch government coalition, initiates crisis

Party leader Geert Wilders announced the decision on 3 June, citing disagreements with coalition partners over PVV’s proposed measures to crack down on asylum applications. PVV finished first at the 2023 elections and, after months of discussions, entered a coalition with the centre-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the centrist New Social Contract (NSC), and the populist Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB).

Since then, both NSC and BBB have collapsed in the polls. Wilders is likely hoping to provoke a government reshuffle by threatening the two minor parties with early elections, where they could perform poorly. If this strategy fails, PVV will head to a new vote, hoping to emulate other European far-right parties, which have performed well at recent elections. However, the gambit could backfire for PVV, particularly if both the centre-left and PVV have strong electoral results.

Protest groups commit to anti-tourism demonstrations on 15 June across southern Europe

The protest organisation Menys Turisme Més Vida (Less Tourism, More Life) has announced that 60 of its chapters will commit to coordinated anti-tourism protests across Spain on 15 June. Demonstrations are expected in major tourist destinations including Palma de Majorca, Ibiza, Alicante, Barcelona, the Canary Islands, and several other Spanish locations.

Similar protests are expected in other parts of southern Europe frustrated over tourism and its associated effects such as rising house prices, with protests likely to materialise in Lisbon in Portugal and the Italian cities of Naples and Venice.

Thousands protest in Bulgaria over adoption of the euro

On 31 May, thousands of Bulgarians protested in the capital Sofia and other major cities against the government’s decision to adopt the euro. The protests are largely led by civic groups and nationalist parties, which are demanding a referendum on the new currency. Protestors have argued that entering the eurozone will lead to high prices and reduced economic sovereignty, an argument also advanced by incumbent President Rumen Radev.

Furthermore, recent polling indicates that almost 60 per cent of Bulgarians are against adopting the euro, likely suggesting that further protests are likely. On 4 June, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission (EC) gave the green light to Bulgaria’s adoption of the euro, a move that resulted in a brawl within the Bulgarian parliament and one that will almost certainly spark further protests over the weekend of 6-8 June.

Egyptian authorities hike gas prices due to energy crunch

Local media reported on 30 May that the Ministry of Petroleum and Renewable Energy will include the hikes in its June bill. Egypt has struggled with an energy crunch for months amid falling domestic production. In April, the government passed the first fuel hike of the year, of approximately 15 per cent; in mid-May, Cairo announced its plans to buy between 40 and 60 cargoes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to ameliorate the situation ahead of the summer.

The latest hikes, which have a realistic possibility of being followed by further measures in the summer, could generate significant public discontent and possibly spark major protests.

Opposition leader excluded in Ivory Coast electoral list

Prominent opposition leader Tidjane Thiam and several other opposition leaders have been excluded from the Ivory Coast’s final list of presidential candidates for the October election. Thiam has been excluded on the grounds that he had French nationality at the time of registration, although the move has been widely assessed as being politically motivated.

The decision has been met with strong rhetoric from the opposition, who have also signalled their intent to mobilise protests in major urban centres like Abidjan and Yamoussoukro. Previous incidents of political exclusion have triggered mass unrest, including the 2010-2011 post-election crisis, which killed over 3,000 people. Additionally, disputes over nationality and voter eligibility contributed to the Ivory Coast’s 2002-2007 civil war, which killed thousands and displaced almost a million people.

Ruling CNDD-FDD party seeks victory in Burundian legislative elections

On 5 June, Burundian citizens voted in legislative elections to elect members of Burundi’s 123-member National Assembly. The ruling Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) is highly likely to take the majority of seats, with opposition parties fragmented. The CNDD-FDD has been in power since 2005, with President Evariste Ndayishimiye coming to power in 2020 after the former president passed away.

Ndayishimiye’s party has been accused of rigging the election, with the interior ministry suspending the primary opposition party National Freedom Council (CNL) in 2023 over “irregularities” in its meetings and barring its leader Agathon Rwasa, in 2024. In the lead-up to the election, opposition parties decried the harassment and intimidation of their supporters by the CNDD-FDD youth league, Imbonerakure.

The election took place against the backdrop of rising inflation, fuel shortages, foreign currency shortages, tensions with the neighbouring Rwanda, and a refugee crisis triggered by the conflict in the DRC’s South Kivu region. The deliberate intensified fragmentation of opposition parties by the CNDD-FDD is almost certainly influenced by the national instability, which would highly likely cause the opposition to vote against the incumbent party if there were a viable alternative.

