On 13 May, reports emerged that 17 family members of Ovidio Guzman Lopez, son of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, were allowed to enter the US in a deal between Ovidio, who is detained in the US. Notably, Mexico City was not notified of the deal before the family members’ crossing into US territory. Ovidio is, alongside his brothers, one of the key leaders of the “Chapitos” faction of the Sinaloa Cartel, which is currently engaged in an internal war with the “Mayitos” faction, named after Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, who is also detained in the US.

This conflict started in the Summer of 2024, after El Mayo was arrested after being lured into the US, reportedly by Joaquin Guzman Lopez, another one of El Chapo’s sons. El Mayo’s arrest was blamed by his supporters on the Chapitos’ alleged betrayal, resulting in the internal conflict.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The development is likely linked to Ovidio’s expected change of a plea deal in his US drug trafficking case and is highly likely indicative of the narcotrafficker’s openness to collaborating with US authorities and providing them with extremely valuable information on cartel operations. The transfer was highly likely carried out due to a reasonable expectation that Guzman’s family members’ safety could not be ensured by Mexican authorities or, more likely, the Chapitos. This, in turn, could be an indication that the internal power struggle within the Sinaloa cartel has tipped in favour of the Mayitos.

There is a realistic possibility that the deal and its developments will affect the Sinaloa Cartel’s internal war, possibly driving a short-term increase in targeted attacks between rival groups. Currently, clashes between the two groups are especially severe in Culiacan, in Sinaloa state. However, violence has also been reported in other states, like northern Baja California, as the two factions battle for control over key drug and human trafficking routes, including in popular tourist areas like Los Cabos. Moreover, third parties, like the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), are almost certainly taking advantage of the Sinaloa Cartel’s fragmentation to enter new areas, leading to further violence.

Finally, the possible collapse of the Sinaloa Cartel is highly likely to influence the 1 June Mexican judicial elections. Organised criminal groups almost certainly retain a key interest in influencing the choice of hundreds of magistrates and judges whose seats are, for the first time, contested via the ballot. The clashes between the Chapitos and Mayitos, as well as the increased competition by CJNG and other cartels seeking to capitalise on the Sinaloa Cartel’s fragmentation, is likely to pose a direct threat to candidates and other civilians.

On 13 May, El Salvador President Nayib Bukele declared a proposal for a Foreign Agents Bill on the social media platform X. While the precise details of the bill have not yet been announced, it is highly likely to reflect a similar one Bukele proposed in 2021, which would have required entities and people receiving foreign funding to register as a “foreign agent” with the Interior Ministry and be barred from carrying out “political activities” that “threaten national security”. The bill is reportedly also set to include a 30 per cent tax on donations to non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Solace Global Assessment: 

The legislation will highly likely pass, given Bukele’s control over Congress and widespread popularity in El Salvador. The bill crudely resembles similar “foreign agent” or “foreign influence” bills passed in countries like Russia, Hungary and Georgia, which have been widely criticised for reducing foreign oversight over government actions.

The bill almost certainly comes as a response to criticism from humanitarian organisations regarding the government’s crackdown on civil liberties to curb gang violence since March 2022. Since the state of emergency was imposed by the government, at least 85,000 people accused of being affiliated with gangs have been arrested. El Salvador now has the highest incarceration rate in the world.

While the measures have succeeded in significantly reducing homicide rates, numerous demonstrations have taken place in protest of Bukele’s actions. On 12 May, security forces cracked down on hundreds of peaceful protesters in front of Bukele’s house; a move that was heavily criticised by humanitarian groups. Further protests are highly likely following the announcement of the Foreign Agents Bill.

If passed, the bill will almost certainly significantly reduce NGOs’ freedom to operate by effectively enabling the government to ban NGOs that criticise the government. In Nicaragua, a similar measure was imposed after mass protests occurred in 2018, and the government has since outlawed at least 3,500 NGOs. While a similar proposal was blocked by international condemnation in 2021, with Germany threatening to withdraw humanitarian funding, Bukele is almost certainly emboldened by his strong relationship with President Donald Trump, which has seen increased strategic alignment and collaboration.

On 15 May, the Peruvian government announced that it would extend the state of emergency in metropolitan Lima and Callao, originally declared on 17 March, in response to high rates of organised crime. However, the state of emergency in metropolitan Lima will only be extended to eight districts: Ate, Carabayllo, Comas, Puente Piedra, San Martín de Porras, San Juan de Lurigancho, Villa María del Triunfo, and Villa El Salvador. The previous day, on 14 May, a nationwide general strike was organised by transportation unions, student groups, merchants, and other workers’ unions to protest violence and organised crime in Peru

Solace Global Assessment: 

The extension of the state of emergency to only parts of Lima is likely based on crime data and heat maps highlighting continued high levels of criminal activity in these areas. While the state of emergency will be lifted elsewhere, those districts will still receive increased security patrols. However, the easing of the state of emergency in other parts of the capital will likely enable the government to redirect resources to the areas most affected by the violence.

However, there are multiple indications that the government is failing to curb rates of violence and to effectively counter organised crime. On 9 May, the Canadian government added Peru to its list of countries where travellers are advised to exercise high caution, almost certainly in response to the ongoing security concerns linked to organised crime. This has involved a major spike in homicides and endemic extortion, often including lethal attacks on offices and public transport. However, unlike the Peruvian government, the Canadian alert also warned against travel to other parts of the country, including the provinces of  San Martín, Huánuco, Ucayali, and Ayacucho.

In addition, on 4 May, the bodies of 13 miners were discovered in Pataz Province, approximately 400km north of the capital. The murders were linked to organised crime and illegal mining operations. Collectively, these incidents likely demonstrate the degree to which organised crime is embedded in rural areas of Peru and increasingly consolidating its presence in the urban areas, through a combination of coercion, corruption, illicit revenue and weak state governance. This will likely continue to overstretch Peru’s security forces and increase the pressure on the Boluarte administration, which is likely to result in the imposition of additional emergency measures in both urban and rural regions.

