INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

This almost certainly constitutes the most significant threat to President Rajoelina’s rule since the disputed 2023 re-election, with the military unit that installed him in 2009 now attempting to oust him. While it is currently unclear to what extent CAPSAT has seized control of the government, the lack of statements from Rajoelina likely confirms reports that he has fled the country.

A previous coup took place in Madagascar in 2009 following a political crisis driven by tensions between President Marc Ravalomanana and opposition forces led by Rajoelina, then mayor of Antananarivo. Following months of protests and clashes, soldiers stormed and seized the Ambohitsorohitra Presidential Palace in March, forcing Ravalomanana to transfer power to a military council, after which the military junta formally handed over power to Rajoelina.

Following the coup, many of Ravalomanana’s supporters refused to accept the legitimacy of Rajoelina’s new government and staged demonstrations in the capital, to which security forces cracked down, resulting in at least 30 to 40 deaths, according to some estimates, in the immediate weeks after the coup. Prominent supporters of Ravalomanana were detained or forced into hiding, and journalists and media critics of the new leadership were censored or attacked. The situation was finally resolved after nine months, with a power-sharing agreement put in place in November 2009.

Another coup was attempted in November 2010 following factional divisions within the military; fighting broke out in Antananarivo, leaving several people dead before loyalist forces regained control.

Significant economic disruptions took place. Rajoelina announced a freeze of all mining contracts with foreign companies due to their alleged failure to pay the required fees and royalties. Major partners such as the World Bank, IMF, EU, and US, suspended aid or downgraded relations, causing foreign aid to drop by over 60 per cent between 2008 and 2010. The tourist sector, a major component of Madagascar’s economy, was severely hit. Hotels, tour operators, and related businesses experienced declines in revenue, triggering extensive layoffs from the hospitality industry and informal sectors that depended on tourism, deepening economic hardship and exacerbating poverty rates nationwide.

Following the ongoing coup, continued instability and protests are highly likely. Rajoelina has seen sporadic counterdemonstrations among supporters in Antananarivo, and these will likely be motivated to engage in pro-Rajoelina rallies in the capital. The military, which is currently attempting to restore order in the country, will highly likely respond to demonstrations with forceful crackdowns, which could trigger further unrest.

The broader protest movement, however, had Rajoelina’s resignation as one of its primary demands. There is a realistic possibility that the widespread Gen Z-led demonstrations will subside following the coup. CAPSAT’s apparent siding with protesters was almost certainly a calculated move to bring an end to the ongoing unrest. Furthermore, access to protest organiser Gen Z Madagascar’s Facebook page is currently restricted, something that could prevent widespread demonstrations from being organised.

However, the 2009 coup exacerbated economic difficulties, a spark for the current wave of unrest, and a further worsening of living conditions will likely increase the risk of unrest.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The anniversary of the 7 October attack will likely result in an increased risk of civil unrest and terrorism, particularly in Western Europe. This will highly likely be particularly severe in the countries that have had recent large-scale ‘Global Sumud Flotilla’ protests, particularly Italy, France, Spain, Germany and the UK, as protest organisers seek to maximise pressure on their governments and capitalise on the large attendance during the previous demonstrations.

Civil unrest is highly likely to consist of both large-scale demonstrations and small-scale targeted direct actions meant to affect local transport and services. The former are highly likely to target high-visibility areas like the vicinity of Israeli diplomatic offices, local government buildings, and the headquarters of companies perceived to be supporting the Israeli war effort.

A common tactic seen in previous protests is the blockade of main roadways, such as the ring roads that surround most large European cities. In terms of direct action, protesters may seek to carry out targeted acts of vandalism against private and public assets, and particularly company offices, or blockades of public transport hubs, such as train and metro stations and airports. While lower, the threat of more sophisticated acts aimed at causing disruptions, such as the targeting of electrical infrastructure or the use of drones to disrupt airport operations, cannot be ruled out.

