INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The dispute originates from a 1904 colonial-era agreement between France and Siam using the watershed principle to define the border, but a later French map placed the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia. The ICJ ultimately ruled in Cambodia’s favour. Tensions over the disputed region have occasionally escalated, most notably in 2008 and 2011 following armed skirmishes between Cambodian and Thai troops.

Tensions again reignited on 24 July 2025, with violence erupting along multiple border sectors. The two sides exchanged artillery, rocket fire, heavy weaponry, and airstrikes. Overall, the conflict displaced over 300,000 civilians across Thailand and Cambodia. Many villages, schools, and civilian buildings were damaged. On 28 July, both sides agreed to a ceasefire following Malaysia-mediated peace talks with added pressure from the US and China.

The US-brokered Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord was signed by both sides in October. Under the agreement, both sides committed to refrain from the threat or use of force, and to settle disputes peacefully under international law, withdraw heavy weapons from border zones, establish a monitoring mechanism, and demine and clear unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Further clashes are highly likely over the coming days. While the conflict has largely been confined to the border areas, the accusations of civilian targeting on each side, as well as accusations of the use of “toxic gas”, almost certainly heighten the risk of towns and cities further from the border being targeted. Furthermore, accusations of civilian targeting may result in tit-for-tat measures, such as the deliberate targeting of hospitals.

US President Donald Trump has declared that he will “make a phone call” to stop the clashes. It is highly likely that he will threaten further tariffs, which would almost certainly impact the economies of both countries and could act as a diplomatic off-ramp to engage in negotiations. There is a realistic possibility that protests will take place in Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Martial law may be imposed if tensions continue to escalate.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The elections are likely to cause protests in Honduras in the short term. This is due to the extreme polarisation of the Honduran political system. In the lead-up to the vote, several main parties have levied accusations of fraud and warned of foreign interference. The Attorney General has alleged that the opposition will attempt to manipulate the results, releasing, in late October, an audio recording that seems to suggest an agreement between National Party officials and senior military figures to claim victory before the official vote count is complete. Military leaders have also demanded to run a “parallel” vote count, which has almost certainly increased fears of institutional interference.

Previous elections have also resulted in widespread protests. In 2017, the vote led to almost a month of violent street clashes, curfews, mass arrests and almost 40 deaths after the opposition claimed there was widespread election fraud. In 2009, following the military ousting of President Manuel Zelaya, large-scale mobilisations paralysed parts of Tegucigalpa and other cities for weeks.​

Protests are likely to begin shortly after the vote count is completed and the results are announced. However, if any of the participating parties claim an “early” victory, this would highly likely increase the risk of large-scale unrest in the immediate term. Protests following the elections are likely to take place near government buildings and party offices. Large-scale unrest often coincides with road blockades on key highways, leading to severe traffic disruptions.

Honduras currently implements a “state of emergency”. It was issued in 2022 and is based on the “Mano Dura” anti-crime approach adopted by El Salvador. The state of emergency grants police significant powers to stop, search, and detain civilians. While aimed at combating organised crime, the state of emergency almost certainly increases the threat of a violent police response to all forms of unrest.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Guinea-Bissau has grappled with chronic instability since achieving independence from Portugal in 1973, marked by repeated coups and ongoing political power struggles. The country has experienced at least 10 successful or attempted coups, making it one of the most coup-prone countries in Africa.

Political instability has increased following the postponement of the elections, with the opposition regarding Embaló as an illegitimate president, claiming that his mandate expired on 27 February 2025. The two main opposition parties had been largely excluded from the elections, including the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which led Guinea-Bissau’s fight for independence.

The arrest of Embaló is highly likely indicative of a falling out between the presidency and the military, which is likely due to Embaló’s attempts to centralise authority and reshape the country’s security services while marginalising his political opponents. This apparent coup attempt marks the second in recent months, coming not long after another alleged coup attempt took place on 31 October, resulting in the arrests of several senior army officers. It is highly likely that the military, which holds considerable political power in Guinea-Bissau, used Dias’ claim to victory as a pretext to conduct the arrest.

Former Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira has accused Embaló of simulating a coup so he could initiate a crackdown on the opposition. Dias’ claim of victory in the presidential election has highly likely provided Embaló with a pretext to portray him as attempting to forcefully take power. If simulated, Embaló will highly likely exploit the situation to arrest Dias and other opposition members.

