On 6 June, demonstrations against the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids broke out in Los Angeles. The civil unrest has resulted in vandalism, the erection of barricades, reports of looting, and the throwing of projectiles, including Molotov cocktails, at law enforcement.

Furthermore, both local law enforcement and federal forces have deployed tear gas, rubber bullets, stun grenades, pepper spray and pepper balls, and used mounted units as part of crowd control operations.

The worst-impacted locations in Los Angeles include the area around the Metropolitan Detention Center, with demonstrators blocking the nearby Highway 101 and setting fire to Waymo driverless taxis; the Los Angeles Federal Building; the Fashion District; Paramount; and Compton.

On 7 June, US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of 2,000 National Guard troops to the Los Angeles area, which has since been doubled to 4,000. 700 US Marines have been additionally activated for potential deployment; however, they are unable to directly participate in civilian policing unless the Insurrection Act is invoked. This deployment has been met with staunch opposition by the Governor of California, Gavin Newsom.

In the days following the initial outbreak of unrest in Los Angeles, “solidarity” protests broke out in multiple other US cities. Of these, the most significant protests took place in San Francisco, where close to 150 people were arrested following violent clashes near a downtown ICE office; Santa Ana, where tear gas and flashbangs were used against protesters outside the Santa Ana Federal Building; and New York, where 24 protesters were arrested at Trump Tower.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The civil unrest has been characterised by the relatively small size of demonstrations, compared to, for example, the Black Lives Matter protests. However, despite the relatively low attendance, the level of disruption has been pronounced, highly likely due to a combination of both the propensity for the attendees to conduct direct action and due to the forceful response by authorities.

It is highly likely that protests will continue in the following days, given the so far established cycle of escalation. ICE raids were the initial primary trigger for the unrest, with the protests in Paramount, for example, being triggered by rumours of an ICE raid at a Home Depot. It is almost certain that further ICE raids will continue to act as a trigger for localised demonstrations in major US cities, with protesters attempting to stop the mass detentions through direct action.

As the protests progressed, however, additional triggers for escalation materialised. First, the arrest and hospitalisation of David Huerta, the President of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), acted as a trigger for protests within the organised labour movement, with union chapters coordinating demonstrations.

Second, the deployment of the National Guard and then the proposed deployment of active-duty US Marines have catalysed so-called “solidarity” protests in other US cities.

A key trigger for further escalation would be the unlikely but possible scenario of the Trump administration invoking the Insurrection Act, which would allow the deployment of the armed forces for law-enforcement activities. The most likely focal points for demonstrations (and associated violent clashes with authorities) continue to be federal facilities, particularly ICE offices and federal detention centres, and areas where ICE raids are being conducted (with social media almost certainly serving as a key means of enabling this).

Moreover, planned ‘No Kings’ demonstrations are set to occur to protest the 250^th anniversary parade of the US Army in Washington D.C. on 14 June, which also coincides with President Trump’s birthday.

The protest movement has announced that it will stage protests in over 1,500 cities and towns across all 50 US states, including in key urban areas like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Houston and Phoenix. Organisers are promoting the protests as a nationwide day of defiance against government corruption and the militarisation of public spaces, highly likely a reference not just to the parade but also a response to the recent deployment of the US National Guard and Marines in California.

The recent ICE raids and associated unrest have almost certainly energised a wider anti-Trump protest movement and will likely result in increased participation in the 14 June ‘No Kings’ demonstrations. These protests will likely be highly disruptive, and there is a high likelihood of violent confrontations, particularly in urban centres, at the military parade and in proximity to federal buildings.

On 7 June, Colombian presidential candidate Senator Miguel Uribe of the right-wing Centro Democratico (CD) party was shot several times, including twice in the head, when attending a political event in the Bogota neighbourhood of Modelia. The suspected assailant is a 15-year-old boy who the police believe was hired as a “sicario” or hitman, although investigations are ongoing to determine if others were directly involved.

Uribe remains in critical condition and has undergone brain surgery, but has shown minimal response to the treatment. Colombian Defence Minister Pedro Sanchez Suarez has announced a reward of COP 3 billion (approximately USD 730,000) for any information that leads to the capture of those involved in the attack and has stated that security measures have been raised to the maximum level. The opposition has condemned the incumbent government for its security failures, and there are reports that Uribe’s security detail was cut days before the attack.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Uribe has been a vocal opponent of President Gustavo Petro’s “total peace” strategy, arguing that it amounts to state appeasement and has even suggested that Petro, a leftist, is kneeling to the demands of the guerrillas. The presidential candidate has also called for the militarisation of areas with a high guerrilla presence and for guerrilla groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to be designated as terrorist organisations.

Such a move would almost certainly result in increased security operations, an end to peace negotiations and a host of legal and financial restrictions imposed on the armed groups. These positions indicate a high likelihood that guerrillas or organised crime groups, which often overlap considerably, were responsible for the attack.

However, Uribe was polling significantly behind other right-wing candidates, such as Germán Vargas Lleras, who share similarly hardline positions on armed groups. There is a realistic possibility that the attack against an outsider candidate was designed to send a warning to other candidates deemed hostile to the objectives of guerrilla and organised crime groups.

With Colombian parliamentary elections set for March 2026 and presidential elections due in May 2026, there is a high probability that political violence will continue to increase across the country. Former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, known for his hardline policies against guerrilla groups, has publicly stated that international intelligence agencies have warned him of current assassination plots against himself, further underscoring the reach and threat posed by armed groups within Colombia.

