Iran Retaliation Strikes Against US Bases in the Gulf

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The Iranian retaliation strikes against US military facilities across the region are a major escalation in comparison to Iranian retaliatory actions during the June 2025 12-Day War. The Iranian ballistic strikes against Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, Qatar, following US intervention in June 2025, were highly likely intended to be subthreshold for further escalation while maintaining deterrence. In contrast, these strikes were likely intended by Tehran to cause maximum damage against US military interests and fulfil the repeatedly stated threat that Iran would do such strikes in retaliation for US-Israeli strikes.

Early indications are that the interception rates have been very high, with the US having engaged in a significant buildup of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot anti-ballistic missile air defence systems over the past month. However, early reports indicate that air defences were penetrated by Iranian projectiles at the headquarters of US Navy’s 5th Fleet in Manama, Bahrain. This highlights that even with comprehensive air defence coverage, large-scale Iranian strikes are capable of saturating advanced air defence systems, leading to penetration.

Moreover, the use of ballistic missiles presents a significant risk of collateral impact, particularly from falling debris outside intended target areas, as highlighted by the death of one civilian in Abu Dhabi from debris. Emergency services are also likely to be operating at increased capacity, which may result in longer response times and reduced availability for non-critical incidents.

Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term and will highly likely prioritise the targeting of US military installations. However, there is a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, airspace closures, flight diversions, airport disruption, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region. Civilian infrastructure in proximity to military facilities is at risk of incidental targeting.

Over the coming days, Iran’s capability to conduct mass large-scale ballistic missile launches capable of penetrating advanced air defences could notably reduce. Iran’s ballistic missile Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) are almost certainly high-value targets for joint US-Israel operations, and their use reduces their concealability. However, airspace closures and disruptions are highly likely to be protracted, and shelter-in-place orders are highly likely to remain in place while Iranian retaliation strikes continue.

If the regime is threatened existentially, Tehran is likely to escalate even further. A currently less likely but most dangerous course of action for Tehran would be to fulfil previously issued threats to launch attacks at US economic interests in the region, particularly oil and gas infrastructure. Furthermore, the Iranian naval forces could attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint for the transportation of oil. Finally, Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Yemen could launch their own attacks against US military bases or economic interests in the Arabian Peninsula. Shia militias in Iraq have the capability to conduct attacks into Kuwait, and the Houthis in Yemen are capable of launching missile and long-range drone attacks across the peninsula, in addition to resuming attacks against merchant vessels.