After three rounds of unrest on 4, 20 and 26 July, Mexican protest groups are planning another demonstration on 9 August, against the increase in US nationals residing in the Mexican capital. These groups include the CDMX Anti-Gentrification Front, which has issued a series of demands to the local government, including rent controls, expanded renters’ rights, restrictions on short-term lets, and greater engagement with residents’ groups. In late July, the municipality of Mexico City announced a 14-point plan to lower rental prices; however, protest groups have dismissed that plan as too limited.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the protests are characterised by their organisers as being against the general trend of gentrification and overtourism, and thus similar to European anti-tourism protests, they are more directly characterised by hostility towards US nationals. Past protests have coincided with multiple cases of harassment and violence, like rock-throwing, directed at US citizens, and there have been several instances of vandalism targeting businesses that cater to English-speaking guests. It is highly likely that the upcoming protests will result in similar incidents, particularly in neighbourhoods like Roma and Condesa, which are popular with US expats and tourists.

Recent developments are likely to shape the future of the Mexico City protest movement. The decision by the city’s government to respond to some of the protesters’ demands will highly likely embolden the protesters to continue in their efforts to achieve greater reform. Moreover, the Mexican anti-tourism movement is still relatively underdeveloped compared to those in Europe. Consequently, there is a realistic possibility of the protests expanding in geographical scope, towards other Mexican cities that have high concentrations of foreign remote workers and tourists, particularly from the US.

Tensions and hostility towards US nationals in Mexico risk further souring US-Mexico relations, especially given the context of ongoing trade disputes that already strain bilateral ties. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum’s condemnation of the protests as “xenophobic” likely reflects concerns over the potential negative impact a more lenient response could have across the border. While this stance may be prudent from a diplomatic perspective, it likely risks deepening local grievances and escalating unrest.

One injured in clashes in Honduras

On 30 July, supporters of the opposition Liberal Party demonstrated outside the Honduran Parliament to demand that the government adhere to holding general elections on 30 November. The protests evolved into clashes when demonstrators attempted to enter the building and were prevented by security forces. Several protesters were beaten, including Mario Segura, the head of the Liberal Party, and Jorge Cálix, a deputy from the party. A series of corruption scandals within the ruling LIBRE party, the National Electoral Council (CNE)’s dysfunction, with internal disputes and a failure to open primaries on time, military politicisation, as well as crackdowns on civil society critical of the government, have triggered mounting public mistrust. Hondurans almost certainly mistrust political institutions, and many believe that the government is consolidating power, aided by the state of exception imposed in December 2022 to deal with the high crime rates. Further civil unrest is highly likely in the lead-up, and if Hondurans perceive the election as having been conducted in an unfree and unfair manner, the publication of results could trigger widespread civil unrest.

El Salvador removes limits on presidential terms

On 31 July, El Salvador’s ruling New Ideas party, led by incumbent and controversial President Nayib Bukele, passed a constitutional reform which allows for indefinite presidential re-election, extended terms, and removes presidential run-offs. The opposition has condemned the reform as it moved forward without public debate and has almost certainly provided President Bukele with the opportunity to consolidate his power. While Bukele retains a lot of popularity due to his draconian policies, which have significantly reduced crime in El Salvador, the gradual erosion of democratic checks and concentration of executive power likely heightens political risk in the country and has raised concerns for foreign NGOs operating in the country due to Bukele’s increasing crackdown on dissent and civil society.

Colombia-Ecuador diplomatic tensions rise over deportations of Colombians

On 24 July, the Colombian government stated that their Ecuadorean counterparts had announced the intent to deport Colombians imprisoned in the country, a measure which Colombia opposes. On 26 July, local media reported that approximately 700 Colombian nationals had been transported to the border crossing near Tulcan, with no prior notice to local authorities. The deportation of Colombian inmates has long been advocated by President Daniel Noboa. Quito likely assesses that removing Colombian inmates will both deteriorate the strength of Colombian organised criminal groups in its prisons and overall decrease overcrowding at the facilities. Prisons remain centres for violence in Ecuador, and several facilities are effectively controlled by inmates. Consequently, there is a realistic possibility that an acceleration in the deportations will result in spikes in prison violence and unrest, which could also exacerbate gang violence outside of the prison system.

Bolivia to mark 200 years of independence as elections approach

On 6 August, Bolivians will celebrate 200 years of independence, with general elections scheduled for 17 August. The date has previously served as a flashpoint for political mobilisation and civil unrest, with protests likely to be organised by the opposition and pro-Morales group ahead of the controversial election. Recent tensions within the ruling Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) party, especially the electoral court’s disqualification of former president Evo Morales, have triggered sustained unrest, strikes, blockades, and violent clashes with security forces. Given the symbolic weight of the bicentennial and the proximity of election, demonstrations are likely in major urban centres such as La Paz, El Alto, and Santa Cruz, with an elevated risk of road disruption and isolated clashes in areas that support Morales, such as Cochabamba.

Lone wolf terrorist targets US football league HQ in New York City.

On 28 July, an individual carried out a shooting at a Manhattan office building, killing four people. The shooter later allegedly committed suicide. Authorities reported finding a note on the suspect, where he expressed resentment against the National Football League (NFL), which he blamed for his sports-related injuries. Despite wanting to target the NFL offices, the shooter reportedly mistakenly targeted the premises operated by investment management company Blackstone. The case represents a further instance of lone wolf terrorism targeting high-profile private companies, and there is a high likelihood that the perpetrator was inspired by similar cases that have occurred since 2024.

