Global Intelligence Summary

Crisis conditions in Cuba have further worsened amid a widespread fuel shortage. On 5 February, a major power outage occurred in eastern Cuba after a fault at a Holguín substation triggered a disconnect affecting Holguín, Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantánamo. The outage impacted over two million people. On 7 February, authorities imposed strict fuel restrictions, with diesel sales in Cuban Pesos or US Dollars suspended, and a limit of 20 litres of petrol per registration on an online ticketing platform.

On 9 February, Havana issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) warning that jet fuel would not be available for aircraft refuelling at nine airports (including Havana José Martí, Cuba’s main international airport) from 10 February until at least 11 March. In response, the Canadian carriers Air Canada and Air Transat suspended all flights to Cuba, with WestJet beginning an “orderly wind down”. Air Canada also stated that efforts had begun to repatriate 3,000 customers. Furthermore, on 11 February, the Russian carrier Rossiya announced that it would now only be operating flights to get tourists back from Cuba. Other carriers have announced delays and layovers in countries such as the Dominican Republic.  Tourists in Cuba have reported being transferred to different hotels, reportedly to maximise the efficiency of fuel consumption from generators. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

The fuel crisis has been almost certainly inevitable since the US intervention in Venezuela, which ousted Nicolás Maduro and resulted in a stop to the approximately 70,000 barrels of Venezuelan oil a day which were shipped to Cuba. Furthermore, US President Donald Trump’s administration has applied pressure against Mexico to cease oil shipments to Cuba, which, despite pushback from Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum, remains halted as of 12 February.  For the first time in a decade, Cuba has had a month without oil imports. US pressure has also targeted potential suppliers, following a 29 January executive order signed by President Trump, which threatened tariffs on any countries that provide oil to Cuba.

The peak tourism season in Cuba runs from mid-December to mid-March, and tourism is an economically vital industry for the Cuban economy. Tourism is estimated to account for approximately ten per cent of Cuba’s GDP, although this statistic likely underplays the tourism sector’s importance. Almost 75 per cent of Cuba’s GDP is in the services sector, a sector heavily reliant on tourism, and tourism is a key source of hard currency. Due to the Cuban Pesos’ depreciation, hard foreign currency (particularly US dollars) is vital to the economy and also the island nation’s primary means of purchasing imports of basic goods, such as food and medicine.

A substantial shortage in hard currency is likely to follow the ongoing fuel shortage, due to the significant decrease in tourism and Cuba’s inability to export a considerable proportion of its oil imports to Asian markets in exchange for hard currency. This shortage is likely to exacerbate shortages of essential goods, increase inflationary pressures, and compound Cuba’s existing problems.

The current peak Cuban tourism season has already been the worst since the Covid-19 pandemic, and tourism was already declining with an 18 per cent drop in 2025 compared to 2024. Multiple hotels have closed in the years since the pandemic, and the almost certain further drop in tourism due to the current fuel crisis likely represents an existential threat to Cuba’s tourism industry.

Tourism demand will likely continue to decrease, and further airlines will likely consider suspending flights to Cuba, with the crisis likely to only worsen unless an agreement is reached between Havana and Washington. Any deal would highly likely require major concessions favourable to Washington. Cuban leadership have increasingly indicated a willingness to engage in talks with Washington, while maintaining that a dialogue must be conducted “without pressure or preconditions”. Failure to reach a deal in the near term is likely to result in a deteriorating security environment in Cuba, characterised by an increased risk of civil unrest, opportunistic crime, power outages, travel disruptions and critical shortages of essential goods.