Continued political instability is highly likely in the coming weeks. In the immediate days, the military will highly likely occupy key sites, including government buildings, media outlets, airports and border crossings, and critical infrastructure. It is highly likely that they will close the country’s borders and airspace, impose a curfew, and/or impose internet blocks while they attempt to re-establish order. Increased military checkpoints are highly likely on major routes and in the vicinity of government buildings and airports.

There will almost certainly be a heavy security presence in Bissau and other major cities in Guinea-Bissau over the coming days. The arrest of the Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces indicates that military factionalism is highly likely. Security forces will likely conduct further arrests of high-ranking individuals in the government and opposing factions within the military. There is a realistic possibility that military factions opposed to the army chief of staff will engage in armed resistance. A failed coup attempt in 1998, led by a dissident general, triggered a year-long civil war.

The apparent coup will almost certainly be perceived as exacerbating Guinea-Bissau’s political instability, and there is a realistic possibility that civil unrest breaks out in the coming weeks. After an alleged coup attempt in 2023 and the subsequent dissolution of parliament by Embaló, small-scale protests took place near the parliament building, with several people burning tyres. Guinea-Bissau’s security forces typically respond forcefully to protests, and the expected heavy security presence across the capital in the coming days will likely dissuade many from demonstrating. However, given the high tensions in the country following the dual victory claims, there is a realistic possibility that many will engage in rival protests.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Violent civil unrest has increased significantly across Bangladesh in the aftermath of the July Revolution. Cases of large-scale mob violence, often led by local student political groups, have repeatedly coincided with important anniversaries of domestic and international events. Violence between opposing political parties, or even opposing factions within parties, is the most frequently reported. However, post-revolution violence has also disproportionately targeted local religious and ethnic minorities.

The ongoing unrest is highly likely to continue until the verdict is announced on 17 November and will highly likely continue in the immediate aftermath. The unrest will highly likely take the form of clashes between AL and other parties’ supporters – particularly those of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) – and between AL supporters and police. Opportunistic attacks on minority places of worship and other institutions remain likely during the unrest, as demonstrated by the recent firebombings on Catholic sites.

Focal points for protests will likely include universities, main public squares in large cities, and the vicinity of party headquarters. Protests in Bangladesh often coincide with road blockades, with protesters erecting improvised barricades and often attacking transiting vehicles. There is a realistic possibility of unrest near airports, which could cause flight delays or cancellations.

Bangladeshi police will likely respond to all unrest with violent crowd control methods. These include tear gas, baton charges, water cannons, and, in some cases, live ammunition. There is a realistic possibility that police actions will escalate unrest.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The attack comes a day after a vehicle explosion killed at least eight people near the Red Fort landmark in Delhi, India, although there is so far no evidence linking the two events.

Suicide bombings in Islamabad have been less common in recent years relative to other Pakistani urban centres. The city is Pakistan’s most securitised urban space, containing security checkpoints and fortified zones to prevent such attacks.

There is no official confirmation of the perpetrator’s affiliation. Pakistani media has accused “Fitna al-Khawarij”, a term often applied to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which primarily operates in regions next to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The group has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Pakistan’s major cities, including a 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, a 2017 suicide bombing in Lahore, and a 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Karachi. The group has previously targeted Islamabad, attempting a suicide bombing in Islamabad’s government district in December 2022. In August 2025, Pakistan’s intelligence agency announced that it foiled a planned TTP suicide car bombing. Early assessment suggests that the TTP are the most likely perpetrators of the Islamabad District Judicial Court bombing, although there are multiple other terrorist threat actors present in Pakistan.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has also claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the country. PBIEDs are often used by the group; however, most of ISKP’s attacks have taken place in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the group has not previously targeted Islamabad. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is also active in Balochistan, with typical targets including Pakistani security forces, infrastructure projects, and government installations in the Balochistan region.

The attack comes amid heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamabad has frequently accused the Afghan Taliban-led government of allowing TTP militants safe havens across the border, from which attacks are launched into Pakistan. Recent tensions escalated into airstrikes conducted by Pakistan on TTP targets in Kabul on 15 October, following TTP raids on Pakistani military posts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that killed 11 on 11 October.

