On 6 May, Colombian officials released figures regarding their ongoing crackdown on the Gulf Clan, one of the country’s most violent crime syndicates. Since 15 April, Bogota claims to have arrested 200 cartel members, and that an additional 15 suspects have been killed in the raids. Authorities likewise announced the seizure of 6.8 tonnes of narcotics during the operations, as well as arms and munitions.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro stated that the raids were a response to the so-called “pistol plan” implemented by the Gulf Clan – the systematic assassination of police officers, which has resulted in at least 21 deaths.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Gulf Clan remains Colombia’s largest crime syndicate. The group’s strongholds are concentrated in the country’s north. During the past years, the cartel has suffered from growing internal instability, with several splinter groups emerging from it.

In early April 2025, one of CDG’s five leaders, Jose Miguel Demoya – alias “Chirimoya” – was killed in a joint Colombian-American raid in the Cordoba province, north of Medellin. The killing of Chirimoya, who had a leading role in organising CDG’s narcotics trade in the Caribbean region, likely represented the most severe blow to the cartel since the arrest of one of its leaders, “Otoniel”, in 2021. In 2022, Otoniel’s extradition to the US was also followed by a period of increased assassinations against security forces.

CDG’s adoption of systematic targeted assassinations has the realistic possibility of being a response to these setbacks, aimed at demonstrating the organisation’s strength in confronting the government. The 2022 escalation occurred when Petro’s landmark “total peace” strategy, which allowed authorities to negotiate with criminal groups, was being rolled out.

In contrast, the recent escalation comes as the government, which faces the most severe violence from local paramilitary groups in years, is adopting a more confrontational stance. Consequently, further developments, including arrests or large-scale drug seizures, are likely to escalate the confrontation between CDG and Bogota. While past cases indicate that CDG members will prioritise attacking government officials and police forces, such attacks still pose a high threat to bystanders.

Protests against gang violence in Haiti continue, as gangs gain territory

On 4 May, several protests occurred in Port-au-Prince, as locals called on members of the interim government to resign due to their failure to curb the gang violence affecting almost all of the country’s territory. During the reporting period, gangs have carried out several attacks in the town of Petite Riviere de l’Artibonite, north of the capital. These attacks are likely part of the gangs’ efforts to cut Port-au-Prince off from the border with the Dominican Republic, thus taking greater control over the entry and distribution of humanitarian aid and other goods.

Venezuelan opposition leaders leave the country

Several members of Venezuela’s opposition left the Argentine diplomatic residence in Caracas and were transported to the US following negotiations with the Venezuelan government. The group, comprising five staffers, had resided at the diplomatic offices since March 2024, following the issuing of warrants for their arrest. Senior leaders of the opposition, including Maria Corina Machado, are still believed to be in hiding in the country. While it removed an important source of diplomatic strife with Buenos Aires, the development is unlikely to result in warmer relations between Venezuela and Argentina.

State of emergency imposed in Belize to curb gang violence

On 8 May, a state of emergency covering Belize City, the Belize District, and the Cayo District was imposed in response to escalating gang violence. The measure will grant the police expanded powers and will likely include arrests and detention without warrant, curfews, heightened security patrols, checkpoints, and search operations targeting gang members and illegal weapons. The declaration follows a spike in shootings, including the high-profile killing of Brandon Baptist, which authorities say has elevated the threat to a critical level.

US Embassy in Honduras briefed on mass-shooting threats

On 6 May, the US embassy in Tegucigalpa issued a security alert warning of mass-shooting threats targeting three locations in the Honduran capital. The alert, reportedly based on information received from the FBI, claimed that the targets of the possible attacks included Elliot Dover Christian School, the Government Civic Centre, and a shopping mall, which remained unnamed. Further threats were also identified for 16 May. In response to the threats, the Honduran police stated that they would implement more stringent security protocols in the capital. The country’s Foreign Minister, Enrique Reina, did not assess the threat’s validity but implied that they are meant to stoke fear in Honduras during an election year.

Peru suspends gold mining in the north after multiple miners killed

On 5 May, Peru suspended gold mining in the northern district of Pataz for 30 days after 13 gold miners were kidnapped and killed in the area. The miners, who worked for the mining company Compañía Minera Poderosa S.A., were allegedly killed by illegal miners linked to organised crime groups. The government has also enforced an 18:00 to 06:00 local time curfew and has promised to establish a military base in the area to curb the violence. Peru has suffered from a wave of violence associated with illegal mining in the north, which is assessed to have killed approximately 40 people, with the recent surge likely linked to current increases in gold prices.  

