On 20 and 21 September, anti-government protests broke out, led by Gen Z protesters, after the government passed a law requiring young adults to join a private pension fund. At least 18 people have been injured in clashes after approximately 500 protesters gathered in central Lima.  The Peruvian National Police deployed rubber bullets and tear gas, and demonstrators broke through police cordons and set fires as they attempted to reach the Government Palace of Peru and other key government buildings in central Lima. Video footage shows protesters throwing objects, including Molotov cocktails, and setting fires near key locations such as Plaza San Martín and the Supreme Court. The situation has led to temporary closures of metro stations and changes in traffic routes in the affected areas.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Anti-government sentiment has been growing for months, driven by rising organised crime and extortion cases alongside widespread perceptions of government corruption. President Dina Boluarte’s approval rating has plummeted, with the latest polls placing it at approximately two per cent, with Boluarte starting her tenure as popular after the former president was deposed in a political coup. Boluarte’s popularity has further plummeted due to widespread perceptions that she is failing to tackle rising crime rates or deal with systemic government corruption. On Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Peru scored a 31 out of 100, the same score as Djibouti and Papua New Guinea. The weak oversight, frequent changes of government, and numerous scandals have contributed to significant anti-government sentiment.

Extortion and crime rates have almost certainly exacerbated the public’s frustration. Between 2021 and 2023, reported extortion cases increased by 370 per cent. Peru also recorded its highest number of homicides in seven years in 2024, with many homicides linked to refusals to pay the extortion demands of transnational criminal organisations like Tren de Aragua. This has led to states of emergency being imposed and expanded security powers that have included the imposition of curfews, checkpoints, restrictions on public gathering and the deployment of more security personnel. Generation Z has also been hugely affected by economic conditions, which have resulted in high rates of youth unemployment and a rise in informal work, which has increased youth mobilisation. The pension reform law has raised concerns that the responsibility for pensions has shifted from the state to the individual, and that this transition disproportionately affects younger and informal workers who lack stable income or long-term employment prospects. This has almost certainly acted as a catalyst for the current protests. However, given President Boluarte’s low popularity rating, perceptions of corruption, endemic security issues and a range of economic issues, there is a high capacity that what emerged as anti-pension reform protests will evolve into a larger protest movement with greater participation from wider society. The current protest is the most significant demonstration of 2025 and the third major wave of unrest in five years. Previous demonstrations in 2020 and 2023 resulted in at least 68 deaths as civil unrest broke out across the country, which resulted in widespread clashes with the security forces.

Truck drivers protest in Quebec, Canada.

Severe disruptions were recorded in Quebec on 22 September, as several protest road blockades and slow convoys were set up by local truck drivers. The protests were organised to coincide with a planned strike of the Société de transport de Montréal (STM), likely to compound the impact on transport across the state. Organisers have called for demonstrations to oppose a perceived increase in the number of drivers who lack Quebec-approved permits.  In 2022, trucker-led protests against COVID-19-related restrictions resulted in severe economic impacts and attained widespread international visibility. While the latest unrest is highly unlikely to reach the same scope, there is a realistic possibility of protracted disruptions depending on the government’s response to the protesters’ demands.

Protests across Brazil against Bolsonaro “amnesty” bill.

On 21 September, large-scale protests occurred across Brazil’s 26 states, following the passing, by the parliament’s lower house, of an opposition-sponsored constitutional amendment that requires a secret vote by representatives to authorise criminal charges against an elected lawmaker. Opponents of the bill, which include President  Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, argue that this will likely make it extremely difficult to prosecute elected representatives and that it will also derail the implementation of the recent sentence of 27 years in prison recently handed to former President Jair Bolsonaro over his attempts to remain in power after losing the 2022 elections. Bolsonaro continues to be an extremely controversial political figure in Brazil and, despite his recent conviction, retains a massive power base. Further protests remain likely following the final vote on the bill in the Senate.

US pledges economic support for Argentina.

On 22 September, US Treasury officials pledged to consider “all options” to support the Argentine economy. On the following day, US President Donald Trump and Argentine President Javier Milei met in New York,wherethe former reiterated his commitment to “help” Buenos Aires. The developments occurred amid a major run on the Peso that has been ongoing since Milei’s party performed poorly at the Buenos Aires provincial elections, widely seen as a barometer of overall support for the government. Aside from the possible economic implications of Washington’s statements, the pledge is highly likely to drive significant opposition from the country’s left, which is sceptical of the Milei administration’s drastic foreign policy turn towards Washington. Large-scale protests against Mieli’s austerity policy programme occurred on 17 September in Buenos Aires, and the opposition will likely seek to take advantage of further opportunities to capitalise on the president’s relative political weakness.

US to designate Antifa as a “domestic terrorist organisation”.

