On 24 November, a coalition of farmers and truckers staged a nationwide transport blockade involving trucks, tractors and farm vehicles being parked on major federal highways, toll roads, industrial zones, and on the US-Mexican border approaches, including on the Zaragoza-Ysleta International Bridge, which connects the US city of El Paso, Texas, with Mexico’s Ciudad Juárez. The protests were organised by unions and groups like the National Front for the Rescue of the Mexican Countryside (FNRCM) and National Association of Transporters (ANTAC), with participation from several smaller organisations. The protests have resulted in major disruption to transport and businesses, with blockades recorded in as many as 25 Mexican states. Key transport corridors into Mexico City were affected, as well as key routes in Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Puebla, Veracruz, and Zacatecas. While several of the blockades have been removed, farmers and truckers have maintained roadblocks in multiple states.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Mexican farmers are demanding fair crop prices and relief from rising production costs, whereas the truckers are calling for greater security on highways, protection from extortion, and stronger government support for the transport sector. While their objectives vary, their coordination has allowed them to achieve greater disruption and visibility, culminating in negotiations with the government. However, farmers and agricultural workers walked out of talks with the interior ministry on 25 November, after their demands for higher crop prices and a review of the Water Law were not met, and to express discontent with Mexico’s current levels of insecurity. Truckers have yet to enter formal negotiations with the government, but have maintained their stance that hijackings, cartel-linked extortion and cargo theft have made the industry increasingly unsafe and economically untenable.

While some highways have reopened, protests are likely to continue until substantive demands are met, and the establishment of ad-hoc blockades to pressure the government into negotiations is likely. These protests follow the recent so-called “Gen-Z” protests in Mexico City, which likely marked the first major challenge to President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration since taking office. These protests were also largely influenced by Mexico’s insecurity, with the trigger being the assassination of a popular anti-cartel mayor in Michoacán.

The convergence of three major protest movements, all of which have been in part driven by a deteriorating security environment, is likely indicative of widespread frustration over the government’s perceived inability to curb cartel violence, despite the Sheinbaum administration taking a more coercive approach than the previous administration. This trend may suggest that periodic large-scale, disruptive and even nationwide protests will become a recurring feature in Mexico to pressure the government into addressing cartel violence and wider insecurity.

Honduras is scheduled to hold general elections on 30 November to elect the president, members of the National Congress and 20 members of the Central American Parliament. The president will be determined by a one-round vote, in which the candidate with the most votes is elected to succeed incumbent President Xiomara Castro, who is constitutionally limited to a single term. Current polling indicates that the presidency is a tightly contested race between Salvador Nasralla of the Liberal Party and Nasry Asfura of the National Party running neck-and-neck, while LIBRE’s Rixi Moncada trails in third place, suggesting no clear frontrunner.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The main parties have already warned of fraud, the Attorney General’s Office has alleged the opposition is planning to manipulate the results, and an audio tape has been leaked suggesting that the military, which is typically aligned with the National Party, has attempted to influence the vote. Moreover, the military recently requested access to tally sheets in violation of Honduran electoral law, a development that has almost certainly increased fears of institutional interference.

Given the narrow polling margins and Honduras’s long history of disputed elections, post-election unrest in the country is highly likely. Previous contested elections, such as the 2017 one, resulted in almost a month of violent street clashes, curfews, mass arrests and almost 40 deaths after the opposition claimed there was widespread election fraud. In 2009, following the military ousting of President Manuel Zelaya, large-scale mobilisations paralysed parts of Tegucigalpa and other cities for weeks.

In the highly likely event that the elections are contested, large-scale protests, roadblocks and barricades on major highways and around government buildings, and violent clashes with the security forces are likely. The security forces will likely use tear gas, rubber bullets, mass arrests, and, in extremis, live ammunition to disperse crowds, and curfews will likely be imposed in major population centres.

The US is reportedly preparing to enter a new phase of Venezuela operations designed to increase pressure on the Maduro administration, according to undisclosed US officials. The new phase will reportedly begin with covert operations, forming the initial component of a wider campaign aimed at undermining or potentially overthrowing President Maduro. The officials also stated that President Trump is willing to use every element of US power to stop drugs from flooding into our country and to bring those responsible to justice. The report follows the 24 November formal designation of the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns), a terrorist foreign organisation (FTO) by the White House. President Maduro has responded by addressing his supporters in Caracas while wielding a sword, accusing Washington of seeking to oust him and vowing to fight “imperialist aggression,” suggesting that the US objective is to seize Venezuela’s natural resources.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The disclosure of a new phase of operations initiated with covert action will likely enable the US to maintain strategic ambiguity in the immediate future. There is no defined scope or timeline of these clandestine and sensitive operations, and covert operations offer a high degree of plausible deniability and are challenging to attribute. The effect of the disclosure is likely to exert increased psychological pressure on the Maduro administration by implying that the US is prepared to or is already engaged in hostile activity within Venezuela. This pressure could force the regime into engaging in talks with the US or overreacting in a way that could backfire and isolate Maduro, such as increasing internal crackdowns.