Bolivian court to uphold rule banning candidates from serving more than two terms

On 14 May, Bolivia’s Constitutional Court ruled that no individual may serve more than two presidential terms, a decision that effectively bars former President Evo Morales from standing in the 2025 presidential elections. The other primary contender, incumbent President Luis Arce, dropped out of the presidential election on the same day as the decision due to slumping popular support.

Both candidates are members of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) party, which is now deeply divided between factions loyal to Morales (“Evistas”) and those backing Arce (“Arcistas”). This internal rift has destabilised the party, eroding its electoral cohesion and sparking widespread unrest across the country, especially within the indigenous community and grassroots supporters loyal to Morales, who credit him with advancing indigenous rights, social programmes, and economic inclusion.

The stepping down of both MAS faction leaders may help to stabilise the party; however, there is a realistic possibility that barring Morales from running for president could reignite unrest in parts of Bolivia.  

US to potentially support Latin American troop deployment to Haiti

The US is considering the deployment of Latin American troops to Haiti to counter the powerful criminal gangs that now control most of the capital, Port-au-Prince, and large parts of the country. The proposal will involve the US funding the mission, but troops will be sourced from the Organisation of American States (OAS), a multilateral regional body comprised of 33 member states.

Washington is likely attempting to bypass the UN, with UN-supported missions often denied by Russia’s and China’s veto. However, concerns have been raised over the OAS’ lack of mandate and the availability of experienced and capable troops. The proposal will likely require the backing of major Latin American nations with adequate resources and military experience, such as Brazil and Colombia.

Organised criminal groups target Ecuadorian soldiers during anti-mining operation

Eleven soldiers were killed on 9 May in the Amazon region of Ecuador. The soldiers were reportedly ambushed by members of the criminal group Comandos de la Frontera (CDF) during an operation to shut down an illegal gold mine in the Alto Punino area (Orellana Province). CDF is a splinter group originating from dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC). While primarily operating in Colombia, it has maintained a presence over the border in Ecuador, particularly in the Sucumbíos and Orellana provinces.

The area where the ambush took place heavily favours the “defending” criminal groups, as the jungle makes it impossible for security forces to approach by any means other than by helicopter and also complicates efforts to collect information on criminals’ assets and manpower before carrying out operations. The Ecuadorian government will likely increase troop deployments to Alto Punino in the immediate term as a response to the failed operation.

Politically, the incident is likely to further complicate President Daniel Noboa’s situation: despite the implementation of the “Plan Fénix” to curb rising organised crime since late 2024, the first five months of 2025 have been the deadliest in Ecuador’s history, with more than 2,300 violent deaths recorded in the first quarter of the year (65 per cent more than in the same period of 2024).

Canada’s Manitoba province declares state of emergency due to wildfires

The wildfires broke out on 13 May and rapidly extended to the area of Lac de Bonnet in the province’s east, killing at least two people and prompting 1,000 people to evacuate. As of 16 May, 21 fires are burning in the province, despite firefighters’ efforts to contain them. The fires are the first major ones that likely mark the beginning of this year’s wildfire season in Canada.

In addition to direct threats to life and property, Canadian wildfires can have spill-over impacts, affecting air quality in Canada and northern areas of the United States. Moreover, wildfires can result in high CO2 emissions, with the 2023 Canadian wildfire season being assessed as the top driver of carbon emissions globally that year. Wildfires like the ongoing ones in Manitoba are driven by dry and windy conditions, and as temperatures rise in the summer months, further large-scale fires will likely occur in the area.

US issues multiple tornado warnings in Midwest

On 15 May,  tornadoes and severe storms struck parts of Wisconsin and Minnesota, causing reported damage and localised power outages. The storm system is tracking northeast into Canada, but another round of severe weather is forecast for 16 May in the Midwest region. The US Storm Prediction Center has issued a moderate risk warning for severe thunderstorms in the Lower Ohio Valley. Populated areas at heightened risk include St Louis, Louisville, Indianapolis, Clarksville, Memphis, and Paducah. Storm conditions are also likely to bring hailstorms and heavy rains, likely leading to incidents of flash flooding in the areas affected.

On 14 May, the German authorities coordinated the arrests of three Ukrainian nationals suspected of acting as Russian agents involved in sabotage operations. Arrests were made in Cologne and Konstanz in Germany, and one suspect was apprehended in Switzerland. The men allegedly intended to place explosive or incendiary devices in freight shipments on German cargo transport, targeting German aid bound for Ukraine.

The authorities reported that the suspects had tested their plan using GPS-tracked parcels and had communicated their intent to individuals linked to Russian intelligence.

In his first parliamentary speech on 14 May, new Chancellor Friedrich Merz accused Russia of targeting Germany and other European countries with acts ranging from cyberattacks, espionage and sabotage to disinformation, poison attacks and even state-sponsored assassinations.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Germany has been on high alert for acts of sabotage directed by the Kremlin since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, initial plots or successful acts of sabotage at the start of the war largely involved acts of arson or physical tampering, designed to disrupt and deter German military aid to Ukraine but without resulting in loss of life. This latest series of arrests mirrors a similar plot uncovered in 2024, which involved incendiary devices being placed in packages sent from Lithuania to other parts of Europe. This plot was widely attributed to Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Russia’s primary military intelligence agency responsible for conducting covert operations abroad, ranging from sabotage to assassination.

The two cases of sabotage involving incendiary devices targeting Europe’s logistics network likely only reflect a small proportion of Russian covert and hybrid activity in Europe. This activity is likely to increase in line with US disengagement from Ukraine, with Ukraine relying more on Europe for its military sustainment. This will likely include increased acts of espionage, cyberattacks, disinformation and acts of sabotage, ranging from arson to the damage of undersea cables.

