On 18 June, US officials announced a revision in the country’s entry policies for foreign travellers. The version of the notice published by foreign embassies states that “effective immediately, all individuals applying for an F, M, or J non-immigrant visa are requested to adjust the privacy settings on all of their social media accounts to ‘public’ to facilitate vetting necessary to establish their identity and admissibility to the United States under U.S. law.” Respectively, F, M visas denote academic and vocational students, while J visas include “exchange visitors” like au pairs. The US Department of State website further states that “under new guidance, we will conduct a comprehensive and thorough vetting, including online presence, of all student and exchange visitor applicants in the F, M, and J non-immigrant classifications.”

Solace Global Assessment: 

The updated policy is part of the current Trump administration’s push to increase vetting of foreign nationals entering the country via legal pathways, and follows the country-specific travel bans issued by the administration. The policy more specifically targets students. As such, it is highly likely to reflect the administration’s goal of stifling civil unrest on academic campuses, which continue to remain important hotspots of protests against the US government. Moreover, it is also reflective of growing concerns regarding the exploitation of student visas as a means for migrants to settle into the US permanently. The travel bans, released earlier in June, were also justified by noting the high overstay rates for nationals of some countries with regard to F, M, and J visas, rates that reach 42 per cent in some cases. Finally, Washington likely assesses that the study pathway is at risk of being exploited by hostile actors, including drug traffickers and hostile states. This possibly follows from recent incidents, including the arrest, earlier in June, of two Chinese researchers for allegedly seeking to smuggle a sample of fungus that can damage crops, which was described as a case of “agroterrorism” by the administration.

It is still unclear to what extent the new policy will result in visa-holders being denied entry to the US, as there is currently no clear picture of what forms of “online presence” could constitute grounds for denial. For instance, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio remarked that “the lack of any online presence” may be reflective of elusiveness, a somewhat vague position whose implications appear potentially very broad.

Overall, the new entry policies reflect a tightening security environment for international travellers seeking to enter the US legally. In addition to these, current reports indicate that other, pre-existing entry policies are being implemented more thoroughly at US entry points. For instance, travellers to the US have reported more searches of personal electronic devices being conducted by immigration officials. As US law gives officials the power to access both personal and business-provided devices, and to “review, copy, and/or analyze [their] contents”, business travellers planning entry to the US will likely face more pressure to take steps to minimise threats to intellectual property and business intelligence.

US sanctions Mexican banks tied to cartels.

On 25 June, the US Treasury Department sanctioned three Mexican financial institutions: CIBanco, Intercam Banco, and Vector Casa de Bolsa, after alleging that they laundered millions of dollars for major drug cartels, including the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), Sinaloa, Gulf, and Beltrán-Leyva cartels. The sanctions, enacted under the new Fentanyl Sanctions Act and FEND Off Fentanyl Act, block the banks from conducting transactions with US financial institutions. Mexico’s Finance Ministry has rejected the claims, stating no conclusive evidence had been shared, but indicated it would act if proof were provided. The move likely forms part of a broader US strategy to disrupt cartel financing and may trigger further scrutiny of Mexican and regional banks; however, the sanctions also risk straining US-Mexico cooperation on anti-money laundering and cross-border financial enforcement.

Argentina’s President Milei vetoes law offering flood relief to Bahía Blanca.

The presidential decree, which was issued on 24 June, vetoes a law that was originally passed in June, and which declared the city of Bahía Blanca, which was hit by floods in March, a “disaster zone”, granting it a special fund equivalent to USD 170 million for reconstruction and immediate relief. The decree justifies itself by stating that the law does not specify the source of the funds, and thus is likely to threaten the state’s fiscal balance. As the law was passed with overwhelming parliamentary support, Milei’s decision is likely to prove extremely controversial and will likely provoke backlash in Buenos Aires.

US State Department issues “do not travel” warning for Monterrey-Reynosa Highway, Mexico.

The notice, issued on 20 June, cited an increase in “disappearances” and kidnappings on the stretch of road in Tamaulipas state. The state is a stronghold for the various factions of the Gulf Cartel (CDG), and has a large presence of the Northeast Cartel (CDN) and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). As it has done in other Mexican states, CJNG is likely leveraging internal splintering within a larger and more established group, in this case, CDN. Local media claims that recent violence has been driven by competition between the Los Metros and Los Escorpiones factions of CDG, with CJNG having increasingly supported the former. However, the recent disappearances on the Monterrey-Reynosa Highway are, according to available reports, being carried out by CDN. Recent cases of kidnapping have ended with the victims being found alive after multiple days of captivity, which highly likely suggests the kidnappings are being done for financial gain.

Gangs further expand areas of operation in Haiti, attack civilians.

On 21 June, the Gran Grif gang reportedly attacked civilian communities in Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite. In addition to multiple deaths and injuries, local media reported that several local residents have been kidnapped in the attack. Gran Grif is the main criminal group operating in the Artibonite department and is considered an ally of the Viv Ansanm coalition, which is the most powerful gang group in Haiti. Gran Grif has adopted an extremely brutal treatment of locals in the areas it controls, and has been responsible for several massacres, including the mass-killing of more than 70 individuals in Pont-Sondé in October 2024. In the recent incidents, reports indicate that the local police failed to intervene. This almost certainly demonstrates the continued inability of Haiti’s police and security forces to stop or deter gang operations and to safeguard the civilian population.