The US strategy towards Venezuela has so far been characterised by a series of military moves, policy changes and disclosures aimed at gradually increasing pressure on Maduro and signalling that the US is preparing to commit to direct strikes within Venezuela. This has included naval deployments, strikes on vessels in international waters, B-52 bomber flyovers, FTO designations, the authorisation of covert operations and the delayed arrival of a carrier strike group (CSG). With the recent arrival of the Gerald R. Ford CSG in the Caribbean and the FTO designation of the Cartel de los Soles, an organisation Washington directly links to Maduro and senior Venezuelan officials, the US is now likely in a position where it can exploit existing counterterrorism authorities to strike the regime and has achieved a credible deterrence and strike capability in the Caribbean region.

However, there is a critical vulnerability with this approach. The US now has the military assets in theatre to achieve many of its stated and assumed objectives. If Washington continues to signal threats without taking some form of visible action, there is a growing risk that the Maduro administration will increasingly perceive US actions as mere coercive posturing and interpret the activity as a strategic bluff. While the risk of miscalculation or escalation is now at its highest, there is a realistic possibility that if the US fails to act after extensive signalling, the strategy will lose credibility and fail to achieve its likely objective of pressuring regime change or compelling Maduro to the negotiations favourable to the US.

Brazil’s ex-President Bolsonaro to begin serving 27-year prison term.          

On 25 November, Brazil’s Supreme Court ordered Bolsonaro to begin serving his sentence for plotting a coup to overthrow Brazil’s government after the 2022 general election. Bolsonaro will be imprisoned in Brasília. Bolsonaro still retains a wide base of support at home, and his imprisonment has been opposed by the US administration. On the other hand, recent protests in support of the former president have drawn increasingly smaller crowds. There is a realistic possibility of protests in Brasília, São Paulo and other large Brazilian cities in the short term.

One killed during miners’ protests in La Rinconada, Peru.     

On 26 November, protests erupted at a gold mining site in La Rinconada, in Peru’s Puno region. The protests were started by local workers, who demanded that operations at the mine restart after a two-month halt. Local media reported that protesters set industrial vehicles and trucks on fire, and that security forces responded violently, with some unverified sources claiming that live ammunition was fired. At least one person died during the unrest. The protests, which also affect the nearby site of Lunar De Oro, are likely to continue in the short term.

Two National Guard members shot in Washington, D.C., in likely lone wolf attack.

On the afternoon of 26 November, an individual reportedly opened fire on a group of National Guard members near Farragut West Station, an area of the capital close to the White House. Two guardsmen were critically injured, while the suspect was disarmed and arrested at the scene. The alleged attacker is a 29-year-old Afghan national who had entered the US in 2021 under “Operation Allies Welcome”, the programme to resettle some Afghan nationals who had cooperated with US forces after the Taliban takeover of the country. The dynamic of the shooting, its targets and location make it likely that it constituted a lone wolf terrorist attack, although authorities have not disclosed whether the attacker espoused any particular extremist ideology. In response to the shooting, the US administration ordered the deployment of an additional 500 guardsmen to Washington and announced they would pause all immigration from Afghanistan “indefinitely”.

Mexican authorities arrest seven bodyguards suspected of being involved in mayor’s assassination.       

On 21 November, seven individuals were arrested for their suspected involvement in the 1 November assassination of Mayor Carlos Manzo, in Uruapan, Michoacán. All seven suspects were reportedly bodyguards employed to protect Manzo, who failed to intervene in the assassination and then subsequently killed the teenage gunman who shot the mayor. The suspected involvement of the bodyguards has raised concerns over how the cartels, likely the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) in this case, have consistently succeeded in infiltrating municipal security structures and reaching politicians hostile to cartel operations. The assassination was also the trigger for major anti-government protests in Mexico City and has resulted in the central government deploying an extra 10,000 troops to Michoacán to bolster the state’s security forces.

Flooding causes significant damage across southern Brazil.                

Since 22 November, severe flooding has been ongoing in several southern states of Brazil, including Santa Catarina, which was likely the hardest-hit state, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraná. More than 32 cities have reported damage, with hundreds of households affected. In Erechim, local media reported up to 150 injuries due to a hailstorm on 24 November. The floods occur just before the “normal” start of the rainy season in southern Brazil, which usually runs from December to February. Large parts of southern Brazil are now under a state of emergency, and multiple settlements remain isolated due to flooding.

Tornadoes hit near Houston, Texas, US.

On 20 November, a fast-moving storm system triggered record rainfall across parts of Texas Hill Country and North Texas. The National Weather Service issued a Flash Flood emergency for Concho, McCulloch and Menard Counties in response. The storm system subsequently produced two confirmed tornadoes in the Houston area on 24 November, damaging more than 100 homes and disrupting power across several neighbourhoods. The first tornado, an Enhanced Fujita (EF)1, touched down in Riata Ranch with peak winds around 177 km/h, while a stronger EF2 tornado later struck the Klein and Memorial Northwest areas with winds estimated near 187 km/h. Both tornadoes tracked several miles, uprooting trees, removing roofs from homes, dispersing debris across roadways, and inflicting structural damage to numerous houses. Despite the intensity of the storms, no injuries or fatalities have been reported, and cleanup crews and emergency responders are working to restore power, clear debris, and assist affected residents as the region begins recovery.

