On 30 November, Honduras held a general election to determine the new president, all 128 members of Congress, and representatives to the Central American Parliament. Pre-election polls indicated that the presidential contest was a close three-way contest between Rixi Moncada of the ruling left-wing Liberty and Refoundation (LIBRE) party, Salvador Nasralla of the centrist Liberal Party, and Nasry Asfura of the right-leaning National Party.

As of 4 December, the official results have not been declared; however, with almost 80 per cent of votes counted, centrist Nasralla maintains a narrow lead with 40.23 per cent.  National Party’s Asfura is in second with approximately 39.5 of the vote share, a difference of less than 20,000 votes. The left-wing candidate, Moncada, is effectively out of the race with only 19 per cent of the vote. The elections are decided in a single round, with the candidate winning the most votes being elected president, even without an absolute majority.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Before the election, the three main parties had already warned of fraud. The Attorney General’s Office alleged the opposition was planning to manipulate the results, and an audio tape was leaked suggesting that the military, which is typically aligned with the National Party, was going to attempt to influence the vote. During the vote, the official vote-counting system malfunctioned, and the public tally-report portal crashed almost immediately after the polls closed, forcing a shift to manual vote counting, a development that has almost certainly increased suspicion of electoral interference and undermined the credibility of the process.

The credibility of the electoral process was also likely further undermined by perceptions of foreign political interference. US President Donald Trump publicly backed Asfura of the National Party, describing the candidate as the only one who will defend democracy and fight the “narcoterrorists”, threatening to pull US aid to Honduras if he didn’t win. Trump accused election officials of attempting to manipulate the election after the vote-counting system malfunctioned, and also granted a full pardon to former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández.  Hernández had been sentenced in the US to 45 years for drug trafficking, with the pardon likely being assessed as contradictory to Washington’s current aggressive posture toward those suspected of smuggling narcotics to the US.

The combination of a tightly contested presidential race, mutual accusations of manipulation, technical failures and perceptions of foreign interference has almost certainly increased the risk of widespread civil unrest in Honduras. Protests and looting have already been observed in San Pedro Sula, Honduras’s second-largest city, and protestors have established roadblocks on the C7 Highway. Further unrest is highly likely after the official vote is released and will likely be most intense if the National Party wins due to perceived foreign interference and accusations of the military’s involvement.

Previous contested elections, such as in 2017, resulted in almost a month of violent street clashes, curfews, mass arrests and almost 40 deaths after the opposition claimed there was widespread election fraud. If the 2025 elections are widely contested, large-scale protests, roadblocks, and clashes with security forces are likely, with authorities expected to respond with tear gas, rubber bullets, mass arrests and potentially live ammunition, as well as curfews in major urban centres. Due to perceptions of US interference, there is a realistic possibility of protestors deliberately vandalising, looting or targeting US businesses.

The US has continued to apply significant pressure on the Maduro regime to transfer power. On 1 December, President Trump reportedly delivered an ultimatum to President Maduro, stating, “You can save yourself and those closest to you, but you must leave the country now,” and threatened to conduct land strikes on Venezuela “very soon”, on 2 December.

The ultimatum follows the recent disclosure of a 21 November phone call between the two leaders, in which proposals for Maduro’s surrender were allegedly discussed. Washington was reportedly willing to consider Maduro peacefully stepping down in exchange for personal safety guarantees, limited amnesty for his immediate family, and the option of exile.

However, the negotiations collapsed after Maduro asked for a blanket amnesty for around 100 of his top officials, conditions that would allow Maduro loyalists to form any transitional government and a refuge for Maduro closer to Venezuela, such as in Cuba. These demands were reportedly unacceptable to the Trump administration, which is insisting on conditions that preclude regime loyalists from retaining influence and ensuring accountability for senior figures linked to the trafficking of narcotics into the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the Trump administration has rejected Maduro’s initial proposals, the opening of diplomatic channels has likely afforded Maduro with more time, and further dialogue will likely occur before the US commits to strikes. Washington has sent signals that it is willing to accept certain conditions, such as limited personal security guarantees for Maduro and his immediate family, the possibility of exile in a neutral third country, and a managed transition to democratic rule, provided Maduro resigns immediately, and that any transitional government is not controlled by loyalists. Trump has reiterated that the Cartel de los Soles, recently designated by Washington as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO), must ultimately be dismantled. However, US policymakers likely assess that this objective could be at least partially achieved through a credible democratic transition and the removal of regime loyalists from state institutions.

Reporting from within Venezuela indicates that US threats, military deployments and aggressive posturing are affecting Maduro. The Venezuelan president is reportedly increasingly concerned for his personal safety, consistently changing his bed down location, switching mobile phones and has expanded the role of his Cuban bodyguards. Internal crackdowns have also increased, and counterintelligence officers have infiltrated the Venezuelan military to help uncover any internal threats.

These indicators may suggest that mounting pressure and paranoia will likely force Maduro to re-evaluate his previous position and resume dialogue with Washington under terms more favourable to the US. However, failure to concede to Washington’s demands will likely increase the risk of strikes, with the Trump administration under growing pressure to act, as prolonged inaction likely risks diminishing the credibility of its threats.

Peru declares state of emergency on Chilean border due to migrant crossings.       

The government of Peru has declared a 60-day state of emergency along its southern border with Chile, which became effective on November 28. The decision was announced by the new Peruvian President, José Jerí, who cited concerns over a potential surge of unauthorised migrants. In response to the emergency, military reinforcements have been deployed to the border area. Despite these measures, about 30 migrants reportedly entered Peru from Chile, bypassing border controls at the Santa Rosa Complex in Tacna.

The situation has prompted Peru and Chile to agree on conducting joint patrols along their borders to manage the movement of migrants. Many of the migrants are reportedly Venezuelan nationals who moved to Chile and other South American nations. However, worsening economic conditions and rising anti-Venezuelan sentiment are likely influencing many to make the reverse journey back to Venezuela.