The discovery of two plots targeting cargo transports may also indicate an escalation by Russia, and a reflection of the Kremlin’s growing operational risk appetite. The detonation of an explosive device on an airframe or at a major logistics hub is far more likely to result in loss of life, marking a significant escalation, while remaining highly deniable and challenging to attribute to Russia directly.

If Russia’s risk appetite in Europe has increased in reaction to signals of US disengagement, there is a realistic possibility of the Kremlin escalating its operations through other means.

One avenue historically employed extensively by Russian intelligence but not yet utilised in the current context is that of assassination. A previous plot linked to Russian intelligence that was thwarted by German and US intelligence involved the attempted assassination of Armin Papperger, the CEO of Rheinmetall, a major German defence company supplying arms to Ukraine.

These developments collectively indicate a Russian capacity and willingness to escalate its campaign of hybrid warfare in Europe to undermine support for Ukraine.

On 10 May, the leaders of France, UK, Germany and Poland met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv. Following the meeting, an announcement was made that Ukraine and its allies are prepared for a full, unconditional ceasefire with Russia for at least 30 days, starting 12 May.

Pending agreement from Moscow, Kyiv would then be ready for direct talks with the Kremlin. If refused, then new sanctions would be imposed on Russia. Essentially an ultimatum, this followed US President Donald Trump’s calls for a 30-day ceasefire in the week prior, with sanctions threatened if it is not respected.

Russian President Vladimir Putin responded in the evening, making no comment on the ceasefire proposal and instead calling for direct talks on 15 May in Istanbul, Turkey. Trump then stated on 11 May, via social media, that Ukraine should agree ‘IMMEDIATELY’ to the direct talks.

Zelensky travelled to Turkey for the proposed talks, however, Putin did not, instead sending a lower-level delegation. One of the delegates, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, stated on 13 May that Ukraine must ‘denazify’. With the prospects of meaningful direct talks diminished, Trump stated that ‘nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together’. Trilateral direct talks nonetheless began in Istanbul on the morning of 16 May. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ultimatum given by Kyiv and its European allies was almost certainly intended to not only pressure Moscow into a ceasefire, but also to pressure Washington into adopting a more coercive stance.

What transpired, however, was likely a complete loss of credibility in the threats made, as the narrative was purposefully shifted towards the prospect of direct talks instead of the unilaterally proposed ceasefire. Moscow then only sent a lower-level delegation, highly likely a reflection of its lack of seriousness towards the prospects of the direct talks. Fundamentally, the attempt at leverage by the European NATO allies spectacularly failed, with Putin’s response completely sidestepping the ultimatum and Trump de facto refusing (via omission) to provide the coercive measures required for the ultimatum to have any weight.

The Russian delegation sent to Istanbul is notably similar to that sent in the 2022 talks between Ukraine and Russia, likely shaping the narrative to propose essentially a direct continuation of those talks. Drafted protocols from the 2022 talks essentially involved the neutering of Ukraine’s defensive deterrence with demands including: renouncing NATO membership; a constitutional amendment to enforce neutrality; the end of all military agreements; a ban on foreign personnel, trainers and weapon systems; and significant limits on both the size and capabilities of the Ukrainian military.

It is highly likely that Moscow treats most (if not all) of these conditions as necessary for peace. Furthermore, the repeated calls for ‘denazification’ are almost certainly a call for regime change in Kyiv.

It is highly likely that the Kremlin is drawing out as far as possible any negotiations, whilst simultaneously warding off any additional punitive measures through calculated diplomatic engagement and narrative control, as Russian forces continue to pursue Moscow’s maximalist objectives on the battlefield.

Following a call to disband in February from the long-imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah “Appo (Uncle)” Öcalan, the PKK scheduled the holding of its 12^th Congress. In a statement released on 12 May, the PKK announced that the congress had decided to disband, disarm and end its armed struggle, with the PKK having ‘completed its historic mission’.

Whilst details of the specific conditions that will be implemented now are sparse, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government will submit a text to parliament no later than June that will include conditional prison releases and transition to house arrest for a considerable number of imprisoned alleged PKK members and supporters (which could affect up to 60,000 people). Ankara has stressed, however, that no general amnesty will be enforced and that it will require proof of weapon handovers.

Early indications suggest that PKK weapon handovers will now be contingent on Ankara’s forthcoming actions, Kurdish rights, and the fate of PKK leaders and fighters.

Approximately 20 per cent of Turkey’s population is Kurdish. The PKK launched its full-scale insurgency in 1984, with the objective of creating an independent Kurdistan. Alongside direct clashes with the Turkish military in eastern Turkey, Iraq and Syria, the PKK and its splinter groups conducted several attacks in Turkish urban centres, such as the October 2024 attack near Ankara, which killed seven people at the headquarters of Turkish Aerospace Industries. It is estimated that the conflict has resulted in the deaths of over 40,000 people.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Öcalan, imprisoned since 1999, had gradually softened his stance towards the necessity of an armed struggle. The development that almost certainly enabled the current breakthrough, however, was an unprecedented October 2024 statement from Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which is currently allied with Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AK) and has been historically highly anti-Kurdish, which suggested that Öcalan could be paroled if he disbanded the PKK.

Erdoğan is unable to run again for president, unless the constitution is amended or an early election is called, both of which require at least a three-fifths majority in parliament to be possible. There is a realistic possibility that Erdoğan has made an agreement with the Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), to add to the MHP-AK alliance, further incentivising a move to peace.

It is unlikely that Öcalan will be imminently released, as this would highly likely be unpopular and his life would be endangered, although the government will likely gradually ameliorate Öcalan’s prison conditions.