Several of Belgium’s largest transport and public sector trade unions, including ACOD Spoor, ACV-Transcom, and VSOA Spoor, organised a nationwide general strike from 24-26 November. The strike was organised to protest the government’s proposed austerity measures and cuts to social protections. The strikes significantly disrupted air operations, rail services, and other forms of transport. On 26 November, all departing flights from both Brussels Airport and Charleroi Airport were cancelled, and metro and tram services in Brussels were greatly reduced. Additional public services, such as waste collection, were also significantly disrupted.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The three-day nationwide strike follows a series of large-scale protests and strikes across Belgium organised by the trade unions in response to the same proposed austerity measures. However, unlike the October protests, which involved tens of thousands of protestors and escalated to violent clashes with the police in several cities, the recent round of strikes has focused on coordinated walkouts and picket lines to cause disruption, with no significant protests or incidents of violence. However, the industrial action has been highly disruptive and was motivated by the same underlying grievances.

The new right-wing government headed by the Flemish nationalist Bart De Wever has proposed a raft of austerity measures to address Belgium’s high public debt, such as increasing the retirement age, reducing state pensions and cutting unemployment benefits. Belgium has also come under increased pressure from the EU, which is imposing strict fiscal rules on countries failing to keep public debt within the reformed Stability and Growth Pact thresholds. These pressures are likely to force the new government into implementing and proposing new austerity measures throughout 2026.

Further rounds of disruptive strikes and protests across Belgium are highly likely to be staged in reaction to these measures, resulting in significant disruption to transport and businesses. Large-scale demonstrations in response to wide-reaching reforms, particularly those affecting pensions, unemployment benefits, and broader social protections, are likely and could escalate to violent clashes with the police, especially in the Wallonia region, where opposition to austerity and the new government’s Flemish nationalism is most entrenched.

Following the provisional US-backed 28-point peace plan being briefed to the press on 21 November, US President Donald Trump set a deadline of 27 November (Thanksgiving) for Kyiv to agree to the plan. The 28-point plan included multiple concessions to the Kremlin’s maximalist demands and was quickly met with condemnation from both Kyiv and its European allies. Reuters reported on 26 November that, according to three sources, the 28-point plan drew from a Russian-authored ‘non-official communication’ (known as a ‘non-paper’ in diplomatic circles) that was submitted to the Trump administration in October. Moreover, Bloomberg published leaked transcripts of a phone call in October between US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and top Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov, as well as a call between Ushakov and the Russian envoy Kiril Dmitriev in which the two senior Kremlin figures agreed to push for “the maximum” with the US and then “at least it’ll be as close to it as possible”.

Following a flurry of diplomatic engagements between the US and Ukraine, most notably in Geneva on 23 November, the plan was revised from 28 points to 19 with Ukrainian agreement, pending “minor details to be sorted out”. By 25 November, President Trump backed away from the Thanksgiving deadline, stating that “the deadline for me is when it’s over”. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov commented on the revised plan with an insistence that the proposal must reflect the “spirit and letter” of Moscow’s demands established in the August Alaska Summit.

Overnight 24-25 November, Russian forces launched 22 missiles (including both cruise missiles and ballistic missiles), and over 460 one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) and decoys, in a large-scale wave of aerial attacks primarily targeting Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Cherkasy regions were also targeted. Ukrainian authorities reported at least six deaths in Kyiv and 12 injuries. Targets reportedly included the combined heat and power plants CHP-5 and CHP-6, and the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP), with power outages being recorded in multiple districts following the strikes.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is unlikely that the current surge in diplomacy will lead to an imminent peace deal. The revised 19-point draft plan that has reported provisional agreement from Kyiv has the most contentious points, such as territory and NATO relations, “placed in brackets”, with a requirement for further leader-level talks. Fundamentally, Kyiv almost certainly cannot agree to many of the maximalist demands in the original 28-point plan without leaving Ukraine critically vulnerable to a future Russian reinvasion that could pose an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty. While the Zelensky administration may be able to tolerate major concessions to end the war, credible security guarantees are almost certainly a necessary red line requirement for Kyiv in peace negotiations. However, the provision of such guarantees in a meaningful manner is likewise likely a red line for Moscow, particularly the deployment of any foreign troops from NATO members in Ukraine.

With likely mutually exclusive red lines for a potential peace agreement, movement towards peace would need to be reached through further conflict that could coerce concessions from either side. However, there are arguably two key extenuating factors in bridging the divide. First, Kyiv is almost certainly heavily incentivised to maintain US support, given how critical US intelligence and military aid (now conducted via sales to European partners) are to Ukrainian defence. The Trump administration is therefore able to exert considerable pressure on Kyiv to make concessions. Second, Moscow is highly likely to be incentivised to ward off US pressure and to exploit diplomatic developments to further the pursuit of its maximalist objectives, as it has done in previous periods of Trump-led diplomatic pressure.