The increased likelihood of terrorism on 7 October is driven by the date’s symbolic importance. In addition to the thwarted plot in Germany in early October 2025, there have been several foiled or successful terrorist attacks in Europe and North America, which have coincided with notable dates associated with Judaism or Israeli history. This most recently occurred with the 2 October Manchester synagogue stabbing attack on Yom Kippur, which killed two people and was perpetrated by a highly likely self-radicalised “lone wolf” inspired by extremist Islamist ideology.

While 7 October 2025 remains the most high-risk date for both civil unrest and terrorism, the threat is likely to remain elevated in the short term following the attack anniversary. Protests are highly likely to occur on the 10-13 October period, the first weekend following the anniversary and the second anniversary of the beginning of the Israeli invasion of Gaza. Moreover, ongoing significant developments in negotiations between Hamas and Israel are highly likely to serve as triggers for demonstrations.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The protests, Morocco’s largest in years, come amid widespread youth frustrations with unemployment, education, and healthcare. According to the national statistics agency, Morocco has an unemployment rate of 12.8 per cent, with youth unemployment standing at 35.8 per cent, and 19 per cent among graduates. The protests have targeted the government, which is perceived as neglecting public services while investing billions of dollars into football infrastructure ahead of hosting the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations and co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

The catalyst for the public anger was the deaths of eight pregnant women in the maternity ward of a public hospital in Agadir following caesarean operations in September, which had initially sparked smaller-scale protests. According to the World Health Organisation, Morocco has fewer than eight doctors per 10,000 people, far below the recommended 25.

The government’s appeal for dialogue is unlikely to appease protesters in the short term. The civil unrest likely constitutes a culmination of public anger after years of neglect in public services, a state of affairs unlikely to be quickly remedied. The government statement defended the security forces’ crackdown, praising the “balanced reaction of security authorities in line with relevant legal procedures”. This will highly likely further inflame the unrest, with the van ramming being widely shared across social media. The further deaths of protesters on 1 October will almost certainly add to protester anger, likely sustaining the civil unrest.

The Gen Z 212 movement, which emerged in the weeks prior, has rapidly gained traction across social media. The “212” almost certainly refers to Morocco’s country code, suggesting that organisers view themselves as part of a broader youth-driven movement. The demonstrations share key traits with other Gen Z-led protests in the region: mobilisation through online platforms, an explicitly leaderless structure, and a lack of formal ties to political parties.

These protests are highly likely inspired by similar youth movements, including the recent Nepalese unrest that overthrew the government, as well as ongoing mobilisation across Africa, notably in Kenya and, most recently, Madagascar. It is highly likely that the global surge in youth protests will lead to further civil unrest across many other African countries, where economic frustrations, such as unemployment and a rising cost of living, are similarly felt among the population, particularly Gen Z.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Madagascar is one of the world’s poorest countries. According to a 2022 report from the World Bank, 75.2 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. Poverty rates have remained high over the past decade, with rural poverty decreasing marginally while urban poverty has almost doubled. Many households suffer from overlapping deprivations in health, education, sanitation, and infrastructure.

​The poor economic situation is exacerbated by Madagascar’s high vulnerability to environmental risks, including cyclones and droughts. Damage from four tropical storms in 2022 was estimated to have cost as much as 5 per cent of Madagascar’s GDP.

The protests have been in line with other Gen Z-led protest movements in Africa. The movement gained momentum on social media, which was used to mobilise protests, coordinate meeting points, and share live updates.

Smaller demonstrations were also observed in provincial towns like Toamasina, Antsirabe, Toliara, and Antsiranana, likely reflecting wider discontent with the incumbent government.

The lack of political figures among the protesters highlights the grassroots nature of the movement. The use of Straw Hat Jolly Roger, which was widely used in the recent Nepalese protests which deposed the government, suggests a broader Gen Z-focused sentiment and the potential desire of a far more radical intent to likewise overthrow the government.