If confirmed to be TTP, already high tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan will highly likely further increase. There is a realistic possibility that Pakistan will conduct further cross-border strikes into Afghanistan targeting TTP hideouts. Additionally, Islamabad may suspend ongoing diplomatic engagement, fully close partially open border crossings, and/or impose further travel restrictions on Afghan nationals.

Islamabad has also frequently blamed New Delhi for supporting the TTP as a proxy to destabilise Pakistan, and Pakistani media have accused the perpetrators of the attack of being “India-backed”. There is a realistic possibility that protests will occur close to the High Commission of India in Islamabad, although demonstrations are generally restricted inside the diplomatic zone and are likely to be met with a heavy security presence.

A heightened security presence across major cities in Pakistan is highly likely, with increased security checkpoints and road closures. Heightened security will highly likely lead to increased travel disruptions in the short term. Intensified security operations in the border regions, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and/or Balochistan, are highly likely.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Red Fort, also known as the Lal Qila, is a Mughal-era fort located in the old city and is a popular tourist destination with heavy foot traffic. The location of the blast in the area and near a traffic hub likely suggests that, if the explosion is terrorism-related, its perpetrators sought to maximise civilian casualties while also obtaining maximum visibility for their actions.

While a possible terrorist link has not been confirmed by authorities as of the time of reporting, the incident occurred only hours after two separate terror plots were reportedly thwarted by Indian authorities. On the night of 9-10 November, Indian police reported the arrest of seven individuals in Faridabad, part of the Delhi National Capital Region, who were reportedly found in possession of approximately 360 kilograms of explosive material and a “large cache of arms and ammunition”. Authorities reported that the suspects were linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a separatist-Islamist group based in Kashmir.

On 9 November, three individuals were arrested in Gujarat and found in possession of several firearms and approximately 4 kilograms of ricin precursors. Indian authorities have suggested that they had had links with an Afghanistan-based operative of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). In late October, Indian authorities had already arrested two suspected ISKP-linked operatives for planning attacks in New Delhi on Diwali.

If the Red Fort blast is confirmed as terrorism, there is a realistic possibility that the attack is linked to the reported foiled plots, with the perpetrators seeking to quickly conduct an attack due to the increased threat of discovery. Moreover, confirmation of an act of terrorism, particularly if linked to JeM, would highly likely increase tensions between India and Pakistan.

Transport disruptions are highly likely following the blast, with potential closures to the metro and likely road closures in the area. Furthermore, there is highly likely to be a heightened security presence in Delhi and other major cities, with increased checkpoints.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

While the organisers of the march to Novi Sad have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to peaceful protest, the possibility of political violence on 31 October and 1 November cannot be ruled out. The past twelve months of anti-government protests have significantly deepened divisions in Serbia’s political landscape, and there have been repeated cases of targeted attacks against anti-government protesters during past demonstrations. Moreover, the anniversary falls only days after a shooting occurred outside the Serbian parliament, in an area where supporters of the president had erected an improvised “encampment”. The shooting injured one, and Vučić described it as a “terrorist attack”.

Should the protests turn violent, Serbian police are likely to use heavy-handed crowd control measures such as pepper spray, tear gas, stun grenades and water cannons. These tactics have previously intensified unrest, with their use during past demonstrations often provoking larger turnouts, escalating clashes, and fuelling public anger over perceived police brutality.

While the main rallying point for the demonstrators will be the vicinity of the Novi Sad train station, the protests are likely to create disruptions throughout the city’s centre. In past demonstrations, protesters blocked the city’s main bridges over the Danube, as well as the main roadways leading to and from the city. Even in the absence of violent unrest, the protests are likely to result in traffic disruptions in and around Novi Sad.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Despite President Jerí announcing that the death of the protester would be “objectively investigated” and that they would face the “full force of the law”, the killing of Ruiz has almost certainly deepened anti-government sentiment and inflamed protests. This has been further exacerbated by President Jerí’s refusal to step down amid escalating pressure from Peru’s parliament.

The state of emergency will likely be imposed to quell civil unrest over the weekend. Previous bouts of civil unrest in the country, such as the December 2022 to March 2023 demonstrations against the removal of Former President Pedro Castillo from office, have led to the government imposing similar states of emergency.

Under the expanded powers, the government will highly likely deploy military forces, impose curfews, and conduct mass arrests. The state of emergency imposed in 2022 failed to deal with the civil unrest, instead resulting in alleged human rights abuses, such as the use of live ammunition against protesters and forced disappearances; protests continued for months, inflamed by the perceived excessive force used by security forces.

