The bill first passed in the Senate on 1 July after US Vice-President JD Vance cast a tie-breaking vote, and then was again passed in the House of Representatives on 3 July after overcoming significant opposition from a minority of Republican representatives. The budget reconciliation bill, named “One Big Beautiful Bill Act”, includes hundreds of provisions, including extending tax breaks passed during the first Trump administration, further tax reductions, an increase in the debt ceiling, a significant increase in the funding for the Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency, and cuts to Medicaid and other welfare structures.

The passing of the bill coincides with the major annual US holiday, 4 July, which was also an informal “deadline” the US president had set for its approval. On this day, “Free America” protests are scheduled to occur in several large US cities. These are the first of a series of protests in July, which also include the 17 July “Good Trouble Lives On” protests to commemorate five years since the death of civil rights leader and House Representative John Lewis.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The legislation is highly politically divisive, due to its adding to the national deficit, its planned welfare cuts and tax cuts, and its boosting of ICE’s budget. It was opposed by several prominent Republican officials and by important allies of the current administration, including billionaire Elon Musk. The bill’s approval coincides with the scheduled unrest on 4 July, and it is highly likely to further drive participation in the protests on the day. Notably, the “Free America” rallies have been promoted by large civil society organisations, like Women’s March, but the single local events have been largely left to the discretion of local organisers. This means that, while the protests are likely to remain peaceful, there is a realistic possibility that limited cases of disruptive direct action, including road blockades, will occur. On the other hand, the protests scheduled for 17 July have more centralised planning and a clearer schedule, which will likely result in a lower likelihood of disruptions.

Protestors block major Peruvian mining corridors.

Informal miners in Peru have blocked sections of a key mining corridor in the Chumbivilcas province, disrupting transport routes used by major copper producers MMG (Las Bambas), Glencore (Antapaccay), and Hudbay (Constancia). The protesters are demanding an extension to the government’s deadline for formalising informal mining activities. Given that the affected corridor serves three of Peru’s top ten copper mines, sustained disruption caused by the protests could significantly impact production and exports and will likely force the government into intervening.

Bomb threats shut down several major Canadian airports.

On 3 July, bomb threats targeting Nav Canada air traffic control facilities resulted in the suspension of flights and evacuations at six of Canada’s largest airports, including Ottawa, Montreal, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Calgary, and Vancouver. However, RCMP investigations discovered no credible threats or physical evidence of bombs, likely suggesting that the incident was a hoax aimed at disrupting air operations in the country.

Gangs attack La Chappelle, Haiti, displacing 9,000.

On 22 June, gangs began a protracted attack on the town of La Chappelle, in the Artibonite department. According to local sources, the gangs killed at least six people and caused 9,000 people to become internally displaced. By 24 June, local media reported that La Chappelle was “under gang control”, and that the attack was carried out by the “Talibans”, a criminal group aligned with the Viv Ansanm gang coalition, which is currently the strongest group in Haiti. Notably, reports indicate that authorities knew about the impending attack since at least 19 June. Despite this, there are no notable accounts that the gangs encountered significant police opposition, likely further demonstrating the severe deficiencies of the Haitian police and the deployed international task force.

Argentina orders in absentia trial for alleged perpetrators of 1994 AMIA bombing.

On 18 July 1994, a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) detonated outside a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, killing 85 and injuring 300, in the deadliest terrorist attack in the country’s history. On 26 June 2025, Argentine prosecutors charged ten individuals as perpetrators of the attack, including Iranian government officials and alleged Hezbollah members. The move is the latest in a series of efforts by Argentine President Milei to support an investigation into the attack, as part of broader efforts to improve ties with Israel. Hezbollah has retained a long-standing presence in South America, particularly operating at the Tri-Border area between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, and in Venezuela. Here, Hezbollah operatives mostly engage in criminal enterprises, through which they seek to diversify sources of funds for the group beyond Iranian patronage. While a terror attack in Argentina appears to be against Hezbollah’s interests as it would result in a government crackdown that the group is unlikely to be able to withstand, it is highly likely that Hezbollah operatives retain the ability to stage such an operation in the country, which has a Jewish population of almost 200,000.

Western Venezuela affected by severe floods

High volumes of precipitation have resulted in severe flash floods in the states of Merida, Trujillo and Tachira, causing around 9,000 people to evacuate. The floods reportedly destroyed more than 150 homes and 25 bridges, and have caused the Jose Antonio Paez highway, a key link with Caracas, to be closed. The severe damage suffered by local transport infrastructure is likely to complicate rescue and emergency supply efforts, particularly in rural parts of the affected states. According to weather researchers, the severe flooding that has increasingly occurred during Venezuela’s rainy season between May and October is also partly due to growing construction in the natural floodplains for the local rivers, meaning that floods tend to affect larger numbers of people even if the volumes of rain remain largely consistent across separate events.