There is a realistic possibility that the election results, which are expected in the coming days, will trigger demonstrations, although the almost certain security crackdown and violence from the Imbonerakure will likely prevent any protests from escalating.

Bomb blast kills nine at bus park in Nigeria’s Borno State

On 2 June, a bomb blast at a bus park killed at least nine people in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. The bomb detonated as villagers from the Mairari village in the Guzamala district were waiting for a bus. While no group has yet claimed responsibility, it was highly likely perpetrated by Boko Haram, a group known for more frequent targeting of civilians compared to their rivals, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The village is largely deserted due to frequent terrorist attacks in the area.

This bombing constitutes the latest attack in a trend of increasing militant activity in the region, which can largely be attributed to reduced levels of inter-group fighting between Boko Haram and ISWAP, evolving insurgent tactics, a regional security deficit, reduced inter-nation cooperation, and militant activity culminating before the onset of the rainy season. While the rainy season has technically started, with central and southern regions such as Abuja experiencing rain and thunderstorms, northern regions of Nigeria typically enter the rainy season slightly later. Continued attacks are highly likely over the coming weeks.

Nigerian security forces have struggled to contain the insurgency in Borno state, intensifying airstrikes under Operation Hadin Kai since mid-March, most recently targeting fleeing Boko Haram militants in Bita on 30 May.  On 3 June, Nigeria’s defence chief called for Nigeria’s borders to be fenced off from its neighbours, something that would be highly unlikely to slow the insurgency and would highly likely instead increase dissatisfaction with the government in the region by hindering local economies that rely on free cross-border movement, playing into insurgent groups’ hands.

Puntland forces complete Hilaac operation, take Islamic State strongholds in Mirale Valley

The security forces of the breakaway region of Somalia have been engaged in an offensive to destroy units of the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) since December 2024, focusing on the Cal Miskaad mountain range. Operations in the area have been supported by US and UAE airstrikes, which have likely proved successful in preventing ISS forces from regrouping after losing territory. The latest phase of the offensive has concentrated on the Mirale Valley, where ISS forces retained entrenched positions.

The remote and mountainous landscape in Cal Miskaad will almost certainly allow some protection to fleeing ISS fighters and will possibly allow them to reinfiltrate previously cleared areas. Nevertheless, the Puntland forces’ operation has likely successfully halted ISS’s efforts to expand its territorial control and manpower, which had increased in 2024.

ISS is a key “node” in the Islamic State’s transnational network, with its al-Karrar Office having been particularly effective at governing and expediting flows of funds between IS branches in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, through the port of Bosaso, ISS has favoured the crossing of fighters from the Arab Peninsula to the Horn of Africa. The disruption of ISS operations could therefore prove to be a significant blow to the Islamic State’s global operations.

Mount Etna erupts, causing localised disruptions in nearby parts of Sicily

The eruption occurred on the morning of 2 June and continued throughout the day. According to local media, the event resulted in the partial collapse of a side of the volcano’s crater. While ash fall was recorded in some local inhabited areas and tourist locations near the volcano’s summit were evacuated, the eruption did not result in any injuries and no disruptions were recorded at the airport of Catania. Nevertheless, local authorities increased the local aviation notice level due to the realistic possibility of further eruptions.

5.8 magnitude earthquake hits near Turkish resort town of Marmaris

On 3 June 2025 at 02:17 local time, a 5.8-magnitude earthquake struck 10 kilometres off the coast of Marmaris in Muğla province, southwestern Turkey. The tremor caused widespread panic but no major structural collapses. One fatality was reported, a 14-year-old girl in Fethiye, while 69 individuals sustained injuries, primarily from attempting to flee shaking buildings. Significant shaking was felt not only in Marmaris, the epicentre, but also across the Aegean, including Rhodes and other nearby Greek islands. The overall damage to infrastructure in the area is low; however, there is a realistic possibility of aftershocks in the region.

Hajj begins in Saudi Arabia amid extreme heat and new restrictions

The annual Islamic Hajj pilgrimage spanning from 4 to 9 June is expected to attract as many as two million pilgrims. The 2025 Hajj coincides with extreme heat, with temperatures expected to reach the mid-40s Celsius. The Saudi authorities have implemented several countermeasures to reduce the risk of heat-related illnesses, such as the planting of 10,000 trees and the installation of water coolers and misting systems.

