Global Intelligence Summary

An executive order issued by US President Donald Trump on 29 January declared a national emergency with respect to the threat of Cuba. The order cited the Cuban regime’s alleged ties to Russia, China, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, and stated that “Cuba constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat”. The order sets up the potential for non-specified tariff rates to be imposed on countries that directly or indirectly sell or provide oil to Cuba.

In response, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, stated on 30 January that the US government likewise “constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat” and, due to the survival of “Humanity” being threatened by nuclear threat and climate change, Cuba declares “an international emergency”.

As a result of the increased tensions and the ongoing energy crisis in Cuba, multiple embassies and international companies have reportedly been reviewing contingency and evacuation plans. Nearly 12 European and Latin American countries have anonymously confirmed that they have updated their evacuation plans and lists of nationals in-country. Moreover, several subsidiaries of international companies anonymously confirmed reconsidering activity in Cuba, notably including the British multinational Unilever, which has already evacuated the families of its foreign workers in Cuba.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Cuba has suffered from a series of both nationwide and localised power blackouts since 2022, leading to instances of civil unrest, which are typically rare in the communist one-party country. The previously ongoing power crisis, caused by ageing infrastructure, increased demand, and fuel shortages, is almost certain to be worsened first by the fall of President Maduro in Venezuela following US military intervention. Venezuela provided 70,000 barrels of oil a day to Cuba, although Cuba resold a significant proportion of this to Asian markets to acquire hard currency, and this supply has now been cut off.

The Mexican state oil company Pemex provided an additional 20,000 barrels of oil a day to Cuba, but Washington has exerted great pressure against Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum to cease deliveries. Despite Sheinbaum’s insistence that “humanitarian aid will continue”, she has acknowledged that Mexican oil shipments remain suspended.

Global trade consultancy estimates indicate that Cuba has received only 84,900 barrels this year from one Mexican shipment in January. Because of this, estimates suggest that Cuba now only has enough oil reserves to last 15 to 20 days. Shipments from other oil suppliers such as Russia and Algeria have been sporadic, and President Trump’s executive order and the threat of tariffs apply even further pressure against oil exporters to Cuba. It is likely that Cuba is on the precipice of a major fuel crisis.

Figures within the Trump administration, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a son of Cuban emigres who is staunchly anti-Cuban regime, are almost certainly pushing for regime change in Cuba. President Trump has already asserted that Cuba is “about to fall”, although he did state on 31 January that he believes that Cuba will “probably… come to us and want to make a deal”, a hypothetical deal which would highly likely entail major concessions to Washington.

While Cuba did previously resell a sizable proportion of its oil shipments for foreign currency, hard currency is crucial for the Cuban economy, given the profound weakness of the Cuban Peso. Cuba, as an island nation, is heavily import-dependent, and imports typically need to be bought with hard currency. The developing crisis is therefore highly likely to also impact the provision of basic goods, with the most significant protests in Cuba in recent years occurring in 2021 due to food and medicine shortages. Moreover, the tourism industry (also crucial for foreign currency inflows) is declining due to the persistent issues and is almost certain to further decline amid a developing diplomatic and domestic crisis.

Having already been experiencing what some academics have termed a ‘polycrisis’ due to record emigration, inflation and currency depreciation, severe goods shortages, and significantly increasing inequality, the likely imminent fuel crisis presents an existential threat to the regime. Cuba requires the oil shipments for energy production and hard currency, and tourism will almost certainly further decline. With all three of these components highly likely to worsen, and each compounding the other, the Cuban regime will likely face the biggest challenge to its power in 2026 since the fall of the Soviet Union.