Cartel violence results in 15 deaths in 24 hours in Sinaloa state, Mexico.

Authorities reported that 15 individuals were killed in the municipalities of Culiacán and Ahome in less than 24 hours on 26-27 July. In total, 22 homicides were recorded in the area over the weekend. The state of Sinaloa has been affected by severe levels of violence since the arrest of Sinaloa Cartel leader Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada in September 2024. El Mayo’s arrest precipitated an internal war between two factions of the cartel, “Los Mayitos”, who are loyal to El Mayo, and “Los Chapitos”, who are led by the sons of imprisoned cartel leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. The recent killings have occurred despite an increase in the security forces deployed to Sinaloa. Mexican cartels, including the Sinaloa group, have significantly increased their firepower and can, in some cases, match security forces. In addition to the ongoing intra-Sinaloa Cartel war and the pressures from Mexico City, the violence in Sinaloa is also driven by the encroachment of other cartels, like the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), which are leveraging the violence to increase their influence in new areas of Mexico.

Three killed in mass shooting in Turks and Caicos.

On 27 July, 3 people were killed and 10 injured by a shooting at a popular nightspot on the island of Providenciales in the British Overseas Territory of Turks and Caicos. The shooting is being described by the territory’s premier, Charles Washington Misick, as a gangland-type slaying and the first mass shooting in the territory’s modern history. Initial investigations have suggested links between the shooting and elements within the local Haitian community, which accounts for approximately one-third of the territory’s population. This has likely raised concerns over the spread of gang-related violence in Haiti to other parts of the Caribbean region, which may result in greater border controls, security measures and increased police operations aimed at disrupting transnational criminal networks.

State of emergency extended in Trinidad and Tobago.

On 29 July, Trinidad and Tobago’s parliament voted to extend the current state of emergency in the country after uncovering prison-based plots to assassinate senior figures in the country. Intelligence reportedly uncovered plots by gang leaders to coordinate the assassinations from prison with smuggled cell phones, resulting in the relocation of gang leaders to military bases. The state of emergency grants the security forces sweeping powers, including warrantless searches, arrests and detentions without bail, although no curfew has been imposed. However, the need to extend the state of emergency likely reflects the scale of Trinidad and Tobago’s long-standing security challenges, particularly endemic gang crime, high murder rates, and systemic vulnerabilities within the prison system, which has effectively turned them into command centres for violent criminal gangs.

Mass shooting in Ecuador kills 17 people.

On 27 July, an unknown number of gunmen travelling in two pickup vehicles fired into La Clínica bar in El Empalme, Guayas province, killing approximately 17 people and injuring 14.  According to witnesses, the gunmen shouted “active wolves”, which is a likely reference to Los Lobos, which translates to “The Wolves” in English. This was almost certainly a targeted killing, with most of the deaths likely collateral damage. This is the second incident in a little over a week, with gunmen shooting nine people dead in a pool hall on 21 July in Playas, also in Guayas. Ecuador has seen steadily increasing gang violence in recent years, with homicide rates rising from 5 to 46 per 100,000 inhabitants between 2017 and 2023. In 2025 alone, 4,051 homicides have been recorded. Further attacks of a similar nature are highly likely as Ecuador’s gangs vie for control over narco-trafficking routes.

Puerto Rico records severe water outages after main line damage.

Puerto Rican authorities issued a state of emergency on 30 July over protracted water shortages, which have affected up to 180,000 residents, local businesses, and public infrastructure. Authorities have set up public water distribution points, deploying the National Guard to assist with relief efforts. The cause of the outages reportedly is the accidental damage to a main water line during regular repair efforts. The dynamic of the incident, the severe impact it had, and long-standing public dissatisfaction with water infrastructure in Puerto Rico are likely to drive public resentment. There is a realistic possibility of protests occurring in connection with the incident.

On 24 July, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that he will recognise Palestinian statehood at the next UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in September. On 29 July, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that British recognition of Palestine would also occur in September unless Israeli officials agreed to a ceasefire. The UK’s announcement was followed by that of Canada, a Commonwealth member. On 31 July, Portuguese officials stated that they would also prepare an official recognition statement for the UNGA meeting, while German leaders made more cautious openings, deferring outright recognition.

In addition to these developments, on 29 July, a group comprising the EU, the Arab League, and seventeen states released a joint statement, the “New York Declaration”, condemning both the 7 October 2023 attack and the Israeli offensive in Gaza, and calling for an end to the war, Hamas’ disarmament, and the return of Palestinian Authority (PA) rule in the territory. The declaration is additionally notable as it is the first time the 7 October attack has been unanimously condemned by the Arab League.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The numerous diplomatic developments regarding Palestine that have occurred in July are among the most high-profile in decades. France and the UK’s recognition of Palestinian statehood would represent a significant development within major international organisations, including the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union. Paris and London’s recognition will likely drive civil unrest and domestic pressure in European states that have not pledged to recognise Palestine, including Germany, Belgium and Italy. It will also likely have an impact in the US, Australia, and New Zealand, which all have strong pro-Palestine movements.

