On 15 November, demonstrations were held in Mexico City and other large urban centres to commemorate the death of Carlos Manzo, the mayor of Uruapan, in the state of Michoacán, who had become popular nationwide due to his repeated open condemnation of the cartels and of the alleged corruption of public officials. Manzo’s assassination, which occurred during the Day of the Dead celebrations, has been attributed by the authorities to the powerful Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG).

The protests in Mexico City, which were attended by around 17,000 people, quickly turned violent, with protesters trying to break through police lines and into the National Palace, where President Claudia Sheinbaum resides. More than 100 police officers were injured, as well as dozens of protesters.  President Sheinbaum condemned the violence and alleged that right-wing agent provocateurs were responsible for inciting violence during the demonstration via social media.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The violent protest almost certainly constituted the first major wave of opposition faced by President Claudia Sheinbaum since taking office in 2024. While Sheinbaum has adopted a considerably harsher approach to dealing with the cartels than her predecessors, critics from the opposition, civil society groups, and even from within the ruling Morena Party (this latter category included Manzo) have pushed for a “zero-tolerance” approach to organised crime. Moreover, regardless of Sheinbaum’s positions, the protests were likely also more broadly directed against the Morena Party itself. Initially founded as a populist, anti-establishment group, Morena has now been in power continuously since 2018, and has recently been hit by several scandals, including allegations of corruption and reports of lavish spending by party leaders (an apparent breach of the party’s stated commitment to “austerity”). Broader issues, some of which are not directly related to the government’s recent policies, such as the cost-of-living crisis, also likely influenced the unrest. In this sense, it is highly likely that the killing of Manzo served as a catalyst for pre-existing grievances.

Mexican officials and media have widely condemned the violent protest. The protest movement lacks coordination and leadership, dynamics that may limit the chances of sustained large-scale unrest in Mexico City in the immediate term. However, there is widespread anger towards persistent levels of cartel violence, endemic corruption and the failure of the government to contain the violence. Further large-scale, disruptive and potentially violent protests are likely to occur in the short term, and particularly in response to further high-profile cartel attacks, political assassinations, or corruption scandals, which, when amplified through social media, have the capacity to evolve into nationwide movements, influenced by broader socioeconomic grievances.

The 20 November yearly parade to commemorate the 1910 revolution, scheduled to occur in central Mexico City, is likely to coincide with unrest, with another protest having been organised on the day. Due to the severity of the unrest on 15 November, and Sheinbaum’s planned participation in the parade, there will highly likely be a large security presence in the Zócalo area of central Mexico City, likely resulting in localised disruptions.

On 18 November, “Iván Mordisco”, the current leader of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), one of the largest and most active Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissident groups in Colombia, released a video from the Colombian jungles. Mordisco condemned recent government airstrikes, which killed at least 28 EMC militants, including several minors, and portrayed them as an act of war by President Gustavo Petro. In response, Mordisco threatened that his group may actively disrupt the electoral process, framing their actions as the “defence of territories” that are currently under dissident control. Colombia is scheduled to hold presidential elections on 31 May 2026. The Colombian Defence Minister, Pedro Sanchez, stated on 19 November that the military will continue carrying out bombing operations to curb the expansion of illegal armed groups, despite the recent deaths of at least 12 children and teenagers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The EMC has consistently rejected the 2016 Peace Agreement and refused to demobilise. The EMC remains embedded in multiple communities across Colombia, including in key departments, such as Caquetá, Meta, Guaviare, Putumayo, Nariño, Cauca and Arauca, enabling it to consolidate control and project influence across Colombia’s southern, southwestern and eastern regions. The dissident faction remains engaged in an ongoing armed confrontation with the Colombian state and has been implicated in a range of attacks, including assaults on security forces, bombings, targeted killings, forced recruitment and intimidation of the local population. Most of the attacks have been contained to rural areas where the group maintains in primary strongholds. However, the EMC has been implicated in multiple recent attacks in urban areas, such as a series of coordinated attacks in Cauca and an August truck bombing outside a military aviation school in Cali, Colombia’s third-largest city, which killed at least five civilians and injured 30.

These attacks likely demonstrate the EMC’s intent and capability in attacking high-value targets (HVTs) in major urban centres, typically outside of its immediate sphere of influence. While no specifics were provided in the threat, potential EMC targets to disrupt the electoral process may include political party offices, campaigns and government buildings, combined with its usual targeting of the security forces. The threat may also be interpreted as a tacit claim of responsibility for the assassination of opposition senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe, who was shot in Bogotá in June 2025, which Colombian intelligence has linked to dissident left-wing guerrilla groups. The threat could also extend to journalists and media outlets, who Mordisco has accused of working with military intelligence and misreporting on the EMC’s activities.

The Petro administration is currently under increased pressure from the Trump administration to combat the smuggling of narcotics into the US. The US military, exploiting current anti-terrorism permissions, has conducted multiple strikes on vessels in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Colombia, targeting boats alleged to be involved in drug trafficking, and has also threatened strikes on Colombian soil.  This dynamic is likely to compel the Colombian government to maintain its current aggressive posture towards the guerrilla groups and narcotraffickers, resulting in more airstrikes and operations targeting EMC HVTs, further increasing the risk of EMC retaliation and a migration of violence from rural to urban areas.

