On 29 August, the UN Security Council began discussions on a draft resolution for Haiti aimed at expanding and strengthening the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti (MSS). The draft resolution has been put forward by the US and Panama with the intent of transforming the MSS into a so-called “gang suppression force”. The new force will be led by a standing group of representatives from the nations that have so far contributed personnel to the MSS, namely Kenya, Guatemala, El Salvador, Jamaica and the Bahamas, plus the US and Canada. To date, less than 1,000 personnel, primarily from Kenya, have been deployed to Haiti; however, this is less than half the intended 2,500 troops the MSS was set to deploy.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The draft resolution follows a warning from UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on 28 August, who stated that Haiti is on the brink of state collapse, with armed gangs now controlling up to 90 per cent of the capital, Port-au-Prince, and are increasingly consolidating power in other parts of the country. This has resulted in the displacement of over 1.3 million Haitians, and now over six million Haitians are estimated to require humanitarian assistance. Essential services, including healthcare, education and security, have effectively collapsed, and UNICEF documented a fivefold increase in violations against children in 2024, including executions and forced recruitment by gangs. Haiti’s humanitarian appeal also remains the most underfunded globally, with just 10 per cent of the required resources received.

The MSS has largely been ineffective at combating the gangs, due to a lack of manpower, communications equipment, medical infrastructure and a lack of armoured mobility. This has denied it from reclaiming territory from the gangs or from securing critical transport corridors required to re-establish state authority and restore humanitarian access.

Sources indicate that the new anti-gang force would deploy up to 5,500 personnel and have a 12-month authorisation to “take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate”. It is also planning on establishing a UN office in Port-au-Prince to provide full logistical support, including fuel, medical services, ground transportation and surveillance from drones to deployed forces. The US and Canada are likely to support funding, logistical coordination and provide strategic direction, but have not yet committed to sending troops.

Should the resolution pass and the new task force deploy to Haiti, it is unlikely that it will deploy early enough to restore enough order to enable Haiti to hold general elections on 15 November.  There is also a realistic possibility that the proposed deployment could exacerbate the security situation in the short term. Intensified military operations, especially in densely populated urban areas, could push gang activity into less affected areas and are likely to trigger retaliatory violence from the gangs and result in high rates of civilian casualties, with many recent deaths attributed to security operations. Furthermore, if the rules of engagement are poorly defined or if oversight and accountability mechanisms are limited, there is an increased risk of human rights abuses. Such developments could undermine the legitimacy of the task force and the central government, ultimately playing into the hands of the gangs that have positioned themselves as a parallel government.

On 1 September, during a rare press conference, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro accused the US of seeking regime change in the country in response to its recent naval deployment in the Caribbean. The US has deployed guided-missile destroyers, amphibious assault ships, an attack submarine and maritime patrol craft to the region, which it states is part of a wider counter-narcotics operation. However, the US has repeatedly accused the Maduro regime of being complicit in the drugs trade and has recently increased its bounty to USD 50 million for credible intelligence leading to Maduro’s arrest, citing accusations of narcotics trafficking and associations with transnational criminal networks.

On 2 September, President Trump released a video via his Truth Social account of what is alleged to be a US drone strike on a vessel suspected of smuggling narcotics, killing 11 people onboard. The vessel reportedly belonged to the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua, which was recently designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the Trump administration.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Venezuela has responded to the US deployment by adopting a defensive posture, activating 4.5 million militia members, deploying 15,000 troops to the Colombian border and expanding its drone and naval patrols. Caracas will also likely exploit Washington’s aggressive posture to consolidate power and reinforce its narrative of US aggression, a move that will likely help bolster its domestic legitimacy.

Venezuela has long laid claim to the oil-rich Essequibo region in Guyana and has previously sought ways to destabilise or interfere with the South American country, which held general elections on 1 September. There is a realistic possibility that the US deployment was in part timed to coincide with the election to deter Venezuelan interference and reassure regional partners of Washington’s commitment to Guyana’s security.

However, the drone strike on a vessel smuggling narcotics linked to Venezuela could reflect a major shift in the US counter-narcotics strategy. The FTO designation on Tren de Aragua provides the US with the legal authority to conduct unilateral military action against the group, and the naval deployment has enabled the US military to closely monitor and strike such targets in international waters, a more permissible environment that is unlikely to trigger a major escalation with Venezuela.

It is too early to assess if this is a symbolic strike aimed at sending a strategic message to Caracas as well as the other groups designated as FTOs, such as several of the Mexican cartels, or if the strike is an early indication of a more offensive campaign against transnational criminal organisations. If part of a broader and more hostile campaign, the use of lethal violence against criminal organisations is likely to result in significant backlash both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, criminal groups are likely to evolve their tactics, potentially retaliating against US interests, and regional partners may decrease cooperation with the US, which could ultimately hinder international cooperation against narcotics trafficking and transnational organised crime.

US “Workers Over Billionaires” protests on Labor Day.

Large-scale protests occurred in several major US cities on 1 September, the country’s Labor Day. The protests’ organisers, including labour unions and civil society groups, characterised the latest demonstrations as linked to past large-scale unrest events against the current administrations, such as the “No Kings Day” protests in June and the “Good Trouble Lives On” protests in July. The estimated more than 1,000 events resulted in no notable disruptions or cases of violence.

Chicago, Illinois, has emerged as an epicentre for anti-government unrest. This is highly likely due to the administration of President Donald Trump signalling that it would become directly involved in the city’s government to address local crime and irregular migration, similarly to the recent intervention in Washington, D.C. On 2 September, US media reported that the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency had contacted the Illinois State Police to inform them that ICE agents would begin operating in the state “later this week”.  Further protests will likely follow the announcement of government policies targeting large US metropolitan centres.

Violent unrest in Martinique with burning barricades and shots fired.