Massive terror attack plot targeting a concert in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, thwarted

Brazilian authorities arrested several suspects who had allegedly planned to carry out a shooting and bombing attack at a Lady Gaga concert in Copacabana, an event that was attended by approximately two and a half million people. According to the police, the group sought to obtain social media notoriety via their attack and aimed to target the LGBTQ community.

Moreover, the group reportedly aimed to recruit young teenagers and children, and reportedly structured itself as an online-based “cult”. These latter elements make it likely that the group falls outside of “traditional” far-right terrorist movements in Brazil, and instead likely sought to emulate transnational extremist groups, like the neo-Nazi and “satanist” Order of the Nine Angles (O9A) or its offshoot 764. The attack’s planner likely also sought to emulate the 2009 São Paulo Parade bombing by the neo-Nazi group Impacto Hooligan.

The plot is almost certainly notable due to its scope and the potential it had to cause massive casualties. High-profile events remain desirable targets for extremist individuals and groups seeking to mainstream their ideology, while simultaneously maximising the number of casualties resulting from their actions.

Puerto Rican authorities extend state of emergency after heavy rains kill two

The island has had two weeks of heavy rain since 18 April, resulting in widespread landslides and flooding, as well as severe transport and service disruptions. The rain is likely to have medium-term impacts, particularly affecting Puerto Rico’s energy and water infrastructure. Moreover, the Caribbean hurricane season begins in June, and there is a realistic possibility that the damages suffered by Puerto Rico during the protracted rains will compound the impact of future storms.

Ecuador changes entry requirements to curb the spread of yellow fever

Ecuador’s Ministry of Health has announced a new health entry requirement for travellers arriving from Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, which is set to be in effect from 12 May. Travellers to Ecuador from these countries must now present a valid yellow fever vaccination certificate upon entry, with the vaccination administered at least 10 days before arrival. The updated entry requirements are almost certainly linked to a marked increase in yellow fever cases in Ecuador and a broader outbreak in South America, with over 131 confirmed cases and 53 deaths already recorded in 2025. This marks a significant increase compared to 2024, with only 61 registered cases and 30 fatalities.

Magnitude 7.5 earthquake off the coast of Ushiaia, Argentina

On 2 May, a magnitude 7.5 earthquake struck off the coast of Ushuaia, Argentina. Initially, Chilean authorities issued a tsunami warning and evacuation order for the coastal areas of the Magallanes region. However, the evacuation order was later lifted, and the tsunami warning was downgraded to a precautionary level. No injuries or significant damage to critical infrastructure were reported. By the evening, all tsunami warnings for the Chilean coasts were cancelled, and normal activities were resumed.

Counter terrorism operations in the UK on 3 May resulted in the apprehension of eight suspects, seven of whom are Iranian citizens. Five suspects were arrested in London, Swindon and Greater Manchester as part of the first operation and have been detained under the Terrorism Act. Reports indicate that this operation was conducted to thwart an imminent attack on an undisclosed location.

The second operation was accelerated due to fears that the suspects would destroy critical evidence and flee the country following the first operation. The suspects were arrested under powers granted by the National Security Act, with some reports indicating that they were involved in state-sponsored espionage at the behest of Iran.

The police have stated that there was no direct link between the two groups arrested and that they are being investigated separately.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The exact target of the disrupted attack has not been confirmed, however, uncorroborated reports indicate that the intended target was the Israeli embassy in London. The foiled attack is potentially indicative of a change of strategy by Iran, after the degradation of its conventional forces and proxy groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis. Iran may be attempting to demonstrate its influence and exert pressure on both Israel and its Western allies by conducting highly deniable, asymmetric attacks through the use of small, localised cells outside of the Middle East.

The UK’s domestic intelligence agency, MI5, has previously warned of an increase in Iranian operations in the UK, disclosing that at least 20 Iranian-linked plots were foiled between 2022 and 2024. Recent Israeli operations have also targeted a senior Hezbollah external attack planner who was allegedly planning attacks with Iran’s  Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) against Jewish and Israeli targets outside of the Middle East. Iran has employed this strategy in the past, often in coordination with proxy forces like Hezbollah. For example, the 1994 attack on the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, killed 85 people and injured over 300 and is widely believed to have been orchestrated by Iran and executed by Hezbollah.