The announced disbandment comes at a time of highly likely profound vulnerability for the PKK and the wider armed Kurdish movement. The increasingly aggressive campaigns waged by both the conventional Turkish military and allied militias such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) against the PKK and other Kurdish forces in eastern Turkey, Iraq, and Syria had almost certainly significantly weakened the PKK’s freedom of movement and operational capabilities.

The US-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), long accused by Ankara of being intrinsically linked to the PKK, are likewise vulnerable, with their proposed integration into Syria’s transitional government carrying great risks. It is likely that the PKK’s disbandment, if successful, will improve regional stability insofar as Ankara would likely apply less pressure against the SDF’s integration.

Fundamentally, it is likely that the root causes of the Kurdish insurgency will not be comprehensively addressed. However, the genesis of the PKK came within a context of severe repression in the 1970s, when Kurdish cultural expression and the language were banned. Now, the Kurdish political movement is no longer underground, with the DEM party a key player in Turkey’s national politics.

Early indications are that the disbandment is being met with scepticism amongst sections of Turkey’s Kurdish population and diaspora, almost certainly due to a cynicism regarding Ankara’s next steps, given past reversals. Nonetheless, if the PKK’s disbandment occurs relatively smoothly and Kurdish rights are upheld or even expanded, the development will likely improve not only Turkey’s stability but the entire region’s.

There is a realistic possibility, however, that PKK dissidents will form new radical splinter groups or join active groups such as the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), groups that pose a much higher threat of conducting terrorist attacks against civilian targets.

In the worst fighting to have taken place in Tripoli in years, armed clashes fought with heavy weaponry erupted overnight on 12 May across the city. The fighting was triggered by the killing of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, AKA Ghaniwa, the commander of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) militia. Ghaniwa was reportedly killed at the 444th Infantry Brigade’s headquarters, with the killing following months of tensions between Abdelraouf Kara’s Special Deterrence Forces (RADA) and factions aligned with the head of Libya’s Government of National Unity (GNU), one of Libya’s two rival governments, Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

The fighting initially calmed on the morning of 13 May, before reigniting overnight, with heavy clashes between the Dbeihah-aligned 444 and 111 Brigades with RADA.On 14 May, the government then announced a ceasefire, bringing an end to the heavy fighting, although sporadic clashes have continued.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The developments in Tripoli are almost certainly an attempt by the Dbeibah-controlled elements of the GNU to consolidate power. The SSA was a powerful militia that de facto controlled the densely populated Abu Salim neighbourhood and critical southern access points to the capital. Ghaniwa and his SSA have been accused of considerable human rights violations, with a 2022 European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) report describing Ghaniwa’s group as the primary perpetrator of violence in Libya’s detention centres.

The GNU, which is almost certainly in a militarily weaker position than the rival Libyan National Army (LNA)-controlled Government of National Stability (GNS) government based in Benghazi, has been plagued by infighting and a lack of centralised control over its fighters. The SSA were highly likely the strongest challenge to Dbeibah’s power in Tripoli, and the killing of their leader (which was followed by Dbeibah-aligned forces rapidly seizing SSA territory), almost certainly leaves Dbeibah as the paramount power broker in GNU-controlled Libya.

RADA, which was previously the dominant force in Tripoli, may have been able to fill the security vacuum left by the SSA’s sudden defeat. What likely emerged, however, was a rapid reorientation of the 444 and 111 Brigades towards fighting with RADA. Concurrently, Dbeibah announced that the ‘era of parallel security institutions is over’, declaring an end to the power of armed groups operating outside the authority of the state.

As of the time of writing, it is likely that Dbeibah’s gambit has been so far successful. However, such a bold move against his rivals is highly likely to provoke resistance. First, this increases the risks of civil unrest in Tripoli. Anti-government rallies have already followed the clashes, including on 15 May when protesters entered Tripoli’s main square. Second, it is likely that clashes will continue, as fighters formerly aligned with RADA or the SSA, in addition to other groups that may feel threatened by Dbeibah’s sudden concentration of power, resist what they highly likely consider an existential threat to their influence.

On 10 May, suspected Islamist militants in Mozambique’s restive Cabo Delgado province conducted an attempted maritime attack on the Russian-flagged oceanographic vessel Atlantida K-1704 (IMO 8607000) near Tambuzi Island, approximately 10 nautical miles east of the mainland. Two speedboats approached the vessel and opened fire on it, forcing the vessel to escape into deeper waters.

The authorities have stated that this is the first time that local militants have attacked a foreign-flagged vessel, with previous maritime attacks confined to targeting local fishing vessels.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the attack was conducted by the Islamic State’s Mozambique Province (ISM), often known locally as al-Shabaab (not affiliated with the Somali-based extremist group with the same name). ISM’s main area of operations is the Cabo Delgado Province, where it has been conducting an insurgency against government forces since the early 2010s.

The group’s primary objective is to establish an Islamic caliphate in northern Mozambique. This has involved attacks on government forces, local Christian communities and foreign companies, especially companies associated with the oil and gas industry. In 2021, ISM launched a large-scale attack on the town of Palma, adjacent to a TotalEnergies-led multibillion-dollar Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project. The attack directly targeted LNG infrastructure and also resulted in the killing of dozens of local and expatriate workers and subcontractors.

Due to the area’s wealth of natural resources, it is highly likely that the Russian oceanographic vessel was conducting a survey in support of the oil and gas industry. Moreover, as the vessel was operating within Mozambique’s territorial waters, it is highly likely that the survey was commissioned by the Mozambican government.

Given the vessel’s likely association with the energy sector, the attack could reflect an evolution of ISM’s anti-industry campaign by migrating attacks to the maritime domain. ISM’s intent is likely to deter foreign investment, disrupt oil and gas exploration and demonstrate its ability to operate at sea. If sustained, this strategy could weaken the state’s capacity to fund counter-insurgency operations, with the energy sector providing a major source of revenue for these efforts.