The European and Arab states’ call on Hamas to agree to a ceasefire and to reintroduce PA rule in the Gaza Strip is likely to put significant pressure on Hamas and its allied armed groups. Hamas, which has been severely degraded during almost two years of conflict, retains a vital interest in remaining the preeminent administrative authority in Gaza following the end of hostilities. The group is thus highly likely to reject calls to disarm.

The developments are also likely to increase pressure on Israel to end the hostilities. Humanitarian conditions in Gaza have worsened considerably in recent months due to the combined effects of renewed Israeli offensive, the blockade of humanitarian aid, and the replacement of UN-led aid distribution efforts with the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), which has almost certainly proved largely ineffective and has increased the risks to the civilian population. The Hamas-run Health Ministry of Gaza reported more than 40 deaths from starvation in July, and assesses the overall death toll in the Gaza Strip to be above 60,000 since the start of the conflict.

US President Donald Trump announced on 28 July that the deadline for Moscow to agree to a ceasefire and engage in peace negotiations is now 8 August, significantly reducing the previously set 50-day timeframe. President Trump has threatened to impose secondary sanctions on countries that trade with Russia if the deadline is not met. A spokesman for the Kremlin responded to the ultimatum by saying that Russia will continue to prosecute the war regardless of threats from the US, and that Russia has been able to cope with heavy sanctions.

Russian forces have continued to launch large-scale mass aerial strikes against Ukrainian cities, which have almost certainly been a key factor in President Trump’s deadline shortening. Overnight 30-31 July, Russian forces conducted several waves of attacks which involved over 300 one-way attack drones (including decoys) and eight Iskander-K cruise missiles (of which five penetrated Ukrainian air defence), primarily targeting Kyiv. At least 28 people were killed in the capital, with 159 injured. The main damage occurred in the Solomianskyi and Sviatoshynskyi districts, and a multi-storey residential building was partially destroyed by a missile strike. The mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, stated that the attack caused the highest number of child casualties in Kyiv since the start of the full-scale invasion.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that Moscow will continue military offensives in Ukraine, despite the deadline given by President Trump. In June, Russian forces seized the most monthly territory (557 square kilometres) so far in 2025, and the situation on the frontlines in the Donbas is almost certainly deteriorating for Ukrainian defenders in key areas.

This week, the Russian Ministry of Defence has claimed the seizure of Chasiv Yar, which has been one of the key battles in the region and has been fought for nearly 16 months. While the claim has been disputed by the Ukrainian military, the taking of Chasiv Yar would mark the first major battlefield victory for Russian forces in Ukrainian territory since Avdiivka in February 2024, albeit with considerable casualties and grinding attritional warfare. Furthermore, the situation in Pokrovsk, almost certainly the most crucial ongoing battle, grows increasingly critical for Ukraine. Because of Russian momentum on the front lines, it is highly unlikely that the Kremlin would countenance any ceasefire which could provide Ukrainian forces with respite.

Secondary sanctions are unlikely to change the battlefield calculus in the short to medium term. However, longer term, there is a realistic possibility that they could make a significant dent in the Russian war economy. In particular, secondary sanctions targeting Russia’s main oil purchasers China and India have the potential to deprive Russia of a major source of income.

The Kremlin has been able not only to sustain but also to extensively grow the Russian military’s manpower without resorting to mass conscription, which has almost certainly been heavily achieved with considerable financial incentives for recruits. Depending on factors such as region of recruitment, a new recruit can earn approximately 600 per cent of the average national wage in their first year of service.

Moreover, China has become an essential means of acquiring electronics and other components for the Russian military industry. These are pivotal for enabling the dramatic increase in Russian attack drone and missile production rates, which have enabled the dramatic increase in mass aerial strikes against Ukrainian cities. These strikes are highly likely to continue in the coming weeks, posing a major threat to civilians in urban centres, with Russian forces almost certainly increasingly directly targeting residential areas. Ukraine’s low interception rate of Russian Iskander-K cruise missiles may also suggest critical vulnerabilities. These missiles fly incredibly low, are equipped with advanced electronic countermeasures and can manoeuvre during flight, making them hard to intercept. Moreover, lower interception rates may indicate critical shortages or the overstretching of Ukraine’s counter-cruise missile capabilities, with resources primarily focused on augmenting Ukraine’s counter-ballistic missile capabilities.

On 28 July, violent unrest broke out in Luanda, the capital of Angola, following the start of a three-day taxi driver strike. The strike was triggered by the government’s 1 July decision to eliminate fuel subsidies, resulting in a roughly 33 per cent increase in diesel prices. The taxi drivers’ strike quickly evolved into broader anti-government protests as thousands of people joined demonstrations, with around 90 per cent of Luanda’s commuters dependent on taxis for travel. Protests resulted in clashes, roadblocks, looted shops, and destroyed cars, and continued into 29 July. Protesters have chanted against fuel price increases and the nearly five-decade rule by the ruling party.