On 10 June, a series of coordinated attacks across Colombia’s Cauca and Valle del Cauca regions resulted in the deaths of at least seven people, including two police officers, and over 70 people were injured. Reports indicate that at least 24 individual incidents were recorded, involving the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), motorcycle-borne improvised explosive devices (MBIEDs), small arms fire (SAF), and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Several attacks took place in Cali, Colombia’s third-largest city, and in multiple nearby towns, including Corinto, El Bordo, and Jamundí. Targets primarily included police stations and municipal buildings. However, civilian targets were also targeted, including a bus bomb which detonated outside a highway toll booth.

The mayor of Cali has ordered an additional 100 police officers to the city, has suspended commercial activity from 21:00 to 06:00 local time, and security on highways in the area will be enhanced. President Petro travelled to Cali on 11 June to preside over an emergency security council aimed at assessing the crisis and coordinating the state’s response.

Solace Global Assessment: 

No group has claimed responsibility for the series of attacks, but police and military sources have attributed the attack to Central General Staff (EMC or FARC-EMC), a dissident faction that split from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) following the 2016 peace agreement. The EMC has since rejected the peace process multiple times and remains active in several regions, especially in southwest Colombia, where it engages in armed attacks, extortion, illegal mining, and narcotics trafficking to finance its operations.

The EMC had also warned the public to stay away from military and police installations prior to the attack, and the authorities suggest that the attack may have been designed to coincide with the anniversary of the killing of EMC commander Leider Johani Noscue. Moreover, Cali serves as the primary staging area for government security forces conducting counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations in southwest Colombia, where the EMC controls drug trafficking routes and produces cocaine.

The scale, complexity, coordination and integration of novel technologies like UAVs likely indicate that the EMC has significantly improved its operational capabilities. There is a realistic possibility that these attacks could represent a shift from previous low-level attacks to more complex and coordinated operations, especially if the EMC has exploited the breathing space afforded by President Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy to regroup, recruit and rearm.

The targeting of police and military assets is likely part of a deliberate strategy to undermine state authority, deter further government operations in the region and to exert increased pressure on the Petro administration, especially ahead of the 2026 elections.

However, the nature of the attacks and growing perceptions that armed groups have exploited peace dialogues to expand operations will almost certainly warrant a strong response from the government. This will likely result in increased military deployments, intelligence operations and expanded strikes on EMC high-value targets such as senior leadership and camps.

In turn, further EMC attacks are highly likely, particularly in southwest Colombia, where state presence remains limited. Likely targets include police stations, military installations, critical national infrastructure, and government buildings. As demonstrated by the attempted assassination of a presidential candidate, there is also an elevated threat to political figures and other personnel involved in counter-insurgency efforts across Colombia.

Major civil unrest linked to supporters of former President Evo Morales (or ‘Evistas’) has continued to cause widespread disruption in Bolivia, with multiple violent clashes reported with the police. On 11 June, two police officers and one firefighter were shot and killed by pro-Morales protestors near Llallagua, a town which sits on the main supply route between La Paz and Sucre.

Roadblocks have been erected by Morales supporters in multiple locations, particularly in the Cochabamba area, which is located on the main supply route between La Paz and Santa Cruz, the largest city in Bolivia. There have been multiple clashes between protestors and the police attempting to unblock roads, with Morales supporters throwing rocks and even dynamite in some cases. Multiple attacks on ambulances have been reported, preventing the emergency services from treating those injured in the protests or from delivering medical supplies to hospitals.

On 12 June, President Luis Arce publicly rejected calls for his resignation following the deadly protests in Llallagua, stating that police and military forces would continue to restore order and dismantle protest-related roadblocks.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The convergence of multiple factors have almost certainly contributed to the recent escalation of protests in Bolivia. In early June, Morales called on his supporters to renew disruptive protests and roadblocks in response to the Constitutional Court and electoral authorities’ rulings, which bar him from standing in the August 2025 presidential election. This resulted in several protests and roadblocks along major transport routes, particularly in the Cochabamba and Santa Cruz regions.

However, on 10 June, Bolivia’s attorney general opened a formal “terrorism” investigation against Morales relating to his alleged sponsoring of civil unrest in 2024, which resulted in hundreds of arrests, over 30 injured police officers and economic losses assessed at close to USD 2 billion.  Morales’ supporters have likely interpreted this as a political move to undermine his legitimacy and bar him from holding office, which has likely been the primary reason for the recent intensification of unrest.

Pro-Morales protests have also intersected with unrest driven by economic issues, such as high fuel prices, shortages of US dollars, and inflation, which has resulted in sporadic protests across the country. This overlap has likely expanded the protest movement beyond Morales’ supporters, resulting in larger and more frequent protests.

The government’s refusal to allow Morales to participate in the upcoming election, combined with President Arce’s public rejection of calls to resign, will likely sustain protests in the lead-up to the August 2025 presidential election. The fatal use of firearms by Morales supporters, resulting in the deaths of police officers and a firefighter, will likely demand a more forceful response by police and military units to restore order.

However, a more assertive response will likely increase the risk of further violent confrontations, particularly on major transport corridors and areas loyal to Morales, likely leading to more disruption and economic losses in Bolivia.