There is a realistic possibility that the government’s strict measures to curtail the protests will succeed. While protesters defied the protest ban on 25 September, the demonstrators were largely made up of relatively small groups. The authorities will likely impose internet and social media restrictions to stop protesters from being able to mobilise. This will also likely limit the circulation of footage of excessive force, which has the capacity to further fuel anti-government sentiment.

The government’s reaction to demonstrations, particularly security forces’ use of force, is highly likely to be perceived as excessive. If footage spreads across social media of security forces using live ammunition against protesters, this could significantly inflame demonstrations, despite a lack of leadership. The rhetoric of protest organisers indicates broader anti-government sentiment, which could escalate unrest motivated by more radical objectives.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The two planned events will likely exacerbate security threats and result in disruption during the day. The marches are scheduled to begin on opposite sides of the Thames and converge in Whitehall. While the Metropolitan Police will likely be able to secure the two marches’ route and prevent the two sides from coming into contact in Whitehall, there is a realistic possibility of occasional clashes between dispersed groups of protesters throughout the day, and particularly near public transport hubs that both marches’ attendees will likely have to use to reach the assembly points.

Note that several major football games will be held in London on 13 September. This will likely further stretch the resources of the Metropolitan Police and is likely to further exacerbate the threat of dispersed violence and clashes during the day, with public transport hubs again being particularly at risk.

The threat of clashes is likely to be highest before 11:00 local time and in the late afternoon, after the end of the rallies and the football games.

Finally, there is a remote possibility of more serious political violence occurring in connection with the event. While not directly linked with it, the march is scheduled to take place only days after the assassination of a prominent American right-wing political commentator. The killing has resulted in a surge in calls for political violence on English-speaking social media, targeting prominent right-wing and left-wing figures, as well as activists.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The protests follow a period of worsening relations between Israel and the United Kingdom, linked with the ongoing war in Gaza. Recent developments in both Gaza and the United Kingdom are likely to exacerbate the protests. First, on 6 September, UK police carried out around 900 arrests at a pro-Palestine demonstration in central London, with the majority of the arrested being accused of supporting a proscribed terror group, Palestine Action. Second, on 9 September, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) issued evacuation orders for the entirety of Gaza City, in preparation for a large-scale offensive meant to occupy the city. Third, Israel launched a series of high-profile airstrikes in Doha on 9 September targeting Hamas’ exiled leadership, a move that has been widely condemned by the international community.

The Metropolitan Police will likely be able to secure the areas of Whitehall and St James’s Square during the scheduled meeting, and the protests are likely to remain peaceful. However, the unrest is highly likely to result in transport disruptions in the nearby areas, particularly affecting the nearby public transport system. Cases of sporadic violence and vandalism, particularly targeting large multinational companies linked to Israel, cannot be discounted. Direct action-style protests, including road and public transport blockades, remain likely during the 10-11 September period.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The attack is unprecedented and almost certainly a significant escalation with ramifications across the Arabian Peninsula. The most immediate ramifications are highly likely to be a dramatic breakdown in ceasefire negotiations, condemnation from the Gulf States, and increased civil unrest in urban centres globally.

Since 2012, Qatar has hosted the Hamas political leadership in exile. It has been this external leadership that has engaged in ceasefire negotiations with Israel, facilitated by international mediators, which have included Qatar. It is almost certain that the attack marks an end to this arrangement. The impact of this is twofold: first, the previously ongoing ceasefire negotiations are likely to completely collapse, given that the Hamas negotiating team has reportedly been largely killed. Second, power within Hamas will likely further concentrate within on-the-ground militants in the Gaza Strip, who have been more hardline and less amenable to any potential diplomacy.

Qatar is a major non-NATO ally of the US, hosting the Al-Udeid Air Base, which is currently the largest US military installation in the Middle East. According to a senior Israeli official talking to Israeli media, US President Donald Trump gave the green light for the Israeli strike in Qatar. Just days prior, on 7 September, Trump issued a “last warning” to Hamas to accept a deal to release all the hostages. If Washington’s approval of the strike is confirmed, the attack almost certainly follows the previous ultimatum, and it is likely that there will be major diplomatic ramifications among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While Qatar’s relations with other GCC states have previously experienced significant strain, it is almost certain that GCC states will strongly condemn the attack.