On 22 September, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order designating Antifa as a “domestic terrorist organisation”, a new designation that is not found in US law. The text of the order does not contain any specific measure to be directed against Antifa as part of the new designation, beyond vaguely mentioning “[utilising] all applicable authorities to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle any illegal operations”. In fact, this wording seems to imply that action against the group would still fall under established categories of criminal prosecution. The impacts of the executive order remain difficult to assess, both due to its novelty and due to its target’s structure; Antifa is a largely decentralised movement, with no vertical chains of command. In the short term, it could be leveraged by the administration to challenge institutions such as colleges and NGOs, which have sometimes been accused by opponents of funding or supporting the group directly or indirectly. In turn, there is a realistic possibility that the order will drive retaliatory action, including possibly political violence and sabotage, by supporters of Antifa or of its ideology.

Likely lone wolf attack targeting ICE facility in Texas, US.

On 24 September, an individual reportedly carried out a shooting targeting an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in Dallas, Texas, killing two people and injuring at least three. The victims were later identified as detainees at the facility, while the shooter, who opened fire from a nearby rooftop according to police, was found dead. According to local officials, authorities found “anti-ICE” written on some of the unspent ammunition rounds.

This marks the third attack on ICE facilities and personnel in less than a year in Texas, after previous cases in Fort Worth and McAllen. The Fort Worth attack, which occurred on 4 July, was the only one to be conducted by multiple individuals. The previous attacks are part of a growing trend of targeted violence against federal officers and particularly ICE agents, which is highly likely linked to the growing high-visibility deportation efforts carried out by the current administration. Finally, it is notable that the individual who, earlier in September, assassinated US right-wing political commentator Charlie Kirk at a university campus in Utah, also wrote slogans or inscribed symbols on the ammunition he used. This commonality potentially points to the recent attack being a copycat action.

Gangs carry out targeted killings in Machala prison, Ecuador.

In the early hours of 22 September, Ecuadorean media reported a series of gunfights inside a prison in Machala, in the southwestern El Oro province, resulting in at least a dozen deaths. According to available reports, the attack was a coordinated “offensive” by members of the Los Lobos gang and targeted inmates who were supposedly members of rival criminal groups. The incident underscores how, despite the state of emergency imposed by authorities and expanded security powers, Ecuadorian gangs are still able to operate out of detention facilities, controlling inflows of firearms and other weapons from the outside, while also widely suspected of commanding operations outside of the prison system. There is a realistic possibility that gang violence on the street will escalate as rival groups carry out retaliatory attacks in response to the prison violence.

Floods damage hundreds of homes in Veracruz, Mexico.

On 23 September, heavy rains caused localised flooding in parts of Mexico’s southern Veracruz state, including Texistepec, Coatzacoalcos and Chinameca.  Local authorities report that up to 1,000 homes were damaged by the flooding, which also caused localised travel disruptions.  In southern Mexico, the rainy season begins in May and continues until October. In Veracruz, rain volumes usually peak in September and October, and, indeed, severe floods were recorded in the state in the same period of 2024. Consequently, further flooding remains likely in the coming weeks, potentially leading to landslides, road closures and business, power and transport disruption.

6.3 magnitude earthquake hits Venezuela.

On 24 September, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake struck 27 kilometres from Mene Grande in northwest Venezuela, at a depth of 14 kilometres. A few hours later, a 5.8 magnitude aftershock struck 28 kilometres from Mene Grande. There were no reports of casualties or serious damage. The earthquake was also felt in neighbouring Colombia, alongside the Caribbean islands of Aruba, Curacao, and Bonaire. Further aftershocks are highly likely, although they will likely be of a relatively low magnitude and are unlikely to cause significant damage.

Several drone-related incidents have been recorded at airports in the Nordic countries of Denmark and Norway. On the night of 22-23 September, Copenhagen and Oslo airports temporarily shut down operations due to reported drone sightings over the facilities. The closures lasted around four hours and resulted in the cancellations or delays of dozens of flights. Danish authorities stated that either two or three drones were active over the Copenhagen airports, and mentioned that the operator was “skilled”, but did not appear to aim to cause harm to bystanders. According to local authorities, as of 25 September, no suspects have been identified and no drones retrieved.  

A second, more serious, wave of closures of Danish airports was recorded in the early hours of 25 September. This time, Billund and Aalborg airports, the latter of which is also used by the military, were forced to close due to reported drone incursions. Drone sightings were also recorded near Sonderborg and Esbjerg airports and Skrydstrup airbase, all on the Jutland peninsula.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Russia of being responsible for the two incidents on social media, although there is currently no evidence indicating that it was Moscow. Also on the evening of 22 September, reports emerged from Sweden, indicating that some locals had contacted police after spotting “large drones” in Malmö. Unlike in Denmark and Norway, no disruptions were recorded in Sweden. The incident occurred just days after a large-scale cyberattack forced the suspension of operations at several other European airports, including London Heathrow, Brussels and Berlin.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Drone-related disruptions at European airports have become more frequent in recent years. Gatwick Airport, in London, was shut down after drones were spotted in both 2018 and 2023. Easily available commercially off-the-shelf (COTS) drones offer a cheap way to cause significant economic disruptions at airports, as even brief pauses in operations can translate into millions of dollars’ worth of losses and widespread frustration. Moreover, drones are difficult to detect or trace and can be deployed and extracted easily from a few kilometres from the target. Operators typically have enough time to escape before authorities identify them and respond, or can simply abandon the cheap and easily available systems at minimal cost.