The Trump administration has signalled its intent to designate the Cártel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) on 24 November. The Cártel de los Soles is generally not considered to be a traditional drug cartel like Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel. Instead, it is a broad term used to describe state-embedded criminal networks in Venezuela that are allegedly composed of high-ranking members of the Armed Forces of Venezuela who are suspected of being involved in the international drug trade. The announcement follows the recent arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the Caribbean Sea, which greatly enhances the strike and deterrence capability of the US in the region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing of the potential designation of the Cártel de los Soles as an FTO has likely been calibrated to coincide with thearrival ofthe CSG and has also overlapped with several other important developments. The Trump administration has also stated on 19 November that it has authorised covert CIA operations in Venezuela, and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) warning pilots of a “potentially hazardous situation” in airspace over parts of Puerto Rico and areas in the southern Caribbean due to an “increase in state aircraft operations.” The NOTAM will be active for 90 days until 16 February.

These developments are likely to place extreme pressure on the Maduro regime and have likely been designed to force him either to step down or make major concessions favourable to the US. The US considers President Maduro to be the head of the Cártel de los Soles, and the FTO designation would likely enable the US to conduct strikes against the regime and members of the Venezuelan military under extant counter-terrorism permissions and without congressional approval. The issuing of a NOTAM has almost certainly reinforced the threat, with it achieving the effect of indicating that there will be an increased military build-up in the theatre or that US strikes over the Caribbean Sea are imminent. The NOTAM’s duration of 90 days is also unlikely to be by accident. A US president can order and sustain military force for 60 days under the War Powers Resolution, followed by a 30-day withdrawal period. Therefore, the NOTAM’s 90-day window effectively mirrors the permissible duration of unilateral military action without congressional approval.

There are early indications that the likely US plan of strategic ambiguity and phased military pressure is beginning to have an intended impact. On 17 November, the Trump administration indicated that it may resume dialogue with Venezuela. President Maduro responded by suggesting that his regime is always ready for dialogue, a reaction that likely indicates that US military pressure and the threat of strikes are achieving the desired effect. In the immediate term, Washington will likely limit kinetic activity to strikes on suspected narcotics-smuggling vessels while observing Maduro’s next moves before deciding whether to escalate to strikes on Venezuelan soil.

Chile’s far-right makes important gains in elections.                 

Chilean citizens voted in the country’s general elections on 16 November. In the parliamentary vote, the centre-left government coalition, Unidad por Chile (UpCh), which supports incumbent President Gabriel Boric, retained the most seats, winning 30 per cent of the vote. It still lost ground, however, to a new coalition recently formed by far-right parties. Known as Cambio por Chile, it won 23 per cent of the vote, surpassing the centre-right coalition Chile Grande y Unido, at 21 per cent. The Green and left coalitions performed poorly, with less than 9 per cent of the vote between them.

The presidential vote did not return a clear winner, meaning that a second round will be held on 14 December. The two candidates that will head to the runoff are Jeannette Jara, of the Communist Party of Chile (part of UpCh), and José Antonio Kast (sometimes referred to as JAK), of the far-right Republican Party (PRCh, the largest group in Cambio por Chile). While Kast finished second in the first round, he is highly likely to head to the runoff as a favourite due to the right’s overall strong performance. Kast ran on a “law and order” campaign, focusing on Chile’s recent increase in crime rates and advancing a series of radical proposals such as deploying the army to combat crime and “fortifying” the border with Bolivia to quash migrant inflows.

US Marines exchange fire with Haitian gangs in Port-au-Prince.       

US military channels reported a gunfight on 13 November, involving US Marines guarding the American Embassy in Port-au-Prince and suspected Haitian gang members. US channels reported that the Marines suffered no casualties in the clash. The incident followed an increased tempo of police operations in Haiti, with raids in areas of Port-au-Prince adjacent to the airport. Likely in response to the incident, which is the highest-profile confrontation between US forces and Haitian gangs since the beginning of the current phase of the crisis in early 2024, leaders of the gang coalition Viv Ansanm called for a “general strike,” urging Haitians to refuse to work, close businesses, and suspend public transportation.  If widely enforced by the gangs, the strike would almost certainly significantly disrupt mobility in Port-au-Prince and increase the likelihood of roadblocks, intimidation and gang attacks on key transit corridors.

Ecuadorians reject amendment that would have allowed foreign bases in the country.

On 17 November, Ecuadorians overwhelmingly rejected a constitutional amendment allowing foreign military bases, dealing a major blow to President Daniel Noboa’s security agenda, despite increasing cartel-related violence that has resulted in Ecuador having one of the worst homicide rates in the world. Voters likely viewed the involvement of a foreign military, widely expected to be the US, as a threat to national sovereignty. Gangs in Ecuador are much better funded and more powerful than those seen in El Salvador before President Bukele’s crackdown, with foreign military intervention likely viewed by Noboa as one of the few realistic courses of action to counter the rising threat of organised crime. The rejection will likely force the Noboa administration to bolster the capabilities of the police and military, tighten the government’s control of prisons and expand the use of states of emergencies or measures likely to be perceived as infringing on civil liberties, including restrictions on movement, assembly and limitations in due process.

State of emergency in Lima and Callao in Peru to remain in effect.

On 18 November, Peru’s President José Jerí announced an extension of the ongoing state of emergency in the Lima Metropolitan Area and Callao province, which was originally scheduled to end on 21 November. According to a high-ranking official, the state of emergency has resulted in a halt to the upward crime trend. A 30-day state of emergency was declared on 22 October following a surge in violent crime and gang activity, which saw extortion levels rise by 370 per cent between 2021 and 2023. Many of these are driven by organised crime, with groups demanding protection payments from businesses, transport firms, and schools. Under the decree, armed forces were authorised to support the police in maintaining public order and some constitutional rights, such as the freedom of assembly, were temporarily restricted. The state of emergency also came amid escalating anti-government protests, and the measure likely had the dual aim of curbing civil unrest while attempting to tackle the escalating crime rates. The state of emergency is likely to be extended further when it expires in 30 days.