The large-scale strikes that were conducted primarily against Kyiv City occurred the day after the 23 November Geneva negotiations. The timing of large-scale Russian aerial attacks against Ukraine over the past year suggests a possible correlation between diplomatic developments and attacks on Ukrainian cities, with large-scale strikes having previously followed prominent Ukrainian diplomatic engagements opposed by the Kremlin. On the one hand, there was a notable lull in Russian long-range fires in the run-up to the Alaska Summit, highly likely intended to remove pressure on Trump to take a more hardline position against Russia in the meeting. On the other hand, the scale of current Russian strikes, particularly against Ukrainian critical national infrastructure (CNI), is likely exerting a great deal of pressure against Kyiv due to the threat of mass power outages during a freezing winter. The Kremlin is likely directly attempting to demoralise Ukraine’s population and promote war exhaustion with strikes against CNI, in addition to likely increasingly directly targeting civilian residential buildings. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission (HRMMU) in Ukraine reported on 25 November that Russian strikes have now inflicted four times more casualties in Kyiv City between January and October 2025 than in the entirety of 2024. Because of the perceived pressure against Ukraine, Russian forces will likely maintain the tempo and scale of strikes against Ukrainian urban centres in the coming weeks.

On 23 November, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted an airstrike in Beirut’s southern suburb of Haret Hreik, targeting Hezbollah’s acting chief of staff, Haytham Ali Tabtabai. The strike hit a multi-storey residential building in the Hezbollah stronghold.  The Lebanese health ministry reported that the strike killed at least five people and wounded 28. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told his cabinet before the strike that Israel would continue to fight terrorism on several fronts and that Israel would do whatever is necessary to prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing its military threat to Israel. The Israeli strike on Beirut is the first since June, when the IAF targeted alleged Hezbollah drone-production facilities in the southern suburbs. Israel has bolstered air defences in the north of the country in preparation for any potential Hezbollah rocket attacks in retaliation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Ali Tabtabai was assessed to be Hezbollah’s current chief of staff, after most of its senior leadership were killed by Israel. He was allegedly responsible for restoring Hezbollah forces to war readiness and overseeing most of its units, likely making him the second most important figure in Hezbollah after Secretary-General Naim Qassem. Tabtabai had also been a member of Hezbollah since its formation and had commanded Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force in Syria and Yemen, where he was partly responsible for external operations against Israel. This would have almost certainly made him a high-value target (HVT) for Israel, and he would have likely been under extensive intelligence collection. The targeting of him within Beirut likely indicates that Israel is willing to target Hezbollah senior leadership in politically sensitive areas like the capital, in clear violation of the ceasefire.

The killing of Tabtabai follows several days of expanded Israeli military activity in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley that has involved strikes on Hezbollah weapons caches, logistic nodes and other military targets. Israel is likely exploiting the current lull in Gaza to pivot military resources towards Hezbollah to arrest its reconstitution as a military threat, and to pressure the Lebanese government into accelerating the disarmament process. Hezbollah is publicly refusing to cede its military capabilities and remains committed to positioning itself as an essential component of national defence against Israel.

There is a realistic possibility that the recent strikes could be followed by a broader campaign designed to degrade the militant group. While most strikes would likely be contained to southern Lebanon or the Bekaa Valley, strikes in Beirut against HVTs or targets of opportunity cannot be discounted. Israeli military operations have severely degraded Hezbollah, but it still maintains some limited options for retaliation, such as localised attacks on IDF positions and short-range rocket fire into Israel. However, with its leadership decimated, logistics under strain and Israeli military pressure increasing, Hezbollah is likely to demonstrate strategic restraint rather than provide the Netanyahu administration with a justification to escalate military operations.

On 26 November, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló announced that he had been placed under arrest at around noon while he was in his office at the presidential palace in the capital, Bissau. According to local media, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Biague Na Ntan and General Mamadou Touré, and the Minister of the Interior, Botché Candé, were also arrested.

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The announcement came shortly after gunfire had been reported in Bissau, with reports stating that the gunshots originated from near the presidential palace. The gunfire lasted for approximately an hour, having stopped by 1400 local time. It is currently not clear who was involved in the gunfire, but an Embaló spokesperson declared that the men were affiliated with opposition leader Fernando Dias da Costa. According to Embaló, no violence had been committed against him, and the army chief of staff had orchestrated the coup d’état. Reports later emerged that opposition leaders Dias and Domingos Simoes Periera had also been arrested and taken to an air force base in Bissau.

The situation in-country was reported as calm following the reports of gunfire. Several elements of the Presidential Guard reportedly occupied strategic routes leading to the palace. A group of military officers identifying themselves as the “High Military Command for the Restoration of National Security and Public Order” released a statement through state television shortly after, announcing “total control” of the country and that Guinea-Bissau’s borders and airspace were closed. The military also declared that it is taking over all public institutions, banning media programmes and implementing an overnight curfew from 2100 to 0600 local time.

The arrest came only a day before the results from the 23 November presidential election were set to be released. Tensions were high, with Embaló and leading challenger Dias both prematurely declaring victory on 24 November. Both parties stated that they exceeded the 50 per cent threshold required for victory, negating the requirement for a run-off vote. In a statement given in Bissau, Dias stated, “We have won the presidential race. We will not have a second round”. Campaign spokesperson for Embaló, Oscar Barbosa, announced only hours later that Embaló had won outright and called on challengers to avoid making claims that undermine the democratic process.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Guinea-Bissau has grappled with chronic instability since achieving independence from Portugal in 1973, marked by repeated coups and ongoing political power struggles. The country has experienced at least 10 successful or attempted coups, making it one of the most coup-prone countries in Africa.