US suspends asylum and visa processing for 19 “high-risk” countries.

Following the shooting of two National Guard soldiers on 26 November by a suspected Afghan national, the Trump administration has implemented an extensive security and immigration crackdown, with the government launching a full re-examination of green-card holders from 19 “countries of concern.” Asylum and visa processing will be suspended for all nations on the travel-ban list, comprising 12 countries under full bans: Afghanistan, Myanmar (Burma), Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen; and seven countries under partial restrictions: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.

The crackdown has been justified as a measure to prevent extremist infiltration and migration-linked security risks. In 2017, when Executive Order 13769 blocked entry to the US from seven predominantly Muslim-majority countries, large-scale protests were observed across the country, and there is a realistic possibility that the suspensions will increase the risk of civil unrest.

El Chapo’s son guilty plea likely to impact cartel violence in Mexico.               

Joaquín Guzmán López has been in US custody since July 2024, when he handed himself over to US authorities in Texas alongside Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, one of the founders of the Sinaloa Cartel. Guzmán reportedly admitted to “kidnapping” Zambada, a betrayal that provoked a split in the cartel and subsequent war between the “Los Mayitos” faction – loyal to the Guzmán family – and “Los Mayitos”, who support Zambada. The guilty plea, which almost certainly confirms Guzmán’s intention to cooperate with US authorities and will constitute further proof of his “betrayal” of the cartel, has the potential to drive a short-term spike in cartel violence in the states where competition between the two Sinaloa Cartel factions is fiercest, such as Sinaloa, Sonora, and Durango.

Airline suspends flights from Port-au-Prince, Haiti, after aircraft is hit by gunfire.

On 30 November, Haitian regional airline Sunrise Airways announced it would suspend all flights from Port-au-Prince after one of its aircraft was hit by bullets moments before take-off. The gunfire likely came from gang members near the airport. Haitian gangs have repeatedly fired indiscriminately at aircraft in the capital, likely as part of their campaign to disrupt all governance structures and discredit civilian authorities. Sunrise Airways’ decision de facto means that the airport has ceased passenger operations, with only occasional cargo flights still scheduled according to Flightradar24. Critical humanitarian aid arriving in Haiti is primarily entering via Cap-Haïtien International Airport (CAP) in the north of the country. Gangs have increasingly encroached into the surrounding area, raising concerns that they may target airframes at CAP to further disrupt or deny aid delivery to Haiti.

New clashes in Norte de Santander, Colombia, between ELN and local militias.       

On 28 November, at least seven people were killed and an unspecified number injured during clashes between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and local Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissident groups, which occurred in the El Tarra area of the Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander department. According to local media, the local ELN commander was killed in the clashes. The clashes are part of an ongoing spike in violence, which started in January 2025, when ELN militants launched an offensive against FARC dissident groups in the area, provoking the displacement of more than 80,000 people. Catatumbo, at the Colombia-Venezuela border, is a key area for transnational drug trafficking routes to Venezuela and also has vast coca fields, making it strategically important for local armed groups. Further clashes remain highly likely in the short-to-medium term. Clashes in Catatumbo have a realistic possibility of being impacted by developments affecting Venezuela, which is currently facing severe pressure from the US to quash transboundary drug trafficking.

US Midwest and Northeast suffer disruption from first seasonal winter storm.         

The first winter storm of the 2025-2026 season impacted the US Midwest and Northeast starting on 26 November. The storm first developed over the Great Lakes, subsequently moving towards the Northeastern coast. The storm, which brought sub-zero temperatures and heavy snowfall to the affected states, caused localised traffic and service disruptions, including dozens of road traffic accidents. In Missouri, at least one person died in a road traffic accident. In Pennsylvania, authorities reported more than 600 road accidents on 2 December alone. Authorities have halted airport operations at several key regional hubs, including Chicago and Boston. The storm is expected to decrease in intensity during the 4-6 December period, but further localised disruptions remain likely in the immediate term.

Cuban power grid suffers partial collapse.     

On 3 December,  Cuba’s energy ministry confirmed a disconnection to the national grid in the western area of the country, affecting, stating that several provinces from Cienfuegos to Pinar del Río were affected, including the capital, Havana. Cuban authorities stated that they had begun reconnecting the electrical grid by 4 December. Cuba has experienced several major power cuts over the past two years, with some outages lasting more than 20 hours. There are several factors that likely contribute to this trend. Cuba has an obsolete and poorly maintained electrical grid, its fuel imports from Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela have dwindled, and the damage from Hurricane Melissa has yet to be fully repaired. In March and October 2024, power cuts resulted in rare anti-government protests, which prompted the authorities to cut access to the internet and arrest several participants. More frequent and prolonged blackouts are likely to increase the risk of further protests, which could affect the stability of the Cuban regime, depending on the scale of the blackouts.

On 1 December, large-scale protests occurred in the capital Sofia and across Bulgaria. The protests were the largest since the 2020-21 “Revolution of Dignity”, with up to 50,000 people gathering in the centre of the capital. The unrest was in opposition to the 2026 budget plan, which was the first to be drafted using the Euro, with Bulgaria preparing to officially adopt the Eurozone’s common currency on 1 January 2026. The budget also included notable tax increases on the private sector and raised social-security contributions.

The protests followed a first wave of anti-budget gatherings on 26-27 November. Following these, the government of Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov stated they would resubmit the budget for parliamentary approval, only to then renege on this, sparking the call for further protests. The protests on 1 December, which turned violent, resulted in at least 71 arrests and several injuries. On 2 December, the government stated that it would withdraw the budget.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recent unrest is likely driven by several factors. First, Bulgaria’s entry into the Eurozone remains extremely contentious, with around half of the public opposing it. Anti-Euro protests have been held throughout 2025, with hundreds of gatherings occurring during the Summer. Second, widespread perceptions of endemic corruption in the public sector make proposed tax-funded increases to the public sector budget politically charged.