Ecuador recaptures gang leader a year after his escape.

José Adolfo Macías, known as “Fito”, was arrested in Manta little more than a year after he managed to escape from Guayaquil Regional Prison, where he was serving a 34-year sentence for drug trafficking. Fito is the leader of “Los Choneros”, a cartel that emerged in the 1990s in Manabí, but has since become a “federation” of small groups dispersed across the country’s territory that is mostly controlled by imprisoned leaders. Cartel leaders in Ecuador often prefer operating out of prisons. These facilities are often populated with gang affiliates, ensuring a high degree of security for leaders, and the widespread police corruption likely allows them unchecked freedom to contact outside groups. Fito’s 2024 escape, which precipitated a year-long conflict between the government and Los Choneros, thus likely had a negative impact on the gang’s stability, as it prompted a crackdown on prison facilities, which disrupted lines of command. It is highly likely that the cartel will retaliate following the latest arrest of its leader. This could take the form of unrest at prisons where the cartel has a high population of affiliated inmates, or attacks on police officers and assets.

Landslide kills ten in Medellín, Colombia.

A landslide occurred in the city in the Antioquia department on 24 June, following protracted heavy rains. At least ten people were killed and eight injured, and dozens more were forced to evacuate. The landslides affected the municipality of Bello, which is located just north of Medellín. Several residential areas in and near Medellín are constructed against highly sloped terrain, are built to below-standard quality, and lack safety measures that can minimise the threat from landslides. The recent incident falls towards the end of Colombia’s main rainy season, which occurs between April and June.

Nationwide healthcare emergency declared in Bolivia over measles outbreak.

On 24 June, Bolivian President Luis Arce declared a nationwide health emergency in response to a major measles outbreak, following the confirmation of over 60 cases across the country as well as 300 suspected cases. As part of the emergency response, healthcare protocols and a vaccination campaign have been activated to control the spread of the disease, school holidays have been moved forward, and remote learning will be introduced to stem the spread of the disease. The Health Minister has urged parents to vaccinate their children, with declining vaccination rates linked to post-COVID healthcare disruptions being blamed for the resurgence of measles.

Overnight 22-23 June, a wave of Russian drone and missile strikes in Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast killed at least 10 civilians. While officials accused Moscow of targeting residential areas, a Russian military spokesperson declared that the attacks targeted Ukrainian ‘military-industrial complex enterprises in the Kyiv region’. The following night, Russia launched 97 Shahed and decoy drones, hitting Dnipro City and Samara in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least 17 people and injuring over 279. One drone struck a train, injuring several passengers. In Sumy, where Moscow has deployed a lot of resources as part of its ongoing summer offensive, three more people were killed in drone strikes. The attacks occurred as President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived at the NATO summit in the Hague, Netherlands. Overnight 23-24 June, Ukrainian long-range strikes targeted Russia’s Rostov Oblast. According to Russian authorities, drone attacks damaged a grain facility, a school, residential buildings, and a sports complex.

On 24 and 25 June, the NATO Summit took place in The Hague, Netherlands, for the first time since the founding of NATO in 1949. During the summit, European countries agreed to increase their defence spending to 5 per cent of their GDP annually within a decade. It also included a line pledging further support to Ukraine, emphasising that its ‘security contributes to ours’. While responding to a question regarding whether the US would supply Ukraine with additional Patriot air defence systems, US President Donald Trump stated that they would ‘see if they can make some available’. Several European partners pledged further military aid to Ukraine during the Summit. On 24 June, the Norwegian government agreed to allocate USD 642 million to Ukrainian drone procurement; Ukrainian and Danish Defence Ministers signed a letter of intent regarding the joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Denmark; and the United Kingdom pledged a new package of 350 Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (ASRAAMs), which have been adapted to be compatible with the United Kingdom-supplied RAVEN ground-based air defence systems, of which it will supply five more.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Russia has increased the intensity of its recent missile and drone attacks on Ukraine, which almost certainly coincides with diverted Western military and political attention due to ongoing Israel-Iran tensions. The 24 June attacks were highly likely designed to take place alongside the NATO summit, where Zelensky was expected to meet Trump to discuss sanctions and weapons deliveries. A similar pattern occurred during the G7 Summit overnight 16-17 June, where Russia launched its deadliest attack on Kyiv since 8 July 2024. This highly likely reflects a calculated message from Moscow timed to remind the West of Ukraine’s vulnerability, erode Ukrainian morale, and undermine NATO by conducting attacks on civilians without consequences. It also likely constituted a response to Ukraine’s military gains in Kursk and increased drone attacks on Russian territory.