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Political instability has increased following Embaló’s postponement of the elections in November 2024, with the opposition regarding Embaló as an illegitimate president, claiming that his mandate expired on 27 February 2025. The two main opposition parties had been largely excluded from the elections, including the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which led Guinea-Bissau’s fight for independence.

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The arrest of Embaló is highly likely indicative of a falling out between the presidency and the military, which is likely due to Embaló’s attempts to centralise authority and reshape the country’s security services while marginalising his political opponents. This coup attempt marks the second in recent months, coming not long after another alleged coup attempt took place on 31 October, resulting in the arrests of several senior army officers. It is highly likely that the military, which holds considerable political power in Guinea-Bissau, used Dias’ claim to victory as a pretext to conduct the arrest.

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Former Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira has accused Embaló of staging a coup to justify a crackdown on the opposition. Dias’ claim of victory in the presidential election has highly likely provided Embaló with a pretext to portray him as attempting to forcefully take power.

Continued political instability is highly likely in the coming weeks. In the immediate days, the military will highly likely occupy key sites, including government buildings, media outlets, airports and border crossings, and critical infrastructure. Increased military checkpoints are highly likely on major routes and in the vicinity of government buildings and airports. The border and airspace closures will likely remain closed for several days. In the 12 April 2012 coup, the military took six days to reopen the borders. Given that the military has already arrested Embaló and opposition figures to prevent a government in exile from being formed and appears to have established control over the country’s institutions, border and airspace closures are unlikely to remain in place longer than a week.  

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There will almost certainly be a heavy security presence in Bissau and other major cities in Guinea-Bissau over the coming days. The arrest of the Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces indicates that military factionalism is highly likely. Security forces will likely conduct further arrests of high-ranking individuals in the government and opposing factions within the military. There is a realistic possibility that military factions opposed to the army chief of staff will engage in armed resistance. A failed coup attempt in 1998, led by a dissident general, triggered a year-long civil war.

The coup will almost certainly be perceived as exacerbating Guinea-Bissau’s political instability, and there is a realistic possibility that civil unrest breaks out in the coming weeks. After an alleged coup attempt in 2023 and the subsequent dissolution of parliament by Embaló, small-scale protests took place near the parliament building, with several people burning tyres. Guinea-Bissau’s security forces typically respond forcefully to protests, and the expected heavy security presence across the capital in the coming days will likely dissuade many from demonstrating. However, given the high tensions in the country following the dual victory claims, there is a realistic possibility that many will engage in rival protests.

France’s National Assembly rejects 2026 budget, prolonging political crisis.            

On 22 November, the French National Assembly voted, almost unanimously (404-1), against the income provisions of the government’s 2026 budget. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu, who was re-appointed to his office in October after his first cabinet collapsed only hours after being appointed, blamed the vote on opportunism by the various parliamentary groups. France’s parliament remains deadlocked, with three broad alliances all refusing to cooperate to pass a deficit-focused budget that almost certainly remains extremely unpopular across the political spectrum. While the recent vote is unlikely to result in an immediate collapse of the Lecornu government, it further decreases the likelihood of a budget being agreed upon before the start of 2026.

National strike on 28-29 November to end Italy’s month of protests.              

Italian trade unions will hold a general strike on 28 November, followed by a “national demonstration” in central Rome on 29 November. The protest follows a month of frequent labour-related unrest across the country. The key grievances cited by the protest organisers, which include Italy’s major labour and student unions, are related to the 2026 budget law advanced by the government of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, which they say allocates excessive funds to defence to the detriment of welfare and education. There is a realistic possibility of violence at key protest locations, including Rome, Bologna, Genova, Florence, and Milan. Protests are likely to result in significant traffic disruptions in major cities’ centres.

Ugandan opposition claims over 300 members detained in lead-up to election.      

On 25 November, a spokesperson of the opposition National Unity Platform (NUP) stated that Ugandan security forces have detained over 300 NUP members and supporters since the start of election campaigning in October 2025. The NUP is led by Robert Kyagulanyi, better known by his stage name Bobi Wine, who is the primary challenger to incumbent President Yoweri Museveni in the upcoming January 2026 presidential election. Many of those were arrested in Kampala this week after Wine began campaigning on 24 November. One rally in the Kawempe area on 24 November saw security forces use tear gas, water cannon, and pepper spray to disperse the rally. Wine shared a video on social media on 26 November depicting one man being beaten, and numerous photos depicting tear gas being used at his rallies. The Ugandan elections are set to take place on 15 January 2026 and are expected to be contentious as Museveni, who has cracked down on opposition, seeks a seventh term in power. Civil unrest is likely around the election, with Wine likely to attempt to mobilise supporters against the government if the election is perceived as rigged.

South Africa declares “national disaster” over gender-based violence after protests, online campaign.  

On 20 November, South African authorities announced that they would declare gender-based violence (GBV) a “national disaster”. The announcement occurred on the eve of a nationwide symbolic protest, consisting of a 15-minute “lie-down” across major cities to protest GBV in South Africa, which has one of the world’s highest femicide rates. Organisers stated that the length of the symbolic protest matched statistics indicating that, on average, 15 women are murdered in the country per day. South Africa has some of the world’s highest levels of GBV. The protests occurred a few days before 25 November, which was designated by the UN General Assembly as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

Drones lead to air traffic disruption in Eindhoven, Netherlands.         