Trump administration pressures Mexico to investigate cartel-linked politicians

The Trump administration is pressuring the Mexican government to investigate and potentially prosecute elected officials suspected of links to organised crime. Sources allege that failure to do so could result in additional tariffs on Mexican goods entering the US.

The US has even named Mexican politicians suspected of colluding with the cartels, such as the Baja California Governor Marina del Pilar Avila, who strongly denied any connections to criminal groups and has recently had her US visa revoked. A crackdown targeting elected officials would mark a major escalation of Mexico’s current efforts against organised crime. However, it would likely carry considerable political risk and potentially cause fractures within the ruling Morena party.

Protests continue in Colombia in support of president’s proposed referendum on reforms

Protests have been held across multiple locations in Colombia in support of President Petro’s proposed labour and social reforms. Petro has been trying to advance a referendum on his reforms through the Senate, which has to date refused to allow the referendum to proceed, effectively blocking this legislative route.

Petro has issued a presidential decree in an attempt to bypass Congress, a move that will likely galvanise protests and also be contested by the Constitutional Court. There is a realistic possibility that the Court may strike down or limit the scope of the decree, which will likely further escalate tensions between the executive and legislative branches, as well as intensify protests.

Protests in Argentina after Kirchner conviction upheld

Protests have erupted in Argentina after the Supreme Court’s 11 June decision to uphold former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s six-year prison sentence for corruption. The ruling also bars her from holding public office. On 10 June, trade unions blocked traffic on the RN-9 highway in Buenos Aires, and protests have been staged near the University of Buenos Aires and outside Kirchner’s residence. While demonstrations have remained largely peaceful, there is potential for further disruption, particularly by Peronist-aligned groups and trade unions.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader calls for attacks against US political figures

Sa’ad bin Atef al-Awlaqi, who has a USD 6 million bounty on his head, issued a series of threats in his first video appearance since becoming AQAP’s leader in March 2024. Notably, he called for attacks against President Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth, and Elon Musk.

AQAP is primarily based in Yemen and has almost certainly diminished in strength in recent years, with a notable decline in recorded activity. It has previously been considered one of the most dangerous branches of al-Qaeda, being responsible for coordinating and planning the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting in France, and the 2019 Pensacola shooting in the US.

Its new leader, however, specifically called on prospective terrorists not to consult with anyone. This is likely reflective of a wider trend of jihadist terrorist groups calling for lone-actor terrorism in Western states, a strategy that will likely limit opportunities for intelligence collection and the thwarting of potential attacks.

Kenya and the Dominican Republic sign memorandum to repatriate police from Haiti

Kenya has deployed approximately 800 police officers to Haiti and is the leading member of the multinational police mission that the UN has backed to combat the rampant insecurity and powerful gangs in Haiti. The memorandum will allow Kenya to more quickly expedite the rotation of its police officers and to repatriate wounded officers. In recent weeks, Kenya has sought to increase its efforts in Haiti, even approving the setting up of a consulate general in the country. This has likely been a reaction to growing US openness to providing economic inducements to the country, including a free trade agreement.

Manitoba wildfires continue, prompting further evacuation orders by Canadian authorities

More than 21,000 people have fled the fires by 13 June, the largest of which has affected more than 300,000 acres of land. The province of Manitoba has been under a state of emergency for more than a week, and Premier Wab Kinew stated that he is contemplating using emergency powers to free hotel rooms to house displaced persons.

Canada’s wildfire season started earlier than usual this year and has rapidly intensified. In addition to the severe direct threats to life and property, Canadian wildfires are severe pollution emitters, releasing approximately three billion tons of carbon dioxide during the record 2023 wildfire season.

Magnitude 6.3 earthquake causes moderate shaking in Bogotá, Colombia

On 8 June, a magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the Cundinamarca and Meta regions of Colombia, approximately 100 kilometres east of Bogotá. Moderate shaking was felt in Colombia’s capital, prompting alarms and evacuations. The metro services, however, continued to function normally, and the mayor later stated no injuries occurred.

Minor structural damage was recorded in towns such as Tocaima, Medina, and San Juan de Rioseco in the Cundinamarca region. As is typical with strong earthquakes, multiple aftershocks occurred, including one which registered as a magnitude 4.8. Despite the earthquake’s strength and relative proximity to large population centres, the impact was ultimately minimal.

Central Colombia is highly seismically active, with historical earthquakes such as the 1999 magnitude 6.2 earthquake, which killed 1,200 people, causing significant casualties.

Violent unrest has been ongoing in Ballymena, County Antrim, since 9 June. The unrest started in Clonavon Terrace following reports of two Romanian-speaking 14-year-old boys sexually assaulting a teenage girl. The two boys have been charged with attempted rape.

Protesters have clashed with police officers, injuring at least 17, and targeted foreign residents, breaking windows and setting fire to curtains of houses, as well as setting vehicles alight. The protesters have utilised petrol bombs, bricks, and fireworks. Demonstrations spread on 10 June, with smaller protests taking place in Lisburn, Coleraine, Newtownabbey, Carrickfergus, and Belfast.

On 11 June, a leisure centre that had been providing emergency shelter for families fleeing the violence was targeted in an arson attack. Police have responded with baton rounds and water cannons. Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that he ‘utterly condemns’ the violent unrest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Tensions between Ballymena residents and the Roma community escalated sharply following reports of the alleged sexual assault. Demonstrators have targeted foreign residents suspected of being of having Romani heritage, with non-Roma immigrants resorting to putting up signs displaying their nationality to deter targeting.