While no suspects have been identified so far, there is a realistic possibility that the assessment advanced by Kyiv is correct, with Danish authorities referring to the incident as a “hybrid” attack. Individual drone incursions over an airport are often conducted by individual actors. However, the scale and coordination of these incursions suggest a high degree of organisation and planning, likely indicative of a state actor. Moreover, some of the targets reinforce this argument. In Denmark, both Aalborg and Skrydstrup are used by the military, and the latter hosts the entire fleet of F-16 fighter jets operated by the Royal Danish Air Force (RDAF). Danish F-16s were scrambled over 80 times in 2024 in Quick Reaction Alert-activations, most of which were over the Baltic Sea to monitor Russian aircraft. Denmark has also provided Ukraine with several F-16s, with several more due to be handed over in 2025.  Furthermore, both Norway and Denmark continue to commit military aid to Ukraine and have increased pledges in 2025.

Moscow has recently taken a series of escalatory actions targeting NATO’s “border states”, likely aimed at testing both the individual states’ and NATO’s resolve, increasing domestic political tensions, and assessing the responsiveness of their air defence systems and response protocols. These notably included the incursions of several drones in Poland and Romania, and of fighter aircraft in Estonia. Belarusian and Russian forces also recently staged the Zapad 2025 (“West 2025”) exercises near the border with Lithuania. Moreover, Russian ‘hybrid’ operations have previously targeted air transport hubs. In late 2024, Polish security forces arrested four individuals likely linked to Russian intelligence for allegedly planning to plant incendiary explosive devices on cargo planes, with one detonating at a warehouse in Birmingham, UK. These actions imply a deliberate strategy designed to undermine Western support and apply pressure on NATO through a blend of conventional and asymmetric actions that have been part of Moscow’s modus operandi since the start of the Ukraine war. Given the effectiveness of these tactics, the level of associated disruption, and limited prospects of escalation, it is likely that these tactics will increase in scale and frequency.

On 20 September, large-scale disruptions were recorded at check-in desks at London Heathrow, Zaventem (Brussels), Dublin, and Berlin airports, with hundreds of flights either cancelled or delayed. According to the airport operators, the disruptions were caused by a cyberattack that exploited vulnerabilities in the check-in software of Collins Aerospace, a US-based company which provides services to the three affected facilities. Disruptions continued to be reported on 22 September, as Collins Aerospace representatives noted that they could not immediately provide a secure and updated version of the software to be deployed at the facilities. The company appears to be rebuilding the system after attempting to relaunch it. Other European airports reported being indirectly affected by the cyberattacks, as they were forced to adjust flight schedules and operations due to the disruptions. On 24 September, UK authorities reported the arrest of one individual in West Sussex in connection with the incidents.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) stated on 22 September that the incident was a form of ransomware attack that utilised an “identified” type of malware. A ransomware attack is an operation where the perpetrator damages critical infrastructure or blocks the target’s access to it, demanding payment to restore it to its original state. In recent months, several high-profile ransomware attacks have targeted EU and UK-based companies, at times resulting in damages exceeding hundreds of billions of USD. Thales, a French aerospace and defence company, claimed that cyberattacks targeting the aviation sector have increased by 600 per cent between January 2024 and April 2025, with a total of 27 attacks recorded in this period. Notably, attacks have also been perpetrated by a wide selection of actors, with 22 separate entities responsible for the incidents during this period.

Air transport is highly likely to remain a desirable target for cybercriminals, including both state and non-state actors. The interconnectedness of the sector means that even short-lived disruptions can cause severe economic damage, thus providing an incentive for targets to pay a ransom. Moreover, air transport operators are attractive targets for cyberespionage operations, due to their access to strategically and economically valuable information, such as passengers’ biometric data and cutting-edge technology. Finally, airports are intrinsically high-visibility targets due to general expectations of extremely high security standards, and disrupting their operations can therefore have notable political implications, which makes attacks an attractive hybrid warfare tool.

On 21 September, the United Kingdom, jointly with Commonwealth countries including Canada and Australia, recognised Palestinian statehood. Portugal also recognised Palestine on the same day. French President Emmanuel Macron also pledged to recognise Palestine at the UN General Assembly in New York. The UK and France’s announcements place them alongside other European countries, such as Spain, Sweden and Ireland.

The European powers’ move leaves Germany and Italy as the two most prominent countries in the EU that do not recognise Palestine. In Italy, large-scale pro-Palestine protests occurred on 22 September following the developments. The unrest resulted in large-scale clashes in Milan, Bologna and other cities, as well as cases of vandalism targeting public infrastructure and businesses perceived to be pro-Israeli, and widespread transport and service disruptions. Protesters also sought to blockade Italian ports, including those in Genoa and Marghera, that are departure points for weapons shipments to Israel. At least 60 people were injured and dozens arrested.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recent diplomatic developments are almost certainly the product of growing domestic pressures in the United Kingdom and France, as well as in other countries, which have steadily increased throughout the course of the war in Gaza and have almost certainly reached their peak following the beginning of the Israeli offensive in Gaza City. While recognition is highly unlikely to have an immediate effect in Gaza or the West Bank, it is likely to further complicate Israel’s international position and will highly likely drive a worsening in diplomatic relations between Israel’s government and Paris and London.