Finally, the protests likely embody an overall dissatisfaction with the political class. Bulgaria has been in an almost constant period of political crisis since 2021, which has resulted in seven parliamentary elections in four years. The current government relies on a fragile coalition of parties, and on the controversial external support of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) of Delyan Peevski, an oligarch who has been sanctioned for corruption by both the US and UK.

Zhelyazkov has rejected calls to resign (including from President Rumen Radev) and call early elections, stating that it would be irresponsible and worsen the political crisis in the absence of a budget. However, the government almost certainly faces extreme instability and could easily collapse, forcing an early vote. New elections, while having a realistic possibility of producing a more stable coalition, would almost certainly deepen Bulgaria’s political instability, possibly worsening economic shocks following the adoption of the Euro in January. Overall, both a snap election scenario and one in which the coalition attempts to pass another budget are likely to result in further unrest in the short term.

On 1 December, the Kremlin published a video of Russian President Vladimir Putin thanking military commanders for the full capture of Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast. The Russian Defence Ministry additionally released footage of troops holding up a Russian flag in central Pokrovsk. However, Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Response Corps stated that Russia “is trying to sell its desires for reality” in reaction to the claims, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Moscow had launched “new disinformation campaigns” just prior to the 2 December US-Russia talks in Moscow.

During the Moscow talks, US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and special envoy Steve Witkoff met with Putin, as well as senior Kremlin officials Yuriy Ushakov and Kirill Dmitriev. Trump described the meeting with Putin as “reasonably good” and the following meetings as “very good”. Substantive details regarding the negotiations have been kept confidential, although Ushakov stated that the US delegation presented proposals on issues such as territorial control, but no compromise was reached. Moreover, Ushakov said that Putin “made no secret” of the Kremlin’s criticism of multiple potential peace terms presented.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The open-source intelligence interactive map DeepState tracking the war in Ukraine has stated that Russian forces captured 90 per cent more Ukrainian territory in November than in October. Between 500-700 square kilometres was seized in November, depending on the source, the largest monthly gain for Russia since late 2024. The heaviest fighting has occurred in and around Pokrovsk, a strategically highly significant battle as Pokrovsk’s seizure would, in the longer term, likely set the conditions for Russian forces to advance west to isolate or encircle the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration.

Russian claims of full capture of Pokrovsk are likely false, although its full capture is likely imminent. With full annexation of the Donbas being one of Moscow’s key demands, it was almost certainly desirable for Kremlin channels to claim victory in Pokrovsk prior to the US delegation’s visit to Moscow. This is likely to bolster the negotiating position that the Kremlin’s maximalist objectives can be ultimately fulfilled with military force, so Ukraine should be compelled to concede to such demands.

While Pokrovsk has seen the heaviest fighting, 40 per cent of Russian advances in November actually occurred around Huliaipole, in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. In Ukrainian, these areas are called dyke pole (“Wild Fields”), due to their sparsely populated nature. On the frontlines of Donetsk, which was heavily populated before the war, Ukrainian defenders have leveraged highly fortified urban areas to make what has been termed “the fortress belt”, imposing a very high cost for only small Russian advances.

The fighting in the Wild Fields, at the intersection of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, has received far less attention. However, the recent Russian advances on the Huliaipole axis have been so significant that Ukrainian forces will likely need to be redeployed to this section of the front to mitigate against the longer-term threat of Russian advances towards besieging Zaporizhzhia. Currently, Ukrainian forces have reported stabilising the front on this axis after the Russian breakthrough in mid-late November, with the Haichur River, which runs past Huliaipole, likely providing defensive advantages.

In September 2022, Russia unilaterally declared the annexation of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Moscow is highly likely to continue pursuing its maximalist objectives with military force, with recent battlefield successes (although very costly) likely to increase Putin’s confidence in his hardline negotiating position. Even the initially leaked 28-point peace plan, claimed to have been negotiated between Dmitriev and Witkoff, which included numerous maximalist concessions that Kyiv almost certainly could not accept without risking its sovereignty in future, has not been accepted by the Kremlin. It is unlikely that the current US-Russia talks will reach an imminent breakthrough, although Moscow is almost certainly incentivised to ward off increased US pressure and attempt to reduce support for Ukraine by presenting itself as willing to meaningfully engage in negotiations.

On 2 and 3 December, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and Rwanda-backed AFC/M23 rebels accused each other of ceasefire violations. The FARDC has claimed that AFC/M23 attacked its troops in South Kivu. The alleged attacks took place in Kamanyola, and Katogota, two towns held by AFC/M23; Luvungi, a strategic town along the N5 road held by the FARDC and Wazalendo, preventing AFC/M23 from advancing towards Uvira; and Kaziba chiefdom in Walungu territory, which is contested. AFC leader Corneille Nangaa contradicted this, declaring that the FARDC, alongside Burundian troops, launched attacks against AFC/M23 positions.

The fighting has displaced many civilians, with Kamanyola residents fleeing over the border towards Bugarama in Rwanda. In Luvvungi, residents have been reported as fleeing to neighbouring villages.

The accusations come shortly before DRC President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame are set to sign a US-brokered peace agreement on 4 December, following on from the preliminary peace agreement signed on 27 June between the two sides, and a nonbinding peace framework roadmap agreement between the DRC government and AFC/M23 on 15 November.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is notable that fighting has resumed shortly before the signing of the DRC/Rwanda peace agreement. There is a realistic possibility that AFC/M23 are attempting to seize territory before the threat of Rwanda withdrawing or reducing its support comes into force. Uvira, a city close to the border with Burundi, almost certainly constitutes a long-term aim for AFC/M23. Uvira’s capture would almost certainly be unacceptable to Burundi, with its capital, Bujumbura, on the other side of the crossing. Uvira’s capture would highly likely result in Burundi placing significant diplomatic pressure on the DRC to refuse AFC/M23’s demands to keep its captured territory. Alternatively, the rebel group may be attempting to sabotage the peace agreement or use strategic messaging to demonstrate that it will not adhere to any agreement signed without its involvement.

The signing of the peace agreement is set to formalise previously agreed-upon terms, which include the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC and for the two countries to establish a regional economic integration framework, a joint security framework, and the “disengagement, disarmament, and conditional integration of non-state armed groups”. While this includes Rwanda’s support for AFC/M23, it also calls for the withdrawal of Congolese support of certain militias, including the Hutu group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which Rwanda perceives as a threat. Numerous issues, such as humanitarian access, the return of state authority, and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), are yet to be agreed upon. It is highly likely that negotiations over these issues will take months and will require the involvement of AFC/M23, who signed a framework agreement for a peace deal with the DRC on 15 November.

The ceasefire violations are unlikely to threaten the formal signing on 4 December. However, they reflect the difficulties in the potential implementation of the terms of the peace agreement, with speculation that the signing is merely to appease the US. Rwanda, which continues to deny its support for AFC/M23, has previously agreed to withdraw troops from the DRC as part of the revived Luanda Process, with both sides agreeing in October 2024 to the “Neutralization of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda”. If the DRC fails to eliminate the threat of the FDLR as part of the new peace agreement, Rwanda is unlikely to withdraw its troops or support for AFC/M23.

 The ongoing clashes almost certainly make the DRC’s negotiations with AFC/M23 harder due to the almost certain lack of trust between the two sides. Despite the likely signing of the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement, it will almost certainly be far more difficult to negotiate a binding agreement between the DRC and AFC/M23, with neither side withdrawing from their maximalist positions.

Opposition supporters have called for a “mega protest” to be held on 9 December, coinciding with Tanzania’s Independence Day, to demand the removal of President Samia Suluhu Hassan and to condemn the recent violence of security forces. The protests are also referred to as “D9”. On 24 November, Prime Minister Mwigulu Nchemba declared that Independence Day celebrations had been cancelled, with the funds instead being used to rebuild infrastructure damaged in the recent protests.

The Tanzanian Police Force has reportedly intensified a nationwide crackdown, arresting numerous individuals accused of planning and inciting unrest on Independence Day since mid-November. The individuals include members of CHADEMA, social media influencers, and WhatsApp group administrators. Some of the arrests have been reported by witnesses as potential abductions by armed, plainclothes individuals, claims that the police have rejected.

On 1 December, the US Embassy in Tanzania released a statement warning that there are “ongoing calls for nationwide anti-government demonstrations on December 9, but protest activity could begin as early as December 5.” It added that “Travelers to Tanzania over the next several weeks should be prepared for potential disruptions, including the possibility of unrest, nation-wide curfews, an internet blackout, cancellation of ferries to Zanzibar, cancellation of international flights, and roadblocks enacted to enforce strict movement controls.”

Solace Global Assessment: 

The previous wave of demonstrations between 29 and 31 October saw security forces respond with live ammunition, tear gas, and water cannon, and impose a curfew and internet shutdown. While total death figures are unclear, the opposition has alleged that at least 2,000 people were killed by security forces. While the numbers may be lower, footage of security forces’ harsh treatment of protesters was shared on social media, and there is almost certainly a widespread perception that protests were severely cracked down on with deadly force. This is likely to deter many from taking part in the protests out of fear of being killed or arrested. However, Independence Day celebrations often involve local parades and the closure of businesses, which could raise the likelihood of informal gatherings organically evolving into protests.

The real reason for the cancellation of celebrations is highly likely due to the planned “mega protest”, with large, informal celebratory gatherings significantly raising the likelihood of civil unrest organically breaking out. Any kind of large informal gathering on Independence Day may be treated as a demonstration and cracked down on.

Heightened levels of security are likely across Dar es Salaam and other major Tanzanian cities in the lead up to 9 December, and internet restrictions are likely to be imposed ahead of or in response to any protests. If the planned demonstrations go ahead with a high turnout, they would highly likely be met with a similar response to the 29 to 31 October wave, with security forces likely to deploy live ammunition, and highly likely to conduct mass arrests and use crowd dispersal measures such as tear gas and water cannon. Authorities would likely also impose a curfew if the demonstrations became widespread.

Anti-government protests in Madrid demand resignation of Spanish prime minister.

According to Spain’s largest opposition party, the Popular Party (PP), up to 80,000 protestors held a demonstration in the centre of Madrid on 30 November to demand the resignation of incumbent Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and for snap elections. The protest followed the arrest of former transport minister José Luis Ábalos and his former advisor over an alleged corrupt scheme involving pandemic-era medical-supply contracts. Protestors accused the government of institutional corruption, under the slogan “mafia or democracy?”.

The arrest of Ábalos marks the first time a sitting national-level MP has been remanded and has forced the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) to expel him, although he retains his seat as an independent. Investigations into corruption relating to pandemic-era procurement schemes are ongoing, which are likely to lead to further protests and calls for elections.

Protests in Germany during Alternative for Germany (AfD) youth wing launch.        

On 28 November, large-scale protests occurred in Giessen, Hesse, to coincide with the official launch of Generation Germany, the new youth wing of AfD. Generation Germany’s predecessor, the Young Alternative for Germany (JA), was dissolved in March 2025, after being classified by authorities as an “extremist” organisation. Protesters managed to briefly delay the conference, carrying out road blockades and clashing with police, as well as reportedly vandalising several private vehicles. AfD, which occupies the far-right of Germany’s political spectrum, came second in the February 2025 federal elections, and has topped the country’s polls since September. AfD’s growth in the polls is a key driver of political unrest, and further demonstrations remain likely in the short term, possibly following the launch of Generation Germany’s various regional chapters.

Pro-Palestine protesters raid newspaper office in Turin, Italy.            

On 28 November, during the nationwide strike to protest the Italian government’s 2026 budget law, a few dozen demonstrators broke into the offices of the newspaper La Stampa in Turin, vandalising them. Protesters tagged the building with slogans in favour of a local imam, who was placed under an expulsion decree due to alleged statements in support of Hamas. Local authorities claimed to have identified around 34 individuals who participated in the attack, who are reportedly linked with local far-left groups. The protests follow more than a month of unrest in Italy, which has been driven by both domestic grievances and international developments linked to Gaza. Italian labour unions have announced a further strike for 12 December.

Anti-far-right protests in Croatia.

On 30 November, several rallies were recorded across Croatia. Named “United against fascism”, the protests were organised in response to a series of cases of attacks and harassment targeting ethnic minorities, including a targeted attack by nationalist activists on an event by ethnic Serbs in Split earlier in November. While the protests were peaceful, local media reported some instances of attendees being harassed by counterprotesters. In Rijeka, at least five people were arrested for reportedly throwing firecrackers and flares at the protesters, in a likely attempt to intimidate them and disrupt the event.

Greek farmers block roads in nationwide protest.

On 30 November, Greek farmers began staging road blockades on key highways throughout the country, and particularly in northern Greece. Labour union representatives, whose groups staged the unrest, have stated that they are protesting rising production costs, worsening market conditions, and growing economic uncertainty in the sector. The immediate trigger for the unrest was a series of delays in subsidy payments, which was in turn caused by a corruption scandal in June. The protests are still ongoing as of 4 December, and there have been several cases of clashes between protesters and responding police. Unrest is likely to continue over the coming days. This may result in increased traffic on key northern Greek highways, as well as delays at border crossings.  

Major opposition leader detained in Azerbaijan under charges of alleged coup plot.              

On 29 November, the Azerbaijani State Security Service (SSS) raided the home of Ali Karimli, the leader of the opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (APFP) in Baku. Karimli was detained, with his whereabouts being initially unknown. On 1 December, the Sabayil District Court in Baku ordered that Karimli be remanded in pre-trial detention for two months and 15 days, under charges of allegedly plotting a coup to overthrow Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev. Government sources briefing international media stated that the case is linked to a broader criminal case involving Ramiz Mehdiyev, a former head of the presidential administration, with accusations that Mehdiyev financed Karimli.

Multiple human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, have condemned the detention as being part of an intensifying campaign to suppress dissent and meaningful opposition in Azerbaijan. With the APFP being one of the only few remaining significant opposition forces in Azerbaijan, the removal of its longtime leader (since 2000) would likely mark a further consolidation of Aliyev’s power.

Protests erupt at university in Dakar, Senegal

On 3 December, protests at the Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar over delayed scholarship payments quickly escalated into clashes, with students throwing rocks at security forces, who responded with tear gas. Several students have been reported injured, and classes at the university have been suspended. According to student witnesses, students were attempting to engage in discussions when security forces entered the campus, escalating the situation. Another student declared that peaceful demonstrations had been held for 13 months without success. The protests are taking place as Senegal is under significant financial strain, with debt equal to 132 per cent of its GDP.

While small-scale, there is a realistic possibility that the protests, driven by young Gen Z students, could quickly escalate into broader frustrations over unemployment, the rising cost of living, and perceived government financial mismanagement. Roughly 75 per cent of Senegal’s population is under 35, and a large proportion of this population is unemployed, underemployed, or in unstable work. Senegal has recently seen large-scale demonstrations. In February 2024, civil unrest broke out across the country after then-President Macky Sall postponed the presidential election. Protesters built barricades, burned tyres, and clashed with security forces, who used tear gas, stun grenades, and rubber bullets.

Guinea-Bissau electoral commission declares that votes were seized from offices following coup.

On 2 December, Guinea-Bissau’s electoral commission declared that armed men seized vote slips and tallies from its offices and destroyed servers storing the results. The election results were due to be released on 27 November, but a military coup on 26 November deposed incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló before the results could be announced. Following the coup, Embaló flew to Senegal, and Horta Inta-A Na Man, head of the military junta, has promised a one-year transition period. Embaló has been accused of orchestrating a ceremonial coup, with suspicions raised about his contact with foreign media after his arrest and his swift departure from the country. If true, the destruction of electoral materials was likely to disguise the fact that Embaló lost to opposition candidate Fernando Dias, who is currently residing in Nigeria after the government granted him asylum. Alternatively, the military may have decided to act, pre-empting a political stalemate and potential instability in the country. While the destruction of the election materials almost certainly raises the risk of civil unrest, the transitional government has banned protests and strikes ahead of a visit by delegations from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Cameroonian opposition leader dies after weeks in detention.           

On 1 December, Cameroonian opposition leader Anicet Ekane, of the African Movement for New Independence and Democracy (MANIDEM) party, died at a military medical facility after weeks in detention. Ekane was accused of hostility against the state, incitement to revolt, and calls for insurrection. According to his lawyers and family members, he had been experiencing breathing issues but was not given proper care, nor was he presented before a judge. Minister of Communication René Emmanuel Sadi declared that Ekane had received proper medical attention, but that an investigation had been launched into his death. The family has called for an independent autopsy to be performed.

In the aftermath of the death, MANIDEM supporters gathered at the headquarters, which was reportedly surrounded by security forces. Ekane’s death comes a little over a month after large anti-government protests took place from 26 to 29 October around the release of the presidential election results, resulting in the deaths of at least 48 people, according to the UN. While much of the momentum has been taken out of the calls for anti-government protests, there is a realistic possibility that this will result in calls for further civil unrest. If further anti-government demonstrations occur, they would highly likely be met with a security crackdown, including arrests, tear gas, and potentially live ammunition.

One person shot dead at Ugandan opposition leader Bobi Wine rally in Iganga.

On 28 November, Ugandan security forces fired live ammunition during an election rally by the National Unity Platform (NUP) candidate Robert Kyagulanyi, popularly known as Bobi Wine, in Iganga, approximately 90 kilometres northeast of Kampala. One person reportedly died, and several were injured. According to a statement from the Police Headquarters in Naguru, officers “faced attacks, including stone-throwing incited by the candidate”, which injured several officers and damaged some patrol vehicles, causing the officers to respond forcefully. Wine contradicted this account, stating that his rally was peaceful and that security forces violently dispersed crowds with tear gas.

The incident follows similar clashes in Kayunga on 27 November, where a supporter was allegedly shot and injured. The security crackdowns come ahead of the 15 January 2026 presidential elections, where Wine is facing the incumbent Yoweri Museveni, who is seeking a ninth term in power, having ruled since 1986. Security forces in Uganda typically come down hard on large-scale protests, with the lead-up to the previous presidential elections resulting in at least 54 people killed during demonstrations after the arrest of Wine. Museveni has cracked down on opposition and civic space in the lead-up to the election, and there is a realistic possibility that security forces will again attempt to arrest Wine, something that would highly likely trigger demonstrations by his supporters.

Spanish counterterrorism forces disrupt neo-Nazi network.

Spanish and Europol channels reported on a series of raids, dating to 25 November, which targeted the neo-Nazi group “the Base” in Madrid and Valencia. Three people were arrested in the raids, and several firearms were seized.  “The Base” (named after the literal translation of the name “al-Qaeda”) is a neo-Nazi “accelerationist” group which advocates for provoking societal collapse in the West. Originating in the US in 2018, it has a decentralised structure, which has allowed it to build cells in Canada, Europe, and Oceania. The recent arrests represent the first time a cell was detected in Spain. In 2024-2025, “the Base”, whose founder is suspected to operate from Russia, has increasingly taken an active interest in the Ukraine War, calling on supporters to stage sabotage and assassination actions to damage the Ukrainian war effort. In July 2025, “the Base” supporters claimed responsibility for the assassination of a Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) Colonel in Kyiv. The Spanish cell, which was reportedly founded earlier in 2025, likely reflects this growing interest in Europe, related to the EU’s support for Ukraine.

US-Syrian forces stage joint anti-ISIS operation.        

Between 24 and 27 November, US and Syrian counterterrorism forces staged a series of raids across 15 sites in Syria, targeting infrastructure and personnel associated with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The raids reportedly resulted in the seizure of several weapons and explosive caches. The raid follows Syria’s entry into the US-led global coalition against ISIS, which further formalised Damascus-Washington cooperation on counterterrorism. Syrian forces also carried out further raids on ISIS assets in Idlib and Dana on 30 November, dismantling a cell and killing at least two ISIS operatives, and in Kanaker (south of Damascus) on 3 December, detaining three ISIS operatives.

Druze militias detain and execute rivals in Suwayda, Syria.

On 2 December, Syrian media reported that the body of a local Druze cleric had been found in Suwayda. The cleric had been detained alongside around ten other people on 29 November by members of the so-called “National Guard”. A video of the victim being tortured was shared by his captors online.

The National Guard, founded in August 2025, is a militia linked with cleric Hikmat al-Hijri, one of three Druze sheikhs in Syria and an opposition figure to the Syrian transitional government. The militia includes several former officers of the Assad-era Syrian military. Following the large-scale sectarian clashes in July 2025, during which Israeli forces carried out several airstrikes on Syrian government forces, Hijri’s faction has continued to call for Suwayda’s secession and for Israeli forces to intervene against Damascus. The National Guard continues carrying out opportunistic attacks on Syrian government forces and other Druze factions, likely aimed at prolonging a state of insecurity in the area.  

On 4 December, channels linked with the National Guard published statements claiming that the Druze cleric, alongside another individual who was killed in a similar manner, had in fact died due to an “overdose”. They further claimed that the individuals responsible for the video of one of the victims being tortured had been “suspended” and that “strict measures will be taken against them”. This almost certainly reflects significant backlash from other local Druze groups, as well as likely concerns over national and international reactions to the brutal treatment of political dissenters in Suwayda.  

Israeli forces to reopen Rafah crossing in the Gaza Strip.

On 3 December, Israeli authorities announced that the Rafah crossing to Egypt “will open in the coming days exclusively for the exit of residents”. The Rafah crossing is the key entry point for aid to the southern Gaza Strip and has been closed for much of the conflict. Israeli forces assess that the crossing, alongside the dozens of underground tunnels connecting south Gaza to Egypt, are vital smuggling routes for weapons and explosives supplying Hamas. The decision to reopen the crossing likely reflects the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) progress in destroying militant infrastructure in southern Gaza, and their assessment that they will be capable of controlling possible smuggling attempts. The “one-way” opening of the crossing almost certainly reflects the Israeli government’s calls for the removal of the Palestinian civilian population from Gaza, a measure that is opposed by most Gazans and by other regional powers. In January 2025, a temporary opening of the Rafah crossing following the approval of the first Israeli-Hamas ceasefire (which collapsed in March) had also allowed the entry of aid. The opening had resulted in protests in Egypt.

Suspected US ISR flights take place in Nigeria.             

Flight tracking software shared on social media has depicted a private US aerospace company aircraft flying several missions over Nigeria since 28 November. The aircraft appeared to fly over Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) strongholds in Borno State near Lake Chad, Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) strongholds in Sokoto State near the border with Niger, and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) areas around the Kwara and Niger State border. The company is reportedly used by the US government, and the flights were likely intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.

The suspected ISR flights come after comments from US President Donald Trump regarding a Christian genocide in Nigeria, where he threatened airstrikes and troop deployments to deal with the issue “guns-a-blazing”. It is likely that the Nigerian government, which has struggled to deal with the multiple armed groups on its territory, particularly ISWAP and its progenitor, Boko Haram, has requested help from the US with its counterterrorism operations. If this is the case, US ISR operations in Nigeria are likely, which could be in support of Nigerian strikes or evolve into kinetic strikes conducted by the US directly.

Iranian officials issue warnings for poor air quality in Tehran and other cities.

As of 4 December, Tehran and several other cities across Iran have recorded a protracted period of poor air quality, marked by high concentrations of particulate matter (PM), which can pose a threat to life. Iranian authorities closed numerous schools and universities on 30 November to 3 December. High PM concentrations have also been recorded in Isfahan, Tabriz, across Khuzestan province, and in the Qahjavarestan area, where the PM2.5 index hit 297.

Poor air quality in Iran is due to a combination of heavy motor traffic, worsened by the widespread use of older and less efficient vehicles, combined with industrial emissions and the use of generators, which are exacerbated in Tehran by the local topography. Iran’s ongoing water crisis has also likely compounded the air pollution emergency by drying out landscapes and generating more dust, increasing both PM10 and PM2.5 levels. Both environmental issues are widely associated with government mismanagement, likely increasing the risk of anti-government protest.

On 3 December, a further round of peace talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan held in Saudi Arabia concluded without achieving a breakthrough. However, both sides agreed to continue with the fragile ceasefire that has been violated by both sides since it came into force in October. The meeting, which involved Pakistan’s military, intelligence services and foreign office, follows earlier unsuccessful rounds in Qatar and Turkey aimed at easing tensions after a series of deadly border clashes were recorded in October.

The Taliban government denied all responsibility for militant attacks within Pakistan, stating that it cannot guarantee security beyond its territory. The Afghan foreign minister criticised Islamabad’s claims that it is sponsoring militant activity in Pakistan, rejecting the accusations as inconsistent and baseless, while urging Pakistan to address its internal problems. Pakistan has demanded a written commitment from the Taliban to help counter anti-Pakistan groups, a demand Kabul considers beyond its mandate.

Solace Global Assessment: 

During the talks, several suspected or claimed Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) attacks occurred in Pakistan close to the Afghan border, and Pakistan conducted counterterrorism (CT) operations in regions where the TTP is highly active, primarily Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. While no direct hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been observed, the current tempo of militant attacks and government CT operations indicates that the ceasefire is having a limited effect on Pakistan’s security environment. This current rate of militancy, which Islamabad continues to allege is originating from Afghanistan or is directly sponsored by the Taliban, is likely creating significant scope for escalation, including the potential resumption of border clashes and renewed Pakistani airstrikes deep into Afghanistan.

On 3 December, Pakistan reopened the international border to enable UN humanitarian consignments to transit into Afghanistan, marking the first controlled reopening since Islamabad halted all trade on 11 October following border clashes. While this is likely to be perceived as a gesture of goodwill, the measure does not include the resumption of full trade; instead, it only includes aid, such as food and medicine, and will likely provide only limited economic relief to Afghanistan, while maintaining pressure on the Taliban. Moreover, Islamabad has now expelled around one million of the three million Afghans living in Pakistan this year.

These expulsions were originally justified on security grounds and framed as a required response to increasing militant activity attributed to groups operating from Afghanistan. Expulsions have increased in recent months, and Pakistan has recently been rounding up members of the Afghan diaspora, including those born and raised in the country. The reopening of the border has likely been in part influenced to facilitate the expulsion of Afghans from Pakistan.

The accelerated expulsion of Afghans is likely being done to address the internal security situation, secure domestic support and increase pressure on the Taliban. However, there is a credible risk that this strategy will prove counterproductive, as the forced return of large numbers of impoverished and marginalised Afghans could heighten grievances, fuel radicalisation, and create additional opportunities for groups such as the TTP and ISKP to recruit militants or embed themselves within the community.

Heavy rainfall, flooding, and landslides were recorded in several parts of Sri Lanka since mid-November 2025, with the situation worsening from 26 November due to Cyclonic Storm Ditwah. Authorities declared a State of Emergency on 29 November, with over 25,000 military personnel being deployed to support relief efforts. Critical infrastructure was severely affected, with two major hydropower plants, Kotmale and Rantambe, going offline. Widespread disruption to power, water, and transport occurred, with roughly one-third of the population losing access to electricity and running water, over 200 roads being rendered impassable, and damage to at least 10 bridges. Over 1.5 million people in Sri Lanka were impacted by flooding, approximately seven per cent of the population, with all 25 districts across the island’s nine provinces being affected. The Sri Lankan Disaster Management Agency confirmed at least 474 deaths and 356 remaining missing as of 3 December.

Flooding was widespread, with major urban centres also affected. In Colombo, neighbourhoods such as Kelaniya, Wellampitiya, and Peliyagoda were inundated with floodwaters, the Colombo Stock Exchange halted trading early, and schools and train services were suspended. Nationwide, the worst-impacted regions were the central highlands and south-central districts, particularly hill-country districts Kandy, Badulla, Nuwara Eliya, Kurunegala, and Matale. In Badulla alone, at least 71 confirmed deaths have been reported, with dozens still missing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The confluence of the already ongoing monsoon rains and Cyclonic Storm Ditwah has led to Sri Lanka’s deadliest natural disaster in over two decades. The Global Climate Risk Index (CRI) has frequently ranked Sri Lanka as among the top ten countries at risk of extreme weather events, with a UN report published in late 2023 stating that the pace of climate change is outstripping Sri Lanka’s readiness to respond to the increasing threat.

Disaster resilience is a critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. As Cyclonic Storm Ditwah intensified, national and district authorities formally activated disaster mechanisms, including early warnings, evacuations and search-and-rescue capabilities.  However, Sri Lanka’s government, run by the National People’s Power (NPP), has come under initial criticism for inadequate preparation. Residents in some areas told local media that the severity of the threat was not fully understood until the night of 27 November, by which point evacuation was already complicated to achieve.

In some instances, citizens claimed to international media that no warnings or evacuation orders were received, even when flooding had become dangerous. Moreover, in some areas of Colombo, many residents reportedly chose to remain in their homes despite floodwaters due to the fear of looters.  One key point of criticism raised has been that the declaration of a holiday for public sector workers on 28 November, announced due to the inclement weather, resulted in residents being unable to contact local officials for emergency support. There is a realistic possibility that these perceived government failings will trigger civil unrest once the flooding has subsided.