There has also been a discernible trend in Iran leveraging criminal networks and members of the disenfranchised Iranian diaspora throughout Europe, with some reports suggesting that Iran is paying sums amounting to USD 200,000 to carry out attacks or assassinations. This strategy will likely enable Iran to expand its operational reach, maintain plausible deniability and establish a “hybrid warfare” campaign across Europe, crudely mirroring Russia’s approach in response to its conflict with Ukraine. Such a campaign could blend a range of threat vectors, including espionage, sabotage, cyber operations, disinformation, and attacks, likely to be primarily aimed at Israeli or Jewish interests but also governments or businesses supporting Israel.

On 8 May, the three-day unilateral ceasefire previously announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin began, corresponding to the 9 May Victory Day (the commemoration of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany) parade in Moscow. Numerous world leaders attended the event, including China’s Xi Jinping, Brazil’s Lula da Silva, Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić, and Slovakia’s Robert Fico (the only EU member state that attended).

Just days prior, starting on 6 May and intensifying on 7 May, Ukraine conducted mass uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks into internationally recognised Russian territory, with Moscow announcing that a record 524 Ukrainian UAVs had been shot down. Ukrainian one-way attack UAVs (OWA-UAVs) reportedly struck several military-industrial targets, including: the Bazalt plant in Krasnoarmeysk (near Moscow); the Splav plant in Tula; and the Optic Fibre Systems plant in Saransk, Mordovia Republic.

The significant number of Ukrainian UAVs led to airspace and airport closures, with an estimated 60,000 passengers being stranded. Citing the Ukrainian UAV threat, Russian authorities announced that the internet and mobile network usage would be purposely disrupted across multiple areas of Russia during Victory Day.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Being the 80^th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany in WWII (known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), 2025’s Victory Day is almost certainly a symbolically powerful tool for Moscow to project strength and a narrative of being under siege by hostile powers. The Victory Day re-enactments include a life-sized replica of the Reichstag building in Moscow, and the not inconsiderable attendance by world leaders and foreign dignitaries almost certainly highlights the lack of comprehensive global isolation despite the war in Ukraine.

Putin’s three-day ceasefire was almost certainly part of an effort to avoid embarrassment during Victory Day, a genuine threat that was exemplified by the significant Ukrainian UAV strikes in the days prior. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed the ceasefire as a ‘theatrical production’ and a ‘game’, reiterating calls for the US-proposed 30-day ceasefire.

Should Ukraine violate the unilateral ceasefire and attack Russia during Victory Day celebrations, it is almost certain that considerable layered retaliation strikes would be conducted by Russia against Ukrainian urban centres. In the feasible scenario that Russia conducts a false-flag operation to gain leverage in accusing Ukraine of warmongering, the threat to Ukrainian urban centres would be similarly increased.

Many of the Ukrainian UAVs launched, particularly those that caused the mass airport shutdowns (including all three of Moscow’s airports), were highly likely intended to be diversionary and to overwhelm Russian air defence, for the likely primary mission objective: the targeting of multiple specific military-industrial sites.

The reported successful strikes against the Fibre Optic Systems are particularly notable, given the site’s immense importance as Russia’s sole plant that produces fibre optic cables. The cables have been highly likely critical, for example, to Russia’s advances in the Kursk salient, with their use in tethered first-person view (FPV) UAVs circumventing much of the developed Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) soft-kill defeat techniques.

The Israeli government released a new plan highlighting shifts in its approach to the conflict with Hamas and other Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip, which resumed following the collapse of the ceasefire agreement on 18 March.

The new plan calls for the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) to switch from carrying out raids inside parts of Gaza to occupying territory, particularly in the north of the Gaza Strip, preventing the return of displaced civilians and the re-infiltration of fighters. The plan also entails the expansion of the buffer zone alongside the Israel-Gaza border, the creation of a “sterile area” south of Rafah, and outlines a new organisation for the delivery of humanitarian aid via private companies. Alongside the announcement, the Israeli government announced a new call-up of “tens of thousands” of reservists.

Israeli authorities have stated that they will begin the plan’s implementation following the visit of US President Donald Trump to the region, which will occur between 13 and 16 May. Trump is expected to visit Israel, as well as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The new war plan almost certainly serves to both acquiesce hard-right government allies (like Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who reacted to the plan by stating that Israel will “finally annex” Gaza) and to increase pressure on Hamas. If implemented in the Gaza Strip, the plan will almost certainly represent an important shift in the dynamics of the conflict.