The frustrations are highly likely exacerbated by the above-average unemployment rate and changes to Ballymena’s ethnic demographics. Roma people constitute the largest minority in the town. Protests have already spread to other cities in Northern Ireland, and they will likely escalate and continue to spread, with Belfast being a likely area of unrest over the coming days.

The growing disorder comes amid critical underfunding for the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), which currently has the lowest number of officers in its history. While 6,200 officers currently serve, approximately 1,500 are away from frontline policing. PSNI had 9,000 officers when it was established in 2001.

As a result, the PSNI has issued an SOS to request short-term reinforcements from other organisations, such as Police Scotland, with police costs are expected to exceed GBP 3 million. To prevent demonstrations from escalating further, violent protesters will likely be given long prison sentences to act as a deterrence, a solution that contributed to ending the July and August 2024 Southport riots.

The protests promoted by the South Europe Network Against Touristification (SET) will occur on 15 June at several major cities across Spain, Italy, Portugal, France, and Malta. SET is a large and dispersed network of anti-tourism groups which formed in 2018, and this is its first major action.

SET, alongside other more localised anti-tourism groups, has become more active after the COVID-19 pandemic, where the restart of tourism after a period of virtually complete pause, coinciding with ongoing trends like rising costs of living and rental prices, has contributed to mainstreaming opposition to overtourism.

The 15 June protests were announced in late April, when one of SET’s members staged a protest in Barcelona, during which activists symbolically “hijacked” a tourist bus in front of the Sagrada Familia.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests are likely to be the largest anti-tourism demonstrations in Europe so far. They will likely coincide with some disruptions in highly trafficked cities like Barcelona, Palma, Venice, Palermo, and Lisbon, particularly in parts of the cities’ central areas where the main tourist attractions are located. In Palma and other seaside destinations, protesters may also symbolically “occupy” beaches and resorts.

While the protests are likely to remain peaceful, there is a realistic possibility of isolated cases of tourists being harassed by protesters, a phenomenon already observed during past anti-tourism protests in Spain. There is a realistic possibility of acts of vandalism targeting assets perceived to be associated with overtourism, such as multinational corporation offices, rental companies, and short-term rental properties.

Protesters have previously warned that they will escalate their tactics if their demands are not met, potentially resorting to more disruptive or unlawful actions targeting key infrastructure such as transport hubs. This has included threats to stage protests at airports. This could entail protests within airport arrivals to maximise the visibility of the protests.

However, protest activity could also escalate to attempts to block access roads, breach secure areas, or disrupt airport operations directly, resulting in significant delays and operational disruption. These tactics would be especially disruptive in tourist islands like the Canaries or the Balearics, where air travel is by far the primary method of entry. This has been a tactic of groups adjacent to the anti-tourist movement, such as environmentalists, who are increasingly aligning themselves with and participating in anti-tourism protests.

As the tourist season reaches its zenith in late June, July, and August, further anti-tourism protests are highly likely to occur. Indeed, it is likely that the 15 June SET protests will prove influential in driving further civil unrest linked with anti-tourism, as they will almost certainly contribute to further mainstreaming the (now transnational) movement.

While Southern Europe, where overtourism-related debates are most common, is almost certain to remain the epicentre of the anti-tourism movement, this process of mainstreaming could enable the movement to gain a stronger foothold in other European countries where it has, so far, been less pronounced. These may include Southeast European destinations that see large-scale influxes of tourists during the summer, like Greece, Croatia, Turkey, or Albania, or in areas in northern Europe such as Amsterdam.

On 8 June, Russia’s Defence Ministry announced that units of the 90th Tank Division had reached the western edge of the Donetsk Oblast and begun advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian media and officials have portrayed the advance into Dnipropetrovsk as a key event, variably framing it as either an effort to create a ‘buffer zone’ in Ukraine outside of the territories Moscow claims to have annexed, or as an attempted territorial acquisition.

So far, open-source intelligence only confirms minor territorial gains near the Dnipropetrovsk border, especially around Novoukrainka and Kurakhove. Russian kinetic activity in Dnipropetrovsk has primarily taken the form of longer-range attacks rather than ground incursions, with artillery, first-person view (FPV) drones, and one-way attack drones targeting multiple areas, particularly in Nikopol and border villages such as the Pokrovske Hromada.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Following the success of Operation Spider’s Web (Pavutyna) on 1 June, when over 100 Ukrainian drones smuggled into Russia struck Russia’s highly valued strategic bomber fleet, Moscow has almost certainly been incentivised to reverse the narrative of Ukrainian success in the war. It is highly likely that the full extent of Russia’s intended retaliation for Pavutyna has yet to materialise, despite multiple Russian long-range strikes on major population centres in Ukraine.

US officials have warned that it will likely involve a ‘significant, multi-pronged strike’, likely suggesting that initial waves of long-range attacks have only comprised the initial stages of Russian retaliation. Russia will almost certainly sustain its long-range strikes against Ukrainian cities and increase its indirect fire attacks on locations close to the Russian border, such as Sumy and Kharkiv, which are already in range of some Russian multi-barrel rocket launcher systems. Russia will also likely attempt to carry out retaliatory strikes on facilities linked to Ukraine’s Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), which was responsible for conducting Pavutyna, such as against the SBU headquarters, which would serve as a symbolic victory for Moscow.