One dead, several missing due to flash flooding in Silvania, Colombia.          

On 18 November, severe flash floods were recorded in the area of Silvania, in the department of Cundinamarca, following a winter storm which brought considerable precipitation. Dozens of buildings were damaged by the floods, and at least one person was killed while three more remain missing as of 20 November. Local media have reported that the most severely impacted areas are mostly rural and that the flooding occurred “in a matter of minutes” during the night, meaning that residents likely did not have the time to evacuate their residences or seek shelter on higher ground. The area impacted by the floods is located only around 30 kilometres southwest of Bogotá and may affect travel to and from the capital.

On the night of 16–17 November 2025, a railway line connecting the Polish capital, Warsaw, to Lublin and onward to the Ukrainian border was targeted in what the authorities expect was a deliberate act of sabotage. A section of the track, approximately 60km southeast of Warsaw, suffered significant damage as a result of an explosion, forcing the immediate suspension of services along one of Poland’s most important rail corridors. Damage to overhead power lines was also recorded further east along the same railway line, and a metal clamp device was found tied to the tracks, which was reportedly designed to derail a train.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has stated that this constituted an “unprecedented act of sabotage” aimed directly at undermining Poland’s state security infrastructure and the rail link used to deliver aid to Ukraine. The Polish foreign minister has stated that it will order the closure of Russia’s last consulate in Poland in Gdansk.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Russian intelligence is widely suspected of establishing a gig economy for low-cost acts of sabotage across Europe, whereby disenfranchised or pro-Russian individuals are paid to conduct disruptive acts on transport infrastructure, warehouse and other facilities associated with the facilitation of lethal aid to Ukraine. However, the use of explosives and coordinated acts on several parts of the line likely indicate that Russian intelligence was directly involved in the planning, resourcing and execution of the operation.

Moreover, initial investigations have identified two Ukrainian nationals suspected of carrying out the operation, who then reportedly exited Poland into Belarus via the Terespol border crossing. The sabotage also follows the charging of six individuals in Poland (three Poles, three Belarusians) with sabotage, arson and other crimes tied to Russian intelligence, covering acts like the 2024 warehouse fires in Gdańsk. Polish authorities have also arrested over 60 individuals in the past months, suspected of either planning sabotage or terrorist actions, at the behest of Russian intelligence.

The recent acts and likely direct involvement of Russian intelligence may indicate that the Kremlin’s risk threshold has increased, suggesting a growing willingness to conduct higher-impact, more sophisticated and potentially deadly operations on NATO soil to deter support for Ukraine. These incidents follow the large-scale Russian drone incursions over Polish territory in September, an act that was likely designed to test Polish and NATO readiness and resilience. 

Poland remains highly vulnerable to Russian acts of sabotage and destabilisation campaigns. Poland’s shared border with Belarus, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, and Ukraine is unique. Poland also houses NATO forces, has taken in millions of Ukrainian refugees, and is the primary staging post for military aid to Ukraine. The Polish government has also remained resolute in its support for Ukraine and has committed billions to improving its defence capabilities. However, there are indications that Russian operations are having the intended strategic effect. Support among Polish citizens has reportedly waned, with polling suggesting war fatigue, rising scepticism and increased demands for a negotiated end to the conflict- trends that are likely to influence Moscow to sustain and potentially escalate its sabotage campaigns in Poland and other European states.

In a report published on 19 November, US and Russian officials briefed Axios that the US President Donald Trump administration has been working with Kremlin officials on a draft 28-point plan to end the war in Ukraine. The plan is reportedly inspired by the currently successful, although fragile, 20-point Gaza peace plan that was also proposed by Trump. Multiple sources have separately briefed on the potential conditions, which include several major concessions to the Kremlin. These include ceding the entire Donbas, significant caps on the size of Ukraine’s armed forces, recognition of Crimea and other occupied territory as Russian, a prohibition of foreign forces in Ukrainian territory, and the relinquishing of some of Ukraine’s long-range weaponry.

Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is reported to be leading the process from the US side, engaging in extensive discussions with the diplomatically influential CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Kirill Dmitriev, who visited Miami on 24-26 October. Dmitriev has stated that the deal’s chance of success is higher because “we feel the Russian position is really being heard.” He added that the “timing is good for this plan now”, arguing that Moscow’s leverage has grown due to battlefield successes.

The national security adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Rustem Umerov, has stated that Kyiv is aware that the US are working on a deal with Russia. Witkoff was scheduled to meet Zelensky on 19 November in Turkey, now postponed, but on 19 November, it was reported that two top US Army leaders arrived in Kyiv in an unannounced trip to meet with Ukrainian leaders.

Overnight 18-19 November, Russian forces launched a large-scale aerial attack against Ukraine with 470 one-way attack drones/decoys and 48 missiles (one ballistic, 47 cruise). Ternopil, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk in western Ukraine, and Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine, were all reportedly targeted, particularly critical national infrastructure (CNI) and energy facilities. Two residential nine-story flats in Ternopil were directly hit, killing at least 26 civilians, with 93 more injured. Zelensky also stated that the regions of Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Dnipro came under attack.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Many of the briefed potential conditions of the peace plan effectively amount to conceding to the Kremlin’s maximalist demands. Since multiple press outlets reported on the plan, Washington has likely attempted to downplay the finality of the alleged plan, with one anonymous senior US official allegedly telling Ukrainian media that the proposed conditions are a “maximalist Kremlin fantasy”. It is almost certain that officials for both Kyiv and key European allies are outraged by the as-yet-unconfirmed proposals, which, if confirmed, would almost certainly be perceived as essentially a surrender.