Since its first operation in Gaza following the Hamas attack in October 2023, the IDF has struggled with Palestinian fighters’ ability to re-infiltrate previously cleared areas, often taking advantage of the movement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), subsequently inflicting attrition on returning IDF units. While more costly in terms of manpower commitments, the occupation of parts of Gaza is highly likely to be effective at reducing the risk of re-infiltration, particularly in Gaza’s north.

On the other hand, the approach risks further exacerbating the already extremely severe humanitarian situation in Gaza. By forcing people in north Gaza (who have already been displaced several times in most cases) to the south, IDF operations are likely to put further strain on the surviving humanitarian structures in south Gaza. They will likewise increase Hamas’ incentives to stage operations and deployments in areas densely populated by civilians.

It is highly unlikely that the shift towards permanent deployments in north Gaza will create the conditions for Israel to “annex” the area in the medium term. Besides the monumental task of clearing the thousands of tonnes of debris and unexploded ordnance from the area, any Israeli presence in north Gaza post-conflict would be at a constant threat from Hamas attacks.

The plan will almost certainly drive considerable opposition in Israel itself and abroad. Several organisations representing the families of the still missing Israeli hostages have opposed the plan’s maximalist goals, stating that they are counterproductive from the standpoint of securing the release of surviving hostages.

These groups have, in the past, led large-scale civil unrest in Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities, and are highly likely to stage further protests as the plan is implemented, and possibly coinciding with Trump’s visit to Israel.

Abroad, the plan is highly likely to drive protests in cities that have large pro-Palestine movements, like London, Paris, Berlin, Barcelona, New York, and Istanbul. Large-scale unrest is also highly likely to be driven by the upcoming Nakba Day commemorations (15 May). As in the case of past high-visibility dates, there is a realistic possibility of political violence and terrorism targeting protests and counter-protests on or near Nakba Day.

On 4 May, a Houthi ballistic missile fired from Yemen hit a parking lot within the perimeter of Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) in Israel. The strike led to multiple international airlines suspending flights to the airport. The attack was followed by a Houthi announcement of a ‘comprehensive aerial blockade’ of Israel. In retaliation, Israel conducted major strikes on the port of Hodeidah and a nearby cement factory on 5 May, with reports indicating that 70 per cent of the port was damaged. This was followed by at least 15 strikes on Sanaa International Airport (SAH) on 6 May.

Concurrently, on 6 May, US President Donald Trump announced that the Houthis had ‘capitulated’ to US demands to stop attacks against merchant shipping, following negotiations with Omani mediators, resulting in a ceasefire agreement between the US and the Houthis. Houthi leadership figures have given conflicting statements; however, the Supreme Leader, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, has acknowledged the ceasefire.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Houthi missile impact at TLV airport marks the first successful penetration of Israeli air defence since the renewed Houthi long-range strikes campaign. Israel’s Arrow 3 air defence system has proven thus far to be highly capable at intercepting Houthi ballistic missiles, with 27 Houthi missiles having either been intercepted or failed since the collapse of the Gaza ceasefire on 18 March.

In this instance, however, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) claim that an Arrow 3 interceptor experienced a ‘technical failure’. Local sources claim that the Houthis used multiple ballistic missiles to overwhelm Israeli air defences, and the impact will likely have necessarily involved the failure of several layers of air defence. Some sources claim that the Houthis used newly-introduced missile technology, namely Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), however, there has yet to be credible evidence for this.

The Houthi announcement of an aerial blockade is almost certainly an attempt to seize the narrative following the successful impact. Despite the US-Houthi ceasefire, the Houthis have emphasised the continuation of their campaign in support of Hamas against Israel. It is highly likely, therefore, that Houthi long-range strikes against Israel will continue.

Whilst it is likely that the IDF will have learnt valuable lessons from the air defence failure, attempted Houthi strikes, even if successfully intercepted, pose risks due to falling debris, and significant air travel disruption can occur if Houthi missiles or long-range attack drones penetrate Israeli airspace.

The ceasefire is almost certainly a victory for Trump’s escalated anti-Houthi campaign. Air power has almost certainly previously proven itself to be incapable of solely achieving the total defeat of the Houthi movement, with the Houthis being highly adept at holding out and rebuilding damaged infrastructure.