There is growing evidence that Iran is exploiting organised criminal networks to conduct asymmetric operations against Israeli and Jewish interests across Europe, with Sweden, Denmark, and Germany identified as the primary countries for operations. In March 2025, the United States sanctioned Sweden’s Foxtrot gang and its leader, Rawa Majid, accusing them of acting on behalf of the Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (MOIS). The gang has been linked to the failed grenade attack on the Israeli Embassy in Stockholm in January 2024. Recent reporting also suggests Foxtrot has been attempting to recruit drone pilots to conduct attacks targeting Western and Israeli interests across Sweden, Denmark, and Germany.

In a separate but related development, a Danish national was arrested in Denmark in late June in conjunction with the German authorities for allegedly spying for Iran and gathering intelligence on Jewish sites and individuals in Berlin. It is alleged that the suspect was reconnoitring sites in support of Iran-linked attacks. In response, the German government summoned the Iranian ambassador and increased protective measures around Jewish sites.

Solace Global Assessment: 

These incidents are almost certainly part of a broader asymmetric strategy employed by Iran. Tehran is widely suspected of establishing relations and supporting a range of organised crime groups and non-state actors, from small criminal gangs to organised paramilitaries like Hezbollah. The use of proxy forces enables Iran to gather intelligence, project influence, intimidate and even conduct attacks, in exchange for remuneration or protection. This strategy allows Iran to maintain a high degree of plausible deniability and limit the opportunities for escalation. Previous incidents linked to Iran and its use of proxy forces include attempts to assassinate Iranian dissidents throughout Europe, Israelis in tourist resorts in Turkey and Cyprus, and even an attempt to assassinate former US National Security Adviser John Bolton.

Following Iran’s conflict with Israel, Tehran’s conventional military capabilities have been severely degraded. Its proxy networks have suffered major operational setbacks and will likely take years to recover, and Iran’s nuclear programme has likely been delayed after US and Israeli military intervention. The cumulative effects of the conflict have weakened several components of Iran’s deterrent. Consequently, it is highly likely that Tehran will increasingly rely on deniable, asymmetric tactics, such as cyber operations, proxy-linked attacks and the use of criminal networks, to pursue its strategic objectives. These tactics are low-cost, difficult to attribute to Iran, and unlikely to provoke large-scale retaliation, making them an attractive option for a regime under pressure. These tactics are also an opportunity for Iran to demonstrate its capability to target areas outside of the range of its conventional military capabilities, with previous Iranian-linked attacks being conducted as far away as Argentina.

Overnight 28-29 June, Russian forces conducted the largest combined strikes of the war against Ukraine. A total of 477 Shahed one-way attack drones (OWA-UAVs) and decoys, and 60 missiles (including 11 ballistic missiles: seven Iskander-M missiles, and four hypersonic Kinzhal missiles). Only one of the Iskander ballistic missiles was intercepted, and none of the hypersonic Kinzhal missiles. Targeted areas included Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk in the west of Ukraine, and Kyiv, Cherkasy, Poltave, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia. At least ten people were killed during the attacks, and a Ukrainian F-16 fighter aircraft and its pilot were downed.

Overnight 3-4 July, Russian forces conducted another major layered attack against Ukraine, with a record 550 Shahed OWA-UAVs and decoys used and 11 missiles. The main target of this attack was Kyiv, with six out of the city’s ten districts being hit: Solomianskyi, Holosiivskyi, Sviatoshynskyi, Darnytskyi, Dniprovskyi and Shevchenkivskyi. According to initial reports, eight locations were successfully hit by Russia with nine missiles and 63 OWA-UAVs. At the time of writing, at least 23 injuries have been recorded.

Concurrently, the Pentagon has reportedly suspended and diverted several shipments of military aid to Ukraine. The shipments, which were part of previously promised deliveries from the Biden administration, included Patriot air defence PAC-3 interceptors and other precision munitions. The decision was reportedly taken due to concerns that US stockpiles have fallen too low.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Russian strikes against Ukrainian urban centres have almost certainly entered their most intensive phase of the war thus far. The scale of Russian long-range aerial strikes has continuously grown since January 2025, with the attacks consistently breaking records established just weeks prior. It is highly likely that the threat environment to civilians and foreign operations based in Kyiv is currently the most severe since the initial phases of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when Kyiv was under the potential threat of siege or capture. This is due to the notably increasing penetration rates of Russian long-range fires against Ukrainian air defence.

This has almost certainly resulted firstly from the sheer scale of the attacks, which has been enabled by drastically increased Russian production rate. It has been estimated that Russia can now produce 100 Shahed drones every three days, which is approximately four to five times higher than in late 2024 and ten times higher than the same time last year. During the summer of 2024, between 10-30 Shaheds would regularly target Ukraine over the course of a nightly attack, whereas this summer, Russian forces have on multiple occasions launched attacks of over 300 Shaheds and decoys.