However, the risk remains high, with almost 1,300 dying in the 2024 Hajj due to extreme temperatures. The authorities have also increased measures to restrict unauthorised access to limit overcrowding and stampedes, with several previous Hajj pilgrimages involving fatal incidents like the 2015 Mina stampede, which killed almost 769 people (though independent estimates suggest over 2,000).

Additionally, the mass transit of pilgrims from multiple parts of the world has typically increased the risk of communicable disease outbreaks, as seen during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and the 2012 MERS outbreak.

Severe flooding in Mokwa, Nigeria

In Mokwa, Nigeria, flooding has resulted in more than 200 confirmed deaths, with over 500 individuals still missing. The floods, which began on 29 May, has left over 3,000 people displaced and caused significant damage, submerging approximately 300 homes. Despite the severity of the situation, many residents are reportedly hesitant to relocate to relief camps. The Nigerian government has allocated 2 billion naira to aid the affected communities. Government officials have refuted claims that the flooding was triggered by water releases from the Kainji or Jebba dams. Search and rescue operations are actively continuing in the region.

The Supreme Court announced the decision to reinstate the party on 1 June. JI had been previously outlawed under the rule of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was ousted in the August 2024 revolution. The Supreme Court also acquitted JI leader Azharul Islam, who had been in custody since 2012, of charges of crimes against humanity dating back to the 1971 war.

JI is the country’s largest Islamist party and traces its origins to the pre-partition Raj.  In addition to a strong supporter base, JI can count on several local and national student and youth associations.  Historically, JI espoused a brand of political Islam similar to other Bangladeshi Islamist movements, as well as counterparts further west. However, following the revolution, JI leaders have increasingly adopted progressive rhetoric, mostly on economic issues but with some social concessions.

In the same reporting period, Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) has also begun the trial of ousted Prime Minister Hasina, charging her with crimes against humanity and other crimes, including mass murder. Hasina is currently in exile in India.

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The Supreme Court’s decision will highly likely allow JI to participate in the next elections, which are currently predicted by the interim government to be held before June 2026. JI has a historic ally in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and it is likely that BNP officials will increasingly seek opportunities to form an alliance with JI prior to the upcoming elections.

The decision will also almost certainly concern India, particularly in the context of the growing cases of violence against Hindu minorities in Bangladesh following the revolution. Despite its recent leftist turn, JI has held long-standing positions calling for religious minorities in Bangladesh to have second-class citizen status, or at times even called for their expulsion from the country.

The trial against Hasina, which is being televised in an unprecedented move, will almost certainly reinforce the position of the Yunus government, which is currently trying to resist parties’ pressure to call early elections. The interim government has, in recent months, adopted a strategy meant to progressively destroy Hasina’s Awami League (AL) party’s influence on civil society and political institutions, while simultaneously buying time to implement political and electoral reforms.

Hasina’s trial has the realistic possibility of driving further waves of violence targeting AL members or perceived supporters in the country, which may extend to religious minorities.

Mongolian Prime Minister resigns

On 3 May, Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene resigned after losing a vote of confidence. 44 lawmakers voted in favour of Oyun-Erdene and 38 voted against, meaning that he failed to reach the majority of 64 votes required to pass the vote. The vote came following peaceful anti-government protests that have been ongoing in Ulaanbataar since 14 May, after a video was shared on social media of Oyun-Erdene’s son’s lavish gifts to his girlfriend.

While the protests have demanded the resignation of Oyun-Erdene, they have also denounced corruption in the country amid rising living costs. The country ranked at 114 on the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2024. Oyun-Erdene will likely remain prime minister in a caretaker capacity, but a successor must be named within 30 days. Protests will highly likely now subside since Oyun-Erdene has agreed to step down.

South Korea elects Lee Jae-myung as president

On 3 June, South Korean voters elected Democratic Party candidate Lee with 49.42 per cent of the vote. His conservative rival Kim Moon-soo came second, with 41.15 per cent of the vote. Voter turnout was the highest since the 1997 presidential election, with approximately 35 million people going to the polls.

In his address, Lee announced that he would ‘never again’ let democratic institutions be threatened and would ‘become a president who ends the politics of division.’ Lee has experienced several political scandals linked to corruption and family feuds. Lee will enter the presidency as the country is grappling with a slowing economy triggered by the post-martial law instability and exacerbated by US tariffs.