However, the strategic objective pursued by the Trump administration of a cessation of the Houthi Red Sea campaign was both limited in scope and achievable with the military means available. Furthermore, contrary to Houthi rhetoric and statements, the Houthis have not actually targeted a merchant vessel transiting the Red Sea since November 2024, likely making the concession further palatable to Houthi leadership. It will nonetheless likely take months or even years for the confidence in maritime shipping security in the region to return to pre-October 2023 levels.

Since 4 May, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan have launched a series of drone attacks against the Port of Sudan, Sudan’s second largest city, de facto capital, and main seaport that accounts for approximately 90 per cent of the country’s international trade. The city is also home to Port Sudan International Airport (PZU), which has become the primary airport in the country following the suspension of flights from Khartoum International Airport (KRT).

RSF drone strikes have targeted port and airport infrastructure, fuel depots, cargo warehouses, energy infrastructure, a hotel near the residence of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Osman Digna Air Base, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) primary air base, which is adjacent to Port Sudan International Airport. The strikes have disrupted airport operations, resulting in shortages in humanitarian aid and calls from international aid agencies for increased protections.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Port Sudan has remained relatively unscathed throughout the civil war, with the RSF’s main area of operations focused on Khartoum and the consolidation of territory in Darfur. However, the recent attacks on the Red Sea city likely indicate a change in strategy, aimed at destabilising the Sudanese government and disrupting aid delivery through the targeting of transport and energy-related infrastructure.

Port Sudan is the main entry point for humanitarian aid into Sudan and a critical logistics hub for the onward distribution of aid to conflict-affected regions, including Darfur. The city is also home to diplomatic missions, aid agencies and many of Sudan’s internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The suspension of flights and the disruption of port operations will likely reduce the amount of aid entering Sudan, and the attacks on fuel infrastructure will likely compound the humanitarian situation by affecting road transport, electricity generation, and cooking gas distribution across Sudan.

Recent RSF operations in Darfur have included the systematic targeting of aid convoys, displacement camps, and humanitarian workers. Deep strikes against Port Sudan are likely reflective of a wider strategy to disrupt aid deliveries to Darfur and force a deterioration in the humanitarian situation.

The RSF’s objective is likely to consolidate control over Darfur by increasing displacement, deterring foreign humanitarian and reducing international oversight of alleged war crimes and human rights abuses. Consequently, it is highly likely that drone strikes on Port Sudan will continue, with the SAF lacking sufficient air defence to counter the attacks and the RSF reportedly sustained by the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

However, RSF strikes have also targeted Flamingo Bay, a long-coveted Russian port in Port Sudan, located on the strategic Red Sea. There is a realistic possibility that sustained attacks on Port Sudan could draw Russia further into the conflict, which has been gradually increasing its support for the SAF.

This could result in an uplift in capabilities to the SAF, especially if a ceasefire is achieved in Ukraine, which could include improved air defence to protect Port Sudan, but also offensive capabilities to enable the SAF to reclaim territory in Darfur.

Severe clashes in Paris following Champions League match

Police reported 43 arrests following clashes on the night of 8-9 May after the PSG-Arsenal Champions League semifinal match at Parc des Princes Stadium. Three people were injured when a car struck them in central Paris, near the match venue, while police clashed with fans in the Champs-Élysées. The clashes, which occurred despite the mobilisation of 2,000 police officers for the event, are likely to impact the security arrangements for the tournament’s final, which is to be held in Munich, Germany, on 31 May. 

Right-wing populist candidate wins first round of Romanian presidential election

George Simion, of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), won approximately 41 per cent of the domestic vote and 61 per cent of the diaspora vote. This is not enough to avoid a runoff vote (15 May) where Simion will face Nicușor Dan, who nevertheless lagged behind at the polls by 20 percentage points.

Following the first vote, centre-left Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu announced his resignation. It is highly likely that Simion, who benefits from massive support among Romania’s diaspora, from having endorsed barred candidate Călin Georgescu, and now from the general confusion among the “establishment” parties following Ciolacu’s resignation, will win in the second round.

This, in turn, is likely to affect Romania’s political stability, with some impacts also felt in Brussels. If he becomes president, Simion is likely to launch an attack on the judiciary over the annulled elections and will seek to reorient Bucharest’s policies regarding Ukraine and Moldova.