Several Kremlin officials have rejected reporting on the plan. However, the Kremlin has highly likely facilitated the briefing of some details, most notably through Dmitriev, as a means of reflexive control – the Russian doctrine of shaping an adversary’s decision-making by exposing them to carefully selected information or signals.

Kyiv almost certainly cannot agree to a plan with such provisions without leaving Ukraine critically vulnerable to a Russian reinvasion in the future that could pose an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty. For example, the ceding of the remaining unoccupied sections of the Donbas would involve forfeiting the ‘fortress belt’(which includes the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration), Ukraine’s most defensible line, exposing less fortified areas to potential future Russian advances. Moreover, the Ukrainian military would reportedly be ‘halved’, and although there are mooted unspecified security guarantees from the US, it is unclear how reliable these could be as a deterrent, given the other provisions, which include no foreign forces in Ukraine.

Dmitriev’s mention of the ‘good timing’ of the plan almost certainly refers to the increasingly critical situation for Ukrainian defenders in several key sectors of the front lines, particularly Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast and Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast. Furthermore, the currently dramatically escalated Russian aerial strikes campaign against Ukrainian critical national infrastructure (CNI, particularly energy facilities) could, in worst-case scenarios, result in a humanitarian disaster in cities such as Kyiv this winter if temperatures fall below -10 degrees Celsius and power and heating plants go offline for several days. The 18-19 November strikes were almost certainly calibrated to challenge the relative ‘sanctuary’ status of western Ukrainian cities, such as Lviv, Lutsk and Ivano-Frankivsk, from Russian long-range fires. Moreover, the direct impact of a cruise missile against a residential building in Ternopil, which resulted in mass civilian casualties, is likely indicative of continued attempts to demoralise the civilian population, in conjunction with the wider campaign against CNI, which is likely at least partly aimed at depriving civilians of heating in freezing winters. However, despite all of the aforementioned considerable pressures against Ukraine, it fundamentally remains unlikely that Kyiv can be coerced into a perceived ‘surrender’ peace plan, given the continued capability of Ukrainian forces to inflict enormous casualties on slowly advancing Russian forces and the strategic level impact that has been achieved with the Ukrainian long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure.

On 19 November, opposition figure Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who unilaterally declared victory in the 12 October presidential election, called for a National Day of Mourning to take place on 21 November in a Facebook live stream. On this day, businesses, government offices, and services are instructed to close, and the population is encouraged to observe a minute of silence at noon. This day, according to Bakary, will also constitute an “act of resistance” to demonstrate the unity of the Cameroonian people. Bakary has promised further directives in the coming days.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Bakary is reportedly under the protection of Nigerian security in Yola, the Adamawa State capital. Local media reported multiple attempts by Cameroonian authorities to arrest Bakary while he was in Cameroon, and Nigeria has declined a request from Cameroonian authorities to extradite him. Bakary would highly likely be arrested if he were to return to Cameroon, which could trigger further civil unrest from his supporters. Bakary’s failure to announce actions after the 48-hour deadline he gave the government to release all the prisoners or “bear the consequences” expired on 11 November likely indicates that he is hesitant to directly call for further civil unrest, likely due to the risk of extradition or assassination.

Bakary is highly likely to use the day of mourning to assess whether Cameroonians will follow his directives before calling for further actions, which would increase the risk of extradition or assassination. Bakary’s directives will highly likely be observed in his stronghold cities of Garoua and Douala, whose residents took part in his “ghost town” directives from 3 to 5 November. There is a realistic possibility that it will also be observed in Yaoundé, although it is likely that residents in the capital will be divided, and many will go about their daily activities.

If Bakary’s orders are widely observed, he will highly likely announce further waves of “ghost towns” or civil unrest. Security forces will highly likely respond forcefully, including with crowd dispersal measures such as tear gas and water cannon, mass arrests, and potentially live ammunition. Internet shutdowns are also likely in the coming days to prevent Bakary’s directives from being spread through social media.

On 23 November, presidential and parliamentary elections are set to take place in Guinea-Bissau. They were originally intended to be conducted separately, with general elections initially scheduled for November 2024. However, they were postponed by incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló on the alleged grounds of instability, logistical challenges, and disputes over presidential term limits.

The elections are taking place shortly after an alleged coup attempt occurred on 31 October, resulting in the arrests of several senior army officers. The coup attempt took place the day before the general election campaign was set to begin and was allegedly organised by Brigadier General Dahaba Nawalna, the director of a military training school.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Embaló has become increasingly authoritarian since coming to power in 2020. In 2023, he dissolved the opposition-controlled National Assembly following armed clashes between the paramilitary National Guard and Presidential Battalion. Embaló then dismissed Prime Minister Rui Duarte de Barros and directly appointed his successor, triggering protests and clashes with security forces. Journalists have been systematically obstructed and harassed. Ahead of the upcoming election, the government blocked Portuguese media outlets RTP, RDP, and Lusa on 15 August. No official reason was given, and international observers have accused the actions of being arbitrary.

Political instability has increased following the postponement of the elections, with the opposition regarding Embaló as an illegitimate president, claiming that his mandate expired on 27 February 2025. The two main opposition parties have been largely excluded from the upcoming elections, raising the risk of the election being perceived as rigged. The instability is exacerbated by almost certain divisions within the military, as highlighted by the recent coup attempt. Guinea-Bissau has experienced at least 10 successful or attempted coups, making it one of the most coup-prone countries in Africa. There is a realistic possibility that any political crisis could result in another coup attempt.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a mission to assist Guinea-Bissau in resolving the electoral crisis, but left after being threatened with expulsion. Given the increasing authoritarianism of Embaló, it is likely that the elections will be neither free nor fair. If the elections are perceived to have been rigged, there is a high likelihood of unrest. Previous instances of civil unrest have resulted in security forces cracking down on protesters, such as in May 2024, when at least 90 peaceful protesters were arrested. If demonstrations occur, security forces will likely respond forcefully with arrests and crowd dispersal measures, which could cause protests to spread and intensify.