It is likely that a state of emergency resulting in harsher measures by security forces will exacerbate protests. Demonstrations are highly likely over the weekend and into next week.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

This almost certainly constitutes the most significant threat to President Rajoelina’s rule since the disputed 2023 re-election, with the military unit that installed him in 2009 now attempting to oust him. While it is currently unclear to what extent CAPSAT has seized control of the government, the lack of statements from Rajoelina likely confirms reports that he has fled the country.

A previous coup took place in Madagascar in 2009 following a political crisis driven by tensions between President Marc Ravalomanana and opposition forces led by Rajoelina, then mayor of Antananarivo. Following months of protests and clashes, soldiers stormed and seized the Ambohitsorohitra Presidential Palace in March, forcing Ravalomanana to transfer power to a military council, after which the military junta formally handed over power to Rajoelina.

Following the coup, many of Ravalomanana’s supporters refused to accept the legitimacy of Rajoelina’s new government and staged demonstrations in the capital, to which security forces cracked down, resulting in at least 30 to 40 deaths, according to some estimates, in the immediate weeks after the coup. Prominent supporters of Ravalomanana were detained or forced into hiding, and journalists and media critics of the new leadership were censored or attacked. The situation was finally resolved after nine months, with a power-sharing agreement put in place in November 2009.

Another coup was attempted in November 2010 following factional divisions within the military; fighting broke out in Antananarivo, leaving several people dead before loyalist forces regained control.

Significant economic disruptions took place. Rajoelina announced a freeze of all mining contracts with foreign companies due to their alleged failure to pay the required fees and royalties. Major partners such as the World Bank, IMF, EU, and US, suspended aid or downgraded relations, causing foreign aid to drop by over 60 per cent between 2008 and 2010. The tourist sector, a major component of Madagascar’s economy, was severely hit. Hotels, tour operators, and related businesses experienced declines in revenue, triggering extensive layoffs from the hospitality industry and informal sectors that depended on tourism, deepening economic hardship and exacerbating poverty rates nationwide.

Following the ongoing coup, continued instability and protests are highly likely. Rajoelina has seen sporadic counterdemonstrations among supporters in Antananarivo, and these will likely be motivated to engage in pro-Rajoelina rallies in the capital. The military, which is currently attempting to restore order in the country, will highly likely respond to demonstrations with forceful crackdowns, which could trigger further unrest.

The broader protest movement, however, had Rajoelina’s resignation as one of its primary demands. There is a realistic possibility that the widespread Gen Z-led demonstrations will subside following the coup. CAPSAT’s apparent siding with protesters was almost certainly a calculated move to bring an end to the ongoing unrest. Furthermore, access to protest organiser Gen Z Madagascar’s Facebook page is currently restricted, something that could prevent widespread demonstrations from being organised.

However, the 2009 coup exacerbated economic difficulties, a spark for the current wave of unrest, and a further worsening of living conditions will likely increase the risk of unrest.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The anniversary of the 7 October attack will likely result in an increased risk of civil unrest and terrorism, particularly in Western Europe. This will highly likely be particularly severe in the countries that have had recent large-scale ‘Global Sumud Flotilla’ protests, particularly Italy, France, Spain, Germany and the UK, as protest organisers seek to maximise pressure on their governments and capitalise on the large attendance during the previous demonstrations.

Civil unrest is highly likely to consist of both large-scale demonstrations and small-scale targeted direct actions meant to affect local transport and services. The former are highly likely to target high-visibility areas like the vicinity of Israeli diplomatic offices, local government buildings, and the headquarters of companies perceived to be supporting the Israeli war effort.

A common tactic seen in previous protests is the blockade of main roadways, such as the ring roads that surround most large European cities. In terms of direct action, protesters may seek to carry out targeted acts of vandalism against private and public assets, and particularly company offices, or blockades of public transport hubs, such as train and metro stations and airports. While lower, the threat of more sophisticated acts aimed at causing disruptions, such as the targeting of electrical infrastructure or the use of drones to disrupt airport operations, cannot be ruled out.

The increased likelihood of terrorism on 7 October is driven by the date’s symbolic importance. In addition to the thwarted plot in Germany in early October 2025, there have been several foiled or successful terrorist attacks in Europe and North America, which have coincided with notable dates associated with Judaism or Israeli history. This most recently occurred with the 2 October Manchester synagogue stabbing attack on Yom Kippur, which killed two people and was perpetrated by a highly likely self-radicalised “lone wolf” inspired by extremist Islamist ideology.