It is highly likely that civil unrest will result from the attack. Pro-Palestine protests will likely be organised outside Israeli and US embassies across the Middle East, and protests will also highly likely be organised in major European and US cities.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The general strike will almost certainly result in severe transport and service disruptions across France. Rail travel, particularly services transiting through Paris, is highly likely to be affected by severe delays. Travel to and from the country’s main airports, including Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG/LFPG), Paris Orly (ORY/LFPO), Lyon Saint Exupéry (LYS/LFLL), and Nice-Côte d’Azur (NCE/LFMN), is also likely to be affected.

Flight operations at the main international airports are almost certainly to be impacted by the strike. According to available projections from local media, flight cancellations on the two strike days will total between 25 and 40 per cent of all flights, with average delays of around 90 minutes. A drop in operations at the key international flight hubs will highly likely impact smaller airports, further disrupting domestic flights.

While the organisers have pledged to carry out the strike despite the collapse of the Bayrou government, the scope and intensity of the strike action will highly likely be heavily influenced by President Emmanuel Macron’s decision on how to respond to the government crisis. LFI has called for new elections, as have several other left parties and the far-right National Rally (RN). However, such a move would likely be damaging for the already-weakened centre coalition that supports Macron, who may therefore opt to instead appoint a new prime minister. Such a move would almost certainly result in violent anti-government unrest in the short term, particularly in Paris.

Violent cases of unrest are likely. These will likely include sabotage and vandalism, particularly aimed at government offices and properties operated by multinational companies. Direct action groups may also target public infrastructure, as observed on the eve of the 2024 Paris Olympics. French police often respond violently to large protests, deploying pepper spray, tear gas, water cannons, and other crowd control tools. It is highly likely that clashes between the police and protesters will occur during the strike days, particularly in Paris and other large urban centres.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The protests occur amid broader frustration with a lack of access to basic healthcare, food insecurity, and shortages of essential medications. The population’s economic insecurity has been exacerbated by frequent flash flooding in recent months. In July and August, heavy floods impacted Nepal, disrupting trade and damaging hydropower plants. Members of the government, in contrast, are perceived to be living in luxury. Nepal is ranked 107 out of 180 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, with frequent corruption scandals and legal retaliation against journalists.

The government’s decision to ban 26 major social media and online platforms has almost certainly been perceived as government overreach and an attempt to introduce censorship. Approximately half of Nepal’s population uses these platforms, and usage is disproportionate among Gen-Z. Communication apps like WhatsApp are also heavily relied on to communicate both within Nepal and to diaspora communities abroad. Unless repealed, these restrictions will almost certainly continue to fuel resentment towards the government.

VPN usage in Nepal has increased markedly since the 4 September ban on online platforms. This has enabled a partial circumvention of the ban. The government has warned against the indiscriminate use of VPNs and has hinted at restricting VPN usage. Should the government impose restrictions on VPN usage, it is highly likely that protest movements will intensify.

Restrictions on social media and online platforms will likely reduce the spread of disinformation and limit the ability of protest groups to coordinate online. However, the move will also likely obfuscate the true scale, size, and nature of the protests, restricting independent reporting and situational awareness for anyone in-country. Potential information gaps will likely increase reliance on state narratives, with limited opportunities for independent verification.

The use of rubber bullets against journalists will almost certainly portray security forces as using excessive force to quell dissent. The death of a protester will highly likely further exacerbate protests. The endorsement of the protests by prominent people, including key political figures, is likely to provide the protest with a degree of legitimacy and could provide the movement with some form of leadership, dynamics that could sustain the momentum of current protests.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Afghanistan is prone to large earthquakes, particularly in the Hindu Kush mountain range, where the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates meet. Aftershocks are highly likely in the next days to weeks. While most will likely be small-to-moderate (magnitude 3.0 to 4.0), further magnitude 5.0 or above earthquakes remain a realistic possibility and could result in significant damage.