It is additionally likely that stocks of advanced air interceptors are beginning to run low, given the observed increased rates of air defence penetration from Russian ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile systems are almost certainly the most challenging threat to intercept for Ukrainian air defence, with the Patriot system being one of Ukraine’s only methods to consistently intercept ballistic missiles. During previous periods of interceptor shortages due to delays in US military aid, Russian forces were able to successfully penetrate Ukrainian air defence to strike high-value targets in areas with comprehensive air defence coverage, such as a thermal power plant near Kyiv in April 2024. Moscow is almost certainly militarily incentivised to continue large-scale waves of layered strikes to deplete Ukrainian air defence interceptors as far as possible, given that US support is now far less likely to replenish these stocks. Russian strike tactics have furthermore highly likely evolved to increasingly target civilian areas directly. It is likely, therefore, that the threat environment in areas that were previously considered safer havens for international operations in Ukraine, namely Kyiv, will continue to worsen.

It is likely that the suspension of critical military aid could also accelerate Russian advances on the battlefield, reflecting previously observed trends. Russian media and war bloggers claimed on 30 June to have captured its first village in the Dnipropetrovsk region, although as it stands, this claimed advance is likely not a significant new axis of Russian offensives. A key developing front, however, is the northeastern summer offensive against Sumy. Ukrainian military leadership have stated that Russian advances in the region have been recently successfully halted. Given the immense challenges Russian forces have faced on the Pokrovsk axis in Donetsk, Moscow has likely allocated significant resources and manpower at the Sumy axis to pressure a new major front of the war and achieve a breakthrough. While Ukrainian defences against the northeastern offensive have so far been successful, there is a realistic possibility that the reported suspension of US aid could accelerate Russian gains on this axis.

On 27 June, Russian security forces conducted mass raids in the city of Yekaterinburg targeting ethnic Azeris in connection with cold case murder investigations dating back to 2001. Two of the primary suspects, Azerbaijani brothers, died while in custody. Azerbaijani authorities stated that post-mortems indicated that the brothers were tortured and died from severe physical trauma. Baku responded by summoning the Russian chargé d’affaires, cancelling Russian cultural events, and suspending bilateral meetings, including a scheduled visit by the Russian Deputy Prime Minister.

On 30 June, Azerbaijani police raided the offices of the Russian state-funded news outlet Sputnik Azerbaijan and made several arrests.  Eight Russian nationals were then arrested on charges of drug smuggling and cybercrimes on 1 July, with court footage revealing several of the suspects as having visible injuries. Moscow summoned the Azerbaijani ambassador, and multiple Azerbaijani businessmen and diaspora leadership figures were reportedly arrested across Russia, including in St Petersburg and Voronezh.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Russia and Azerbaijan have maintained strong economic and cultural ties since the fall of the Soviet Union, with a sizable Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia that unofficial estimates indicate could be as high as two million. The decades-long Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia complicated relations, however, with Armenia being a member of the Russia-led military alliance Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). While relations between Russia and Azerbaijan improved following the reorientation of Moscow’s favour towards Baku rather than Yerevan by 2020,  the 25 December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines crash, when a passenger jet en route to Grozny was accidentally hit by Russian air defences, caused significant tensions.

Azerbaijan’s military victory over Armenia in 2020 and subsequent full seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh in the 2023 offensive highlighted a geopolitical realignment in the region. Azerbaijan was able to bypass Russian dependence and pursue its objectives with Turkish support. Strategic partnership with Turkey, a NATO member, proved to be highly useful for Azerbaijani military successes, particularly due to Turkey-provided drone technology and weapon systems. Russia’s ability to maintain its prior hegemonic influence in the South Caucasus has highly likely been dramatically hampered by the diversion of resources to the war in Ukraine.  It is notable that on 1 July, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky made a phone call to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, which is further indicative of the likely major geopolitical realignment that is unfolding in the region.

The use of arrests (and in many cases, the apparent physical beatings of detainees) by both states almost certainly highlights the increasing threat of ‘hostage diplomacy’ in travel risk management. State use of detention of foreign or dual-nationals to pursue diplomatic objectives, whether initially conducted arbitrarily or otherwise, has likely replaced kidnapping by non-state groups as the foremost international hostage-taking concern.

Recent assessments from the US Department of Defense (DoD) indicate that Iran’s nuclear programme has been delayed by one to two years following US and Israeli strikes on nuclear enrichment facilities, nuclear scientists and other key nuclear-related infrastructure. However, analysts have assessed that Iran still maintains sufficient stocks of enriched uranium and the expertise to create a less advanced gun-type fission weapon, similar to the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, in only a matter of weeks. However, such a weapon would be non-missile deliverable and would require a more rudimentary means of deployment, such as being dropped directly from an aircraft or physically placed adjacent to the target area in a vehicle.   