Should ISM’s maritime capabilities continue to mature, it could pose a credible piracy threat in the Western Indian Ocean and the Mozambique Channel. The geography of northern Mozambique, which is characterised by a chain of sparsely populated islands, limited naval presence, and narrow coastal channels, could be exploited by militants to stage ambushes and evade detection.

This potential shift could be leveraged by the Islamic State’s senior leadership, who have increased financial and strategic support to African affiliates, including ISM. This forms part of a wider pattern in which Islamic State branches across Africa are carrying out increasingly sophisticated attacks, broadening their operational scope, and enhancing their technological capabilities.

Portugal to hold third general election in as many years

On 18 May, Portugal will hold its third general election in as many years after Prime Minister Luís Montenegro failed a confidence vote in March over ethical concerns over his family’s business dealings. Montenegro’s centre-right Democratic Alliance (AD) is leading in the polls, however, the party is unlikely to secure a parliamentary majority, with potential coalition partners also falling short.

Low wages, strained public healthcare, a developing housing crisis, high living costs and immigration are the issues dominating the campaign, with many citizens expressing frustration over Portugal’s political instability. The far-right anti-immigration party, Chega, is currently polling at around 17 per cent, but is unlikely to be the disruptive force observed elsewhere in Europe.

France expels Algerian diplomats

The decision was announced on 14 May by Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Noel Barrot, who claimed it was in response to similar moves by Algeria last week. It is the latest development in the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Paris and Algiers, which has accelerated in 2024 over France’s support of Moroccan claims in Western Sahara, and the arrest, in April 2025, of several Algerian citizens, including a consular official, over the alleged kidnapping of an Algerian dissident near Paris.

Poland to hold first round of presidential elections

The vote will be held on 18 May, at the same time as those in Romania and Portugal. The two key candidates currently leading the polls are the Mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, of the ruling liberal Civic Platform party (PO), and Karol Nawrocki of the right populist Law and Justice party (PiS). Sławomir Mentzen of the far-right New Hope party (NN), after having a surge in support in March, has recently stagnated in the polls.

In the last days of the electoral campaign, there have been several protests on high-visibility issues, including a rally against migration in Warsaw on 11 May. The election itself is unlikely to coincide with large-scale disruptions. However, a threat of civil unrest remains in the short term following the vote, especially if it is inconclusive. With the leading candidate Trzaskowski polling at around 35 per cent, it currently appears likely that the elections will go to a second round, to be held on 1 June.

“Remigration” conference near Milan, Italy, highly likely to drive civil unrest, possibly violence

On 17 May, a “Remigration Summit” will be held in the small town of Somma Lombardo, near Milan. The event was sponsored by several European identitarian and far-right groups and influencers, including members of the Generation Identity (GI) network. The event is highly politically controversial and was banned from taking place in Milan and other towns before the current location was agreed upon.

Italian left-wing groups have pledged to stage protests in central Milan, near the Duomo, on 17 May, and there is a realistic possibility of attempts by local direct action groups to disrupt the conference by blocking roads or targeting local infrastructure.

Turkey detains 97 students over protests

On 13 May, Turkish police carried out large-scale arrests of students from Boğaziçi University in Istanbul, who were protesting against a conference by an Islamic scholar who holds views seen as legitimising child marriage. The arrests reportedly followed the outbreak of violence between the protesters and police after the former tried to storm the event venue. The various universities in Istanbul have been hotspots for unrest, most recently in connection to the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu.

Mali junta formally dissolves all parties

The 13 May announcement follows last month’s “recommendation” by the national conference, which also called for the extension of the presidency of junta leader Assimi Goïta. Several opposition figures have “disappeared” in recent weeks or have been arrested by authorities on unclear charges. The ban and arrests are almost certainly meant to strengthen the junta’s position, mitigating the risk of instability driven by civil society actors.

The junta, which is backed by Russia, likely assesses that it can withstand and quash any reaction to the ban. The Malian junta has also intensified moves to restrict Western actors from operating in the country, banning French channel TV5 Monde due to its coverage of pro-democracy protests. There is a realistic possibility that the growing bans and restrictions on association and reporting will be weaponised by the junta to arrest foreign citizens, who could then be leveraged for hostage diplomacy.

Health workers threaten to strike in Ethiopia

Over the past week, health workers demonstrated across multiple cities in Ethiopia, including Addis Ababa. The recent wave of protests comes after health workers submitted a 12-point proposal to the government on 11 April, threatening to strike after 30 days, on 12 May, if the government did not address their points. The points include a salary increase, free health insurance, free transportation, and a house or land.

While health workers have not yet conducted any strikes, the recent wave of protests reportedly constitutes an attempt to pressure the government to address each point explicitly. If this does not happen by the end of the week, health workers have declared they will initiate strike action.

The Ministry of Health announced that it has addressed the 12 points in Proclamation 1362/2017, with the health minister additionally saying that the health budget would be increased in June. Given that many health workers reportedly consider the terms only partially addressed, it is likely that they will engage in strike action from around 19 May.

Germany bans monarchist extremist group

On 13 May, German police arrested four members of the Königreich Deutschland (“Kingdom of Germany”) group, following the Interior Ministry’s decision to ban it, stating that it had sought to establish a parallel state apparatus. The group espouses an ideology associated with the so-called “Reichsbürger” movement, which combines various conspiracy theories (often adjacent to a variety of ideologies and beliefs, from neo-Nazism to US-centred “sovereign citizen” movements) around the central claim that current Federal Germany is an illegal entity and that the “real” Germany still is the monarchical Reich.