Recent reporting indicates that Ukraine’s air defences protecting Kyiv are being stretched beyond capacity. Ammunition shortages, particularly counter-ballistic missile systems like Patriot, IRIS-T, and SAMP/T systems, have left critical gaps, increasing the success of Russian long-range attacks and the risk of successful strikes on strategic and civilian targets in Kyiv. Following the recent wave of strikes on Kyiv, Zelensky highlighted that Russia is now deliberately targeting Ukrainian cities and civilians at a higher rate. It is likely that Russia will sustain its higher-than-average tempo of attacks on Kyiv in the near term in an effort to overwhelm and deplete Ukraine’s already strained air defences, inflict further damage on critical infrastructure, and erode civilian morale while Western focus and resources are split, especially due to recent hostilities in the Middle East.

The European pledges of military aid are unlikely to significantly bolster Ukrainian air defences, with the systems providing no protection from Russia’s ballistic missile threat. This will highly likely require increased US assistance.  A further supply of patriot missiles and systems would almost certainly constitute a significant improvement, since they constitute one of the few Western systems capable of reliably intercepting Russian ballistic missiles, and it would allow Ukraine to increase the missiles’ geographic coverage. However, an immediate transfer of Patriot systems is unlikely due to competing demands in the Middle East and President Trump’s insistence on purchase rather than donation. Although Western financial commitments may benefit Ukraine’s long-term procurement, Russia’s accelerated missile production and deployment of improved systems will likely threaten Ukraine’s air defences over shorter timeframes, increasing the threat to Ukrainian population centres.

Early 22 June, the US launched Operation Midnight Hammer, deploying B-2 bombers and 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) “bunker-busting” munitions on the Fordow enrichment site, Iran’s primary and most hardened nuclear enrichment facility, as well as strikes on Iran’s other nuclear facilities. The Trump administration has claimed Iran’s nuclear programme was ‘obliterated’ but early battlefield damage assessments (BDAs) vary. A low-confidence leaked report from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) suggested that Iran’s nuclear programme has only been delayed by a matter of months, while the Central Intelligence Agency has stated that it has been set back several years. In response to the US strike, Iran warned that it would retaliate, stating that it ‘reserves all options’ from closing the Strait of Hormuz to attacking US military bases in the region.

In retaliation, Iran conducted Operation Glad Tidings of Victory on 23 June, launching 19 ballistic missiles at al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, a strategic hub for US military operations in the Middle East. However, Iran provided advanced warning of the attack to the US via backchannels. This enabled US service personnel to find hard cover, and all but one missiles were intercepted, resulting in no casualties or damage to US military assets. Attacks by Iranian-backed Shia militias on US bases were also reported in Iraq, but no casualties were recorded. The Trump administration immediately downplayed Iran’s attack and secured a ceasefire between Iran and Israel the following day. Despite initial violations of the ceasefire, it has continued to hold, and negotiations between Iran and the US over the former’s nuclear programme have been scheduled for next week.

Solace Global Assessment: 

: An Iranian attack on US military bases in the Gulf was seen as one of the most likely triggers for a regional escalation. However, the attack was largely symbolic and was almost certainly viewed by the US as sub-threshold, given that advanced warning was issued and no casualties were recorded. Qatar was also likely targeted as it has the best relations with Iran out of the Gulf States, has played mediator for Iran since the 7 October attacks and has fragile relations with many of the other Gulf States following the Qatar diplomatic crisis of 2017-21; factors that limited the chances of a regional escalation. The Trump administration has reaffirmed its “America First” stance and is not seeking regime change, almost certainly the primary trigger for Iranian escalation. The US has likely exploited the limited nature of Iran’s retaliation as an opportunity to de-escalate and advance talks, although the US force posture in the region will almost certainly remain enhanced, given the precarious nature of the ceasefire and capacity for renewed hostilities.

Despite aggressive rhetoric, Iran is unlikely to escalate in the near future. Iran’s proxy forces, such as Hezbollah, had already been critically weakened, and now Iran’s conventional military capability has been severely degraded by Israel. Many key figures within Iran’s command and control have also been killed, limiting its ability to coordinate attacks. According to Israel, Iran has lost over half of its ballistic missile capability, and many of its production facilities have been damaged, limiting its ability to counterstrike. Furthermore, much of its air defence has been destroyed, and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) network has been severely compromised, making Iran incredibly vulnerable to aerial attacks. The regime is currently pivoting inward, prioritising counter-intelligence and internal security amid fears of Israeli infiltration and the prospect of unrest. The arrest of over 700 individuals, several executions, and the isolation of the Ayatollah likely highlight growing regime paranoia, with regime survival now the top priority. However, while large-scale retaliatory attacks in the near term are unlikely, Iran may pursue highly deniable asymmetric options.

Israel has largely met its operational objectives. It has significantly degraded Iran’s air defence and missile capacity, inflicting leadership losses, and rolling back Iran’s nuclear programme. It has also demonstrated the ability to exert extreme pressure on the regime by targeting state security apparatus, critical national infrastructure, and state media. However, with some intelligence suggesting that Iran’s nuclear programme has not been comprehensively destroyed, and reports indicating that Iran has preserved enough enriched uranium to possibly produce up to ten nuclear warheads, a future pre-emptive Israeli strike remains a realistic possibility, with such action likely to lead to a major Iranian escalation.  However, in the short term, Israel will likely prioritise regrouping and replenishing its missile defence systems, with some reporting suggesting that it was running critically low on interceptor munitions. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may also seek to capitalise on current approval ratings to consolidate political gains, potentially through snap elections. Most importantly, Tel Aviv is unlikely to act in ways that would undermine President Trump and ongoing US-Iran diplomacy, which is now the salient factor for determining the next phase of confrontation.