Afghanistan is one of the least disaster-resilient countries in the world, and given the prevalence of unreinforced, non-earthquake-resilient buildings, even moderate aftershocks could trigger secondary collapses, complicate rescue operations, and result in further casualties.

Topography in the affected regions and adjoining Pakistani districts (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Lower Dir) makes landslides and rockfall a significant risk, particularly along river valleys and cut slopes. Slope failures could block roads, isolate impacted communities, and cause flooding if river channels are dammed.

Damage to water and sanitation networks will likely increase the likelihood of waterborne diseases, adding further strain on hospitals and clinics. Access constraints, including debris, landslides, damaged bridges, and the presence of non-state armed actors in parts of eastern Afghanistan, will almost certainly complicate the provision of humanitarian aid and disaster relief.

In Pakistan, while no significant damage has been recorded, localised infrastructure disruption in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, particularly temporary road closures and communications outages, is highly likely. An elevated landslide risk in hill districts following aftershocks or rainfall could further exacerbate the humanitarian situation following monsoon flooding. Furthermore, there will likely be congestion at the Torkham border crossing if humanitarian flows and medical referrals increase.

Access will likely be constrained in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, with debris-blocked roads, infrastructural damage, and continuing aftershocks and slope failures impeding ground movement on both sides of the border.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The current protests form part of a broader wave of anti-government sentiment in 2025, which has triggered sporadic civil unrest. Notably, student-led civil unrest targeting government austerity erupted on 17 February under the slogan #IndonesiaGelap (Dark Indonesia). Beginning on 25 August, the most recent demonstrations started following the publication of reports regarding a new monthly housing allowance for politicians, which is worth approximately 20 times Indonesia’s minimum wage. The publication has acted as a catalyst for broader anti-government sentiment centring on low wages, cuts to government funding, job cuts in the textile industry, government corruption, and the growing role of the military in civilian life, which have been sources of growing frustration among much of Indonesia’s population.

The perceived government failures are amid a background of economic uncertainty. Real wages have lagged behind inflation, contributing to shrinking real wages and a rising cost of living. This has been exacerbated by accelerating unemployment, with Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, which constituted 32 per cent of the country’s GDP in 2002, shrinking to just 19 per cent in 2024. In the first half of 2025, approximately 42,000 manufacturing workers were laid off. Furthermore, economic growth has slowed, dropping to 4.8 per cent in Q2 of 2025, the weakest pace in nearly four years and short of President Prabowo Subianto’s target of 8 per cent.

Social media has catalysed unrest, with footage of clashes spreading quickly and prompting further anti-government sentiment. The government has blamed online platforms for disinformation and has summoned representatives from several social media platforms, including Meta and TikTok. According to the deputy communications minister, the government will request that the platforms moderate their content. There is a realistic possibility that, should social media platforms refuse to impose strict content moderation measures, the government will impose social media blocks to prevent further anti-government sentiment from spreading. However, such measures would also likely significantly reduce situational awareness, limiting the ability to track the scale and location of protests in real-time.

Given the escalation in demonstrations, particularly since 28 August, it is highly likely that they will continue over the weekend. While there is a realistic possibility that this could subside in early September, the police’s continued use of force and any potential investigation into police brutality will likely trigger further unrest. There is a realistic possibility that the government will attempt to placate protesters by imposing policies centred on curbing corruption and austerity measures, although minor concessions are unlikely to quell current or prevent further demonstrations.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The earthquake is the joint sixth-largest recorded globally since 1900, and the strongest since Japanʼs 2011 magnitude 9.0 Tohoku earthquake. The Kamchatka Peninsula is situated along the seismically active Pacific Ring of Fire, a horseshoe-shaped tectonic belt which spans most of the coastal Pacific and is responsible for approximately 90 per cent of the worldʼs earthquakes.