The latest arrests follow a period of increased scrutiny from authorities, which began with the large-scale anti-extremist raids in 2022 linked to an alleged coup plot by Reichsbürger sympathisers. The ban on Königreich Deutschland will likely result in the organisation’s splintering, possibly pushing its adherents to create smaller and less traceable groups.

JNIM attack in Mali results in two Chinese nationals being kidnapped

On 12 May, Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) militants attacked a Chinese-operated mining site in Narena, in the country’s southwest. The attackers destroyed equipment and killed several workers from Mali and Ghana, but reportedly kidnapped two Chinese nationals. The attack follows another recent operation where militants destroyed mining equipment in Kayes.

There is a realistic possibility that the attacks are meant to cripple Mali’s vital mining industry, which is crucial for the government’s survival and foreign policy. Moreover, the kidnapping of two foreign nationals appears deliberate and is likely notable: compared to other regional extremist groups like the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), JNIM has generally refrained from kidnapping foreigners.

Djibo attack kills over 100 in Burkina Faso, and junta accused of March massacre.

On 11 May, fighters from the al-Qaeda affiliated group Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) killed over 100 people in an attack conducted simultaneously in eight localities in northern Burkina Faso. The primary attack occurred in the strategically important town of Djibo, near the Malian border, with JNIM militants taking over checkpoints and military camps, most notably a Special Anti-Terrorist Unit camp. Fortifications and trenches which were constructed following a previous large-scale attack in November 2023 proved insufficient as JNIM militants overwhelmed Burkinabe forces. Most of the fatalities were Burkinabe military personnel, although several dozen civilians were also reportedly executed after Djibo was overrun.

It is likely that the use of 14.5mm antiaircraft guns by JNIM, which forced the withdrawal of Burkinabe air support, was a critical component of the assault’s success. Previous attacks on Djibo had been successfully repelled with the help of airpower.

Separately, on 12 May, a Human Rights Watch report was published stating that government forces were responsible for the massacre of at least 100 civilians in a March attack near the town of Solenzo in western Burkina Faso. The victims were ethnic Fulani, a community that has been strongly associated with JNIM by the junta. The report outlines that after the initial mass killings by the Burkinabe military, JNIM re-entered the town and then conducted retribution killings against civilians deemed to be junta collaborators.

The incident is indicative of a cycle of extreme violence, with the brutality of the junta worsening inter-ethnic tensions and therefore bolstering JNIM, whilst JNIM themselves regularly conduct massacres. Whilst the report may lead to protests in Ouagadougou, it is unlikely due to the firm grip of security forces in the capital, a current wave of propaganda-driven fervour for junta leader Ibrahim Traoré, and a general distrust of Western sources.

RSF continue to target Port Sudan with drone attacks

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued to strike Port Sudan with drones, marking the thirteenth consecutive day of attacks on the de facto capital of Sudan.  Drone strikes have hit both military and civilian infrastructure, causing disruption to port operations, fuel and water shortages, and the displacement of hundreds of civilians. It is likely that the RSF’s wider strategy is to destabilise the country and disrupt the facilitation of humanitarian aid across Sudan, with Port Sudan serving as the main entry point for relief.   

At least 130 people kidnapped near Wargaadhi, Middle Shabelle, Somalia

At approximately 16:00 local time on 12 May, armed assailants hijacked seven vehicles loaded with goods and passengers en route to Gaalkacyo from Mogadishu, between Wargaadhi and Cad Cadeey. The vehicles included men, women, and children, as well as elderly and sick individuals. The kidnapping is highly likely a retaliatory action linked to a dispute over looted khat, a stimulant plant chewed in the region.

The retaliation is reportedly linked to an earlier incident in Matabaan in Hiraan province, where a vehicle carrying khat was detained and its occupants abducted. By abducting 130 people, the group responsible is highly likely to seek the release of the detained vehicle.

The incident comes amid an ongoing al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab offensive in the Middle Shabelle region and likely reflects the breakdown in security in the province. Further incidents of clan-related violence are highly likely in the regions around Mogadishu as the security situation continues to deteriorate.

Flooding kills more than 100 in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Severe flooding occurred in the area of Kasaba, in South Kivu Province, following heavy rains between 8 and 9 May. The rains caused the Kasaba River to overflow, affecting nearby villages. According to available sources, the majority of the victims were children or elderly people who likely had more difficulty fleeing the affected areas in time. The Kasaba area is extremely remote and lacks infrastructure, and the only humanitarian organisation operating in its vicinity is the Red Cross, factors which have almost certainly complicated search and rescue efforts.

On 11 May, a spokesperson for the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) announced that the militant group have conducted 71 coordinated attacks across 51 locations across Pakistan’s Balochistan province, under what has been labelled “Operation Herof”. Attacks were conducted against Pakistani military and intelligence sites, as well as local police stations, mineral transport vehicles and infrastructure along major highways.

The statement accused Pakistan of being a breeding ground for global terrorism and called on the international community to label it as a terrorist state. The BLA addressed India, claiming that every talk of “peace, ceasefire, and brotherhood” from Pakistan was a “deception, a war tactic, and a temporary ruse.” The BLA also assured India that it would attack Pakistan from the western border in the event of a full-scale war between India and Pakistan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Although the BLA announcement refrained from indicating the exact time frame of the attacks, initial indications are that there was a major spike in BLA attacks following India’s initial attacks on Pakistan. It is almost certain that the BLA was attempting to exploit an overstretched Pakistani military that was forced to pivot focus and resources to what could have escalated to a major conflict.

This tactic was likely emulated by other militant groups in Pakistan. Under its “Operation Khandak”, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also conducted brazen attacks against the Pakistani military, including one attack in South Waziristan that killed 20 troops. Of note, this death toll achieved through only one militant attack is approximately half of the total amount of Pakistani troops assessed to have been killed by India, a major conventional force, which conducted multiple long-range strikes and border skirmishes over several days.