For three consecutive nights from 1-3 September, clashes took place between protesters and police in the French overseas department of Martinique. Protesters established burning barricades in Ozanam Batelière, Schoelcher, and in Sainte-Thérèse, and five gendarmes were “slightly injured” by “small calibre” gunfire. Law enforcement regained control of the streets of Schoelcher by the morning of 3 September. While the protests were small, they were a notable reemergence of violent civil unrest primarily stemming from cost-of-living demonstrations.  Starting in September 2024, widespread protests in Martinique, characterised by arson, looting, and road barricades, resulted in the implementation of curfews and the deployment of a controversial elite riot police unit. Ultimately, a deal was signed to cut prices for key imported products, and protests gradually subsided. However, many of the drivers for the movement are extant, and there is a realistic possibility that protests could escalate in Martinique in the coming weeks.

Prominent Nicaraguan opposition member dies in government custody.

Attorney Carlos Cardenas, a vocal critic of the authoritarian government in Nicaragua led by President Daniel Ortega, died in custody on 30 August, following his arrest on 15 August. His death follows the death of another political activist, Mauricio Alonso, just days before, and now at least five prominent government critics have died in government custody since 2019.

The deaths are almost certainly part of a wider crackdown on the opposition by President Ortega and his wife and co-president, Rosario Murillo, that has resulted in the systemic dismantling of civil society, characterised by the banning of over 3,000 NGOs, oppression of the Catholic Church and the imprisonment or exile of the majority of opposition leaders, independent journalists and human rights activists.

President Ali announces victory in Guyana’s election.

On 1 September, Guyana held general and regional elections, with incumbent President Irfaan Ali’s People’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) claiming victory after securing over 240,000 votes and seven of the country’s ten districts. However, the party fell short of an outright majority in some regions and will likely require support from smaller parties to govern regionally. The newly established We Invest in Nationhood (Win) party came second, displacing the long-standing A Partnership for National Unity (APNU).

The election passed peacefully, with many international observers present, including CARICOM, the EU and the Commonwealth. However, some parties have called for recounts, and the potential for post-election unrest cannot be discounted, with the 2020 disputed election resulting in widespread unrest after accusations of electoral fraud, with multiple incidents of violence between protesters and the security forces, as well as between Guyana’s Afro- and Indo-Guyanese communities.

Trial of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro set to conclude by 12 September.

On 2 September, the trial of Brazil’s former right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro entered its final stage and is set to give a verdict by 12 September, although the verdict could be announced earlier. The former president is accused of instigating a coup d’état attempt following his loss of the 2022 election; membership of an armed criminal organisation; plotting the assassinations of key figures, including President Lula; damage to federal property; and the obstruction of justice and money laundering. If convicted on all counts, Bolsonaro could face up to 40 years in prison.

However, Bolsonaro retains a significant support base in Brazil and the trial has been framed as a witch hunt by the Trump administration, which has imposed punitive tariffs on Brazil in direct response to the trial. Previous developments in the trial have resulted in major protests, and it is highly likely that any guilty verdict could trigger significant unrest, particularly around Brazil’s Independence Day on 7 September, which Bolsonaro supporters have previously used to mobilise around.

Indonesian embassy official’s shooting in Lima, Peru likely a contract killing.

On 1 September, Zetro Leonardo Purba, an Indonesian embassy official, was shot outside his flat in the Lince neighbourhood of Lima while riding a bicycle home from work. Security camera footage showed the assassin shooting Purba at point-blank range before escaping on a motorcycle. Nothing was stolen, Purba had not received any threats, and the motive is unknown, but an investigation into the killing is underway. According to the Peruvian government, it was likely a contract killing.

There has been a significant rise in homicides, including contract killings, and extortion in Peru in 2025 under President Dina Boluarte. There have been over 1,500 homicides in 2025, more than a 20 per cent increase from the same period in 2024. A 30-day state of emergency was announced in Lima in March 2025 amid a wave of violence, largely attributed to extortion and organised crime. It is highly likely that the killing of Purba was linked to extortion.

Hurricane Kiko strengthens as Hurricane Lorena weakens over the eastern Pacific Ocean.

Hurricane Kiko has been increasing in strength as it moves westward across the Pacific Ocean. Kiko has intensified into a Category 4 hurricane, positioned approximately 2,500 kilometres east of Hawaii. Despite its strength, no coastal warnings have been issued. The National Hurricane Center (NHC) has been monitoring Kiko closely, having escalated from a tropical storm into a Category 2 hurricane off the southwestern coast of Baja California, before further intensifying.

Hurricane Lorena, currently located approximately 125 miles from Cabo San Lázaro, Mexico, is expected to weaken over the next few days. Mexico has discontinued the Tropical Storm Watch for the western coast of Baja California Sur. However, the hurricane continues to pose a threat, with heavy rainfall and life-threatening flash flooding affecting Baja California Sur. The state government of Sonora has suspended classes in public and private schools at all levels, and classes have also been cancelled in parts of Baja California Sur until further notice. Public transport services in La Paz have been suspended as a precautionary measure, but airports in Loreto, Los Cabos, and La Paz are operating as normal.

On 8 September, Prime Minister François Bayrou’s government is likely to lose a parliamentary confidence vote on its proposed national budget, leading to its collapse. Bayrou, who is the third prime minister to be appointed by President Emmanuel Macron in little more than a year, has sought to pass unpopular welfare reforms and tax hikes in an effort to curb France’s growing deficit and debt burden. After the announcement of the confidence vote, both the left, led by the populist France Unbowed (LFI) party, and the right of the National Rally (RN), pledged to vote against the government, leaving it without a parliamentary majority. Bayrou’s budget remains extremely unpopular: a citizen-led strike action initiative has been announced for the week starting on 10 September, and the country’s major labour unions have pledged to carry out a nationwide strike on 18-19 September. The organisers have stated that the strikes will go ahead even if Bayrou falls.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Bayrou’s gamble, which appears likely to backfire, was almost certainly predicated on the assumption that RN would continue its “truce” with the government, which falls short of a formal alliance but has allowed the prime minister to survive several no-confidence motions. RN’s leader, Marine Le Pen, was sentenced in March to a five-year ban on running for office in her embezzlement trial. Bayrou likely assessed that RN would not risk precipitating a government crisis while its political leadership remains unclear. Having lost the right wing, Bayrou is also unlikely to strike a last-minute deal with the Socialists (PS). PS leader Oliver Faure has already stated that the party will vote against the government, likely acknowledging that the party cannot afford to back an unpopular prime minister without losing voters to LFI.

The government’s collapse is likely to result in large-scale and potentially violent unrest. As indicated by their intention to carry out the strikes regardless of the confidence vote’s outcome, French labour unions are likely aiming to impose maximum pressure on the Macron administration to limit its policy options. A weakened Elysee, they likely assess, will find it difficult to pass an austerity budget, and may have to compromise with the left. Consequently, large-scale civil unrest is likely to occur in the short term, beginning on 8 September and likely continuing throughout the following two weeks. Unrest is highly likely to be particularly disruptive in Paris, where it will almost certainly affect travel, services and business operations.  

Diplomatic overtures toward ending the war in Ukraine have faltered as Moscow continues to signal little interest in direct bilateral peace talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. On 1 September, a senior Kremlin official stated that there was “no agreement” on holding a bilateral meeting, and also on 1 September, Putin used a speech at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit to reiterate that peace could only be achieved if the “root causes” of the war are eliminated. Elaborating further at the SCO on 3 September, Putin stated that he would be willing to meet Zelensky if the Ukrainian president visited Moscow, and that if there is no diplomatic progress, “we will have to achieve our objectives by military means.”

Concurrently, a significant redeployment of Russian forces to the frontlines in Donetsk Oblast is ongoing. Several units from secondary axes, such as Kursk and Sumy, have been moved to positions near Dobropilya and Pokrovsk, including elements of the 155^th Naval Infantry Brigade, and Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) formations have been observed arriving in Donetsk. Furthermore, on 2 September, two South Korean lawmakers stated that their National Intelligence Service estimated that around 2,000 North Korean troops deployed to Ukraine have been killed, with Pyongyang planning to send an additional 6,000 soldiers. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

Prior to the 15 August Alaska Summit between US President Donald Trump and Putin, the main thrust of Trump’s pressure against Moscow was for an unconditional ceasefire as a prelude to comprehensive peace talks. The original 50-day deadline under threat of secondary sanctions that Trump set on 14 July for a ceasefire has now expired, with the deadline having been revised to 10 to 12 days following continued mass Russian strikes against Ukrainian urban centres. However, the flurry of diplomacy that culminated in the Alaska Summit likely warded off pressure from Washington, although a 50 per cent tariff has been imposed on India for buying Russian oil.

Bilateral or trilateral direct peace talks between Putin, Zelensky and potentially Trump are now highly likely the primary diplomatic objective for Washington. The Kremlin has almost certainly consistently delayed and obfuscated the potential for such a meeting, with spokesmen and officials most often resorting to the need for thorough ‘preparations’ for the meeting. The invitation for Zelensky to come to Moscow is almost certainly disingenuous, as his personal safety cannot realistically be guaranteed, and there is a high risk of arrest.

While the Kremlin has continued the practice of using diplomacy only to ward off US pressure, divide Ukraine’s allies, and attempt to gain concessions in pursuit of more maximalist objectives, Russian forces are highly likely preparing for a major intensification of offensives in Donetsk. Moscow almost certainly calculates that it can secure more favourable terms through battlefield gains than through diplomacy. With the autumn rasputitsa (mud season) only weeks away, the window for major ground offensives before poor conditions set in is closing, although conditions remained favourable in 2024.

Russia has already redeployed significant resources and manpower to Donetsk. Reports indicate that the North Korean reinforcements are primarily combat engineers or troops set to be deployed to Russia’s rear areas. These troops will likely be used to bolster Russian defence in Kursk, an area where Ukraine has made several incursions. This development will likely enable Russia to laterally redeploy further troops to Donetsk to commit to expanded offensives, but will also likely limit Ukraine’s ability to seize Russian territory, thus limiting its leverage in any future negotiations. 

In the past week, forces aligned with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh have mobilised outside Tripoli. Reports of large convoys of vehicles and heavy weaponry moving from the Misrata area towards Tripoli emerged on 28 August, with Libyan media warning of a potentially imminent confrontation between GNU forces and the RADA Special Deterrence Forces militia.

Osama Hammad, the prime minister of the parallel Tobruk-based Government of National Stability (GNS), strongly condemned the developments and affirmed a commitment to protecting the security of Tripoli. Furthermore, 40 MPs in the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) called for Debeibah’s immediate resignation, and unconfirmed reports indicate that Libyan National Army (LNA) forces have been moving towards the ceasefire front lines of the two rival governments.

Amid the tensions, on 2 September, a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) was detonated outside a headquarters of the Dbeibah-aligned 444^th Combat Brigade in Bani Walid; however, no group has claimed responsibility and no casualties have yet been reported. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

The GNU has been plagued by factional fighting and a lack of centralised control over its fighters. Power in Tripoli has been dispersed between powerful militias with varying allegiances to different factions within the GNU. However, Dbeibeh has almost certainly been attempting to gain a monopoly on force in western Libya.