Woman in Thessaloniki, Greece, dies after bomb prematurely detonates

 A woman died on 3 May when a bomb she was carrying prematurely detonated in her hands. The woman was reportedly attempting to plant the device outside of a bank when the bomb detonated. Several storefronts and vehicles were damaged by the explosion. The authorities are investigating the woman’s potential links to extreme left-wing groups that have conducted a series of bombings in recent years, largely targeting government offices or the property of private companies deemed antithetical to their ideologies. However, it is highly unlikely that the objective was to cause casualties, as these attacks are normally preceded by warning calls and typically conducted during unsociable hours.

Russian police killed in suspected Islamic State attack in Dagestan

On 5 May, three police officers and two assailants were killed after suspected militants opened fire at a police checkpoint in the town of Makhachkala in Russia’s Dagestan province. Several civilians were also reportedly injured in the attack. Security forces have launched a manhunt for additional suspects believed to be involved, with reports indicating that militants escaped in a stolen police vehicle.

Official confirmation regarding the perpetrators is pending, however, some pro-Islamic State (IS) channels have claimed responsibility for the attack. This is the third attack recorded in 2025 in Dagestan, and there is a realistic possibility that militants are attempting to exploit perceived security vulnerabilities in Russia resulting from the conflict in Ukraine.

In 2024, there were at least 93 recorded attacks in the North Caucasus region, marking a tenfold increase compared to the previous year. There is a realistic possibility that the attacks are the result of a recrudescent Islamic State Caucasus Province (ISCP), which was assessed as dismantled in 2017 but has since operated through the use of small local cells.

Hospital bombed in Old Fangak, South Sudan

On 3 May, two helicopter gunships bombed a Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital and pharmacy before firing on the town of Old Fangak, killing seven and injuring 20, according to the humanitarian aid organisation. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan has declared that the act was deliberate and may constitute a war crime.

While no group claimed responsibility, the act was likely committed by government forces, who are engaged in conflict with the Nuer-led White Army militia, ethnically aligned with First Vice President Riek Machar. The conflict has threatened to re-ignite South Sudan’s civil war, which ended in 2018 after a power-sharing agreement between those loyal to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to Machar.

This is not the first incident of humanitarian groups being targeted in South Sudan amid the recent flare-up of tensions; on 15 January 2025, armed men opened fire on two MSF boats in Upper Nile state. Further attacks on hospitals are likely as government forces retaliate against Nuer civilian populations.

Three dead in Kilimanjaro region, Tanzania, due to heavy rainfall

According to local sources, the casualties followed the collapse of the roof of a residential building, caused by the rain. May falls at the end of the first of two Tanzanian rainy seasons. Also referred to as “masika”, this season, between mid-March and May, coincides with “long rains”, while a shorter rain season (“vuli”) occurs between November and January.

In 2024, Tanzania had heavy rains in April, which resulted in more than 150 deaths and severe flooding. The Kilimanjaro region, including the Moshi District where the three deaths were recorded, is sparsely populated and mostly rural. The lack of infrastructure, particularly in and near small, inhabited areas, is likely to make search and rescue efforts following floods difficult.

In Moshi District, the recent rains reportedly blocked the Moshi-Dar es Salaam highway, a key roadway in the area, and resulted in the overflowing of the Kisangiro River.

At approximately 00:30 local time on 7 May, the Indian Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes against nine different locations in both Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Pakistan. Among the areas targeted are Muzaffarabad, Kotli, and Bagh in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and Sialkot, Sarjal/Tehra Kalan, Muridke, and Bahawalpur in Pakistan. Pakistani Armed Forces (PAF) spokespersons have claimed the attacks resulted in at least 26 dead and 46 injured, but shot down two Indian fighter aircraft using Chinese-made J-10s. In response, the PAF launched artillery strikes along the Line of Control (LoC) overnight into four Jammu and Kashmir districts.

On 8 May, Pakistan claimed to have shot down 25 Indian drones across multiple locations, including Lahore, Attock, Gujranwala, Chakwal, Rawalpindi, Bahawalpur, Miano, Chhor, and near Karachi. The Indian military claimed to have targeted air defence systems in response to ‘unprovoked’ artillery fire near the LoC. The drone strikes allegedly neutralised the air defence systems in Lahore.

Pakistani retaliation came late on 8 May, whereby the PAF launched one-way attack drones into Jammu, Pathankot, and Udhampur, 50 of which were reportedly shot down by the Indian Army. The drones targeted military installations. A complete blackout was imposed on Jammu. In response, India launched drones into Pakistan, with the PAF claiming to have shot down 48.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The airstrikes, codenamed Operation Sindoor, were carried out as part of India’s broader strategy to dismantle terrorist infrastructure in neighbouring Pakistan, following the 22 April attack in Pahalgam.

