Gulf Security Under Pressure From Iranian Attacks

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Iran’s shift to the targeting of critical infrastructure and other civilian profile targets is likely reflective of an attempt to increase economic disruption across the Gulf, pressure regional governments that host US military bases and support operations, and demonstrate Iran’s capacity to impose widespread costs across the region despite being under sustained pressure from US and Israeli joint strikes. Iran may have also calculated that attacks of this magnitude may undermine the long-term presence of the US military in the Middle East by increasing the political and security costs for host nations and raising domestic pressure within Gulf states to distance themselves from US military operations.

Iran is also likely attempting to pressure Washington and Tel Aviv by provoking international condemnation and economic pressures on a global scale. Attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, followed by the suspension of operations at these sites, combined with a de facto Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, will almost certainly trigger economic shocks and volatility in global energy markets, as well as disruptions to maritime trade and energy supply chains. This strategy is likely to increase international pressure and could help to isolate Washington.

Before the US and Israeli offensive operations in Iran, the US conducted hundreds of cargo flights to the region to enhance its force posture and defensive capabilities. This involved the rapid deployment and reallocation of air defence systems and munitions to the Gulf. Large-scale and layered Iranian ballistic missile and UAV attacks have largely been contained by regional air defence systems, although casualties and damage have resulted from interceptions. Moreover, joint strikes and high rates of expenditure have rapidly degraded Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, resulting in marked decreases in the volume of missiles it is firing in just a matter of days.

However, Iran was assessed to have 2000-2500 ballistic missiles before the start of the war, and as many as 100,000 long-range attack UAVs. Iran will likely be able to sustain long-range attacks across the Gulf for weeks, even if its ballistic missile capabilities are completely destroyed or exhausted. Previous Iranian attacks have likely probed for weaknesses and vulnerabilities in regional air defence systems, which could be exploited in future attacks. Moreover, the expenditure rates of regional air defence munitions have been extremely high and in many cases, very cost-ineffective, with expensive interceptor missiles used to counter low-cost UAVs and relatively-low cost missile systems.

Iran’s initial tactics may have been to force the Gulf States into rapidly expending large volumes of air defence interceptors to degrade regional air defence capacity. If the Gulf States run critically low on interceptors, Iran will likely exploit this by targeting the affected countries with increased attacks, especially with low-cost UAVs, as its ballistic missile capabilities are either spent or held in reserve. This would likely place Iran in a position to maintain small-scale attacks against the Gulf, with increased penetration rates and sustained economic disruption.

Kuwait, which lies just dozens of kilometres from mainland Iran and borders southern Iraq, is likely the most vulnerable to Iranian attacks, and hosts several US bases. Projectiles can be launched from Iran within close range of Kuwait, providing limited reaction and interception time. Furthermore, Iranian-backed Shia militia groups are highly active in southern Iraq and maintain a large arsenal of rocket, drone, and missile capabilities. However, other Gulf States, especially the UAE, are likely to present more strategically attractive targets for Iran due to their concentration of high-value economic infrastructure and scale of US investment. This has likely been reflected by the number of missiles and UAVs that have been launched against the UAE, which remains the most targeted country in the Gulf. Dubai is located approximately 150 kilometres from Iran, where UAVs can be launched and approach targets, using slow and low-altitude flight profiles, which will likely complicate detection, positive identification and interception and provide air defences with limited time to react.