Protests take place in Slovakia on Velvet Revolution anniversary.

On 17 November, tens of thousands of people took part in anti-government rallies and marches across multiple cities in Slovakia. In Bratislava, protesters gathered in Freedom Square, chanting against Prime Minister Robert Fico and his pro-Russia views. The rally took place on the anniversary of the 1989 Velvet Revolution, which saw citizens of Czechoslovakia oust the communist government led by Prime Minister Andrej Babis. Fico recently cancelled the national holiday marking the Velvet Revolution, allegedly as part of austerity measures. Opposition leader Michal Šimečka has rejected this, stating that “Robert Fico just wants to tell us that the holiday of freedom is useless, that freedom is useless. We value freedom, and we will not let it be taken away from us.” This is the latest in a wave of protests against Fico’s government, with the last large-scale protest taking place in September, seeing thousands rally across 17 cities. Many have taken exception to his softer stance towards Russia, whereby the government has ended military aid to Ukraine, criticised EU sanctions on Russia, and visited Moscow. This has been exacerbated by the government’s proposed budget cuts, tax and spending changes, and the removal of public holidays. Further protests are highly likely and are likely to result in transport disruptions.

Russia hosts Togolese president in the Kremlin.

On 19 November, President Putin hosted Togo’s long-standing president, Faure Gnassingbé, in the Kremlin, for talks aimed at strengthening ties with the West African nation. The talks reportedly covered diplomacy, economy, trade, agriculture, energy, training, and food security. This is highly likely reflective of Russia’s strategy of cultivating relationships with small but resource-rich countries, with Togo being a major producer of phosphate, a mineral used to extract phosphorus, which is primarily used in fertilisers but also a range of industrial and military applications. This strategy has led to increased Russian engagement at the expense of Western influence in countries like Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Equatorial Guinea, and several other African nations, many of which have been maligned by the West for democratic backsliding, authoritarianism, and human rights abuses.

Tanzanian opposition groups call for “mega protest” on 9 December.

Opposition supporters have called for a “mega protest” to be held on 9 December, coinciding with Tanzania’s Independence Day, to demand the removal of President Samia Suluhu Hassan and to condemn the violence of security forces. Heightened security is likely across Dar es Salaam around this date, and internet restrictions are likely to be imposed ahead of any expected protests. If the planned demonstrations go ahead with a high turnout, they would highly likely be met with a similar response to the 29 to 31 October wave, with security forces likely to deploy live ammunition, and highly likely to conduct mass arrests and use crowd dispersal measures such as tear gas and water cannon. Authorities would likely also impose a curfew if the demonstrations became widespread.

US declares European far-left groups as terrorist entities.   

On 13 November, the US State Department announced that it would designate four groups – Antifa Ost, Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front (FAI/FRI), Armed Proletarian Justice, and Revolutionary Class Self-Defence – as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). Antifa Ost (also known as Hammerbande) is German but has a cross-border presence in central Europe, FAI/FRI is Italian, while the latter two are Greek anarchist groups.

Antifa Ost was designated as a terrorist group by the Hungarian government in late September. The group has also been at the centre of a recent diplomatic crisis involving Budapest, Rome and Brussels, centred on EU Parliament Member Ilaria Salis. Salis had been arrested in Budapest in 2023 after allegedly taking part in attacks on Hungarian far-right activists alongside Antifa Ost members. In 2024, while on house arrest, she was elected to the European Parliament, thus gaining immunity (an attempt to lift her immunity was narrowly defeated in a EU Parliament vote in October 2025).

This link to Hungary and Italy – whose current leaders, Viktor Orbán and Giorgia Meloni, are widely considered allies of the Trump administration in the EU – likely makes the designation a symbolic gesture aimed at strengthening “allied” factions in the EU Parliament. On the other hand, there is a realistic possibility that the move will result in sanctions being imposed on Salis as an alleged Hammerbande member. This would increase tensions with Brussels and could result in civil unrest in EU countries.

Russian intelligence-gathering vessel directs lasers at RAF pilots near UK waters.

On 19 November, the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) reported that the Russian intelligence-gathering vessel, the YANTAR, had directed disruptive laser beams at Royal Air Force (RAF) surveillance pilots, marking a significant escalation in Russian grey-zone activity against UK forces. The vessel was operating near UK waters to the north of Scotland.

The vessel is part of Russia’s Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), a secretive arm of the Russian MOD that sits outside the regular navy command structure. GUGI is primarily responsible for deep-sea intelligence operations, such as the surveillance and mapping of undersea cables and other forms of underwater critical national infrastructure (CNI), in support of sabotage and specialist underwater operations. GUGI is considered one of Russia’s most capable assets that supports its escalating grey-zone warfare, and the deployment and use of lasers is likely intended as a strategic message to the UK to suspend support for Ukraine.  

Brother of anti-trafficking activist assassinated in Marseille, France.             

On 13 November, Mehdi Kessaci, the brother of an anti-drug trafficking advocate who had a significant online following, was shot and killed in a likely targeted assassination in Marseille. The murder has been widely condemned by the French government and other civic society institutions, attracting significant visibility. Reacting to it, Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin stated that it was part of a “strategy of terror” increasingly adopted by drug-trafficking groups in France. On 18 November, President Emmanuel Macron pledged to “amplify” the fight against narcotrafficking, and stated that the killing was a “turning point” for France.