In May, the heaviest fighting in years took place in Tripoli after the killing of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, AKA Ghaniwa, the commander of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) militia. The SSA was a powerful militia that de facto controlled the densely populated Abu Salim neighbourhood and critical southern access points to the capital. Dbeibah-aligned forces (namely the 444 and 111 Brigades) rapidly seized SSA territory before then fighting with RADA, which controls the Mitiga complex, which includes Mitiga International Airport. A ceasefire had brought an end to the heavy fighting, and it is likely that the current mobilisation is in preparation for a potentially imminent attack against RADA across eastern and southeastern Tripoli.

RADA are likely the most powerful remaining non-Dbeibah-aligned militia group in Tripoli. Unable to quickly defeat RADA in May, Dbeibah has likely mobilised a greater contingent of forces from across GNU-controlled Libya to achieve this objective. Due to the potentially imminent outbreak of major clashes, sources indicate that negotiations are currently taking place between representatives of the GNU leadership and RADA, facilitated by the UN mission in Libya. There is a realistic possibility that the force currently being threatened by Dbeibah will compel RADA into concessions, particularly withdrawal from the Mitiga complex, averting the conflict.

Should GNU forces launch an offensive against RADA-controlled parts of Tripoli, this will highly likely result in fighting breaking out across the city, characterised by the use of heavy weaponry. Moreover, while civil unrest is unlikely during periods of heavy fighting, it is likely that clashes will be followed by protests once the fighting has died down.

There is a realistic possibility that factional fighting in Tripoli could spark a return to greater civil conflict between the GNU and LNA. Khalifa Haftar’s LNA, which de facto controls GNS territory, may be emboldened to intervene against the GNU. The risks of a broader conflict breaking out in Libya, should an offensive against RADA be launched by GNU forces, partly depend on whether RADA could be swiftly defeated. A limited, rapid offensive would still likely be followed by international condemnation and domestic unrest. However, a more protracted conflict in Tripoli would increase the risks of LNA involvement to exploit any perceived weakness of the GNU, risking a return to full-scale civil war.

On 29 August, Germany warned its citizens to leave Iran immediately and to refrain from travelling to the country to avoid potential Iranian retaliation over Berlin’s part in triggering sanctions over Iran’s nuclear programme. The announcement follows the 28 August decision of Germany, France and the UK to trigger a process to reimpose United Nations sanctions on Iran under the “snapback” mechanism of the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The activation of this mechanism could result in the return of sanctions in 30 days.

Iran has responded by stating that the three European nations (E3) have no legal jurisdiction to reactivate sanctions and that both Russia and China supported Iran’s position. Iran’s foreign ministry also warned that the move would seriously undermine Tehran’s ongoing process with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), referring to the move as escalatory and that it would be met with “appropriate responses”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The decision to start a process that could reimpose sanctions on Iran will almost certainly result in a major deterioration in relations between Tehran and the three European nations. While the threat has only been issued by the German authorities, similar statements from the UK and France are likely, and the threat environment for all E3 nationals and organisations in Iran has almost certainly equally increased. Iran has a well-established history of conducting arbitrary detentions, imposing exit bans and engaging in “hostage diplomacy”, the state practice of detaining foreign or dual nationals to gain leverage for concessions, such as sanctions relief.

European consular assistance in Iran has already been scaled back, limiting the ability of diplomatic missions to provide in-country support. The threat is almost certainly higher for dual nationals of E3 and Iran, as Tehran does not officially recognise dual nationality. Dual nationals are likely to be treated as Iranian only and will likely be denied all consular assistance. E3-linked NGOs and businesses operating in Iran will also likely be at greater risk of retaliatory measures, which could include visa or license revocations, increased physical and electronic surveillance, bank account freezes, SIM card deactivation, fines, and, in extreme cases, asset seizures. Outside of Iran, UK, French and German private companies and public institutions are likely at greater risk of Iranian-state-sponsored cyber-attacks, which could result in data breaches, operational disruption and reputational damage.

Iran has previously responded to renewed sanctions by stepping up its nuclear programme. Conflict with Israel has resulted in the degradation of its proxy forces, and Iran has sustained heavy losses to its conventional military capabilities. Tehran now likely assesses that resuming its nuclear programme is its most viable route to restoring some form of strategic deterrent. This course of action would almost certainly increase regional tensions, decrease the opportunity for diplomatic de-escalation and increase the risk of military escalation in the future.

UK court ruling on Epping Hotel case likely to drive more anti-migrant demonstrations.

On 29 August, the UK’s Court of Appeal overturned an injunction blocking asylum seekers from being housed at a hotel in Epping, near London. The location remains at the centre of anti-migrant protests, which have spread to other facilities housing asylum seekers in Britain. While a victory for the government, the ruling is highly likely to provoke further unrest, including, possibly, violent protests. According to UK police, at least 30 protests are scheduled to occur during the 5-7 September period. On 13 September, a large-scale demonstration protesting immigration is scheduled to occur in central London.

Clashes continue in Novi Sad, Serbia, on the 10-month anniversary of the canopy collapse.

On 1 September, protesters gathered outside the University of Novi Sad to mark 10 months since the collapse of the railway canopy at Novi Sad Train Station, which killed 16 people. The Dean of Novi Sad University’s Faculty of Sports and Physical Education, Patrik Drid, entered the faculty building, which had been occupied by students since November 2024. Riot police set up a cordon outside, resulting in clashes between police officers and protesters. According to the Ministry of the Interior, demonstrators threw objects at the police, injuring one officer with a brick. Local media has countered this, claiming that demonstrators did not provoke the police and that police officers threw stun grenades and deployed pepper spray against protesters. The clashes follow earlier protests outside the University of Novi Sad, where police deployed pepper spray after students allegedly threw rubbish and water at the police blockade outside the Faculty of Philosophy. Further demonstrations and clashes between protesters and security forces are highly likely over the coming weeks, particularly in Novi Sad and other major cities, including Belgrade.

