Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and the current lack of US-Iran talks to formally extend the ceasefire have almost certainly increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict, with the US and Iran essentially in a stalemate. Washington almost certainly intends to pressure Iran to make concessions on the nuclear file via its blockade, due to an assessment that Iran only has a limited time remaining to store oil before it is forced to ramp down its oil production. Tehran highly likely calculates that the US will not be able to tolerate a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The current status quo in the Strait of Hormuz is almost certainly untenable for both the US and Iran in the long term, and it is unlikely that either party will be willing to prolong the situation indefinitely. Some research estimates asses that Iran may only have enough storage capacity to last another 12 to 22 days for its domestic oil production, due to the US blockade limiting Iranian exports, but that the impact on Iranian revenues will not be felt for another three to four months.

Other analysts have noted that due to Iran’s experience in stockpiling oil during the COVID pandemic, the remaining space at its storage facilities, and efforts in the past ten years to expand alternative storage export facilities, Iran is unlikely to be in imminent danger of a “major crude oil shut-in”. Furthermore, some Iranian tankers have managed to continue navigating through the US blockade, Iran continues to export oil overland (in relatively small quantities), and Iran could use its crude carrier vessels as floating storage, which is estimated to provide an additional two months of production capacity. Overall, it is unlikely that the US blockade will be capable of compelling Iran to make immediate concessions.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that Tehran can be compelled to make significant concessions that could be perceived as conceding to the US due to the widely reported consolidation of power by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hardliners, with multiple sources indicating that IRGC commander Major General Ahmed Vahidi is now effectively in control of regime decision-making.

Outside of the current stalemate, Washington may calculate that a return to conflict is the only means to force compliance from Tehran if the blockade fails to exert the necessary pressure. The reported withdrawal of the USS Ford CSG, which will reduce the number of deployed CSGs in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) from three to two, may be in anticipation of a relief in place with an additional carrier such as the USS Dwight D Eisenhower, which recently completed its pre-deployment sea trials at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard on 24 April.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran in an effort to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Such attacks would likely involve Iran broadening its targeting to include assets and infrastructure that enable the Gulf States to export oil and gas by circumventing the Strait of Hormuz, such as oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Emirati port of Fujairah.

Iran has repeatedly threatened that its forces are ready and prepared to resume attacks, with the military highly likely to have exploited the ceasefire to improve its offensive and defensive positions. Furthermore, Iranian forces have reportedly moved transporter erector launchers (TELs) out of range of some US long-range fires. The movement of TELs deeper into Iran may reduce the proportion of Iran’s ballistic missile force able to range Israeli territory, potentially increasing the likelihood that these systems are instead used against Gulf states if full-scale conflict resumes.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: