Global Intelligence Summary

On 30 March and 1 April, Haitian gangs carried out a wave of mass killings in the Petite-Rivière area, located in the northwestern department of Artibonite, killing dozens of people (some NGOs have provisionally indicated a death toll of 70) and displacing around 6,000. According to local media, the attacks, which occurred during a local festival, were carried out by the Gran Grif gang and by a local gang leader known as “Ti Kenken”. The same gang had already attacked the area in April 2024, reportedly killing at least 50 people.

On 1 April, Haitian police carried out operations in several parts of Artibonite, with the aim of preventing further gang attacks. Officials stated that, although gang members had withdrawn from Petite-Rivière ahead of the police’s arrival, they were regrouping to attack the town of Marchand Dessalines, 20 kilometres north of the location previously attacked.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Artibonite Department, located on Haiti’s northwestern coast, is a key agricultural centre in the country for cereal production. Since 2023, the intensification of gang violence has severely disrupted local production and exacerbated food insecurity, likely increasing the strategic importance of the area. Petite-Rivière is located approximately 12 kilometres east of Route Nationale 1 (RN1), a critical north–south transport corridor connecting Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haïtien, which serves as a primary route for humanitarian aid and food distribution from Cap-Haïtien, which is the primary port of entry for humanitarian aid. Petite-Rivière is also just north of Rte. Départmentale 11, a key roadway that connects the RN1, a key roadway connecting RN1 to inland agricultural areas and to major population centres like Mirebalais, which is located on Route Nationale 3 (RN3), a separate major transport corridor from the capital to Cap-Haïtien.

Securing control over these routes would likely enable the gangs to disrupt humanitarian aid convoys and restrict the movement of aid, likely exacerbating local shortages and increasing the population’s dependence on illicit networks operated by the gangs. The control of key corridors such as RN1 and RD11 also undermines the central government’s ability to project authority and maintain freedom of movement, likely eroding state legitimacy.

Large-scale killings by gangs have become common in Haiti, particularly following the escalation of the Haitian gang war in 2023-2024. In October 2024, the Gran Grif gang carried out a massacre in Pont-Sondé, also in Artibonite, killing at least 115 people and injuring dozens. The attack was reportedly an act of “retaliation” for the community supporting another gang. In December 2024, the Wharf Jeremie gang killed more than 200 people in Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince, reportedly because gang leader “Mikanor” blamed elderly residents for practising witchcraft to harm his son.

Haitian security forces remain almost certainly unable to deter the gangs or significantly threaten their hold on large parts of the country. International support initiatives have, so far, likely proved equally ineffective. The UN-backed, Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission failed, by the time of its end in October 2025, to free the capital from gang control, with the UN assessing that the gangs still control up to 90 per cent of the capital as of March 2026. The Haitian government-backed plan to deploy private security contractors to carry out operations against gang strongholds has also almost certainly proved counterproductive, with several cases of drone attacks killing civilians resulting in significant international backlash.

In April, the MSS will be replaced by another UN-backed effort, known as the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). The GSF is expected to comprise approximately 5,500 personnel and, according to US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz, will operate under a “strengthened mandate” to counter gang activity. However, this is likely to small a force to dislodge the entrenched gangs, which have consolidated control over much of the country and retain the ability to sustain coordinated attacks, control key routes, and blend into the local civilian population to evade detection and security operations.