Afghanistan–Pakistan Clashes Escalate

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The recent escalation comes after Pakistani strikes on alleged Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) camps and hideouts located in Nangarhar and Paktika provinces on 22 February. These strikes followed a series of high-profile terror attacks and increased militancy in Pakistan, particularly from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad has long accused the Afghan Taliban of sponsoring or failing to restrain.

The strikes also follow the 6 February mass casualty attack on a Shia Mosque in Islamabad, which was claimed by Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP), which largely derives from Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional branch of IS operating primarily in Afghanistan and parts of western Pakistan.

This escalation marks the first time that Pakistani forces have directly targeted Taliban installations in Kabul. Previous Pakistani strikes in Afghanistan have targeted militant camps and have generally been subthreshold to avoid all out conflict. This almost certainly marks the most significant escalation since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021.

Pakistan’s armed forces significantly outmatch Afghanistan’s, with roughly 660,000 personnel and extensive materiel, including at least 465 combat aircraft, around 6,000 armoured vehicles, and approximately 4,600 artillery systems. Afghanistan, on the other hand, has approximately 172,000 troops and no functioning air force excluding drones.

A prolonged conflict is highly likely undesirable to both sides. Pakistan has multiple ongoing insurgencies, and a conflict would significantly increase the probability of exacerbating the militant threat, with the TTP highly likely to increase its attack volume against security personnel and civilians in Pakistan in the short-to-medium term. Furthermore, sustained clashes risk significantly disrupting Pakistan’s economy, increasing pressure on an already unpopular government.

For Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military advantage means it can almost certainly impose disproportionate physical and political costs on Afghanistan, including targeting Taliban officials and important military sites. Furthermore, a conflict would almost certainly undermine the Taliban’s attempts to improve external relations and reduce its isolation on the international stage, which has been a primary goal of the Kabul-based Taliban faction.

The Taliban potentially being open to talks almost certainly provides an offramp to Pakistan to de-escalate. However, both governments are likely to face significant internal pressure from their civilian populations to not be perceived as backing down, which risk further escalating the conflict. There is a large degree of disinformation from both countries’ media outlets, as well as on social media, which is highly likely to exacerbate nationalist sentiment. Should the governments be perceived as backing down, protests in major population centres are likely.

If clashes continue to escalate, the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments are highly likely to further restrict border crossings and impose airspace restrictions. The risk of terror attacks in major Pakistani urban centres, including Islamabad, has highly likely further increased.