Kim, a former ally of former president Yoon Suk Yeol, has warned that Lee would abuse his powers and retaliate against opponents, declaring that he ‘is now trying to seize all power in South Korea and establish a Hitler-like dictatorship’. Although protests related to developments in Yoon’s case have occurred sporadically, they will likely diminish following the election. However, deep political divisions are highly likely to persist, creating a risk of renewed demonstrations, almost certainly incited by Yoon’s opponents, particularly Kim.

Over 200 inmates escape from prison in Pakistani city of Karachi

On 3 June, more than 200 inmates escaped from Karachi’s District Malir prison after a series of earthquakes prompted guards to move prisoners into the courtyard, where some overpowered staff and seized firearms. Officials have confirmed that approximately 80 escapees have been recaptured, but the rest remain at large, with several likely armed and dangerous.

The Pakistani police and rangers have increased patrols and established roadblocks in and around Karachi in a bid to capture the escapees and have stressed that none of the inmates are violent criminals to alleviate concerns over public safety.

Myanmar junta extends ceasefire to 30 June

On 31 May, the Myanmar junta declared that it had extended the temporary ceasefire to 30 June to support reconstruction and relief efforts following the March earthquake that is estimated to have killed almost 4,000 people. Opposition groups in the country have also agreed to the ceasefire extension.

However, government forces have continued to launch airstrikes and conduct artillery strikes on rebel positions throughout the country. Reports also indicate that the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has seized a junta base in Thabawtboe on the Thai border in what will likely be perceived as a major strategic and symbolic blow to the junta. Further ceasefire violations from both sides are highly likely.

The government has stated that rebel attacks on transportation routes, civilians, security forces, and military posts, or attempts to expand territory, will be met with retaliation, likely in a move to justify sustained strikes in response to widespread international criticism.

Thailand prepared for ‘high-level’ military operation following border skirmish with Cambodia

The Thai military, which is heavily involved in the country’s politics, has stated that it has increased its operational readiness and is fully prepared to conduct a ‘high-level’ military operation to defend its sovereignty. The announcement is reportedly in response to intelligence that indicates Cambodia has increased its force posture on the border, following a skirmish which started on 28 May in an undemarcated border area between Cambodia’s Preah Vihear province and Thailand’s Ubon Ratchathani province.

However, given Thailand’s significant military and the prioritising of diplomatic resolutions, a major confrontation remains unlikely.

Pakistan records first polio case in northern enclave

On 2 June, the first polio case in seven years was recorded in the northern Diamer district of the Gilgit-Baltistan region, marking the 11^th nationwide case in 2025. The identification of the virus in a new region will almost certainly be viewed as a major failure of Pakistan’s third nationwide vaccination drive in 2025.

Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan remain the only two countries in the world where the spread of the wild polio virus has not been contained, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). However, efforts to eradicate the virus have faced major setbacks after a wave of militant attacks on healthcare workers, with militants claiming that the vaccination drives are a Western conspiracy to sterilise Pakistani children. A vaccination drive in the Diamer district came under fire from militants in late May, and multiple recent attacks have been observed in areas like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

Stampede in Bengaluru, India kills 11 and injures 56

On 4 June, a stampede occurred during a cricket victory parade outside the M. Chinnaswamy Stadium in Bengaluru. The latest reports confirm that at least 11 people have died, and 56 others are injured, with several in serious condition. The incident took place during celebrations for the Royal Challengers Bengaluru cricket team, with some people without passes attempting to push through the event barriers.

One witness stated that they saw police officers caning crowds at one gate. Karnataka state chief minister Siddaramaiah stated that ‘The fans that showed up were beyond our expectations.’ Prime Minister Narendra Modi has referred to the event as a ‘mishap’. Protests are likely to occur across Bengaluru in the coming days and weeks targeting the authorities’ handling of the event.

Heavy rains trigger flooding in Southwestern China

Flooding has been ongoing in Yunnan Province in Southwestern China. In Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture, at least 27 houses were damaged, and 16 bridges were damaged or destroyed. Landslides and floods caused roads to close in the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. Flooding triggered the evacuation of approximately 300 tourists from the Meri Snow Mountain scenic zone. Further rainfall and flooding are highly likely, with a strong chance of increased damage and disruption across the region.

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