Civil society groups and activists on social media have called for protests across the country from 26 to 28 June. On the first day of unrest, 26 June, hundreds of protesters gathered in Togo’s capital, Lome, to demand the resignation of President Faure Gnassingbé. Demonstrators burned tyres and threw projectiles at security forces, who responded with tear gas and arrests. The arrests occurred in the Bè neighbourhood, a stronghold for the opposition parties such as Union of Forces for Change (UFC) and National Alliance for Change (ANC). The protests had two main triggers. The introduction of a new political structure which allows Gnassingbé, who has been in power since 2005, to remain president indefinitely, and the increase in energy prices. A political coalition called ‘Hands Off My Constitution’ has called for further protests over the coming days and has called on Gnassingbé to release all one hundred political prisoners and restore purchasing power to the population.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Togo’s government has imposed harsh laws on protests over Gnassingbé’s presidency, imposing a de facto blanket ban on public demonstrations since 2022, which stipulates that demonstrations must be given advanced approval, something that is rarely given. On 10 April 2024, the Togolese government declared a planned three-day protest, organised in response to the arrest of opposition figures and proposed legislation to eliminate presidential elections, as unlawful.

Most recently, hundreds of protesters engaged in demonstrations on 5 June, denouncing the arrest of activists, rising electricity bills, and the rollback of direct presidential elections under the new constitution. Security forces responded with tear gas, batons, and at least 56 arrests, allegedly subjecting those detained to torture and ill-treatment. On 6 June, authorities forced journalists to delete footage of the protests, and on 16 June, the government suspended broadcasts of France24 and RFI for three months, accusing them of biased reporting.

It is currently unclear to what extent these protests will escalate. Heavy-handedness by security forces, which has been present during the first day of demonstrations, can have two contradictory effects on protests. The first is dissuasion, as seen in Zimbabwe on 31 March 2025, whereby a planned national protest calling for the resignation of President Emmerson Mnangagwa amid economic uncertainty, corruption, and attempts from the leader to cling on to power saw an immediate crackdown from security forces with tear gas and arrests. Many had already stayed home instead of joining the protests, fearing the security crackdown, and the harsh reaction from security forces largely prevented further protests from occurring.

The other is provocation, as seen in the ongoing protests in Kenya, whereby security forces’ repressive measures become the target of demonstrations and encourage them to quickly spread due to the widespread public outrage. While major protests demanding that Gnassingbé step down occurred in Togo from August 2017 to May 2018, demonstrations have been rare, localised, and small-scale since then, particularly following the de facto protest ban in 2022. While these protests were relatively small, consisting of hundreds of people, they constitute the most intense demonstrations since the 2017-2018 protests, and there is a realistic possibility that they will gain significant momentum and escalate into larger-scale civil unrest, particularly since opposition groups are largely supporting them.

Somalia and the Horn of Africa: Further evidence of al-Shabaab and Houthi partnership.

Recent reporting from the UN indicates that the relationship between the al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organisation, al-Shabaab (AS) in Somalia and the Yemen-based Houthi Movement (Ansar Allah) has evolved from being opportunistic to a more structured and strategic partnership. The report suggests that between June and September 2024, AS reportedly received shipments of arms, ammunition, and explosives via Somali ports in Lower Shabelle, which were later used in attacks against African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and Somali forces. Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has even publicly stated that the Houthis are responsible for fuelling al-Shabaab’s resurgence, citing weapons proliferation and enhanced capabilities.

Solace Global Assessment: The developing relationship between AS and the Houthis has almost certainly enabled AS to advance its offensive capabilities. Field reporting indicates that AS is increasingly using uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and surface-to-air missiles, capabilities that have improved its ability to monitor adversarial forces, conduct long-range attacks from and reduce its vulnerability to aerial attacks. Additional reporting indicates that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is facilitating the relationship, coordinating weapons transfers and even attacks, despite inherent ideological differences. There are even indications that AS fighters have been trained in Yemen by AQAP, and the Houthis have sent fighters to Somalia to further conduct training.

Should this relationship continue to deepen, it is likely that a trans-regional militant supply chain will emerge, linking East Africa to the Gulf of Aden. This development could allow Iran to expand its influence by projecting power through increasingly sophisticated proxy groups in Africa, operating beyond Tehran’s traditional sphere of influence. This is something that will likely appeal to Iran, given the recent degradation of its conventional military capabilities, proxy forces and nuclear program.