India’s Defence Ministry has declared that it targeted nine different sites considered “terrorist infrastructure” in a “focused, measured, and non-escalatory” manner, with sites allegedly linked to proscribed militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. No Pakistani military sites were reportedly targeted. Indian officials issued a list of alleged militant camps targeted across Pakistan in the aftermath.

In retaliation, Pakistani forces conducted cross-border shelling in Kashmir, reportedly killing and injuring several civilians, and have claimed to have downed five Indian military aircraft.

Despite the de-escalatory language, tit-for-tat drone strikes have further escalated the conflict, which has gone further than previous escalations between the two sides, seeing Indian airstrikes deeper into Pakistan and Pakistan targeting more populated areas than in previous cases of escalation.

Given that both nations are nuclear-armed, a full-scale conventional conflict would risk rapid escalation and nuclear war. This acts as a deterrence from significant escalation for both sides, but there is a realistic possibility for miscalculation amid growing tensions.

The US has, so far, failed to apply substantial diplomatic pressure, which was largely responsible for de-escalating previous escalations. On 8 May, Vice President JD Vance stated that the US would try to encourage the two sides to ‘de-escalate a little bit, but we’re not going to get involved in the middle of war that’s fundamentally none of our business and has nothing to do with America’s ability to control it.’ In the absence of significant US pressure, other regional actors, including China, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have taken a mediating stance.

It is highly likely that the populations of both countries will continue to apply pressure to their respective governments to continue to respond to what both sides perceive as acts of aggression. On 8 May, crowds in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, reportedly cried ‘there will be war’, which will ‘continue until Kashmir is freed.’ Many Indian Hindus, on the other hand, want punitive measures against Pakistan’s perceived terrorist financing, which has contributed to numerous terror attacks in India, most notably the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed 175 and injured over 300.

Despite these calls, neither population likely wants a full-scale conflict. Since both sides perceive the other as initiating the current tensions, each is highly likely wants the final say, something that means tit-for-tat attacks will likely continue without significant diplomatic pressure. However, these attacks will highly likely be contained to military targets, largely in Jammu and Kashmir.

On 2 May, two coordinated attacks on Buddhist civilians were conducted in Thailand’s Narathiwat Province in the restive Deep South. In Tak Bai District on the Malaysian border, six gunmen on motorcycles opened fire on a house, killing three Thai Buddhist civilians, including a nine-year-old girl. In Chanae District, militants opened fire on an elderly blind woman and her son who were riding a motorcycle, resulting in the death of the woman.

The attacks follow an attack on Buddhist monks in nearby Songkhla Province in late April, which led to the death of a novice monk. The Thai authorities have stated that the attacks were carried out by Islamist separatist groups and are retaliation for increased security operations in the area.

The Fourth Army Region commander, Lieutenant General Paisan Nusang, condemned the attacks as “inhumane and barbaric” and has ordered an extensive manhunt, security reinforcements, and additional protection for vulnerable civilian groups.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recent attacks follow a wave of attacks on local police, army and ranger forces across Thailand’s Deep South. However, deliberate attacks on civilians are relatively rare and likely signal a significant change in strategy by militant groups like the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the most active and influential group in southern Thailand. The objective of the militant groups is likely to exert pressure on the government to reduce its operations in the area.

On 6 May, Thailand’s Defence Minister, Phumtham Wechayachai, condemned the recent violence but also stressed the government’s willingness to enter peace talks. However, a series of attacks that have killed a Buddhist monk, a child and an elderly blind woman have provoked widespread outrage in Thailand.

Furthermore, the Thai government has emphasised that it will not enter negotiations with any group continuing to engage in violence and stated that it is willing to increase its “proactive operations” to counter the resurgent insurgency.

There are also reports of infighting within the BRN, with senior factions championing peace and newer ones aiming to pursue more aggressive tactics. If this is the case, then any progress made through dialogue is unlikely to be observed by the more militant faction.  

The Thai government’s immediate response to the attacks will likely be an intensification of its current counterinsurgency strategy. There are currently almost 150 companies deployed to the Deep South, and further reinforcements could follow. The government will likely expand its surveillance of insurgents, which it characterises as “Black Faces” (active operatives) and “Grey Faces” (indirect operatives). However, it has also stated that it will begin to identify “White Faces”, individuals with no criminal records but assessed to enable militant groups through funding or recruitment.