The development’s most immediate impact will highly likely be felt in Germany and Italy, as well as in Belgium, whose government has pledged to recognise Palestine only after the release of the hostages. All three countries have large pro-Palestine movements but are also governed by parties that are perceived to espouse broadly pro-Israeli foreign policy positions. Because of this, it is highly likely that civil society actors will increasingly seek to maximise domestic pressures on their governments by leveraging civil unrest and direct action methods, such as transport blockades targeting infrastructure and transport hubs. As seen in Milan and Bologna, large-scale protests that follow major diplomatic developments are likely to turn violent, and can coincide with cases of targeted vandalism.

Finally, the events’ high visibility has the realistic possibility of driving political violence, including extremist action such as “lone wolf” terror attacks. This threat is moreover amplified by the upcoming second anniversary of the 7 October Hamas-led attack. Since late 2023, notable anniversaries relating to the Israel-Palestine conflict, but also more broadly linked with Israeli and Palestinian history, have at times coincided with cases of extremist violence. These include, for instance, a lone wolf attack in Munich in September 2024, which occurred on the anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre.

In what has been considered a stunning shift in his position, US President Donald Trump stated on 23 September that he believes Ukraine can “win” the war against Russia and reclaim lost territories. Trump asserted that Russia is in “BIG economic trouble” and dismissed Russia as a “paper tiger”. Trump also continued to urge NATO members to stop purchasing Russian oil as a prerequisite for the US imposing new sanctions against Moscow. Trump reportedly held a phone call with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and urged Hungary to stop importing Russian oil, as Hungary is one of the largest importers in the EU.

Speaking alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the UN General Assembly, Trump also stated in response to a journalist that NATO aircraft should shoot down Russian aircraft which enter allied airspace, but later qualified that US support would depend on the circumstances. The Kremlin has responded defiantly to Trump’s various statements,  with spokesman Dmitry Peskov claiming that Russia is more of a “bear” than a tiger, and “there are no paper bears”.

One of Trump’s stated reasons for his confidence in Ukraine has been the successes of its aerial campaign. Ukrainian forces have continued the campaign over the past week with several attacks, including several drone attacks against targets in occupied Crimea, and further successful attacks against Russian energy infrastructure, including the Gazprom Neftekhim petrochemical complex in Bashkortostan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There are almost certainly multiple factors which have conditioned Trump’s newfound optimism on Ukraine’s prospects in the war. First, there are domestic political influences. Outside of the more isolationist ‘MAGA’ tendencies in the Republican Party, more traditional ‘hawks’ in the party have consistently pushed for a more pro-Ukrainian position. This is reflected by the statements of multiple senior congressional figures in the GOP following Trump’s statements, which supported the president’s new rhetoric.

Second, Trump has reportedly received updated US intelligence which outlines the extent of the economic damage wrought by Ukraine’s aerial campaign against oil infrastructure. Multiple regions in Russia have been forced to impose strict limits on gasoline sales, including selling only diesel and limits of only 10-20 litres per customer in some instances. Ukrainian forces have been striking refineries on an almost weekly basis, with supply disruptions being reported in Moscow, Leningrad, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, and other regions.

Third, Trump has likely been impressed by the capability of Ukrainian forces to repel Russian advances at the front lines in Donetsk. On 23 September, Zelensky told Trump that at least 1,000 Russian troops had been encircled, which highly likely refers to the Ukrainian de facto counteroffensive against the Dobropillia salient. Russian forces in August successfully made a breakthrough on the Dobropillia axis, in a rapid advance which posed major concerns about the state of Ukraine’s defences at the front line. However, Ukrainian forces have highly likely successfully not only stopped this advance but are in the process of completing an encirclement of the salient. According to two sources familiar with the situation speaking to US media, Trump has received a briefing that Kyiv is planning an offensive against Russia, which would require US intelligence support, which has likely further contributed to Trump’s sentiment that Ukraine is well-capable of continuing the war.

Trump’s potential shift on Ukraine has not yet materialised in practical policy changes. Washington continues to impose limits on the use of US-provided long-range weaponry against targets in Russia, and Trump continues to hold off on imposing new sanctions against Russia. The US continues to supply arms to Ukraine through the NATO Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which involves European allies purchasing US arms on behalf of Ukraine, with limited cost incurred to the US. There is a realistic possibility that the newly deployed rhetoric by Trump may justify, in the longer term, the US stepping further back from directly supporting Ukraine, due to a potentially implied perspective that Ukraine is capable enough of prosecuting its defensive war against Russia with European support alone.

On 22 September, the treason trial of suspended Vice President Riek Machar began in Juba. The court proceedings, which Machar’s lawyer claimed are “unconstitutional, unlawful, illegal, and void”, opened under tight security, with media access restricted to the state broadcaster. Machar’s charges include, among others, treason, murder, and crimes against humanity. The charges were levelled after the White Army militia attacked a military base in Nasir, northeastern South Sudan, in March 2025, killing over 250 soldiers. The attack was allegedly carried out under Machar’s orders and was marked by gross violations of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law, including the desecration of corpses, persecution of civilians and attacks on humanitarian workers”, according to Justice Minister Joseph Geng Akech. Seven other members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), including the former minister of petroleum, have also been charged.