It is likely that the Houthis’ use of Somali ports and coastal intelligence networks, combined with AS’ long-standing smuggling infrastructure, will help to establish a permissive environment for the transit of Iranian and Chinese-supplied drone and missile components. This will not only increase the threat of higher-grade weapons entering the Somali theatre but will also likely increase the regional maritime threat that could extend to Western Indian Ocean trade routes and strategic chokepoints like the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, posing an increasingly sophisticated threat to international shipping and foreign naval forces. This convergence could also significantly reshape the regional threat environment. Improved joint operational capabilities, access to more advanced weapons systems, and shared tactical expertise are likely to enable militant groups to carry out more complex and disruptive attacks against both military and civilian targets in the region.

Kenya: Nationwide protests erupt on the first anniversary of the storming of parliament. Demonstrations and clashes with security forces broke out on 25 June across multiple cities in Kenya. The protests, which initially began in Nairobi, have now expanded to other cities including Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Nyahururu. Protests have also been reported in Eldoret, Kakamega, Narok, Busia, Makueni, Nyeri, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Machakos, Homa Bay, and Kirinyaga. Demonstrations have taken place in at least 20 of the country’s 47 counties. While precise numbers are unconfirmed, thousands of demonstrators have taken to the streets.

In Nairobi, large crowds occupied parts of the Thika Road highway, and protesters have blocked streets in the Zimmerman area.  Security forces deployed tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowds, particularly in the central business district and outside City Hall. Reports from Matuu in Machakos County and Molo in Nakuru County indicate that police opened fire on protesters, resulting in at least two deaths and several injuries in both locations. Eyewitnesses in Matuu claim that the violence occurred when protesters attempted to enter a police station. Reports indicate that at least 16 people have been killed to date and over 400 injured.

Solace Global Assessment: The unrest has led to significant disruptions. Kenya Railways announced the suspension of commuter trains in Nairobi due to the ongoing protests. Additionally, the Kenyan government has taken steps to control the flow of information, with the Communications Authority ordering TV and radio stations to cease live broadcasts of the demonstrations. Local NTV and KTN stations report that security forces raided their transmission centres and turned off their signals. NetBlocks has reported disruptions to the Telegram messaging service across Kenya, following a government ban on media platforms covering the protests. Multi-media organisation The Standard Group has declared that it will continue to broadcast despite the attempted ‘news blackout’. This will highly likely exacerbate the response from security forces, which will likely trigger further clashes.

Protests will likely continue to escalate, particularly given that the protests in 2024 went on for approximately two months. On 17 June, the most violent day of unrest before today, a large group of unidentified individuals on motorcycles arrived in the Central Business District in Nairobi armed with makeshift weapons, including whips and clubs, and Kenyan police forces shot a bystander who had been selling face masks with an anti-riot shotgun at point-blank range in the head. There is a realistic possibility that the allegedly pro-government individuals could once again target protesters, which would almost certainly continue to exacerbate tensions.

Opposition leaders Kalonzo Musyoka and Eugene Wamalwa have joined demonstrators in Nairobi, laying wreaths outside parliament in honour of those killed during demonstrations last year, which killed an assessed 60 people. Former Chief Justice David Maraga is also taking part in the protests. They have called on police to exercise restraint and have condemned police brutality. The presence of prominent opposition figures will almost certainly add pressure on President William Ruto, who has seen multiple bouts of unrest since attaining power in 2022. There is a realistic possibility that protests will continue to escalate until Ruto steps down.

UK ban on Palestine Action likely to be driver of unrest.

On 23 June, the UK Home Office announced plans to ban the pro-Palestine protest groups under the country’s anti-terrorism laws. On the following day, Home Office officials stated that they are investigating possible financial links between Palestine Action and Iran. The group has recently carried out several high-profile direct actions, including the recent vandalism of some aircraft at a Royal Air Force (RAF) base in Oxfordshire. The ban is likely to drive a reaction by Palestine Action and other direct-action groups that are adjacent with its positions. This is likely to take the form of targeted protests, transport and road blockades in London and other areas likely to attract media attention.

France again risks political crisis over pension reform.

On 24 June, crucial talks between the government of Prime Minister François Bayrou, trade unions, and employers failed to reach a deal on pensions. In 2023, the Macron government sought to raise the retirement age from 62 to 64, sparking nationwide protests that have continued with alternating intensity. The talks’ failure prompted both the centre-left Socialist Party (PS) and the populist left France Unbowed (LFI) to announce no-confidence votes against Bayrou. As the French parliament is split into three blocks, the left would need the support of the populist right National Rally (RN) to pass the motion. RN, however, has stated that they will not vote to topple Bayrou ahead of the presentation of next year’s budget. The developments highlight the ongoing impasse at the centre of French politics. This instability, particularly following major domestic political developments, is highly likely to result in large-scale civil unrest in the short-to-medium term.

Budapest Pride march set to go ahead despite ban by Hungarian government.

Organisers, volunteers, politicians, and thousands of locals are expected to attempt to attend the 30th Budapest Pride march on 28 June, despite an official government ban. The event, declared illegal by Hungarian authorities, is set to take place in open defiance of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party, which has introduced a series of legislation targeting the LGBTQ+ community. Participants at the event risk fines and possible legal action, with authorities reportedly planning to deploy facial recognition technology to identify attendees. Given the heightened tensions and ban, a heavy police presence is expected, and clashes between demonstrators and security forces are likely.

Romania approves new big tent governing coalition.