While 7 October 2025 remains the most high-risk date for both civil unrest and terrorism, the threat is likely to remain elevated in the short term following the attack anniversary. Protests are highly likely to occur on the 10-13 October period, the first weekend following the anniversary and the second anniversary of the beginning of the Israeli invasion of Gaza. Moreover, ongoing significant developments in negotiations between Hamas and Israel are highly likely to serve as triggers for demonstrations.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The protests, Morocco’s largest in years, come amid widespread youth frustrations with unemployment, education, and healthcare. According to the national statistics agency, Morocco has an unemployment rate of 12.8 per cent, with youth unemployment standing at 35.8 per cent, and 19 per cent among graduates. The protests have targeted the government, which is perceived as neglecting public services while investing billions of dollars into football infrastructure ahead of hosting the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations and co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

The catalyst for the public anger was the deaths of eight pregnant women in the maternity ward of a public hospital in Agadir following caesarean operations in September, which had initially sparked smaller-scale protests. According to the World Health Organisation, Morocco has fewer than eight doctors per 10,000 people, far below the recommended 25.

The government’s appeal for dialogue is unlikely to appease protesters in the short term. The civil unrest likely constitutes a culmination of public anger after years of neglect in public services, a state of affairs unlikely to be quickly remedied. The government statement defended the security forces’ crackdown, praising the “balanced reaction of security authorities in line with relevant legal procedures”. This will highly likely further inflame the unrest, with the van ramming being widely shared across social media. The further deaths of protesters on 1 October will almost certainly add to protester anger, likely sustaining the civil unrest.

The Gen Z 212 movement, which emerged in the weeks prior, has rapidly gained traction across social media. The “212” almost certainly refers to Morocco’s country code, suggesting that organisers view themselves as part of a broader youth-driven movement. The demonstrations share key traits with other Gen Z-led protests in the region: mobilisation through online platforms, an explicitly leaderless structure, and a lack of formal ties to political parties.

These protests are highly likely inspired by similar youth movements, including the recent Nepalese unrest that overthrew the government, as well as ongoing mobilisation across Africa, notably in Kenya and, most recently, Madagascar. It is highly likely that the global surge in youth protests will lead to further civil unrest across many other African countries, where economic frustrations, such as unemployment and a rising cost of living, are similarly felt among the population, particularly Gen Z.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Madagascar is one of the world’s poorest countries. According to a 2022 report from the World Bank, 75.2 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. Poverty rates have remained high over the past decade, with rural poverty decreasing marginally while urban poverty has almost doubled. Many households suffer from overlapping deprivations in health, education, sanitation, and infrastructure.

​The poor economic situation is exacerbated by Madagascar’s high vulnerability to environmental risks, including cyclones and droughts. Damage from four tropical storms in 2022 was estimated to have cost as much as 5 per cent of Madagascar’s GDP.

The protests have been in line with other Gen Z-led protest movements in Africa. The movement gained momentum on social media, which was used to mobilise protests, coordinate meeting points, and share live updates.

Smaller demonstrations were also observed in provincial towns like Toamasina, Antsirabe, Toliara, and Antsiranana, likely reflecting wider discontent with the incumbent government.

The lack of political figures among the protesters highlights the grassroots nature of the movement. The use of Straw Hat Jolly Roger, which was widely used in the recent Nepalese protests which deposed the government, suggests a broader Gen Z-focused sentiment and the potential desire of a far more radical intent to likewise overthrow the government.

There is a realistic possibility that the government’s strict measures to curtail the protests will succeed. While protesters defied the protest ban on 25 September, the demonstrators were largely made up of relatively small groups. The authorities will likely impose internet and social media restrictions to stop protesters from being able to mobilise. This will also likely limit the circulation of footage of excessive force, which has the capacity to further fuel anti-government sentiment.

The government’s reaction to demonstrations, particularly security forces’ use of force, is highly likely to be perceived as excessive. If footage spreads across social media of security forces using live ammunition against protesters, this could significantly inflame demonstrations, despite a lack of leadership. The rhetoric of protest organisers indicates broader anti-government sentiment, which could escalate unrest motivated by more radical objectives.