Following the charges, on 15 September, the SPLM-IO officially denounced the charges as a “political witch-hunt” and a move to “dismantle” the 2018 peace agreement; it also labelled President Salva Kiir’s regime a “dictatorship” that is “holding power illegally and by violence” and demanded “regime change”, urging its supporters to “report for national service” and to utilise “all means available to regain their country and sovereignty”. Despite the rhetoric, there are reportedly no current indications that troop mobilisation is underway.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Machar will likely be found guilty. While South Sudan’s courts are formally independent, they are weak, politicised, and vulnerable to executive interference in practice; a 2023 US Department of State report on human rights in South Sudan found “serious problems with the independence of the judiciary.” Capital punishment is a legal penalty under the Penal Code Act of South Sudan and is typically used against individuals convicted of serious crimes, including murder and terrorism. Machar’s charges, if fully upheld, almost certainly reach the legal threshold for capital punishment. However, given the fragility of the political situation, a severe sentence avoiding the death penalty, such as life imprisonment, may be favoured by the court to mitigate more severe reactions from the SPLM-IO.

The trial of Machar almost certainly threatens to collapse the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The agreement, signed in September 2018, established a coalition government of the SPLM, led by President Kiir, and SPLM-IO, led by First Vice President Machar. The resolution brought together the warring factions: the Dinka, aligned with Kiir, and the Nuer, aligned with Machar. It has been credited with ending the civil war that killed over 400,000 people since 2013. Through 2025, renewed fighting between the ethnically Nuer White Army, which presents itself as a community defence force for Nuer people, and government forces has triggered the ongoing political crisis, with the arrest of Machar in March a major flashpoint.

While the peace deal has not fully collapsed, a guilty verdict, particularly if Machar is given the death sentence, could be the trigger that returns South Sudan to civil war. Renewed clashes in 2025 have, so far, been offset by the formal commitment from both the SPLM and SPLM-IO to continue to engage politically, almost certainly due to the high likelihood of large-scale violence if the peace agreement were to collapse. However, the 15 September statement from the SPLM-IO regarding regime change and mobilisation suggests a change in its approach towards the government. Machar is the most senior Nuer leader in the national government, and his sentencing will likely be interpreted as a departure from the commitments of the R-ARCSS by the SPLM-IO.

French syndicates propose another general strike for 2 October.

On 24 September, several leaders of France’s major labour unions met with newly-appointed Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu in Paris. Following the meeting, several union representatives stated that they were disappointed in the discussions and called for another general strike on 2 October, following the previous “Bloquons Tout” strikes on 18 and 10 September. The call was met with support from all the country’s major left-wing parties. The announcement is likely indicative of labour unions’ perception of the government’s weakness, which makes them assess that maximising pressure will result in significant political concessions. Further strikes would almost certainly result in severe transport disruptions, as seen in the first two iterations of “Bloquons Tout”.

Anti-migrant demonstration in the Hague, the Netherlands, escalates into violence.

On 20 September, hundreds of protesters clashed with police in the Dutch city during a protest opposing immigration to the country. Protesters also reportedly vandalised the local headquarters of the centre-left Democrats ’66 (D66) party. The protests were originally called by a Dutch social media influencer, who has no clear party affiliation, although is broadly supportive of local populist right forces like Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV). Local media have reported that the protests were attended by local “hooligans”, and have published social media posts, allegedly by the protest’s organiser, calling for their attendance.

The protests are notable as they are almost entirely social-media driven and developed rapidly after the initial online call for unrest. The Netherlands will hold general elections in late October, when, as in other European countries, immigration is likely to be the key campaign issue. As such, further protests, including possible clashes, remain likely during the campaign.

Far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) tops nationwide polls for the first time.

According to the latest polling average monitored by Politico, which collects all national polling data, AfD surpassed the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) in mid-September to become the highest-polling party in Germany, with 26 per cent total support. This represents the first time that the AfD has topped German polls and constitutes a further increase in the party’s share of the (projected) vote, up from the 20.8 per cent it won at the 2025 parliamentary elections. The new data is unlikely to translate into any meaningful short-term opening for the AfD to enter power, as the “cordon sanitaire” system, an alliance between centrist parties to keep AfD out of government, continues to hold both at the local and federal levels. However, the AfD’s growth may indirectly push CDU/CSU to the right in highly contentious areas such as migration and welfare reforms. Moreover, in 2024, large-scale anti-AfD protests occurred across Germany in response to the party’s growing support. Further unrest remains a possibility following the release of the latest polling data.

Moldova arrests 74 people over alleged Moscow-backed plan to cause large-scale civil unrest.