The newly elected President of Romania, Nicusor Dan, appointed centre-right National Liberal Party leader Ilie Bolojan as Prime Minister on 20 June. On 23 June, the new Bolojan government passed a vote of confidence, with the support of the Social Democratic Party, the centre-right Save Romania Union, and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. The Liberal Party has agreed to a “rotation” ahead of the parliamentary vote in 2028: Bolojan is thus expected to step down in April 2027, to be replaced by a Social Democrat.

Georgian opposition figures arrested, triggering protests.

Daily anti-government protests have continued in the Georgian capital Tbilisi, following the government’s recent arrest of key opposition figures for refusing to take part in a parliamentary inquiry. Since the disputed October 2024 election, the Georgian authorities have arrested nearly all major opposition leaders, with at least four prominent figures jailed in the last few days. Both the opposition and the European Union have accused the governing Georgia Dream party of steering the country towards Kremlin-modelled authoritarianism and scuppering Georgia’s prospects of joining the European bloc. Further protests are highly likely in response to continued arrests and the government’s use of force to quash unrest.

Parallel authority established by opposition SPLM-IO.

On 23 June, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) party issued Executive Order No. 02/2025, which establishes a County Authority in SPLM-IO-controlled regions. The order was reportedly implemented following the SPLM’s ‘repeated violations’ of the peace agreement regarding power sharing and state-level governance. The executive order threatens to create a situation whereby there are dual governments in South Sudan in control of different regions, a scenario akin to the civil war period of 2013 to 2020. Following the house arrest of SPLM-IO leader and Vice President Riek Machar on 27 March 2025 and escalating regional violence between the government and Nuer groups ethnically aligned with Machar, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) is close to collapsing.  The RTGoNU plays a crucial role in maintaining peace in South Sudan following the civil war, since it is responsible for bringing the rival factions into a power-sharing arrangement and implementing the Revitalised Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS). If the RTGoNU collapses, there is a realistic possibility of South Sudan’s civil war restarting.

DRC and Rwanda set to sign Washington-backed ceasefire agreement.

On 27 June, the governments of the DRC and Rwanda are scheduled to sign a ceasefire agreement to end the ongoing conflict between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and its allies and the Rwanda-backed AFC/M23 rebel group in eastern DRC. The ceasefire is part of a “minerals deal” agreed between Kinshasa and Washington, whereby US investment in the country’s mineral wealth will be exchanged for US support in ending the AFC/M23 insurgency. The DRC mining sector is currently dominated by Chinese state-owned companies, and AFC/M23 has monopolised the country’s Coltan reserves, which it exports to Rwanda. Whilst US companies, such as the Jeff Bezos-, Mark Zuckerberg-, Bill Gates-, and Sam Altman-backed KoBold Metals stand to significantly benefit from the agreement, it is unclear to what extent the deal will end the ongoing conflict. Whilst Rwanda supports AFC/M23, they are not beholden to Kinshasa and have defied their directives in the past. Furthermore, AFC/M23 are not formally part of the Washington-backed ceasefire; something that has been a sticking point for previous peace agreements, such as the Angola-mediated Luanda Agreement. It is unclear whether the agreement has teeth to end the conflict; according to critics of the draft agreement, ‘withdrawal’ is nowhere in the document, and Rwanda is unlikely to completely withdraw support for AFC/M23.

Around 150 people report being stabbed with needles during French music festival.

Around a dozen individuals were arrested for allegedly stabbing attendees at the Fête de la Musique, a yearly music festival that happens at various French cities, on 19-21 June. French media channels claimed that, ahead of the event, several calls to carry out needle spiking appeared online. However, these accounts currently remain unverified. In addition to these incidents, notable disorders, including several cases of vandalism, were also recorded during the event, with 371 arrests made, of which 89 were in Paris.

Armenian security claims to have thwarted coup attempt.

A report by security officials claimed that a movement, known as “Holy Struggle”, had been planning for little more than a year to stage a series of “terrorist attacks” to cause state collapse and subsequently take power. The report further claims that the group could rely upon several dozen ex-military personnel and police officers, and up to 1,000 co-conspirators. Moreover, Armenian forces arrested 14 people, including Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, who has emerged as a key figure in the opposition landscape since the end of Armenian-Azerbaijani hostilities, and has been identified as one of the key leaders of Holy Struggle. The arrests are likely to precipitate relations between Yerevan and the Apostolic Church, and will almost certainly drive civil unrest in the main Armenian cities. Moreover, the internal disorder is likely to further worsen Armenia’s geopolitical position: with Iran on the defensive following Israeli strikes, and relations with Moscow having significantly worsened since 2023, Yerevan runs the risk of further weakening itself vis-à-vis Baku.

Suicide bombing at church in Damascus, Syria, kills 25, injures dozens.