However, Ukraine has been partially conditioned to absorbing sustained long-range Russian strikes. Russian strikes have likely failed to achieve Russia’s objective of reversing the narrative. Consequently, it is likely that Russia will attempt to amplify minor battlefield successes and limited territorial gains, such as those reported near the Dnipropetrovsk border, through its information operation campaigns and state-controlled media in order to project progress. This approach will likely be used to deflect domestic and international audiences from battlefield losses and major operational failures, such as Pavutyna and Russia’s current extremely high rates of attrition, with some sources now alleging that Russia has exceeded one million battlefield casualties in Ukraine.

In the early hours of 13 June, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted a series of coordinated airstrikes targeting multiple locations and senior figures across Iran associated with Iran’s nuclear program as part of ‘Operation Rising Lion’. Targets included the Natanz Enrichment Complex; nuclear-related facilities in Qom, Markazi, Kermanshah, and Hamadan; and multiple locations in Tehran.

Israeli sources have also claimed to have completed a ‘broad strike’ on Iranian air defence systems in western Iran, destroying dozens of radars and surface-to-air missile launchers (SAMs). Iranian state media claim the strikes resulted in dozens of fatalities and casualties. Among those reportedly killed are Hossein Salami, Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, and senior nuclear scientists Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi and Fereydoun Abbasi.

Israel has declared a state of emergency, closed its airspace, suspended operations at Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) indefinitely, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned Israeli citizens that they may have to spend extended periods within air raid shelters. Public offices and educational institutions across the country will remain closed until at least 20:00 local time on 14 June.

Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has vowed that Israel will face ‘severe punishment’ for the strikes on its nuclear program. On the morning of 13 June, Iran launched 100 uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) in response to the Israeli strikes.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a statement affirming that Israel “took unilateral action against Iran”. Despite repeated denials from senior US officials regarding any direct involvement in the strikes, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has accused the United States of assisting in the operation. IRGC officials have vowed a “strong response from Iranian forces” against Israel and US forces in the region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The strikes form part of a broader Israeli strategy aimed at dismantling the IRGC leadership and disrupting Iran’s nuclear program. The most immediate threat posed by the escalation is of Iranian retaliation strikes against Israel. Reports indicate that the first wave of Iranian UAVs was completely intercepted by Israel or regional forces like Jordan.

However, the first wave was likely an initial response and will almost certainly be followed by larger waves of layered attacks consisting of UAVs and ballistic missiles conducted by Iranian conventional forces. Israeli attempts to degrade Iranian air defence likely indicate that further Israeli strikes on Iran are impending, which will almost certainly provoke further Iranian retaliation. Given the strategic importance of Iran’s nuclear program, it is likely that future Iranian attacks will be larger than those observed in April and October 2024.

Iranian proxy forces in the region will likely form part of Iran’s retaliation against Israel. The Houthi Movement in Yemen will likely conduct missile and drone attacks targeting southern and central Israel. Iranian proxies in Iraq will likely launch drones at Israel. Despite much of its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon having been dismantled, Hezbollah still maintains a credible arsenal of rockets, missiles, and drones. However, Hezbollah officials have so far indicated that the group will not “initiate” an attack on Israel in response to the strikes on Iran.

So far, the US Trump administration has sought to distance itself from the Israeli operation. However, Iran’s foreign ministry has stated that the US will also be responsible for the “dangerous consequences” of Israel’s “adventurism”, and there are indications from Iranian television broadcasts that Iran will now not participate in the scheduled negotiations with the US on 15 June.

The most likely US targets to be attacked are the US military bases in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, it is likely that the Iraq-based Iranian proxies, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMFs), will engage in rocket attacks against these US bases. Such attacks would highly likely lead to retaliation from the US, threatening to further escalate the conflict.

Should Hezbollah resume direct conflict with Israel, this would almost certainly be met with Israeli airstrikes against Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, particularly in the Dahieh suburbs of southern Beirut, the Beqaa Valley, and south of the Litani River. As the Royal Jordanian Air Force has already engaged in interceptions of Iranian aerial threats over Jordan’s airspace, this poses an immediate threat of debris in Jordan. Furthermore, Jordanian involvement has previously led to civil unrest in Amman, and this will likely occur again, particularly in the vicinity of the Israeli and US embassies.

Direct Iranian attacks on Gulf states or US military assets remain unlikely at this stage, as such actions would risk triggering a broader regional conflict that regime is unlikely to withstand. However, the possibility of Iranian proxy attacks on infrastructure targets in Saudi Arabia or the UAE, particularly energy and transport facilities, cannot be ruled out, given previous patterns of escalation.

While Gulf states have sought to distance themselves from the Israeli strikes by issuing public condemnations, Tehran may still view US military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, or Saudi Arabia as potential targets in the event of a major escalation.

On 6 June, the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner Group announced its withdrawal from Mali, where it had been present since the 2021 military coup. In a statement via Telegram, Wagner announced that it ‘completed [its] main mission – all regional capitals are back under control of legitimate authorities’. The Russian paramilitary Africa Corps announced that it would remain in Mali, despite Wagner’s withdrawal.

On 12 June, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) announced that it killed Attaye Ag Boulkhey, an influential member of Mema Katiba, affiliated with the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in Idjardahanen in the Mopti region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Russian involvement in Mali will highly likely increase following Wagner’s withdrawal, with the Africa Corps set to assume its role. Unlike Wagner, who operate as a PMC, Africa Corps, founded in July 2023, is directly affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD).