Sri Lanka has only just started recovering from the 2021-2022 financial crisis, during which the country declared bankruptcy. Sri Lanka’s president, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, faces his most major crisis since his election in 2024. With Sri Lanka so heavily dependent economically on the tourism industry and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the natural disaster is almost certainly a major challenge to the country’s economic recovery.

The death toll from the floods and severe weather conditions caused by Cyclone Senyar and Typhoon Verbena has surpassed 1,000. Indonesian authorities reported at least 800 victims (with hundreds more still missing as of 4 December), mostly concentrated in Sumatra and Aceh; Thailand recorded 263 victims; Vietnam approximately 260; the Philippines more than 280 (including those killed by Typhoons Tino and Uwan in early/mid November). Malay authorities reported at least three deaths. Approximately 20 million people have been affected across the region.

While the storms dissipated by 3 December, their impacts continue to cause severe disruptions in the affected regions. In Indonesia, authorities continue to report widespread infrastructural damage and disruptions throughout North Sumatra. These continue to complicate search and rescue efforts in isolated and remote areas. In Southern Thailand, authorities assess that, as water levels are receding, at least two million people remain affected, with several provinces having reduced access to clean water.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Researchers have argued that the severity and intensity of the regional storms in November are due to a series of climate-related factors, including the impact of the La Niña weather pattern.  La Niña is characterised by cooler surface temperatures in the eastern and central equatorial Pacific, pushing warmer surface water towards east Asia and creating low-pressure zones that contribute to increased rainfall and storm formation in the area. La Niña reportedly developed in September and is expected to continue at least until February 2026. Further severe weather events remain likely in the short-to-medium term. In the Philippines, for instance, tropical depression Wilma, which developed on 3 December in an area east of Easter Visayas, is expected to make landfall between 5-6 December.

Continuing severe weather events are likely to have compounding effects on the severity of the disruptions and damages recorded in the affected countries, worsening infrastructural damage and exacerbating patterns of internal displacement. In turn, protracted disruptions increase the likelihood of large-scale unrest. This was, for instance, the case in the Philippines, which has had large-scale protests since September, linked with reported corruption regarding flood control infrastructure projects.

Imran Khan’s associates and family warn of “torture” in Pakistani prison.  

On 2 December, Uzma Khanum, the sister of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, stated that her brother, who has been imprisoned in Rawalpindi since 2023, is being subjected to “mental torture”. Khanum was allowed to visit Khan after weeks without contact, during which some supporters speculated that the former PM had died in custody, provoking some isolated cases of unrest involving supporters of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. Khan and PTI remain extremely popular, winning the most votes in the 2024 elections (but remaining outside of the governing coalition), and developments surrounding Khan’s condition often result in large-scale unrest.

Widespread outcry forces Indian government to backtrack on “cyber-safety” app.              

On 1 December, local media reported that the Indian government issued a mandate to major phone manufacturers, including Apple, Xiaomi, and Samsung, to pre-install an app called “Sanchar Saathi” on their devices, also making sure it is impossible to deactivate. The state-owned app is meant to track lost devices and has other safety features, and is likely meant to try to combat the growing black market for the resale of stolen devices. The announcement has resulted in considerable backlash on both legacy and social media, with civil society groups warning of government overreach. The severity of the backlash almost certainly forced officials to officially scrap the plan on 3 December.

Drone attacks at Afghanistan-Tajikistan border kill five Chinese nationals.                 

On 27 November, Tajik authorities reported two drone attacks near the Afghan border in the Khatlon region, targeting a compound for Chinese gold mining sector staff. Five Chinese nationals were killed in the attacks, and five more were injured. The drones, likely relatively cheap quadcopters weaponised with a grenade-dropping mechanism, reportedly flew to their targets from Afghan territory. Tajik authorities blamed “criminal groups” for carrying out the attacks, likely referring to narcotics smugglers or illegal gold miners, who operate in the border areas.

However, targeting Chinese nationals is a high-visibility gesture and is likely to provoke swift retaliation from authorities – a development that criminal groups likely see as counterproductive. The dynamic, location and target of the attack raise the possibility that it was carried out by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). ISKP heavily recruits Tajiks from border areas, and, like other extremist groups in Afghanistan, has repeatedly sought to target Chinese nationals (indeed, Chinese nationals have increasingly been targeted by the Islamic State worldwide, with several attacks having been carried out by IS’s African branches). On 3 December, Tajik authorities appealed to their Russian counterparts to carry out joint border patrols, stating that the border areas are “unstable”.

Thailand closes border crossings with Myanmar following fighting near the border.             

On 30 November, clashes between Myanmar’s military and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in Myawaddy township, Karen State, close to the border with Thailand, escalated as Myanmar troops attempted to advance on KNLA positions. Sustained mortar fire and drone-dropped explosives were exchanged between the two sides. Five mortar rounds reportedly landed on Thai territory, injuring two people. In response to the spillover, Thailand temporarily closed all border crossings with Myanmar for seven days, excluding the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge 1, which connects the Thai town of Mae Sot, Tak Province, with the Myanmar town of Myawaddy, Karen State. Thai troops have been deployed to secure the border, and officials have warned that they would retaliate if any further cross-border fire took place.

Hong Kong authorities respond to apartment complex fire which killed at least 159.              

Authorities have continued enacting reactive measures to respond to the 26 November Wang Fuk Court fire, whose death toll has reached 159. Authorities have arrested at least 15 people under various charges, including manslaughter and corruption. At least three people, including a university student, have been arrested under Hong Kong’s national security laws, and security forces reportedly carried out censorship operations at local academic institutions. Chinese and Hong Kong authorities have further alleged that foreign powers are seeking to exploit the disaster to provoke domestic instability. These statements, combined with the arrests, almost certainly indicate local authorities’ intention to prevent any incident-related unrest.

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