On 22 September, Moldovan authorities claimed to have conducted more than 250 raids across the country, leading to the arrest of 74 people. According to prosecutors, the arrested were part of a Russia-backed network aiming to stage large-scale civil unrest and “destabilisation” on the eve of the 28 September elections. The vast majority of the suspects are also reported to have received “training” in Serbia. The arrests almost certainly reveal the extent of Russian efforts to destabilise Moldova ahead of the key general election, which is largely perceived as the final political hurdle in the country’s road to joining the EU following the narrow victory of a 2024 referendum. Days earlier, the BBC published an exposé detailing a sophisticated information operation coordinated from Moscow, aimed at promoting parties friendly to Russia and eroding support for President Maia Sandu and her pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS).

Syrian government postpones elections to 5 October, opens voting in Suwayda.

On 21 September, the Syrian state-run media agency SANA stated that the vote to elect two-thirds of the members of the People’s Assembly will be held on 5 October, with the remaining third being directly appointed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The vote had initially been scheduled for September, but was postponed for security reasons, and was likely to follow al-Sharaa’s appearance at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Moreover, Syrian officials state that the 5 October vote will be held in all provinces of the country. This represents an important shift, as the original plan called for the indefinite postponement of the elections in the provinces of Suwayda, Hasakah, and Raqqa.

In Suwayda, government forces have repeatedly clashed with Druze groups, which remain opposed to a pact with Damascus. Meanwhile, Hasakah and Raqqa governorates are under the partial control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The elections are likely to entail severe security risks, as there are, in Syria, several armed groups who almost certainly have an interest in targeting the voting process to destabilise the government. These include, in addition to the Druze forces in Suwayda, a resurgent Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which sees voting as morally unacceptable and aims to portray Damascus as being occupied by an “apostate” government, and pro-Assad remnant forces, particularly in Syria’s Mediterranean coast.

Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso announce withdrawal from ICC.

On 23 September, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising the junta-led Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, announced their withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC). In justifying the withdrawal, an AES statement denounced the ICC as a “tool of neocolonial repression” and claimed that it was incapable of prosecuting the more severe crimes under international humanitarian law (IHL), such as genocide.

Since the coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in January and September 2022, and Niger in 2023, the countries have withdrawn from several international agreements, most notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2025. They have also ejected the French military and UN peacekeeping missions and employed anti-colonial rhetoric while increasingly relying on Russian private military companies (PMCs) and paramilitary personnel.

The regimes have been accused of several crimes under IHL by the UN and humanitarian groups such as Human Rights Watch, including summary executions and forced disappearances of civilians. The ICC has engaged in an investigation into alleged war crimes committed in Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal in Mali since 2013. The withdrawal is highly likely to shelter the regimes from prosecution by aiming to delegitimise the institution. Furthermore, the AES likely aims to align more closely with Russia, which withdrew its signature of the Rome Statute in November 2016 following an ICC report labelling the Russian annexation of Crimea an “occupation”.

Guinea voters endorse new constitution, which allows junta leader to run in upcoming election.

On 23 September, Guinean citizens voted in a constitutional referendum. The referendum was concerning whether to replace the existing 2020 constitution with one that introduced a Senate and extended term limits for the president. The new constitution would also allow junta leader Mamady Doumbouya, who overthrew President Alpha Condé in September 2021, to run for office. The referendum passed with 89 per cent of voters voting in favour; turnout exceeded 70 per cent. 45,000 security personnel were deployed across the country during the vote in a move opposition have claimed aimed to intimidate the population.

The constitutional referendum comes as part of Doumbouya’s pledge to restore civilian rule after four years of junta control and takes place in the run-up to presidential elections, the first to be held in Guinea since the coup, which have been promised for December 2025. The referendum highly likely constitutes an attempt by the junta to constitutionally solidify its hold on power, which has been consolidated by an increasing militarisation of the government since the coup. While civil unrest is unlikely at this stage, particularly given the junta’s ban on protests in 2022, there is a realistic possibility that a sweeping Doumbouya victory in the election amid suppression of opposition voices will provoke widespread demonstrations.

NATO aircraft intercept three Russian jets in Estonian airspace.

On 19 September, NATO jets were scrambled to intercept three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets after they entered Estonian airspace over the Gulf of Finland. According to NATO channels, the incursion lasted 12 minutes, while Moscow denied that it happened. Estonian officials requested consultations on Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which allows any member state to bring an issue to the attention of the council if it perceives a direct threat to its sovereignty. The incident occurred only a week after a large incursion of Russian drones and jets in Polish airspace, which resulted in Warsaw triggering Article 4. Moscow is highly likely using these provocations as part of a strategy intended to test NATO’s resolve in actions assessed to be sub-threshold for war, as well as to probe air defences and response times in NATO’s eastern flank.  

Two killed in an attack at the Israel-Jordan border prompt frontier closure.

On 19 September, an individual, reportedly a truck driver transporting an aid shipment, carried out a shooting that killed two Israeli soldiers at the Allenby Crossing between Israel and Jordan. Tel Aviv announced a border closure on the same day, with the crossing remaining closed as of 25 September.  The 19 September attack was the latest in a series of similar incidents at the Israel-Jordan border, which almost certainly constitute “lone wolf” attacks by self-radicalised individuals, with no clear affiliation to Palestinian armed groups. The increase in Israeli operations in the West Bank, which are highly likely to further accelerate following several Western states’ recognition of Palestinian statehood, is likely to drive further attacks.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strike on a mosque in El-Fasher, Sudan, kills 78.