Turkish court annuls opposition’s Istanbul congress

On 2 September, a Turkish court announced it would annul the 2023 congress of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Istanbul, citing reported irregularities. The ruling resulted in the dismissal of Istanbul party chair Ozgur Celik and several other administrators. A separate court ruling on annulling the nationwide congress of CHP, also dating back to 2023, is expected in the coming weeks and could result in the removal of party leader Ozgur Ozel. The ruling is likely to be understood in the context of the ongoing crackdown on CHP that has been in effect throughout 2025 and has been almost certainly promoted by the administration in Ankara. In March, CHP presidential candidate and Mayor of Istanbul Ekrem İmamoğlu, widely seen as the key challenger to President Erdogan, was arrested on corruption charges. This resulted in a period of civil unrest that only decreased in intensity in the mid-summer. Istanbul remains one of the key strongholds of CHP, and while the recent development is unlikely to trigger protests comparable to the ones observed in spring, there is a realistic possibility of some unrest occurring in the city.

Protests staged in Bahrain over the affirmation of new Israeli ambassador.

On 2 September, protests were staged in Manama, Bahrain, after Shmuel Revel was officially affirmed as Israel’s ambassador to Bahrain, which established diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020 under the Abraham Accords. The protests almost certainly reflect both ongoing domestic opposition to Bahrain’s normalisation with Israel and widespread support for Gaza. While protests have remained relatively peaceful, they are likely to fuel further tensions between the predominant Sunni government and majority Shia population, although violent unrest is unlikely in the near term due to the government’s track record of using severe force to suppress dissent.

Burkina Faso junta passes law banning homosexuality.

On 1 September, the Burkina Faso junta passed a law banning homosexuality. According to Justice Minister Edasso Rodrigue Bayala, “If a person is a perpetrator of homosexual or similar practices, all the bizarre behaviour, they will go before the judge”. If found guilty, individuals could face up to five years in jail; foreign nationals will be deported. The neighbouring junta-ruled Sahel countries of Mali and Niger have passed similar anti-LBGTQ+ laws, framed as defending traditional and family values.

The law highly likely aims to garner support from Burkina Faso’s generally conservative population amid an accelerating Islamist insurgency. The government holds approximately 60 per cent of Burkina Faso’s territory, with the rest held primarily by the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Multiple coup attempts have been foiled, according to the government, most recently in April 2025. It is highly likely that interim President Ibrahim Traoré feels increasingly vulnerable and is attempting to increase the junta’s popularity through the passing of anti-LBGTQ+ legislation.

RSF leader sworn in as head of parallel government in Sudan.

On 30 August, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, was sworn in as the head of the Government of Peace and Unity, the Sudanese parallel government. The ceremony occurred in Nyala, the de facto capital for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which controls most of the Darfur region. The Government of Peace and Unity was established in April 2025 to administer the RSF-controlled regions of Sudan. The UN Security Council has rejected the formation of the parallel government, declaring it a violation of Sudan’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Despite this rejection, the RSF is almost certainly aiming to boost its image as a government force rather than merely an ‘armed group’, although it is unlikely that the RSF will halt its routine attacks on civilians to improve its credibility, given its precedent of using violence to consolidate control and its limited ability to control the rank and file. El Fasher in North Darfur, which is home to hundreds of thousands of displaced people, will highly likely remain a focal point for the targeting of civilians. The city is the only state capital in Darfur that remains under partial control of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and serves as a major logistics hub for operations in the Darfur region.

Clashes in the north of South Sudan kill at least 20.

On 2 September, at least four soldiers and 16 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) fighters and White Army militants were killed in clashes in the northern Upper Nile State. Fighting reportedly erupted when SPLA-IO fighters and members of the White Army militia attacked South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), according to a senior army officer. The violence comes amid heightened tensions in 2025 following the arrest of Vice President Riek Machar in March, which prompted clashes between government forces and the White Army, a militant group ethnically aligned with Machar and the SPLM-IO. The escalating clashes between government forces and the SPLM-IO, which are involved in a power-sharing agreement as part of the civil war peace agreement in 2018, and a subsequent formalisation of the unity government in 2020, threaten to return the country to civil war. The increasingly frequent clashes threaten to collapse the peace agreement entirely, with accusations of violations on both sides. Given the fracturing of the unity government in 2025, a return to civil war is becoming increasingly likely.

Two dead in clashes between protesters and security forces in Boma, DRC.                                                           

On 28 August, protests escalated into violent clashes between young protesters and DRC security forces in the Kilomètres 8 neighbourhood, Boma, in western DRC. Security forces responded with live ammunition, resulting in the deaths of two people and injuries to several others. The protests started over accusations that the city police are complicit with criminals after eyewitness accounts accused police members of fleeing in a jeep when locals mobilised to chase away some criminals. While the protests were an isolated incident, ongoing tensions over the insurgency in eastern DRC and the stalled peace process between the government and AFC/M23 have raised the risk of demonstrations throughout the country, including in areas largely unaffected by the violence. While unlikely due to the localised nature of the Boma demonstrations, there is a chance that anti-corruption protests could spread to other cities in the DRC to denounce the government and security forces.

At least 31 people killed in land-dispute clashes in Gbiniyiri, Ghana.

Mob violence broke out on 24 August in the town of the Savannah Region, reportedly due to local disputes over the control of land. According to local media, 12 communities in the area have recorded violence, and more than 40,000 people have been displaced, several crossing into neighbouring Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast. While 31 deaths have been formally confirmed as of 3 September, some unverified sources have shared a much higher number of up to 200. Violent land disputes are frequent in peripheral regions of Ghana, the most well-known case likely being that of the inter-clan competition in the northeastern border area of Bawku. However, the ongoing clashes remain notable due to the high volume of casualties recorded in only ten days. There is a realistic possibility of the violence continuing in the short term, despite the likely increase in government forces’ presence in the area.