On 22 November, air traffic at Eindhoven Airport (EIN/EHEH) was suspended after multiple drones were spotted flying near the facility. The attribution and origin of the drones have not yet been confirmed. Earlier on 21 November, drones were sighted near Volkel Air Base, prompting the Royal Netherlands Air and Space Force to use “weapons” in attempts to intercept the drones, which reportedly failed as the drones escaped. Just in the past few weeks, air facilities (including both military air bases and civilian airports) have observed drones in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Germany. In a phenomenon that has significantly increased in recent months, the increase in drone-related disruptions at European airports is suspected to be linked to Russia, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen calling the incursions “hybrid warfare”.

Demonstrations by Alawite minority following sectarian violence in Syria.

On 25 November, thousands of Alawites participated in demonstrations in Latakia, Tartus and Homs in Syria. The protesters, members of the ethnoreligious Alawite minority sect of which the former ruling al-Assad family were members of, demonstrated against claimed discrimination by the post-Assad transitional government and made calls for a more decentralised political system. During the unrest, there were numerous reports of live gunfire, with conflicting, unverified claims of security forces firing into the air to disperse rival groups of protesters, and others of live ammunition being directly fired on protesters. Verified footage from Latakia showed a motionless man on the ground with a head wound. As of 27 November, there have been no credibly confirmed fatalities.

The protests followed the triggering of sectarian tensions in Homs after the killing of a Bedouin couple, with Bedouins from the same Bani Khaled tribe then entering Alawite-majority neighbourhoods in Homs and carrying out acts of targeted violence. Security forces intervened, and a curfew was enforced in several neighbourhoods. The violence and unrest are indicative of how isolated incidents can rapidly escalate to broader instability in Syria, and there is a realistic possibility of this current outbreak of sectarian tensions further escalating in the coming weeks. Previously, in March 2025, government-aligned forces almost certainly participated in mass retribution killings against predominantly Alawite civilians following raids against armed Assad-regime remnant groups, with estimates of over 1,300 civilians having been killed.

MSF withdraw from Darfur hospital in Sudan.                

On 25 November, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) released a statement announcing that a stretcher-bearer was killed by a stray bullet at Zalingei hospital in Central Darfur state on 18 November and that its staff would be withdrawn from the hospital in response. The statement added that MSF “teams cannot resume humanitarian activities until the Rapid Support Forces guarantee safe conditions to protect staff and patients”. MSF had operated an emergency room at the facility, conducting operations, newborn care, and treating measles and cholera outbreaks. This follows a 15-day temporary suspension in August after a grenade exploded at the facility, killing one and injuring 5. The RSF have targeted numerous healthcare facilities in Darfur since the start of the conflict, and further instances of the MSF being forced to pull out are highly likely.

Nigerian president declares security emergency following spate of kidnappings.  

On 27 November, President Bola Tinubu declared a nationwide security emergency and outlined measures including the recruitment of 20,000 additional police officers, the use of National Youth Service Corps camps as training sites, the expansion of trained forest guard units, and the withdrawal of officers from VIP protection duties so they can be redeployed to conflict-affected areas. The announcement comes after a spate of kidnappings across the country, most notably the mass kidnapping of over 300 schoolchildren in Niger state on 21 November, 38 worshippers in Kwara state on 18 November, and 24 schoolgirls in Kebbi state on 17 November. Insurgent groups in Borno State, primarily Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have also been particularly active in 2025, targeting numerous villages and military outposts. Tinubu’s announcement is highly likely motivated by increased pressure from US President Donald Trump, who has threatened to intervene militarily over the perceived persecution of Christians, accusing the government of failing to protect them.

Puntland forces make gains against ISS, plan end of offensive.         

On 21 November, Puntland media reported that the breakaway Somali territory’s officials are planning to end their year-long “Operation Hilaac” targeting Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) in the Cal Miskaad mountain range. Puntland officials stated that their forces are currently advancing towards the Baallade Valley, which they assess to be the last major stronghold held by ISS in the area. They are doing so with the support of US Central Command airstrikes, which have almost certainly increased ISS losses in the rugged terrain and, according to some sources, with the direct involvement of US soldiers on the ground. ISS, under the leadership of Abdulqadir Mumin (who has highly likely escaped Somalia during the offensive), had become a key hub for the Islamic State’s global funding and attack planning efforts, favouring the movement of funds and fighters between Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Operation Hilaac has highly likely successfully disrupted ISS’s operations and has significantly reduced its manpower (down to an estimated 100-200 fighters in the Summer of 2025, from a peak of up to 1,200 in 2024). However, there is a realistic possibility that the ending of Operation Hilaac will provide ISS with breathing room and allow them to regroup.

Central African Republic (CAR) strikes peace agreement with rebel groups.

On 21 November, CAR authorities stated that, on the previous days, they had finalised a peace agreement with the Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC), whose leaders “permanently renounce[d] the use of arms” and rejoined the 2019 reconciliation framework. MPC was, until 2023, one of the members of the anti-government Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC). It was particularly active in the country’s northeast. The peace agreement is likely to be a political victory for the government of Faustin-Archange Touadéra, who is running for re-election in December. The situation in CAR, nevertheless, remains precarious, particularly at the border with Sudan.