Security forces reacted forcefully with live ammunition, tear gas, and rubber bullets, killing at least 30, injuring over 200, and over 1,200 arrests were made across the capital. At least 91 businesses were vandalised. Hospitals have reported becoming overwhelmed by injured protesters, and there were reports of ambulances being attacked. State-run media has avoided covering the protests. Despite the clashes and government appeals for an end to the strike, the taxi drivers’ association in Luanda condemned the violence and casualties but committed to continuing the strike on 30 July, which formally ended on 31 July.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the price increase was proposed on 1 July, which triggered weekly protests, the taxi strike almost certainly acted as a catalyst for Angolan citizens to vent their broader frustrations against the government and economic conditions in the country. The ruling party, People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), has been in power since 1975 and has been facing increasing opposition. Angola’s economy is heavily reliant on oil, which accounts for approximately 90 per cent of export revenues. It has also failed to invest in refining capabilities and is heavily dependent on imported fuel. Global price fluctuations in recent years have triggered high inflation, rising food and transport costs in a country where the average monthly wage is just USD 75.

Angola’s ongoing unrest is largely driven by widespread youth unemployment and disenfranchisement. The country has one of the youngest populations in the world, with around 65 per cent under the age of 24, yet limited access to quality education, formal employment, and political representation. As observed in other protests, the country’s youth have increasingly used social media platforms to organise demonstrations, share grievances, and highlight state violence, which has provided a catalyst for unrest.

The government’s mass deployment of police and the military, and the widespread use of state violence, have likely quelled the unrest in the short term, with no major unrest observed after the formal ending of the three-day strike. However, the government’s response, Angola’s continued overreliance on oil and the failure to address the root causes of many of the youth’s grievances have likely increased mistrust and resentment. In the long term, these dynamics likely increase the risk of periodic unrest, especially if the government refuses to make substantive reforms or continues to remove subsidies.

Lithuanian government crisis.

Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas announced his resignation on 31 July, amidst an ongoing scandal related to alleged conflicts of interest and irregular business activities involving Paluckas. On 30 July, the Democratic Union “For Lithuania” party, the key coalition ally of Paluckas’ Social Democrats, announced that it would quit the coalition unless Paluckas stepped down. The prime minister’s resignation will almost certainly cause a government reshuffle and will likely threaten the stability of the coalition, less than a year after the last parliamentary elections.

Protests over custodial deaths in Egypt.

Protests have been ongoing in Belqas and El-Saf, among other towns, since 27 July over reports of multiple deaths of individuals held in custody, which protesters blame on the police and the government of President al-Sisi. The protests first started in Belqas, where a 21-year-old was reported to have died after being imprisoned over an alleged drug-related offence, with his lawyer claiming the individual had been “tortured” to death. A second case was reported days later in El-Saf, with a similar dynamic. Some clashes between protesters and police have been recorded in connection with the unrest. There is a realistic possibility of the protests spreading to other Egyptian cities in the short term. Police brutality has long been a source of popular grievance in Egypt, particularly that connected with the state suppression of domestic cases of unrest.

Côte d’Ivoire president announces bid for fourth term.

On 29 July, 83-year-old President Alassane Ouattara announced that he would stand for a fourth term in the upcoming 25 October 2025 election. According to Ouattara, who came to power in 2011, a constitutional amendment signed in 2016 resets his presidential term limit. This decision significantly raises the possibility of civil unrest around the election period in a country that has not had a peaceful transfer of power since the death of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. In 2010, a political crisis escalated into civil war, which resulted in the deaths of at least 3,000 civilians. In 2020, Ouattara controversially decided to seek a third term after the sudden death of his successor, Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly. The decision sparked condemnation from opposition parties and triggered large-scale protests, which were met with security force crackdowns, resulting in the death of approximately six people. Opposition parties boycotted the election, and Ouattara was elected with 95.31 per cent of the vote, with very low turnout. Widespread unrest is likely around the election, and security forces will likely respond to it with force.

Main opposition candidate barred from Cameroon elections.

On 26 July, Cameroon’s electoral commission rejected the candidacy of Maurice Kamto for the presidential election scheduled for 12 October 2025. Kamto is perceived as the main competitor for the 92-year-old President Paul Biya, who has been in power since 1982 and is seeking his eighth consecutive seven-year term. There are growing frustrations among Cameroon’s young population, who suffer from widespread unemployment and rising food and fuel prices.

The government’s perceived authoritarianism, with arbitrary arrests of opposition members, journalists, and civil society leaders, the de facto banning of demonstrations, and accusations of election rigging, is likely to trigger protests around the election. While there is a realistic possibility that Kamto’s rejected candidacy for the election could trigger demonstrations, a larger catalyst, such as the publication of election results, is more likely to trigger large-scale civil unrest in defiance of security forces.

Around 80 people arrested, one killed during riots in Zambia.

Violent civil unrest broke out in Chingola, Zambia, on 30 July. Police reported at least 80 arrests, and seven officers were injured during the clashes. Local media reported that one protester died after being shot with live ammunition, with several more individuals having been shot. The protests broke out after illegal miners were dispersed from an open pit in the Senseli area. This prompted the miners to attack nearby towns, with some cases of looting and vandalism being reported. Criminal gangs, often referred to as “Jerabos” (“jail boys”), have long operated in Zambia’s Copperbelt region, and the state has often alternated between tolerating them and cracking down on their operations. The recent unrest has a realistic possibility of continuing in the short term, and there is a remote possibility that it will expand to other Copperbelt settlements.

ISIS conducts offensive in Syria’s Deir Ezzor Governorate.

Between 22 and 30 July, militants from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) conducted a series of attacks across Syria’s Deir Ezzor Governorate, in what has been its highest tempo of operations since early 2024. Attacks were concentrated along the River Euphrates’ right bank, targeting Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) personnel, checkpoints, and infrastructure, especially along key transit corridors such as the M4 highway.