On 22 June, an individual carried out an Inghimasi attack (a shooting and suicide bombing) during mass at a Greek Orthodox church in the Duwayla neighbourhood of Damascus. While Syrian officials stated that they suspected that the attack had been carried out by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), it was later claimed by Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah. Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah is a radical Sunni Islamist group that was established in early 2025 as a splinter of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and has adopted a strategy of attacks on Syrian religious minorities. The group has sought to recruit HTS members who are disillusioned with the “moderation” of the post-Assad government of Ahmed al-Sharaa, and espouse narratives similar to those of ISIS, although it is currently unclear if the two groups are linked. The attack likely demonstrates the limitations of the new security apparatus established by the government. It also poses a political problem: by “forcing” al-Sharaa’s government into demonstrating explicit support for religious minorities’ safety in Syria, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah is likely aiming to send a message to the many hundreds of Syrian and foreign fighters who espouse particularly radical forms of Islamism but whose role in a post-Assad Syria remains unclear.

Lebanese forces detain local head of ISIS.

On 24 June, Lebanese military officials issued a statement that they had arrested an individual known as “Qasoura”, who is alleged to have been the head of the Islamic State in the country since the arrest of Abu Saeed al-Shami, his predecessor, in December 2024. The arrest is likely linked to growing concerns that ISIS is increasingly using Lebanon as a base to conduct cross-border attacks into Syria, following the collapse of the Assad regime. During the arrest, the authorities seized weapons, drone-manufacturing equipment, and electronic devices. There are also growing concerns that ISIS may be looking to conduct attacks within Lebanon itself, particularly against its Shia enemy, Hezbollah, which has been severely weakened following its conflict with Israel.

More than 40 killed in attack at hospital in West Kordofan, Sudan.

The attack occurred on 29 June, when al-Mujlad Hospital was reportedly struck by a drone, resulting in dozens of casualties. The hospital is located near the contact line between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the main rebel group in the ongoing Sudanese civil war. Hospitals and other humanitarian facilities have been systematically targeted during the conflict, particularly by the RSF which has deliberately targeted hospitals, displacement camps, aid convoys and ports of entry used for humanitarian efforts. However, initial reports indicate that it was the SAF that was responsible for this attack despite its official denial and counter-accusations against the RSF.

Several Nigerian army bases overrun in coordinated attacks in northwest.

At least 17 Nigerian soldiers were killed in a series of coordinated attacks on three forward operating bases in Niger and Kaduna states, in attacks that likely highlight the growing capability and boldness of armed criminal groups operating in northwestern Nigeria. The surprise attacks were reportedly carried out by large, heavily armed groups commonly referred to as “bandits” rather than organised militant groups, which also operate in the region. The attacks are likely further evidence of a deteriorating security environment in the region, which has seen a recent spike in attacks, where both criminal and jihadist elements exploit limited state presence and an increasingly overstretched and under-resourced military.

Suicide bombing kills 12 in Borno State, Nigeria.

On 21 June, a female suicide bomber with an improvised explosive device (IED) strapped to her chest killed 12 people and injured at least 18 after detonating the device in a crowded fish market in Konduga Local Government Area of Borno State. This constitutes the first suicide bombing in the region in 2025 and was almost certainly perpetrated by Boko Haram, who have been waging an ongoing insurgency in Borno State since 2009. While Boko Haram frequently targets civilians, the rival splinter group Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) typically spares Muslim non-combatants and instead targets security forces. Boko Haram have utilised suicide bombings extensively, perpetrating at least 127 in 2017. However, this has waned in recent years, with none happening between 2020 and 2024, and five in 2024, likely due to an evolution in tactics, military successes in the region, and the emergence of ISWAP, which has degraded Boko Haram through a factional conflict. A shift back to utilising suicide bombings is highly likely indicative that Boko Haram is attempting to make a decisive “comeback” statement amid the group’s resurgence in recent months. Furthermore, Boko Haram suicide bombings typically occur during the rainy season in Borno State, which tends to make conventional attacks more difficult as insurgents are forced to vacate the Lake Chad region. Given Boko Haram’s general increase in activity in 2025, further suicide bombing attacks targeting civilians are highly likely.

Severe thunderstorms in northern France.

A severe thunderstorm system swept across France on the night of 25 June, causing widespread damage and disruptions. The storm, which brought winds of approximately 112 km/h, resulted in the deaths of two individuals due to falling trees in Mayenne and Piquecos. 21 people are injured, four critically. The storms left approximately 110,000 homes without power, with the most affected areas being Auvergne, northern Midi-Pyrénées, Centre-Val de Loire, Burgundy, and Limousin. Nearly 100,000 homes remain without electricity. In Paris, the storms led to flooding that impacted metro and RER regional rail services, with multiple stations closed. Additionally, multiple trees were reported to be lying on the roads in Paris’ 16th arrondissement. In the Eure region, first responders dealt with over 120 weather-related incidents.

Wildfires in Turkey’s Izmir Province.

On 25 June, a wildfire erupted in the forest area near the Bozköy neighbourhood of Aliağa district in Turkey’s Izmir province. High winds spread the flames into the forests of the Foça district. Approximately 550 people were evacuated from the Ilıpınar area of Foça. The Turkish Forestry Directorate deployed six helicopters, 46 fire trucks, 13 water supply units, nine bulldozers, and several tankers and emergency vehicles. The fire is now under control. The cause of the fire is under investigation, but preliminary reports indicate that the fire was caused by electrical wiring.