While a “power sharing” agreement was attained in early 2024, which gave the MOD limited control over Wagner in Mali, Wagner fighters have been hesitant to fully subordinate themselves to the MOD. By replacing Wagner with Africa Corps, the MOD will almost certainly have increased operational oversight and strategic alignment over Russia’s involvement in Mali, where it seeks to gain control over strategic resources including gold, oil, gas, lithium, and uranium.

It is highly likely that the shift from using Wagner to the Africa Corps marks a professionalisation of Russian involvement and will likely give rise to increased Russian advanced weaponry and personnel deployments in the country. Some remaining Wagner troops will likely be absorbed into the Africa Corps, while the rest will likely be sent to Ukraine. While Wagner has been relatively ineffective at halting the ongoing insurgencies, the increased resources will almost certainly help the military junta secure Bamako, as well as other strategic strongholds from insurgent groups.

The defence of Timbuktu, which has been under siege from the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) since August 2023, will likely be prioritised by the Africa Corps, particularly since the junta recently repelled a JNIM assault. Other FAMa bases will also highly likely receive increased supplies and reinforcements amid a recent surge in JNIM attacks targeting FAMa bases across northern and central regions of Mali.

US “No Kings” protests to impact Europe

Demonstrations are expected to occur at several large European cities to coincide with US “No Kings” protests over President Donald Trump’s staging of a military parade. US consulates and embassies are likely to be hotspots for the unrest. The protests are likely to be further inflamed by the escalation between Israel and Iran, which is likely to prompt large-scale pro-Palestine gatherings in major European cities.

Egyptian authorities detain hundreds of “march to Gaza” participants

Hundreds of activists, who had travelled from several different countries to Egypt to join a symbolic march to the Gaza border, were detained upon arrival at Egyptian airports and at various hotels. At least 73 individuals were deported to Turkey by 12 June, with up to 200 awaiting deportation. Among the detainees, the majority are citizens of North African countries, followed by several dozen Europeans.

Cairo has sought to maintain close relations with Israel and the United States and, with much of the population remaining pro-Palestinian, has tried to minimise demonstrations and other forms of unrest that could incite broader disorders. The arbitrary arrests are likely to provoke a diplomatic backlash from the activists’ countries of origin.

Somaliland and Ethiopia to hold talks over port deal

Somaliland President Abdirahman Abdillahi Irro is expected to visit Addis Ababa to hold a meeting with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The meeting is reportedly set to discuss the Maritime Agreement (MoU) signed by the two sides on 1 January 2024, which provides Ethiopia with port access for 50 years in exchange for ‘full recognition’ of Somaliland’s independence.

The agreement is yet to be implemented and is highly controversial, since Mogadishu, which considers Somaliland part of Somalia, has accused Ethiopia of infringing on its sovereignty. The deal has led to intensified hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia, with Mogadishu expelling Ethiopia’s ambassador, closing Ethiopian diplomatic missions, and signing a security agreement with Egypt in 2024.

While tensions have eased in recent months amid efforts from both sides to restore relations, the talks between Irro and Abiy risk escalating tensions once again. It is likely that Ethiopia becoming the first country to formally recognise Somaliland may trigger more moves to recognise the secessionist state. US President Donald Trump, for example, has hinted at formally recognising Somaliland in exchange for building a military base near the port of Berbera.

Gabon withdraws from EU fishing agreement

On 6 June, Gabon announced it would withdraw from a fishing partnership with the EU after 18 years. Under the agreement, European vessels could fish in Gabonese waters in exchange for providing financial support to Gabon’s fishing industry. President Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema has accused European vessels of profiting significantly and overfishing while providing limited returns to Gabon.

It is highly likely that overfishing from European vessels, as well as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, has contributed to increasing economic pressure on local fishermen, who have increasingly turned to piracy.  2025 has seen a 35 per cent increase in piracy incidents off the Gulf of Guinea, with many attacks occurring further south of Nigerian waters than in previous years.

Gabonese waters are a particular hotspot, with notable incidents including the 31 January kidnapping of three Senegalese crewmembers from the AMERGER 7 (IMO: 8012619) and the 18 March kidnapping of 10 crewmembers from the BITU RIVER (IMO: 9918133). The Gabonese government will likely implement further measures to increase regulation over IUU fishing, which may, in turn, contribute to reducing piracy rates off the coast of Gabon.

Elevated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) activity over the past week

On 7 June, militants, highly likely the Islamic State-aligned ADF, kidnapped nearly 50 people, mostly artisanal miners, in Bafwasende, in the DRC’s Tshopo province. The attackers reportedly set fire to houses in numerous villages, including Balembangwa, Sun City, Mafwada, and Kibinda. The next day, the ADF conducted two separate attacks in Lubero, killing at least 60 civilians. On 10 June, another ADF attack killed “several” civilians in two mining sites in Bapukara, also in Lubero.

The activity in Tshopo would constitute a geographic expansion for the ADF, who typically operate in the Ituri and North Kivu provinces. This would also be the first attack targeting civilians in the province. This westward expansion is likely indicative of increased military pressure from the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), operating in the eastern DRC under Operation Shujaa, which aims to neutralise the ADF threat to Uganda.