At least 15 individual attacks were recorded, and ISIS used tactics ranging from motorcycle-borne gunmen, sniper fire, and ambushes to strike adversarial forces without committing to protracted engagements. The attacks are likely part of a broader strategy of exploiting security gaps and undermining the SDF’s control in areas of weak governance, and if sustained, will likely enable ISIS to expand its influence, increase its recruitment and help destabilise eastern Syria.

Joint US-Syrian operation kills senior ISIS leader in Aleppo region, Syria.

On 25 July, forces of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) carried out a raid in al-Bab, Aleppo governorate, leading to the killing of Dhiya’ Zawba Muslih al-Hardani, as well as two of his adult sons. Al-Hardani was a senior member of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and had reportedly acted as the “governor” of the Khayr wilayah (“province”), approximately corresponding with the Deir ez-Zor governorate, during the group’s territorial expansion phase.

The raid is notable as Syrian interim government forces heavily publicised it and their cooperation with CENTCOM via their official media. This choice was almost certainly adopted to send a message to Tel Aviv, with Damascus almost certainly pressuring Washington to halt Israeli force projection in the country’s south. At the same time, open statements of cooperation with the US will almost certainly be leveraged by both pro-Assad and Islamist anti-government forces in Syria, which remain active in the country.

Lebanese armed group Hezbollah rejects calls to disarm.

On 30 July, Naim Qassem, the leader of Hezbollah, dismissed calls for the group to lay down its weapons, stating that they serve Israeli foreign policy interests. Hezbollah has been significantly degraded during its conflict with Israel, particularly in the phase between September and November 2024. Much of its leadership, including historic leader Hassan Nasrallah, was killed, and the group also lost thousands of fighters and much of its rocket stockpile. This, in turn, has emboldened Beirut’s demands for the group’s disarmament, which also hinges on significant US and Israeli pressures. Washington and Tel Aviv aim to influence the Lebanese government to issue an official motion pledging to disarm Hezbollah.

The Shiite militia is likely to continue efforts to prevent such a motion from being passed, possibly making significant concessions to do so. Hezbollah is almost certainly unwilling to escalate tensions with Beirut, unless its key interests are threatened, as this would highly likely be leveraged by Tel Aviv to increase its pressure on Lebanon, possibly threatening the already fragile ceasefire.

Attack against military base in northern Burkina Faso claimed to have killed over 50 soldiers.

On 29 July, an attack against a military base in Dargo, Boulsa Department, Namentenga Province, killed at least 50 soldiers, according to accounts from local sources. The junta has not yet publicly acknowledged the incident. The attack, if confirmed, was almost certainly conducted by militants from Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), who are highly active in the area. In May and June, JNIM significantly escalated its operations across the Sahel’s junta-led states, carrying out a sharp rise in attacks that resulted in at least 1,000 fatalities, the vast majority of which occurred in Burkina Faso.

In the first half of 2025, the number of JNIM attacks was double the number from the same period in 2024. The increasing frequency and severity of JNIM attacks in Burkina Faso almost certainly indicate deteriorating control by the junta outside the capital, Ouagadougou. Currently, JNIM likely do not have the means to launch and sustain a direct siege of Ouagadougou. However, JNIM likely seek to gradually encircle the capital, and it is highly unlikely that the Burkinabe military will be able to reverse the current trend.

Togolese foreign minister acknowledges JNIM threat to northern regions.

Togolese Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Dussey has publicly acknowledged the growing threat of the Islamist group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), within Togo’s northern region. Dussey stated that JNIM had conducted at least 15 attacks in 2025 so far, resulting in the deaths of eight soldiers and over 50 civilians, despite the deployment of around 8,000 Togolese soldiers to the border region with Burkina Faso and increasing security cooperation with its northern neighbour. The increased level of attacks in Togo has largely been attributed to the expulsion of Western forces from the Sahelian states and is likely reflected or JNIM’s efforts to increase recruitment in Togo and to establish a buffer zone to safeguard its operations in neighbouring Burkina Faso.

Pirate Action Group (PAG) sighted off the coast of Lagos, Nigeria.

On 27 July, the Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG) issued a warning regarding an active Pirate Action Group (PAG) off the coast of Lagos, in the Nigerian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, after a peak in the mid-2010s, has declined in recent years, although it remains a persistent threat. The sighting of a PAG in Nigerian waters is notable, due to its vulnerability to being intercepted by Nigerian security forces. Pirates intending to hijack vessels almost always operate outside territorial waters.

In November 2024, a vessel was boarded by 15 armed robbers off Lagos, with crew members held captive while perpetrators took personal belongings and attempted to breach secured containers. However, such robberies are typically carried out by less sophisticated criminal elements who generally only attempt to steal easily accessible ship stores and belongings before escaping. Considering its location, the PAG is likely not seeking to hijack vessels. Nonetheless, its sighting illustrates the continued risks of transiting through the Gulf of Guinea, even if in Nigerian territorial waters.

RSF announce formation of parallel Sudanese government.

On 26 July, a Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-led coalition known as the Tasis Alliance announced the formation of a parallel government in Sudan. The African Union has declared that it does not recognise the government and has “called on all AU Member States and the international community to reject the fragmentation of Sudan and not recognise the so-called ‘parallel government’, which has serious consequences on the peace efforts and the existential future of the country”.