Negotiations are scheduled in Oslo between the US and Iran; however, Iran has refused to alter its position on uranium enrichment, and the US has maintained its zero-enrichment stance. Tehran has also passed a new law suspending cooperation with new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  inspectors, which follows a pattern of non-compliance with Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) obligations. Israeli media reports suggest Israel is drafting a post-war mechanism, with US backing, to prevent Iranian nuclear reconstitution. Israeli officials have stated this will include provisions for pre-emptive strikes against attempts to reconstitute Iran’s nuclear programme.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the ceasefire between Israel and Iran is holding and the threat of regional escalation has been significantly reduced, Israel has not fully achieved its primary war objective, as Iran still has the capacity to produce a crude nuclear weapon within a short time frame. Moreover, Iran’s refusal to concede on uranium enrichment and its move to restrict IAEA access have almost certainly reinforced concerns over its long-term nuclear intentions.

Israel’s plans for a post-war enforcement mechanism, which has reportedly been endorsed by the US, to authorise pre-emptive action against Iranian nuclear reconstitution indicate that containment and deterrence will highly likely be prioritised over diplomacy. In the short-term, Israel is likely to focus on the reconstitution of its forces, especially its counter-ballistic missile capability, as well as the war in Gaza. Israel may also escalate efforts to dismantle Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon and Syria, given the group’s potential utility as a delivery mechanism for Iran to deploy a crude nuclear weapon in any future confrontation. However, any indication that Iran is seeking to rapidly reconstitute its nuclear capabilities is likely to trigger renewed Israeli military action, especially if diplomatic efforts continue to falter.

Latest figures from the 25 June protests place the death toll at at least 19 people, with 531 injuries, 15 “enforced disappearances”, and multiple sexual assaults. On 30 June, Boniface Kariuki, who was shot at close range with an anti-riot shotgun by security forces on 17 June, was declared brain dead, sparking further public anger and demands for justice. Many Kenyans have appealed to the government to settle the hospital bill after Kariuki’s family appealed to the public for donations to cover the costs. On 3 July, protesters set fire to a police station in Mawego during a funeral procession for blogger Albert Ojwang, who was killed by Kenyan police in custody on 9 June.

Residents of Embu County attacked Member of Parliament for Mukuweini John Kaguchia on 29 June after he condemned police officers for killing civilians and indicated that he would file a motion to remove Cabinet Secretary for Ministry of Interior and National Administration Onesimus Kipchumba Murkomen for encouraging police officers to shoot protesters who approach police stations with “criminal intent”. Numerous Kenyans have called for further demonstrations on July 7, Saba Saba Day, the date on which nationwide anti-government demonstrations occurred in 1990.  In an effort to prevent demonstrations from spreading, a Kenyan legislator has proposed a bill limiting demonstrations to designated areas. Kenyan police have issued a statement urging demonstrator organisers to submit a formal notification and that protesting without a formal permit is illegal.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Nationwide protests are highly likely to occur on 7 July. While the 25 June demonstrations drew parallels with the 2024 anti-finance bill protests, demonstrators on 7 July will almost certainly seek to evoke the wave of civil unrest in the 1990s. Most significant is the Saba Saba (Seven Seven) Uprising on 7 July 1990, in which pro-democracy activists led by opposition figures rallied against the rule of President Daniel arap Moi, who had been in power since 1978. The government banned the rally and violently cracked down on demonstrators, with security forces killing at least 20 people, arresting hundreds, and detaining opposition leaders without trial. In December 1991, Moi lifted the ban on opposition parties, enabling multiparty politics.

The current government’s reaction to civil unrest somewhat mirrors the Moi government, whereby protesters are cast as a destabilising force, with Interior Minister Kipchumba Murkomen describing protests as “terrorism disguised as dissent”. The allusions to the Saba Saba Uprising will highly likely focus protesters on the single issue of despotic governance as they almost certainly increasingly call for the resignation of President William Ruto. A notable distinction from the Saba Saba Uprising is that while protests in the 1990s were led by opposition figures, the current demonstrations are a grassroots Gen Z movement led by students without defined leaders or ethnic affiliations. This will highly likely make it more difficult for protesters to pressure Ruto, who has weathered previous waves of protests since his election in September 2022, to resign.

French ATC strike leads to hundreds of flight cancellations.