The shallow depth of the earthquake is a key cause of the extensive tsunami threat. The effects of tsunamis will almost certainly depend on the disaster resilience of the countries affected. Hawaii and Japan, two locations anticipated to experience the greatest tsunami impact, both have comprehensive disaster preparedness measures which have highly likely mitigated the potential impact.

In Japan, the suspension of high-speed rail, mass evacuations, emergency broadcasting, and automated sea gates have all contributed towards a low risk to life as of the time of writing. In Hawaii, the rapid issuance of evacuation orders and pre-emptive measures to protect critical infrastructure, such as the shutting down of water supply valves, have likewise considerably reduced the risk to life. The effectiveness of the evacuation orders in Hawaii has been notable, particularly in contrast with the emergency communications system failures that exacerbated the impact of the 2023 Maui wildfires.

In multiple areas with issued tsunami warnings, the level of disruption is high, with significant air travel disruption, high levels of traffic congestion, and the sudden suspension of business activity.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

While the price increase was proposed on 1 July, which has triggered weekly protests, the taxi strike almost certainly acted as a catalyst for Angolan citizens to vent their broader frustrations against the government. The ruling party, People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), has been in power since 1975 and has been facing increasing opposition. Angola’s economy is heavily reliant on oil, which accounts for approximately 90 per cent of export revenues. Global price fluctuations in recent years have triggered high inflation, rising food and transport costs in a country where the average monthly wage is just USD 75.

Angola has a large youth population who are experiencing widespread unemployment and are driving the current wave of unrest. Approximately 65 per cent of Angola’s population is under the age of 24, and only 2 per cent of its population is aged over 65. Social media almost certainly constitutes a tool for organising demonstrations and could be blocked by the government in an attempt to quell the unrest.

Civil unrest will highly likely continue on 30 July, which will be the third and final day of the originally planned taxi driver strike. The forceful reaction from security forces almost certainly aims to deter further protests. However, this could have the adverse effect of further inflaming demonstrations, particularly if footage of violence perpetrated by security forces is widely shared on social media.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

After an armed confrontation in the disputed border region of Preah Vihear on 28 May, which resulted in the death of one Cambodian soldier, tensions have escalated between the two countries. In the following weeks, border crossing restrictions have been imposed, trade of produce, fuel, and media has been stopped, resulting in protests, economic disruption, and a political crisis in Thailand resulting in the suspension of Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra.

The dispute originates from a 1904 colonial-era agreement between France and Siam using the watershed principle to define the border, but a later French map placed the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia. The ICJ ultimately ruled in Cambodia’s favour. Tensions over the disputed region have occasionally escalated, most notably in 2008 following armed skirmishes between Cambodian and Thai troops.

In 2011, both sides engaged in a week-long exchange of artillery, mortars, and rocket fire, triggering at least 15 deaths and 85,000 displacements. The clashes prompted the diplomatic intervention of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and led to both sides agreeing to de-escalate with Indonesian observers monitoring the border. Following the clashes, Bangkok and Phnom Penh agreed to settle future disputes with a Joint Boundary Commission; a means which failed to resolve the current dispute on 15 June.

Given the instability in Thailand, there is an elevated risk of a coup, with the Thai military highly likely exploiting the border crisis with Cambodia to win public favour. Thailand has a history of coups, with 22 coup attempts, 13 of which were successful, since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The most recent two coups ousted Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra‘s family members, Thaksin in 2006 and her aunt Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014. The normalisation of coups in Thailand has likely created a ‘coup culture’, whereby often military-led takeovers are viewed by many as an acceptable way to solve a political crisis. The likelihood of coups typically increases during times of mass protest or armed conflict, with the military justifying a coup by claiming they are “restoring order”.

Thailand has a significant military advantage over Cambodia, outmatching Cambodia in airpower, firepower, and mobility. Cambodia has historically relied on symbolic and diplomatic efforts during disputes with Thailand. On 14 July, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet declared that mandatory military conscription would be implemented in 2026 in an attempt to bolster its military capabilities.