The formation of a parallel government almost certainly reflects an attempt by the RSF to entrench its control in Darfur and parts of Kordofan, having been expelled from Khartoum in March 2025. The UN has warned that the decision could further fragment Sudan and complicate diplomatic efforts by imposing a de facto partition. It is highly likely that this will encourage the proliferation of armed groups vying for power to win a position in one of the respective governments.

ADF kill at least 43 in attack on Catholic Church in Komanda, DRC.

On 27 July, Islamic State-aligned Allied Democratic Forces militants attacked a Catholic church in Komanda in Ituri Province in eastern DRC, where approximately 100 people were gathered for a night vigil. At least 43 people were killed, including men, women, and children, and several children between the ages of 12 and 14 were kidnapped. ADF members also attacked and burned houses and shops nearby, displacing approximately 30,000 people, according to a UN report. Military patrols around Komanda have been reinforced by DRC and Ugandan forces in response.

This incident follows a spate of other instances of ADF violence targeting several towns near the border between Irumu and Beni in North Kivu on 12 July. The Komanda attack almost certainly constitutes a continuation of these reprisal attacks in response to DRC and Ugandan forces shelling the ADF’s largest camp near Lolwa on 6 July. Continued reprisal attacks are highly likely to capitalise on the ongoing fighting between government-aligned forces and the AFC/M23 before the expected peace deal on 18 August. There is a realistic possibility that the ADF will conduct bombings in Kampala to dissuade Ugandan counterinsurgency efforts.

Ugandan and South Sudanese troops clash on the border.

On 28 July, Ugandan and South Sudanese troops clashed along their shared border in the West Nile region. The Ugandan military reported that three South Sudanese soldiers were killed after they crossed into Ugandan territory, established a camp, and refused to withdraw, leading to an exchange of fire in which a Ugandan soldier also died. However, according to a local South Sudanese official from the Central Equatoria state, he received the bodies of five soldiers, and the firefight was a “surprise attack” by Ugandan soldiers. Sporadic clashes have occurred over the disputed border region, leading the two countries to establish a joint border demarcation committee, which expects to decide on the territorial demarcation by 2027. The two countries are allies, and Ugandan forces are currently deployed in South Sudan to support President Salva Kiir against pro-Vice President Riek Machar forces. Further small-scale border clashes are likely, particularly in poorly demarcated and lightly governed frontier zones.

Series of attacks targeting Christian community in northern Mozambique.

At least nine civilians have been killed in Mozambique’s restless Cabo Delgado province after a series of attacks between 22 and 25 July targeting the local Christian community. The most lethal incident occurred in the Ancuabe district, where six individuals were allegedly captured and beheaded by the Islamic State’s Mozambique Province (IS-M).

IS-M, which has been conducting an insurgency since 2017, has strong links to the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province (ISCAP) or Allied Democratic Forces, which claimed responsibility for a mass-casualty church attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo on 27 July, which killed at least 34 worshippers. The timing and sectarian nature of the attacks may indicate a degree of coordination by Islamic State-affiliated groups in the region, which are likely exploiting limited state control to exert pressure on local communities, undermine state authority and exacerbate sectarian divisions.

Severe wildfires in Portugal.

Portuguese authorities have deployed more than 2,500 firefighters to combat severe wildfires that have affected rural areas in the centre and north of the country, and particularly in the area of Arauca, southwest of Porto. The wildfires, as in other South European countries, have been exacerbated by protracted dry and hot conditions, which have increased the volume of dead vegetation, fuelling the rapidly spreading fires. The fires are likely to continue in the short term, with temperatures expected to remain over 30 degrees Celsius across Portugal over the next ten days.

Flooding in Romania kills at least three.

A yellow warning for heavy rain remains in effect across six counties in southern Romania. The Romanian weather agency has also issued yellow and orange flood warnings across the majority of the country. The recent severe flooding has resulted in the deaths of three people, particularly impacting Neamt and Suceava counties. Emergency services report that approximately 890 individuals have been evacuated from their homes in Borca, Farcașa, and Poiana Teiului counties after the Bistrita River overflowed, affecting around 250 homes.

On 30 July, a magnitude 8.8 earthquake struck near the Kamchatka Peninsula in the far east of Russia. The tremor was shallow, occurring at a depth of 19.3 kilometres. The epicentre was located 136 kilometres east-southeast of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. The impact in parts of Kamchatka was severe, with tsunami waves of up to five metres devastating the town of Severo-Kurilsk, and strong shaking in the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky caused power and mobile outages, building damage, and multiple injuries.

Tsunami warnings and evacuation orders were triggered in coastal regions across much of the Pacific, including Japan, Hawaii, Alaska, and California, and as far as Chile. The Japan Meteorological Agency issued warnings of tsunami heights of up to three metres for coastal areas from Hokkaido to Wakayama Prefecture, with evacuation advisories being issued for nearly two million people in over 220 municipalities. In Hawaii, evacuation warnings were issued across Maui and Oahu, including the state capital, Honolulu, with flights being suspended as a precaution.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The earthquake is the joint sixth-largest recorded globally since 1900, and the strongest since Japan’s 2011 magnitude 9.0 Tōhoku earthquake. The Kamchatka Peninsula is situated along the highly seismically active Pacific Ring of Fire, a horseshoe-shaped tectonic belt which spans most of the coastal Pacific and is responsible for approximately 90 per cent of the world’s earthquakes.