Major low-cost carriers like Ryanair and EasyJet have cancelled flights in France on 3 and 4 July in response to a French Air Traffic Control (ATC) strike organised by two separate unions. The strike will not only affect flights to and from France but also flights that use French airspace, with flights to the UK, Ireland, Spain and Greece likely to be hugely impacted. Disruption is expected to be worse at French airports on 4 July, with 40 per cent fewer flights from the Paris airports at Charles de Gaulle, Orla and Beauvais after France’s civil aviation authority demanded airlines reduce flight schedules at several airports across the country.

Budapest Pride goes ahead, despite Hungary’s government opposition.

On 29 June, the annual Pride march occurred in the capital of Hungary, with more than 100,000 people attending. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban has repeatedly stated his opposition to the event, and the passage of a controversial law in March 2025 had prompted the march to be banned. Despite this, organisers, backed by Budapest Mayor Gergely Karácsony, still held the event, which resulted in no notable cases of violence and only two arrests. Budapest Pride’s large attendance was almost certainly driven by opposition to Orban’s policies and has likely energised Hungary’s opposition.

Serbian protest movement escalates again, several cities blockaded.

Clashes were recorded in Belgrade on 29 June, involving anti-government protesters and responding police. The protesters, approximately 140,000, were calling for early elections and for the removal of President Aleksandar Vučić, who has ruled the country for 12 years. Two days prior, Serbian police had detained five people on the accusation of planning to overthrow the government, and Vučić has stated that he believes the ongoing protests to be an attempt at staging a “colour revolution” orchestrated from abroad. As of 4 July, protests have continued to escalate: Serbian student groups announced a traffic and service “blockade” in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nis, Kragujevac, and Valjevo. As part of the protests, students have also blocked several roadways, including a highway near Cacak.

Protests have been ongoing in Serbia since November 2024, when the collapse of a train station rooftop in Novi Sad that killed 16 people caused local protests, which quickly became driven by national grievances concerning state corruption. Vučić’s heavy-handed approach to suppressing the unrest is likely to drive further violence, not only between protesters and police, but also due to the growing risk of clashes between protesters and counter-protesters. Following the blockade announced on 4 July, protests are likely to continue on the 4-6 July period, which will in turn likely result in Serbian authorities carrying out a high volume of arrests.

Ethiopia announces completion of controversial mega-dam.

On 3 July, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced the completion of the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, the primary tributary of the River Nile, which can provide up to 85 per cent of the total water volume of the Nile during the rainy season. The GERD has been a major source of contention with Egypt, as the mega-city of Cairo and the surrounding environs rely on the Nile for nearly all its water needs. Egypt has consistently demanded a binding agreement on water release, particularly during drought conditions, but this has failed to materialise. Egypt has previously threatened military action against the GERD, and while this is unlikely in the near term, the dam will almost certainly remain a long-term flashpoint in the region, with a high potential for crisis escalation during future droughts or periods of political tension.

Three days of violent protests in Togo.

Three days of clashes from 26 to 28 June between demonstrators and security forces in Lomé resulted in the deaths of at least four people, dozens of injuries, and at least 60 arrests. Thousands of people took to the streets to denounce proposed constitutional reforms, which would extend President Faure Gnassingbé’s rule indefinitely, as well as energy price hikes. Security forces reacted violently, with videos on social media depicting beatings and men in plain clothes hauling civilians away. The government shut down social media access in response. This unrest marked a break from recent years, whereby protests have been de facto banned since 2022. As with the protests in Kenya, this is primarily led by Gen Z, highly likely spurred by social media. The government’s suppression of social media will likely trigger an adverse reaction from the country’s youth, enunciating government repression and triggering further waves of unrest. Security forces almost certainly expect further protests and remain stationed at key intersections.

Syria and Israel in talks over deal to end hostilities.

Local and international media have reported ongoing talks between Tel Aviv and Damascus, aimed at entering some type of agreement, likely as part of an extension of the US-spearheaded Abraham Accords. It is unclear if the status of the Golan Heights, which Israel occupied following the 1967 war, is being discussed. Damascus will likely not agree to a full normalisation of relations with Tel Aviv in the medium term, as this would likely be anathema to much of the post-Assad leadership of the country. Nevertheless, new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has demonstrated himself open towards closer relations with the West, and notably discussed the Abraham Accord framework during his meeting with US President Donald Trump in May. Regardless of its actual implementation, hints of rapprochement between Israel and Syria are almost certainly to be leveraged by violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the country. VEOs almost certainly retain a key interest in delegitimising al-Sharaa, as part of their broader efforts to create security vacuums in Syria which they can exploit to set up alternative administrative systems.

Unclear responsibility for attacks at Kirkuk, Baiji, and Zakho, Iraq.