Intercommunal clashes trigger blockades and curfew in Mau Narok, Nakuru County, Kenya.

On 30 August, clashes erupted between two communities in Mau Narok along the Nakuru–Narok border. Attackers stormed villages in the area and torched at least 12 houses. The violence resulted in one death and injuries to at least seven people, one of whom was shot with an arrow. Fearing further attacks, hundreds of residents fled Tipis Centre on the morning of 31 August. The government responded by imposing a daily curfew in parts of Njoro between 1900 and 0500 local time and deploying security officers to the region.

Residents of Mau Narok blockaded the town’s main road on Sunday to protest the government’s response. When a family rushing a patient to the hospital had their windscreen smashed, tensions again reignited and fresh clashes were reported nearby on 1 September, although peace has since resumed. Tensions reportedly escalated after one community spread rumours that their livestock had been stolen, prompting them to retaliate against those they accused. Given the heightened tension in Nakuru County following the clashes, there is a realistic possibility of further violence.

Government-Military divisions continue regarding Israeli plan to occupy Gaza City.

Local media reported that the Israeli cabinet and senior members of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) held a meeting regarding the plan to occupy Gaza City on 1 September. IDF officials reportedly repeated the military’s position that the planned offensive is unlikely to destroy Hamas, will endanger the surviving hostages, and will result in a significant increase in IDF casualties.

However, the administration of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains highly likely committed to the offensive plan, which it likely assesses as more politically and strategically advantageous than negotiating a deal with Hamas. At least 60,000 reservists have been mobilised in preparation for the offensive. As of 3 September, the 99^th and 162^nd divisions are carrying out advances in Gaza City’s outskirts, likely aimed at encircling the area and eliminating peripheral Hamas positions. On 31 August, an Israeli airstrike reportedly killed Hamas spokesperson Abu Obeida in Gaza City’s al-Rimal neighbourhood. While unlikely to be strategically important, the decapitation strike likely indicates how several high-ranking Hamas members continue to operate in the city.

Houthis confirm death of prime minister and attempt missile attack against vessel in Red Sea.

The Houthis publicly confirmed the death of Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi on 30 August, following significant airstrikes conducted by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in Sanaa on 28 August. The head of the Houthi-run government, al-Rahawi is the most senior Houthi official to have been killed since an intensification in Israeli attacks on Yemen began in May 2025. Houthi leadership figures have vowed revenge, and it is highly likely that further attempted Houthi long-range attacks will be launched towards Israel, particularly Ben Gurion International Airport, in the coming weeks. Such attacks would likely result in further retaliatory strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen.

Furthermore, the Houthis attempted a missile attack against the Liberian-flagged and publicly Israeli-owned oil tanker SCARLET RAY (IMO: 9799654) in the Red Sea on 1 September, with a Houthi spokesman claiming the vessel was successfully struck. However, this is highly likely false, with the vessel instead reporting that an unknown projectile landed in close proximity and caused no damage. Notably, the attempted missile attack is the furthest north in the Red Sea since the anti-shipping campaign began in 2023.

Burkinabé pro-government militias open fire on civilian protest in Barani

On 2 September, Burkinabé social media monitors reported that forces of the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP) opened fire on a civilian protest against the junta government in the village of Barani, killing at least two and injuring an unspecified number. The VDP militia was established in 2020 to combat jihadist groups in the country and has been heavily supported by Ouagadougou. However, the group has likely been more active in the Mossi-Fulani/Peulh ethnic conflict, staging several attacks on Fulani communities, resulting in hundreds of casualties.

VDP likely remains highly important for the Burkinabé junta, as it both provides vital manpower while simultaneously covering an important strategic space between the civilian population and the military. At the same time, its repeated attacks on Fulani groups are almost certainly counterproductive and contribute to jihadist groups’ radicalisation efforts. This ambivalence is unlikely to be resolved in the medium or long term, as Ouagadougou continues to be plagued by severe vulnerabilities that make needed structural reforms of VDP highly unlikely.

Cable car derailment kills at least 15 people in Lisbon, Portugal.

On 3 September, Lisbon’s Gloria funicular cable car, a popular tourist attraction, derailed near the Avenida da Liberdade, resulting in the deaths of 17 people and injuries to 22 others. The Mayor of Lisbon ordered the suspension of services on the city’s Bica, Lavra, and Graça funicular railways for inspections. At least 60 emergency service personnel were deployed to the scene. An investigation has been initiated to determine the cause of the crash. Traffic on Avenida da Liberdade, which was affected by the incident, has now resumed. Disruptions in the area are highly likely, and there is a realistic possibility of protests in the coming weeks should the local authorities be perceived as at fault for the accident in any way.

Train derailment in Matrouh, Egypt kills three and injures 103.

On 30 August, seven carriages of train No. 1935, which was travelling from Marsa Matrouh to Alexandria, derailed between Fouka and Galal stations at approximately 15:30 local time. Over 50 ambulances were dispatched, and 87 were treated and discharged by that evening. Kamel El-Wazir, the Minister of Transport, visited the area and announced an investigation into the cause of the derailment. He stated that anyone found responsible would face dismissal. The incident is the latest in a series of rail accidents, with 220 recorded in 2024, killing 57. There is a realistic possibility that demonstrations will occur targeting the Ministry of Transport over the perceived lack of public transport safety.

Landslide in Sudan kills over 1,000 people.

On 2 September, a landslide in Jebel Marra, Darfur, Sudan, resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 people, with only one survivor reported. The landslide, attributed to heavy rains, buried the entire village of Tersin. In response, Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, the internationally recognised head of state for Sudan, has confirmed the fatalities and announced a large mobilisation of resources to provide relief to those affected. Additionally, the Governor of Darfur has appealed to international bodies and the UN for assistance in recovering the bodies of the victims. While the Jebel Marra region is held by the neutral Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), Darfur is largely held by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It is highly likely that aid delivery will be complicated by the fact that the RSF will be unlikely to allow government relief efforts to have access to the region. Furthermore, the RSF have been accused of deliberately targeting aid convoys on numerous occasions, and several aid groups have been forced to suspend operations in the region.