Continued clashes are highly likely as both sides conduct retaliatory strikes. The accusations of the deliberate targeting of civilian areas from Thailand significantly escalates the risk of miscalculation from both sides. While ASEAN has, so far, been diplomatically impotent regarding the escalations, given the lack of formal mechanisms for conflict dispute and consensus-based decision-making, diplomatic intervention to de-escalate between the two sides is likely.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Anti-government protests have escalated following the death of blogger Albert Ojwang in police custody on 9 June. Today is the most significant day of unrest since 25 June, the first anniversary of the storming of parliament. Protests will almost certainly escalate throughout the day and into the evening, with demonstrators highly likely to clash with security forces.

​Ahead of today’s protests, Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Interior and National Administration Onesimus Kipchumba Murkomen encouraged security forces to shoot on sight, something that will almost certainly exacerbate the civil unrest.

The 7 July Saba Saba (Seven Seven) Uprising in 1990 saw pro-democracy activists led by opposition figures rally against the rule of President Daniel arap Moi, who had been in power since 1978. The government banned the rally and violently cracked down on demonstrators, with security forces killing at least 20 people, arresting hundreds, and detaining opposition leaders without trial. In December 1991, Moi lifted the ban on opposition parties, enabling multiparty politics. ​

A notable distinction from the Saba Saba Uprising is that, while protests in the 1990s were led by opposition figures, the current demonstrations are a grassroots Gen Z movement led by students without defined leaders or ethnic affiliations.

​The protesters have demanded good governance, greater accountability, and justice for victims of police brutality. The broad demands and lack of clear leadership will highly likely make it more difficult for protesters to pressure President William Ruto, who has weathered previous waves of protests since his election in September 2022, to resign. This, alongside the continued heavy-handedness by security forces, means that protests will likely continue beyond today.

Security checkpoints and protests have blocked major roads across Kenya. Continued travel disruptions around major cities, including Nairobi and Mombasa, are highly likely.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The incident is the first Houthi attack against a merchant vessel since December 2024. Following the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the US and the Houthis on 6 May, some merchant vessel operators had resumed transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. However, the attack against MAGIC SEAS, almost certainly highlights the continuing threat to merchant vessels, and there is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will follow up the success of the attack with further attacks in the near future. 

The brief Gaza ceasefire between Israel and Hamas between January and March led to the Houthi movement announcing an end to attacks against merchant vessels that are not directly affiliated with Israel. However, the Houthis announced a resumption of the anti-merchant shipping campaign after the end of the ceasefire, with the US and Israel then regularly conducting air strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen. The Houthis, however, did not attack any merchant shipping during this period, despite sustained threats.

The US involvement in strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities in Operation Midnight Hammer in June led to a member of the Houthi politburo announcing an end to the ceasefire with the US, and it is likely that the attack against MAGIC SEAS is intended as strategic messaging of a renewal of the Houthi anti-merchant shipping campaign.

MAGIC SEAS was transiting between China and Turkey. However, the shipowner, Allseas Marine, has at least three other vessels that have previously made port calls in Israel. In a statement published after the attack, the Houthis claimed that the vessel “meets the Yemeni criteria for targeting ships”.  It is unclear at the time of the writing whether this is due to the vessel owners having conducted business in Israel – given the ambiguity of Houthi statements and the previously indiscriminate nature of Houthi attacks, all merchant vessels transiting near Yemen should consider themselves a potential target. 

The Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) employed during the attack stand out for both the scale and diversity of attack methods. While the Houthis have previously used skiffs during attacks, the number used during this attack is particularly large. It is highly likely that the ISR capabilities of the Houthis have been significantly degraded following the withdrawal of Iranian assets from the region and US-Israeli strikes. The Houthis likely used the large group of skiffs to enable the targeting of the vessel with other weapon systems such as USVs and missiles. It is almost certain, given the attack methods, that the Houthis intended to sink the vessel.