On the night of 30 June-1 July, Iraqi sources reported several attacks at multiple locations in the country, including a refugee camp in Zakho. In Kirkuk, unknown militants reportedly fired at least two Katyusha rockets at an Iraqi military airbase, injuring one. As of the time of writing, it is unclear which group was responsible for the attack. Iranian-backed Shia militias have conducted several attacks on Iraqi military facilities and US bases in the region, and are known to have a large inventory of Katyusha-type rockets. However, according to some local sources, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) operations near Kirkuk have surged in recent months, and the point of origin of the rockets may have been a neighbourhood associated with ISIS activity, which has gradually increased in the region since the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

Israeli media reports severe worsening of threats at aid distribution centres in Gaza.

The Israeli newspaper Haaretz published a report on 27 June collating testimonies from Israel Defence Forces (IDF) soldiers stationed near the aid distribution points created by the new US-backed program in Gaza. The reports highlight a disproportionate volume in the use of deadly force by IDF units as a means to control crowds, which has resulted in approximately 600 deaths since the beginning of the new system. The report further showcases that the system, administered by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), is almost certainly vastly more dangerous and less effective than previous aid distribution systems run by the UN and international humanitarian organisations.

JNIM launches coordinated attacks in western and central Mali.

On 1 July, the al-Qaeda affiliated militant group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), conducted a series of attacks in western and central Mali, targeting military positions at seven locations, including Niono, Molodo, Sandaré, Nioro du Sahel, Diboli, Gogui, and Kayes. In one attack, a factory was overrun, and three Indian workers were abducted by the group, likely to be held for ransom to fund future operations. Junta forces claim to have killed 80 militants but have not provided details regarding their own casualties. An increase in attacks in western Mali, particularly on the border, may indicate that JNIM has established safe havens in neighbouring Senegal, allowing JNIM to launch cross-border operations with relative freedom. Attacks on border towns and trade routes likely suggest that the militant group is employing a strategy intended to isolate Bamako from critical supply lines and restrict the junta’s freedom of movement in a broader effort to undermine state control.

Nigerien army records several cases of mutiny.

Local media reported that two cases of mutiny occurred in Filingué and Téra, both located in the country’s southwest and near the border with Burkina Faso. In one case, the soldiers beat their commander, who was later evacuated to Turkey to receive medical treatment. The mutinies highly likely followed the Banibangou attack of 19 June, where Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) militants killed 71 soldiers, and almost certainly reflect the poor morale and severe deficiencies experienced by the Nigerien military. Despite receiving Russian supplies, much of Niger’s military continues to record shortages of weapons and tools and reports widespread delays in the payment of wages. The local defence sector is deeply affected by institutional corruption, which has further worsened this situation. Further mutinies or defections remain likely, particularly as JNIM and other regional jihadist groups are continuing to carry out a high volume of attacks.

Six armed groups sign peace agreement in the DRC’s restive Ituri region.

On 28 June, six armed groups signed a peace agreement to end the ongoing conflict. The groups include the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO), Zaire/Auto-Defense, Popular Self-Defence Movement of Ituri (MAPI), Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri (FRPI), Popular Front for the Independence of Congo (FPIC), and Chini Ya Tuna. The signing followed five days of intercommunity dialogue and was supported by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). The peace agreement is highly unlikely to result in lasting peace in the region. CODECO, one of the most active groups in the region, has already broken the peace agreement, attacking a military post on 2 July. If the other groups respect it and disband, former militia members will highly likely be left without a means of subsistence and will likely either rejoin their groups, join other groups not party to the peace agreement, or form new groups. Furthermore, CODECO has been organised as a Lendu self-defence group centred around the reclamation of land allegedly taken by the Hema ethnic group and the refusal to accept foreign exploitation of local resources. The recently DRC-Rwanda peace agreement will highly likely lead to a ‘minerals deal’ between the US and DRC, which will almost certainly increase foreign access to the DRC’s minerals. Furthermore, in 2025, a new pro-Hema group Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR), was formed and is not party to the peace agreement. Other militant groups are active in the region and are also not party to the agreement, including the pro-Hema Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) and Islamic State-aligned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The ADF, who have been particularly active in the Ituri region throughout 2025 amid the security vacuum caused by the AFC/M23 insurgency, will highly likely exploit the peace agreement and seek to recruit former militia members, likely strengthening its insurgency.

Mass evacuations in Crete due to wildfires.

More than 5,000 people have been evacuated in parts of the Greek island near Ierapetra, after wildfires broke out in the area on 2 July. As of 4 July, wildfires have spread over a six-kilometre front, prompting authorities to close local roads. Several homes have been destroyed in the Agia Fotia area, a popular tourist village. According to current reports, the spread of fire has been aided by the thick and mostly dry forest in the area.