On 31 August, a magnitude 6.0 earthquake struck near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, devastating the eastern provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar. The quake resulted in heavy casualties and widespread destruction, with the death toll continuing to rise as rescue operations progress. The latest figures presented by the Taliban-run Interior Ministry place the death toll at over 1,411, with at least 3,124 injuries across the affected areas.

The most affected area is Kunar’s Nurgal district, where at least three villages have been destroyed. Afghan disaster officials warned that hundreds of people might still be trapped beneath the rubble. In Nangarhar province, at least 10 deaths and 250 injuries were reported, with Dara-I-Nur district among the hardest-hit locations. The Taliban authorities dispatched relief teams to assist with search and rescue operations in the worst-affected regions, with helicopter teams bringing the injured to hospitals from remote villages. The mountainous terrain has complicated relief efforts, however, with many roads blocked by debris.

The earthquake’s tremors were also felt across the border in Pakistan, with shaking reported in Islamabad, Peshawar, Hangu, Mansehra, and Malakand. Precautionary measures were implemented in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the federal capital region, though no significant casualties have reported.

A magnitude 5.2 aftershock struck eastern Afghanistan on 2 September, exacerbating relief efforts. Foreign governments, including Pakistan, China, India, the UK, and Switzerland, international aid groups, and the United Nations have provided relief packages to areas hit by the earthquake.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Afghanistan is prone to large earthquakes, particularly in the Hindu Kush mountain range, where the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates meet. Aftershocks have already occurred, and more are highly likely in the next days to weeks. While most will likely be small-to-moderate (magnitude 3.0 to 4.0), further magnitude 5.0 or above earthquakes remain a realistic possibility. Afghanistan is one of the least disaster-resilient countries in the world, and given the prevalence of unreinforced, non-earthquake-resilient buildings, even moderate aftershocks could trigger secondary collapses, complicate rescue operations, and result in further casualties.

Topography in the affected regions and adjoining Pakistani districts (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Lower Dir) makes landslides and rockfall a significant risk, particularly along river valleys and cut slopes. Slope failures could block roads, isolate impacted communities, and cause flooding if river channels are dammed.

Damage to water and sanitation networks will highly likely increase the likelihood of waterborne diseases, adding further strain on hospitals and clinics. Access constraints, including debris, landslides, damaged bridges, and the presence of non-state armed actors in parts of eastern Afghanistan, will almost certainly complicate the provision of humanitarian aid and disaster relief.

In Pakistan, while no significant damage has been recorded, localised infrastructure disruption in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, lingering road closures and communications outages are highly likely. An elevated landslide risk in hill districts following aftershocks or rainfall could further exacerbate the humanitarian situation following monsoon flooding. Furthermore, there will likely be congestion at the Torkham border crossing if humanitarian flows and medical referrals increase.

Protests, which began on 25 August, have continued into this week. Demonstrations escalated after a Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob) vehicle ran over motorcycle taxi driver Affan Kurniawan on 28 August. A video of the incident circulated widely online, sparking outrage. On 29 August, protests started in Jakarta, with protesters gathering near the Brimob and metropolitan police headquarters and staging blockades across the city centre, particularly the Kwitang area.

Violent clashes reportedly started after protesters attempted to block a transiting police convoy and pelted vehicles with rocks. Brimob units responded with tear gas to disperse the crowds, further increasing tensions, which resulted in protesters attempting to storm the metropolitan police headquarters in Jakarta. Protests were also recorded in multiple other large Indonesian cities, including Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Makassar, Medan, and Bandung.

On 30 August, clashes erupted again in Jakarta after protesters threw bottles, rocks, and firecrackers, which security forces responded to with tear gas and rubber bullets and turned off electricity in the area. Protesters burned seven bus stations across Jakarta, prompting services to be temporarily suspended. A police station and provincial government building in Surabaya, as well as areas near the parliament buildings in Jakarta, were also set alight. On 1 September, five people were arrested during a protest at the Makassar Police Headquarters in South Sulawesi. In total, at least ten people have died, and hundreds more have been injured or arrested.

The unrest has prompted the local government in Jakarta to urge companies to adopt work-from-home policies and allow schools in affected areas to conduct distance learning. The government has agreed to cut some lawmakers’ perks, including the controversial USD 3,000 housing allowance. On 1 September, Indonesian students and civil society groups called off protests, citing fears of a crackdown by authorities. However, sporadic protests have continued, with Indonesian media reporting demonstrations taking place in central Jakarta on 2 September. On 4 September, the All-Indonesian Student Executive Board Alliance (BEM-SI) is set to hold a “Save Indonesia” rally. Approximately 205 police personnel are set to be deployed.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Following the government U-turn over the housing allowance and the subsequent calling off of protests by unions and student groups, there is a realistic possibility that protests will subside over the coming week. However, momentum could be sustained if clashes erupt again during the planned 4 September protest, or if videos depicting perceived crackdowns by security forces are shared widely on social media.

The recent protests likely form part of a broader wave of anti-government sentiment in 2025, which has triggered multiple waves of protests. Notably, student-led protests in response to government austerity measures erupted on 17 February under the slogan #IndonesiaGelap (Dark Indonesia). The 25 August protests were organised following the publication of reports regarding a new monthly housing allowance for politicians, which is approximately 20 times Indonesia’s minimum wage. The publication almost certainly was only a catalyst for broader anti-government sentiment resulting from low wages, cuts to government funding, job cuts in the textile industry, government corruption, and the growing role of the military in civilian life, which have been sources of growing frustration among much of Indonesia’s population.