Kessaci’s assassination occurs amid growing drug-related violence in France, which has increased after the COVID-19 Pandemic. In 2023, French police recorded 418 drug-related homicides, 39 per cent more than the previous year. While the volume of homicides has decreased in 2024 and 2025, it remains higher than pre-pandemic levels. Moreover, while homicides have decreased in 2024-2025, France has had a sharp rise in “high-visibility” attacks carried out on civil society and state institutions by organised criminal groups. These include the May 2024 ambush on a prison van in Incarville, and the wave of firebombings targeting prisons across the country in April-May 2025. These attacks have almost certainly been driven by Paris’ attempts to crack down on organised crime, including by creating new maximum security detention facilities for high-ranking traffickers. Further escalation in these approaches is likely to drive renewed violence, including targeted killings and bombings, posing a significant threat to bystanders.

UK deploys specialist counter-drone unit to Belgium to protect airports and military installations.

The UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) has deployed a specialist counter-drone unit to Belgium to boost security after a request for support to counter rogue drone activity around airports and military installations. The unit, which falls under the RAF Regiment, the branch of the RAF responsible for ground-based air defence and the protection of air assets, will be joined by French and German counterparts. The units will deploy with advanced drone detection, tracking, electronic warfare and kinetic interception capabilities, including sophisticated technology that can electronically take command of an enemy drone and turn it back on itself to attempt to identify those flying them over sensitive sites like airports. The deployments will likely be perceived as a demonstration of NATO unity in response to suspected Russia-sponsored acts of hybrid warfare in Europe, aimed at undermining support for Ukraine.

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attempts prison break in al-Hasakah, Syria.     

On 13 November, Syrian sources reported an attempted prison break at the Ghweiran detention facility, in al-Hasakah. The prison houses around 4,750 detainees and is administered by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Ghweiran was the location of the 2022 Battle of al-Hasakah, where ISIS forces launched their largest offensive since 2019, suffering severe losses but successfully allowing hundreds of prisoners to escape. More recently, in August 2025, another riot reportedly occurred at the prison, while some local media claimed at least two detonations of possible improvised explosive devices (IEDs) near the area in October. Detention facilities in Syria continue to be extremely high-value targets for ISIS, as they house thousands of fighters and almost certainly function as hubs for radicalisation, recruitment and operational planning within the group’s residual networks.

JNIM announces “second stage” of fuel blockade in Mali.   

On 18 November, channels associated with the jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) announced a tightening of the ongoing fuel blockade in the country, which has resulted in severe shortages, including in the capital, Bamako. JNIM stated that they will now consider all fuel tanker drivers as “combatants”, and directly threatened fuel shipment companies. JNIM has recently increased its presence west of Bamako, further reducing the number of fuel convoys able to reach the capital from Senegal and Mauritania. This, in turn, has led the ruling junta to intensify operations south of the capital to secure supply lines from the Ivory Coast. The announcement will likely further deter fuel shipment companies from conducting business in Mali, exacerbating the fuel crisis. In response to the statement, the Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian foreign ministries released advisories calling on their nationals to evacuate the country, following more than a dozen other Western states, including the US, UK, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Australia.

Militants kidnap at least 25 schoolgirls and attack church in central Nigeria, killing at least two.   

On 17 November, armed militants kidnapped at least 25 students after storming the Government Girls Comprehensive Secondary School in Maga town, northwestern Kebbi state. The attackers also killed a staff member and injured another. One schoolgirl subsequently escaped and is reportedly safe. Local volunteers, alongside security forces, are conducting a search for the remaining students. While no group has claimed responsibility, local media have referred to the perpetrators as “bandits”, who regularly conduct mass kidnappings from schools in northern Nigeria. The school is close to Zamfara and Sokoto states, where several gangs operate. Nigerian authorities have shut schools in five districts of Kwara state, fearing further potential attacks.

On 18 November, several militants attacked the Christ Apostolic Church in Eruku in Kwara state, central Nigeria, killing at least two and abducting several others. A live feed from the church depicts a service being interrupted by gunfire before armed men entered. No group has claimed responsibility, but given the abductions, it is highly likely that the perpetrators were also bandits. The attacks are likely to spark outrage from US President Donald Trump, who has previously claimed that Christians are being persecuted in Nigeria and has threatened to intervene with airstrikes or military deployments. A heightened security presence in the region is highly likely, particularly since the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) recently attacked a security patrol in Kwara state, the first time the group has conducted an attack in Nigeria.

ADF militants kill at least 28 people at a health centre in North Kivu, DRC.   

On 14 November, Islamic State ADF militants attacked a health centre in Byambwe, Lubero territory, North Kivu, approximately 50 kilometres west of Butembo. According to local sources, the ADF members killed at least 28 people, including 17 patients, set the maternity ward and operating theatre on fire, and looted various medications. The attack took place near the ADF’s most southern and active of its three camps, the Abwakasi Camp, which has been responsible for several of the group’s most brutal attacks in recent months. Many of the group’s attacks have targeted small, poorly defended villages. While this is not the first instance of an ADF attack on a health centre, they have not conducted such attacks since May 2024. Further attacks targeting civilians in the region are highly likely.

DRC government and AFC/M23 rebels approve peace agreement framework in Doha.        

On 15 November, the DRC government and AFC/M23 rebels signed a framework for peace in Doha, Qatar. The new framework builds upon a declaration of principles signed in July and addresses, among other things, humanitarian access, the return of displaced people, and the protection of the judiciary. Kinshasa is demanding that Rwandan troops withdraw from its territory, which Kigali has agreed to once the ethnically Hutu FDLR militia is disbanded.