Fires in Izmir, Turkey, prompt airport closure. Izmir airport briefly suspended operations on 1 July due to severe wildfires affecting the city. At least 50,000 people have been evacuated in the 29 June – 1 July period, after the fires broke out in the Seferihisar district, which has large wooded areas. The fire spread rapidly to neighbouring parts of the city, also due to winds of up to 75 kph. The fires occur at a time when Turkey, like much of the rest of the Mediterranean countries, has severe heatwave conditions, with temperatures in some parts of the region crossing the 40 degrees Celsius threshold. Further wildfires remain highly likely throughout July and August and could further disrupt travel in the region.

Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra is under mounting pressure following the leak of a phone call with former Cambodian leader Hun Sen, in which she appeared to downplay the role of a senior Thai military commander and referred to Hun Sen as “uncle”. Paetongtarn defended the phone call by calling it a ‘negotiation technique’. On 28 June, approximately 10,000 protesters gathered in Bangkok calling for the resignation of Paetongtarn and holding placards reading “PM is enemy of state”. On 1 July, the Constitutional Court suspended Paetongtarn from office, pending an ethics investigation. Deputy Prime Minister Suriya Juangroongruangkit has taken over as caretaker. On the same day, Paetongtarn’s father, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, appeared in court over comments criticising the Thai monarchy he made to South Korean media in a 2015 interview.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Paetongtarn is unlikely to politically survive this ongoing crisis. If she passes the constitutional court’s investigation, there is a realistic possibility that other bodies, such as the anti-corruption agency, will launch their own investigation. Furthermore, much of the Thai public has almost certainly lost confidence in her and will be unlikely to accept her leadership again.

The Thai military is highly likely exploiting the border crisis with Cambodia to win public favour. Thailand has a history of coups, with 22 coup attempts, 13 of which were successful, since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The most recent two coups ousted Paetongtarn Shinawatra‘s family members, Thaksin in 2006 and her aunt Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014. The normalisation of coups in Thailand has likely created a ‘coup culture’, whereby often military-led takeovers are viewed by many as an acceptable way to solve a political crisis. The likelihood of coups typically increases during times of mass protest, as large segments of the population often actively call for military intervention.

Previous military-led coups have caused significant short-term economic damage, slowing GDP, reducing public investment and tourism, and lowering consumer and business confidence. Given the financial damage already caused by the border closure with Cambodia, which has reduced trade and cross-border labour movement, a military coup could compound the issue, triggering an economic crisis in Thailand. Moreover, previous coups have exacerbated civil unrest in Thailand, resulting in major disruption and political violence. In 2006, when Thaksin was deposed, it triggered years of political polarisation between the “Red Shirts” (pro-Thaksin, rural and working-class supporters) and “Yellow Shirts” (royalist, urban middle class and conservative elites). By 2010, Red Shirt protests had escalated to such a degree that the military crackdown in central Bangkok resulted in the deaths of almost 100 people.

In late June, a series of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were discovered at 11 different locations in popular tourist locations in southern Thailand. IEDs were planted at Phuket’s Patong Beach, in the car park of Phuket International Airport, and in several other locations in Phuket, Krabi and Phang Nga. Two men linked to the southern Islamist separatist group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), have been arrested for allegedly planting the devices, with two other suspects yet to be apprehended. Reports suggest that all four suspects were from Thailand’s restive Pattani Province, where the insurgency has been active for over 20 years. Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra has placed all government agencies on high alert and urged heightened vigilance. However, early reports indicate that many of the devices were designed to resemble IEDs and lacked the destructive capacity to cause mass casualties.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The apparent limited destructive capacity of the devices highly likely suggests they were intended primarily to instil fear and disrupt Thailand’s tourism sector rather than to inflict mass casualties on civilians. This strategy could be an attempt by the BRN to undermine economic stability and security outside of its main area of operations in the Deep South, rather than an indication that the insurgency is migrating to other parts of Thailand. However, the ability to emplace multiple IEDs across several tourist resorts hundreds of kilometres from Pattani Province has likely demonstrated the BRN’s operational reach and ability to target areas outside of the Deep South, and has likely exerted pressure on the central government.

The BRN has been linked to previous fatal attacks outside of the Deep South. In 2016, a series of coordinated IED attacks occurred in the popular tourist resorts of Hua Hin, Phuket, Trang and Surat Thani. These attacks were linked to the BRN and resulted in the death of four people and 36 injuries. Moreover, anecdotal reporting suggests there may be internal divisions within the BRN, with some factions reportedly adopting more aggressive tactics, including the deliberate targeting of civilians. Separatist attacks in the Deep South have escalated in recent months, with 57 attacks on civilians recorded just in April in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla, resulting in at least 18 deaths. This is despite a pledge made by the BRN to refrain from attacking civilians.