The internal threat posed by militant groups likely added significant pressure on the Pakistani government to seek an opportunity to de-escalate tensions with India. Moreover, it likely sets a precedent for future hostilities with India. Militant groups will likely attempt to exploit the diversion of Pakistani military resources to intensify their insurgencies, with attacks on transport and logistics infrastructure integral to undermining the Pakistani military’s ability to coordinate operations, divert resources and project force on multiple fronts.

With tensions still high with India and a realistic possibility of further escalation, the Pakistani military is likely to remain focused on the Indian border for the foreseeable future. This diversion of security resources will almost certainly create further opportunities for militant groups to escalate attacks within Pakistan’s restive regions, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Consequently, militant attacks in Pakistan are almost certain to continue, with primary targets including military and police units, transport infrastructure, and symbols of perceived exploitation such as mineral extraction sites, Chinese-backed projects, and government installations.

On 10 May, US President Donald Trump declared a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. Both sides claimed the ceasefire as a victory, fuelling celebrations among each country’s population. Shortly after the announcement of the ceasefire, firing resumed along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, and each side accused the other of ceasefire violations. The skirmishes ended by 11 May, however, and the ceasefire then held, with no further reports of explosions along the LoC.

Parades and rallies were held across Pakistan, with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif declaring 11 May a day of recognition for its armed forces. Despite initial reluctance to add diplomatic pressure to the situation, Washington reportedly became increasingly concerned over the risk of nuclear escalation. In exchange for the ceasefire agreement, Trump has pledged to increase trade with the two nations.

Solace Global Assessment: 

External pressure highly likely acted as an offramp for each side to de-escalate without letting the other have the final word. While neither India nor Pakistan wanted to enter a conflict which could severely disrupt both economies and risk nuclear war, each wanted to portray itself as the victor in the tit-for-tat military operations and skirmishes. The considerable disinformation that proliferated on each side, whereby the opposition losses were significantly inflated, likely also contributed to de-escalation by enabling each government to portray itself as having won to its respective population.

While the ceasefire is a temporary solution to the conflict, pressure from each population could re-ignite it in the face of perceived hostilities. This is exacerbated by the fact that the ceasefire is fragile and leaves the root sources of tensions largely unaddressed. India has declared that another attack in a similar vein to the recent Pahalgam attack would be considered an act of war. The Indus Water Treaty, which regulates the division of water from the Indus River between the two nations, remains suspended, which constitutes an existential issue for Pakistan.

The recent round of hostilities highly likely expanded the threshold of acceptable retaliation, whereby Indian airstrikes ventured deeper into Pakistan and the Pakistani military targeted more populated areas of Jammu and Kashmir. If hostilities resumed, tensions would likely rapidly escalate to reach the newly established threshold. It is almost certain that the most significant factor preventing a full-scale war was nuclear deterrence. Both parties had effectively exhausted all possible military actions that did not considerably threaten nuclear escalation. Given that there was little to no space for further deterioration, should Islamabad or New Delhi pursue even greater brinkmanship in any future reignition of hostilities, this could risk an even more dangerous escalation.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has declared that both sides have agreed to talks at a neutral site. This will almost certainly address the non-military actions each side took, which remain in place, including the closure of airspace to each other’s aircraft, the closure of the Attari-Wagah border crossing, the ban on bilateral trade, and the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty. Currently, however, neither side has agreed to an agenda, with India wanting to focus on terrorism and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and Pakistan wanting to focus on the Indus Water Treaty and Indian-administered Kashmir. Trump has also declared intentions to resolve the Kashmir crisis, but ultimately, a permanent resolution is highly unlikely.

On 10 May, the interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus banned the Awami League (AL), the party of Bangladesh’s long-time ruler, Sheikh Hasina, who was ousted in the July-August 2024 student-led revolution. The ban includes all party “activities”, both in person and online, and falls under the country’s Anti-Terrorism Act. It will remain in place until a special tribunal carries out a trial of the party and its leaders over their alleged responsibility for the hundreds of deaths that occurred during the uprising.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Yunus government almost certainly remains in an extremely precarious position. While Yunus is broadly respected at home and abroad, his grip on power rests upon the backing of several opposition parties who have replaced AL as the country’s main political force. These groups, like the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP) or the student-led National Citizen Party (NCP), are now impatient to fill the political vacuum left by AL’s removal. Consequently, their support for the interim government is constantly threatened by inter-party competition and strife, which has often resulted in political violence and mob attacks.

Yunus has likely targeted AL to buy time (Yunus has cautiously sought to postpone the first post-Hasina elections to early 2026) and to appease these groups, who likely retain a common interest in Hasina’s party’s complete disappearance. For instance, in February, the interim government launched “Operation Devil Hunt”, leading to the arrest of more than 1,000 Hasina supporters and AL members.

The latest decision was almost certainly a reaction to the interim government’s political objectives and increasing public pressure. In the days before the ban, large-scale protests occurred in Dhaka, led by various student groups, including NCP and the youth wing of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). The protesters issued an “ultimatum” to the government to ban AL by 10 May.

The ban will likely be followed by further actions to remove AL from power. While operating as a political party, AL also retained a strong control over local institutions (including non-political ones, like public transport firms) via a layered system of clientelism and informal ties. Opposition parties are likely interested in also replacing AL at this level, and there have been cases of mob violence at the local level driven by competition to control local institutions following the revolution.

On 12 May, the Philippines midterm elections took place. Approximately 18,000 seats were contested across multiple levels, including governorships, mayorships, and seats in the House of Representatives and Senate.