Community-level security is also set to increase, with Interior Ministry volunteers manning village checkpoints, likely to compensate for gaps in coverage. The government is also likely to expand its operations targeting insurgent leadership structures, aimed at disrupting militant command and control.

While these measures are likely to be endorsed by the broader Thai public and could achieve a short-term reduction in militant operations, the expanded surveillance and operations affecting the local populace will likely risk further provoking retaliatory attacks. There is a realistic possibility that militant groups, especially the newer, more aggressive factions, will respond with an increase in attacks that deliberately target the Buddhist civilian community to pressure the central government, undermine the public’s confidence in the government’s strategy, and to demonstrate their operational resilience.

If the government sustains its pressure on the insurgents, there is the potential for militant attacks to migrate outside of the Deep South, as evidenced by the 2016 bombings, which occurred in the resort town of Hua Hin.

Labor wins Australian elections, holds control of government

The 3 May vote increased the ruling party’s number of house seats, while the opposition Liberal-National Coalition suffered a nationwide setback, with Coalition leader Peter Dutton losing his parliament seat. The election will highly likely strengthen the position of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who entered the elections at a record-low level of support and will now face important domestic and international challenges, including the ongoing cost of living crisis and the changing strategic landscape of the Pacific. Some observers have claimed that Dutton’s defeat mirrors that of the centre-right in Canada: having run “Trump-like” campaigns, both parties subsequently suffered from the White House’s confrontational foreign policy towards its historic allies.

Car-ramming attack in Osaka, Japan, injures several schoolchildren

On 2 May, a man drove a vehicle into a crowd of children and parents outside an elementary school in the Osaka area. At least seven children were injured. According to Japanese authorities, the suspect carried out “an indiscriminate attack with a strong intention to kill” and, after his arrest, stated that his motive was that he “was fed up with everything”. The case is almost identical to a car-ramming attack against schoolchildren in China, which occurred approximately a week prior. The choice of target and the attacker’s statement make the attack a highly likely instance of a “revenge against society” action, incidents which, in addition to Japan, are also frequent in China and South Korea.

Laotian troops killed after attack on Thai-Laos border

Multiple Laotian troops have been killed on the Thai-Laos border after their border posts were attacked on 3 May. Reports indicate that the fighting is ongoing and is contained to the Bokeo Province in northwestern Laos, which borders both Thailand and Myanmar.

The fighting is highly likely linked to a recent Laotian counter-narcotics operation, which resulted in the seizure of over 20 million methamphetamine pills. Current assessments are that the attacks are being perpetrated by local drug syndicates, potentially involving ethnic militias, with ties to Myanmar’s Wa minority, who control drug production and trafficking in the Golden Triangle area.

The syndicates have a high degree of freedom of movement in all three countries, and there is a realistic possibility of the fighting migrating to other parts of the region. The fighting has reportedly forced the closure of Thailand’s Phu Chi Fa Forest Park in Chiang Rai province after a stray bullet hit a local home.

Philippines deploys military assets to shadow Chinese research vessel in the South China Sea

The Philippines has deployed a coast guard vessel and military aircraft to intercept and escort the Chinese research vessel Tan Suo 3 (IMO: 1024637), which it accuses of conducting illegal marine scientific research within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), approximately 90 nautical miles west of Ilocos in the contested South China Sea.

The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) reported that the vessel’s movements were inconsistent with standard freedom of navigation practices and indicative of unauthorised research activity. The PCG also identified the vessel deploying a deep submersible vessel (DSV) and potentially an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV).

There is a realistic possibility that the vessel is a dual-purpose vessel tasked with conducting civilian-military research in support of future People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) activity. The use of deployable underwater assets is often used to obtain a better understanding of the underwater battlespace in aid of future naval activity, especially submarine operations.

Thailand records its first anthrax death in decades

Thailand has reported its first anthrax death since 1994, after a 53-year-old man in Mukdahan province contracted the disease during the slaughter of a cow at a religious ceremony. The authorities have also identified a second case, three more are under investigation, and 638 people have been identified as potentially exposed.

Anthrax, a bacterial infection primarily affecting livestock, can spread to humans through skin contact, ingestion, or inhalation, with varying severity. The Thai authorities are reportedly actively monitoring exposed individuals and have issued nationwide health alerts for both anthrax and Streptococcus suis, a bacterial infection locally known as “deafness fever”, largely associated with eating or handling raw pork.

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