Volcano in Ethiopia’s Afar region erupts for first time in 10,000 years, causes flight disruptions. 

On 23 November, the Hayli Gubbi volcano located in Ethiopia’s Afar region erupted, the first confirmed eruption in at least 10-12,000 years. No casualties or major damage were reported from the eruption. The ash cloud resulted in air travel disruption, with dozens of flights being either cancelled or rerouted on high-altitude flight paths, especially on routes between India and the Middle East. As of 26 November, the ash cloud has mostly cleared, and a geologist at Addis Ababa University has stated that while the eruption “will likely continue for a short period”, it will likely soon “stop until the next cycle”.

On 24 November, three militants targeted the headquarters of the Federal Constabulary (FC) in Peshawar, the largest city of the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. All three attackers arrived on a single motorcycle, parked the vehicle close to the headquarters and then attacked the facility armed with grenades and small arms fire after one of the assailants breached the compound with a suicide-borne improvised explosive device (SBIED). All three militants and three constables of the FC were killed in the incident, and at least five FC constables were injured. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa stated that the attackers were likely of Afghan origin, and the authorities have reportedly collected samples of the body parts of the attackers for DNA testing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack; however, some media outlets have suggested that the assailants were affiliated with Jamaat‑ul‑Ahrar (JuA), a faction associated with Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP), commonly referred to as the Pakistani Taliban. The TTP has carried out a series of recent attacks in Pakistan, and the Peshawar attack may have been planned to demonstrate its operational reach by targeting the well-defended headquarters of the FC in a densely populated urban area, despite Pakistan’s increased counterterrorism operations.

Pakistan has likely assessed that the attack was orchestrated by the TTP. On 25 November, the Pakistan Air Force conducted airstrikes in the Afghan city of Khost, located close to the international border in an area widely believed to be a major staging post and support hub for cross-border TTP militancy. Retaliatory airstrikes within Afghanistan have now become an established pattern following suspected TTP attacks in Pakistan, reflecting Islamabad’s willingness to strike militant sanctuaries despite the risk of border clashes, reprisal attacks and a further deterioration of relations with the Afghan Taliban.

However, the Afghan Taliban has claimed that the airstrikes in Khost killed nine children and one woman and has vowed to “respond appropriately” to the attack. The Taliban’s opportunities for retaliation are largely limited to attacks on the Pakistan border or sponsoring TTP attacks within Pakistan, suggesting further militant attacks in Pakistan are highly likely in the coming weeks. Most TTP attacks are contained to provinces near the border, like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Balochistan. However, the TTP has previously demonstrated its ability to target cities way beyond its traditional area of operations, including the 11 November attack in the centre of Islamabad, which was claimed by the TTP’s JuA faction.

Since mid-November, large parts of southern Thailand and northern Malaysia have been affected by heavy rains and flooding associated with persistent low-pressure systems along the Thai–Malaysian border and the broader regional effects of Tropical Storm Senyar. The storm is currently located in the Strait of Malacca, moving towards the Andaman Sea. As of 27 November, flooding has been recorded in the southern Thai provinces of Nakhon Si Thammarat, Phatthalung, Songkhla, Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Trang, and Satun. Songkhla province has been declared a disaster zone. The main city in the province, Hat Yai, has recorded floodwaters of two metres, causing significant power outages and forcing the closure of multiple medical facilities. At least 33 fatalities have been recorded across southern Thailand.

In Malaysia, flooding has been recorded in at least eight states, including Kelantan, Perak, Kedah, Terengganu, Perlis, and Pahang. Kelantan remains the worst affected, with around 11,000 people evacuated, two rivers above danger level and at least two fatalities recorded. The Malaysia Meteorological Department (MetMalaysia) has issued heavy rainfall warnings for several states until at least 28 November, with alerts remaining in place for Perak and northern Malaysia as Tropical Storm Senyar moves from the Malacca Strait into the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Severe flooding across southern Thailand and northern Malaysia is highly likely to persist in the coming days. Further heavy precipitation is forecast due to ongoing low-pressure weather systems and the start of the official Northeast Monsoon season, which typically runs from mid-November to March. The death toll on both sides of the border is likely to increase with relief efforts currently impeded by the degree of flooding.

The Thai military, which is in charge of large-scale relief and evacuation operations, has deployed an aircraft carrier and a flotilla of 14 vessels loaded with relief supplies and field kitchens to aid the worst-affected communities.  While more than two million people in Thailand have been affected by the floods, just 13,000 have been moved to shelters so far.

In Malaysia, the National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA), supported by the Armed Forces and Civil Defence Force, have deployed rescue teams, high-water vehicles, and boats to assist evacuees in the worst-affected areas. However, access constraints, damaged infrastructure and sustained rainfall followed by increased flooding are likely to disrupt relief operations in both countries.