The strike occurred during Friday prayers on 19 September, and is the latest in a series of RSF attacks against civilian and healthcare infrastructure in the city. El-Fasher remains the last stronghold of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Darfur, and the attack followed renewed RSF efforts to take the besieged city. Capturing El-Fasher would likely allow RSF to rotate forces to the east of the country, where the group has faced significant defeats in recent months, including the loss of the capital of Khartoum.

The intensification of fighting in El-Fasher is highly likely to further exacerbate the humanitarian conditions of the approximately 300,000 civilians in the city, a high proportion of whom are internally displaced persons (IDPs). Moreover, it is likely to have cross-border impacts: the conflict in Darfur has displaced tens of thousands of individuals to the northeast of the Central African Republic (CAR) and the northeast of South Sudan, exposing them to severe abuse, including human trafficking.

France suspends counterterrorism cooperation with Mali.

On 19 September, Paris expelled two Malian diplomats and announced that it would suspend counterterrorism cooperation programmes with Mali. International media reported that the decision followed the arrest of a French intelligence officer in the country, dating back to August, with the accusation of planning a “coup”. Relations between France and the three juntas of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) have deteriorated significantly in recent years, with the juntas increasingly looking to Moscow as a replacement security provider. The recent development is unlikely to significantly impact the ongoing conflict in the Sahel, but, on the other hand, is likely to further incentivise Paris to strengthen security ties with coastal West African states to counter the growing threat of transnational violent extremist organisations (VEOs) in the region.

Flash floods affect Spain, Italy and France.

Severe flooding affected parts of France, Spain and Italy starting on 20 September, causing significant damage and at least two deaths. In France, the Mediterranean coast near Marseille, and the northwestern department of Côtes-d’Armor, in Brittany, have been most affected by flooding, which killed at least one person. In Spain, two deaths were recorded in Catalonia, the most severely affected region, and other disruptions were recorded in Bilbao.

In Italy, the heaviest-hit regions were Lombardy and Piedmont, in the north, although authorities have also issued alerts for the southern region of Campania, which includes the city of Naples, as well as parts of Latium and Tuscany. Local weather forecasts indicate that heavy rains are likely to continue during the 25-27 September period. The areas most at risk remain the north of Spain, the southeast of France, and the west coast of Italy.

Super Typhoon Ragasa, called Typhoon Nando in the Philippines, originated from a tropical depression which formed in the Philippine Sea on 18 September. The storm system intensified to super typhoon strength as it tracked westward between northern Luzon, in the Philippines, and Taiwan. Between 23 and 25 September, the super typhoon severely impacted Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and southern China. With maximum wind speeds of 269 km/h, the super typhoon was the equivalent of a Category 5 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale.

In the Philippines, at least 11 deaths have been reported. Seven of the deaths have been attributed to fishing vessels capsizing off Cagayan province. Almost 700,000 people have been affected in Luzon, with 25,000 people evacuated to government-run emergency shelters. In Taiwan, at least 14 people are confirmed dead, with dozens still missing. Adverse rainfall resulted in a barrier lake in Hualien County overflowing, with a flash flood devastating Guangfu township and causing many of the confirmed fatalities. Rescue teams and military troops have been dispatched to Hualien, with search and rescue operations ongoing. Over 7,600 evacuations have been recorded.

In Hong Kong and Macau, Ragasa skirted approximately 100km south, with sustained maximum wind speeds of approximately 195km/h. Hong Kong International Airport cancelled all flights for 36 hours, beginning the evening of 23 September, stranding an estimated 20,000 passengers. Hong Kong underwent a citywide shutdown, closing public transportation, businesses, government offices, schools, and the stock exchange. Nearly 800 residents were placed in temporary storm shelters. Macau likewise experienced mass flight cancellations and service closures, and power supply was suspended in flooded low-lying areas after heavy rainfall resulted in flooded streets.

In China, authorities evacuated approximately 1.9 million people from high-risk areas. Dozens of cities in Guangdong (including Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Dongguan, Foshan, and others) closed schools, factories, and public transportation in anticipation. Shenzhen evacuated 400,000 residents and ordered people to stay indoors. Super Typhoon Ragasa resulted in ongoing severe conditions on China’s southern coast, with public transportation suspended, factory and school closures, and large waves recorded along the coastline of Zhuhai.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Ragasa is the first super typhoon-strength tropical cyclone of the 2025 Pacific typhoon season, and the world’s most powerful storm of 2025, so far. A weather station in Chungdao town, China, recorded maximum wind speeds of 241km/h, which is the highest in Jiangmen city since records began.

Having made landfall between the cities of Yangjiang and Zhanjiang, Ragasa is forecast to continue significantly weakening as it tracks west over southern China before impacting northern Vietnam. Nonetheless, heavy rainfall will likely pose a high risk in northern Vietnam due to the country’s lower disaster resilience and higher vulnerability.