The Senate outcome marked a defeat for President Marcos Jr, whose endorsed candidates won six of the 12 contested seats; one of these candidates is also endorsed by the Duterte family, however. Sara Duterte’s endorsed candidates won four seats, and the final two were won by non-affiliated candidates, Paolo Benigno “Bam” Aquino and Aquino ally Francis Pangilinan.

Rodrigo Duterte, Sara’s father, won the mayoral election in his family’s stronghold district, despite currently being imprisoned in The Hague. His son and vice mayor Sebastian Duterte is expected to assume the role in Rodrigo’s absence. There were sporadic reports of violence and voter machines malfunctioning. Police reported 20 killed and 30 injured.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The election is significant for the future of Philippines politics. The vote for 12 Senate seats almost certainly constituted the most important vote of the day, since its makeup would almost certainly be a deciding factor in Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment case. Sara Duterte is set to go on trial in front of the Senate over her impeachment over alleged corruption on 30 July. A two thirds majority, or 16 out of 24 senators, is required to impeach Duterte.

Following the midterm election, neither camp has an overwhelming majority; there are approximately 12 pro-Marcos senators and six pro-Duterte senators and with six remaining neutral. Allegiances are fluid, however, and could change.

Sara Duterte will almost certainly be a contender for the 2028 presidential election if she is not impeached. While Marcos is unable to run again, Duterte will highly likely seek revenge against Marcos should she claim victory, raising the stakes of the impeachment trial.

The Philippines will almost certainly face further division and opposition. While Marcos began with a high approval rating, he has become increasingly unpopular due to economic challenges and the rift with the Duterte camp. The population is also generally split on Sara Duterte, with her approval rating hovering at around 60 per cent. Anti-government protests have already occurred, with significant demonstrations across the country in January and February 2025 targeting social and economic issues. Notably, Catholic and Protestant leaders mounted a protest criticising both Marcos and Duterte.

The division will almost certainly be exacerbated by the election of Rodrigo Duterte, who has been arrested by the ICC for “crimes against humanity”, allegedly responsible for the deaths of at least 7,000 people during his “war on drugs” and currently awaits trial in The Hague. The Aquino family’s re-entry into politics via the senate will highly likely add another source of conflict, since they were the Marcoses’ primary political rivals in the 1980s and 1990s. The numerous sources of public division in government will highly likely trigger protests from the respective supporters of Marcos and Duterte. Key dates for likely unrest in 2025 will be the impeachment trial of Sara Duterte on 30 July and the trial of Rodrigo Duterte on 23 September.

American scholar unable to leave Thailand, despite charges for insulting the monarchy being dropped

On 16 May, prosecutors reportedly dropped charges against him for insulting the monarchy. Political science lecturer Paul Chambers was arrested in April after the royalist army filed the charges related to a blurb for a seminar he spoke at. Despite dropping the charges, Chambers is reportedly unable to leave the country and remains in limbo as police could still pursue the case, facing up to 15 years in jail.

Chambers’ arrest is a rare case of Thailand’s lese-majeste law being used against a foreigner and reflects the high level of risk associated with insulting the Thai monarchy. Given the attention the case has attracted, Thai police will likely drop the case as Bangkok seeks to relax US export tariffs on Thailand.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) inactivity could be linked to clashes with Baluch militants

The last time ISKP claimed an attack inside Afghan territory was on 13 February 2025, thus making this the longest operational pause in the group’s history since the Taliban took Kabul in 2021. At the same time, ISKP has remained active in Balochistan, Pakistan, carrying out a bombing in mid-April targeting police officers in Mastung city.

There is a realistic possibility that the ongoing pause is linked with the group’s interest in Pakistan, where it is increasingly facing pressure from local Baluch separatist groups. According to local sources, Baluch militants have in recent weeks carried out several anti-ISKP operations in Pakistani territory, including an attack on an ISKP camp near Mastung in mid-March, which reportedly resulted in the deaths of around 30 ISKP militants.

In addition to this external threat, in early 2025, nationalist Afghan groups, who oppose both ISKP and the Taliban, claimed that the Islamic State branch was undergoing an internal reshuffling, possibly affecting its ability to stage operations in Afghanistan. While the pause could be evidence of ISKP’s current difficulties, it is almost certain that the group retains an interest in staging attacks in Afghanistan and Balochistan.

Pakistani authorities issue heatwave warning for 16-19 May

Available weather data shared by authorities indicates that much of the country, and particularly northern regions like Punjab, Kashmir, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the capital Islamabad, will have a protracted period of extremely hot and dry conditions. Temperatures of above 40 degrees Celsius are highly likely to last throughout the weekend, with possible peaks reaching above 45 degrees. As Pakistan has had one of the driest winters in history, with around 65 per cent less rainfall than average, there is a high likelihood that protracted high temperatures will cause water shortages, particularly in densely populated areas.

Likely methanol poisoning kills 21 in Punjab, India

The victims, in addition to ten other people who have been hospitalised, are reported to have consumed toxic liquor. Authorities have arrested nine people near the city of Amritsar and have launched an operation to “destroy” the local supply of contaminated liquor. In India, the sale of homemade or contaminated liquor is widespread, particularly in disadvantaged areas or in areas where the sale of alcohol is illegal, like the state of Gujarat. Improvised distilleries often spike cheap liquor with methanol to increase its strength.

Japan’s Sakurajima Volcano erupts, impacts air travel

The volcano, which is located in the south of Kyushu Island, in the Kagoshima prefecture, erupted on 15-16 May, releasing an ash plume which reached a three-kilometre altitude. The eruption has resulted in the cancellation

of dozens of flights at the nearby Kagoshima airport. While no evacuation orders have been issued as of the time of writing, there is a realistic possibility of further eruptions causing a more direct threat to local residents. The city of Kagoshima has a population of almost 700,000, and past eruptions, like in 2015, have prompted Japanese authorities to issue evacuation preparation warnings.

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