The two sides were meant to sign the full peace agreement on 18 August, but this collapsed amid accusations of ceasefire violations.  This deal is unlikely to result in concrete changes to the situation on the ground, and further talks are expected over the coming weeks, which are set to include a peace timeline and details on how certain processes will be implemented. However, there are numerous sticking points, such as the withdrawal of AFC/M23 troops from its captured territory, that will almost certainly require one side to relinquish its maximalist demands.

Suspected al-Shabaab attack in Kenya kills two.

On 19 November, two Administration Police (AP) border patrol officers were killed when their vehicle drove over an improvised explosive device (IED) in Kenya’s Dadaab area in Garissa County, close to the border with Somalia. At least five other officers were injured. While unconfirmed, authorities have blamed al-Shabaab for the attack, although the group has not claimed responsibility. This is the first confirmed IED attack in Kenya since May 2025 and comes after Kenya’s Special Operations Group (SOG) foiled another potential IED attack in the Eelmerer-Yumbia area in Garissa County in October. Al-Shabaab has targeted Kenya since it committed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia in 2011, currently labelled the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Further attacks on Kenyan security forces are highly likely, primarily in Garissa, Mandera and Wajir counties adjacent the Somali border. Although the group has not targeted Nairobi since January 2019, it is almost certainly a high-value target, and the US Embassy in Nairobi issued a warning of possible attacks on 20 August 2025.

Major flooding recorded across Iraq.

Major flooding has affected various regions of Iraq, particularly impacting the central and eastern areas, including Baghdad, since November 15. Heavy rainfall has led to significant disruptions, with multiple areas experiencing submerged vehicles and isolated communities. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the town of Zakho has been particularly affected, with local media sharing videos of submerged cars and extensive floodwaters. In the Akre district of Duhok, roads have been flooded, isolating a village. Northern Mosul has also seen road flooding. In Baghdad, officials have been actively working to drain floodwaters from streets, where antiquated drainage systems have been overwhelmed in several parts of the city.

Authorities warn of Tehran evacuation due to severe water shortage in Iran.

Iran is currently facing its worst water crisis in decades, with rainfall at record lows and reservoirs nearly empty, forcing the government into cloud seeding, which involves dispersing chemical particles into clouds to encourage precipitation, to artificially induce rain. Taps have reportedly run dry in the capital, Tehran, and the authorities have warned that they may have to begin rationing water or even evacuating the capital, Iran’s largest city, home to almost ten million people. Since the start of the rainy season more than 50 days ago, more than 20 provinces have yet to receive any rainfall. While the crisis is primarily the result of a lack of rain, it has almost certainly been exacerbated by Iran’s mismanagement of water supplies, with 90 per cent of its water used in low-yield agriculture in the pursuit of self-sufficiency. The water crisis has almost certainly increased the risk of a major uprising that may result in violent protests and clashes with the security forces. In 2021, water shortages resulted in the Iranian water protests, a series of protests by Iranians against water shortages in Khuzestan province that spread to multiple other provinces and cities, where people organised rallies in solidarity with Khuzestan, including in Tehran, leading to hundreds of arrests and several deaths.

On 17 November, Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) sentenced former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to death on a series of charges, including crimes against humanity and murder. Hasina’s government, led by her Awami League (AL) party, was toppled in the student-led 2024 July Revolution, which resulted in up to 1,400 deaths. As Hasina escaped to India following the revolution, she was tried in absentia. For the first time in Bangladeshi history, trial proceedings were televised.

Several cases of violence and vandalism have been recorded during the sentencing period. Between 13 and 16 November, several improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were detonated in Dhaka, multiple buses were set on fire across the country, and cases of vandalism and arson were recorded, among other places, in Barguna, Munshiganj, Tangail, and Gopalganj. On 17 November, violent protests erupted in the Dhanmondi 32 area of Dhaka, with several attacks on police. On the same day, a representative of the youth wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP, the largest party in the country following the collapse of Hasina’s AL) was stabbed to death in Barishal, while another BNP leader was shot and killed in Dhaka. Further incidents occurred after the verdict. On 19 November, arson attacks were recorded across Dhaka, including near police stations, while a train coach was set on fire in Mymensingh.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hasina’s sentence to death is unlikely to be carried out as the Indian government retains little interest in surrendering the former leader to Dhaka. Still, it almost certainly represents an important political victory for the interim government of Muhammad Yunus, who remains, despite significant pressure from BNP and the other political parties backing his government, a largely unifying figure. In practice, the sentence has a likelihood of accelerating further prosecution procedures towards Hasina’s associates and AL leaders who still remain in the country.

The current impossibility of carrying out the verdict is likely to be a key driver of continued political violence, particularly mob violence, targeting AL assets and personnel in Bangladesh. Moreover, India’s role has the realistic possibility of inflaming sectarian tensions in Bangladesh, possibly placing Hindu minority communities in the country at a risk of “retaliatory” attacks.

Protests in Bangladesh often consist of road blockades and thus cause severe transport disruptions. In some cases, protesters have targeted transiting vehicles, posing a direct threat to bystanders’ lives. Protracted periods of protests can result in nationwide disruptions and may impact key services such as the delivery of emergency healthcare.