A country’s disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, remains the most critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. Ragasa intensified rapidly due to very hot ocean waters, although authorities in multiple countries were able to deploy comprehensive preparedness measures such as evacuations. It is almost certain that disruptions will continue in the impacted locations. However, many of these disruptions, such as the city-wide closures in Hong Kong mandated by the invoking of Typhoon Signal No. 10, are indicative of the high levels of disaster resilience, which likely mitigated against far greater casualty numbers. Despite Ragasa’s significant strength, no fatalities have yet been recorded in mainland China, Hong Kong, or Macau.

Super Typhoon Ragasa’s impact underscores the ongoing threat of tropical cyclones in late summer-early autumn. This year’s Northwest Pacific typhoon season had been projected to be likely 15-20 per cent below the 30-year norm. The development of La Niña conditions later in the year would enhance Northwest Pacific typhoon activity, potentially triggering an uptick in abnormal late-year typhoon formation. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Climate Prediction Center issued a September outlook that indicated a notable rise in La Niña emergence odds in winter 2025/26; an increase from the previously assessed unlikely to likely. Should La Niña conditions emerge, this would likely lead to further powerful storm systems forming later this year in the region.

Statehood protests in Ladakh, India, kill four.

Violent civil unrest broke out in Ladakh, located in the eastern part of Kashmir, on 23 September, resulting in five deaths, dozens of injuries and arrests. The protests broke out amidst a hunger strike being carried out by leaders of the Leh Apex Body and other pro-statehood movements, who seek to pressure Delhi into restarting negotiations. Ladakh was made a “union territory” with the 2019 Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, and placed under the direct control of Delhi. This almost certainly reflected the territory’s strategically crucial position, bordering both Kashmir and China. During the unrest, protesters also attacked the local headquarters of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). As a round of talks is scheduled to occur on 6 October, future unrest will likely depend on the outcome of negotiations between local political groups and the central government.

China launches social media controls to curb “pessimism” online.

Chinese authorities announced, on 22 September, a two-month campaign targeting social media and legacy media to curb disinformation, as well as “pessimistic” attitudes. The online campaign is likely to give local authorities, who already have largely unchecked powers to control dissent online, further freedom to counter possible civil society opposition to the government. Despite significant successes in constructing a domestic online environment separate from those of third countries, Beijing has increasingly demonstrated opposition to the perceived adverse social, cultural, and security-related impacts of tools like social media.

For instance, China has had a growing number of low-sophistication violent attacks carried out by individuals not affiliated with radical groups, which some observers have described as driven by online media. While apparently similar to Western “lone wolves”, these attackers notably do not espouse any clear ideology. In Chinese media, such incidents are sometimes referred to as “Xianzhongxue” (a reference to an early modern peasant warlord) and have been linked to the online spread of “anti-social” sentiment.  

Japan’s ruling party to hold leadership elections on 4 October.

On 4 October, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will hold leadership elections. The vote is taking place only weeks after the resignation of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in September, which followed the party’s defeat in the upper parliamentary chamber elections. Following that vote, the LDP lost its majority in both chambers, meaning that there is a realistic possibility that the new party leader will not become prime minister. Ishiba’s removal from office comes at a time of political and economic instability in Japan, with populist forces like the far-right Sanseitō party threatening the parliamentary status quo.

US calls on Taliban to “return” Bagram base.

On 20 September, US President Donald Trump released a statement on social media calling on Kabul to allow US forces to return to the Bagram air base, which was evacuated during the Taliban takeover of the country in 2021. Washington almost certainly considers the base strategically important due to its proximity to China, as well as its utility to project power across Central Asia. The Taliban government in Kabul has increasingly reached towards Moscow and Beijing as strategic partners. However, it has likewise gradually improved relations with European states, leveraging, for instance, European interests in the region in terms of combating irregular migration and terrorism. While it is highly unlikely that the Taliban will acquiesce to Washington’s demands on Bagram, Kabul’s pragmatism could open the way for a degree of security cooperation between the two states.

7.8 magnitude earthquake recorded in Kamchatka, Russia.

The tremor occurred early on 19 September, at a depth of 10 kilometres and approximately 128 kilometres east of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky region. The tremor prompted Russian and American authorities to briefly issue tsunami warnings and alerts for coastal and island regions, including Hawaii and Alaska, although no damage was recorded. The latest earthquake is part of a series of aftershocks that have been ongoing since the 8.8 magnitude earthquake that occurred off the coast of Kamchatka in July 2025, which was the sixth strongest earthquake ever officially recorded. Following the July tremor, the US Geological Survey (USGS) released an aftershock forecast which indicated a 33 per cent chance of 7+ magnitude aftershocks within 12 months.

Around 800 students affected by food poisoning in Indonesia.

At least two separate incidents have been recorded in the country, in the regions of Garut and Central Sulawesi. The students had reportedly consumed meals provided as part of President Prabowo Subianto’s landmark free school meal programme, which was launched in January 2025. Over 4,000 cases of food poisoning have been recorded since the programme’s launch, which has lead to speculation and concerns of poor food safety and quality standards. Due to the high political visibility of the programme and the number of students affected, further incidents have the potential to drive anti-government unrest.

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