The intensified activity over the past week is highly likely influenced by the renewed fighting between Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and AFC/M23, which has almost certainly created a security vacuum, giving the ADF more operational freedom.

Protests erupt in Nairobi, Kenya, over blogger’s death in custody

Clashes between police and protesters were recorded on 12 June, as protests in the capital city of Kenya intensified. The unrest was sparked by the death of Albert Ojwang, a political blogger who had been detained for “insulting” a local deputy police chief and later died after “hitting his head against a cell wall”. President William Ruto stated that Ojwang was killed by police, which conflicted with the police’s account of the incident and likely contributed to sparking the protests. On 13 June, Kenyan media reported that one police officer had been arrested in connection with the blogger’s death.

Anti-government protests in Nigeria on Democracy Day

Demonstrations and counter-demonstrations were held in Abuja, Lagos, and several other locations on 12 June, Nigeria’s Democracy Day. In Abuja, protesters from the Take It Back movement, which opposes President Bola Tinubu and accuses the government of widespread corruption, had originally planned to storm the National Assembly, although this failed due to a massive security deployment near the premises. The protests have resulted in some localised traffic disruptions. There is a realistic possibility of further unrest in the immediate term.

Burundi’s ruling party wins every seat in the National Assembly in parliamentary elections

On 11 June, the electoral commission announced results from the Burundi parliamentary election, which took place on 5 June. The ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) won 96.51 per cent of the vote. Because no other party reached two per cent of the vote, CNDD-FDD have gained all 100 seats in the National Assembly.

The main opposition party, the National Congress for Liberty (CNL), which was barred from standing in the election, accused the government of using intimidation and fraud to secure the victory. Olivier Nkurunziza, leader of the Uprona opposition party, called the elections ‘rigged’, and accused the government of having ‘killed democracy’.

Amid a socio-economic crisis marked by rising inflation, fuel and foreign currency shortages, tensions with the neighbouring Rwanda, and a refugee crisis triggered by the conflict in the DRC’s South Kivu region, public discontent is growing. There is a realistic possibility that the vote will trigger unrest when the final results are released on 20 June.

School shooting in Graz, Austria, kills ten

The shooting, which occurred on 10 July, was the deadliest in Austrian post-war history. The perpetrator targeted a school where he had been a student and committed suicide during the attack. In addition to carrying out the shooting, he had also allegedly built an improvised explosive device (IED), which was not used. The motive of the shooting remains unclear, although local media reported that the shooter sent a recorded video message to his family explaining his actions. There is a realistic possibility that the school shooting was influenced by similar recent cases in Europe and particularly North America.

Libya’s Haftar accused of conducting a joint border attack with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

On 10 June, forces loyal to Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar reportedly conducted a joint attack alongside the RSF near Sudan’s northwestern tri-border region. The next day, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) retreated from the area.

The SAF has previously accused Haftar forces of supporting the RSF via weapons deliveries from Libya, but this would constitute the first direct Haftar attack on Sudanese territory. The attack is highly likely indicative that the RSF is attempting to consolidate control over the border region to facilitate flows of weaponry from Libya to secure western regions of Sudan.

Further joint attacks conducted with Haftar forces are highly likely in the coming weeks and months as the RSF attempts to consolidate control and establish uncontested sovereignty over North Darfur.

Opposition forces capture strategic northeast town in South Sudan

On 11 June, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), also known as the anti-governmental forces (AGF), captured New Fangak, the administrative capital of Fangak County in Jonglei State. Members of the local Gawaar White Army, ethnically aligned with the SPLA-IO, fought alongside the militia.

SPLA-IO are led by Vice President Riek Machar, who has been under house arrest since 26 March 2025 on charges of plotting a rebellion and attempting to restart the civil war to prevent the December 2026 general elections. The group split from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by President Salva Kiir, in 2013, due to a leadership dispute between Kiir and Machar, sparking the civil war.

The capture of Fangak County comes shortly after the SPLA-IO alleged a government plot to relocate Machar to Uganda.

Flooding in Eastern Cape, South Africa, kills at least 78

Ongoing flooding in the Eastern Cape has killed at least 78 people. Casualties include high school students who were washed away when their school bus was caught in floodwaters on 10 June. The search for four missing students is ongoing. Disaster teams have been activated in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Hundreds of thousands of homes have been impacted by power outages since 10 June. Hundreds of residents have been displaced, with many staying in makeshift shelters. The flooding, which began on 7 June, was exacerbated by intense cold conditions and heavy snow.

On 12 June, Air India flight AI171 crashed during take-off from Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport (AMD) in Ahmedabad in India’s Gujarat province. The Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner had a capacity of 256 passengers and was bound for London Gatwick Airport (LGW). 242 people were onboard, including the two pilots and ten cabin crew staff. According to reports, passengers included 169 Indian nationals, 53 Britons, seven Portuguese, and one Canadian. One British national, seated in 11a, next to the emergency exit, survived and is currently undergoing treatment; 241 people died.

The plane departed at 13:38 local time (08:08 UTC), and the signal was lost less than a minute after take-off, while the plane was 625 feet (190 metres) high. A mayday call was sent out almost immediately after take-off. The plane was due to land at 18:25 local time (17:25 UTC). According to social media footage, the plane crashed outside the airport perimeter in a residential area near the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, southwest of the airport. The plane, which had a fuel load of around 126,000 litres, caught fire after crashing and black smoke was seen rising from the crash site.