Border crossings remain open; however, primary transport corridors in the region are likely to be affected for days. At least 14 major rural routes have been closed across southern Thailand, and in Malaysia, at least 30 road sections across multiple states, especially Kelantan, Perlis, Kedah, and Penang, have been fully or partially closed as a result of flooding, landslides, or damaged bridges. Rail operations have also been disrupted with the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) suspending 10 southern-line train services, including the cross-border rail route between Padang Besar (Malaysia) and Hat Yai (Thailand). Hat Yai International Airport remains open; however, flights to Bangkok have been suspended by several airlines, leaving thousands of tourists stranded.

Ten major trade unions conduct nationwide protests in India.             

On 26 November, a coalition of ten major trade unions conducted a nationwide protest against the government’s new labour codes, which came into force on 21 November. The unions labelled the codes “deceptive fraud” against workers, eroding job security and weakening collective bargaining. The Indian government has argued that the codes will modernise old laws, with four modern codes merging with the older 29 labour laws to create a unified system that standardises wages, expands social security to all workers (including gig and informal), strengthens safety rules, and gives employers more flexibility in hiring and layoffs. Unions have argued that these laws are skewed in favour of employers. Protests occurred across numerous states, including Kerala, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, as well as New Delhi. The demonstrations were peaceful but triggered transport disruptions. Further protests are highly likely.

Anti-government protests staged in Sri Lanka over cost of living and insecurity.    

On 22 November, thousands of opposition supporters rallied near Colombo in what is the first major demonstration against President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government as it completes its first year in office. Protestors have criticised the government for failing to deliver on its campaign promises to reduce taxes, ease the cost-of-living burden, and restore public security, claiming instead that law-enforcement agencies have been politicised to suppress political dissent. The protests almost certainly reflect growing pressure on the Dissanayake administration, which has increased taxes and austerity measures to comply with the IMF’s demands. Opposition members have framed the protests are a “warning shot” and warned of increased anti-government demonstrations should it fail to deliver clear economic progress and curb rising crime.

Upcoming 30 November protests in the Philippines.

Following large-scale anti-corruption protests in Manila, Philippines, on 16-17 November, stemming from a scandal regarding embezzlement from flood control projects, authorities are preparing for anticipated large-scale and nationwide protests scheduled on 30 November, a further iteration of the “Trillion Peso March”. On 25 November, a Quezon City government official warned organisers off one of the upcoming rallies to be held at People Power Monument (PPM) in Quezon City that any “acts of rebellion and sedition” would be met with dispersal and criminal charges. A memorandum of understanding reached with protest organisers states that violations of the Philippines’ laws ensuring the right to peaceful assembly would be grounds for revocation of the rally permit. Moreover, an agreement has reportedly been reached that protest attendees will not march from White Plains Avenue to other areas.

The 16-17 November protests were largely peaceful, but previous protests within the broader movement have seen instances of isolated violent clashes, such as in September. In addition to the high likelihood of transport disruptions, there is a realistic possibility of clashes occurring. If the agreed terms of the march are not abided by more radical elements within the demonstration, security forces will likely respond forcefully.

China-Japan dispute escalates with confirmation of surface-to-air missile deployment.   

A dispute between China and Japan further escalated on 23 November. During a visit to the southern Japanese island of Yonaguni, only 110km east of Taiwan, Japan’s Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi confirmed plans to deploy a medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) unit to the island. A spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office stated on 26 November in response to a question on the deployment that China “will crush all foreign interference”, and that the deployment “is extremely dangerous, deliberately creating regional tensions and provoking military confrontation”.

Also on 23 November, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that Japan was crossing a red line, in reference to earlier comments on 7 November from Japan’s new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Takaichi stated to Japan’s Parliament that a Chinese blockade or invasion of Taiwan would be a “survival” issue for Japan. Under Japan’s post-WWII constitution, the country’s Self-Defence Forces can only be deployed in “survival-threatening situations”. The dispute has seen China retaliating against Japan with halts on specific imports and flights, and the sailing of three Chinese warships past a Japanese island soon after Takaichi’s remarks to Parliament. Described as the largest dispute between the two countries in years, the dispute is indicative of the regional fallout from the issue of Taiwan, which is almost certain to continue driving regional instability in the coming years.

Apartment complex fire kills 55 in Hong Kong.             

On 26 November, a large fire broke out in the Wang Fuk Court apartment complex in the Tai Po District of Hong Kong. The fire, which is partly still ongoing as of 27 November, has killed at least 55 people, including one responding firefighter and injured dozens, making it the deadliest fire in more than six decades in Hong Kong. While authorities have not identified the immediate cause of the fire, it is thought that it spread rapidly due to the use of flammable bamboo scaffolding and mesh for building work, and early investigations have resulted in three arrests for manslaughter due to gross negligence.

Tropical Cyclone Fiona causes severe damage in Darwin, Australia.               

On 21 November, Tropical Cyclone Fiona made landfall as a Category 2 storm on the Coburg Peninsula. It had developed in mid-November in the Timor Sea. On 22 November, it intensified to a Category 3 “severe tropical cyclone” and approached Darwin, subsequently reaching Category 4 one day later. The cyclone caused severe precipitation (up to 168.6 mm of precipitation over 24 hours on 22-23 November) in Darwin, resulting in flooding and widespread traffic disruptions, as well as cutting power to approximately 19,000 households. Local authorities have stated that the cyclone was the strongest to hit Darwin in 50 years.

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