It is almost certain that despite the earthquake being so powerful and the tsunami threat so extensive, highly effective early warning systems and comprehensive evacuation efforts resulted in only minimal casualties. The effectiveness of global monitoring systems has advanced considerably since the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami killed over 220,000 people on the coasts of the Indian Ocean.

The installation of tsunami early warning systems (TEWS) has enabled coastal regions to activate evacuation plans with sufficient advanced warning, which successfully led to millions being evacuated to safety in the hours following the Kamchatka earthquake. In Hawaii, the success of the evacuation orders is notable given the contrast with emergency communication systems failures that exacerbated the impact of the 2023 Maui wildfires. Disaster preparedness and resiliency measures are a critical determinant of the potential impact of natural disasters, with advances in their implementation almost certainly becoming increasingly necessary as global warming increases both the severity and frequency of tropical cyclones and adverse weather.

Developed economies that have a high to severe risk of environmental threats, such as Taiwan and Japan, have invested considerably in disaster resiliency. However, countries in historically less environmentally vulnerable regions, such as Europe, will almost certainly need to increasingly emulate these disaster systems. For example, poor disaster response and warning systems were a key factor in making the 2024 Spanish floods the deadliest natural disaster in the country’s history. In addition to direct assessment of environmental threats, such as seismic activity levels or tropical cyclone formation, disaster resiliency should be a crucial consideration for risk assessments of overall environmental risk.

Ongoing Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led protests demanding the release of former prime minister, Imran Khan, are set to culminate on 5 August in multiple locations across Pakistan, including a major rally in Islamabad. PTI leaders have instructed all provincial leaders and organisational units to ensure a strong turnout, with all party ticket-holders expected to lead demonstrations and rallies in their respective constituencies. However, Khan has issued a statement calling for party members to set aside differences over fears that internal divisions are preventing the protest movement from building momentum.

The federal and several provincial governments have issued warnings over the protests, indicating that they will not tolerate any form of violent protest. Incumbent Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has condemned the protests, suggesting that PTI are undermining efforts to revive Pakistan’s economy.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Internal divisions have almost certainly limited current PTI mobilisation efforts, and the protests have not attracted the level of participation that was originally anticipated. This can also be attributed to the government’s pre-emptive measures, which have included warnings and arrests of PTI senior leadership. However, the date of the protest, which marks the two-year anniversary of Khan’s arrest, combined with increased political repression and the instruction for every ticket-holder to lead rallies in their respective constituencies, has likely increased the likelihood of coordinated demonstrations in major urban centres.

Previous PTI-led rallies have resulted in roadblocks, transport disruptions, communication suspensions and violent clashes with the security services, tactics that are likely to be emulated on 5 August. During the November 2024 “Final Call” protests, which also demanded the release of Khan and alleged electoral fraud, thousands were arrested, dozens were killed, and the security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition. The state’s response and following arrests have likely deterred PTI supporters and degraded the party’s ability to coordinate organisational capacity.

However, multiple protests are still almost certainly to be observed on 5 August and will be perceived as a challenge to the state, resulting in the mass deployment of security forces. The government has also recently created the Federal Constabulary, a new paramilitary force that has been constituted from the existing Frontier Constabulary. This force will likely be deployed to counter the protests, as one of its primary responsibilities is to maintain law and order. However, the force is experienced in border security and counterterrorism and likely lacks sufficient training, experience or protocols to deal with protest activity. This will likely increase the likelihood of violence during political demonstrations in Pakistan’s urban centres, especially if protest activity escalates or if the Federal Constabulary uses excessive force.

At midnight local time on 29 July, a ceasefire came into effect between Thailand and Cambodia to halt the fighting that had been ongoing since 24 July. The two sides agreed after the intervention of President Donald Trump, who threatened to pause trade deals with Thailand and Cambodia until the fighting stopped, prompting them to meet in Malaysia to decide a peace deal. China has also entered negotiations with the two countries. Shortly after the ceasefire’s imposition, Thailand accused Cambodia of violating the ceasefire, claiming that the Thai military stopped firing after midnight, but gunfire continued to originate from the Cambodian side.

Despite the accusations, local Thai and Cambodian commanders met that same day and agreed to stop shooting, halt the movement of troops, and allow each other to collect their dead. A second reported ceasefire violation occurred on 30 July, with Thailand accusing Cambodia of launching an overnight attack on its troops in Sisaket province. However, the ceasefire has held, with both sides reaffirming their commitment to it after a meeting in Shanghai. Overall, at least 43 people, many of whom were civilians, were killed, and over 300,000 were displaced. While both sides were supposed to meet in the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh, Thailand has proposed a meeting in Malaysia, since it is considered neutral territory, and has proposed extending the meeting from one day to three, from 4 to 7 August, to allow sufficient time for discussions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Given the mutual distrust between the two countries, there is a realistic possibility that the ceasefire will collapse. However, both the US and China are motivated to maintain peace between the two countries. For the US, forcing Thailand and Cambodia into diplomacy constitutes a significant victory for President Trump’s portrayal as a peacemaker. By linking the peace agreement to the threat of tariffs, Trump can put significant economic pressure on the two countries, which have experienced a slowdown in economic growth in 2025, something that has been exacerbated by the border clashes and, for Thailand, the ongoing political crisis. Furthermore, it enables Trump to champion his transactional approach to diplomacy, acting as a differentiator from other recent presidents.