Tensions have almost certainly risen following widespread accusations of police brutality, and given Indonesia’s economic pressures, periodic protests are likely to recur across the country in the medium term. Real wages have failed to keep pace with inflation, increasing living costs. Unemployment has risen, with manufacturing’s share of GDP falling from 32 per cent in 2002 to just 19 per cent in 2024, and growth has slowed to 4.8 per cent in Q2, Indonesia’s weakest in four years and well below President Prabowo’s 8 per cent target. With Indonesia’s youth disproportionately affected by the poor-performing economy, student-led protests are likely to become a persistent feature of the country’s political landscape.

Large-scale mob violence injures hundreds in Chittagong, Bangladesh.

On 30-31 August, large-scale riots erupted between residents and students of Chittagong University, resulting in at least 250 cases of injury. The mob violence was reportedly sparked after a female student was assaulted by a security guard at a campus accommodation facility. News of the alleged assault drove hundreds of students to gather at nearby Jobra village, where they were confronted by residents, resulting in clashes. Later, reports emerged of separate targeted attacks against smaller groups of students and residents. According to Bangladeshi media, no police presence was recorded during the clashes, highlighting the continued severe vulnerabilities of the Bangladeshi state apparatus. The incident continues to highlight how university groups remain among the main actors behind mob violence in Bangladesh and, furthermore, how Dhaka likely remains unable to effectively prevent or contain riots.

Thai prime minister removed from office following ethics investigation.

On 29 August, the Constitutional Court dismissed Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra under Section 170 (1)(4) and Sections 106 (4) and (5) of the Constitution, which stipulate that ministers must be trustworthy, subject to scrutiny, and must demonstrate integrity. The dismissal followed an ethics investigation into Paetongtarn’s leaked telephone call to Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen, where she was accused of displaying subservience, as well as disrespect to her military during heightened tensions.

This decision brings an end to the Shinawatra political dynasty, with Paetongtarn being the sixth premier from or supported by the Shinawatra family to be removed from power. Following Paetongtarn’s dismissal, the ruling Pheu Thai Party initially announced that it planned to negotiate a new government coalition, which would then nominate Thailand’s next prime minister. However, the ruling party subsequently announced that it was asking the king to dissolve Parliament and hold an election. 

Anti-migrant protests in Osaka, Japan.

On 30 August, approximately 3,000 people carried out a march in central Osaka against the current government’s immigration policies. The protest particularly targeted the government’s “Africa Hometown” initiative, which symbolically proclaimed some Japanese cities to be “hometowns” for select African countries, as part of a program to strengthen cultural exchange. On social media, misinformation narratives presented the program as an attempt by Tokyo to transfer sovereignty over the cities to African countries.

This, in turn, likely contributed to the protest’s large turnout. Anti-migrant sentiment is an increasingly important driver of unrest in Japan. In July, the Sanseitō party scored an unexpected positive result in the country’s upper parliamentary chamber elections by embracing a rhetoric and messaging reminiscent of populist parties in Europe and North America, warning of an “invasion” of Japan by foreigners.

Pakistani officials declare emergency across hospitals in Quetta following bomb attack.

Officials have declared an emergency across hospitals in Quetta, in Pakistan’s restive Balochistan province. The announcement follows the 2 September bombing of a political rally at the Shahwani Stadium, which killed at least 15 people and injured more than 30. The rally was organised by the Balochistan National Party–Mengal (BNP-M), a regional political party in Pakistan that promotes greater autonomy for Balochistan.

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack; however, Pakistan’s Interior Minister has publicly attributed the attack to “India-backed terrorists and their facilitators”, a term that is often used to refer to Baloch militant groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF).

While these militant groups support the same broader cause as the BNP, they have often accused the BNP of taking too conciliatory an approach with Islamabad, and there is a realistic possibility that one of these militant groups conducted the attack to undermine the BNP’s legitimacy and reinforce their own claims of representing Baloch interests through armed struggle ahead of political negotiation.

Myanmar junta designates Karen ethnic rebels as terrorists.

On 28 August, Myanmar’s junta government formally designated the Karen National Union (KNU) as a terrorist organisation and criminalised all association with the group. The KNU has fought for autonomy since 1948 and has been one of the most operational ethnic resistance groups against the junta since the 2021 coup. The designation precedes planned elections in December 2025, which the KNU has vowed to disrupt.

The designation will likely be applied to other ethnic rebel groups and will likely be leveraged to increase the junta’s control ahead of the elections. Non-violent activities such as information campaigns and political coordination with the KNU will also be made illegal, a move that will likely enable the junta to intensify its crackdown on dissent and justify broader military operations in areas held by rebel forces. A separate law was introduced in July that allows for the death penalty for those accused of “opposing or disrupting” the polls, a measure that will almost certainly be used to intimidate opposition groups and one that could be used extensively against opposition figures, activists and civil society groups.

Tropical Storm Nongfa causes torrential rainfall in Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.

On 30 August, Tropical Storm Nongfa made landfall on Vietnam’s north-central coast, causing torrential rainfall which flooded roads and cut off dozens of mountain villages in Ha Tinh and Quang Tri provinces. After weakening, the storm system moved westwards into Laos and triggered significant flooding in Phetchabun province in Thailand. Thailand’s Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) issued a public alert, with the district of Lom Sak being the worst hit area due to the Pa Sak River bursting its banks. Government buildings, a police station, residences and businesses were impacted by the flooding in Lom Sak, with early reports indicating that 493 households were damaged. As of 4 September, no casualties have been reported. Nongfa is the sixth storm to form in the South China Sea in 2025, with more storms likely to occur in the wider region, as the Northwest Pacific typhoon season typically runs through October.

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