The discrepancy between the BRN’s public pledge to refrain from targeting civilians and increasing attacks on non-combatants could potentially confirm internal divisions within the group. This split could lead to increased violence, with more aggressive factions endorsing attacks on civilians within and beyond the Deep South. Such a fracture risks expanding the geographic scope of insurgent attacks, including into Thailand’s tourist regions, and will likely be greatly influenced by the government’s response. Previous heavy-handed government responses, including security crackdowns, arbitrary arrests, and allegations of human rights abuses, have helped fuel the insurgency, increase recruitment and provoke retaliatory attacks..

The Taliban are recognised as the legitimate Afghan government by Russia.

Moscow announced the landmark decision on 3 July, becoming the first country to recognise the government that has ruled Afghanistan since 2021. It is almost certain that several Russian allies, including Central Asian states, will follow suit. Moscow’s recognition is highly likely to be both a political and economic victory for the Taliban, boosting their perceived legitimacy at home and abroad and creating space for more international investment and security partnerships. Moreover, Russia’s move puts pressure on both Europe and China. In the case of the former, countries like Germany likely have an interest in building stronger diplomatic ties with the Taliban despite domestic political opposition due to Afghanistan’s position as an origin country for irregular migration flows to the EU. Consequently, Berlin, Brussels, and other European capitals may tacitly support Moscow’s decision.

Former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina handed first sentence in absentia.

Hasina, whose trial for murder and other crimes is being televised in Bangladesh, was found to be in contempt of court and sentenced to six months in prison. Hasina is currently exiled in India, where she fled during the August 2024 revolution that toppled her government. The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus likely continues to leverage the trial’s high visibility to accrue political support and placate the parties, formerly in the opposition, that are calling for quick elections and a transition to a post-Hasina elected government. Despite this, political tensions in Bangladesh continue to remain high, with targeted killings and politically-motivated mob violence remaining frequent. On 2 July, a local leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), currently the largest political party in Bangladesh, was shot and stabbed to death in Dhaka by unknown perpetrators.

Last Hong Kong pro-democracy party disbands.

The League of Social Democrats announced the decision, citing the National Security Law (NSL) passed by the government in 2020, which was a response to the 2019-2020 pro-democracy protests. The development is a major symbolic win for Beijing, which has almost certainly successfully quashed civil society organisations in the territory in order to consolidate control.

Hindu pilgrimage begins in disputed Kashmir region.

Just months after the Pahalgam terror attack and the subsequent four-day conflict between India and Pakistan, thousands of Hindus have begun a monthlong pilgrimage to the Amarnath Himalayan cave shrine in the Muslim-majority Indian-administered Kashmir region. The pilgrimage will be covered with heavy security, with thousands of paramilitary troops and high-tech surveillance equipment deployed along the route, with civilian movement along key roads hugely restricted. However, the pilgrimage will almost certainly be a high-value target for militants in the area, while rights groups have criticised the pilgrimage as a militarised affair serving the Indian nationalist objectives of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) administration.

Suicide bombing kills 13 Pakistani soldiers in North Waziristan.

On 28 June, a suicide bombing targeted a Pakistani military convoy in Mir Ali, an area near the Durand Line. Following the attack, the Pakistani military stated they had launched a retaliatory raid which killed 14 militants. The attack was almost certainly carried out by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), although Islamabad blamed “Fitna al Hindustan”, an alleged India-sponsored terrorist group, for the incident.

Pakistan has increasingly used the term “Fitna al Hindustan” to refer to Baloch and Waziri extremist and separatist organisations carrying attacks on its soil, and the Pakistani Ministry of Interior published a notice in late May “institutionalising” this designation. Nevertheless, there is currently no evidence that a group under that name is actually in operation, and it is rather more likely that the attribution of terror attacks to Delhi is a diplomatic move following the Pahalgam attack in April.

Heavy monsoon rains kill 46 in Pakistan.

The heavy rains started on 24 June and continued throughout the week, affecting much of Pakistan’s territory and resulting in severe flooding. In areas that have poor infrastructure, including Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the damage caused by the flooding appears to have been particularly severe. The reportedly slow response from local authorities likely exacerbated the impacts of the severe weather event. Pakistan is one of the world’s most at-risk countries for severe weather events. Currently, weather conditions in the country are marked by extreme heat, with daily average maximums above 32 degrees Celsius, and almost constant precipitation. On 3 July, Pakistani authorities issued an alert for severe rains and floods in several parts of the country from 6 to 10 July.

“Bomb” cyclone formed off eastern Australia.

A “bomb” cyclone, a rapidly intensifying storm characterised by a sudden and significant drop in atmospheric pressure, which leads to strong winds and heavy precipitation, has formed off the coast of eastern Australia and has caused widespread disruption and damage in New South Wales. authorities have responded to over 2,000 emergency calls along the southeastern coast, and over 30,000 homes have been left without power across the region. Emergency weather warnings remain in effect, with authorities urging residents in low-lying areas to shelter in place due to dangerous flooding conditions.

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