For China, instability so close to the border constitutes a threat to its national security. Furthermore, by presenting itself as a less confrontational mediator in the region, Beijing can portray itself as a more reasonable alternative to the US. In contrast to the US’s transactional approach, Beijing used quieter, envoy-level engagements to mediate a cessation of hostilities. For both countries, renewed fighting would disrupt trade corridors and undermine infrastructure investments, providing a significant incentive for pressuring Thailand and Cambodia into maintaining peace.

Ruling party increases targeting of Muslim communities across India.

Reports from Human Rights Watch (HRW), indicate that India has increased the unlawful expulsion of Bengali-speaking Muslims and Rohingya refugees from the country, especially in border regions like Assam. The campaign is reportedly being spearheaded by the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and has involved forced deportations without legal proceedings, violent pushbacks at the border, and demolitions of Muslim homes. In regions not adjacent to the border, such as Maharashtra, Odisha, Gujarat and Rajasthan, Muslim migrant workers have allegedly been detained and expelled without proper citizenship verification.

The campaign has almost certainly intensified following the May terror attack on Hindu tourists in Jammu and Kashmir and the subsequent conflict with Pakistan. Moreover, the campaign is likely to intensify in states such as Assam and Maharashtra, which have state elections in 2025-2026 and are currently led by the BJP. These actions are likely to exacerbate already strained sectarian tensions, increase radicalisation and could drive recruitment by violent extremist groups seeking to exploit current tensions and perceptions of state persecution.

Anniversary of August Revolution likely to drive higher security risks in Bangladesh.

On 5 August, Bangladesh commemorates the first anniversary of the student-led revolution that, in 2024, led to the toppling of the government of Sheikh Hasina, who is currently in exile in India. The event is highly likely to coincide with street celebrations and demonstrations led by the key parties that played a role in the revolution. There is a realistic possibility of an increase in mob violence and sectarian clashes on or near the day. Attacks on perceived supporters of Hasina or of her Awami League (AL) party continue to occur regularly, as do clashes between members of other parties. Party youth and student wings are often responsible for mob violence, meaning that universities and other academic institutions likely remain at higher risk.

The Trump administration is contemplating shifting US stance towards Myanmar.

US President Donald Trump’s administration is reportedly weighing proposals that would alter the US’s longstanding policy towards Myanmar and its junta government. Proposals include engaging with either the junta government or even ethnic rebel forces to secure US access to rare earth minerals, the majority of which are currently routed through China. Such a policy would mirror a similar strategy observed in Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), whereby security guarantees and peace deals are brokered in exchange for US access to coveted minerals. No final decision has been made; however, the prospective policy shift follows the recent easing of US sanctions on the junta, likely suggesting that the White House is willing to increase its engagement with Myanmar.

First large-scale protests in years in Malaysia over cost-of-living crisis.

On 26 July, thousands of protesters gathered in central Kuala Lumpur’s Independence Square, calling for Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to step down over the country’s worsening cost-of-living crisis. The protests are notable as they are the first case of large-scale unrest since Anwar won the 2022 elections. Anwar has sought to appease the protesters by pledging the disbursement of one-off payments and unveiling a series of new subsidies for fuel. The protests, which were named after the slogan “Turun Anwar” (“Anwar resign”), remained peaceful, with authorities reporting no large-scale disruptions. Further demonstrations remain possible in the medium term.

Mass shooting at Bangkok market.

On 28 July, five people were killed and one injured after a gunman opened fire at a popular market in the Chatuchak district in northern Bangkok. Four of the people killed were security guards, and the fifth was a local market vendor. The assailant committed suicide before being apprehended by the police. Reports suggest that the attack was motivated by a personal dispute with a security guard at the market and was in no way connected to either the South Thailand insurgency or ongoing tensions with Cambodia.

Singapore report concludes terror threat still high.

Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) reported in its annual Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report on 29 July that the country’s terror threat will remain at “high”.  The report attributed this assessment to higher rates of radicalisation linked to the war in Gaza, the increased spread of radical online ideologies and the increasing influence of evolving technologies, especially artificial intelligence (AI), which has resulted in a huge increase in radicalisation. The report also highlighted the global trend of increased youth radicalisation, but stressed that there is no current intelligence of an imminent attack against Singapore. The report identifies radical Islamist groups, particularly the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ), as posing the greatest threat both in terms of radicalisation. However, it also noted a growing threat from far-right extremism and racial supremacist ideologies online, with complex links to white supremacist extremism recorded in Europe, Oceania and North America.

Flooding and landslides kill at least 30 in northeastern China.

Heavy rains have severely impacted northeastern China, leading to significant flooding and landslides. In Beijing, the highest-level flood emergency response remains in effect, with non-essential work and school suspended. The Miyun and Yanqing districts have been particularly affected, with at least 44 fatalities and over 80,000 people displaced. In Shanxi, the death toll has risen to 10, with ongoing search operations for at least four others after a bus was caught in flooding near Datong. In Hebei Province, more than 350,000 people have been affected, with 44,000 evacuated. Additionally, 13 villages along the Beihe River in Tianjin have been evacuated due to flooding. The heavy rains have caused power outages in 136 villages and damaged 62 communication cables in greater Beijing.

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