On 16 and 17 November, large-scale but peaceful protests occurred in Metro Manila in the Philippines. The demonstrations were part of an ongoing wave of anti-corruption protests that began in September, stemming from a scandal regarding embezzlement from flood control projects. On 16 November, an estimated 500,000-600,000 Filipinos attended a rally organised by the religious group Inglesia ni Cristo (INC), the largest gathering so far in the protest movement. The main venue was Rizal Park in Manila, although smaller gatherings also took place elsewhere, such as 2,000  attendees in Quezon City. The protest was peaceful, although authorities closed roads in anticipation and classes were suspended. On 17 November, the demonstrations notably consisted of student-led mobilisations (coinciding with International Students’ Day), the largest gathering again in Rizal Park, with a further rally planned for the following day being cancelled by INC organisers. Authorities are reportedly preparing for anticipated large-scale and nationwide protests scheduled on 30 November, a further iteration of the “Trillion Peso March”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Philippines is almost certainly among the most vulnerable countries in the world to natural disasters. Its geographical position exposes it to frequent tropical storms and typhoons, while its location within the Pacific ‘Ring of Fire’ makes it highly prone to seismic activity. Furthermore, the Philippines has poor disaster resiliency. A country’s disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, is a critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. Due to the confluence of the Philippines’ extreme exposure to natural hazards and its poor disaster resilience, the country is frequently cited as the most disaster-prone country in the world.

The protest movement has almost certainly been galvanised by the devastating impact of several natural disasters in recent months, including a powerful 6.9 magnitude earthquake off Cebu Island, Super Typhoon Ragasa (known locally as Nando) and Typhoon Bualoi (Opong). In early-mid November, the combined impacts of Super Typhoon Fung-wong (Uwan) and Typhoon Kalmaegi (Tino) killed at least 259 people in the Philippines, with emergency response efforts having almost certainly overwhelmed by the sheer extent of the flooding.

Although the Philippines’ typhoon season has now reached its typical end, the protest movement will highly likely continue over the coming months, given the sheer impact of flooding that is almost certainly exacerbated by corruption in disaster resiliency projects. The movement in general has been characterised by its largely peaceful nature, although considerable disruptions can still occur, and there have been instances of isolated clashes, such as during protests in September. However, if considerable strides are not made by the government to address the grievances of the protesters, there is a realistic possibility that the movement could grow more radical and therefore violent in future.

The disaster-prone central region of Vietnam is experiencing heavy rainfall exceeding 400 mm, leading to flooding and landslides, which have caused significant disruption.

The deadliest landslide occurred on 17 November on a mountain pass between Dat Lat and Nha Trang, killing at least seven people, and its impact was exacerbated by difficulties in accessing the site. This follows a larger trend of landslides and flooding across the region, of which the cities of Hue, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Quy Nhon and Quang Ngai have been particularly affected. On 16 November, one person was killed due to waterlogged soil collapsing on them in Khanh Hoa, then on 17 November, Da Nang was struck by a tornado, injuring two and damaging 20 houses, and at least seven dead in Khanh Hoa from landslides. Following these landslides, officials declared a state of emergency. Evacuations have been carried out in the Khanh Hao, Quy Nhon, Quang Tri and Gia Lai provinces.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The central region is experiencing major transport disruptions. Sections of the National Route 1 highway have been flooded and damaged. In Dak Lak, parts of the highway have been blocked to traffic and sections of the highway south of the city are also experiencing disruptions. Other major highways have been blocked, and bridges have collapsed, isolating several villages in the region. The rain has triggered multiple landslides on major routes in Vietnam’s Central Highlands, including many mountainside roads popular with tourists. Public transport and vehicle access have been suspended on many of these highland routes. Key sections of the North-South railway are submerged. The popular services of SE7 from Hanoi and the SE6 from Saigon have also been affected.

According to the National Centre for Hydrometeorological Forecasting, heavy rainfall is set to continue across the North of the region as well as the South-Central coast. Rivers are rising rapidly, with emergency flood warnings issued for multiple rivers across Central Vietnam (from Hue to Khanh Hao). Vietnamese authorities are warning that disruptions to transport, agriculture and daily life are likely to continue across the South-Central region of Vietnam.

Labour rights and anti-corruption protests in Jaipur, India. 

Between 18 and 20 November, civil unrest was recorded in Jaipur, Rajasthan. The protests were driven by two concurrent incidents. First, the suicide of a local booth level officer (BLO, a category of government official) and teacher, which was reportedly motivated by excessive work requirements and pressure linked with the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) system. SIR is an electoral exercise aimed at preparing voter lists across the country. BLOs are required to meet voter enumeration quotas, which critics say are too demanding. Second, alleged election fraud during the recent local elections. While the unrest on 18 November did not result in notable disruptions, the protests on 20 November were significantly larger and turned violent after protesters allegedly tried to breach the perimeter near a local minister’s residence. Indian police stated that approximately 150 people were detained during the unrest.

Pakistani security forces conduct large raids near the Afghan border, killing 38 militants.                 

On 16 November, Pakistani security forces conducted two raids in Dera Ismail Khan and North Waziristan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, on Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) hideouts, killing at least 15. Two further raids took place on 17 November across the northwestern Bajaur and Bannu districts, killing at least 23. No military casualties were reported. The raids come after a suicide bombing killed 12 people in Islamabad on 11 November, in an attack that was linked to the TTP. The attack risked escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, whose Taliban government have been accused of harbouring and supplying the TTP. Further raids and a heightened security presence in areas close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are highly likely in the coming weeks.

Massive fire destroys and damages hundreds of buildings in Oita, Japan.  

On 18 November, a large-scale fire broke out in Oita, a city in the southern island of Kyushu, Japan. The fire reportedly broke out in the city’s Saganoseki district and quickly spread to nearby buildings as well as a nearby forested area and even an island one kilometre from the coast. Before being contained on 19 November, the fire burned or damaged approximately 170 buildings and caused severe disruptions throughout the city.

At least one person died due to the fire. The incident constitutes the largest urban fire in Japan since a 1976 blaze in Sakata. The cause of the fire in Oita remains, as of 20 November, undetermined. Its severe impact, however, was almost certainly caused by the strong winds, which also led to the fire’s spread to the nearby island.

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