India’s aviation minister has stated that rescue teams have been mobilised. The Chief Minister of Gujarat has stated that officials have been instructed to carry out ‘immediate rescue and relief operations’. A green corridor for injured individuals has been arranged to ensure priority at the hospital. The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has been sent from Delhi to investigate the cause of the incident.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the cause of the crash is unclear, the loss of signal shortly before the crash could indicate a critical systems failure. A weather-induced accident is unlikely given the conditions at the time. An investigation into the cause of the incident will almost certainly be quickly carried out by the DGCA and Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), which will attempt to recover the black boxes (flight data and cockpit voice recorders) to determine the nature of the crash. The authorities have quickly ruled out sabotage, suggesting the investigation will pivot towards identifying a technical failure of human error.

The last fatal plane crash in India occurred at Kozhikode International Airport (CCJ) in 2020, where a plane skidded off the runway and crashed into the ground. 21 people were killed and over 100 were injured. Prime Minister Narendra Modi will likely declare a day of national mourning over the victims of the crash as casualty figures become clear. If the cause of the crash is deemed to be due to poor maintenance, regulatory failures, or negligence, there is a high likelihood of demonstrations being organised in response.

Violent protests in northeast Manipur state

On 9 June, authorities imposed a curfew and shut down the internet in parts of Manipur in response to violent demonstrations. Protesters clashed with security forces, storming a police post, setting fire to a bus, and blocking roads in Imphal. Security forces responded with tear gas and live ammunition.

Protests erupted following the arrest of five leaders of the armed Meitei group, Arambai Tenggol, on 7 June. Among those arrested was leader Asem Kanan Singh, who has been accused of being involved in “various criminal activities” linked to ethnic clashes.

The two largest groups in Manipur, the majority Meiti living in the Imphal Valley and the minority Kuki-Zo tribal community from the surrounding hills, have engaged in ethnic clashes since 2023. The clashes were sparked by an affirmative action measure, with tribal communities protesting against the Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status. Approximately 250 people have been killed and tens of thousands displaced in the ongoing conflict.

Afghan Taliban carries out raid on Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) hideout in Kabul

Taliban security forces raided an alleged hideout used by ISKP members in the country’s capital on 9 June. According to Taliban sources, the raid resulted in the killing of two ISKP members and the seizure of several suicide belts and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The hideout was located near the airport. The discovery of a hideout in a critical area of Kabul almost certainly demonstrates that, despite the repeated setbacks suffered in recent months, ISKP remains able and committed to staging attacks in Afghanistan to destabilise the Taliban government.

Pakistan announces major defence spending hike

The government of Pakistan announced that it would increase the country’s defence spending by approximately USD 9 billion, amounting to a 20 per cent increase. The hike is the largest in more than a decade, and is almost certainly driven by the ongoing tensions with India since the late April Pahalgam attack and a significant rise in militant activity in multiple parts of the country.

India has continued to accuse Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism on Indian soil and, on 11 June, Indian officials stated that Operation Sindoor, the retaliatory strikes following the Pahalgam attack, is not over, hinting at the possibility of further military action on Pakistani territory.

Thai and Cambodian forces to withdraw to agreed positions

Tensions on the Thailand-Cambodia border have eased after both nations withdrew military forces to their previously agreed positions, following a deadly clash on 28 May which killed a Cambodian soldier. Both governments have reiterated their commitment to peaceful dialogue to resolve the longstanding border dispute, although tensions remain high and Thailand has temporarily reduced operating hours at ten border crossings with Cambodia due to continued security concerns.

South Korea turns off propaganda broadcasts

South Korea’s newly elected liberal government has suspended the loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts into neighbouring North Korea, almost certainly in an attempt to improve relations and reduce military tensions. The government also urged South Korean activists to cease sending anti-North Korean leaflets, citing risks to residents near the border. The state, however, exercises minimal control over such activists.

While President Lee Jae-myung may be seeking to restore communications with Pyongyang and reduce the chances of hostilities, the prospects for meaningful reconciliation remain limited in the short term, with North Korea’s growing alignment with Russia and Kim Jung Un’s recent declaration of South Korea as the North’s ‘principle enemy.’

New report claims Kabul, Afghanistan, at severe risk of water shortages

NGO Mercy Corps assesses that the Afghan capital is at a severe risk of running out of drinkable water by the end of the decade. Local aquifers have been severely depleted by growing urbanisation and lack of rainfall, and much of the local groundwater is unsafe to drink, with “high levels of sewage, arsenic, and salinity”.

Growing water scarcity in South Asia is highly likely to become a major driver of displacement and both intra- and inter-state conflict. Lacking adequate infrastructure and investment, and continuing to suffer from extreme political instability, Kabul is likely particularly at risk from water scarcity, a threat that the ruling Taliban government is almost certainly unable to ameliorate.

Typhoon Wutip triggers evacuations in South China

Typhoon Wutip is the first typhoon to hit China this year and is currently tracking along Hainan’s western coast, forecast to make landfall on the Leizhou Peninsula on 14 June. The typhoon has triggered heavy rain and strong gales in southern regions, forcing evacuations and flight cancellations in Hainan early 13 June. Maximum wind speeds are set to hit 111 km/h before dropping significantly after making landfall. Free temporary shelters have been set up in mountainous and coastal areas. Transport disruptions are highly likely in Southern China over the coming days.

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