On 23 June, Thailand closed its land border crossings with Cambodia in the latest escalation in tensions between the two countries. The measures also ban foreign tourists from leaving Thailand to gamble in border towns, an act that is illegal in Thailand but legal for foreigners in Cambodia. Anyone travelling by air to Siem Reap in Cambodia to gamble will also be restricted. Exemptions may be granted for humanitarian reasons, with, for example, medical patients allowed through the border at border officials’ discretion. According to a military statement, the new restrictions matched the current security situation and will help counter scam operations in Cambodia. The Bhumjaithai party declared on 24 June that it would seek a parliamentary no-confidence vote in Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and her cabinet on 3 July. This is due to a leaked phone conversation on 15 June between Paetongtarn and former Cambodian leader Hun Sen concerning the ongoing border tensions, whereby Paetongtarn addressed Hun Sen as ‘uncle’ and dismissed the actions of a Thai military commander, saying he was merely trying to ‘look cool.’ The phone call triggered significant public anger and caused Bhumjaithai, the second-largest party in the ruling coalition, to quit the alliance. On 26 June, Shinawatra and Hun Sen made separate visits to troops and officials on the Thai-Cambodian border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The closure of the border crossings constitutes the latest event in steadily escalating tensions between Thailand and Cambodia following an armed confrontation in the disputed border region in the Emerald Triangle Region, which left one Cambodian soldier dead on 28 May. This will almost certainly impact both countries’ economies; casinos in Phnom Penh and along the Thai border are central to Cambodia’s tourism industry and draw in millions of Thai visitors per year.

The escalating friction reflects the structural limits of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which lacks the architecture to effectively deal with disputes. Amidst increasing attempts to mediate in the Myanmar conflict, the Cambodia-Thailand dispute risks revealing ASEAN’s impotence, largely due to its non-intervention principle. If ASEAN fails to play a meaningful role in resolving the ongoing dispute, member states may increasingly pursue unilateral or extra-regional solutions, undermining ASEAN’s credibility and cohesion.

The leaked phone conversation has almost certainly added significant pressure to the coalition government, which was already facing criticism for split loyalties due to Paetongtarn’s friendship with the Hun family. Following the resignation of Bhumjaithai, the government has a slim majority and faces mounting opposition. Compounding criticism over Paetongtarn’s perceived deference to Hun is Thailand’s economic slowdown, something exacerbated by the ongoing political instability.

To counter perceptions of weakness, Paetongtarn announced a cabinet reshuffle and approved a USD 3.5 billion worth of infrastructure projects aimed at boosting the economy. To prevent the collapse of the government, Paetongtarn will highly likely need to back further punitive measures and be perceived as siding with the Thai military.

Former Chief Election Commissioner victim of mob attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

On 22 June, Nurul Huda was surrounded, harassed, and beaten by a mob in the Uttara area of Dhaka. When the attack happened, Huda was being taken into police custody in a case that had been filed by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), alleging he had committed electoral fraud. One individual, a BNP youth section leader, has been arrested in connection with the attack, which has sparked widespread outrage across the Bangladeshi political spectrum. This is likely the highest-profile case of mob violence in Bangladesh in recent months and showcases the central role played by youth and volunteer wings of local parties in exacerbating the phenomenon. The police’s failure to prevent the attack, despite their alleged presence at the scene, likely reflects significant deficiencies in local policing. It may also suggest a degree of institutional capture by political interests.

Ceasefire extension set to expire in Myanmar.

The temporary ceasefire in Myanmar, declared after the March earthquake, is set to expire on 30 June, raising the risk of renewed full-scale conflict between the military junta and opposition forces. Despite repeated extensions of the ceasefire, fighting has continued in recent months, despite aid agencies and ASEAN urging all sides to uphold and expand the truce to facilitate humanitarian relief. The junta has carried out numerous airstrikes in rebel-held areas since the earthquake, resulting in civilian casualties and undermining the credibility of the ceasefire, often resulting in renewed rebel offences. The junta is also pushing ahead with preparations for December elections in junta-controlled areas, which opposition groups and Western governments view as illegitimate but will likely be exploited to justify increased aggression.

Monsoon season in India results in multiple casualties and widespread disruption.

The 2025 monsoon season in India has caused widespread disruption, with intense rainfall triggering severe flooding across multiple states. In Himachal Pradesh, flash floods and a cloudburst have left at least two people dead, with more feared missing in areas including the popular tourist area of Dharamsala. Landslides in Jammu and Kashmir’s Bhairav valley have led to a temporary halt in pilgrim movement, Gujarat is under a red-level alert for extreme rainfall and flooding, while Karnataka has issued flood warnings along the Cauvery River, as the Krishna Raja Sagara dam has reached full capacity. In Rajasthan, evacuations are underway, and road repair efforts are ongoing in Uttarakhand. The monsoon has also affected Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, and Odisha, where several villages remain submerged and weather warnings are in place.

Copyright © 2025 Solace Global Risk Limited. All rights reserved. No part of this document or content may be reproduced, copied, translated, sold, or distributed, in whole or in part without the consent of Solace Global Risk Limited.